Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Pale Privileged Communication
Pale Privileged Communication
MADIANDA
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Madianda may be reprimanded for violation of CPR.
HELD: Yes. As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally
was also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive
documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment
complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship
imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the
profession.SI
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the
attorney-client privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
FACTS:
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of
preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to
the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases
in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from
possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
respondents. Sandiganbayan held that client and lawyer relationship existed between
Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in
the information. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding
the offense charged in the information is privileged. The case was elevated to this
Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary
writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: WON the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet is barred by the
attorney-client privilege.
HELD:
No. For the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the
period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by
the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client
seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the
attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the
clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with
regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for
purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.Statements and communications
regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who
committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications
between attorney and client having to do with the clients contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges
ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.In the
present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are
the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of
Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of
Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which
were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges
now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in
reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past
by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore,
the existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it
has also been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation
of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the
interest of justice.
defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet
falls under the mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer and his
client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
unsuccessful examinees of the petition for mandamus before the court, and made
without malice.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are
not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged
communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the
occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these are speeches or
debates made by Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its
committees. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is
conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind of
privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel
provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To
this genre belongs private communications and fair and true report without any
comments or remarks falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausibly be deduced from the fact of
petitioners having dubbed in their telecast an old unrelated video footage. As it were,
nothing in the said footage, be it taken in isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal
report, can be viewed as reputation impeaching; it did not contain an attack, let alone
a false one, on the honesty, character or integrity or like personal qualities of any of
the respondents, who were not even named or specifically identified in the telecast.
It has been said that if the matter is not per se libelous, malice cannot be inferred
from the mere fact of publication.
1 According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in question actually related to a 1982
demonstration staged by doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital management.
However, this doctrine is not without qualification. Statements made in the course of
judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of
defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent,
or material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry. A pleading must meet the test
of relevancy to avoid being considered libelous.
As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory
matters privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the
privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject
matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and
impropriety. In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need
not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings, It must,
however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of the inquiry in the course of the trial
Based on the facts, it appears that the Accuseds statement was in reply to Atty.
Ceniza charging Sesbreno with misrepresentation, prevarication, and "telling a
barefaced and documented lie.
Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the pleading in question was
undoubtedly strong, since it was made in legitimate defense of his own and of his
client's interest, such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged and cannot be
the basis of an action for libel.