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Supreme Court of The United States
Supreme Court of The United States
Supreme Court of The United States
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
Syllabus
of the ratio under the relevant statutes and Guidelines. Congress
took no action after the Commissions 1997 and 2002 reports recom
mended changing the ratio. The Commissions 2007 report again
urged Congress to amend the 1986 Act, but the Commission also
adopted an ameliorating change in the Guidelines. The modest
amendment, which became effective on November 1, 2007, yields sen
tences for crack offenses between two and five times longer than sen
tences for equal amounts of powder. The Commission thus noted
that it is only a partial remedy to the problems generated by the
crack/powder disparity. Pp. 1011.
(b) The federal sentencing statute, as modified by Booker, re
quires a court to give respectful consideration to the Guidelines, but
permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other [3553(a)]
concerns as well, 543 U. S., at 245246. The Government contends
that the Guidelines adopting the 100-to-1 ratio are an exception to
this general freedom and offers three arguments in support of its po
sition, each of which this Court rejects. Pp. 1121.
(1) The Government argues that the 1986 Act itself prohibits
the Commission and sentencing courts from disagreeing with the
100-to-1 ratio. This position lacks grounding in the statute, which,
by its terms, mandates only maximum and minimum sentences: A
person convicted of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or
more of crack must be sentenced to a minimum of 5 years and a
maximum of 40. A person with 50 grams or more of crack must be
sentenced to a minimum of 10 years and a maximum of life. The
statute says nothing about appropriate sentences within these brack
ets, and this Court declines to read any implicit directive into the
congressional silence. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs En
forcement, 543 U. S. 335, 341. Drawing meaning from silence is par
ticularly inappropriate here, because Congress knows how to direct
sentencing practices in express terms. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. 994(h).
This cautious reading of the 1986 Act draws force from Neal v. United
States, 516 U. S. 284, which involved different methods of calculating
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) weights: The method applicable in
determining statutory minimum sentences combined the weight of
the pure drug and its carrier medium, while the one controlling the
calculation of Guidelines ranges presumed a lower weight for the car
rier medium. This Court rejected the argument that the Guidelines
and the statute should be interpreted consistently, with the Guide
lines presumptive-weight method controlling the mandatory mini
mum calculation. Were the Governments current position correct,
the Guidelines involved in Neal would be in serious jeopardy. The
same reasons alleged to justify reading into the 1986 Act an implicit
command to the Commission and sentencing courts to apply the 100
Syllabus
ognized that some departures from uniformity were a necessary cost
of the remedy that decision adopted. And as to crack sentences in
particular, possible variations among district courts are constrained
by the 1986 Acts mandatory minimums. Moreover, to the extent
that the Government correctly identifies risks of unwarranted sen
tence disparities within the meaning of 3353(a)(6), the proper solu
tion is for district courts to take account of sentencing practices in
other courts and the cliffs resulting from the statutory mandatory
minimum sentences and weigh these disparities against the other
3553(a) factors and any unwarranted disparities created by the
crack/powder ratio itself. Pp. 1820.
(c) Booker rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, 543
U. S., at 245, but preserved a key role for the Sentencing Commis
sion. In the ordinary case, the Commissions recommendation of a
sentencing range will reflect a rough approximation of sentences
that might achieve 3553(a)s objectives. Rita v. United States, 551
U. S. ___, ___ (slip op., at 11). The sentencing judge, on the other
hand, is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import
under 3553(a) in each particular case. Gall v. United States, ante,
at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of these discrete
institutional strengths, a district courts decision to vary from the ad
visory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when the sentencing
judge finds a particular case outside the heartland to which the
Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply. Rita, 551 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 12). On the other hand, while the Guidelines are
no longer binding, closer review may be in order when the sentencing
judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judges view that
the Guidelines range fails properly to reflect 3553(a) considera
tions even in a mine-run case. Ibid. The crack cocaine Guidelines,
however, present no occasion for elaborative discussion of this matter
because those Guidelines do not exemplify the Commissions exercise
of its characteristic institutional role. Given the Commissions depar
ture from its empirical approach in formulating the crack Guidelines
and its subsequent criticism of the crack/powder disparity, it would
not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when
sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity
yields a sentence greater than necessary to achieve 3553(a)s pur
poses, even in a mine-run case. Pp. 2021.
2. The 180-month sentence imposed on Kimbrough should survive
appellate inspection. The District Court began by properly calculat
ing and considering the advisory Guidelines range. It then addressed
the relevant 3553(a) factors, including the Sentencing Commissions
reports criticizing the 100-to-1 ratio. Finally, the court did not pur
port to establish a ratio of its own, but appropriately framed its final
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UNITED STATES
2 Kimbrough
to 270 months with the range that would have applied had
he been accountable for an equivalent amount of powder
cocaine: 97 to 106 months, inclusive of the 5-year manda
tory minimum for the firearm charge, see USSG 2D1.1(c);
id., ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table. Concluding that the
statutory minimum sentence was clearly long enough to
accomplish the objectives listed in 3553(a), the court
sentenced Kimbrough to 15 years, or 180 months, in
prison plus 5 years of supervised release. App. 7475.3
In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Fourth Cir
cuit vacated the sentence. Under Circuit precedent, the
Court of Appeals observed, a sentence outside the guide
lines range is per se unreasonable when it is based on a
disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and
powder cocaine offenses. 174 Fed. Appx., at 799 (citing
United States v. Eura, 440 F. 3d 625, 633634 (CA4 2006)).
We granted certiorari, 551 U. S. ___ (2007), to determine
whether the crack/powder disparity adopted in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines has been rendered advi
sory by our decision in Booker.4
II
5 Injecting
8 An
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13 The Government concedes that a district court may vary from the
100-to-1 ratio if it does so based on the individualized circumstance[s]
of a particular case. Brief for United States 45. But the Government
maintains that the 100-to-1 ratio is binding in the sense that a court
may not give any weight to its own view that the ratio itself is inconsis
tent with the 3553(a) factors.
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