I.

Overview
A. Definition and Concepts
1. Judicial Power
a. Meaning of Judicial Power,
justiciable controversy
Belgica v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 208566, etc.
November 19, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Doctrine:
Scrutinizing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that
the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it
is an exercise of judicial power.
Facts:
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but
similar to the CDF Articles, the
201170 PDAF Article included an express
statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the VicePresident: Representatives were given P70
Million each, broken down into P40
Million for "hard projects" and P30 Million
for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was
given to each Senator as well as the VicePresident, with a P100 Million allocation
each for "hard" and "soft projects."
Likewise, a provision on realignment of
funds was included, but with the
qualification that it may be allowed only
once.

Inter alia, eighty-Two (82) NGOs

entrusted with implementation of
seven hundred seventy two (772)
projects amount to P6.156 Billion
were either found questionable, or
submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in
whole or in part their utilization of
the Funds.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been

typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of
Congress, the present cases and the recent
controversies on the matter have, however,
shown that the terms usage has expanded
to include certain funds of the President

such as the Malampaya Funds and the

Presidential Social Fund.
Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with
implementation of seven hundred seventy
two (772) projects amount to P6.156
Billion were either found questionable, or
submitted
questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole
or in part their utilization of the Funds.
Petitioners filed separate Rule 65 petitions
to
prohibit
spending
and
nullify
congressional and presidential pork
barrels.
Issue:
Whether or not (b) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions are matters of policy
not subject to judicial review;
Held:
No. The issues raised before the Court do
not present political but legal questions
which are within its province to resolve.
Ratio:
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question
Doctrine.

The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork

Barrel System" is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches
of government but rather a legal one
which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.
Scrutinizing the contours of the system
along constitutional lines is a task that
the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it
is an exercise of judicial power. More
importantly, the present Constitution has
not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially
makes it a duty to proceed therewith.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The
judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. It includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which

are legally demandable and enforceable,

and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." In
Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded
concept of judicial power under the 1987
Constitution and its effect on the political
question doctrine was explained as
follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the
reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review of this
court not only to settle actual
controversies
involving
rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine
whether or not there has been a
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of
government.
Heretofore,
the
judiciary has focused on the "thou
shalt not's" of the Constitution
directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
With
the
new
provision, however, courts are
given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the
Court power of doing nothing. x x x
[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other
departments; does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature or the
executive, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."144 To a great extent, the
Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms
undertaken by its co-equal branches of
government. But it is by constitutional

force that the Court must faithfully

perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the
Courts avowed intention that a resolution
of these cases would not arrest or in any
manner impede the endeavors of the two
other branches but, in fact, help ensure
that the pillars of change are erected on
firm constitutional grounds.

Francisco v. HR
G.R. No. 160261, etc.
November 10, 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.
Doctrine:
this moderating power to determine the
proper allocation of powers of the different
branches of government and to direct the
course of government along constitutional
channels is inherent in all courts[25] as a
necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is the power of the
court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint[4] (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices[5] of this
Court for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes.[6] The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to
the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003
The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in
form,[9] but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice

voted to dismiss it, the second

impeachment complaint[11] was filed with
the Secretary General of the House [12] by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William
B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines
Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was
accompanied
by
a
Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House of Representatives.

(1) the threshold and novel issue of

whether or not the power of judicial review
extends
to
those
arising
from
impeachment proceedings;

Respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al.:

impeachment is a political action which
cannot assume a judicial character. Hence,
any question, issue or incident arising at
any stage of the impeachment proceeding
is beyond the reach of judicial review.[47]

Judicial power includes the duty of

the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable,

Senator Pimentel: the Senates sole power

to try impeachment cases[48] (1) entirely
excludes the application of judicial review
over it; and (2) necessarily includes the
Senates power to determine constitutional
questions
relative
to
impeachment
proceedings.
ARTICLE XI
SECTION
3. (1) The
House
Representatives
shall

of
have

the exclusive power to initiate all cases

of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power
to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall
not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
Issue:

Held:

Ratio:
This Courts power of judicial review
is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

and to determine whether or not there

has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting

to

lack

or

excess

of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch

or

instrumentality

of

the

government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on
exhaustively expounded upon by Justice
Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission[23] after
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present
provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2
on what judicial power includes.
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this
moderating power to determine the proper
allocation of powers of the different
branches of government and to direct the
course of government along constitutional
channels is inherent in all courts[25] as a
necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is the power of the
court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902,
decades before its express grant in the
1935 Constitution, the power of judicial
review was exercised by our courts to

invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.

[29]
And as pointed out by noted political
law professor and former Supreme Court
Justice
Vicente
V.
Mendoza,[30] the
executive and legislative branches of our
government
in
fact
effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review
in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only
by
subsequent
ones,
and
their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law

to be inconsistent with the

Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall
govern.

Administrative

or

executive

acts, orders and regulations

shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or
the

Constitution.(Emphasis

supplied)
To ensure the potency of the power of
judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion

by any

branch

or

instrumentalities of government, the

afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time
into its history, into block letter law the
so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction
of this Court,

the role of the judiciary during

the

deposed

regime

was

marred considerably by the

circumstance that in a number
of

cases

against

the

government, which then had

no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions
and got away with it.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
Laurel, J.

Doctrine:
the judicial department is the only

constitutional organ which can be

called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the

several departments and among the

integral or constituent units thereof.

Facts:
This is an original action instituted in this
court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest
filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent,
against the election of said petitioner as
member of the National Assembly for the
first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.
National Assembly: Confirmed Election of
Angara on December 3, 1935
v.
Electoral Commission: election protests up
to December 9, 1935
Issue:
1.
Has
the
Supreme
Court
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in
the affirmative,
2.
Has the said Electoral Commission
acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction
in
assuming
to
take
cognizance of the protest filed against the
election
of
the
herein
petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
Held:
1. Yes.
2. The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
Ratio:
x x x In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten

or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In

cases

of

conflict,

the

judicial

The Constitution is a definition of the

is

to

powers

to determine the proper allocation of

extent

departments and among the integral

the instrumentality of the judiciary

organ which can be called upon

powers

between

the

several

of

government. Who

department is the only constitutional

determine
of

the

nature,

such

scope

powers?

and

The

Constitution itself has provided for

or constituent units thereof.

as the rational way. And when the

As
any
human
production,
our
Constitution is of course lacking perfection
and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting
through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of
their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions

constitutional boundaries, it does not

judiciary

provided in the said instrument. The

Constitution

sets

forth

in

no

uncertain language the restrictions

and limitations upon governmental

powers

and

restrictions

transcended

agencies.

and

If

these

would

be

limitations

it

are

inconceivable if the Constitution had

not provided for a mechanism by
which

to

direct

government

the

along

course

of

constitutional

channels, for then the distribution of

powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of

rights mere expressions of sentiment, and
the principles of good government mere
political
apothegms.
Certainly,
the
limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional
grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power

of the courts, not to speak of its

historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not

mediates

to

allocate

assert any superiority over the other

departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only

asserts

the

solemn

and

sacred obligation assigned to it by the

Constitution to determine conflicting
claims

of

authority

under

the

Constitution and to establish for the

parties in an actual controversy the

rights which that instrument secures

and guarantees to them. This is in

truth all that is involved in what is

termed
"judicial
supremacy"
which
properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary
in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and
legislative
departments
of
the
[24]
government. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

expressly, by clear implication from

section

of

Constitution.

article

VIII

of

our

Tolentino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150

October 16, 1971
Barredo, J.
Doctrine:
these postulates (from Angara v. Electoral
Commission) just quoted do not apply only
to conflicts of authority between the three
existing regular departments of the
government but to all such conflicts
between and among these departments, or,
between any of them, on the one hand, and
any
other
constitutionally
created
independent body, like the electoral
tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and
the Constituent assemblies constituted by
the House of Congress, on the other
Facts:
Petition for prohibition principally to
restrain the respondent Commission on
Elections "from undertaking to hold a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which
the proposed constitutional amendment
"reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution of the
Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,
submitted" for ratification by the people
pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of
the Constitutional Convention of 1971,
and
the
subsequent
implementing
resolutions, by declaring said resolutions
to be without the force and effect of law in
so far as they direct the holding of such
plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of
the respondent Commission (COMELEC)
performed and to be done by it in
obedience to the aforesaid Convention
resolutions to be null and void, for being
violative of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
the main thrust of the petition is that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing
resolutions
thereof
subsequently approved by the Convention
have no force and effect as laws in so far as
they provide for the holding of a plebiscite
co-incident with the elections of eight
senators and all city, provincial and
municipal officials to be held on November
8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in
obedience thereof and tending to carry out

the holding of the plebiscite directed by

said resolutions are null and void, on the
ground that the calling and holding of
such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a
power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a
legislative body, and may not be exercised
by the Convention, and that, under
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution,
the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for
ratification separately from each and all of
the other amendments to be drafted and
proposed by the Convention. On the other
hand, respondents and intervenors posit
that the power to provide for, fix the date
and lay down the details of the plebiscite
for the ratification of any amendment the
Convention may deem proper to propose is
within the authority of the Convention as
a necessary consequence and part of its
power to propose amendments and that
this power includes that of submitting
such amendments either individually or
jointly at such time and manner as the
Convention may direct in discretion.
Issue:
They (intervenors) contend that the issue
before Us is a political question and that
the Convention being legislative body of
the highest order is sovereign, and as
such, its acts impugned by petitioner are
beyond the control of the Congress and the
courts
Held:
Court has jurisdiction to determine
constitutionality of Organic Resolution 1
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
(declared void)
Ratio:
There should be no more doubt as to the
position of this Court regarding its
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality
of the acts of the Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, and, for that matter,
those of a constitutional convention called
for the purpose of proposing amendments
to the Constitution, which concededly is at
par with the former.
In Gonzales v. COMELEC

Since, when proposing, as a

constituent assembly, amendments
to the Constitution, the members
of Congress derive their authority
from the Fundamental Law, it
follows, necessarily, that they do
not have the final say on whether
or not their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits.

these postulates (from Angara v. Electoral

Commission) just quoted do not apply only
to conflicts of authority between the three
existing regular departments of the
government but to all such conflicts
between and among these departments, or,
between any of them, on the one hand, and
any
other
constitutionally
created
independent body, like the electoral
tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and
the Constituent assemblies constituted by
the House of Congress, on the other. We
see no reason of logic or principle
whatsoever,
and
none
has
been
convincingly shown to Us by any of the
respondents and intervenors, why the
same ruling should not apply to the
present Convention, even if it is an
assembly of delegate elected directly by
the people, since at best, as already
demonstrated, it has been convened by
authority of and under the terms of the
present Constitution.

Javellana v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. L-36142, etc.
March 31, 1973
Concepcion, C.J.
Doctrine:
When the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the
issue on whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met,
or the limitations respected, is justiciable
or non-political, the crux of the problem
being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom.
Facts:

While the Convention was in session on

September 21, 1972, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under Martial Law. On
November 29, 1972, the Convention
approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day,
November 30, 1972, the President of the
Philippines issued Presidential Decree No.
73, "submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
and appropriating funds therefor," as well
as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973.
Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case
G.R. No. L-35925, against the Commission
on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the Auditor General, to
enjoin said "respondents or their agents
from implementing Presidential Decree
No. 73, in any manner, until further orders
of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia,
that said Presidential Decree "has no force
and effect as law because the calling ... of
such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines
for the conduct of the same, the
prescription of the ballots to be used and
the question to be answered by the voters,
and the appropriation of public funds for
the purpose, are, by the Constitution,
lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and
"there is no proper submission to the
people of said Proposed Constitution set
for January 15, 1973, there being no
freedom of speech, press and assembly,
and there being no sufficient time to
inform the people of the contents thereof."
In view of these events relative to the
postponement of the aforementioned
plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to
refrain, for the time being, from deciding
the aforementioned cases, for neither the
date nor the conditions under which said
plebiscite would be held were known or
announced officially.
"In the afternoon of January 12,
1973, the petitioners in Case G.R.

No.
L-35948 filed an "urgent motion,"
praying that said case be decided
"as soon as possible, preferably not
later than January 15, 1973." It
was alleged in said motion, inter
alia:
"6.
That
the
President
subsequently
announced
the
issuance of Presidential Decree
No. 86 organizing the so-called
Citizens
Assemblies,
to
be
consulted
on
certain
public
questions [Bulletin Today, January
1, 1973];
15. That petitioners have reason to
fear, and therefore state, that the
question added in the last list of
questions to be asked to the
Citizens Assemblies, namely:
Do you approve of
the New Constitution?
in relation to the question
following it:
Do you still want a
plebiscite to be
called to ratify the
new Constitution?"

"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION
BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE
1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
xxx
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers in me vested by the
Constitution, do hereby certify and
proclaim that the Constitution proposed
by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one
(1971) Constitutional Convention has been
ratified by an overwhelming majority of all
of the votes cast by the members of all the
Barangays
(Citizens
Assemblies)
throughout the Philippines, and has
thereby come into effect.
The Present Cases
Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142
against the Executive Secretary and the
Secretaries of National Defense, Justice

and Finance, to restrain said respondents

"and their subordinates or agents from
implementing any of the provisions of the
propose Constitution not found in the
present Constitution" referring to that
of 1935. The petition therein, filed by
Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and
a qualified and registered voter" and as "a
class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all
citizens and voters similarly situated," was
amended on or about January 24, 1973.
After reciting in substance the facts set
forth in the decision in the plebiscite
cases, Javellana alleged that the President
had
announced
"the
immediate
implementation of the New Constitution,
thru his Cabinet, respondents including,"
and that the latter "are acting without, or
in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
the said proposed Constitution" upon the
ground:
"that
the
President,
as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the
same "are without power to approve the
proposed Constitution ..."; "that the
President is without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed Constitution"; and "that the
election held to ratify the proposed
Constitution was not a free election, hence
null and void."
Issue:
WON the Court can decide on the
constitutionality of PD 73 and PP 1102
Does the issue on the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the
nature of a political, and, hence, nonjusticiable question?
Held:
1. There is unanimity on the justiciable
nature of the issue on the legality of
Presidential Decree No. 73.
2. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and
myself are of the opinion that the question
of validity of said Proclamation has not
been properly raised before the Court,
which, accordingly, should not pass upon
such question

Ratio:
The five questions thus agreed upon as
reflecting the basic issues herein involved
are the following:
1. Is the issue of the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or
political and therefore non-justiciable,
question?
Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six
(6) members of the Court, hold that the
issue of the validity of Proclamation No.
1102 presents a justiciable and nonpolitical question. Justices Makalintal and
Castro did not vote squarely on this
question, but, only inferentially, in their
discussion of the second question. Justice
Barredo qualified his vote, stating that
"inasmuch as it is claimed there has been
approval by the people, the Court may
inquire into the question of whether or not
there has actually been such an approval,
and, in the affirmative, the Court should
keep hands-off out of respect to the
people's will, but, in negative, the Court
may determine from both factual and legal
angles whether or not Article XV of the
1935 Constitution been complied with."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or
three (3) members of the Court hold that
the issue is political and "beyond the
ambit of judicial inquiry."
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention been
ratified validly (with substantial, if not
strict, compliance) conformably to the
applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?
Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six
(6) members of the Court, hold that the
issue of the validity of Proclamation No.
1102 presents a justiciable and nonpolitical question. Justices Makalintal and
Castro did not vote squarely on this
question, but, only inferentially, in their
discussion of the second question. Justice
Barredo qualified his vote, stating that
"inasmuch as it is claimed there has been
approval by the people, the Court may

inquire into the question of whether or not

there has actually been such an approval,
and, in the affirmative, the Court should
keep hands-off out of respect to the
people's will, but, in negative, the Court
may determine from both factual and legal
angles whether or not Article XV of the
1935 Constitution been complied with."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or
three (3) members of the Court hold that
the issue is political and "beyond the
ambit of judicial inquiry."
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating
that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973
Constitution has been validly ratified
pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain
that in the light of traditional concepts
regarding the meaning and intent of said
Article, the referendum in the Citizens'
Assemblies, specially in the manner the
votes therein were cast, reported and
canvassed, falls short of the requirements
thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I
have no means of refusing to recognize as
a judge that factually there was voting and
that the majority of the votes were for
considering as approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of the
usual form of plebiscite followed in past
ratifications, I am constrained to hold
that, in the political sense, if not in the
orthodox legal sense, the people may be
deemed to have cast their favorable votes
in the belief that in doing so they did the
part required of them by Article XV,
hence, it may be said that in its political
aspect, which is what counts most, after
all, said Article has been substantially
complied with, and, in effect, the 1973
Constitution has been constitutionally
ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra,
or three (3) members of the Court hold
that under their view there has been in
effect substantial compliance with the
constitutional requirements for valid
ratification.
3. Has the aforementioned proposed
Constitution acquiesced in (with or
without valid ratification) by the people?

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices

Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
hold that "the people have already
accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely,
Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that
there can be no free expression, and there
has even been no expression, by the people
qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of
their acceptance or repudiation of the
proposed Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is
conceded that the doctrine stated in some
American decisions to the effect that
independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once
accepted acquiesced in by the people must
be accorded recognition by the Court, I am
not at this stage prepared to state that
such doctrine calls for application in view
of the shortness of time that has elapsed
and the difficulty of ascertaining what is
the mind of the people in the absence of
the freedom of debate that is a
concomitant feature of martial law."

88

Three (3) members of the Court express

their lack of knowledge and/or competence
to rule on the question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro are joined by
Justice Teehankee in their statement that
"Under a regime of martial law, with the
free expression of opinions through the
usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have
no means of knowing, to the point of
judicial certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution."

competence of this Court, 90 are relevant

and unavoidable."
5. Is the aforementioned
Constitution in force?

proposed

Four (4) members of the Court, namely,

Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue
of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the
premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution;
and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely,
Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention is not in force;
with the result that there are not enough
votes to declare that the new Constitution
is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority
of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes
of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar,
Fernando and Teehankee, all the
aforementioned
cases
are
hereby
dismissed. This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? And

On the fourth question of relief, six (6)
members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS
the petition. Justice Makalintal and
Castro so voted on the strength of their
view that "(T)he effectivity of the said
Constitution, in the final analysis, is the
basic and ultimate question posed by these
cases to resolve which considerations other
than judicial, an therefore beyond the

Concepcion, C.J.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is
qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue on whether or not
the prescribed qualifications or conditions
have been met, or the limitations
respected, is justiciable or non-political,
the crux of the problem being one
of legality or validity of the contested
act, not its wisdom.

10

What is more, the judicial inquiry into

such issue and the settlement thereof are
the main functions of courts of justice
under the Presidential form of government
adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the
system of checks and balances, one of its
basic predicates. As a consequence, We
have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the ineluctable
obligation made particularly more
exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land,
to support and defend the Constitution
to settle it.
1. What is the procedure prescribed by the
1935 Constitution for its amendment?
Under section 1 of Art. XV of said
Constitution, three (3) steps are essential,
namely:
1. That the amendments to the
Constitution be proposed either by
Congress or by a convention called for that
purpose, "by a vote of three-fourths of all
the Members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives voting separately," but
"in joint session assembled";
2. That such amendments be "submitted
to the people for their ratification" at an
"election"; and
Const. (1935), Art. V, Sec. 1. Suffrage may
be exercised by male citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are twenty-one years of age or
over and are able to read and write, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines
for one year and in the municipality
wherein they propose to vote for at least
six months preceding the election. The
National Assembly shall extend the right
of suffrage to women, if in a plebiscite
which shall be held for that purpose
within two years after the adoption of this
Constitution, not less than three hundred
thousand women possessing the necessary
qualifications shall vote affirmatively on
the question.
Const. (1935), Art. X Sec. 2. The
Commission
on
Elections
shall

have exclusive charge of the enforcement

and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections and shall exercise
all other functions which may be conferred
upon it by law. It shall decide, save those
involving
the
right
to
vote, all administrative
questions,
affecting
elections,
including
the
determination of the number and location
of polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election
officials. All law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, when
so required by the Commission, shall
act as its deputiesfor the purpose
of insuring fee, orderly, and honest
elections. The decisions, orders, and
rulings of the Commission shall be subject
to review by the Supreme Court.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus clear that the proceedings held
in such Citizens' Assemblies and We
have more to say on this point in
subsequent pages were fundamentally
irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in section 1 of
Art. V of the Constitution were allowed to
vote in said Assemblies. And, since there
is no means by which the invalid votes of
those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the
qualified voters, the proceedings in the
Citizens' Assemblies must be considered
null and void.
Art. XV envisages with the term "votes
cast" choices made on ballots not
orally or by raising by the persons
taking part in plebiscites. This is but
natural and logical, for, since the early
years of the American regime, we had
adopted the Australian Ballot System,
with
its
major
characteristics,
namely, uniform official ballotsprepared
and furnished by the Government and
secrecy in the voting, with the advantage
of keeping records that permit judicial
inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy
of the election returns. And the 1935
Constitution
has
been
consistently
interpreted in all plebiscites for the

11

ratification
rejection
of
proposed
amendments thereto, from 1935 to 1967.
Hence, the viva voce voting in the Citizens'
Assemblies was and is null and void ab
initio.
3. That such amendments be "approved by
a majority of the votes cast" in said
election.
b. How should the plebiscite be held?
(COMELEC supervision indispensable;
essential requisites)
The point is that, such of the Barrio
Assemblies as were held took place
without
the
intervention
of
the
Commission on Elections, and without
complying with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. What is more,
they were held under the supervision of
the very officers and agencies of the
Executive Department sought to be
excluded therefrom by Art. X of the 1935
Constitution. Xxx And the procedure
therein mostly followed is such that there
isno reasonable means of checking the
accuracy of the returns files by the officers
who conducted said plebiscites.

Makalintal, J. and Castro, J., concurring:

There can hardly be any doubt that in
everybody's view from the framers of
the 1935 Constitution through all the
Congresses since then to the 1971
Constitutional Convention amendments
to the Constitution should be ratified in
only one way, that is, in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and
participated in only by qualified and duly
registered voters.
The Citizens Assemblies were not limited
to qualified, let alone registered voters, but
included all citizens from the age of
fifteen, and regardless of whether or not
they were illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex
convicts * these being the classes of
persons expressly disqualified from voting
by Section 102 of the Election Code. In
short, the constitutional and statutory
qualifications were not considered in the

determination of who should participate.

No official ballots were used in the voting;
it was done mostly by acclamation or open
show of hands. Secrecy, which is one of the
essential features of the election process,
was not therefore observed. No set of rules
for counting the votes or of tabulating
them and reporting the figures was
prescribed or followed. The Commission on
Elections, which is the constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections, took no part at all,
either by way of supervision or in the
assessment of the results.
In the deliberations of this Court one of
the issues formulated for resolution is
whether or not the new Constitution, since
its submission to the Citizens Assemblies,
has found acceptance among the people,
such issue being related to the political
question theory propounded by the
respondents. We have not tarried on the
point at all since we find no reliable basis
on which to form a judgment. Under a
regime of martial law, with the free
expression of opinions through the usual
media vehicles restricted, we have no
means of knowing, to the point of judicial
certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution. In any event,
we do not find the issue decisive insofar as
our vote in these cases is concerned. To
interpret the Constitution that is
judicial. That the Constitution should be
deemed in effect because of popular
acquiescence that is political, and
therefore beyond the domain of judicial
review.
We therefore vote not to give due course to
the instant petitions.

Barredo, J, concurring:
As far as I am concerned, I regard the
present petitions as no more than mere
reiterations of the Supplemental Petitions
filed by Counsel Lorenzo M. Taada on
January 15, 1973 in the so called
Plebiscite Cases xxx. I reiterate, therefore,

12

the vote I cast when these petitions were

initially considered by the Court; namely,
to dismiss them.
As I shall elucidate anon, paramount
considerations of national import have led
me to the conviction that the best interests
of all concerned would be best served by
the Supreme Court holding that the 1973
Constitution is now in force, not
necessarily as a consequence of the
revolutionary concept previously suggested
by me, but upon the ground that as a
political, more than as a legal, act of the
people, the result of the referendum may
be construed as a compliance with the
substantiality of Article XV of the 1935
Constitution.
the most important point I took into
account was that in the face of the
Presidential
certification
through
Proclamation 1102 itself that the New
Constitution has been approved by a
majority of the people and having in mind
facts of general knowledge which I have
judicial notice of, I am in no position to
deny that the result of the referendum was
as the President had stated.
It is my sincere conviction that the
Constitution of 1973 has been accepted or
adopted by the people. And on this
premise, my considered opinion is that the
Court may no longer decide these cases on
the basis of purely legal considerations.
Factors
which
are
non-legal
but
nevertheless ponderous and compelling
cannot be ignored, for their relevancy is
inherent in the issue itself to be resolved.
it being obvious that of the three great
departments of the government under the
1935 Constitution, two, the Executive and
the Legislative, have already accepted the
New Constitution and recognized its
enforceability and enforcement, I cannot
see how this Supreme Court can by
judicial fiat hold back the political
developments taking place and for the
sake of being the guardian of the
Constitution and the defender of its
integrity and supremacy make its judicial

power prevail against the decision of those

who were duly chosen by the people to be
their
authorized
spokesmen
and
representatives.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I
vote
to
dismiss
these
petitions
for mandamus and prohibition without
costs.

Makasiar, J., concurring:

Assuming, without conceding, that Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution prescribes a
procedure
for
the
ratification
of
constitutional amendments or of a new
Constitution and that such procedure was
no complied with, the validity of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1102 is a
political, not a justiciable, issue; for it is
inseparably or inextricably link with and
strikes at, because it is decisive of, the
validity of ratification and adoption of, as
well as acquiescence of people in, the 1973
Constitution and the legitimacy of the
government organized and operating
thereunder.
The ruling in the cases of Gonzales vs.
Comelec, et al. (L-28224, Nov. 29, 1967, 21
SCRA 774) and Tolentino vs. Comelec, et
al. (L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702)
on which petitioners place great reliance
that the courts may review the
propriety of a submission of a proposed
constitutional
amendment before
the
ratification or adoption of such proposed
amendment by the sovereign people, hardly
applies to the cases at bar; because the
issue involved in the aforesaid cases refers
to only the propriety of the submission of a
proposed constitutional amendment to the
people for ratification, unlike the present
petitions, which challenge inevitably the
validity of the 1973 Constitution after its
ratification or adoption thru acquiescence
by the sovereign people. As heretofore
stated, it is specious and pure sophistry to
advance the reasoning that the present
petitions pray only for the nullification of
the 1973 Constitution and the government
operating thereunder.

13

The inevitable consequence therefore is

that the validity of the ratification or
adoption of or acquiescence by the people
in the 1973 Constitution, remains a
political
issue
removed
from
the
jurisdiction of this Court to review.
If this Court inquires into the validity of
Proclamation No. 1102 and consequently
of the adoption of the 1973 Constitution it
would be exercising a veto power on the
act of the sovereign people, of whom this
Court is merely an agent, which to say the
least, would be anomalous. This Court
cannot dictate to our principal, the
sovereign people, as to how the approval of
the new Constitution should be manifested
or expressed. The sovereign people have
spoken and we must abide by their
decision, regardless of our notion as to
what is the proper method of giving assent
to the new Charter.
Even if conclusiveness is to be denied to
the truth of the declaration by the
President in Proclamation No. 1102 that
the people through their Citizens'
Assemblies had overwhelmingly approved
the new Constitution due regard to a
separate, coordinate and co-equal branch
of the government demands adherence to
the presumption of correctness of the
President's declaration.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, ALL
THE PETITIONS IN THESE FIVE
CASES SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

Esguerra, J., concurring:

this Court should abstain from assuming
jurisdiction, but, instead, as an act of
judicial statesmanship, should dismiss the
petitions. In resolving whether or not the
question presented is political, joint
discussion of issues Nos. 1, 3 and 4 is
necessary so as to arrive at a logical
conclusion. For after the acceptance of a
new Constitution and acquiescence therein
by the people by putting it into practical
operation, any question regarding its

validity should be foreclosed and all

debates on whether it was duly or lawfully
ushered into existence as the organic law
of the state become political and not
judicial in character.
what is sought to be invalidated is the new
Constitution itself the very framework
of the present Government since January
17, 1973. The reason is obvious. The
Presidential decrees set up the means for
the ratification and acceptance of the new
Constitution and Proclamation No. 1102
simply announced the result of the
referendum or plebiscite by the people
through the Citizens Assemblies.
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss all
petitions.

ZALDIVAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

One department is just as representative
as the other, and judiciary is the
department which is charged with the
special duty of determining the limitations
which the law places upon all official
actions 4.

In

the

case

of Gonzales

v.

Commission on Elections , this Court

ruled that the issue as to whether or not a
resolution of Congress acting as a
constituent
assembly
violates
the
Constitution is not a political question and
is therefore subject to judicial review. In
the case of Avelino v. Cuenco 6, this Court
held that the exception to the rule that
courts will not interfere with a political
question affecting another department is
when such political question involves an
issue as to the construction and
interpretation of the provision of the
constitution. And so, it has been held that
the question of whether a constitution
shall be amended or not is a political
question which is not in the power of the
court to decide, but whether or not the
constitution has been legally amended is a
justiciable question.
it is in the power of this Court, as the
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, to
determine the validity of the proposal, the

14

submission, and the ratification of any

change in the Constitution. Ratification or
non-ratification
of
a
constitutional
amendment is a vital element in the
procedure to amend the constitution, and I
believe that the Court can inquire into,
and decide on, the question of whether or
not an amendment to the constitution, as
in the present cases, has been ratified in
accordance
with
the
requirements
prescribed in the Constitution that was
amended.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

ince the Constitution pre-eminently
occupies the highest rung in the hierarchy
of legal norms, it is in the judiciary,
ultimately this Tribunal, that such a
responsibility is vested. With the 1935
Constitution containing, as above noted,
an explicit article on the subject of
amendments, it would follow that the
presumption to be indulged in is that the
question of whether there has been
deference to its terms is for this Court to
pass upon. Xxx Nor is it a valid objection
to this conclusion that what was involved
in those cases was the legality of the
submission and not ratification, for from
the very language of the controlling
article, the two vital steps are proposal
and ratification, which as pointed out
in Dillon v. Gloss, 11"cannot be treated as
unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in
a single endeavor." 12 Once an aspect
thereof is viewed as judicial, there would
be no justification for considering the rest
as devoid of that character.
"political questions" should refer to such
as would under the Constitution be
decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity or in regard to full discretionary
authority is vested either in the President
or Congress. It is thus beyond the
competence of the judiciary to pass upon.
Unless
clearly
falling
within
the
formulation, the decision reached by the
political branches whether in the form of a
congressional act or an executive order
could be tested in court. Xxx Even when

the Presidency or Congress possesses

plenary powers, its improvident exercise or
the abuse thereof, if shown, may give rise
to a justiciable controversy.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

ANTONIO, J., concurring:

in the final analysis, what is assailed is
not merely the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 of the President, which is merely
declaratory of the fact of approval or
ratification, but the legitimacy of the
government. It is addressed more to the
framework and political character of this
Government which now functions under
the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a
Constitution that is already effective.
In other words, where a complete change
in the fundamental law has been effected
through political action, the Court whose
existence is affected by such change is, in
the words of Mr. Melville Fuller Weston,
"precluded from passing upon the fact of
change by a logical difficulty which is not
to be surmounted." 5 Such change in the
organic law relates to the existence of a
prior point in the Court's "chain of title" to
its authority and "does not relate merely
to a question of the horizontal distribution
of powers." 6 It involves in essence a matter
which "the sovereign has entrusted to the
so-called
political
departments
of
government or has reserved to be settled
by its own extra governmental action."

Ocampo v. Cabagis
G.R. No. L-3893
February 15, 1910
Elliott, J.
Doctrine:
In a broader sense, and for the purposes of
construing and testing the validity of the
Acts of the Philippine Legislature, they
are constitutional courts, because they,
like the Legislature, exist by virtue of a
written Organic Law enacted by the

15

supreme legislative body. The validity of

all legislative Acts must be determined by
their compliance with this Organic Law,
and the determination of the legal
question of compliance or noncompliance
therewith is a judicial question, which
must in the last analysis be determined by
the judiciary.
Facts:
On the 26th of December, 1908 a judgment
was entered in this case in the following
words:
Without prejudice to the filing of
an extended opinion later, the
judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and the defendant is
absolved from the complaint
without special finding as to costs,
and twenty days hereafter let
judgment be entered in conformity
herewith, and ten days later let
the record be returned to the court
wherein
it
originated,
for
appropriate action. So ordered.
The appellees now seek the cancellation
and annulment of the entry of judgment
and the recall of the remittitur and the
record of the case to this court. The motion
is made upon the theory that no final
judgment has ever been entered, and that
by reason of the changes in the personnel
of the court the more extensive opinion
which was contemplated can not now be
filed.
Issue:
WON the decision violates Act No. 136,
Sec. 15 and thus invalid.
Are Philippine courts constitutional
courts?
Held:
No. Motion denied.
In a broad sense, yes.
Ratio:
Section 15 of Act No. 136 provides that "in
the determination of causes all decisions
of the Supreme Court shall be given in
writing, signed by the judges concurring in
the decision, and the grounds of the

decision shall be stated as briefly as may

be consistent with clearness."
Section 15 of Act No. 136 expresses a
proper rule which should be observed by
the court unless there is some substantial
reason for departing therefrom, but if such
reason exists, the judicial action can not be
controlled by legislative directions. In
holding that this statute is directory, we
assume of the court against its judicial
judgment.
The doctrine is well established in the
various States of the Union that the
legislatures have no power to establish
rules which operates to deprive the courts
of their constitutional authority to exercise
the judicial functions. A constitutional
court when exercising its proper judicial
functions can no more be unreasonably
controlled by the legislature than can the
legislature when properly exercising
legislative power be subjected to the
control of the courts. Each acts
independently within its exclusive field.
But counsel asserts that the courts of the
Philippine Islands are not constitutional
courts, and "that Act No. 136, the Acts of
Congress and the Commission are the
Constitution as far as this Supreme Court
is concerned." We are unable to accept this
as a correct statement of the law. In a
certain sense these courts are not
constitutional courts. In a broader sense,
and for the purposes of construing and
testing the validity of the Acts of the
Philippine
Legislature,
they
are
constitutional courts, because they, like
the Legislature, exist by virtue of a
written Organic Law enacted by the
supreme legislative body. The validity of
all legislative Acts must be determined by
their compliance with this Organic Law,
and the determination of the legal
question of compliance or noncompliance
therewith is a judicial question, which
must in the last analysis be determined by
the judiciary. Xxx The motion is therefore
denied.

16

b. Political question
Lansang v. Garcia
G.R. No. L-33964, etc.
December 11, 1971
Concepcion, C.J.
Doctrine:
the Executive is supreme, as regards the
suspension
of
the
privilege,
but
only if and when he acts within the sphere
allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he
has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in
turn, constitutionally supreme.
Facts:
Proclamation No. 889
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of
the Constitution, do hereby suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for
the persons presently detained, as well as
others who may be hereafter similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on
the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or
in connection therewith.
Due to emergence of rebels with precepts
based
on
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
teachings
Respondents: the "President of the
Philippines acted on relevant facts
gathered thru the coordinated efforts of
the various intelligence agents of our
government but (of) which the Chief
Executive could not at the moment give a
full account and disclosure without risking
revelation of highly classified state secrets
vital to its safely and security"; that the
determination thus made by the President
is "final and conclusive upon the court and
upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of
the nature of political question(s) which
cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry,"

Issue:
WON "the authority to decide whether the
exigency has arisen requiring suspension
(of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus) belongs to the President and his
'decision is final and conclusive' upon the
courts and upon all other persons."
Held:
No, the Court had authority to and should
inquire into the existence of the factual
bases required by the Constitution for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ.
Ratio:
Upon further deliberation, the members of
the Court are now unanimous in the
conviction that it has the authority to
inquire into the existence of said factual
bases in order to determine the
constitutional sufficiency thereof.
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the
privilege
is
neither
absolute
nor
unqualified. The authority conferred by
the Constitution, both under the Bill of
Rights
and
under
the
Executive
Department, is limited and conditional.
The precept in the Bill of Rights
establishes a general rule, as well as an
exception thereto. What is more, it
postulates the former in the negative,
evidently to stress its importance, by
providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ
of habeas
corpus shall not be
suspended ...." It is only by way
of exception that it permits the suspension
of the privilege "in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or, under Art
VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger
thereof" "when the public safety
requires it, in any of which events the
same may be suspended wherever during
such period the necessity for such
suspension shall exist." 13 For from being
full and plenary, the authority to suspend
the privilege of the writ is thus
circumscribed, confined and restricted, not
only by the prescribed setting or the
conditions essential to its existence, but,
also, as regards the time when and the
place where it may be exercised.

17

the separation of powers, under the

Constitution, is not absolute. What is
more, it goes hand in hand with the
system of checks and balances, under
which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege,
but only if and when he acts within the
sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law,
and the authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the
Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally
supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the
function of the Court is merely to check
not to supplant 22 the Executive, or to
ascertain merely whether he had gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom
of his act. To be sure, the power of the
Court to determine the validity of the
contested proclamation is far from being
identical to, or even comparable with, its
power over ordinary civil or criminal cases
elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from
inferior courts, in which cases the
appellate court has all of the powers of the
court of origin.
Relying upon this view, it is urged by the
Solicitor General
... that judicial inquiry into the
basis
of
the
questioned
proclamation
can go
no
further than
to
satisfy
the
Court not that the President's
decision is correct and that public
safety was endanger by the
rebellion
and
justified
the
suspension of the writ, but that in
suspending the writ, the President
did not actarbitrarily.
As heretofore adverted to, for the valid
suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a)
there must be "invasion, insurrection or
rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2),
section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution
"imminent danger thereof";

two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all

Communists, whether they belong
to the traditional group or to the
Maoist faction, believe that force
and violence are indispensable to
the attainment of their main and
ultimate objective, and act in
accordance with such belief,
although they may disagree on the
means to be used at a given time
and in a particular place; and (b)
there
is
a
New
People's
Army, other, of course, that the
arm forces of the Republic and
antagonistic thereto. Such New
People's Army is per se proof of
the existence of
a
rebellion,
especially considering that its
establishment
was announced
publicly by the reorganized CPP.
Such announcement is in the
nature of a public challenge to the
duly constituted authorities and
may be likened to a declaration of
war, sufficient to establish a war
status
or
a
condition
of
belligerency, even before the actual
commencement of hostilities.
and (b) public safety must require the
aforementioned suspension. The President
declared in Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, that both conditions are present.
The fact, however, is that the
violence
used
is
some
demonstrations held in Manila in
1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize
the bulk of its inhabitants. It
would
have
been
highly
imprudent, therefore, for the
Executive to discard the possibility
of a resort to terrorism, on a much
bigger scale, under the JulyAugust Plan.
Considering that the President
was in possession of the above
data except those related to
events that happened after August
21, 1971 when the Plaza
Miranda bombing took place, the
Court is not prepared to hold that
the Executive had acted arbitrarily

18

or gravely abused his discretion

when he then concluded that
public safety and national security
required the suspension of the
privilege of the writ, particularly if
the
NPA
were
to
strike
simultaneously
with
violent
demonstrations staged by the two
hundred forty-five (245) KM
chapters, all over the Philippines,
with
the
assistance
and
cooperation of the dozens of CPP
front organizations, and the
bombing or water mains and
conduits, as well as electric power
plants and installations a
possibility which, no matter how
remote, he was bound to forestall,
and a danger he was under
obligation to anticipate and arrest.
paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of
our Constitution, reading:
The privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except in
cases
of
invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion,
when the public safety
requires it, in any way of
which events the same
may
be
suspended
wherever
during
such
period the necessity for
such
suspension
shall
exist.
and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII
of the same instrument, which provides
that:
The
President
shall
be
commander-in-chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines, and
whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof when the
public safety requires it, he may
suspend the privileges of the writ
of habeas corpus, or place the

Philippines or any part thereof

under martial law.

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 162230
April 28, 2010
Del Castillo, J.
Doctrine:
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution
to the executive and legislative--'the political'-departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision."
Facts:
Original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court with an application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction
The comfort women have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing
a claim against the Japanese officials and
military
officers
who
ordered
the
establishment of the comfort women stations
in the Philippines. However, officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the
petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied
by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Issue:
Can the Supreme Court issue a WPMI to
compel the Executive Department to
espouse the comfort womens claim
against the Japanese Government?
Held:
No. Political question. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the
Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners claims against Japan.

19

political questions refer "to those questions

which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."
It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative--'the political'--departments of
the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision."
the Executive Department has already
decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951.
[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation
in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign relations.
The Executive Department has determined
that taking up petitioners cause would be
inimical to our countrys foreign policy
interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan,
thereby
creating
serious
implications for stability in this region. For us
to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.

Mamba v. Lara
G.R. No. 165109
December 14, 2009
Del Castillo, J.
Doctrine:
even if the issues were political in nature, it
would still come within our powers of review
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us by Section 1, Article VIII of the

Constitution, which includes the authority to

determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government
Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer
for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the April 27,
2004 Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5, Tuguegarao City, dismissing
the Petition for Annulment of Contracts and
Injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan
passed Resolution No. 2001-272[4] authorizing
Governor Edgar R. Lara (Gov. Lara) to engage
the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures
Corporation as financial advisor or consultant
for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund
the priority projects of the governor without
cost and commitment.
the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, through
Resolution No. 290-2001,[5] ratified the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[6] entered
into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures
Corporation.
majority of the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of
Cagayan
approved
[8]
Ordinance No. 19-2002, authorizing the
bond flotation of the provincial government in
an amount not to exceed P500 million to fund
the construction and development of the new
Cagayan Town Center.
RTC: the instant case is a political question, a
question which the court cannot, in any
manner, take judicial cognizance.
Issue:
WON decision as to flotation of bonds and
funding of construction and development
of a town center are justiciable issues.
Held:
Yes.

20

Ratio:
A political question is a question of policy,
which is to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or by the legislative or the
executive branch of the government to which
full discretionary authority has been
delegated.
Petitioners put in issue the overpriced
construction of the town center; the grossly
disadvantageous
bond
flotation;
the
irrevocable assignment of the provincial
governments
annual
regular
income,
including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to
cover and secure the payment of the bonds
floated; and the lack of consultation and
discussion with the community regarding the
proposed project, as well as a proper and
legitimate bidding for the construction of the
town center.
the issues raised in the petition do not refer to
the wisdom but to the legality of the acts
complained of. Thus, we find the instant
controversy within the ambit of judicial
review. Besides, even if the issues were
political in nature, it would still come within
our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by
any branch or instrumentality of the
government

Fortun v. Arroyo
G.R. No. 190293, etc.
March 20, 2012
Abad, J.
Doctrine:
although the Constitution reserves to the
Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper
suit, it is implicit that the Court must
allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in
its express duty to defend the Constitution

through such review should the Supreme

Court step in as its final rampart.
Facts:
heavily armed men, believed led by the
ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down
and buried under shoveled dirt 57
innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. Xxx President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1946,
declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao,
Sultan
Kudarat,
and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress
similar
lawless
violence
in Central
Mindanao.
Then President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law
and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in that province except
for identified areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009
President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress in accordance with Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a
report in person or in writing of her
action.
Congress, in joint session, convened
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to review the validity of
the Presidents action. But, two days later
or on December 12 before Congress could
act, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and
restoring the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Issue:
Is the decision of the President to put
under a state of emergency and later
under martial law and to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus a
justiciable issue?
Held:

21

No. Only when Congress defaults in its

express duty to defend the Constitution
through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart.
Ratio:
Prudence and respect for the co-equal
departments of the government dictate
that the Court should be cautious in
entertaining actions that assail the
constitutionality of the acts of the
Executive or the Legislative department.
The issue of the constitutionality of
Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for
two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her
proclamation
of
martial
law
and
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus before the joint houses of
Congress could fulfill their automatic duty
to review and validate or invalidate the
same.
under the 1987 Constitution the President
and the Congress act in tandem in
exercising the power to proclaim martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. They exercise the power,
not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly
since, after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on
its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does
not have.
although the Constitution reserves to the
Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper
suit, it is implicit that the Court must
allow Congress to exercise its own review
powers, which is automatic rather than
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in
its express duty to defend the Constitution
through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the Presidents
proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress

before it becomes a justiciable one in the

hands of the Court.
Here,
President
Arroyo
withdrew
Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses
of Congress, which had in fact convened,
could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot
and the Court has nothing to review.
If the Congress procrastinates or
altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting
the proclamation or suspension within the
short time expected of it, then the Court
can step in, hear the petitions challenging
the Presidents action, and ascertain if it
has a factual basis. If the Court finds
none, then it can annul the proclamation
or the suspension. But what if the 30 days
given it by the Constitution proves
inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers
the answer in his dissent: that 30-day
period does not operate to divest this
Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The
settled rule is that jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost until the case has been
terminated.

2. Courts and judges; Definitions

a. Court of law and court of
equity distinguished
Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui
G.R. No. 130115
July 16, 2008
Puno, C.J.
Doctrine:
prohibition against an alien from owning
lands of the public domain is absolute and
not even an implied trust can be permitted
to arise on equity considerations
Facts:
Petition
for
Review
[1]
on Certiorari assailing the Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 42993 which reversed and set aside
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 74, in
Civil Case No. 558-0-88.

22

The instant case traces its origin to an

action for partition filed by petitioners
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden,
Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo
against their brother, respondent Vicente
Teng Gui, before the RTC, Branch 74 of
Olongapo City.
Ting Ho,
respondent

Sr.

->

siblings-in-law

->

the RTC considered the Affidavit of

Transfer,
Relinquishment
and
Renouncement of Rights and Interests
over the land as a donation which was
accepted by the donee, the herein
respondent. With respect to the properties
in the lot, the trial court held that
although the sales were simulated,
pursuant to Article 1471 of the New Civil
Code[9] it can be assumed that the
intention of Felix Ting Ho in such
transaction was to give and donate such
properties to the respondent. As a result,
it awarded the entire conjugal share of
Felix Ting Ho in the subject lot and
properties to the respondent and divided
only the conjugal share of his wife among
the siblings.
RTC: With regards (sic) to the transfer
and relinquishment of Felix Ting Hos
right to the land in question in favor of the
defendant, the Court believes, that
although from the face of the document it
is stated in absolute terms that without
any consideration Felix Ting Ho was
transferring and renouncing his right in
favor of his son, the defendant Vicente
Teng Gui, still the Court believes that the
transaction was one of implied trust
executed by Felix Ting Ho for the benefit of
his family. xxx
To the defendant Vicente Teng Gui is
adjudicated an undivided six-tenth (6/10)
of the aforementioned properties and to
each of the plaintiffs Felix Ting Ho, Jr.,
Merla Ting-Ho Braden, Juana Ting and
Lydia Ting Ho-Belenzo each an undivided
one-tenth (1/10) of the properties

petitioners claimed that the RTC erred in

awarding respondent the entire conjugal
share of their deceased father in the lot
and properties in question contrary to its
own finding that an implied trust existed
between the parties.
respondent, on the other hand, asserted
that the RTC erred in not ruling that the
lot and properties do not form part of the
estate of Felix Ting Ho and are owned
entirely by him.
CA: reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC. deceased Felix Ting Ho was
never the owner and never claimed
ownership of the subject lot since he is
disqualified under Philippine laws from
owning public lands, and that respondent
Vicente Teng Gui was the rightful owner
over said lot by virtue of Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. 7457 issued in his favor
Regarding the properties erected over the
said lot, the CA held that the finding that
the sales of the two-storey commercial and
residential buildings and sari-sari store to
Victoria Cabasal and Gregorio Fontela and
subsequently to respondent were without
consideration and simulated is supported
by evidence, which clearly establishes that
these properties should form part of the
estate of the late spouses Felix Ting Ho
and Leonila Cabasal.
while the appellate court dismissed the
complaint for partition with respect to the
lot in question, it awarded the petitioners
a four-fifths (4/5) share of the subject
properties erected on the said lot.
Issue:
whether both Lot No. 418, Ts-308
and the properties erected thereon should
be included in the estate of the deceased
Felix Ting Ho.

Held:
Lot Teng Guis. Properties included in
estate of Ting Ho, Sr. CA decision
affirmed.

23

Ratio:
deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the
owner of the subject lot in light of the
constitutional
proscription
and
the
respondent did not at any instance act as
the dummy of his father.
respondent became the owner of Lot No.
418, Ts-308 when he was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and when
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1064
was correspondingly issued in his name.
Nonetheless, petitioners invoke equity
considerations and claim that the ruling of
the RTC that an implied trust was created
between respondent and their father with
respect to the subject lot should be upheld.
This contention must fail because the
prohibition against an alien from owning
lands of the public domain is absolute and
not even an implied trust can be permitted
to arise on equity considerations.
In the case of Muller v. Muller,
wherein the respondent, a German
national, was seeking reimbursement of
funds claimed by him to be given in trust
to his petitioner wife, a Philippine citizen,
for the purchase of a property in Antipolo,
the Court, in rejecting the claim, ruled
that:
[18]

The Court of Appeals erred in

holding that an implied trust

was created and resulted by

operation of law in view of
petitioner's

respondent.

marriage

Save

for

to

the

exception provided in cases of

hereditary

respondent's
from

succession,

disqualification

owning

lands

in

the Philippines is absolute. Not

even an ownership in trust is
allowed.

Muller v. Muller
G.R. No. 149615
August 29, 2006

Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Doctrine:
Save for the exception provided in cases of
hereditary
succession,
respondents
disqualification from owning lands in
the Philippines is absolute. Not even an
ownership in trust is allowed. xxx
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement
on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought
the property despite the constitutional
prohibition.
Facts:
petition for review on certiorari[1] assails
the February 26, 2001 Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321
affirming with modification the August 12,
1996 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil
Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated
the regime of absolute community of
property
between
petitioner
and
respondent
Petitioner (Filipina) and respondent
(German)
were
married
in Hamburg, Germany on September 22,
1989. The couple resided in Germany at a
house owned by respondents parents but
decided to move and reside permanently in
the Philippines. Respondent had inherited
the house in Germany from his parents
which he sold and used the proceeds for
the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of a
house. The
Antipolo
property
was
registered in the name of petitioner.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents
alleged
womanizing,
drinking,
and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually
separated. Respondent filed a petition[6] for
separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
RTC: the Antipolo property, the court held
that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent.However, it ruled
that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in

24

violation of Section 7, Article XII of the

Constitution.
Court of Appeals which rendered the
assailed decision modifying the trial
courts Decision. It held that respondent
merely prayed for reimbursement for the
purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to
him. It
also
considered
petitioners
ownership over the property in trust for
the respondent. As regards the house, the
Court of Appeals ruled that there is
nothing in the Constitution which
prohibits respondent from acquiring the
same.
Issue:
whether respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.

absolute. Not even an ownership in trust

is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who
is guilty of the fraud. [13] To hold otherwise
would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
Thus, in the instant case, respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground
of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between
transfer of ownership as opposed to
recovery of funds is a futile exercise on
respondents part. To allow reimbursement
would in effect permit respondent to enjoy
the fruits of a property which he is not
allowed to own.

Held:
No.
Ratio:
Section 7, Article
Constitution states:

Philippine
XII

of

the

1987

Save in cases of hereditary

succession, no private lands shall
be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
Respondent
was
aware
of
the
constitutional prohibition and expressly
admitted his knowledge thereof to this
Court.[11] He declared that he had the
Antipolo property titled in the name of
petitioner because of the said prohibition.
[12]
His attempt at subsequently asserting
or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that
an implied trust was created and resulted
by operation of law in view of petitioners
marriage to respondent. Save for the
exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondents disqualification
from owning lands in the Philippines is

Tagyamon

Carpet

Mfg.

Corp.

v.

G.R. No. 191475

December 11, 2013
Peralta, J.
Doctrine:
Laches is a doctrine in equity while
prescription is based on law. Our courts
are basically courts of law not courts of
equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to
resist the enforcement of an existing legal
right. x x x Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and
have no arbitrary discretion to disregard
them.
Facts:
Petitioner
Philippine
Carpet
Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is a
corporation registered in the Philippines
engaged in the business of manufacturing
wool
and
yarn
carpets
and
rugs.4 Respondents were its regular and
permanent employees, but were affected
by
petitioners
retrenchment
and
voluntary retirement programs.

25

Claiming that they were aggrieved by

PCMCs decision to terminate their
employment, respondents filed separate
complaints for illegal dismissal against
PCMC
Labor Arbiter (LA) Donato G. Quinto, Jr.
rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit.
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) sustained the LA decision. In
addition to the LA ratiocination, the
NLRC emphasized the application of the
principle of laches for respondents
inaction for an unreasonable period.
CA reversed LA and NLRC rulings. CA
refused to apply the principle of laches,
because the case was instituted prior to
the expiration of the prescriptive period
set by law which is four years. It stressed
that said principle cannot be invoked
earlier than the expiration of the
prescriptive period.
Issue:
Are petitioners barred by laches to sue
PCMC?
Held:
No.
Ratio:
Laches has been defined as the failure or
neglect
for
an
unreasonable
and
unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, thus, giving
rise to a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned
or declined to assert it.
x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity
while prescription is based on law.
Our courts are basically courts of
law not courts of equity. Thus,
laches cannot be invoked to resist
the enforcement of an existing
legal right. x x x Courts exercising
equity jurisdiction are bound by
rules of law and have no arbitrary
discretion to disregard them.

In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x

x, this Court was more emphatic in
upholding the rules of procedure.
We said therein:
As for equity which has
been aptly described as a
"justice outside legality,"
this is applied only in the
absence of, and never
against, statutory law or,
as in this case, judicial
rules
of
procedure. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis.
The pertinent positive
rules being present here,
they should preempt and
prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on
equity.
Thus, where the claim was
filed within the [four-year]
statutory period, recovery
therefore cannot be barred
by laches. Courts should
never apply the doctrine of
laches earlier than the
expiration of time limited
for the commencement of
actions at law."
An action for reinstatement by reason of
illegal dismissal is one based on an injury
to the complainants rights which should
be brought within four years from the time
of their dismissal pursuant to Article
114633 of the Civil Code. Respondents
complaint filed almost 3 years after their
alleged illegal dismissal was still well
within the prescriptive period. Laches
cannot, therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be
sure, laches may be applied only upon the
most convincing evidence of deliberate
inaction, for the rights of laborers are
protected under the social justice
provisions of the Constitution and under
the Civil Code.

DPWH v. Quiwa
G.R. No. 183444
December 11, 2013
Sereno, J.

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Doctrine:
Our courts are courts of both law and
equity. [T]his Court will remain true to
the rule of substantial justice and direct
the payment of compensation to the
contractors, who have completed their
services xxx.

were in bad faith. Fraud is never

presumed but must be established by clear
and convincing evidence.

Facts:
After the 1991 Pinatubo tragedy, DPWH
engaged
contractors,
including
respondents, for the urgent rehabilitation
of
affected
river
systems.
Herein
respondents-contractors did not sign
written agreements with then DPWH
project manager.

Our courts are courts of both law and

equity. The petitioner merely claims that
the omissions of respondents amount to
fraud, while the records show that the
public benefitted from the services of
respondents. Given these, this Court will
remain true to the rule of substantial
justice and direct the payment of
compensation to the contractors, who have
completed
their
services
for
the
governments Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation
Project. Otherwise, urgent actions for
emergency work in the future would be
discouraged.

The contractors completed their assigned

rehabilitation works but DPWH refused to
pay them because their contracts were
invalid due to noncompliance with legal
requirements. They filed an action for sum
of money against DPWH.
RTC/CA/SC: contractors entitled
compensation. Hence, this partial MR.

to

Petitioner: contractors did not come to

court with clean hands to assert their
money claims for their failure to comply
with legal requirements concerning
government contracts and in ascertaining
authority of public official with whom they
contracted. Muller v. Muller: litigant may
be denied relief by a court of equity on
ground that his conduct was inequitable,
unfair and honest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Issue:
WON clean hands doctrine would bar
contractors claim to compensation.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
Respondents
purported
omissions,
standing alone, cannot be construed as
fraudulent or deceitful. Petitioner did not
present evidence of actual fraud and
merely inferred that because of the
omissions, the respondent contractors

Neither the trial court nor the appellate

court found any design to defraud on the
part of the respondent contractors.

LBP v. Ong
G.R. No. 190755
November 24, 2010
Velasco, Jr., J.
Doctrine:
Equity, as the complement of legal
jurisdiction, seeks to reach and complete
justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of
power to adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent to do so.
Facts:
Spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy
secured a loan from LBP and secured it
with real estate and chattel mortgages.
When they realized that they could no
longer pay their loan, they executed a deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage over
their collateral in favor of Evangelines
mother.
Alfredo Ong, Evangelines father, later
informed LBP of the sale with assumption
of mortgage. He was assured by the
branch manager that nothing was wrong
with it and also that, above all, Alfredo

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should pay part of the principal at

Php750,000.00. He paid the sum and it
was duly receipted for.
He later found out that LBP disapproved
the application for assumption of
mortgage. He also just found out that LBP
foreclosed the mortgage of Spouses Sy
after seeing a notice to that effect. He
talked to the banks lawyer and was told
that the amount he paid would be
returned to him but it did not happen.
Alfredo thus filed a collection suit against
LBP.
RTC/CA: Under principle of equity and
justice, LBP should return amount Alfredo
paid with interest.
Issue:
WON LBP should return Php750,000.00 to
Alfredo.

Ratio:
Alfredo had no other remedy to recover
from Land Bank and the lower court
properly exercised its equity jurisdiction in
resolving the collection suit. As we have
held in one case:
Equity, as the complement of
legal jurisdiction, seeks to reach
and complete justice where courts
of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to
adapt their judgments to the
special circumstances of cases,
are incompetent to do so. Equity
regards the spirit and not the
letter, the intent and not the
form, the substance rather than
the circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by different
courts.

Held:
Yes.

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