Double Jeopardy

People vs. Obsania

Facts:
Obsania, armed with a dagger, and by means of violence and
intimidation had carnal knowledge of 14 year-old Erlinda Dollente.
Erlinda, together with her parents, filed with the Municipal Court a
complaint for rape and robbery. Thereafter, the case was
remanded to the Court of First where Instance the prosecution
filed an information of rape against the accused with an
additional averment that the offense was committed with
lewd designs. The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment,
and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective
for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the
subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred
"lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The
court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the
action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the
offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused
were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try
the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the right against double
jeopardy?
Ruling:
No, there was no violation. The Supreme Court ruled that the
controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous
contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and
such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not
on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the
failure of the Government to prosecute. Furthermore, the
appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration
did not terminate the action on the merits.

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in

favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained
in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
Mga ibaibang scenarios galing sa madaming cases na
cinite ng SC
*basahin kung may time.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar
was valid; the court a quo was a competent tribunal with
jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining
and decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case was
without the express consent of the accused.
when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense; because, his action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or
privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him.
If with the express consent to dismiss from the defendant no the
right against double jeopardy is waived.
If without the express consent from the defendant then the right
against double jeopardy comes into play.
In essence, this Court held that where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but
even upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no double
jeopardy under section 9, Rule 113, if the indictment against him
is revived by the fiscal. This decision subscribes substantially to
the doctrine on waiver established in Salico.

Consequently, even under the theory enunciated in some

decisions of this Court (People vs. Salico, etc.) that if a valid and
sufficient information is erroneously dismissed upon motion of the
defendant he is deemed to have waived the plea of double
jeopardy in connection with an appeal from the order of dismissal,
appellees here are not precluded from making such plea.
To paraphrase, had the dismissal been anchored on the motion to
dismiss, the defendants would not have been entitled to
protection against double jeopardy.
an appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the
criminal complaint) by the trial court will not constitute double
jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the
express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an
acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the
merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the
appellate court is purely legal; so that should the dismissal be
found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. (Emphasis supplied)
when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is
estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower
court in support of his plea of second jeopardy. The doctrine of
estoppel is in quintessence the same as the doctrine of waiver:
the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits,
sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be
with his express consent and bars him from subsequently
interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new
prosecution for the same offense.
Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military
authorities, the defendant was estopped from demurring to the
Philippine court's jurisdiction and pleading double jeopardy on the
strength of his trial by the court-martial, A party will not be
allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent
positions which if allowed would result in brazen deception. It is

trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles of

right dealing and good faith, for an accused to tell one court that
it lacks authority to try him and, after he has succeeded in his
effort, to tell the court to which he has been turned over that the
first has committed error in yielding to his plea.
In the first place, the accused-appellees herein filed a motion to
quash on the ground that they incurred no criminal liability under
the facts alleged in the information in the preceding case, No. Q972, and the trial court instead of allowing the withdrawal of the
motion to quash, virtually sustained the same when it denied the
fiscal's motion to amend, thereby forcing the latter to dismiss the
case; hence, it can not be held that the former case was
terminated without the express consent of the accused. Secondly,
the defendants themselves showed that the information in the
previous case was insufficient to charge them with any criminal
offense, in view of their relationship with the principal accused;
and it is well established doctrine that for jeopardy to attach,
there must be an information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction. Lastly, the herein accused having
successfully contended that the information in the former case
was insufficient to sustain a conviction, they cannot turn around
now and claim that such information was after all, sufficient and
did place them in danger of jeopardy of being convicted
thereunder. If, as they formerly contended, no conviction could be
had in the previous case, they are in estoppel to contend now that
the information in the second case places them in jeopardy for
the second time. Their case comes within the spirit of the rule laid
down in People vs. Acierto.
Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient,
but the case is dismissed upon the petition of the accused on the
ground that the complaint or information is invalid and
insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution for the
same offense and the defendant is estopped from alleging in the
second information that the former dismissal was wrong because
the complaint or information was valid.

it is immaterial whether or not the court a quohad said authority.

It, likewise, makes no difference whether or not the issue raised
by defendant in the lower court affected its jurisdiction. The fact is
that she contested its jurisdiction and that, although such
pretense was erroneous, she led the court to believe that it was
correct and to act in accordance with such belief. The elementary
principles of fair dealing and good faith demand, accordingly, that
she be estopped now from taking the opposite stand in order to
pave the way for a plea of double jeopardy, unless the rule of
estoppel laid down in the Acierto case is revoked. As a matter of
fact, said rule applies with greater force to the case at bar than to
the Acierto case, because the same involved two (2) separate
proceedings before courts deriving their authority from different
sovereignties, whereas the appeal in the case at bar is
a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court, which like
this Supreme Court, is a creature of the same sovereignty. In
short the inconsistency and impropriety would be more patent
and glaring in this case than in that of Acierto, if appellant herein
pleaded double jeopardy in this instance.
Twelve days after Casiano, this Court, in People vs. Archilla, supra,
invoked anew the doctrine of estoppel. In this case Alfreda
Roberts, together with Jose Archilla, was charged with bigamy.
After pleading not guilty, Roberts, through his counsel, filed a
motion praying that the complaint be quashed with regard to her
on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute the
offense charged for failure to aver that "insofar as Alfreda Roberts
is concerned, her marriage to Jose Luis Archilla was her second
marriage ..." On appeal, the prosecution contended that the trial
court erred in granting the motion to quash, because the
complaint was sufficient and at least charged the accused as an
accomplice. The defendant maintained that even if that were
true, the quashing of the information amounted to her acquittal
which prevented the prosecution from taking the said appeal as it
would place her in double jeopardy. Mr. Justice Felix Bautista
Angelo, writing for the majority, ruled that the trial court erred,
and proceeded to emphasize that the accused

cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after

inducing the trial court to commit an error which otherwise it
would not have committed. In other words, appellee can not
adopt a posture of double dealing without running afoul with the
doctrine of estoppel. It is well-settled that the parties to a
justiciable proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory
inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court
(Williams v. McMicking, 17 Phil. 408; Molina v. Somes, etc.).
Consequently, appellee is now estopped from invoking the plea of
double jeopardy upon the theory that she would still be convicted
under an information which she branded to be insufficient in the
lower court.
After the accused had pleaded not guilty, the defense counsel
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to try the offense of rape charged by the
fiscal since it was distinct from the one alleged in the complaint
which did not aver that the victim was a demented girl". The
lower court sustained the motion and dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction. On appeal by the prosecution, this Court held that
the trial judge erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction,
but ruled, however, that the appeal could not prosper because it
placed the accused in double jeopardy.
A case of striking factual resemblance with Salico is People vs.
Ferrer (100 Phil. 124, October 23, 1956). In this case, after the
prosecution had rested, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court had not
been published. Acting on this motion, the lower court dismissed
the case. The prosecution appealed. This Court found that the
evidence on record, contrary to the finding of the trial court,
amply proved the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal. However,
without the defendant interposing the plea of double jeopardy,
this Court held that "the Government however meritorious its
case cannot appeal the order of dismissal without violating the
right of the defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy." Again,
like in Bangalao, this Court did not consider the nature of

dismissal whether it was with or without the express consent of

the defendant.
The accused in the case at bar avers that the Salico doctrine
was formally and expressly abandoned in People vs. Labatete,
supra. In the latter case, the trial court, upon motion of the
defendant, dismissed the original information for estafa on the
ground that it did not allege facts constituting the offense
charged. The information recited that the accused had contracted
a loan from the complainant, giving as security the improvements
and products of his property (a piece of land), without averring
that the said property, which was allegedly mortgaged by the
accused to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, formed part of
the security. Consequently, the fiscal filed an amended complaint
alleging that the accused also gave as security the land in
question, which he later mortgaged to the damage and prejudice
of the complaining creditor. This amended information was also
dismissed upon motion of the defendant on the ground of double
jeopardy. This Court, in sustaining the appealed order of dismissal,
held:
If the amended information were to be admitted, the
accused will be deprived of his defense of double jeopardy
because by the amended information he is sought to be
made responsible for the same act of borrowing on a
mortgage for which he had already begun to be tried and
acquitted by the dismissal of the original information.
a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused, is
deemed to be with his express consent and therefore constitutes
a waiver of his right to plead double jeopardy in the event of an
appeal by the prosecution or a second indictment for the same
offense.
o bolster his contention that the Salico doctrine has been dropped
from the corpus of our jurisprudence, the accused cites People vs.
Villarin, supra. Here the accused appealed to the Court of First
instance his conviction in the inferior court for acts of

lasciviousness with consent. After conducting the preliminary

investigation, the fiscal charged the accused with corruption of
minors. Villarin pleaded not guilty, and before the case could be
heard, his counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
information did not allege facts constituting the crime charged.
Acting on this motion, the trial court dismissed the case. On
appeal by the prosecution, this Court thru Mr. Justice Felix Angelo
Bautista, held that the dismissal was erroneous, but that this error
... cannot now be remedied by setting aside the order
dismissal of the court a quo and by remanding the case to it
for further proceedings as now suggested by the prosecution
considering that the case was dismissed without the express
consent of the accused even if it was upon the motion of his
counsel, for to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The only exception to the rule on the matter is
when the dismissal is with the consent of the accused, and
here this consent has not been obtained.
Villarin gives the impression, as gleaned from the above
statement, that this Court therein sustained the plea of double
jeopardy on the ground that dismissal was without the express
consent of the defendant as it was ordered "upon the motion of
his counsel" and not upon motion of the defendant himself. This
conclusion is rather unfortunate and must be rectified, for the
settled rule is that the acts of counsel in a criminal prosecution
bind his client.
the only case in which the defendant cannot be represented by
his counsel is in pleading guilty according to Section 3, Rule 114,
of the Rules of Court.
a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal was not
without the express consent of the defendant, which ruling the
prosecution now invokes in support of its appeal; but said ruling is
not now controlling, having been modified or abandoned in
subsequent cases wherein this Court sustained the theory of

double jeopardy despite the fact that dismissal was secured upon
motion of the accused.
Also, the rule that a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense as said
dismissal is not without the express consent of the defendant, has
no application to a case where the dismissal, as here, is
predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial.
In Diaz, Abao, Tacnengand Robles which are cited above, like
in Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants,
were considered acquittals because they were all predicated on
the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of the
Government to prosecute. Therefore, even if such dismissals were
induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel
were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a
dismissal not amounting to an acquittal.
a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal was not
without the express consent of the defendant. This ruling,
however, has no application to the instant case, since the
dismissal in those cases was not predicated, as in the case at bar,
on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial, but on different
grounds. In the Salico case, the dismissal was based on the
ground that the evidence for the prosecution did not show that
the crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court which, on appeal, we found that it was, so the case was
remanded for further proceedings; and in the Romero case the
dismissal was due to the non-production of other important
witnesses by the prosecution on a date fixed by the court and
under the understanding that no further postponement at the
instance of the government would be entertained. In both cases,
the right of a defendant to a speedy trial was never put in issue.
(emphasis supplied)
Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous
contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and
such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not

on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the
Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this
case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the
merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the
dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to
prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel
requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be
sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his
counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits
and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the
case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of
our jurisprudence.
Paulin v Gimenez
Facts:
The petition before us arose from an incident when the jeep
ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain Castro Belme
Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by herein
petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering
the former with dust. Furthermore, it was alleged that spouses
Paulin pointed their guns at private respondent Mabuyo. A file of
complaints was filed against petitioners for grave threats and
private respondent for grave threats and oral defamation. The
cases were jointly tried and, on June 13, 1990, MTC of Talisay,
Cebu , acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho,
dismissed Criminal Case No. 5204. Not satisfied with the
resolution of respondent Judge Coliflores, petitioners filed on July
31, 1990 a petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with
relief for preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary
restraining order" with the RTC, which was thereafter docketed as
Special Civil Action No. CEB-9207.

Issue:
WON the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No.
5204 against petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration
or reversal of such dismissal as the same would violate
petitioners' right against double jeopardy.
Decision:
No. The municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on
double jeopardy when it set aside the order of dismissal for the
reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it
merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and
dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to
complete the presentation of its evidence. It follows then that the
decision of respondent regional trial court sustaining that of the
court of origin cannot be said to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Demurrer to evidence due to its insufficiency presupposes that the prosecution had already rested its case (Sec.
15, Rule 119, 1985, Rules on Criminal Procedure). Hence, the
motion is premature if interposed at a time when the prosecution
is still in the process of presenting its evidence (Aquino v. Sison,
179 SCRA 648 [1989]), as what happened in this case.
For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the following requisites must have been obtained in the
original prosecution;
a) a valid complaint or information;
b) a competent court;
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent
an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute
double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; (2) the
dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect,
the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.
Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when the dismissal may be held to be final, disposing of the case
once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself, to wit:
1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested,
which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal.
2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial
which is in effect a failure to prosecute.

Philippine Savings Bank vs. Bermoy

Facts:
(respondent spouses) were charged with estafa thru wilful
falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court for
the alleged act of conspiring with each other to defraud the
petitioner. The respondents pleaded not guilty. Their case was
dismissed by the trial court by virtue of a demurer filed by the
defense counsel. According to the trial court, there was nothing in
the transcript given by the witness of the prosecution that could
identify the accused as the one who falsified the documents. An
accused can be identified by pointing him into an open court, or
tapping his shoulder, or if absent, by his pictures attached to his
bail bond. The CA upheld the ruling of the trial court and said that
even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the
accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition
for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy.
Issue:
WON double jeopardy applies to this case.
Held:
Yes. For double jeopardy to apply, the following elements must be
present in criminal case. a) The complaint or information or other
formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (b) The court had jurisdiction; (c) The accused had
been arraigned and had pleaded; and(d) He was convicted or
acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the
accused is charged with the same offense in two separate
pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the
same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such
offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the
same case.[19] The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the

Rules of Court[20] which provides that [a]ny party may appeal from
a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed
thereby in double jeopardy.
Lejano vs. People
Facts:
The case revolves around what everybody refers to as the
Vizconde Massacre. On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and acquitted the Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, et. al of the charges (rape with homicide) against
them on the ground of lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Lauro Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims asked the
court to reconsider its decision claiming that it denied the
prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the
facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a
tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner
that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave
abuse of in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses.
Issue:
Whether the Hubert Webb et al. is covered by the protection of
the right against double jeopardy?
Ruling:
Yes, they are covered. The Supreme court ruled that a
judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places
the accused under double jeopardy which is prohibited under
Section 21, Article IIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Reason behind the law:
There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal
cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If
there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the
same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and

capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would

eventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina,
and the will to fight.
Exceptions:
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an
acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow
as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its
discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a
mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may
assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65.
Icasiano v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Magbago filed an administrative complaint against herein
petitioner Judge Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of authority, manifest
partiality and incompetence. The administrative complaint arose
from two (2) orders of detention issued by the said acting judge
against complainant (Magbago) for contempt of court because of
her continued refusal to comply with a fifth alias writ of execution.
SC dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit in an
en banc resolution. Meanwhile, Complainant Magbago also filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman the same letter-complaint
earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed
violation by Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]).

Issue:
WON the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as
the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case
No. RTJ-87-81
Decision:

No. The SCs resolution in Administrative Matter No. MTJ-87-81

lodged by the same complaining person, Romana Magbago,
whether of exoneration or conviction, even if evidence beyond
reasonable doubt is required for conviction in said proceedings,
cannot serve as basis for the defense of double jeopardy because
MTJ-87-81 remains an administrative case and the instant
proceeding is criminal. One is not a bar to the other. When the
Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the
personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel
administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging
justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not
strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient
to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the
same acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

People vs. Balisacan

Facts:
With intent to kill, respondent willfully attack and stab Leonicio
Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately
caused his death. Accused pleaded guilty in his arraignment.
When he was presenting evidence in order to gain mitigating
circumstances, the accused established that his acted out of selfdefense and voluntarily surrendered to proper authorities. As a
result, the trial court acquitted the accused. Prosecution appealed
to SC that the plea of guilty already determined the guilt of the
accused leaving the trial court with no choice but to impose the
penalties with respect to the mitigating circumstances given by
the accused.
Issue:

Whether the petition to the SC puts the accused in double

jeopardy.
Held:
No. Since the accused pleaded guilty, the trial court should have
convicted him. In the case at bar, when the trial court recognized
the evidence presented by the accused to be enough to result to
acquittal, the accused should have been required to enter a new
plea of not guilty or the court himself to direct the not guilty plea.
However, none of these were done meaning there was no
violation of double jeopardy.
People vs. City Court of Silay
Facts:
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its
case, private respondents who were charged with falsification
by private individuals and use of falsified document moved
to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the
evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court
issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with
costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed
by the accused as narrated do not constitute the crime of
falsification as charged.
Issue:
Whether or not a motion to dismiss a case by the accused filed
after the prosecution had rested its case is covered by the right
against double jeopardy?
Ruling:
Yes, it is covered. The Supreme Court ruled that it is true that
the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the
accused; however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution
had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond

reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the

merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.

Esmena v Pogoy
Facts:
Petitioners Generoso Esmea and Alberto Alba and their coaccused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira
were charged with grave coercion in the city court of Cebu City for
having allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan to
withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to
give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a
game of cards. Esmea and Alba were not duly notified of that
hearing, hence, they were not able to appear. When the case was
called, Father Tibudan was not able to appear because he was
sick. Respondent Judge dismiss the case pursuant to the
invocation of right to speedy trial by the accused. Twenty-seven
days later, the fiscal filed a motion for the revival of the case. He
attached to his motion a medical certificate under oath attesting
to the fact that Father Tibudan was sick of influenza on August 16,
1979.
Issue:
WON the revival of a grave coercion case, which was provisionally
dismissed (after the accused had been arraigned) because of
complainant's failure to appear at the trial, would place the
accused in double jeopardy, considering their constitutional right
to have a speedy trial.
Decision:
Yes. SC hold that the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the
provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional
dismissal would not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if

respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that

the dismissal was with their consent. In this case, it is not very
clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case.
The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused
because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the
complainant and his witnesses did not appear at the trial is a
dismissal equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.

People vs. Pineda

Facts:
In two separate criminal cases, Coronacion Naval was separately
accused of estafa and falsification of documents. Naval thought
that falsification of document is an element of the complex crime
of estafa. In fear that she might be convicted to two similar
crimes, she moved to quash the latter case invoking her right
against double jeopardy. Respondent Judge Pineda allowed the
action thus this petition, questioning the legality of the dismissal
of the case of falsification of document.
Issue:
WON the dismissal of the case is valid.
Held:
No. The SC held that there are four requisites for the proper
invocation of double jeopardy. These are (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused. Naval is yet to be arraigned in the former case of
estafa meaning it is impossible to have double jeopardy because
there had never been a first jeopardy. The first jeopardy is said to
have validly terminated upon conviction, acquittal or dismissal of

the case or otherwise terminated without the express consent of

defendant.

People vs. Tampal

Facts:
On August 17, 1990, the accused persons were charged with Robbery with
Homicide and Multiple Physical Serious Injuries. The case was set for
hearing on July 26, 1991. On said date, however, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Wilfredo Guantero mover for postponement on the ground that he failed to
contact his material witnesses. The case was reset to September 20, 1991
without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on
September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge
considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the
criminal case for failure to prosecute. the Solicitor General contends that
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion when he dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute
despite the fact that the public prosecutor's absence was for a valid cause.
(September 20 is a legal holiday for Muslims in celebration of the Prophet
Mohammad, hence the public prosecutors office was closed on said date.) He
also claims that since the dismissal of the case is void, the case may be
reinstated without placing the private respondents in double jeopardy. In his
comment, respondent judge justifies the dismissal of the case on the rights of
the accused to speedy trial and against double jeopardy.
Issue:
1)Whether or not in the present case, the right to a speedy trial justifies the
dismissal of the case?

2)Whether or not the right to a speedy trial can justify the dismissal of the case
without prejudice to the right against double jeopardy?
Ruling:
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that the facts of the case do not indicate that
the prosecution of the private respondents have been unjustly delayed by the
prosecution hence the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a
fair opportunity to prosecute the case.
Private respondents cannot also invoke their right against double jeopardy. The
three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated, and (3) a second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in
the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2)
before a competent court, (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been
entered, and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. 15
2. It is true that in an, unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of
cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be
stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear
right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to
the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to
speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private
respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.

Melo v People
Facts:
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide wherein he stabbed the victim with a kitchen knife
several times. On December 29, 1949, the accused pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. On the same day, Benjamin Obillo
died from his wounds. On January 4, 1950, an amended
information was filed charging the accused with consummated
homicide.
Issue:
WON the accused would be placed in a double jeopardy pursuant
to the amended information

Decision:
No. The rule of identity does not apply, however when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution,
for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy. "where after the first
prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and
distinct offense", the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicated for the new offense.
Rule of identity: who has been charged with an offense cannot be
again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter
be lesser or greater than the former.

People vs. Adil

Facts:
Margarito Fama Jr. was charged two criminal cases of slight
physical injuries and serious physical injuries. The complaints
came when Fama unlawfully assaulted Miguel Viajar by throwing
pieces of stones hitting Viajar in his right cheek causing a wound
that would heal from 5 to 9 days but eventually left a deformity at
the wounded area. Fama was allowed by respondent Judge Adil to

dismiss the second case with respect to the accuseds right

against double jeopardy.
Issue:
WON the dismissal is valid.
Held:
No. The first charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical
injuries only, because according to the certification of the
attending physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party
would require medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring
complications." When the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975,
only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries
were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a
graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended
party. Evidently, it was only later, after the first case had already
been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already
healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. The scar can
be considered as a supervening event that could warrant the filing
of a separate case hence the serious physical injuries.

People vs. Relova

Facts:
Manuel Opulencia y Lat was accused of violating Batangas City
Ordinance No. 1 Series of 1974 with damage to the City
Government of Batangas by making unauthorized installations of
electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption

of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant. The accused Manuel

Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On
February 2, 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information
upon the grounds that the crime there charged had
already prescribed. In an order dated April 6, 1976, the
Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground
of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light
felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery
thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by
the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense
charged in February 1975. 14 days later, on April 20, 1976, the
Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against
Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under
Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised
Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the right against double jeopardy covers offenses
which are punished by different statutes? (meaning if one is
acquitted from a violation of an ordinance, does it mean that such
person is also deemed acquitted of a violation of another law, say
a statute and is already, given that both laws are identical)
Ruling:
Yes, it is covered. The Supreme Court ruled that where the
offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry
relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available only where
an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense
is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the
acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are
alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is

available so long as the acts which constitute or have

given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance
are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to
the offense charged under a statute.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with
absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be
shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second
offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the
second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof.
Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be
available, not all the technical elements constituting the
first offense need be present in the technical definition of
the second offense.
Reason behind the law:
The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person
by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from
one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set
or overlapping sets of technical elements.
Civil liability:
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because
no reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made
by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action both before the City
Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability whether by
prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not
carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the
offense charged.