Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LABREL Week 5 Digests INC
LABREL Week 5 Digests INC
FACTS:
1. petitioner Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Club) is a domestic non-profit
corporation with principal office at Country Club Drive, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa City. Respondent Alabang Country Club Independent
Employees Union (Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the
Clubs rank-and-file employees. In April 1996, respondents Christopher
Pizarro, Michael Braza, and Nolasco Castueras were elected Union
President, Vice-President, and Treasurer, respectively.
2.On June 21, 1999, the Club and the Union entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which provided for a Union shop and
maintenance of membership shop.
ARTICLE II
UNION SECURITY
SECTION 4. TERMINATION UPON UNION DEMAND. Upon
written demand of the UNION and after observing due process,
ISSUE/S:
1. whether the three respondents were illegally dismissed
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the latter alone was dismissed. Frio was given a suspension term only.
Gr No. L-17535
The action of the employee in exchanging shifts with another, who was
performing the same kind of work in the company, without prior authorization
of the company, in order to testify before the Court of Industrial Relations on
a case against the company, does not by itself show any wanton disregard of
the companys rule of discipline. On the contrary the dismissed employee did
his best to avoid impairing the normal business operation of the company by
exchanging shifts with another. There is more reason to believe that the
dismissal was due to the employees union activities; that is, in testifying
unfavorable against the company in an unfair labor practice case.
FACTS:
1. Pablo Fernandez was employed by H. G. Henares & Sons as laboratory
assistant in the quality control section whose job was "to conduct tests on the
percentage of solidity of ink and other products" of the company.
2. His regular working hours were from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. daily. One day,
he approached Francisco Frio, another laboratory assistant working on the
night shift, and arranged to take over the latters shift from midnight to 8:00
a.m., of the next day.
3. Francisco Frio, on the other hand, was to work on Fernandez shift from
7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m The arrangement was without the companys prior
approval, however it enabled him to testify in the hearing of the case filed
with CIR of unfair labor practice case filed against the company on behalf of
one of its employees.
4. The evidence adduced shows that Martinez who was their immediate
superior, learned of the unauthorized exchange of shift from Francisco Frio
whom she questioned after she allegedly discovered evidence of poor quality
control work on the night shift.
5. When this fact was brought to the attention of the production manager, the
latter issued a memorandum recommending Fernandez discharge from the
company. Both Francisco Frio and Pablo Fernandez were investigated, but
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8
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10
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.
11
FACTS:
1
2
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continuously working for SanMig for a period ranging from six (6) months
to fifteen (15) years and that their work is neither casual nor seasonal as
they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of SanMig. Thus, it was contended that there exists a
"labor-only" contracting situation. It was then demanded that the
employment status of these workers be regularized.
On the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from
SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA
violations, and union busting.
the Union again filed a second notice of strike for unfair labor practice.
Beginning 14 February 1989 until 2 March 1989, series of pickets were
staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and
offices.
SanMig filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages before
respondent Court.
Respondent Court found the Complaint sufficient in form and substance
and issued a Temporary Restraining Order for the purpose of maintaining
the status quo, and set the application for Injunction for hearing.
The Union went on strike.
Apparently, some of the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite had
been laid off. The strike adversely affected thirteen (13) of the latter's
plants and offices.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1
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Union filed a complaint for ULP on the part of GMC for refusal to bargain
collectively.
GMC and the union concluded a CBA which included the issue of
representation effective for a term of three years.
On the day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a
proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted
within 10 days.
ISSUES:
A month after the expiration of the CBA, GMC wrote a letter to the unions
officers stating that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union
which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always
willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was
open to suggestions on how the company may improve its operations.
WON GMC is guilty of ULP for violating the duty to bargain collectively
and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. YES
Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it imposed on GMC the
draft CBA proposed by the union for two years commencing from the
expiration of the original CBA? YES
RULING:
1
The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for
five years. The relation between labor and management should be
undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable
that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of
the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining
agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five
(5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The
unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from
the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said
period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in
good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the
union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company
committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase duty to
bargain collectively, thus:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to
bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement....
We have held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his
statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the
individual case.
Under Article 252, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation
to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose
of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it
presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the
effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article
252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence
of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.
GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union
is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse
that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory
as it turned out to be utterly baseless. We hold that GMCs refusal to make a
counter-proposal to the unions proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication
of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer
to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty
to bargain collectively.
General rule: is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue
to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed
upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are equal. That
is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith.
Exception: However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by
purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule
is warranted.
It would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions
contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMCs
employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBAs duration. We are not
inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted
to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was GMC which violated
the duty to bargain collectively, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or
renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union.
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-------------------------------------------------132 St. John Colleges, Inc. v. St. John Academy Faculty and Employees
Union
GR NO./ SCRA NO. 167892
Date October 27, 2006
Digest by: Anna Beatrice S. Tarrosa
-------------------------------------------------Petitioner: St. John Colleges, Inc
Respondent: St. John Academy Faculty And Employees Union
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J
Topic: Violation of Duty to Bargain
FACTS:
1. Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which
owns and operates the St. Johns Academy (later renamed St. John
Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a
secondary course only. The high school then employed about 80 teaching
and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John Academy
Faculty & Employees Union (Union).The CBA between SJCI and the Union
was set to expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective bargaining
negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in
workers benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the
holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10, 1997.In order to end
the strike, SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the NCMB, agreed to
refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for
assumption of jurisdiction. After which, the strike ended and classes
resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order dated January19, 1998
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the
Labor Code. The partieswere required to submit their respective position
papers. Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board
of Directors of SJCI approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution
recommending the closure of the high school which was approved by the
stockholders on even date.
2. Thereafter, SJCI informed the DOLE, DECS, parents, students and the
Union of the impending closure of the high school which took effect on March
31, 1998. Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the
high school agreed to the closure. Some 51 employees had received their
separation compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept the
same. Instead, these employees conducted a protest action within the
perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike.
3. Thereafter SJCI filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the
NLRC. It claimed that the strike was conducted in violation of the procedural
requirements for holding a valid strike under the Labor Code. Subsequently,
the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal
dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the
NLRC, alleging that the closure of the high school was done in bad faith in
order to get rid of the Union and render useless any decision of the SOLE on
the CBA deadlocked issues.
4. LA: Dismissed the Unions complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while
granting SJCIs petition to declare the strike illegal coupled with a declaration
of loss of employment status of the 25 Union members involved in the strike.
[SOLE: Union filed a manifestation to maintain the status quo on March 30,
1998 praying that SJCI be enjoined from closing the high school. It claimed
that the decision of SJCI to close the high school violated the SOLEs
assumption order and the agreement of the parties not to take any retaliatory
action against the other. For its part, SJCI filed a motion to dismiss with entry
of appearance on October 14, 1998 claiming that the closure of the high
school rendered the CBA deadlocked issues moot. The SOLE denied SJCIs
motions to dismiss and certified the CBA deadlock case to the NLRC] After
the favorable decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI resolved to reopen the high
school for school year 1999-2000. However, it did not restore the high school
teaching and non-teaching employees it earlier terminated. That same school
year SJCI opened an elementary and college department.
When SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the Union members.
Evidently, the closure had achieved its purpose, that is, to get rid of the Union
members.
Evidence provides that subsequent reopening of the high school after only
one year from its closure further show that the high schools closure was
done in bad faith.
Thus, the SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on
May 4, 1998 was illegal for failure to take the necessary strike vote and give
a notice of strike. However, the High Court finds for the findings of the NLRC
and CA that the protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike
because, by then, the employer-employee relationship has long ceased to
exist because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.
In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the closure of the high school and
its reopening after only one year from the time it was closed down, show that
the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing the
Unions right to collective bargaining and its members right to security of
tenure. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
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FACTS:
At the time material to the case, San Miguel Corporation Employees Union
PTWGO (the Union), was the sole bargaining agent of all the monthly paid
employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Incorporated (SMFI).
Almost nine months after the grievance meeting was held, SMFI rendered a
"Decision on Step 1 Grievance" stating that it was still in the process of
completing the "work management review," hence, the Union's requests
could not be granted.
The Union filed a complaint before the NLRC Arbitration branch against
SMFI, its president and Montesa for "unfair labor practice, [and] unjust
discrimination in matters of promotion . . . " It prayed that SMFI et al. be
ordered to promote the therein named employees "with the corresponding
pay increases or adjustment including payment of salary differentials plus
attorney's fees[,] and to cease and desist from committing the same unjust
discrimination in matters of promotion."
Instead of filing a position paper as is required for step 2, SMFI filed for a
motion to dismiss instead on the ground that that the issues raised in the
complaint were grievance issues and, therefore, "should be resolved in the
grievance machinery provided in [the] collective bargaining agreements of
the parties or in the mandated provision of voluntary arbitration which is also
provided in the CBA."
The union opposed the motion to dismiss.
Then a grievance meeting was held by SMFI informing the Union that
a work management review to be completed and would be done
to address the grievence, asking the finance personnel to give it their
attention. The "work management review" was not completed, however,
prompting the Union to elevate the grievance to Step 2.
The Union likewise charges SMFI, however, to have violated the Job Security
provision in the CBA, specifically the seniority rule, in that SMFI appointed
less senior employees to positions at its Finance Department, consequently
intentionally by-passing more senior employees who are deserving of said
appointment.
Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that All doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. Since the seniority rule in
the promotion of employees has a bearing on salary and benefits, it may,
following a liberal construction of Article 261 of the Labor Code, be
considered an economic provision of the CBA.
As above-stated, the Union charges SMFI to have promoted less senior
employees, thus bypassing others who were more senior and equally or
more qualified. It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or
flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
DISPOSITIVE: Union won. Petition denied
DOCTRINE: It may not be seriously disputed that this charge is a gross or
flagrant violation of the seniority rule under the CBA, a ULP over which the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
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That since their mass dismissals and/or lock out, the dismissed
employees have not found any substantial and/or equivalent employment
for themselves, in spite of diligent efforts to that effect
The Acting Prosecutor of this Court filed a formal complaint with this
Court charging respondent Everlasting Manufacturing of unfair labor
practice within the meaning of Section 4(a), sub-paragraphs 1, 4 and 6 in
relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act 875 (An Act to
Promote Industrial Peace and for other Purposes, repealed by P.D. 442).
A Collective bargaining agreement by and between complainant union
and respondent Everlasting Manufacturing, a business establishment
which manufactured paper cups, water cups, and other allied products,
through its general manager Benito Estanislao Alias Cha Wa began
hiring 24 new workers.
It was alleged in the complaint that in order to avoid the implementation
of the collective bargaining contract, to bust complainant union, to
discourage membership with complainant union, on the pretext of selling
and closing its business, and without any justifiable reason respondent
company, by its general manager Benito Estanislao and proprietor Ang
Wo Long, dismissed and/or locked out all the members of complainant
union.
Continuously thereafter, respondent company continued with its business
operations by availing of the services of the above-mentioned 24 new
workers who are non-union members, using the same premises,
business name, machineries, tool and implements, same officials and
supervisors, including its assistant manager Tan Hoc;
ISSUES:
1
Whether or not the respondent court was justified in completely overturning its March 22, 1966 ruling on the liability of Ang Wo Long (finding
guilty of unfair labor practice) under the May 3, 1963 collective
bargaining contract.
RULING: 1. No, the respondent court was not justified in completely overturning the said ruling.
No, because it must be noted that the respondent court modified its decision
and absolved Ang Wo Long of responsibility for and liability under the May 3,
1963 collective bargaining contract because of its finding that there was a
lack of evidence which would show knowledge not only of the CBA but of the
existence of the union itself on the part of Mr. Ang Wo Long.
Knowledge or awareness of what is going on refers to a mental and inner
state of consciousness, cognizance, and information. Whether or not Mr. Ang
Wo Long knew the labor problems of the firm he purchased, the existence of
a union, the on-going CBA negotiations, and the efforts of the employees
he later dismissed to reach an agreement with management on the terms
and conditions of their employment can be determined only from an
admission of Mr. Ang himself or from the surrounding facts and
circumstances indicative of knowledge. or awareness.
Under the facts are circumstances of this case, it is irrational if not specious
to assume that Mr. Ang bought a business lock, stock, and barrel without
inquiring into its labor-management situation and that his dismissal of all the
union members without retaining a few experienced workers and their
replacement with a completely new set of employees who were strangers to
the company was anything other than an attempt to rid the firm of unwanted
union activity.
There is substantial evidence to sustain a finding of Mr. Ang's
knowledge of the bargaining negotiations and the resulting CBA and,
consequently, of unfair labor practice on his part.
The former owner, Benito Estanislao alias Cha Wa, sold Everlasting
Manufacturing to Ang Wo Long on April 29, 1963 while CBA negotiations
were going on and about to be concluded. The firm had a recent history of
labor problems and the bargaining negotiations came about only after a
strike.
According to the respondent court, the acts of Ang Wo Long his filing an
application for registration with the Bureau of Commerce on April 21, 1963,
his securing the mayor's permit, and his other acts of management were
only acts preparatory to taking over the firm and not acts indicating
knowledge of union activity and the CBA negotiations. We rule otherwise.
Precisely because Mr. Ang performed acts indicative of normal care and
caution on the part of a man buying a manufacturing firm, We rule that the
same care and caution was also extended to a more sensitive aspect of the
business, one attracting the greatest degree of concern and attention of any
new owner, which was the relationship of the workers to management, their
willingness to cooperate with the owner, and their productivity arising from
harmonious relations. Benito Estanislao signed the CBA no longer as owner
but as "general manager." The new owner used the same premises, the
same business name, machineries, tools and implements and the same
officials and supervisors including the assistant manager, Mr. Tan Hoc The
only change was the replacement of the 21 union member with a completely
new set of employees hired from outside the firm. As stated by Judge
Amando C. Bugayong in the court's March 22,1966 decision, the respondent
Ang Wo Long did not show any just cause for dispensing with the services of
all the 21 union members. We agree with Judge Bugayong that "the
conclusion becomes inescapable that he (Mr. Ang) dismissed the
complainants in order to break the union and do away with the existing
collective bargaining agreement which it has obtained only after a strike and
bargaining negotiations."
Another mystifying aspect of the questioned order and resolution was the
placing of full responsibility on the shoulders of Mr. Benito Estanislao whom
the court funny knew had already conveniently disappeared even as it
absolved the only person who could grant affirmative relief and whose liability
had earlier been determined to be founded on substantial evidence. The
summons issued to Benito Estanislao was returned by Ang Wo Long's
counsel who stated that Benito Estanislao was no longer at his former
address. Summons had to be effected through publication. The person found
guilty of unfair labor practice did not show up at the reopened hearings and
as far as the records before US show, had disappeared. The concatenation
of circumstances clearly indicates the participation of both Mr. Estanislao and
Mr. Ang in the unfair labor practice. Hence, Ang Wo Long should be jointly
and severally liable with Benito S. Estanislao for the payment of backwages
to the complaining employees.
Hence, the Court held that they grant three (3) years backwages without
deduction or qualification to the dismissed employees. Following the same
considerations and in fairness to Ang Wo Long, reinstatement of the
complaining employees should be made on the basis of the latter's physical
fitness for the respective jobs from which they were illegally ousted.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
1) Ang Wo Long and Benito S. Estanislao are hereby ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the complaining employees three (3) years backwages
without deduction or qualification.
2) Ang Wo Long is hereby ordered to reinstate the complaining employees
and he may require certifications of their physical fitness by a government
physician; and
3) Ang Wo Long and Benito S. Estanislao shall pay the costs.
DOCTRINE: Appreciation of facts and conclusions drawn from facts must be
such as would be acceptable to a reasonable mind. The reconsidered
conclusions of the respondent court not only fly against the dictates of reason
and common sense but are out of touch with the grounds of public policy
implicit in the Industrial Peace Act and in the constitutional mandate on
protection to labor.
Knowledge or awareness of what is going on refers to a mental and inner
state of consciousness, cognizance, and information.
2
3
4
5
8
9
The Court rejects the claims of an alleged waiver by the petitioners of their
economic demands, in the light of an alleged order issued by Labor Arbiter
Aquino in connection with another case(s) involving the same parties. (It was
Labor Arbiter Federico Bernardo who penned the unfair labor practice/illegal
dismissal case.)
We find this puzzling for clearly, Labor Arbiter Aquino's resolution refers to
other cases and not the instant unfair labor practice controversy. The
Commission cannot feign simple mistake for such a lapse. In any event, we
have held that ULP cases are not, in view of the public interest involved,
subject to compromises. Furthermore, these alleged waivers do not appear
to have been presented in the first instance. They cannot be introduced for
the first time on appeal.
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5
6
6 Apr 1992 The union picketed several (6) premises of their employer
(Bagumbayan and Longos in Q.C.; Angono and Antipolo in Rizal; San
Fernando, Pampanga; and San Pedro Laguna.)
a The union was protesting : ULP and Union Busting.
8 Apr Employer FILED : Injunction to stop the illegal strike, with the
NLRC alleging among others:
a The April 6 strike was a Wild-cat strike, in that there was no notice of
strike, it did not comply with the cooling off period, and there was a
pending mediation proceeding scheduled on 10 Apr.
b That during the strike the union impeded the ingress and egress to
the premises by setting up makeshifts, tents, banners, streamers,
and other man-made obstructions.
c That the union had (and still is) doing other illegal acts such as
threats, intimidation, and coercions against persons with lawful
business with the employer.
13 Apr NLRC heard the petition ex parte, for failure of the union to
appear, NLRC issued a TRO
a Apparently the union was not notified of the petition, the company
misrepresented its address
b Neither did the union get a copy of the TRO, it only learned of it when
it was posted on 15Apr in the premises of the company
24 Apr the Union in turn FILED: Injunction, to enjoin the company from
asking the aid of police and military to escort scabs (Case really said
scabs, but it should probably have been people and vehicles) from
entering the establishment.
30 Apr the employer filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction alleging: that the union was still committing illegal
acts complained of despite the TRO.
4 Mar : Union was notified of the motion.
a Next day (5 Mar) the union opposed the motion on the ground that
they were never furnished a copy of the petition for injunction.
NLRC (Same day that union opposed, just one day after the union was
notified): issued the disputed order, GRANTED Employers Preliminary
Injunction against the union, based on testimonies, that:
a Despite TRO strike continued
b By forming a human blockade, the union prevented vehicles from
entering the premises
c By force and intimidation prevented the non striking employees from
going to work
d Wala kaming pakielem sa TRO ninyoBubugbugin namin kayo pag
kayo nagpilit
e Ramon Bana, Union President: sisimentuhin naming ang gates ng
Concrete Aggregate na kahit ipis as hindi makakpasok
8 Union filed the instant petition for certiorari
ISSUE/S:
1. : WON the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction against the union was
proper?
RULING: NO. It violated their right to strike, and it did not comply with the
LCs requirements for the issuance of an injunction
1
DOCTRINE: The restoration of the right to strike is the most valuable gain of
labor after the EDSA revolution. It is the employees sole weapon. In
recognition of its importance, our Consti has accorded this right a distinct
status while our laws have assured that its rightful exercise will not be
negated by the issuance of unnecessary injunctions
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FACTS:
1. Company was the exclusive coupon taxi concessionaire at the NAIA by
virtue of a five-year concession contract awarded by the MIAA.
2. Under the terms of the contract, the coupon taxi units assigned to service
arriving plane passengers would be dispatched from the garage located at
the Duty Free Compound opposite NAIA, whereas units assigned to service
departing plane passengers would be given their assignment by the garage
dispatcher via a two-way radio system on their way back to the garage after
taking arriving passengers to their destination.
3. Infante and others had been taxi drivers of the company, and before they
were dismissed, they were assigned at the Domestic Airport on two the
shifts: morning and afternoon shift. .One was assigned to the morning shift [
and Infante and the other were assigned to the afternoon shift.
4. The Company claimed to have received from the Union a lettermemorandum demanding the dismissal from employment of two drivers of r
on the ground that they were found guilty of committing acts of disloyalty,
conduct unbecoming of a union member and acts inimical to the interest of
the Union. The Union based its action on a petition filed by said employees
calling for a local election. So the two were terminated.
5. When the drivers found out about the incident, they stopped driving their
taxi cabs apparently in sympathy with their dismissed colleagues. Thus the
Company alleged that the work stoppage constituted an illegal strike at the
work premises. Also they averred various illegal acts, such as stopping,
barring and intimidating other employees wishing to enter the work premises,
were committed by the said drivers that resulted in the paralyzation of the
Company.
6. So the Company ordered the striking workers to return to work but some of
the drivers, including Infante and others, refused to do so. Then the
Company filed an action for illegal strike before the Labor Arbiter against
thirty-seven (37) drivers. Two days later, said drivers filed a case for illegal
dismissal against them.
7. In a Joint Affidavit Infante and Borbo denied joining the alleged
strike. They narrated that they reported to work at the domestic airport but
did not find their taxi in the area. They proceeded to the garage at the Duty
Free shop. The dispatcher and the counter sales clerk were likewise not
around. Thereafter, they learned about the protest of their co-workers over
the dismissal of Gonzales and Alzaga. They soon found out that the
management had stopped company operation that afternoon but they stayed
until before lunch. They did not report for work on the following day because
it was their day-off. When they came back to report for work, they were
refused entry by the guard because their names did not appear on the list of
drivers allowed to work on that day. They soon received a copy of the
complaint filed by petitioner charging them with illegal strike
Out of the 37 complaining drivers, only seven remained as complainants
when the case reached the Labor Arbiter. Others executed their respective
affidavits of desistance and filed the corresponding motion to dismiss.
LA: illegal strike, but the drivers who did not participate in the strike were
declared illegally dismissed. Pay separation in lieu of reinstatement without
backwages.
NLRC: affirmed
CA; Annulled. Remanded to LA.
RULING: YES, According to Article 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as
any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute.
A valid strike therefore presupposes the existence of a labor dispute. The
strike undertaken by respondents took the form of a sit-down strike, or more
aptly termed as a sympathetic strike, where the striking employees have no
demands or grievances of their own, but they strike for the purpose of directly
or indirectly aiding others, without direct relation to the advancement of the
interest of the strikers. It is indubitable that an illegal strike in the form of a sitdown strike occurred in petitioners premises, as a show of sympathy to the
two employees who were dismissed by petitioner. Apart from the allegations
in its complaint for illegal strike filed before the Labor Arbiter, petitioner
presented the affidavits and testimonies of their other employees which
confirm the participation of respondents in the illegal strike. Petitioner has
sufficiently established that respondents remained in the work premises in
the guise of waiting for orders from management to resume operations when,
in fact, they were actively participating in the illegal strike.
The office telegram sent to individual respondents informing them to return
to work went unheeded. Respondents failed to satisfactorily explain their
conspicuous absence following the day of the purported illegal strike. No
record whatsoever was presented by Borbo and Infante to prove that 17 May
1990was their day-off. It was convenient to pass the buck on petitioner by
alleging that proof of their alibi is in petitioners file. Castaeda could not even
present a sick leave form to attest to his absence from 11-15 May 1990.
Moreover, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals appeared unanimous in
sustaining the findings of the Labor Arbiter with respect to respondents
participation in the illegal strike. The appellate courts decision dwelt on the
fact that no illegal activities were committed by respondents in the course of
the illegal strike, hence, reinstatement is proper.
DISPOSITIVE: Company won. Petition granted.
DOCTRINE: The Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute.
146
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on two grounds: (a) deadlock on CBA ground rules; and (b) unfair labor
practice arising from the companys refusal to bargain.
8. The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the reasons cited by
the Union were not valid grounds for a strike.
9. The Union then filed an Amended Notice of Strike on September 17,
1999 on the following grounds: (a) unfair labor practice for the companys
refusal to bargain in good faith; and (b) interference with the exercise of
their right to self-organization.
10. The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the
Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola in front of the Companys
premises.
11. A day before the mass action, some Union members wore gears, red tag
cloths stating "YES KAMI SA STRIKE" as headgears and on the different
parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.
12. The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it "to
conduct a mass protest action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola
plant.
13. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front
perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. All of the 14 personnel of
the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71
production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three
bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were
operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours
due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume
of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical case[s] versus
budget.
14. The Company filed a "Petition to Declare Strike Illegal".
15. The Union filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss and/or to Suspend
Proceedings alleging therein that the mass action conducted by its
officers and members was not a strike but just a valid exercise of their
right to picket, which is part of the right of free expression as guaranteed
by the Constitution
16. Labor Arbiter: rendered a Decision granting the petition of the Company.
He declared that the mass leave was actually a strike under Article 212
of the Labor Code. The strike conducted by the Union was illegal since
there was no showing that the Union conducted a strike vote, observed
the prescribed cooling-off period, much less, submitted a strike vote to
the DOLE within the required time. Consequently, for knowingly
participating in the illegal strike, the individual petitioners were
considered to have lost their employment status.
17. The Union appealed the decision to the NLRC. On July 31, 2002, the
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with the modification that
Union Treasurer Charlita M. Abrigo, who was on bereavement leave at
the time, should be excluded from the list of those who participated in the
illegal strike. She was thus ordered reinstated to her former position with
full backwages and benefits.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the September 21, 1999 mass action staged by the Union
was a strike;
2. if, in the affirmative, whether it was legal;
3. Whether or not the individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner
Union should be dismissed from their employment.
RULING: 1. Yes, The ruling of the CA that petitioners staged a strike on
September 21, 1999, and not merely a picket is correct.
Yes, because The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayors permit is
not conclusive evidence that their action/activity did not amount to a strike.
The Mayors description of what activities petitioners were allowed to conduct
is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitive of whether the action staged
by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the situation.
2. Records reveal that the said strike did not comply with the requirements of
Article 263 (F) in relation to Article 264 of the Labor Code for a valid strike.
ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS
xxx xxx xxx xxx
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by
a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in
meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a
majority of the board of directors of the corporation or
association or of the partners in a partnership,
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of
the dispute based on substantially the same grounds
considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken.
The Ministry may at its own initiative or upon the
help them sort it out or, if necessary, help them file a complaint. In the
performance of his duties, he has to take cognizance of and resolve, in the
first instance, the grievances of the members of the Union. He is empowered
to decide for himself whether the grievance or complaint of a member of the
petitioner Union is valid, and if valid, to resolve the same with the supervisor
failing which, the matter would be elevated to the Grievance Committee.
FACTS:
RULLING:
YES.
supporting illegal strikes, absent any finding that such workers committed
illegal acts during the period of the illegal strikes.
left his employment, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue
to him from the employment.
The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to
be illegal. The NLRC ordered their reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement,
the payment of their separation pay, because they were mere rank-and-file
workers whom the Unions officers had misled into joining the illegal strike.
They were not unjustly dismissed from work. Based on the text and intent of
the two aforequoted provisions of the Labor Code, therefore, it is plain that
Article 264(a) is the applicable one.
Under the principle of a fair days wage for a fair days labor, the petitioners
were not entitled to the wages during the period of the strike (even if the
strike might be legal), because they performed no work during the strike.
Verily, it was neither fair nor just that the dismissed employees should litigate
against their employer on the latters time. Thus, the Court deleted the award
of backwages and held that the striking workers were entitled only to
reinstatement in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. (Manila Diamond
Hotel) v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, considering that the
striking employees did not render work for the employer during the strike.
Dispositive: In lieu of reinstatement, the petitioners are granted backwages
equivalent of one month for every year of service.