Shane Hensinger

Josef Korbel School of International Studies – University of Denver

Civil Wars and International Responses – Professor Tim Sisk

Negotiation and Peacebuilding Analysis – Cyprus

Introduction........................................................................................................................3
Negotiation..........................................................................................................................4
Bargaining Framework............................................................................................................4
Greek-Cypriot Bargaining Position........................................................................................6
Turkish-Cypriot Bargaining Position.....................................................................................7
Turkish, Greek and United States Negotiating Positions......................................................9
History of the Negotiating Process..................................................................................10
The Vienna Talks 1975 - 1977................................................................................................10
Factors Contributing to Failure of the Vienna Talks and Subsequent Rounds of
Negotiations.............................................................................................................................12
The Annan Plan................................................................................................................15
The European Union..............................................................................................................16
Turkish-Cypriots....................................................................................................................16
Turkey.....................................................................................................................................17
Greek-Cypriots.......................................................................................................................18
The Final Annan Plan (Annan V)..........................................................................................19
The Defeat of the Annan Plan.........................................................................................20
The Way Forward..................................................................................................................22
Peacebuilding in Cyprus........................................................................................................24
Sequencing the Institutions of the Annan Plan.....................................................................................24
Peacekeeping in Perpetuity? – Drawing Down UNFICYP..................................................................26
Conclusion........................................................................................................................26
Appendix...........................................................................................................................28
Works Cited ......................................................................................................................30

2
Introduction

In report I will present an analysis of the negotiating strategies of the

Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides in the Cyprus conflict since the

Turkish invasion of 1974. I will focus in particular on the negotiation

processes involved in the formulation the Annan plan in 2004 and how

both sides’ bargaining positions have evolved (or devolved) since

negotiations on reunification and a constitutional settlement began

after the Turkish invasion in 1974. I will be relying heavily on the

processes laid out by Timothy Sisk in “Bargaining with Bullets,”

focusing on the prenegotiation and negotiation processes between the

two sides and the theoretical concept of “ripeness” as applied to the

Cyprus situation after the invasion of Turkey in 1974 and preceding EU

accession in 2004, while looking to the applicability of the ripeness

concept to current negotiations preceding elections in the Turkish

Republic of Northern Cyprus in mid-April 20101.

Finally I will be analyzing the negotiation process for its applicability

and inducements towards the building of peace – in particular looking

1
Sisk’s work is strongly applicable in the sense that he outlines a powerful case for “Peacemaking with
Power” and negotiations leading to the building of effective and durable power-sharing institutions, both of
which resonate strongly in the case of Cyprus. Intertwined in Sisk’s recommendations is the issue of
bringing peace to warring parties, which is slightly less applicable to Cyprus due to the cessation of
intercommunal violence more than ¼ of a century ago. The major issues in Cyprus have morphed from
those centered around security in the traditional sense to those centered around the type of consociational
model and confidence buildings measures (CBMs) necessary to convince both communities to accept a
final agreement.

3
at the institutions imagined in the Annan plan. I will offer specific policy

recommendations towards the goal of peacebuilding in Cyprus based

on the models offered by the Annan plan. In particular I will focus on

Sisk’s idea of “sequencing”, but from a constitutional perspective, the

various institutions of the Annan plan to different parts of the island,

both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, which were more supportive of

the Annan plan in the referendum of 2004 in an attempt to

demonstrate the potential effectiveness and unity-enhancing role

these institutions might play.

Negotiation

Bargaining Framework

The framework within which negotiations between the two sides in

Cyprus have been conducted has been set by UN, in particular by a

number of UN Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly

resolutions. The Secretary-General of the UN has been assigned by the

Security Council as a “monitor” of the talks under UNSC Resolution

353. UNSC Resolutions 359, 360, 364, 365 and 367 further established

and then strengthened the Secretary-General’s role and that of the UN

in the conflict.

4
General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) in November 1974 “officially

endorsed the preliminary intercommunal talks as the main negotiating

model for resolving the Cyprus problem” as well as affirming a number

of key points (Michael 46).2 As General Assembly resolutions are

declarations without force of international law the UNSC passed

Resolution 367 affirming the General Assembly resolution which

“established intercommunal talks as the sole legitimate negotiating

process and confirmed the Secretary-General as convener and

facilitator of this process” (Michael 47).3

The bargaining framework put in place by the UN guaranteed the

primacy of the organization and the Secretary-General in negotiations

and locked-in the role of intercommunal talks as the sole bargaining

framework which would be utilized going forward. By recognizing the

territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, mandating that all

refugees be allowed to return to their homes and urging the

withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus the UN also endorsed a

number of elements in the Greek-Cypriot bargaining position, which

2
GA Resolution 3212, in part : 1. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions
directed against it; 2. Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military
presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its
affairs; 5. . Considers that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties
concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end;

3
UNSC Resolution 367: “Requests the Secretary General accordingly to undertake a new mission of good
offices and to that end to convene the two parties under new agreed procedures and to place himself
personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive
negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal
auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated (United Nations).

5
had the effect of ensuring that the Turkish-Cypriot side would always

be operating from a “legitimacy deficit” in the eyes of the international

community and would contribute to a perception of the balance of

power between the two sides.

Greek-Cypriot Bargaining Position

The bargaining position of the two parties directly involved in the

Cyprus conflict, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides, was each

informed by the events of 1974, when Turkey invaded the island in

response to a coup engineered by the junta in Greece. Following this

series of events the Greek-Cypriot government, in conjunction with

Greece, laid out its positions, which came to be known as “the Athens

doctrine” (Michael 39). The doctrine is as follows:

1. The government of the Republic of Cyprus as the sole, legal

government of Cyprus
2. Support for a multiregional, bicommunal federation
3. The area comprising Turkish Cyprus should be equivalent to their
share of the population or in any case not exceed 25% of the
population
4. The right of return of all refugees to their homes and property
before the Turkish invasion.
5. The right of property and freedom of movement of the
population.
6. The removal of all foreign troops from Cyprus

The issue of international recognition of the government of the

Republic of Cyprus is extremely important from an analytical

6
framework in looking at the balance of power in the conflict. The

Republic of Cyprus’ recognition by the international community as well

as its membership in multilateral institutions like the United Nations

and (eventually) the European Union has resulted in an asymmetrical

balance of power between the two sides (Schiff 390). Looking at the

issue while applying Timothy Sisk’s perspective on “fluctuating

stalemate” illustrates the fact of the Republic of Cyprus’s international

legitimacy, endorsement of three of its bargaining position and its

membership in international organizations has resulted in a situation

where the Republic of Cyprus is always ascendant against the Turkish-

Cypriot side. This has resulted in a “polarizing condition, perpetuating

conflict and not leading to avenues for resolution.” (Sisk 43).

Turkish-Cypriot Bargaining Position

In sharp contrast to the position of the Greek-Cypriot side the Turkish-

Cypriots regarded the Turkish invasion in 1974 as legal under Turkey’s

guarantor powers. Their negotiation conditions reflected this reality

and also their belief that the Republic of Cyprus as established under

the 1960 constitution was no longer valid. The position of the Turkish-

Cypriot side was in large part an attempt to lock in their gains since

1974 and consisted of the following:

1. The maintenance of the ethnic homogeneity of northern Cyprus.

2. The continuation of the Turkish military presence in northern
Cyprus and the role of Turkey as a military guarantor.

7
 3. The support for a bicommunal and biregional state.
4. The rejection of a unified or multiregional state as proposed by
the Greek-Cypriot side.

As mentioned in the sections on the negotiating framework and the

Greek-Cypriot position the Turkish bargaining position was affected by

a lack of international legitimacy. The Turkish Cypriots operated under

a strict international embargo which impacted every area of life in

Turkish Cyprus including the ability to travel abroad, to participate in

international sports competitions, receive international loans and many

other restrictions. None of the Turkish-Cypriot bargaining positions

were legitimized by the international community and it received no

international backing other than that of the Turkish government.

During most of the negotiation phrase leading up to the Annan plan

the Turkish-Cypriot side was punished with a number of coercive

measures and offered almost no non-coercive ones, a balance of which

is necessary “to induce the parties to accept the settlement plan (Sisk

39).

This isolation would negatively affect the psyche of the Turkish-Cypriot

side, causing an imbalance in the perception of the symmetry of power

between the two sides, and would contribute to a position of defiance

on the part of the Turkish-Cypriots which was indirectly responsible for

the declaration of independence of the TRNC in 1983.4 Additionally

4
I am not endorsing the declaration of independence on the part of the TRNC but I am stating that their
isolation and the lack of incentives extended to the Turkish Cypriots caused a hardening of their negotiating
position which led to the independence declaration.

8
“the Greek Cypriot economic and political embargo, aimed at

preventing recognition of the Turkish Cypriot ‘state,’ only compounded

the ideology of separateness,” which did not bode well for

peacebuilding efforts during the negotiation process (Michael 42).

Turkish, Greek and United States Negotiating

Positions

The Turkish and Greek states, as guarantor powers under the 1960

Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, also had a place at the

negotiating table where their positions adhered closely to those of

their ethnic kin in Cyprus.

Greece followed the slogan “Cyprus Decides and Greece Follows” while

Turkey adopted a paternalistic approach towards the Turkish Cypriot

state. The Turkish Republic was heavily involved in the governance

and subsidization of the Turkish-Cypriot state from the point of its

invasion in 1974 onward.

The US has been characterized as “the most important non-primary

player in the dispute (Michael 65).US strategy in the conflict was

primarily concerned with keeping Cyprus out of the Soviet orbit and

maintaining peace between NATO allies Greece and Turkey. US policy

has also been influenced by the role of the politically important Greek-

9
American political lobby in the United States. The US, since the failure

of the Nimetz proposals in 1978, has tended to play a background role

to that of the UNSG.

History of the Negotiating Process

The Cyprus conflict has experienced a lengthy negotiation process

composed of multiparty mediation held under the auspices of the

United Nations Secretary General (UNSG). These efforts have included

representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides and at times

the guarantor powers of Turkey & Greece as well as secondary powers

like the United States. In this section I will focus on the major

negotiating efforts in Cyprus including the talks mediated by UNSG

Kurt Waldheim which resulted in high level agreements and then focus

on the only agreement to have ever been submitted to both sides in

the conflict for ratification – the Annan agreement.

The Vienna Talks 1975 - 1977

The “Vienna Talks” held between the two sides under the auspices of

the UNSG and the bargaining framework laid out by UNSC Resolution

367 comprised several rounds of negotiations from 1975 – 1977 and

collapsed upon the death of Cypriot President Markarios, after which

new negotiations took place under different monikers.

10
The Vienna talks were plagued by a lack of convergent interests and

expectations on all sides. One side would come to the table with a

proposal on governance and the other would respond with proposals

on territoriality. The UN was hampered by the distrust of the Turkish-

Cypriot side, which was angered at numerous UN resolutions affirming

its opponent’s negotiating points and thus couldn’t act as a “powerful

peacemaker.” The Greek-Cypriot side had successfully

internationalized the issue and knew it was in an ascendant position

vis-à-vis the Turkish side.

While several “High Level agreements” were negotiated over the years

of negotiation they all suffered from ambiguity on terms, in particular

the use of “bicommunal” as a reference point. There was a point of

agreement in 1978 on the issue which was seen as a major concession

by the Greek side when it acknowledged that there would be separate

control by each community of different parts of the island. This

concession could be interpreted as a “ripe” moment.

A ripe moment, as discussed by Sisk, usually occurs during the process

of prenegotiation and is “a high-risk strategy, as the opposing party

may seize upon a sign of conciliation as weakness and, rather than

responding with a reciprocal act of conciliation, may “defect” or

escalate in order to take advantage of the perception of weakness”

11
(Sisk 46). There was no further concession on the part of the Turkish-

Cypriot side which was symbolic of the lack of a convergence of

interests between the two sides that plagued the negotiations during

all of their iterations.

Factors Contributing to Failure of the Vienna Talks

and Subsequent Rounds of Negotiations

From an analytical framework on negotiation the following appear as

the lead causes of the failure of the Vienna Talks and the subsequent

rounds of negotiations leading to the Annan plan. These factors are not

listed in any particular order.

1. Asymmetrical balance of power between the two sides leading to

a fluctuating stalemate.
2. Lack of credible third-party guarantees.
3. Lack of “ripe moment” (convergent expectations) leading to
meaningful concessions from both sides.
4. Failure to employ “peacemaking with power” on behalf of the
mediator.

The perception of security from each side’s perspective was radically

different. Each party also saw its “sphere of power” differently and

resented the power of the other, but as time would move on each

party’s “sphere” would grow or shrink proportionally to the other and

actions such as UN resolutions buttressing the Greek-Cypriot side

(which was a deliberate and strategically important attempt by the

Republic of Cyprus to “internationalize” the situation) further added to

each side’s perception of the balance of power in the situation (Michael

12
75). As illustrated in the section on the Greek-Cypriot bargaining

position this situation has resulted in an asymmetrical balance of

power which led to a fluctuating stalemate and deadlock in

negotiations.

Throughout the history of the Vienna talks and through subsequent

rounds of negotiations another critical element was missing – the lack

of third-party guarantees necessary to assist both sides in bridging the

security dilemma which existed between them. “Credible

enforcement” is a necessary component of a functional peace

agreement and in the case of Cyprus neither party was prepared to

accept the guarantees the UN offered as “credible.” No additional

third-party with the necessary standing amongst the two sides then

stepped forward, leaving this critical element unfulfilled.

Talks between the two sides were also hampered by the lack of a

“mediator with power,” as Sisk calls it. The United Nations did not have

the ability to offer a package of non-coercive and coercive

inducements to both sides. Because the UN was operating under

specific UNSC resolutions which had recognized a number of the

bargaining positions of the Greek-Cypriots its ability to act as a

“powerful peacemaker… with the [ability] to exercise strategic

strength in leveraging the parties into peace” was limited by the self-

13
imposed conditions under which it operated (Sisk 156). As talks were

mandated to be conducted under the auspices of the UN, a body which

repeatedly passed resolutions the Turkish-Cypriot side felt were in

opposition to their negotiating position, this created a situation where

the Turkish-Cypriot side would increasingly come to view the UN as a

not a partial mediator but one biased in favor of the Greek-Cypriots.

Whether this is true or not is unimportant, for what matters most in the

negotiating process are the perceptions of both sides.

All of the factors discussed in this section are critical to the success of

any peacemaking effort. The appearance of any one of them is

troubling; the appearance of four would make it extremely difficult to

achieve meaningful progress in negotiations and are directly

responsible for the failure of the Vienna talks. Because none of them

were successfully ameliorated they have also played a role in the

failure of subsequent negotiations up to the Annan plan.

Fact Point 1

In 1983, in response to a UNGA assembly which demanded the withdrawal of

all Turkish troops from the island, the return of refugees to their homes and
which called on all states to assist the government of the Republic of Cyprus
to exercise “its full and effective control over the entire territory of Cyprus,”
the Turkish-Cypriots declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). No country other than Turkey recognized the TRNC
and today Turkey remains the only country to have done so.

14
The Annan Plan
The Annan Plan as submitted to the voters of Cyprus in April of 2004

was a product of prenegotiation and negotiation from 2002 – 2004, but

its creation through negotiation was a product of the convergence of a

number of different interests of primary and on-primary actors to the

Cyprus situation. The plan can be considered the product of a “ripe

moment” which was catalyzed by the decision of UNSG Kofi Annan to

approach negotiations from a different perspective and attempt to

ameliorate the factors discussed earlier which had led to the failure of

other negotiation rounds in the past. Specifically Annan would attempt

a four-pronged linkage approach to the new round of negotiations

(Michael 169).

1. Annan intended to “utilize the membership applications of both

Cyprus and Turkey [to the EU] as a catalyst” for
settlement/membership.
2. “Enlist the active support of the main external parties to the
issue – the United States and Britain.”
3. “Lock in the support of the motherlands – Greece and Turkey.”
4. “Use these pathways to alter the entrenched positions of the two
communities.”

Another significant factor in the negotiations was the ability of the

UNSG to unilaterally impose conditions in any of the areas of the

eventual agreement in the event of the two sides to find a path

forward. This was unique in that it prevented either party from acting

as the role of “spoiler.”

15
The European Union

The European Union (EU) began membership negotiations with the

Republic of Cyprus in 1990. This fact was viewed negatively by the

Turkish-Cypriot leadership led by longtime President Rauf Denktash,

because it once again reinforced their perception of asymmetry in

balance of power and the always ascendant status of the Greek-Cypriot

side in international legitimacy.

The decision of the European Union in 2002 to drop conditionally as a

requirement for Cypriot membership “allowed the Republic of Cyprus

to feel free of significant constraints and act upon its own interests in

the negotiations” (Schiff 406). “The EU created a sense of crisis of

impending sanctions that were directed at a single party – Turkey and

the Turkish-Cypriots – while Greek Cypriots were under strictly verbal

pressure that was unaccompanied by any explicit theme” (Schiff 406).

The EU lacked any meaningful ability to act as a “peacemaker with

power” and was largely relegated to the sidelines of the negotiations

Turkish-Cypriots

The position of the Turkish-Cypriots had changed from the earlier

rounds of negotiations (Vienna) due to a convergence of a number of

factors within and outside the TRNC.

16
 1. Change in internal political dynamics/Mass & elite support for
peace - Rauf Denktash’s political position was threatened due to
rising economic and political discord within the TRNC. The
decades of international isolation imposed on the TRNC had led
to a decline in living standards amongst the Turkish-Cypriot
population caused inflation and a high emigration rate and there
was growing resentment to the influx of settlers from Anatolia
and the continuing meddling in the affairs of the TRNC by the
Turkish state (see table below).
2. The “win-set” of the TRNC changed between the rounds of
negotiations after the Turkish invasion to the beginning of the
negotiations on the Annan plan because “the prospect of
imminent EU citizenship seemed to represent a better prospect
for their future than continuing on with the existing state of
affairs” (Schiff 396).
3. Support of Elites - Parliamentary elections in Dec, 2003 brought
to power in the TRNC the opposition bloc, led by Mehmet Ali
Talat. The new government declared it would “work to achieve a
unification agreement, which would ultimately be decided in a
referendum (Schiff 397).
4. Changing attitude of external ally/actor (Turkey) – the
guarantors, protectors and subsidizers of the TRNC, had changed
with the advent of the AKP government (discussed below)

The Turkish-Cypriot side appeared motivated by the fact an agreement

held “greater benefits… than they would achieve by abrogating

negotiations” and returning to the status quo (Sisk 55).

Per capita income in the north and south of Cyprus, 2004 (US$1,000s) 2
Nominal World Bank PPP Corrected
Atlas
North 8.1 7.2 14.8
South 19.4 17.6 22.3
Ratio 42 41 66
(north/south as
a percentage)
Source: World Bank (2006)

Turkey

17
Turkey’s desire to see a settlement achieved in Cyprus was motivated

by its own desires to join the European Union and by the fact that the

new AKP government, elected in November 2002, saw its own political

fortunes as linked to European Union membership, which it knew was

highly unlikely in the event a divided Cyprus was admitted to the EU

with Turkish troops considered as occupiers in the north.

During negotiation over the Annan plan – through all of its iterations,

Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan “made it quite clear he would not be

tolerating a rejectionist policy on the part of Denktash (Asmussen 7).

Denktash was now boxed in – were he to choose to defy Turkey he

would have to resign in which case Mehmet Ali Talat would take over

as President.

Greek-Cypriots

Contrasting starkly to the changes in the position of the TRNC and

Turkey the Greek-Cypriot side felt its position was assured by its

guaranteed admission to the European Union regardless of whether a

unification agreement was reached or not. Despite knowing its

membership was a fait accompli the Greek-Cypriot side came under

“considerable pressure from the US, UN, the EU and Greece” to reach a

settlement before May 1st (Schiff 399).

18
There also did not exist within the Republic of Cyprus the same

groundswell of either mass or grassroots support for negotiations and

settlement which existed in the TRNC – which can be attributed to the

fact that the populace of the Republic of Cyprus had seen itself as

ascendant for a number of years and their assured admission to the

European Union was the ultimate guarantee of that ascendancy. The

Greek-Cypriot side felt “it could not be worse off than in the case of an

agreement which failed to protect its interests” (Schiff 401).

The bargaining position of the Greek-Cypriot side was not motivated by

the same combination of external and internal factors that have been

shown to be present in the TRNC and Turkey. There existed no

convergence of interests within the Republic of Cyprus on negotiation

and for settlement.

The Final Annan Plan (Annan V)

The Final Annan plan was a complex and lengthy document with five

appendices and nine annexes covering matters ranging from federal

government, constitutional law and federal laws, property rights,

reconciliation commissions and the “coming into being” of a new state

of affairs. For the sake of expediency the focus here will be on the

19
constitutional arrangements of the document under the envisioned

“United Cyprus Republic” (UCR).

The Annan plan was a model of consociational power sharing. It

allowed a minority veto on “matters of importance to the group,”

defined proportionality as the basis for governance and allowed for

substantial group autonomy (Sisk 57). It defined structures and

institutions which would allow for the sequenced return of refugees,

guaranteeing that for 19 years the ethnic balance of power in the

different sections of Cyprus would not be impacted. It ensured

adequate compensation for those who lost land and/or housing and

also ensured that the process would not result in expulsions of either

side from dwellings they occupied currently (Annan Plan for Cyprus).

The Defeat of the Annan Plan

There was no implementation of the Annan plan because it was

defeated in a referendum in April 2004. It was approved by a majority

of 64.9% on the Turkish Cypriot side but was defeated resoundingly on

the Greek Cypriot side by a majority of 75.8%.

The plan suffered from a number of defects in the eyes of both sides

but was supported on the Turkish side by a majority of the political

20
establishment and by the consensus of Turkish Cypriots that the plan

represented the best deal they were going to get.

The Greek Cypriot side had a different perspective and different

realities. A majority of the political establishment (the elites) of the

Republic of Cyprus, led by Papadopulous, urged a “No” vote. This

judgment was based on the perception amongst the Greek Cypriot

population that they had already given up enough (they had, after all,

lost over 1/3 of their island to Turkish military occupation for almost 20

years at the time of the vote) and that the agreement in no way

represented their ascendant position as a member of the European

Union. This attitude can be encapsulated by Papdopoulos’ statement

that he “did not receive a State… to deliver a ‘Community’” (Michael

180).

A “ripe moment” requires a convergence of expectations “by all sides”

to be successful (Sisk 46). The entry of Cyprus to the EU, the change in

the political scene of the TRNC and outside pressure were all seen as a

prime motivating factor for all sides which would induce the “ripe

moment” necessary to bring the conflict to a conclusion. Sadly this did

not take into account the fact that for the Greek Cypriot side there did

not exist that “convergence of expectations.” There was certainly a

convergence of expectation of every other side – from Turkey, from the

21
EU, from the Turkish Cypriots, Greece, the UN and the United States.

But the Greek Cypriot side, due to its advantaged bargaining position

and guaranteed entry to the EU, never had that moment of

convergence critical to creating an inducement to settlement.

In addition the guarantee by the European Union of accession

regardless of whether peace was reached on the island or not robbed

the EU of the ability to induce a mutually-hurting stalemate. When the

European Union dropped conditionality as a condition for Cypriot

accession it should have “undertaken the process of socializing the

Cypriot political elite to realize the post-nation character of the Union”

(Kaymak and Vural 88). In this the EU failed entirely, with most of its

initial focus on convincing the Turkish-Cypriot side to pass the plan.

Fact Point 2

Primary reasons for failure of Annan plan in Referendum

 Lack of elite support which translated into lack of mass support
within the Republic of Cyprus.
 Lack of convergence of interests within the Republic of Cyprus.
 Failure to use cooperate-reward, defect-punishment approach on
the part of the UN or EU in reference to the Republic of Cyprus.

The Way Forward

Peacemaking efforts continue in Cyprus today and are motivated by

the fact that a pro-compromise Greek President, Demetris Christofias,

was elected in 2008. With the ascendance of Mehmet Ali Talat to the

22
presidency of the TRNC in 2005 there could be a convergence of

expectations on both sides that was lacking during the negotiation

process leading up to the defeat of the Annan plan in 2004. In

particular the issue of a lack of support from the elite and masses in

The Republic of Cyprus may be impacted by the fact that the head of

their state is in support of peacemaking efforts.

Without an agreement soon, before new presidential election in the

TRNC in April 2010, the prospects for peace look grim in Cyprus. The

political situation in the TRNC doesn’t look positive for the re-election

of pro-Annan agreement president Talat. There exists today a

dangerous situation on Cyprus where both sides have become

increasingly accepting of partition – what can be referred to as the

“Taiwanization” of Cyprus. Especially alarming is the fact that it is “the

youngest segments of both communities that would vote “no” in the

largest numbers in any referendum on the UN-mediated settlement

plan: (ICG 7). The failure of the global community to live up to its

promises in regards to the TRNC – the promise of aid and additional

recognition if they passed the Annan plan, has been blocked in many

cases by the intransigence of the Republic of Cyprus. This has led to a

lessening of support from within both the elites and larger public in the

TRNC and jeopardized the future passage of any peace plan in the

north of the island.

23
Peacebuilding in Cyprus
Sequencing the Institutions of the Annan Plan

Varosha

Greek-Cypriot
Famagusta

In the wake of the failure of the Annan plan there exists a chance to

work towards peacebuilding efforts in the hopes of creating institutions

spanning both sides of the island. The Annan plan was far more heavily

supported in the enclaved Famagusta area of the Republic of Cyprus

than in any other district (see map above). This seems to be because

“individuals in this district would have been strongly and directly

affected by the Annan Plan, given that within three months they would

24
have regained the capital city of their district, and the whole region

would have been upgraded economically, socially and culturally”

(Lordos 24).

Negotiators could look to the results of the 2004 referendum on a

district by district basis and seek to apply a set of the institutions on a

local level in the Famagusta district as well as an equally-populated,

adjacent portion of the TRNC which had supported the agreement as

well. This experiment could act as a “test tube” to implement, under

strict observation by both parties, certain portions of the agreement,

such as a jointly-elected district/city government and the return of

Varosha, or part of Varosha to the control of those who fled the area in

1974, which could then operate under joint-administration as a

condition of its return. These CBMs could demonstrate (hopefully) the

effectiveness and relevance to daily life of the Annan plan and

contribute to acceptance of the plan on both sides.

The residents of the Famagusta district saw tangible benefits from the

passage of the Annan plan and accordingly they supported it in larger

numbers than anywhere else. This same situation applied in the TRNC

as well. The key then is to convince the rest of the elites and the

masses of the Greek Cypriot side of the tangible benefits from a new

25
peace agreement. Only by doing so will any new agreement receive

approval on both sides of the divided island.

Peacekeeping in Perpetuity? – Drawing Down UNFICYP

The United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus has been in place

since 1964 and tasked with the maintenance of its current functions

since 1974. It currently consists of 1,052 personnel of which 941 are

peacekeeping troops. It is routinely reauthorized every six months by

the UNSC and currently is budgeted for $54.41 million on a yearly basis

– of that amount 1/3 is paid by Cyprus and $6 million by Greece

(UNFICYP).

There exists on Cyprus today a situation which no longer requires a UN peacekeeping

force at the level UNFICYP maintains. The presence of the troops is no longer required

to maintain peace but are acting to enforce the situation of partition on the island which

risks becoming permanent the longer the Greek-Cypriot public feels it is not in its interest

to approve a solution to the Cyprus problem. The force can be reduced in a gradual

manner in order to not upset the security situation but which may act as a catalyst in

inducing a ripe moment in negotiations.

Conclusion
If Cyprus at one point “lay at a crossroads,” those crossroads would

have been reached in 2004 when the Annan plan laid out a future of

26
federalism and unification or a future of partition. Cyprus today has

moved from the crossroads of a choice of unification under a federalist

approach to a growing acceptance of partition and separate status for

both sides of the island – with the Greek Cypriots enjoying the fruits of

international recognition and EU membership while the Turkish side

continues to struggle under an internationally-recognized travel and

trade embargo.

Current peace talks benefit from the fact that both sides now are

represented by elites who support negotiation. This could translate into

greater appeal to the larger portion of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots,

in particular the Greek-Cypriot side – which saw a combination of elite

and mass opposition to the agreement in the last referendum. This

may be the last chance for peace for many years to come and it

requires an intense dedication on both parts to sell the idea of peace

and not partition, with real and tangible benefits, to both sides of the

island.

27
Appendix
1. Chronology of Key Events

1960 – Cyprus gains independence from Britain.

1963 – Outbreak of violence between the two communities.
1974 – De facto division of the island into two seats.
1977, 1979 – Signing of the “High Level Agreements.”
1983 – Declaration of the establishment of the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by Rauf Denktash.
1998 – The Republic of Cyprus begins negotiations for accession
into the UN.
1999 – Helsinki Summit: the EU decided that the resolution of the
Cyprus conflict is not a preliminary condition for Cyprus’ entry into
the EU in May 2004.
November 2002 – Publication of the first version of the Annan plan.
March 2003 – Hague Summit – failure of the parties discussions of
the Annan Plan. Annan announces termination of his efforts.
December 2003 – Papadopoulos sends a letter to the UN Secretary
General requesting him to propose a new initiative.
Late January – Early February 2004 – Turkish PM, Erdogan,
meets with the UN Secretary General and US President Bush, and
expresses Turkey’s willingness to respond positively to the Annan
initiative.
February 4, 2004 – Kofi Annan sends a letter to the leaders of
both Cypriot communities, inviting them to New York to discuss a
timetable for the resolution of the conflict.
February 10–13, 2004 – The leaders meet in New York
February 13, 2004 – The leaders agree to officially renew
negotiations
February 19-March 31, 2004 – The parties hold two rounds of
talks in Nicosia and Birkenstock, Switzerland but fail to reach any
new agreement. Annan uses his authority as an arbitrator and
submits the proposal for referendum.
April 24, 2004 – Greek Cypriots reject the Annan Plan with a 75.8%
majority while a majority (64.9%) of the Turkish Cypriots approve
the Plan.
May 1, 2004 – Cyprus, represented by the government of the
Republic of Cyprus, joins the European Union.
2006 – Talks restart between chief negotiators for late Greek
Cypriot president Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot president
Mehmet Ali Talat.

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December 2006 – European Council suspends eight of the
chapters Turkey was negotiating for possible accession to the UN
under pressure from Cypriot government
February 2008 – New Greek Cypriot president, Demetris
Christofias, elected who is not associated with ethnic nationalism or
the “No” campaign on the Annan referendum.
March 2008 – Christofias and Talat meet and agree to new round
of UN talks.
April 2008 – New crossing point in Nicosia opened.
May 2008 – Parameters agreed upon by two presidents –
federation of two “constituent states” and “a single international
personality.”
July 2008 – Agreement reached on “single sovereignty and
citizenship – a total of 22 technical agreements signed.
September 2008 – Negotiations continue

Source: Amira Schiff and the International Crisis Group

29
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31