Study Guide

- Committee Directors
Shabbar Virani
Asna Rizvi
Mohsin Masood Khan

- Assistant Committee Directors

Shumaila Amjad
Iqra Jalal Akbar

Missile Defense System

Introduction To The Topic
On August 6th and 9th of 1945, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively. This culminating event of devastating military
aggression in the Pacific Theater of the Second World War directly consumed approximately
214,000 mainly civilians lives, becoming arguably the single most important military
development of the 20th century, a blast which echoed through international affairs throughout
the century. When the United States debuted the destructive power of atomic weaponry in the
middle of the last century, it forever changed the balance of military power on the world stage, as
it had acquired, with many nations soon following, a virtually invulnerable means of obliteration
without discretion, and introduced an unparalleled degree of irresponsibility into warfare. The
most destructive weapon in history was also one that lacked the measure of control associated
with conventional armaments because it functioned with deadly indiscrimination within the blast
radius, thus rendering the distinction between military and civilian targets that existed before the
introduction of nuclear warfare ineffectual to their function.
The beginning of the Nuclear Age following the Second World War also marked the
Beginning of the Cold War arms race between the US and the USSR, as both these two major
superpowers and their allies sought to develop increasingly sophisticated weapons technology,
particularly more powerful nuclear arsenals and delivery systems. As these the opposing sides of
the Cold War continued to improve their offensive capabilities, states not directly involved in the
conflict, such as South Africa, Israel, Brazil, and others began to pursue their own weapons
programs. The acquisition of atomic weapons quickly set a geopolitical precedent in which states
could secure international relevance and best protect their interests through the possession of
nuclear armaments. However, as these sorts of weapons became more common,
it became naturally evident that states with effective defense systems again nuclear strike would
command a strategic advantage over those employing exclusively offensive means.
Although the since the end of the Cold War, an arms race currently exists between major nuclear
powers, more states possess atomic weapons today than at the end of the US-USSR rivalry in the
late 20th century. International agreements such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
have been relatively successful in controlling the development on nuclear technology for military
purposes around the world and encouraging decreases in the stockpiles of such armaments, yet
states such as the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran have,
allegedly, continued to pursue their weapons programs. Thus, although the threat to international
peace and security present by nuclear weapons has changed, they continue to maintain a relevant
role in international affairs as a major component of state defense policies.
Nuclear Weapons: A History. New Internationalist International. New Internationalist.
June 2008.Web. 27 Jan 2014.

Background Information
Missile defense systems have undergone massive changes since the early days. As the first
missiles were used in warfare, anti-aircraft gunnery was still able to gun it down quite
effectively, as the Brits did against the V-1s of Germany. However already with the development
of the V-2, this proved ineffective as they moved too fast. The Nuclear missiles dropped in Japan
were dropped by bomber aircraft, making them easier to intercept (though preferably long before
the aircraft is above your own territory), but with the invention of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) in the late 50s, atomic payloads could be dropped from afar, and outside of
the effective range of interceptor aircraft. Initially measures against these missiles too were
developed, though the costof Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs) were almost as high as the
offensive missiles themselves, making it rather cost-inefficient. This ultimately again was
superseded by Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) that had one single
missile delivering multiple nuclear warheads, splitting off only at the descent phase of the flight,
making it nigh impossible to take them all out.
The ABM development was further halted when the US and the USSR signed the ABM treaty of
1972, which limited the amount of sites at which it could base a defensive ABM system to two:
one for the capital, and another one for protecting ICBM silos. As neither side developed more
than one, this was limited to this in 1974.This treaty only limited defense against strategic
missiles, but was unclear on what this meant. ICBMs and Submachine Launched Ballistic
Missiles (SLBMs) were considered to fall under this, but both side actively continued to develop
counter-tactical ABM, which ended up also being able to take down SLBMs due to their slow
speed. This treaty lasteduntil 2002, when the US unilaterally announced its withdrawal.
In between, many plans for other Missile Defense Systems were proposed, including the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars by Reagan during his presidency and other
satellite based initiatives. However, no effective one has been developed until recently, where
effective ABM systems have been researched and placed in Israel (the Iron Dome), the United
States, Russia, France, and India. Though only a few of these systems were tested in actual
conditions, instead of merely against simulated launches, and none of them against actual
ICBMs.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THELIMITATION OF
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. 1972. Web. Retrieved from:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abm2.htm (Accessed: 10 Dec
2013).

Scope Of The Topic

The debate will mainly focus on the question of legality of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,
Their potential to cause another arms race, and whether or not to designate their use as
potentially offensive. Further areas that may be expounded upon, but will not be the focus of this
guide, are: the threats they pose to those states who cannot afford these systems themselves;
potential destabilization caused in the Middle-East by Israel adopting one; the differentiation
between strategic and tactical defense systems.

CHINA
China tested the FJ ABM in the Cold War but they were ultimately cancelled. The PLA has
currently developed the KT series of anti-ballistic missiles and also have adopted limited antiballistic capabilities on the HQ-9, KS series, and HQ-16.
China successfully tested its exoatmospheric interception capability in a test in 2010 and also in
a test in 2013, being the second of two countries able to do so.
Four versions of the S-300 are in service the PMU, PMU1 and PMU2 and the navalised S300FM Rif. Based on the S-300PMU1, the Rif equips the PLANs two Type 51C Luzhou airdefense destroyers enabling them to contribute to the protection of a coastal site against SRBM
attack.
The S-300PMU2 has the best chance of intercepting an SRBM missile as it employs
the 48N6E2 missile which has a warhead optimised for destroying ballistic missiles, and better
kinematics compared to earlier 48N6 missiles
HQ-9 may have some ABM capability.
However, it might be noted that on 11 January 2007 the Chinese successfully performed an antisatellite missile testusing a KT-1missile with a Kinetic Kill Vehiclemounted.
New missiles, the HQ-19, HQ-26, and HQ-29, are being built

France, UK and Italy

Italy and France have developed a missile family called Aster (Aster 15 and Aster 30). Aster 30
is capable of ballistic missile defense. On 18 October 2010, France announced a successful
tactical ABM test of the Aster 30 missileand on 1 December 2011 a successful interception of a
Black Sparrow ballistic target missile.Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers and French
Navy and Italian Navy Horizon -class frigates are armed with PAAMS, using Aster 15 and 30
missiles.
Also, France is developing another version, Aster 30 block II which can destroy ballistic missiles
with a maximum range of 3000 km. It will have a Kill Vehicle warhead.
Superficie-Aria Media PortataTerrestre (Italian for Ground-based Surface-to-Air Medium
Range, SAMP/T) using batteries of Aster 30 missiles. France has demonstrated the feasibility of
destroying medium range ballistic missile.
Aster 15 and 30 missiles differ only in the size of their booster - total weights being 310 kg and
450 kg respectively. Aster 30 requires the longer tubes of the SYLVER A50 launcher, but its
range is extended from 30 kilometers (19 mi) to 120 kilometers (75 mi). Aster 30 is also capable
of ballistic missile defense. The first stage booster of the missile is entirely designed and
manufactured by Avio of Italy.

INDIA
India's air defense network has two principal components - the Air Defense Ground
Environment System (ADGES) and the Base Air Defense Zones (BADZ). The ADGES
network provides for wide area radar coverage and permits the detection and interception of most
aerial incursions into Indian airspace. The BADZ system is far more concentrated
with radars, interceptors, SAMs and AAA units working in conjunction to provide an intense and
highly effective defensive barrier to attacks on vital targets.

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

(BMDS)

Missile defense technology being developed, tested and deployed by the United States is
designed to counter ballistic missiles of all rangesshort, medium, intermediate and long.
Since ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, size and performance characteristics, the
Ballistic Missile Defense System is an integrated, "layered" architecture that provides multiple
opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can reach their targets. The
system's architecture includes:

networked sensors (including space-based) and ground- and sea-based radars for target
detection and tracking;

ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles for destroying a ballistic missile using either the
force of a direct collision, called "hit-to-kill" technology, or an explosive blast
fragmentation warhead;

And a command, control, battle management, and communications network providing the
operational commanders with the needed links between the sensors and interceptor missiles.

Missile defense elements are operated by United States military personnel from U.S.
Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Forces Japan,
U.S. European Command and others. The United States has missile defense cooperative
programs with a number of allies, including United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel,
Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and many others. The
Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize
opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability.

Cruise missile defense

Defending against an attack by a cruise missile on the other hand is similar to tackling low-flying
manned aircraft and hence most methods of aircraft defense can be used for a cruise missile
defense system.
In order to ward off the threats of nuke-tipped cruise missile attack India has a new missile
defense programme which will be focused solely on intercepting cruise missiles. The
technological breakthrough has been created with an Advanced Air Defense missile
(AAD) DRDO Chief, Dr V K Saraswat stated in an Interview "Our studies have indicated that
this [AAD] will be able to handle a cruise missile intercept
Furthermore, India is acquiring airborne radars like AWACS to ensure detection of cruise
missiles in order to stay on top of the threat.
Barak-8 is a long-range anti-air and anti-missile naval defence system being developed jointly
by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and the Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) of India. The Indian Army is considering induction of a variant of Barak 8
missile to meet its requirement for a medium-range surface-to-air air defence missile. The naval
version of this missile will have the capability to intercept incoming enemy cruise missiles and
combat jets targeting its warships at sea.India has a joint venture for this missile with Israel.
On 17 November 2010, in an interview Rafael's Vice President Mr. LovaDrori confirmed that
the David's Sling system has been offered to the Indian Armed Forces.

ISRAEL

Israel has a national missile defense against short and medium-range missiles using their Arrow
missile system. The Arrow or Hetz is a family of anti-ballistic missiles designed to fulfill an
Israeli requirement for a theater missile defense system. It is reported to be more effective
against ballistic missiles than the MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile. Jointly funded and
produced by Israel and the United States, development of the system began in 1986 and has
continued since, drawing some contested criticism. Undertaken by Israel Aerospace
Industries (IAI) and Boeing, it is overseen by the Israeli Ministry of Defense's "Homa"
administration and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.
The Arrow system consists of the joint production hypersonic Arrow anti-missile interceptor,
the Elta EL/M-2080 "Green Pine" early-warningAESA radar, the Tadiran Telecom "Golden
Citron" ("Citron Tree") C3I center, and the Israel Aerospace Industries "Brown Hazelnut"
("Hazelnut Tree") launch control center. The system is transportable, as it can be moved to other
prepared sites.
Following the construction and testing of the Arrow 1 technology demonstrator, production and
deployment began with the Arrow 2 version of the missile. The Arrow is considered one of the
most advanced missile defense programs currently in existence. It is the first operational missile
defense system specifically designed and built to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles. Initial
operating capability of Arrow 3 is expected in 2014.The first Arrow battery was declared fully
operational in October 2000. Although several of its components have been exported, the Israeli
Air Defense Command within the Israeli Air Force (IAF) of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is
currently the sole user of the complete Arrow system.
Apart from Arrow missile, Israel has Iron dome which is designed to intercept and destroy shortrange rockets and artillery shells fired from distances of 4 to 70 kilometers away and David's
Sling that is designed to intercept medium-to-long range rockets and cruise missiles, such as
those possessed by Hezbollah, fired at ranges from 40 km to 300 km.

RUSSIA

The Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system is currently operational only around the city
of Moscow, the national capital, and is being augmented to protect major cities in Russia. The A135 anti-ballistic missile system is a Russian military complex deployed around Moscow to
counter enemy missiles targeting the city or its surrounding areas. It became operational during
1995. It is a successor to the previous A-35, and compliant with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty from which the US unilaterally withdrew in 2002.
The A-135 system attained "alert" (operational) status on 17 February 1995. It is currently
operational although its 53T6 (NATO:SH-11) component is deactivated (as of February 2007). A
newer missile is expected to replace it. There is an operational test version of the system at the
test site in SaryShagan, Kazakhstan.
The S-300PMU1 and PMU2 can intercept SRBMs, and the S-300V and S-400 Triumf systems
are capable of intercepting a multiple IRBM attack by all DF-21 model IRBMs.
The enhanced but yet to be produced S-300VM/VMK is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles
with a range of 2,500 km re-entry speeds of 4.5 km/s, whereas the S-400 is claimed to be capable
of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of 3,500 km which equates to re-entry speeds of 4.8
to 5 km/s. A system designed to intercept warheads at 5 km/s has the ability to act as a point
system against simple ICBM warheads which have a typical re-entry speed of 7 km/s.[3] Apart
from the main Moscow deployment, Russia has striven actively for intrinsic ABM capabilities of
its late model SAM systems. Russian ground based theatre defence against ballistic and cruise
missiles are centered on the in-service

S-300P (SA-10)

S-300V (SA-12A/B Giant/Gladiator)

S-300PMU-1/2 (SA-20A/B Gargoyle)
S-400 (SA-21)

S-500 ( In development )

Other Developments

Japan
In 2014, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF), and also the Japan Ground Self Defense
Force (JGSDF), completed their 50th year of annual live-fire missile launches at White Sands
Missile Range (WSMR), and also at McGregor Range, New Mexico in Fort Bliss. The latest
annual service practice of the PAC-3 Patriot missile demonstrated a 100 percent kill rate before a
group which included the commanding general of WSMR, and the 32nd Army Air & Missile
Defense Command (AAMDC). Every JASDF Patriot team participated in the annual exercise,
which takes several months.
Since 1998, when North Korea launched a Taepodong-1 missile over northern Japan, the
Japanese have been jointly developing a new Surface-to-air interceptor known as the Patriot
Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) with the US. So far tests have been successful, and there are
planned 11 locations that the PAC-3 will be installed. A military spokesmansaid that tests had
been done on two sites, one of them a business park in central Tokyo, and Ichigaya a site not
far from the Imperial Palace. Along with the PAC-3, Japan has installed a US-developed shipbased anti-ballistic missile system, which was tested successfully on 18 December 2007. The
missile was launched from a Japanese warship, in partnership with the US Missile Defense
Agency and destroyed a mock target launched from the coast.
Japan is in consultations with the United States to possibly deploy the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) system and a ground-based version of the Standard Missile-3
interceptors mounted on Aegis destroyers. Japan's intention is to create a four-stage anti-missile
shield.

Republic of China
Republic of China, commonly known as Taiwan, is also engaged in the development of an antiballistic missile system, based on indigenously developed Tien Kung-II (Sky Bow) SAM system
and Patriot-III missiles.
Taiwan is building up a "missile defense shield" in response to Chinese missiles pointed in its
direction. The latest addition will be six Patriot III batteries and a long-range early warning radar
system. Albeit, Taiwan needs Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) units

While speaking at a seminar in Vienna in 2012, Zhu Chenghu, of China's National Defense
University, opined missile defense to be destabilizing; Zhu was not alone: Joseph Circincione, of
the Ploughshares Fund and attending the same seminar, stated that any US military planner in
Zhu's position would have had to say the same thing, in order to project credible military
deterrence. Bruno Gruselle, in 2010, noted that French policy makers considered the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the doctrine ofMutual assured destruction to be the
cornerstones of strategic stability. Some French analysts, notably Camille Grand, view missile
defense as jeopardizing both the doctrine and the Treaty, as well as risking a new arms race,
which is reflected in the development of advanced missile defense counter measures and decoys
as well as a higher number of and more maneuverable independently targetable reentry vehicles.
Additionally experts question the accuracy and reliability of these systems. Beyond the technical
difficulties, which have been described as more challenging than hitting one bullet with another
all performance data is derived from experiments and scripted tests. Their effectivity in an actual
war situation is uncertain.
Gruselle noted most French security experts doubted the technological feasibility of ballistic missile
defense. Some thought it foolish to spend huge amounts of money on unproven technologies that
lacked operational or political usefulness. Instead, the French defense policy community viewed
missile defense merely as an American "economic weapon" used to defeat the Soviet Union and win
the Cold War. The extant missile defenses are currently vulnerable to hypersonic missile vehicles,
which travel at speeds high enough to outmaneuver missile defenses. China is among the countries
pursuing hypersonic vehicles as missile delivery systems.
Yousaf Butt, a critic of missile defense, states in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that "just as
with nuclear weapons, the U.S. infatuation with missile defense will cause other nations to desire this
expensive technology.
Russia's top military officer has threatened to carry out a pre-emptive strike on U.S.-led NATO
missile defense facilities in Eastern Europe if Washington goes ahead with its controversial plan to
build a missile shield.[51] Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov also warned that talks
between Moscow and Washington on the topic are "close to a dead end. U.S. State Department
special envoy Ellen Tauscher responded that neither country can afford another arms race

Current challenges
These are the main challenges regarding the topic:

Offensive vs. Defensive

Many find it hard to justify limiting a states defense system as much as offensive weaponry can
be limited. Indeed, it may seem counter-intuitive to forbid a state from effectively defending
itself. However, it should be taken into account of the implications a solid defense system also
brings, namely a more effective first-strike capability, and the increase of (nuclear) stockpiles.

First-strike capability
The reason ABMs increase the first-strike capability of a state, lies in the idea that a first strike
will always target the nuclear stockpiles of the opposing state in an effort to reduce the
retaliatory strike (second-strike) to a minimum. With the current, and probably also all future
technology, it remains impossible to fully defend against an all-out first strike. This is due to the
vast number of missiles in, for example, the United States armory: 10,000 nuclear armed
missiles alone. The number of ABMs needed to be armed and ready at all times to prevent such a
massive attack is extraordinary, and probably unsustainable even with the whole US military
budget on it. Whereas normally a state would have to take out most, if not all of the stockpiles to
even consider such a
strike, due to not wishing to be hit by such a missile themselves; by being able to shoot down a
lot of missiles, this barrier is lowered dramatically.8 To counter being on the losing side of this,
countries will need to invest in missile technology.

Increase of (nuclear) stockpiles

One of the main arguments of why a full-scale war using missiles will not occur, is the concept
of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This implies that as soon as one side starts the attack,
the other will always be able to provide a sufficient counter-response to make it a draw, or
pyrrhic victory at best. The risk of being bombed in retaliation thus overshadows any gain made
from using the weapons in the first place. Of course, this theory also meant that the only way to
protect oneself against nuclear weapons meant developing them yourself, or finding allies who
would cast you under their nuclear umbrella, like the NATO. Adhering to this theory in a world
of ABM thus means thatProliferation of missile stockpiles will increase in the future, rather than
decrease. Whereas earlier a couple of hidden nuclear submarines and some ICBM sites
sufficiently deterred other nations, this will cease to be once the technology of ABMs gets
advanced enough. The only way to counter this is heavy investment into either technology so as
to make them undetectable, or into increasing the overall stockpile ready to be launched in the
event of a nuclear attack, something Russia has alreadyIndicated 2009 due to these reasons.

The above noted offensive implications of these systems thus poses the question whether the
construction of these facilities close to borders of other states can be regarded as the threat of use
of force. The Russian Federation indicated as much when the NATO announced its plans to build
a defense system in Eastern European states such as Poland. This brings into question one of the
fundamental keystones of international law: refraining from the threat of use of force. To note is
also NATOs response: it was not aiming the missiles at Russia, but at any attack by Iranian

Missiles. This is effectively admitting it was aiming the missiles at another country, further
spurring the threatening dynamic of the ABMs.

Main stakeholders
United States of America
The US is very invested in this technology, and one of the major proponents of further
Development. It has started placing numerous systems both in its internal borders as well as
those states allowing their assistance. Furthermore, while not the focus of this debate, it remains
one of the few states actively threatening with the weaponization of outer space for these
purposes.

NATO
Many NATO states are supportive of the BDM system the US is planning to place in Eastern
Europe, although some countries remain critical. Overall, they see the threat of rogue states or
terrorist groups as a valid reason to invest in this technology

Russia
Whilst Russia is not against ABM technology per se it does regard placement of that
Technology near its borders as a threat to its sovereignty. It currently has an active ABM system
around Moscow, and is planning to expand this to other major cities.

Israel
A heavy proponent of ABM technology, citing the Iranian threat. Israel is also focused on
tactical missile defense, as it is often bombed from neighbouring territories by what they deem
terrorist groups.

China
While generally keeping outside of the debate, it send a clear message related to these
Systems when it shot down a satellite of own manufacturing in 2007 so as to indicate its fierce
determination to not enter another arms race into space.

Relevant treaties

While no treaties are currently in effect regarding this topic, delegates are encouraged to research
those treaties concerning the weaponization of outer space, those concerning nuclear armaments,
and those concerning missile limitation.

Conclusion
Overall this topic is a very controversial one where the committee shall have to balance the right
of self-defense for states with the threat these systems can pose to the equilibrium of weapons
currently in the world, and possibilities of ending up in another arms race. Additionally the
committee shall has to find a way to enforce or engender compliance with any decisions it does
make. Best would be to work towards a treaty, as non-binding measures will most likely fall into
the Prisoners Dilemma trap, where states force each other into non-compliance.

Further Reading
History of Strategic and Ballistic Missile Defense Volume I & II available from:

http://history.army.mil/html/books/bmd/index.html
Army-Technology.com contains many useful facts about the systems and missiles currently in
existence, for example Israels Iron dome:
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/irondomeairdefencemi/
More arguments on Missile Defense can be found on websites such as the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament:
http://www.cnduk.co.uk/
Also on Nuclear Files, presenting a list of many links arguing pro and con:
http://www.nuclearfiles.
org/menu/key-issues/missile-defense/issues/pro-con/

http://www.mda.mil/system/system.html