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Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006)
Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006)
Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006)
(Slip Opinion)
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
EVANS v. CHAVIS
Syllabus
tation is treated as a denial on the merits, and a petition denied on
the merits was not untimely.
Syllabus
States with determinate timeliness rules. Id., at 222223. Pp. 810.
(c) Chavis did not file his petition for review in the California Supreme Court within a reasonable time. This Courts examination of
the record refutes his claim that his 3-year, 1-month, delay was reasonable because he could not use the prison library to work on his petition during this period. And since Chavis needs all but two days of
that lengthy delay to survive the federal 1-year habeas filing period,
he cannot succeed. Pp. 1012.
382 F. 3d 921, reversed and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and OCONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
No. 04721
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EVANS v. CHAVIS
Opinion of the Court
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Opinion of the Court
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Opinion of the Court
petition turned upon whether the pending period included the 3-year period between (1) the time a lower state
court, the California Court of Appeal issued its opinion
(September 29, 1994), and (2) the time Chavis sought
review in a higher state court, the California Supreme
Court (on November 5, 1997). The Ninth Circuit held that
the state collateral review application was pending
during this time; hence, it should add those three years to
the federal 1-year limitations period, and the addition of
those three years, along with various other additions,
rendered the federal filing timely.
The Ninth Circuits reasoning as to why it should add
the three years consists of the following:
Under our decision in Saffold, because Chaviss
November 1997 habeas petition to the California Supreme Court was denied on the merits, it was pending
during the interval between the Court of Appeal decision and the Supreme Court petition and he is entitled
to tolling. See [Saffold v. Carey, 312 F. 3d 1031,
10341036 (CA9 2002)]. When the California Supreme Court denies a habeas petition without comment or citation, we have long treated the denial as a
decision on the merits. Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F. 2d
344, 348 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the California Supreme Courts summary denial was on the merits, and
the petition was not dismissed as untimely. See id.;
see also Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819, 820
n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that there was no indication that a state habeas petition was untimely where
the California Supreme Court denied the petition
without comment or citation). As a result, Chavis is
entitled to tolling during [the relevant period]. 382
F. 3d, at 926 (emphasis added).
California sought certiorari on the ground that the
Ninth Circuits decision was inconsistent with our holding
EVANS v. CHAVIS
Opinion of the Court
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Opinion of the Court
11
the library excuses the three year and one month delay
to the point where, despite the delay, he filed his petition
for California Supreme Court review within a reasonable
time.
Chavis concedes, however, that in March 1996, App. 38,
about a year and a half after the California Court of Appeal denied his habeas petition, he was given a new prison
job. He nowhere denies Californias assertion, id., at 68,
that this new jobs working hours permitted him to use the
library. And he also concedes that the prison remained
relatively lockdown free between February 1997 and
August 1997, id., at 39, a 6-month period. Thus, viewing
every disputed issue most favorably to Chavis, there remains a totally unexplained, hence unjustified, delay of at
least six months.
Six months is far longer than the short period[s] of
time, 30 to 60 days, that most States provide for filing an
appeal to the state supreme court. Saffold, supra, at 219.
It is far longer than the 10-day period California gives a
losing party to file a notice of appeal in the California
Supreme Court, see Cal. App. Ct. Rule 28(e)(1) (2004). We
have found no authority suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that California would consider
an unjustified or unexplained 6-month filing delay reasonable. Nor do we see how an unexplained delay of this
magnitude could fall within the scope of the federal statutory word pending as interpreted in Saffold. See 536
U. S., at 222223. Thus, since Chavis needs all but two
days of the lengthy (three year and one month) delay to
survive the federal 1-year habeas filing period, see 382
F. 3d, at 927, he cannot succeed.
The concurrence reaches the same ultimate conclusion
in a different way. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, it would not
count in Chavis favor certain days during which Chavis
was pursuing a second round of state collateral review
efforts. See post, at 10. Because, as the Ninth Circuit
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Opinion of the Court
No. 04721
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EVANS v. CHAVIS
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
I
As the Court has explained, both in Saffold and in its
opinion today, Californias postconviction procedures are
unlike those employed by most other States. See 536
U. S., at 221222; ante, at 1, 23. Californias time limit
for the filing of a habeas corpus petition in a noncapital
case is more forgiving and more flexible than that employed by most States. See Saffold, 536 U. S., at 222.
Generally, such a petition must be filed within a reasonable time after the petitioner or counsel knew, or with due
diligence should have known, the facts underlying the
claim as well as the legal basis of the claim. In re Harris,
5 Cal. 4th 813, 828, n. 7, 855 P. 2d 391, 398, n. 7 (1993).
And the State Supreme Court apparently may exercise its
jurisdiction to decide the merits of a petition for habeas
corpus at any time whatsoever. See Cal. Const., Art. VI,
10 (giving California Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over habeas petitions); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 764
765, 855 P. 2d 729, 738 (1993) (noting procedural rules
governing habeas petitions are judicially created).
It is the existence of this flexible, discretionary timeliness standard in noncapital cases1 that gave rise to both
the issue presented in Saffold and the issue the Court
addresses today. In Saffold, we considered whether a
habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court 412
months after the lower state court made its decision was
pending (and therefore tolled the federal statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA)) during that period. See 536 U. S.,
1 As Californias Deputy Attorney General pointed out at oral argument, this problem does not arise in capital cases because the California Supreme Court has adopted separate rules for such cases. See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 63. This is significant because, while prisoners on death
row often have an incentive to adopt delaying tactics, those serving a
sentence of imprisonment presumably want to obtain relief as promptly
as possible.
EVANS v. CHAVIS
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
EVANS v. CHAVIS
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
EVANS v. CHAVIS
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
presumed to be decisions on timeliness grounds. Californias use of a 6-month period for determining presumptive
timeliness in postconviction capital litigationthe only
specific time period mentioned in Californias postconviction jurisprudenceprovides a principled basis for such a
double-barreled presumption. See Cal. Rules of Court
Policy Statement 3, std. 11.1 (Deering 2005) (A petition
for a writ of habeas corpus [in a capital case] will be presumed to be filed without substantial delay if it is filed
within 180 days after the final due date for the filing of
appellants reply brief on the direct appeal . . .). Moreover, a 6-month presumption would be fully consistent
with our holding in Saffold that the 412-month delay in
that case was not necessarily unreasonable.6
IV
The above standards provide me with two independently sufficient reasons for concluding that the California
Supreme Court actually decidednot once, but twice
that the petitions filed by respondent in that court were
untimely. In one order, the State Supreme Court made its
finding of untimeliness explicit; in the other, the 6-month
presumption should control.
First, as the Court notes ante, at 5, the California Supreme Court entered an order denying respondent habeas
relief on April 29, 1998, and respondent did not file his
federal petition for habeas corpus until August 30, 2000
more than a year later. The Court of Appeals found that
the federal statute of limitations was tolled during this
16-month period by a second set of state habeas petitions
6 The fact that a 6-month presumption would probably lead to the result
that noncapital habeas petitions filed by California prisoners would be
pending for somewhat longer periods than those filed in other States is
attributable to the peculiar features of Californias postconviction review
procedures. It is far wiser to place the responsibility for that consequence
on the State, which can readily modify its procedures, than unnecessarily
to complicate the work of federal judges.
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STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment