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Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010)
Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010)
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) requires a criminal defendants trial
to commence within 70 days of his indictment or initial appearance,
18 U. S. C. 3161(c)(1), and entitles him to dismissal of the charges if
that deadline is not met, 3162(a)(2). As relevant here, the Act
automatically excludes from the 70-day period delay resulting from
. . . proceedings concerning the defendant, 18 U. S. C. A. 3161(h)(1)
(hereinafter subsection (h)(1)), and separately permits a district court
to exclude delay resulting from a continuance it grants, provided
the court makes findings required by 3161(h)(7) (hereinafter subsec
tion (h)(7)). Petitioners indictment on federal firearm and drug pos
session charges started the 70-day clock on August 24, 2006. After
petitioners arraignment, the Magistrate Judge ordered the parties to
file pretrial motions by September 13. On September 7, the court
granted petitioners motion to extend that deadline, but on the new
due date, September 25, petitioner waived his right to file pretrial
motions. On October 4, the Magistrate Judge found the waiver vol
untary and intelligent. Over the next three months, petitioners trial
was delayed several times, often at petitioners instigation. On Feb
ruary 19, 2007179 days after he was indictedhe moved to dismiss
the indictment, claiming that the Acts 70-day limit had elapsed. In
denying the motion, the District Court excluded the time from Sep
tember 7 through October 4 as pretrial motion preparation time. At
trial, petitioner was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to
concurrent prison terms. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of
the motion to dismiss, holding that the period from September 7
through October 4 was automatically excludable from the 70-day
limit under subsection (h)(1).
Held: The time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically
Syllabus
quate pretrial preparation time.
See 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii),
3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The Courts determination that the delay at issue
is not automatically excludable gives full effect to subsection (h)(7),
and respects its provisions for excluding certain types of delay only
where a district court makes findings justifying the exclusion. The
Courts precedents also support this reading of subsection (h)(1). See
Zedner v. United States, 547 U. S. 489, 502. Pp. 1016.
(c) The Act does not force a district court to choose between reject
ing a defendants request for time to prepare pretrial motions and
risking dismissal of the indictment if preparation time delays the
trial. A court may still exclude preparation time under subsection
(h)(7) by granting a continuance for that purpose based on recorded
findings. Subsection (h)(7) provides [m]uch of the Acts flexibility,
Zedner, 547 U. S., at 498, giving district courts discretion . . . to ac
commodate limited delays for case-specific needs, id., at 499. The
Government suggests that a district court may fail to make the nec
essary subsection (h)(7) findings, leading to a windfall gain for a de
fendant who induces delay beyond the 70-day limit. But dismissal
need not represent a windfall. If the court dismisses the charges
without prejudice, the Government may refile charges or reindict. In
ruling on a motion to dismiss under the Act, the district court should
consider, inter alia, the party responsible for the delay. Pp. 1618.
(d) This Court does not consider whether any of the Acts other ex
clusions would apply to all or part of the September 7 through Octo
ber 4 period that is not automatically excludable under subsection
(h)(1). P. 18.
534 F. 3d 893, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a dis
senting opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined.
No. 08728
_________________
STATES
[March 8, 2010]
2 After the Eighth Circuit issued its decision below, Congress passed
the Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008,
122 Stat. 4291, which made technical changes to the Speedy Trial Act,
including the renumbering of several provisions. The amendments did
not change the substance of any provision relevant here. Accordingly,
in this opinion, including our discussions of the orders and decisions
under review, we refer only to the current version of the Act.
4 In
Tibboel, 753 F. 2d 608, 610 (CA7 1985); United States v. Jodoin, 672
(D) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the
motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
disposition of, such motion;
(E) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to the transfer of a
case or the removal of any defendant from another district under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(F) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another
district, or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, except
that any time consumed in excess of ten days from the date an order of
removal or an order directing such transportation, and the defendants
arrival at the destination shall be presumed to be unreasonable;
(G) delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea
agreement to be entered into by the defendant and the attorney for the
Government; and
(H) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty
days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually
under advisement by the court.
8 See Defendants Request for Additional Time To File Pre-trial Mo
tions in No. 4:06CR518SNL (TCM) (ED Mo.), Doc. 19; Order in No.
4:06CR518SNL (ED Mo.), Doc. 44 (granting same).
9 The
10 This conclusion flows not only from subparagraph (D)s text, but
also from its structure. As noted, subparagraph (D) excludes from the
70-day period delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing
of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
disposition of, such motion. In this case, the comma after the first
phrase indicates that the second phrase modifies the scope of exclud
able delay referred to in the first. Thus, subparagraph (D)s automatic
exclusion for delay resulting from a pretrial motion is limited to delay
that occurs from the filing of the motion through the endpoints identi
fied in the provision.
10
11
12
12 The dissent argues that the relevant proceeding in this case is the
District Courts disposition of petitioners motion for additional time to
file pretrial motions. See post, at 2. If that were correct, any order
disposing of a motionincluding a pretrial motion under subparagraph
(D)would be a separate proceeding, and any resulting delay would
be automatically excludable. The dissents reading renders superflu
ous the two provisions in subsection (h)(7) that require findings for the
exclusion of time necessary for adequate preparation for pretrial
proceedings,
3161(h)(7)(B)(ii),
and
effective
preparation,
3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). See also infra, at 1314.
13
14
15
14 Our
16
17
18
No. 08728
_________________
STATES
[March 8, 2010]
this Court.*
No. 08728
_________________
STATES
[March 8, 2010]
C
The Court does not contend that the granting of a de
fense request for time to prepare pretrial motions falls
outside the plain meaning of subsection (h)(1), but the
Court holds that 3161(h)(1)(D) (hereinafter subparagraph
(D)) narrows the meaning of subsection (h)(1). Subpara
graph (D) sets out one of the eight categories of delay that
are specifically identified as delay resulting from [a]
proceedin[g] concerning the defendant, but as noted, this
list is preceded by the phrase including but not limited
to. When include is utilized, it is generally improper to
conclude that entities not specifically enumerated are
excluded. 2A N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland on Stat
utes and Statutory Construction 47.23, p. 417 (7th ed.
2007). See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S.
569, 577 (1994); Herbs Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U. S.
414, 423, n. 9 (1985); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v.
Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 100 (1941); Blacks
Law 831 (The participle including typically indicates a
partial list). And the inclusion in subsection (h)(1) of the
additional phrase not limited to reinforces this point.
See United States v. Tibboel, 753 F. 2d 608, 610 (CA7
1985).
Because subparagraph (D) follows the phrase including
but not limited to, the Court has a steep hurdle to clear to
show that this subparagraph narrows the meaning of the
general rule set out in subsection (h)(1). The Courts
argument is that subparagraph (D) governs not just delay
resulting from any pretrial motion, 3161(h)(1)(D), but
also delay resulting from proceedings involving pretrial
motions, ante, at 8, and n. 9 (emphasis added), and all
pretrial motion-related delay, ante, at 8 (emphasis added).
In the Courts view, Congress has expressed a judgment
that if a period of pretrial motion-related delay does not
fall within the express terms of subparagraph (D), then it
is excludable only when accompanied by district court
2 The
Court hints that the defenses request for additional time might
itself be a pretrial motion within the meaning of 3161(h)(1)(D).
Neither party relies on this theory. The Court of Appeals found that
Bloate never filed a pretrial motion. 534 F. 3d, at 897.
3 This much is clear from the Courts own language. The Court writes
that although the period of delay the Government seeks to exclude in
this case results from a proceeding governed by subparagraph (D), that
period precedes the first day upon which Congress specified that such
delay may be automatically excluded. Ante, at 910 (emphasis added).
Subparagraph (D) does not speak of delay that results from a proceed
ing, ibid.; subsection (h)(1), however, does. See 3161(h)(1).
4 But even if petitioner had filed pretrial motions, the delay resulting
from the granting of the extension still would not be delay resulting
from the motion.
5 The Court incorrectly states that the Courts of Appeals that have
read subsection (h)(1) to exclude preparation time for pretrial motions
have found it necessary to impos[e] extratextual limitations on exclud
ability, namely, that the trial judge must expressly grant an extension
of the time for the completion of pretrial motions. See ante, at 16. This
requirement, however, springs from the language of subsection (h)(1),
for it is the granting of the extension request that constitutes the
proceedin[g] concerning the defendant that triggers the exclusion
under subsection (h)(1). See supra, at 2.
10
6 That the delay in Henderson was delay resulting from [a] pretrial
motion, 3161(h)(1)(D); see 476 U. S., at 322, 330331, distinguishes
that case from the scenario here, where no pretrial motion has been
filed and the delay in question results from a proceeding that, in the
Courts view, is governed by subparagraph (D). Ante, at 910. Cf.
ante, at 15, n. 14.
11
12
13
IV
For these reasons, I would hold that the delay at issue
in this case is automatically excluded for Speedy Trial Act
purposes, and I would therefore affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.