FINAL REPORT TO

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

TITLE: Agriculture in Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia and Romania:
An Econometric Model.

AUTHOR: Josef C. Brada

Marvin R. Jackson
Arthur E. King

CONTRACTOR: Lehigh University

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Josef C. Brada, Marvin R. Jackson and
Arthur E. King
COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER:

627-11 DNA

DATE: September, 1986

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided

by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
i
I.
II.

PAGE

Introduction

The Data Banks

A.

The Agricultural Data Banks

B.

Data Banks for the Bulgarian and Romanian National Models

C.

Data Availability

III. Economic Foundations of the Models

A.

Agricultural Institutions

10

1.

Durability of Historical Differences in Farmer Behavior

10

2a.

Central Planning and Administration

11

i. Influences of Regional Administration

ii. Mechanization and Central Control
iii. Weather, Foreign Trade and Central Planning
b.

Primary Work Organizations Under Socialism

11
12
13
14

i. Formation of Socialist Institutions "Collectivization"

ii. Adjustment of New Institutions
iii. New Institutions for Capital Intensive Agriculture
"Agro-Industrial Complexes11
iv. Private and Personal Farming

15
16
20

B.

Allocative Efficiency

23

C.

Output Variability

30

1.

Institutional Factors

30

2.

Weather Effects

42

21

D.

Policymaking in Agriculture

45

E.

Priorities of Agriculture in Resource Allocation

47

1.

Labor and Investments

48

2.

Material Supplies

53

3.

Financial Allocations

56

IV. Toward an Econometric Model of Socialist Agriculture

A.

B.

V.

61

Animal Production

62

1.

Specifications

62

2.

Results

62

3.

Implications for future research

63

Crop Production

63

1.

Specifications

63

2.

Results

65

3. Implications for Future Research

65

C.

Machine Tractor Stations

66

D.

Finances of State and Collective Farms

67

Future Work

68

APPENDICES
A.

Publications and Working Papers Originating from this Project

69

B.

Data Series Available in the Bulgarian Economic Data Bank

70

C.

Data Series Available in the Romanian Economic Data Bank

77

D.

Preliminary Specifications and Estimates of an Econometric Model

of Socialist Agriculture.

82

I. Introduction
The

objectives of our work on agriculture in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia

and Romania have been to construct econometric models of the

agricultural

sectors of these countries and to use these models both alone and linked to
national macroeconometric models, to investigate the role of agriculture in
socialist economies. It was originally anticipated that an undertaking of
such magnitude could not be completed within the two-year period

of

the

grant, but rather that our work would continue beyond the grant period.
Thus, while this is a final report to the Council,
activities

it

is an

in terms

of

project

interim report largely describing work in progress.

Nevertheless, important tasks have been completed, and although these tasks
are building blocks of the final product, in many cases they can also stand
alone as contributions to our understanding

of

agriculture

in

centrally

planned economies. Appendix A lists the work already published on the

results of our research.
The data banks that have been compiled and stored in machine readable
form are described in the next section of the paper.
the

rather extensive

research

Section H I describes

that we have undertaken on sub-sectors of

agriculture, not only in the target countries but elsewhere in East

as well.

These studies form the basis for our specification of the full

model of the agricultural sector. At the same time, they

own

as

studies of

specific

Section IV provides an
Czechoslovak

Europe

outline

aspects of
of

agricultural model.

stand on

their

agriculture in Eastern Europe.

our prototype

specification

of

the

We close with a discussion of work we

plan to undertake during the next two years.

II. The Data Banks

A major portion of the resources made available for this project by
the

National Council have been used on the preparation of machine readable

data banks an (a) the agriculture

completion

of

the

three

countries

and

(b) the

and/or extension of the national level data on the economies of

Bulgaria and Romania.

A. The Agricultural Data Banks.
The agricultural data banks for all three countries generally

include

all data in the agricultural section of their general statistical yearbooks

and, in some cases, other specialized sources.
Each of the three countries publishes annually a detailed yearbook on
agriculture that

is prepared by

equivalent. Specific requests to

Bulgarian

the Ministry

see

of Agriculture

these volumes were made

to the

and Romanian authorities during a visit to the countries in the

summer of 1983 by Jackson. Unfortunately, the requests were

The

or its

contents of these volumes, assumed

from

an

not honored.

early edition of the

Czechoslovak yearbook and from secondary source references, are discussed

below.
The coverage of the agricultural data banks are as follows:
1. Time Period - generally for all input and output series, from 1950
to 1982.
2.

Disaggregation By Organizational Units - generally all

input and

output series are indicated by (a) total for all kinds of units, (b) state
farms, (c) other state units, (d) cooperative/ collective farm units,
personal

(e)

farms of members of cooperative/collective farm units, and (f)

private farms.

Generally, data

for

specialized

inter-cooperative and

state-cooperative units, such as animal fatting and hothouse units, could

not be separated.
In the case of Bulgaria, data for state and
were no

longer published

after

1973.

cooperative

Instead,

farm units

separate

"agro-industrial complexes" are published beginning 1971 that

series for

subsume the

former units and a few others.

3.

Disaggregation By Region - the only regional disaggregation is for

the separate Czech and Slovak Republics

published

in Czechoslovakia.

Data are

on numerous but not all series in the general yearbooks at the

regional level of each country. There are 11 regions in Czechoslovakia, 28

in Bulgaria, and 40 in Romania (the boundaries and numbers of regions were
changed in Bulgaria in 1959 and in Romania in 1968, thus disrupting the
time series of data).
There were

insufficient resources granted for this project to permit

the entry of regional agricultural data in the data banks.

this would

Nonetheless,

be a useful extension of our work, as is discussed further in

our report.
4.

Crop Production and Area Planted - a large part of each country's

agricultural

data bank

is made up of series of crop production and areas

planted. The crops cover (a) grain crops, (b) vegetables and pulses,

(c)

There are 66 individual crops in the Czech data bank, 41 in the Bulgarian
data bank and 49 in the Romanian data bank.
Land

use figures include land in fallow and non-agricultural uses and

various categories of agricultural land under

irrigation.

However, the

shares of individual crops produced with irrigation is unavailable.

5.

Animal Production and Herds - the second largest component of the

data banks covers animal products, including the main categories of meat,
milk,

eggs, wool, honey and feathers.

In addition, we have calculated our

own estimates of animal fertilizer.

Animal herd data are given by main categories of animals, each divided
into

females vised for reproduction and others. Although additional detail

by age-groups would be desirable, enough data exists

for us

to

estimate

changes in herds as an important component of production.

6.

Machinery Inventories - annual inventories of major categories of

tractors, combines and other kinds of agricultural machinery

are

included

in each data bank.

7.

Capital Stock - total capital stock is included for all three

countries and capital stock by major categories (machinery

structures, herds, and permanent orchards/vineyards)

and equipment,

are

included for

Investments - for each country, the annual values

in constant

Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

8.
prices

(and

in current prices for Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria) are given

for (a) fixed capital investments, by

fixed

capital

Czechoslovakia

investments,
and Bulgaria),

major

(c) net

categories

fixed

(d) changes

capital

(b) commissioned
investments

in material

stocks

(for
(for

Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria), and (e) inventories of unfinished investments

(Bulgaria).
9.

Labor Force - the agricultural labor force

three countries

as

is

included

for the

(a) state workers and employees and (b) other persons

occupied in agriculture. Also included are those having (a) higher and (b)
secondary-technical education qualifications.
Unfortunately, details on

other persons occupied in agriculture are

not normally published. What would

be

important

estimate

of man-days

actually working,

and

working.

Partial data series have been estimated

in this case

the

is the

age and sex of those

from

secondary

sources

for both Bulgaria and Romania.

10.

Material

Inputs

(Physical Quantities)

estimates of animal fertilizer as output

Beyond

this,

and

- as mentioned above,

input have been

included.

the only other material inputs given for all three countries

are chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and

power consumed.

(not for all years)

electric

Unfortunately, primary energy consumed by agriculture is

not available.
11. Value of Agricultural Output - the following series are included:
(a) social product and

net material product in constant prices for all

three countries, (b) social product and net material product

prices

for Czechoslovakia

constant prices countries,

and Bulgaria, (c) gross agricultural output in

total, crops, animal

is

included

for

all

three

(d) gross agricultural output in constant prices for the broad

categories of crop and animal output are included

Bulgaria,

in current

for

Czechoslovakia

and

(e) gross agricultural output in constant prices by farm unit is

included for all three countries, (f) gross agricultural output in constant
prices by main product category and by kind of farm unit is included for
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.
12. Value Of State Procurements

the

quantities

of

the

various

agricultural products acquired by the state are included for Czechoslovakia

and Bulgaria.
13. Value of Agricultural Inputs - the values of the main
of

agricultural

and

Bulgaria.

inputs
This

fertilizers, other

categories

in current prices are included for Czechoslovakia

includes depreciation, values

inputs

from

industry,

and

of

seeds, fuels,

elements of value added

(primary income of enterprises and primary incomes of the households).

14.

Imports And Exports Of Agricultural

imports and

exports of

agricultural

Products

products

foreign (devisa) prices for all three countries.

are

- the values

of

are included in current,

Additional

subdivisions

available for Bulgaria, with some in both current and constant prices.

The division of these imports and exports by major foreign trade area
available

in the official

are

statistics of Bulgaria only since 1982 and of

Romania only since 1973 (when it joined the IMF/World Bank).

From the point of view
proposed
remains

of

the

econometric exercises originally

for this project, the main deficiency in the data banks which
is some

information

necessary

for the best

estimation

of

agricultural production functions. The required information is only in the

specialized agricultural yearbooks mentioned above. It consists of

labor,

capital and material inputs in real or constant price terms which have been
used in the production of specific products (for example, wheat or milk) or
of broad product groups
This

(for example, grain crops or vegetable crops).

information has been

yearbooks by

in the

specialized

agricultural

categories of farm units. With it, we would have estimated,

for example, production

collective

reported

farms.

functions

Estimates

at

for grain
this

on

state

farms and

on

level would have given us fairly

accurate information on response rates to fertilizer use and other critical

inputs.
In place of

this

information as possible

information, we
from the

shall

secondary

endeavor to find as much

literature and check this

information using our more aggregated production functions.

B. Data Banks for the Bulgarian and Romanian National Economic Models.
Part of

the

resources provided

complete and develop data banks

for

for this project have been used to

estimating

the general

econometric

models

of Bulgaria and Romania that will be linked to more detailed models

of their agricultural sectors. The preparation of these data banks

uses

data on both countries obtained in uncirculated sources, as well as their

statistical yearbooks. Both country data banks are being
forms complete with explanatory

assembled

in

notes and definitions. The data banks

include the following categories of statistics:

(1) PRODUCTION - By main branches of production, gross social product
and

net material product

in current and constant prices.

By

main

categories of final uses, net material product. Gross industrial output by

branches of

industry

in constant and (for Bulgaria) in current prices.

Gross agricultural output by crop and animal production in constant prices.

(2) CAPITAL STOCK AND INVESTMENTS - By main sectors of the economy and
by branch of industry, (a) fixed capital stocks at original cost valuation,
(b) gross investments in fixed capital in constant prices
only) current prices,

(c)

fixed capital

investments

constant prices and (Bulgaria only) current prices.

net

investments

in

fixed capital,

(e)

(d)

and

(Bulgaria

commissioned
(Bulgaria

in

only)

(Bulgaria only) investments in

material stocks and investments in unfinished projects. For Romania,

only

total net investments and total changes in stocks are available since 1975.
Also, both data banks contain information on sources of investments funds.
(3) LABOR FORCE AND POPULATION - By main sectors of the
branches of

economy

and

industry, (a) total occupied population and (b) state workers

and employees. Urban and rural population.

Births and deaths

for urban

and rural regions.

(4) FOREIGN TRADE - Both country data banks rely on the foreign trade
data bank of Dr. Jan Vanous up

to

1977.

For more

recent years,

the

Romanian data bank contains the figures published in the Romanian Economic

Memorandum
specialized

and

in IMF publications.

Bulgarian data comes

from

foreign trade yearbook. An effort, supplementing the project,

is now underway to estimate foreign trade prices since 1977 using mirror
statistics and analogies with Hungary and Poland.
(5) GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES - the main categories on both
sides of the state budget of both countries is included.
have been used

Other sources

in Bulgaria's case because state budget figures no longer

appear in the general statistical yearbook.

(6) HOUSEHOLD INCOMES, EXPENDITURES AND MONEY HOLDINGS - the main
categories of household

incomes and expenditures (with details of retail

sales) are included for both countries. Derived price deflators are given
total

incomes, wages and retail sales.

Accurate information on money

holdings (cash and savings deposits) are now available for Romania.

These

have been estimated for Bulgaria using published data on savings accounts
and other information on the difference between income and expenditures.
C. Data availability.
The agricultural data banks are available for use by other researchers.
Either hard copy or computer readable versions of the data banks can be
obtained on a cost basis. A copy of the Czechoslovak data bank was provided
with our interim report.

Tables describing the contents of the Bulgarian

and Romanian data banks are attached as Appendixes B and C

III. Economic Foundations of the Models
There are two ways in which one can approach the construction of large
econometric models.

One is to take a relatively heuristic approach and

specify equations on the basis of a theory that need not be articulated in

great detail, with any theoretical uncertainties clarified by comparing the
statistical properties of rival specifications.

Such a procedure is

defensible

in the case of models of market economies because the model

builder can refer to many quantitative studies of sub-sectors of his model

by

others

and

to

empirical testing.
Czechoslovakia,

body of theory

In the

case

of the

that has undergone a good deal of

agrarian

sectors

of

Bulgaria,

and Romania neither prior empirical work nor theory is

sufficiently developed to permit this approach to modelling.

we have chosen the

Consequently,

alternative approach of developing elements of the

theory and uncovering regularities in behavior on a more

systematic basis

prior to our attempts to estimate the full model. This section reports on
those studies either completed or in progress.
A. Agricultural Institutions
One of our major aims in research on this project is to develop models
of the behavior of agricultural institutions in socialism.
modelling, we
experiences to

are preparing detailed

narratives

of

each

country's

summarize evidence from documents and secondary literature

of the three countries that we have collected during the

We

As a prelude to

are vising our extensive data bases

for

last two years.

experiments

and tests of

institutional theories.
A.I.

Durability of Historical Differences in Farmer Behavior

The socialist countries undertook to change the performance of their

inherited agricultural sectors by (a) changing institutions and (b) by
changing resources available in agriculture.

In the West there is a widely

held opinion that growth in agricultural output in the Socialist countries

has been mostly the result of the latter.

Changed institutions are

considered to have had little positive and even negative effects.

One approach we are

using to test the impact of institutional changes

is to test whether socialist institutions have changed the patterns of

relative productivity that existed before the Second World War.
10

Since

changed productivity in the socialist period can arise from either changes
in resources or changes in institutions, we must first eliminate the effects
of the former.

The pattern of residual productivity will then be compared

(a) to indicators of changed institutions and (b) to relative productivity

patterns across the same countries and regions or districts before the
socialist period (ca. 1935-39).

In the latter case, the null hypothesis is

that relative productivity patterns, once resource changes are considered,

will be similar in the socialist period and in 1935-39. This would lead one
to believe that historical folk cultures of the peasants were more important
in determining relative productivity than were socialist institutions, or
that the latter institutions had all similar effects across countries.

In

that case, institutional differences would not be considered very important.

A.2.a. Central Planning and Administration (in place of markets)
Markets were replaced or restricted by central administration and
planning in which the latter covered (a) the commitments of resources
(including the withdrawal of labor), (b) the selection of products and
production functions, (c) the scheduling of farm operations, and (d) the
distribution of farm outputs.

One of the problems in doing research on

these institutions is that the attention of western scholars has been mostly
concerned with planning and administration of socialist industry.

Research

on institutions in agriculture has focused mainly on the Soviet Union.

Hence, in addition to completing our simple descriptions of the routine of
agricultural planning and administration in the three subject countries, we
are attempting to derive testable hypotheses about organizational processes.
A.2.a.i.

Influences of Regional Administration

One way that planning and administration in agriculture differed from

that in industry is that it has involved much more regional sub-division,

11

including using the regional and local units of government and the party.
I t has been hypothesized that a "Soviet-type" system of administration and
planning creates a tendency of self-sufficiency at lower levels according to
the structure of organization.

Product ministries tend to encourage

vertical integration; regional administration tends to encourage regional

self-sufficiency.

Then i t should follow that regional self-sufficiency

would be more evident in agriculture than in industry, unless other factors

intervened.

We are now looking for a way to test this hypothesis.

The literature of the three subject countries on the question of

specialization suggests conflicting problems.

On one hand, great effort has

been made to increase crop and animal specialization.

In Bulgaria, for

example, separate sheep breeds for wool and for meat have been introducted,
the former in the highlands and the latter in the lowlands.
i s also emphasized in processing.

Specialization

Yet, on the other hand, in both Bulgaria

and Romania programs have been introduced to promote self-sufficiency in

food supply at the district levels.
A.2.a.ii.

Mechanization and Central Control

Another difference in the planning and administration of agriculture

has been in the different application of these processes to state farms and
cooperative farms.

The administration of state farms and other state units

such as agricultural experimental stations and machine tractor stations,

closely followed the administration of industrial enterprises, including a
ministry of agriculture over s t a t e units and not cooperative units.

The

l a t t e r have usually been directed by some sort of national cooperative

council and similar regional cooperative councils.
distinction

seems t o a r i s e

A major reason for this

from the fact t h a t units of

central

administration have had much less a b i l i t y to directly control the labor

members of the cooperative farm units.

12

This weak control over the labor of

members of collective farms was a result of the low incomes available

through the net income of collective farms. In fact, incomes were so low
and uncertain that able-bodied males preferred to commute to jobs in
industry and contributed little or no work on their resident cooperatives.
Instead, in the case of production on the agricultural cooperatives,
central administration and planning was effectuated indirectly by
controlling the operations of machine-tractor stations. Naturally, the role
of the MTS in control of farm operations depended on the degree of
mechanization of critical farm operations like plowing, seeding and
harvesting.
One kind of data published with some pride by the socialist countries
is statistics on the extent basic farms operations have been mechanized.

We

expect to use these data, after appropriate research on their quality, and
data on relative farm incomes to test theories on the effectiveness of
central administration.

Relevant to the issue was the dissolution of the

machine-tractor stations following the Soviet example in 1958. We note that

Romania, the country with the lowest relative farm income on collective
farms, was the exception of the rule, keeping the MTS as a control unit up
to this day.
A.2.a.iii. Weather, Foreign Trade and Central Planning
A major difference in the control of production in agriculture compared
to the production in industry comes from the great influences of weather and
the difficulty of predicting the weather. One would expect to find specific
applications of systems of central planning and administration as responses
to weather in agriculture.
Our research on crop variability, cited below, indicates that there is
significant variability in output resulting from the rather high variability

13

of areas seeded to different crops.

We are now attempting to ascertain if

there is evidence that the variability of seeded areas is connected to

weather variations in such a way as it might be attributed to the actions of
central authorities.
A major problem in research on planning of socialist agriculture is
that very few plan indicators are actually published.

These are expressed

annually as targets for gross agricultural output, physical targets for the
main outputs of crops and animal products, animal herds, main machines and
supplies (fertilizers and pesticides) to be delivered and others like the
planned amounts of irrigated land.
One direction of our research is trying to find out how planners
respond when weather causes large deviations from planned agricultural
output.

We are looking at reactions in terms

of the subsequent supply of

farm products for domestic consumption, supplies for the domestic food
industry and supplies of exports. If there is a shortfall, for example,
will food supplies have priority over other allocations?

Similar questions

are being asked concerning the deliveries of industrial products to

agriculture and are also exported.

Do exports of fertilizers and tractors,

for example, seem to have priority over their delivery to domestic

agriculture?
A.2.b.

Primary Work Organizations Under Socialism (state farms and

cooperative or collective farm)

Concerning

the

second

category

of

socialist

agriculture, the various farm units (state, collective

challenge

is to

develop

of

in

private),

our

and

a theory about why particular institutions were

selected by the policy makers in each country.

behavior

institutions

We also seek to model

the

the basic institutional units in terms that will account for

the record of their responses, including their relative productivity.

14

For

example,

in the latter instance, our research on Czechoslovakia indicates

that collective farms have been more productive

narrative

suggests that the

than

state

following patterns demand

farms.

Our

explanation in

theoretical terms.
A.2.b.i.

Formation of Socialist Institutions - "Collectivization"

and Other Changes Until About 1960

In all three of our subject countries, the first institutional changes
supported

by

communist parties was a series of postwar land reforms that

eliminated any vestiges of large-scale private

farms and began to make

inroads

farms.

on

the

middle

sized

or

kulak

The

first major

collectivization drives took place in 1948/49. Bulgaria undertook the most

ambitious

effort of

all the East European

countries

collectivized nearly half of its agricultural land.

and by 1953 had

Czechoslovakia was not

far behind with 40 percent, while Romania was one of the slowest to change
its institutions during this phase.
Collectivization was not the
example,

reduced

only policy

measure.

Bulgaria, for

crop prices between 1949 and 1953 by about 50 percent,

intending, it was said, to encourage a higher

consequence, Bulgarian collective

farms

rate of

suffered

saving.

losses

As

one

of compulsory

deliveries said to be greater than total investment in agriculture.

"New Course" policies were initiated throughout Eastern Europe which
saw the pace of collectivization reduced, even reversed, and changed
policies in the form of reduced quotas for compulsory deliveries, new and
increased prices, and increased investment shares in agriculture.

And, in

spite of events in 1956, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia completed the

collectivation process by 1958/59, the first to do so in the region.
Romania, again, moved slower; its collectivization, resumed in 1958, was

15

completed by 1962.
As a result of examining the processes accompanying collectivization of
agriculture, we have concluded that it is likely better suited for modelling
separately from the following period.

The break period appears to be about

1960; however, we are testing this assumption in the country econometric

models.

The main challenges in the earlier period is to account for the

different pace of collectivization in the several countries. There are two

theories to be tested.

One would say that the pace of collectivization

depended on resources available for farm mechanization, the main device for
controlling farm operations on collective farms. The other would make
collectivization a political decision, depending on party attitudes towards
the agricultural sector and on the perception of peasant acceptance to the
institutional changes.
A.2.b.ii. Adjustment of New Institutions
In the years to follow, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, once representing
the

extremes of economic development in Eastern Europe, showed interesting

contrasts as the vanguards of

organized

over

socialist

agriculture.

3,000 collective farms, reduced their numbers to just over

900 by 1960 and increased their average

hectares.

At

Bulgaria, having

that

size by

1965 to

nearly 4,000

same date, the average Czech collective was just 608

hectares, even smaller than its Romanian counterpart which had around 1,800
hectares.

In the years that followed collective farms in Czechoslovakia

increased gradually in size (falling in numbers)

size

of

Romanian

collective

farms.

until

they

reached the

Those units have maintained stable

numbers and sizes since their formation.

Table I presents a comparison of

farm sizes across all the socialist countries, but in terms of "sown area"
and not "agricultural land."

16

TABLE I.

NUMBER AND AVERAGE SIZE OF STATE AND COOPERATIVE FARMS

Number of State Farms

Country
1980
1960
1965
1970
1975
156
*2B3
Bulgaria
104
*152
336
200
Czechoslovakia
329
250
GDR
572
511
180
131
Hungary
214
147
Poland
947
3121
1155
370
407
Romania
721
391
Bulgarian data are for "AgroIndustrial Complexes" (APK)
Sown Area per State

Farm

1970
Country
1960
1965
1975
1980
2.81
Bulgaria
2.81
*18.6
*10.4
3.02
Czechoslovakia
2.99
4.04
4.81
.58
. 56
GDR
2.95
Hungary
3.34
4.12
4.60
Poland
.64
1.94
2.76
2.19
4. 18
Romania
3.87
4.21
Bulgarian data are for "Agro-Industrial Complexes" (APK)
Number of Cooperative
Country
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Roman i a

Farms

1960
932

Sown Area per Cooperative

Country
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
GDR
Hungary
Po 1 and
Romania

1960

1965
920
6704
15718
3750
1251
4680

1970
744
6270
10029
2805
11O6
4626

1975

1980

2736

1722

1834
1216
4649

1457
2399
4643

1975

1980

1 .16

1.87

1.91
. 19

2.44

1.42

1 .41

Farm
1965
3.32
.45
.26
.87
.12
1 .45

SOURCE: CMEA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK

17

1970
3.64
.48
.41
1 . 14
. 16
1 .37

.23

What the Bulgarians had done was to create collective farms

large

as their

state farms. Their state farms, by comparison, were only

slightly larger than state farms in the other two countries. All
5,000 hectares with

the

Bulgarian

exceeded

the Bulgarian ones going over 6,000. The Bulgarians

also continued to increase the size of an average collective. On

of

about as

change

in organization

the

eve

to agro-industrial complexes,

collectives were allocated some 66 percent of agricultural land,

higher

figure than the 54-57 percent in Czechoslovakia and Romania.

The overall pattern of land allocation to different categories of farm
organizations is presented in Table II. What is suggested by Table II is
that w e need to develop some theories to explain the variations in land
allocation to different farm units across the socialist countries. Since
about 1965, Romania and Hungary have had about the s a m e share of
agricultural land used by private farming, one that shows little tendency to
fall as it does in all the other countries.

Is this a reflection of

successful or not-so-successful agricultural development.

The other three

countries now have about the same small shares and include the most
developed and one of the least developed.

Both Czechoslovakia and Romania,

one highly developed and the other not, have rather smaller shares in
cooperative farms and larger shares in state units.

In Romania's case, this

is connected with its allocation of relatively large shares to "state units

other than state farms," which would include such uses as agricultural
experiment stations. Perhaps it suggests a category of farm organization not
found in the other countries, but we have not yet identified what it
might be.

18

TABLE II.

SHARES OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BY CATEGORIES OF FARM

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

Bulgaria
-All State Units
State Farms
-Cooperatives
Personal/Private

100.0
10.9

100.0
14.0

100.0

100.0

6.6

9.6

79.9
9. 1

75.7
10.3

100.0
21 .3
15.6
68.0
10.7

Czechoslovakia
-All State Units
State Farms
Cooperatives
Persona1/Private

100.0
2O.3
15.5
62. 1
17.6

100.0
29.6
20.5

GDR
-All State Units
State Farms
Cooperatives
Personal/Private

100.0

100.0

8.0
6.2

7.9
6.7

72.8
19. 1

75.8
16.3

Hungary
-All State Units
State Farms
Cooperatives
Personal/Private

100.0
19.3
12.1
48.6
32. 1

Poland
-All State Units
State Farms
Cooperatives
-Personal/Private
Romania
-All State Units
State Farms
Cooperatives
Personal/Private

Country

* 90.3

*90.3

9.7

*
9.7

100.0
29.4
20 . 2
55.7
14.9

100.0
30.3
20.3
60.5

100.0
30.5
19.8
62.5

9.2

7.0

100 . 0
8.1
7.0
78.2
13.7

100.0

100.0

8.2

8.5
7.3

100.0
16.2
13. 1
66.9
16.8

100.0
11.5
1 1 .2
1. 1
87.3

100.0
13.2
12.8
1 .0
85.8

100. 0
14.4
14.0
1 .2
84.4

100.0

1.6

3.9

81.6

77.4

100 . 0
29.4
11.8
50.2
20.4

100.0
30.2
14.0
54.7
15. 1

100.0

100.0
30.1
13.7

100.0

54.0

54.4

15.9

15.6

55.5

14.9

7.5
82-0

82.5

9.7

9.O

1OO.O
15.3

100.0
15.0

12.8
67.6
17.O

70.0
15.0

100.0
15.4
12.8
71.4
13.2

30.1
14.0
54.1
15.8

12.6

16.8
15.6

*In Bulgaria, state and cooperative -farms are merged into

agro-industrial complexes" (APKs).
SOURCE: CMEA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK

19

100.0
18.7
18.2

30.0
13.6

- "Agro-Industrial Complexes"
In

1970 Bulgaria

announced a policy of shifting agriculture to a new

institution, the agro-industrial complex (APK).

Some

170 of

these

new

units had been set up by 1972, encompassing 679 collective farms, 156 state
farms and some 154 "specialized" organizations. The average APK
30,000 hectares of agricultural land.
and average size decreased.
subordinate

had

In 1978 their numbers were increased

Still, they were very large units and

fanning units, the

over

their

"brigades", were often larger than the

collective farms that they replaced.

Additional industrial units produced

over 17 percent of the value of their gross output from all activities.
Czechoslovakia

initiated

similar movement in 1967 when there was

initiated the institution of district-level agricultural associations on an

economic-accounting basis.

By the beginning of 1968 some 65 units had been

created, having a function of uniting state and collective farms in common

enterprises. The subsequent role of the Czech district associations in the
development of

industrial processing

of

farm products will

receive

attention in our narratives.

Romania, generally moving

slower

than the other two, has taken two

hesitant steps. First, on an increasing scale in the 1970's a large number

of

inter-cooperative

enterprises

were

established, usually as units to

produce meat, eggs, or hot-house products.

state-cooperative

enterprises.

data on these units, our

While

research

in

Also

encouraged

were

joint

there are no officially available

secondary

Romanian

sources has

uncovered significant material that will be evaluated subsequently.

A second Romanian step was taken in 1979 with the establishment of 709
"unified state and co-operative agro-industrial councils" that were handed

20

the tasks of planning and managing the work of all agricultural units,
including the collective farms, the state
machine-tractor

stations

(which

farms, specialized units, the

were

never abolished

as

countries), and private agriculture. Our research is still

in other

attempting

to

evaluate the councils' activities.

A.2.b.iv. Private and Personal Farming
Private and personal fanning are organizational forms which appear to
contribute to agricultural output far in excess to their relative size.
"Personal farming" means activities of members of agricultural cooperatives
on their gardens or personal holdings. In the comparisons below, we are not
considering Poland which, of course, has the highest shares of private
farming because it did not collectivize agriculture.
Romania

remains with what appears to be the largest private sector in

agriculture taken by share of land and labor, counting both personal plots
of collective families and private farms. In 1983 these categories took 16
percent of agricultural land. Out of over 3 million persons occupied
agriculture, only

2,168

thousand

worked

on

thousand workers as state employees, leaving

otherwise occupied.

collectives

247 thousand

and about 604

or

percent

Of course, more labor proportionally was applied to

personal agriculture if one counts the total labor applied

otherwise worked

in

on collectives

and

by

those who

those occupied in non-agricultural

sectors who have small garden- sized holdings.

On the output side, personal and private

agriculture

in Romania

in

1983 provided 45 percent of the meat, 41 percent of the milk and 56 percent
of the eggs.

In crops the same farms provided 60 percent of

fruit, more

than half of potatoes, and significant shares of vegetables. These farms'

share of the value of Romanian agricultural output has not been published
since

1965 when

it was 25 percent of gross crops and 64 percent of gross

21

animal products. Our research will

agricultural

apply an existing

Get of

Romanian

prices to output data published yearly on physical outputs by

categories of farms. Probably

the

result will

put

the personal

and

private farm share at about 30 percent.

If

so, a larger Romanian labor and land contingent would seem to have

produced a smaller share of output than was the case in Bulgaria. That is,
in

1980 personal and private farming in Bulgaria accounted for just under

40 percent of gross social product in agriculture. That was done using 9.7
percent of total agricultural land, while only 107 thousand Bulgarians, not
state employees, were occupied in agriculture. That was about
of

those occupied

10 percent

in the sector. But, it must be emphasized, as in the

case of Romania, that many more worked in personal and private farming.

In

fact, Bulgaria, like Romania, has been encouraging subsidiary agricultural

activities by all members of society.
In Czechoslovakia, personal and private fanning used only 5.7
of agricultural land in 1980, down from 17.6 percent in 1960.
had occurred because a
organizational

number

of

collectives have

In part this

converted

to

new

form where members do not have personal garden plots, but

receive fodder for their livestock from the collective.

to

percent

Nevertheless, up

50 percent of the eggs, 10 percent of meat and 70 percent of the fruit

in Czechoslovakia are produced by the private sector (personal and

private

farming).
The

scope and operation of the private sector in these countries are

not well documented in statistical

publications, nor

are

the

regulations governing private agriculture clearly understood.

laws and

For example,

a statistical issue that needs exploring is the way production is estimated

for

farmer-consumed

agricultural

products.

22

This may

be

way

of

deliberately exaggerating total output (it might

also be

related

to

correlated exaggeration of labor inputs, in particular, of part-time work).

Consequently, we
narratives

of

shall pay
the private

special

attention

to the development

sector, to models of behavior,

and

of
to

cross-checks of the statistical records.

B. Allocative Efficiency
It is generally assumed in the western literature that socialized
agriculture

is wasteful and inefficient, both because of the structure of

decision making and incentives within

individual

agricultural units and

because of the shortcomings of the economic system within which agriculture

is embedded.
changes

Since one of our objectives is to

evaluate the

effects of

in the organization of agriculture, from private to socialized and

within the

socialized

sector between state and collective

agricultural performance,

we

need to understand what the differences in

economic performance among various

end, we have undertaken

farms, on

forms of

agriculture

are.

To

this

a number of studies of efficiency by farm type,

largely for Czechoslovakia because the Czechoslovak data bank was completed
first.

We

expect to replicate these studies for Bulgaria and Romania as

time and data permit.

1
Our first study compared

the

collective farms in the Czech

lands

1971-1980.

relative efficiency
and

in Slovakia

of

state and

for the period

Using a relatively simple Cobb-Douglas production function we

concluded that in the production of crops:

1
Brada, J.; J. Hey; A. King. "Interregional and Inter-organizational
Differences in Agricultural Efficiency in Czechoslovakia" in Socialist
Agriculture: Organizational Responses to Failing Performance, eds. J. C.
Brada and K. E. Wadekin (forthcoming).

23

Collective

characterized

farms and

state

farms

by different production

emphasis on desegregation by unit and by

in

the

functions.

two

regions

were

This underscores our

region where possible

in

our

modelling work.
- Collective farms were more productive than state farms when adjusted
for the availability of inputs.
- There appears to
between
farms.

Slovakia
These

determinants

and

be
the

serious misallocation

Czech

findings underscore
of

investment

flows

of

resources both

lands and between state and collective

the need

to better understand

the

to agriculture and their allocation by

type and location of agricultural units.

The relationship between land, labor and capital
may

in crop production

well be more complex, due to possibilities for complementarities and

economies of scale, than implied by a

Consequently

we

have

replicated

general translog specification.

means of Figures 1-4.

simple

Cobb-Douglas

specification.

our earlier study employing the more

The translog results can be interpreted by

In order to abstract from the effect of relative

factor endowments on observed factor productivity, we calculated an isoquant

representing the identical level of output for collective and for state
farms respectively, assuming labor to be held constant. As may be seen from
Figures 1 (collective farms) and Figure 2 (state farms) the isoquant for
collective farms lies below that for state farms. That is, assuming the
same amount of labor, the collective farm produces the same output with
smaller amounts of capital and land than are required by the state farm.
Similarly, pooling across farm units, we obtain isoquants for the Czech
lands, Figure 3, and for Slovakia, Figure 4.

In Slovakia, it is possible to

produce a given level of output with the same amount of labor and smaller
amounts of capital and land than would be required in the Czech lands.

24

26

27

28

This confirms the efficiency findings of our earlier study, and also
uncovers complementarities between inputs and a generally more capital
intensive technology among state farms than among collectives.

These

results will then serve as the basis of policy studies regarding the
appropriate organization of agricultural activities and the inter-unit
allocation of resources in agriculture.
A more complex issue is the comparison of efficiency
socialized

agriculture.

is relatively
specialized

of private and

In the countries under study, private agriculture

insignificant

in terms of

land

holdings, and

usually

in the production of crops neglected by the socialist sector.

Consequently direct comparisons of private and socialist agricultural units

in these countries are subject to

serious bias.

Nevertheless, our

understanding of the effects of socialization on agricultural production is

vital

for our understanding of the development of the agricultural sector

in these countries.
use production

One possible

functions

to

approach

compare

to this question

the efficiency of socialist

agriculture with that of private farms in market economies.

with

this procedure

is

performance of socialist

that,

as

Gale

agriculture

is

is to

The difficulty

Johnson has pointed out, the

strongly

influenced by the

performance of socialist industry, which provides inputs and by the

2
distribution system.
Consequently, comparisons of agricultural performance in capitalist and
socialist countries

are unable to distinguish between inefficiency within

agriculture and inefficiency imposed upon agriculture from without.

Thus

D. Gale Johnson and Karen McConnell Brooks, Prospects for Soviet

Agriculture in the 1980s. (Bloomington, IND: Indiana University Press,
1983.)

29

such comparisons cannot be used to simulate the effects of privatization on

agriculture in our sample of countries since private farms would have to
rely on socialist industry for input, and thus be subject to inefficiencies
not experienced by private farmers in market economies.
To

measure the performance

agriculture
Poland.

in a

Relatively good

horses,

fertilizer

agriculture. We
private

socialist
data

and

relatively

economy, we have
is available

crop production

are currently

estimating

on

large

scale

turned to the example of

land,

labor, tractors,

in private
the

private

and

socialized

relative efficiency

of

and socialized agriculture in Poland. This is being done by means

of a frontier production function.

are

of

assumed

to

lie on

practice and technology.

In such a

function, all

observations

or below a frontier that represents best current

Preliminary evidence suggests that, on the basis

of a production frontier estimated by linear programing, private farms in

Poland are systematically more efficient than state farms. It also appears
that this difference in efficiency may have increased over time.

It should

be borne in mind that these are preliminary results and thus subject to
revision.

In any case, the final results will provide us with some

understanding of the effects of socialization on agricultural efficiency and

thus serve as a basis for evaluating the effects of collectivization on
agriculture.
C.
1.

Output Variability
Institutional Factors

Fluctuations of agricultural production have had serious consequences

for all three countries. Such variation can be caused either by the weather
or by institutional changes that either alter the risks farmers bear from
output variability or the incentives that farmers have to reduce output

30

variability.

In the case of private agriculture the individual farmer bears

the entire cost of output variability and also reaps the entire benefit of
his efforts to reduce such risk. On the state farms, where workers receive
a salary, such incentives to reduce variability of output do not exist; on
collective farms they are diluted by the nature of the reward system.

The

reward structure for state farms is based on plan fulfillment and for
collective farms on compulsory deliveries.

It disposes them to alter

cropping patterns in response to central directives, whereas private farmers

will respond to market signals, but only within limits established by
financial, technical and psychological bounds.
To test whether socialization has increased the variability of crop
output, we examined the variability of harvests, yields and acreage sown for
seven major crops: wheat, rye, barley, oats, corn, potatoes and sugar
3
beets. We found that in all of the East European countries (the GDR was not
included in the sample) save Poland, variability of harvests increased for a
number of crops during the socialist period over what it had been in the
inter-war period of private agriculture (see Table III). Only in Poland,
where private agriculture predominates was there no difference in harvest
variability between the two periods.

J. Brada, "The Variability of Crop Production in Private and

Socialized Agriculture:
Evidence from Eastern Europe," Journal of
Political Economy, vol 94, no. 3 (June 1986), pp. 545-563.

31

Table III
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF HARVEST OP MAIN CROPS IN EASTERN EUROPE PRE-AND
POST WORLD WAR II (in 2)

COUNTRY
CROP

BULGARIA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

POLAND

HUNGARY

ROMANIA

Post-War
Pre-War
Pre-War
Post-War
Post-War
Pre-War
Pre-War
Pre-War
Post-War
Post-War
(1903-1939) (1945-1981) (1920-1938) (1945-1981) (1920-1939) (1945-1981) (1919-1939) (1945-1981) (1920-1939) (1945-1981)

WHEAT

24.68*

15.30

15.59

20.85*

17.09

20.11*

22.66

. 25.50

23.16

20.84

RYE

22.58

61.79*

18.51

11.95

16.49

35.39*

19.88

18.40

22.59

52.49*

BARLEY

24.89

26.80

15.00

11.60

17.25

21.26*

16.10

21.00

37.89

48.25

OATS

21.33

42.45*

14.99

14.94

18.62

33.93*

18.28

15.90

27.37

38.66*

CORN

25.34

25.98

21.13

22.06**

22.23*

14.79

NC

NC

20.19

21.56*

35.61*

18.47

23.45*

19.89

24.57*

15.73

17.69

20.78

21.42*

46.52

28.40*

18.58

31.11*

27.35

38.67*

22.66

50.61

34.77

POTATOES
SUGAR BEET

35.00
72.58*

NC - Hot calculated due to insufficient cultivation of corn in Poland.

* - difference between larger and smaller variance significant at 5%.
** - difference between larger and smaller variance significant at 10%.

32

At the same time, we found little evidence that yield variability had
increased during the socialist period in any of these countries (Table IV).
However, land sown to individual crops proved to be much more variable in
the socialist period than previously (Table V).
such increase in variability.

Again, Poland showed no

Thus we conclude that socialist agriculture's

greater output variability is the result of state and collective farm

responses to central policy decisions regarding cropping patterns. These
conclusions are corroborated by an analysis of the variability of harvests,
yields and sown land by type of agricultural unit. In all countries, the
output variability of socialized units was greater than that of private
units (Tables VI-XI).

This was largely due to greater variability in

land devoted to individual crops, but in a number of cases also due to

greater yield variability in socialized units.
This research is currently being extended in two directions. First, we
are undertaking a more detailed comparison of Balkan countries. Second, we
are attempting to develop some explanation of the sources of land
variability under socialism.

33

Table IV
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF YIELDS OF MAIN CROPS IN EASTERN EUROPE PRE-AND
POST WORLD WAR II (in %)

COUNTRY
CROP

BULGARIA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

POLAND

HUNGARY

ROMANIA

Post-War
Pre-War
Post-War
Pre-War
Post-War
Pre-War
Pre-War
Pre-War
Post-War
Post-War
(1903-1939) (1945-1981) (1920-1938) (1945-1981) (1920-1939) (1945-1981) (1919-1939) (1945-1981) (1920-1939) (1945-1981)

19.98*

14.00

13.03

10.32

13.17

13.58*

16.06

11.40

19.45*

16.54

2.79

13.20

15.02

8.58

13.68

13.69

14.92

11.87

18.86*

15.85

BARLEY

21.84*

14.96

12.87

10.09 .

16.99*

12.79

7.99

11.73*

31.84

17.21

OATS

18.63

21.12

13.10

11.01

16.99

22.09*

11.81

11.20

21.74

18.82

CORN

23.13

27.83

15.03**

14.61

21.04*

12.85

NC

NC

20.01

16.49

POTATOES

29.71

27.74

17.95

15.79

19.40*

16.54

12.44

14.21

13.96

21.39*

SUGAR BEET

34.35

32.47

12.51

16.14*

12.70

18.59*

15.76

15.85

7.78

18.38*

WHEAT
RYE

NC - Not calculated due to insufficient cultivation of corn in Poland.

* - difference between larger and smaller variance significant at 5%.
** - difference between larger and smaller variance significant at 10%.

Table V
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF LAND SOWN TO MAIN CROPS IN EASTERN EUROPE PRE-AND
POST WORLD WAR II (in %)

COUNTRY
CROP

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BULGARIA

POLAND

HUNGARY

ROMANIA

Post-War
Pre-War
Pre-War
Pre-War
Post-War
Post-War
Pre-War
Post-War
Pre-War
Post-War
(1903-1939) (1945-1981) (1920-1938) (1945-1981) (1920-1939) (1945-1981) (1919-1939) (1945-1981) (1920-1939) (1945-1981)

WHEAT

RYE
BARLEY

9.4l

8.81

7.48

13.95*

8.06

12.07*

23.16

15.48

9.42

14.81*

10.99

40.84*

6.68

9.01*

5.78

29.09*

12.88

15.08

9.48

40.53*

14.35* .

4.17

5.42*

6.69

19.96*

13.28.

19.05*

13.70

41.34*

15.33

12.28

12.88

14.89*

NC

5.86

8.90*

7.01

OATS

11.51

27.37*

4.05

9.54*

6.55

22.19*

CORN

7.69

10.78*

9.90

16.46*

4.57

6.77*

NC

POTATOES

20.07

20.24

3.55

16.48*

8.80

13.23*

9.17

10.16

10.81*

8.94

SUGAR BEET

56.15*

20.32

21.05*

13.18

22.29

24.91*

34.41*

12.57

51.55*

19.17

NC - Not calculated due to insufficient cultivation of corn in Poland.

* - difference between larger and smaller variance significant at 5%.
** - difference between larger and smaller variance significant at 10%.

Table VI
BULGARIA: COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION FOR HARVEST, YIELD AND SEEDED
AREA BY TYPE OF AGRICULTURAL UNIT AND BY CROP (in %)

Notes:
H = Harvest, Y= Y i e l d , A - Seeded

Area

2.

Weather

Eastern Europe lies generally between the climatic regimes of Western

Europe where maritime influences dominate and the Soviet Union dominated by
continental extremes and considerable annual and medium-term variability.
Romania and Bulgaria, in particular, tend to have mostly cold winters and
relatively long hot springs and summers, accompanied by a reputation for
droughts, excessive rainfall, and late spring or early autumn frosts.
The obvious importance of weather on agriculture can, in any case, be
specified in two ways.

First, i t can be treated implicitly as one of

several possible sources of stochastic disturbance, i.e., the error term, in

any equation.

Second, specific weather variables can be included as

explanatory terms and, then, their effects on yields and production patterns
explicitly analyzed.

Our research follows the latter approach in developing

our models for three important reasons.

First, research by the CIA on Soviet agriculture has suggested that
Soviet grain yields have been strongly influenced by medium-term cycles or
fluctuations in weather during the period from 1962-1980. In the 1960s
weather was unusually poor and in the 1970s i t was unusually favorable for
4
agriculture.
If Eastern Europe shared the Soviet experience in weather
then i t would appear t o have achieved productivity growth due t o
technological and organizational factors when in fact these changes were not
taking place.

See Russell A. Ambroziak and David W. Corey, "Climate and Grain

Production in the Soviet Union," in Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems
and Prospects Part 2, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United
States (1982), pp. 109-123.

42

Second, in the preceding section we emphasized the institutional

determinants of short-run variability of yields and areas seeded. Such
variability could result from organizational responses to changing payoffs
that are manipulated by policymakers, or i t could result from responses to
the weather and other factors beyond the organizational system. In our
research we are developing comparative measurements of weather variability
that will be of interest themselves because both organizational designs and
specific decisions, like the choice of plant varieties, may have been a
conscious response to weather variability.

In addition, the weather

variables can be included in models of yields and areas seeded to test their
explanatory power.

What may result is unusual elements of variability in

one of the subject countries that requires further explanation in our

research.

Possibly such experiments will even reveal peculiarities about

one country's statistical reporting.

Third, we shall use information gained on the responses of crop yields
to rainfall to estimate what appears to be an optimal moisture regime for
individual crops.

This information will then be used to estimate the

benefits of extensions and improvements to the irrigation schemes being

5
applied in Bulgaria and Romania, even for grain crops.
Our research on weather effects i s scheduled in several phases. We
have already begun the construction of weather data banks that cover two
different sets of variables.

First, we have monthly weather satellite data

5
The suggested methods follow D. W. Pavin, Jr., "Estimation of
Irrigation Response from Time Series Data on Nonirrigated Crops" American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 55 (February 1973), pp. 73-76. ;

43

for all of Eastern Europe from the late 1960s on air temperature, rainfall
and soil moisture. Second, we are making use of weather data reported by
each country on rainfall and air temperature. These data are available on a
monthly basis for numerous reporting stations in each country. In as much
as our research is comparative, we shall also collect weather data on other
countries in Eastern and Western Europe.
Our first experiment, now underway, is to compare variability of
aggregate variables, such as annual moisture in the capital city, and then
to investigate the relationship between average yields for a country and
annual rainfall.
Our second experiment will be to develop a weather variable or set of
variables that combines the distribution of rainfall within a year and
6
deviation of monthly data from normal levels.
For example, rainfall in
certain months is more important than other months, depending on crop (and
whether, for example, one is considering spring or winter wheat).

In

addition, for any given month there is an optimal level which will give a
maximum yield. Deviations from the optimal level in either direction have
diminishing marginal effects, but also can pass over a boundary which would
define, e.g., a drought, a flood, or a frost. Also, a boundary may consist
of combinations of previous months' rainfall levels. Our problem is to find
the best functional forms for defining the weather variables, given these
circumstances.

6
See John P. Doll, "An A n a l y t i c a l Technique for Estimating Weather
Indexes from Meterological Measurements," Journal of Farm Economics, vol.
49, no 1, part 1 (February, 1967), pp. 79-88).

44

Our third experiment will answer whether spatial disaggregation of the

model of yields and areas seeded with weather variables will improve the
efficiency of the estimates.

We will use area and yield data at a regional

level along with weather reported in the same region.

While we assume the

weather variables will improve the explanatory power, we shall ask whether
t h e improvement i s s u f f i c i e n t t o m e r i t

the additional cost for

disaggregation.
One problematic aspect of disaggregation i s the timing of weather
events.

For example, monthly reporting of rainfall can cover up a drought

that took place in the l a s t three weeks of one month and the f i r s t two or
three weeks of a following month.

So far, we have no sources on weather

observations for a period shorter than one month. However, our research in
the secondary literature of the the three countries will attempt to include
any relevant information.
D.

Policymaking in Agriculture

Any effort to construct models of centrally planned economies must face

the issue of planners' behavior. That is, responses to many exogenous and
c
endogenous developments are made not on the basis of decisions made by the
household or by farms, but rather on the basis of instructions issued by
central planners. This raises two problems in modelling. The first is that
maximizing agents.

Second, even if planners' preferences are as stable as

those of households, there may be a greater variation in the case of

planners' reactions simply because their response is not smoothed out by the
"law of large numbers" as it is in the case of households and producers. To
assist us in determining whether planners' behavior toward the agricultural
sector could be modeled and to understand better planners' policies toward

45

agriculture we surveyed

planners' behavior toward agriculture during

7
harvest crises. The study covered five East European countries for the
period 1969-1980 and included 19 cases of harvest failure.
The rationale for focusing on planners1 responses to short term crises
is that such behavior is difficult to model, but represents an important
component of modelling. The long-run behavior of planners is paradoxically,
easier to model, not only because we have more observations but also, and
more importantly,

long-run agricultural policies are constrained by

physical and biological laws. Thus, for example, the decision to expand
meat production in East Europe during the 1970s has, in the long run,
relatively unambiguous implications for the demand for feed produced
domestically or imported. Once the trend is established, policy responses
can be modeled quite easily, at least until planners' priorities or
8
strategies change. However, in the short run, planners have much greater
flexibility since temporary violations of biological and physical laws may
be possible. For example, in the case of harvest failure the relationship
between animal feed production and herds can be violated either by drawing
down stocks of feed, feeding animals less or by importing more feed.

7
J. Brada, "Harvest Failures in Eastern Europe: Planners' Responses
and Their Implications for World Grain Markets," in J. Jones (ed.) East-West
Agricultural Trade (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, forthcoming 1986).
8
See Brada and King "Czechoslovak Agriculture: Policies, Performance
and Prospects" East European Quarterly, XVII, no 3, (September, 1983), for
an example of such a change in strategy in the case of Czechoslovak
agriculture.

46

Similarly the long-run relationship between meat production and herd size
can be altered in the short term by accelerating or deferring slaughtering
or by importing meat.
The objectives of our survey of planners' responses to harvest crises
were to determine how long-term goals influence planners' short-term
behavior and whether there is sufficient regularity in planners1 behavior to
enable us to use traditional econometric techniques to estimate planners'
response functions to these short-term developments.

I t was evident that

there were significant differences between planners' behavior in the 1960s

and 1970s.

In the earlier period, in all countries, planners were willing

to l e t the animal sector, and consequently longer-term meat production,

bear much of the cost of adjustment to poor harvests.

In the 1970s there

was a greater tendency to shield the livestock sector from the effects of
crop failures.

However, in each time period the significant differences both

in the planners' response in one country as well as among countries suggest

important elements of uniqueness in each harvest crisis.
From t h i s we have concluded that special techniques will have to be
employed f i r s t to estimate planners' long-term behavior and then to
superimpose responses to harvest failures on the model during simulation.
The planners' c r i s i s reaction function clearly cannot be estimated by
traditional means, as we have too few episodes for each country.

Thus, we

plan to create a series of decision rules that represent our estimate of

planners' behavior that will be triggered during any time period that a
harvest crisis is simulated.
E.

Priorities of Agriculture in Resource Allocation.

I t is to be expected that both the patterns of institutional change and

47

the relative performance of institutions in agriculture respond to the

priorities over time given to agriculture in the allocation of a country's
resources.

By allocation p r i o r i t i e s , we are concerned with (1) labor and

investments, (2) current inputs of fertilizers, pesticides, fuels, e t c , and

(3) finance.
Our research on the f i r s t two categories of allocation p r i o r i t i e s i s
focused on quantitative aspects, both in our general econometric models of
each country and in our special studies of production functions and yield
variations.

What we wish to report here are some of the broad patterns and

issues that stand out in a general comparison of the three countries.

Financial allocation covers the issues of price levels and the ability
of farm units to finance their own investments, relative prices and supply
incentives of the main farm organizations, relative personal incomes of
those occupied in farming, and the relative weights assigned to agriculture
in national income accounting.

Because of the paucity of good data on

prices and financial variables, most research in this area will necessarily
be presented in the narrative reports.
1.

Labor and Investments

A major influence on investment in agriculture has been the relative

share the labor force occupied in agriculture.

Table XII provides a

comparison across countries of both labor and investment shares in

agriculture.

In 1950 only 37 percent of the Czech occupied population was

found in agriculture, a share falling to 18 percent in 1970 and 14 percent

in 1980.

By contrast, Bulgaria and Romania started the period we research

with, respectively, 82 percent and 74 percent. That share in Bulgaria fell

to 56 percent in 1960 and by 1970 reached 39 percent, roughly the Czech
starting share, and then 25 percent in 1980. Romania lagged Bulgaria, with
66 percent in 1960, 49 percent in 1970 and 30 percent in 1980.
48

Table XII
LABOR AND INVESTMENT SHARES IN AGRICULTURE
A. Persons Occupied in Agriculture per 100 ha. of Agricultural Land
1960

Country
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
GDR
Hungary
Po1and
Romania

1965
30.6
17.6
18.6
19.9
26.9
37.0

1970
34.3
16.6
15.8
17.0
26.7
32.5

1975
19.9
14.6
14.2
14.9
25.3
25.7

1980
16.3
13.9
14.0
14.8
22.7
20.4

B. Share of Agriculture and Forestry in The Occupied Population

Country
Bulgaria
Czechoslovak i a
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania

1960

1975

1970

1965
55.5
25.9
17.3
38.9
44.2
65.6

45.3
21.1
15.1
29.7
39.4
56.7

35.8
18.5
13

26.4
34.6
49.3

1980
28.2
15.7
11.1
22.6
29.3
38.1

24.6
14.2
10.5
22

29.7
29.8

C. Share of Agriculture and Forestry in Total Investment

Country
Bulgaria
Czechoslovak i a
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania

1960
29.7
16.8
11.7
14.7
12.6
19.6

1965
19.7
13.9
13.5
14.5
16.7
18.5

1970
15.7
10.7
12.8
21.7
16.3
16.4

1975
14.6
12.3
11.7
16.0
13.6
13.5

1980
12.4
10.7
9.7

14.6
16.9
13.3

D. Share of Investment divided by Share of Labor

Country
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
GDR
Hungary
Poland
Romania

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

.54
.65
.68
.38
.29
.30

.43
.66
.89
.49
.42
.33

.44
.58
.98
.82

.52
.78

.50
.75
.92
.66
.57
.45

49

.47
.33

1.05
.71
.46
.35

The difference between Czechoslovakia and the other two countries is an

obvious gap in levels of economic development which was inherited by the
socialist governments. While differences in statistical practices cannot be
excluded as sources of the differences between Bulgaria and Romania, clearly
other things have been involved. Bulgaria appears to have been able to
mobilize investments much faster than Romania. In addition, there may have
been significant differences in the relative emphasis on investment in
agriculture and urbanization. Both differences will be examined, the first
in terms of a general narrative history of the immediate postwar period and
the second by a comparison of experiments with the Bulgarian and Romanian
econometric models.
Investments involved included those in human capital and, in this case,
should not be evaluated without considering incomes and other policies
designed to encourage trained persons to work in the agricultural sector.
Considering only the numbers, we find indications of great differences in
the apparent priorities of Bulgaria and Romania. As an example, in 1970
when Bulgaria had some 44,000 specialists in agriculture with higher
technical and secondary education, Romania had a total of only 29,000 but an
occupied labor force about four times that of Bulgaria. These differences
have encouraged us to estimate the effects of human capital investment
across the three countries, a study now in progress.
Once we have developed time series on human capital in agriculture, we
expect to find that they may well play a lesser role in the early stages of
socialist development of agriculture than in the later stages. By contrast,
probably the dominant feature of the experiences of Bulgaria and Romania
from 1950 to late into the period of our research will prove to be
investment in physical capital.
50

The record of investment patterns In the two less developed countries

shows big differences from 1949 to 1960. In this period Romanian investment
in agriculture increased 5 times while, in contrast, that in Bulgaria
jumped nearly 10 times.

From 1960, the growth rates of fixed capital

investment in agriculture in the two countries were quite similar.

Bulgaria's greater ability and willingness to invest in agriculture
must have been a major factor in its quick collectivization and subsequent
rapid development of collective farms.

Its advantages show up at an early

point in terms of specific investment indicators. The comparative record of

two such indicators, irrigation facilities and tractors, is presented in
Table XIII.

For example, already in 1953-57 Bulgaria had slightly over

twice as many tractors per hectare of agricultural land and per person
occupied in agriculture than Romania.

Bulgaria's advantage grew even more

in the early 1960s and remained over twice Romania's respective tractor
intensities by 1980. Still, by that time even Bulgaria was just approaching
the tractor-use rate per hectare and per person of Czechoslovakia in 196367.
The Czechoslovak experience in agricultural investment needs to be
examined for the possible lessons it holds for future Bulgarian and Romanian
development of the sector.

In 1980 Czechoslovak farms had 60 percent more

tractors per hectare than Bulgarian farms and over 3 times more than
Romania.

Each person working on a Czechoslovak farm had nearly 2 times the

tractors as a person working on a Bulgarian farm and over 5 times the number
of tractors as a Romanian farmer.
It would appear that both Bulgaria and Romania are far from reaching a
saturation of agriculture with capital resources.

But judging the efficacy

of policies available to them on the basis of Czechoslovak experience

requires that that experience be judged in terms of its own efficiency. Our
51

52

research suggests that the Czechoslovak agricultural sector may well have
been approaching a saturation level of capital, given other inputs and
financial policies of planners. By contrast, the same research suggests
9
that Romania was underinvesting in agriculture.
2.

Material Supplies.

The available evidence also shows significant differences in the levels

of material supplies used in Czechoslovak,
agriculture.

Bulgarian and Romanian

The estimates of Gregor Lazarcik for "operating expenses"

alone for the period, 1950 to 1972, suggest Bulgaria used

over twice the

material supplies per person occupied in agriculture as did the Romanians.

In turn, the Czechoslovak margin over Bulgaria, again in terms of supplies
per person occupied, was from over three times in the early 1950s to over
twice in the early 1970s.

The relative patterns of supplies used per

hectare of land showed smaller differences, whereas differences in supplies

plus depreciation were yet smaller.

In this case, by the 1970s Lazarcik

10
suggests that Bulgarian and Romanian input rates were similar.
Unfortunately, neither Bulgaria nor Romania publish time series of the

major material supplies provided by other sectors of the economy to

agriculture.

Needless to say, w e face challenging problems in either

The evidence for both countries i s based on simulations of marginal

reallocations of investments across sectors of the economy, using a large
econometric model of each country. At the time of t h i s particular research
on Czechoslovakia and Romania we had not yet developed a Bulgarian model.
See Josef C. Brada, Marvin R. Jackson and Arthur E. King, "The Optimal Rate
of Industrialization in Developing Centrally Planned Economies: A General
Equilibrium Approach," World Development, vol 9, no. 9/10 (1981), pp. 9911084.
10
See, Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of
Eastern Europe, pp. 362 and 372 and East European Economic Assessment, Part
2 - Regional Assessments, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United
States, (1974, 1980, respectively), pp. 608 and 616.
53

estimating these inputs for individual crops and for d i s t r i c t s or in

specifying our models around the missing variables.

We are attempting to

construct some series in physical units for energy inputs, using available
figures on electric power and estimating fuels from stocks of tractors and
use rates.

There are also figures available on chemical fertilizers used.

Considerable research has been done on the effects of fertilizer on the

levels of yields and the increase in yields over time for many countries and
crops.

For example, one estimate suggests 13.5 percent of the total grain

production of Asia in 1971/72 was due to fertilizer, while 51 percent of the

increase from 1971/72 to 1972/73 was also due to the same factor.

For more

developed countries with greater fertilizer use, naturally the portion of a

given yield attributed t o f e r t i l i z e r i s higher.

But there i s l i t t l e

evidence of diminishing marginal effects in actual uses, something probably

accounted for by offsetting changes in technology and other factors.

For

example, approximately 55 percent of the increase in U. S. grain yields from

1940 to 1955 has been attributed to fertilizers, while estimates on a world
level for a slightly later period suggest a marginal contribution of 28 to
47 percent. The estimated effects on total crop output seem to be smaller
11
than for grains alone.
A recent study by the CIA on the impact of
fertilizer on Soviet grain yields fits the international experience.

From

21 to 26 percent of the increased yield of grains from 1962 to 1974 i s

11
Per Pinstrup-Anderson, Agricultural Research and Technology in
Economic Development (New York: Longman, 1982) pp. 148-175.

54

attributed to increased fertilizer. For the period, 1976 to 1980, Soviet

planners were expecting increased fertilizer to bring a 55 percent increase

12
in yields.

As in the case of the figures cited above, the Soviet figures

reflect two factors,

the effort

in terms of actual applications of

fertilizer (compared to other efforts to raise yields) and the responses

achieved from fertilizer.

In the case of our three subject countries, w e

have only total fertilizer consumption, not by crop (see Table XIV).
TABLE XIV. INDICATORS OF MATERIAL INPUTS
Consumption o f Chemical Fertilizers per h a . of Agricultural Land

Country
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
GDR

Hungary
Poland
Romania

1953-57

E6.1

1958-62
26.0
71.8
150.1
26.2
35.8

1.6

5.0

7.5

47.7
122.5
8.3

1963-67 1973-76
78.8
105-0
117.2
E14.O
200.9
281.0
6O.7
204.0
64.0
175.0
21.5 69.0

1976-79
116.0
242.0
276.0
218.0
189.0
76.0

As with other inputs, the figures show wide differences across countries. In
the mid-1950s, use rates in Czechoslovakia were over six times those in
Bulgaria.
per

In turn, the Bulgarians applied nearly five times the fertilizer

hectare as in Romania.

By the second half of the 1970s Bulgaria had

reached Czechoslovak levels of 1960.

Romania lagged, as usual, reaching

only the Czechoslovak rate of 1960. So at the end of our period of

research, Czechoslovak use rates were about twice those of Bulgaria, while
Bulgarian use rates exceed the Romanian by about 50 percent.

Because of the

lack of data on fertilizer used by crop, we will not be able to estimate the
effects of the mix of crops separately from institutional or technological

12
National Foreign Assessment Center, The Impact of Fertilizer on
Soviet Grain Output, 1960-80, (Washington, D . C . : November, 1977), p . 9 .
55

differences.

In the absence of quantitative approaches at disaggregated

levels, w e shall treat this issue by narrative development of the available

documents and secondary sources.
3.

Financial Allocations

In this section w e consider

profitability of farm units,

(a) levels of producer prices and the

(b) the incentive effects of relative producer

prices on both farm organizations and private farmers, and (c) prices and
demand for agricultural products by domestic consumers.
(a)

Levels of producer prices.

Since the mid-1950s there has been a

common tendency across Eastern Europe for both absolute and relative prices
to agricultural producers to rise compared to industrial prices.

In part,

this is the result of comparative cost patterns which followed greater

technological change and realization of economies of scale in industry
compared to agriculture.

It is also a matter of price policies which tended

to leave larger profit margins in industry.

Also,

in the case of the

equivalent of "market prices" used to measure national income, prices of

industrial goods were raised by the incidence of turnover taxes.
All

of these factors are reflected the relative national income

productivity of labor in agriculture compared to industry. The relative

productivities calculated for Eastern Europe for 1965,

1970, and 1975 show

that by a combination of price and real allocation policies, Bulgaria had

the highest relative labor productivity in agriculture compared to industry.
Czechoslovakia was behind Bulgaria and Hungary in all three years, whereas
Romania had the lowest relative productivity of labor in agriculture in
13
Eastern Europe.
13
See East European Economic Assessment, Part 1 - Country Studies,
Joint Economic Committee, Congress of The United States (1980), p. 575.

56

There are, of course, differences in prices actually paid to producers

and those used to price national income.

One common policy across Eastern

Europe, following earlier Soviet practice, was the early introduction of

extremely low prices on compulsory deliveries from all categories of
producers.

In Bulgaria, for example, the procurement prices used in the

period from 1952 to 1955 covered only 69 percent of the average cost of
wheat, 35 percent for corn and 49 percent for milk. In all the countries,
cost references usually were published only for state farms because cost
accounting for labor on collective farms had not been developed.
accounting was much delayed on collective farms everywhere:

Full cost
Romania

introduced complete cost accounting on collective farms only in the early

1970s.
Across Eastern Europe there have been at least three waves of producer
price increases.

The first saw the elimination of the lower-priced

compulsory deliveries (Hungary in 1956, Romania in 1957, Bulgaria in 1959,

Czechoslovakia in 1960 and GDR in 1966 and in 1969).

Another wave took

place in the second half of the 1960s (Czechoslovakia in 1967, Bulgaria in

1968, and Romania in 1970). Then a third wave came in the latter part of
the 1970s or early 1980s.
Price increases did not always make all products profitable and if they
did so temporarily, it was usually the case that within a few years costs
would rise above prices. This was particularly the case with meat products
in all countries. In Bulgaria, for example, animal products incurred losses
continuously from 1976 through 1980.

In 1977, Czechoslovak state farms in

mountain areas which concentrated on animal production incurred losses.

Under these circumstances one would not expect farm units to generate their
own investment funds.
and bank loans.

Commonly, these came from state budget allocations

In the case of the latter, periodic grace periods or

57

cancellation of payments on debts have been common practice.

(b)

Incentive effects of relative prices.

There are two related

incentive questions connected to relative agricultural prices.

One is

whether relative prices enter into the supply functions of the farm units
for goods supplied to the state fund and directly to retail town markets.
Another is whether relative incomes of peasants enter into their supply
functions for farm labor and the related decision to work in factories by
commuting or changing residence.
At the present time one of the problems in our research is that time
series on prices paid to producers for individual agricultural commodities
are unavailable.

Without these data supply functions for individual

commodities cannot be estimated.

Instead, our research will take the form

of a narrative or price policy, summarizing the secondary literature on

price responses in agriculture.

Clarification is needed about the kinds of

price systems each country has used, emphasizing the extent of price
differentiation by organizational units, quality of output and season.
Tracking down the data on relative personal incomes in agriculture has
c
not been easy. Information on relative wages for state employees in
agriculture and industry is not always conclusive because of the small share
of occupied persons working as employees compared to peasants on collectives
or in private agriculture.

In the case of employees, wages were typically

lower in agriculture in the early years in all countries.

For example, the

ratios of agricultural to industrial wages were as follows:

Czechoslovakia

77 percent (1953), Bulgaria 74 percent (1952), and Romania 71 percent

(1950).

By 1965 all three ratios moved toward 85 percent.

Much bigger

differences were found between average peasant income from the collective
farm and private activities combined, and average wages for state employees.
In 1953 earnings from a collective for a peasant in Bulgaria were only 30
58

percent of wages. In Czechoslovakia in 1958 income (in cash and kind) from
a collective was only half the average wage if one did not count income from
the personal plot and other sources.
Of course, a different view is gained from family income statistics
which compare all sources of income of peasant and worker families (and are
not published for Romania).

In Bulgaria as early in 1955 these statistics

(from household samples) showed that a peasant family had 95 percent of a

worker's income and in later years the relative difference was more a
function of crop yields than any other element. The typical peasant family
income included an important share both of wages, often earned by the senior
male commuting on the job, and of income in kind from other members' work on
the personal plot. A similar picture is revealed in the Czechoslovak family
budget data.

In 1977 in that country, for example, a peasant family earned

94 percent of the income of a worker family.

Income parity between

Czechoslovak peasants on collective farms and workers on state farms was

14
In Bulgaria, parity seems to
achieved in a record harvest year (1974).
have been achieved by the elimination of the status of collective farms and
peasants after the formation of the agro-industrial complexes in the 1970s.
Romania remains with the greatest uncertainty about its relative income
data and probably the lowest relative incomes in agriculture.

In 1965 the

average "active peasant" from "agricultural work" earned less than half the
average wage. The relative figure increased to slightly over 60 percent by
the late 1970s.
14
Karl-Eugen Wadekin, "Labor Renumeration in the Socialized
Agriculture of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," Studies in Comparative
Communism, XI:1-2 (Spring/Summer, 1978), pp. 112-113.

59

Our concern with relative agricultural incomes is focused on the

question of labor incentives, especially as to where rural dwellers will
supply their labor. A related question is the location of the permanent
residence of a family.

In Romania and Bulgaria this issue may well be

settled more by urban housing supplies than relative agricultural and

industrial incomes.

We assume that there has been excess demand for urban

housing, given historical and present relative incomes in farming and

industry.

More rural families would move to the cities if only housing

could be found.

In Bulgaria's case this pressure continues even with a

higher housing stock in rural areas. Possibly, this disequilibrium has

disappeared in Czechoslovakia and the present labor force may be relatively
permanent, young and well-educated.

If so, the conditions under which the

agricultural work force can be stabilized are relevant to the planning and
15
forecasting of Bulgaria and Romania.
(c)

Prices and demand.

The three subject countries have made no

exception to the common practice in Eastern Europe of disconnecting producer

and consumer prices of agricultural goods. Consumer prices been subsidized,
leading to a chronic state of excess demand, especially for meat and good
quality fresh produce.

Recently all the countries in the region have

undertaken significant increases in food prices, supposedly in order to

eliminate subsidies and to bring consumer and producer prices into
alignment. Cur future research will consider the nature of income and price
elasticity of demand and will evaluate possibilities for consumer
equilibrium.

15
OECD, Prospects for Agricultural Production and Trade in Eastern
Europe, Volume 2 (1984), p. 12.

60

IV.

Toward an Econometric Model of Socialist Agriculture

Although the institutional and microeconomic research required for a

sound specification of a model of agriculture has been our first priority to
date, we have taken advantage of the early completion of the Czechoslovak
data bank to specify and estimate a rudimentary model of that country's
agricultural sector.

With the completion of the data banks for Romania and

Bulgaria, we are doing the same for these countries.

Our objective in this first phase specification is two-fold.
wish to familiarize ourselves with the data and its peculiarities.

First we
Second,

and more important, the present naive model will serve as a testing ground
for more sophisticated specifications drawn from our microeconomic studies.
To this end we have specified the first model using only the most obvious of
explanatory variables, the most direct economic and physical relationships,
and a minimum of interactions among various agricultural units, crops,
animals, inputs and financial flows.

Into this basic model, we will then

introduce more sophisticated behavioral equations reflecting our

microeconomic work on individual units and sectors and on the interactions
among them.

We can thus introduce more complex specifications one sector at

a time, enabling us to determine the degree of improvement achieved both in

terms of the sector whose specifications are changed and in terms of the
performance of the entire model.

In this way, we expect to be able to

direct our research efforts to those aspects of modelling that promise the
highest payoff in terms of model performance.
The Czechoslovak model is disaggregated regionally into the Czech and
Slovak Republics. At the Republic level, we disaggregate activities by
socialist units; private agriculture is thus treated as a residual between
total and socialized sector activities.

61

Most of the estimates are for the

Czech lands only; where estimates have been made for Slovak farms, the
equations are identified as such. All coefficients were estimated by
ordinary least squares- The standard errors appear in parentheses below the
estimates and the t-ratios are below the standard errors. A full listing of
the specifications and parameter estimates is provided in Appendix D.
A.

ANIMAL

1. Specifications
The output of the animal sector depends on the number and types of
animals held by agricultural units. The growth of animal products, which
received particular emphasis in the 1970s and 1980s (Brada and King,
1983), depends principally on the reproduction abilities of various types of
animals and on the amount of feed available. Thus we model, for each
agricultural unit, current numbers of animals as depending on herd sizes in
the past year and on feed production.

Included

implicitly is the

availability in that unit. Because of slower reproductive rates of larger

animals we model the number of cows and sows separately.
We also model the value of the animal production of agricultural units
as a function of the number of animals held by the unit. Our objective was
to test whether it is possible to bypass the modelling of the production
process of individual animal products (meat, milk, etc.) and to price
outputs directly in value terms in order to develop a measure of aggregate
animal production.
2. Results
Estimates for animal herds are reported in Equations AP1-AP18. For
each animal type we present results for all agriculture and for state and
collective farms separately. The specifications employed yield satisfactory
results for all animal types save cows and sows and state farm pigs. The

62

rather poor performance of the specifications for cows and sows suggests the
influence of policy variables on the use of

such animals for breeding.

Overall, the herds of collective farm animals exhibit greater stability than
those of state farms with respect to the explanatory variables.
Cattle and pig numbers are significantly affected by the availability
of feed, though sows and cows are not, reflecting the relative insensitivity
of breeding stock to fluctuations in feed supply. As would be expected, the
numbers of sheep are relatively independent of feedstuff availability.
Poultry too, are less sensitive or even negatively related to feed
availability. The negative relationship may reflect the ability to vary
poultry numbers more rapidly than those of other animals.
The equations for estimating the value of animal production, GAA1 and
GAA2, are generally unsatisfactory, reflecting both shifting productivity
per animal as well as changing prices.
3.

Implications for Future Research.

The equations explaining herd size are reasonably satisfactory.

What remains is to explain cow and sow numbers as the result of policy
regarding meat and milk production, changes in procurement policies and the
ability and willingness

to import grain. In this way we will construct

links between animal numbers and domestic demand and

the foreign trade

sector. With a better explanation of cow and sow numbers, a model of cattle
and swine herds based on a model of sow and cow fertility can be estimated.
The total value of animal production by farm unit will be constructed
by first modelling the output of the main animal products (meat, milk, eggs,
etc) and then pricing them to construct an aggregate.
B.

CROP PRODUCTION
1. Specifications
There is little literature to provide a guide to the specification of
63

equations for the output of crops by state and collective farms. The exact
interplay of central decisions and initiative at the farm level is
uncertain.

For now we are focusing on grain crops because of their

importance for consumption, for the livestock sector and for foreign trade.
Our general approach is to model the harvest of individual grains as a
function of the land devoted to each crop and of the yield per unit of land
for that crop. For land sown to individual crops, three specifications were
employed.
Model 1 explains land devoted to a crop as a function of total
agricultural land, changes in an aggregate herd size (a measure based on
feed requirements of various farm animals), and the deviation of last year's
grain harvest from the preceding 3-year average.

The first variable

measures each crop's ability to compete against other crops for available
land.

Such changes may well depend on the relative yield/risk

characteristics of new varieties, their input requirements and the responses

of policymakers to the agricultural sector's evolution. Since grains are a
major source of animal feeds, increases in feed requirements, occasioned by
change in herd size, should also influence the amount of land devoted to
different grains depending on the relative suitability of these crops for
animal feeds. Finally, the harvest deviation measure captures inter-grain
substitution for higher yielding or less variable yield grains in periods of
agricultural crisis.
Model 2 explains land devoted to individual grains as depending on
total agricultural land (as above) and lagged herd sizes.

The latter

variable provides a slightly different measure of the influence of feed

requirements on inter-grain substitution.
Model 3 includes as explanatory variables total land, the lagged value

64

for the amount of land sown to the grain and the value of crop production in
the appropriate farm unit. In a sense we thus model changes rather than
levels of land devoted to individual grains. The value of crop output
measures the income, and thus possibly the autonomy, of agricultural units.
Yields are specified as depending on the level of fertilizer
consumption and its composition as proxied by the number of cattle, the
availability of agricultural machinery and the changes in the amount of land
devoted to the crop. The latter variable will be positive if the least
productive land is taken out of service, but negative if declines in land
sown result from responses to poor weather which lowers crop yields.
2.
The

Results
principal results of both models 1 (Equations LS1-12) and 2

(Equations IS13-17) are that both the state of grain reserves and the demand
for animal feeds influences the amount of land devoted to certain grain
crops such as oats, corn and barley.

Nevertheless, the explanatory power of

some of these equation estimates leaves much to be desired.

Those of model

3 (Equations LS18-21) provide greater explanatory power, but this comes

largely from the lagged dependent variable.
All

crop yields (Equations Yl-12) are responsive to the total amount of

fertilizer consumed save legumes, sugar beets and hay.

The mix of synthetic

and animal fertilizers also appears to be significant.

Changes in land sown

in corn have a significantly negative coefficient, suggesting efforts to

plant other crops when growing conditions are not propitious for corn. This
is not the case for wheat which has a significantly positive estimate for
changes in land sown.

3. Implications for Future Research

Clearly both the effects of weather on cropping patterns and the
changing yield/risk characteristics of grain and non-grain crops need to be,

65

and are being, investigated. Changes in procurement prices will also be

investigated as potential explanatory variables.
The equations for yields perform reasonably well in view of the fact
that the most important variable, weather, is not as yet included. The
effect of weather on and interaction between yields and land sown are
rudent currently at the center of our research efforts.
C.

Machine Tractor Stations (MTS)

Although the importance of MTS in Czechoslovakia has declined over

time, they nevertheless continue to make contributions in the provision of
services related to both agricultural production and machinery repair for
state and collective farms.
Revenues of MTS are specified as derived from the following activities:
-

Chemicalization, with fertilizer application and crop-protective

activities having significant coefficients (Equation MR 1);

-

Work on land, with land plowed and fertilizer application as

explanatory variables (Equation MR 2);

-

Mechanized field work, with grain and beets harvested by combines

and fodder production as the most significant explanatory variables

(Equation MR 3).
Moreover, the aggregation of crops in physical terms also yields good
results (Equation MR 4).
The effort to model revenues from the repair of tractors and
agricultural machinery, on the other hand, is, at this point, unsuccessful in
a number of cases. The problem is even more severe if one considers that
many of the exogenous variables (in Equations MR 7-11) remain to be
endogenized. We may have to consider whether the financial results achieved
by MTS are important determinants of incomes or investment in the

66

agricultural sector.
The physical activities of MTS are somewhat more amenable to
econometric modelling (Equations MO 1-6), in those cases where we are able
to identify the MTS machinery most appropriate to the activity. It may well
be that w e shall have to employ a two-phase regime to account for the
breakup of the MTS system. As with the financial flows, repair and other
nonagricultural activities of MTS are particularly difficult to model.
D.

Finances of State and Collective Farms.

The equations (PC 1-5 and FS 1-5) for state farm revenues from crops in
both Czech lands and in Slovakia indicate that these farms retain little
crop production on-farm as the constant term in both equations is not
significantly different from zero. Also, in the case of Czech and Slovak
state farms, the slope coefficient is not different from 1, indicating that
realized prices and the prices at which crops are valued are the same.
Collective farms in the Czech lands apparently do retain a significant
proportion of crop output for on-farm use, as reflected by the negative
constant (Equation FC 1 or 2).
different from 1.

Again, the slope coefficient is not

The high t-ratios, combined with low coefficient of

determination for state farms suggest a need to explain better the

proportion of crops retained for on-farm use, perhaps as a function of
animal herds and on-farm processing activity as well as of inter-farm
transfers between state and collective farms.
In the equations for revenues from gross animal output (FC 3, 4 or FS
3, 4) the slope coefficients are equal to or slightly less than one while
the constant is positive. This suggests on-farm consumption of some animal
output, (e.g., fertilizer and transportation services).
The costs of materials and services on each type of farm are modeled in
a number of alternative specifications(Equations FC 6-16, FS 6-16),
67

reflecting either output measures and thus a cost function or by means of

inputs employed.

In general, the overall explanatory power and significance

of coefficients as well as their signs suggests that modelling this aspect of

state and collective farm finances should yield good results.
In contrast, efforts to model contributions to farm funds and taxes are
less successful, (Equations FC 17, 18 or FS 17, 18). A closer reading of
policies toward these activities is thus required so that policy changes can
be specified explicitly. Also remaining to be modeled are the effects of
farm-level financial flows on wage payments and investment activity
(see EquationsR 1-3), but linkages to the macro economy must be
specified.
Overall, this simple model suggests that the productive and financial
aspects of Czechoslovak agriculture are amenable to econometric analysis.
Our estimates suggest that a more sophisticated set of specifications should
enable us to construct models useful for forecasting and having sufficient
relevance for counterfactual analyses of economic policy.
V.

Future Work

Within the near future, we expect to complete our microeconomic

studies.

As these studies are completed, their findings will be

incorporated into the basic models, which will simultaneously be expanded to

include activities such as trade, investment, wages and incomes, food
processing and food consumption.

Thus, we expect to begin simulation and

policy analysis of the agricultural sectors of the three countries.

At that

point, we also will begin drafting narrative histories of agriculture in

these countries. Ultimately, we plan to combine the narratives with our
econometric models to produce a monograph that will usefully blend the two
approaches.

68

APPENDIX A
Publications and Working Papers Originating from this Project

Brada, J. C. "The Soviet American Grain Agreement and the National

Interest, "American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 65,
no. 4 (November, 1983), pp. 651-656.
"Harvest Failures in Eastern Europe: Planners' Responses
and Their Implications for World Grain Markets," in J. Jones (ed.),
East-West Agricultural Trade (Westview Press: Boulder, 00,
forthcoming, 1986).
-"The Variability of Crop Production in Private and
Socialized Agriculture: Evidence from Eastern Europe," Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 3 (June 1986).
Brada, J. C., Hey, J. C., and King, A. E. "Interregional and Interorganizational Differences in Agricultural Efficiency in
Czechoslovakia," in Socialist Agriculture in Crisis: Organizational
Responses to Failing Performance, J. C. Brada and K. E. Wadekin (eds.),
(forthcoming).
Brada, J, C. and King A. E.
"Czechoslovak Agriculture: Policies,
Performance and Prospects," East European Quarterly, XVII, no. 3
(September, 1983), pp. 343-359.
Jackson, M. R. "Recent Economic Performance and Policy in Bulgaria,"
in East European Economic Prospects for the 1980's, Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, (1985), pp. 23-58.
"Romania's Debt Crisis: Its Causes and Consequences," in
East European Economic Prospects for the 1980's, Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States, (1985), pp. 489-542.

NOTE
(Single copies of the items listed above, and of a Faculty
Working Paper by Professor Josef C. Brada entitled The
Organization of Agriculture and the Variability of Crop
Production under Socialism, may be obtained from the
National Council by written or telephone request.)

69

APPENDIX B.
Data Series

Available in the Bulgarian Economic Data Bank.

70

DATA SERIES IN THE BULGARIAN AGRICULTURAL DATA BANK

GENERAL NOTE: THE IDENTIFICATION OF DATA BY CATEGORY OF FARM
ORGANIZATION CHANGED AFTER 1972. INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE
IN THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES:
I. TOTAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
either: A. STATE FARMS
B. COOPERATIVE FARMS
C- OTHER SOCIAL ORG ON ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING
D- OTHER SOCIAL ORG NOT ON ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING
or:
A. APK, PAK AND NPO
1. APK
B. OTHER SOCIAL ORG ON ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING
C. OTHER SOCIAL ORG NOT ON ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING
II. TOTAL PERSONAL AND PRIVATE FARMS
A. TOTAL PERSONAL FARMS
1. FARMS OF COOPERATIVE PEASANTS
E. FARMS OF WORKERS AND ARTISANS
B. TOTAL PRIVATE FARMS
1.
FARMS OF NON-COLLECTIVE PEASANTS
2. OTHER PRIVATE FARMS

71

A.

AREA PLANTED AND PHYSICAL OUTPUT FOR THE FOLLOWING CROPS:

TOTAL GRAINS
WHEAT
--RYE
TOTAL FODDER GRAINS
BARLEY
OATS
MAIZE
FODDER PEAS
SOYA
PADDY RICE
--BEANS
TOTAL TECHNICAL CROPS
SUNFLOWER SEEDS
PEANUTS
UNGINNED COTTON
H E M P IN DRY STALKS
--FLAX IN DRY STALKS
ORIENTAL TOBACCO
VIRGINIA TOBACCO
SUGAR BEETS
TOTAL VEGETABLE CROPS
TOMATOES
GREEN PEPPERS
R E D PEPPERS
ONIONS
GREEN BEANS
--POTATOES
MELONS
TOTAL FODDER CROPS
FODDER BEETS
GREEN AND SILAGE MAIZE
ALFAFA HAY
CLOVER HAY
H A Y FROM NATURAL MEADOWS
TOTAL PERENNIAL FRUIT
APPLES
PEARS
PLUMS
CHERRIES
APRICOTS
PEACHES
TOTAL GRAPES
WINE GRAPES
--DESSERT GRAPES
STRAWBERRIES

B. ANIMAL PRODUCTION
S A L E S OF ANIMALS TO SLAUGHTER HOUSES AND ANIMALS BUTCHERED ON FARMS IN
LIVE WEIGHT
TOTAL
CATTLE AND BUFFALOES
SWINE
SHEEP AND GOATS
FOUL AND OTHERS
FOUL
OTHERS
S A M E ITEM IN SLAUGHTERED WEIGHT
ITEMS REPEATED
MEAT BY-PRODUCTS
MILK
FROM COWS
FROM BUFFALOES
FROM SHEEP
FROM GOATS
UNWASHED WOOL
EGGS
FROM CHICKENS
HONEY
COCOONS
C. ANIMAL PRODUCTIVITY
MILK PER COW
MILK PER BUFFALOE
MILK PER SHEEP
MILK PER GOAT
WOOL PER SHEEP
EGGS PER HEN
D. INDICES AND ABSOLUTE VALUES IN CONSTANT PRICES OF GROSS AGRICULTURE OUTPUT
TOTAL CROP OUTPUT
GRAIN
TECHNICAL CROPS
VEGETABLE CROPS
FODDER CROPS
GRAPES
FRUITS AND BERRIES
TOTAL ANIMAL OUTPUT
ANIMAL REPRODUCTION AND GROWTH
PRODUCTS FROM ANIMALS
NATURAL FERTILIZER
OUTPUT
OUTPUT
OUTPUT
OUTPUT

FROM
FROM
FROM
FROM

CATTLE AND BUFFALOES

SHEEP AND GOATS
SWINE
POULTRY

ABSOLUTE VALUES IN CONSTANT PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT IN THE ABOVE

CATEGORIES OF OUTPUT BY THE CATEGORIES OF AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS
LISTED IN THE GENERAL NOTE ABOVE.
73

Dl. TOTAL PRODUCTION AND MATERIAL EXPENSES IN AGRICULTURE IN CURRENT PRICES

MAIN CATEGORIES OF OUTPUT (SEE TABLE C.)
MAIN CATEGORIES OF MATERIAL EXPENDITURES
SEEDS
FORAGE AND LITTER
FERTILIZER
F U E L S AND LUBRICANTS
ELECTRICAL ENERGY
DEPRECIATION
CURRENT REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE
COMBATING PESTS
ESTABLISHING NEW PLANTATIONS
MATERIAL EXPENDITURES SEPARATED BY CROPS AND ANIMLAL PRODUCTION
E. PURCHASES FROM EACH YEAR'S HARVEST OR PRODUCTION OF THE MAIN CATEGORIES
OF CROPS AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS LISTED ABOVE.
F. LAND USED BY MAIN CATEGORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS (SEE GENERAL NOTE )
AGRICULTURAL LAND
CULTIVATED LAND
PLOWED FIELDS
NATURAL MEADOWS
ARTIFICIAL PASTURES
PERMANENT PLANTATIONS
COMMON AND PASTURE LAND
SOWN AREA BY CROPS (SEE CROP CATEGORIES ABOVE IN TABLE A)
IRRIGATED CULTIVATIONS
TOTAL GRAIN
WHEAT
MAIZE
RICE
BARLEY
BEANS
TOTAL TECHNICAL CROPS
SUNFLOWER SEEDS
COTTON
HEMP
FLAX
ORIENTAL TOBACCO
SUGAR BEETS
TOTAL VEGETABLE CROPS
TOMATOES
ONIONS
POTATOES
MELONS
FRUIT ORCHARDS
APPLES
PEARS
PLUMS
PEACHES
VINEYARDS
NATURAL MEADOWS

SPRAYERS
POTATO. PLANTERS
POTATO HARVESTERS
MOWERS
SELF-PROPELLED MOWERS
HAY RAKES
SEED CLEANERS
GRAIN CLEANERS
PNEUMATIC GRAIN TRANSPORTORS
K. ANNUAL FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENTS
INSTALLATION WORK
MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT
OTHER
PERMANENT PLANTATIONS
BASIC ANIMAL HERDS
L. ANNUAL COMMISSIONED FIXED CAPTIAL INVESTMENTS
SEE CATEGORIES IN K.
M. TOTAL POWER USED
MECHANICAL.
TRACTORS
COMBINES
WORK ANIMALS
ELECTRIC ENERGY
N. DELIVERIES OF CHEMICALS
CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS
NITROGEN
PHOSOPHOROUS
POTASSIUM
COMBINATION FODDER
OTHER CHEMICALS
HERBICIDES
O. INDICATORS OF COOPERATIVE FARMS (TKZS)
NUMBER OF UNITS
PERMANENTLY OCCUPIED COOPERATORS
AVERAGE COMPENSATION PER PERMANENTLY OCCUPIED COOPERATOR (LEVA)
LEVA COMPENSATION PER WORK DAY UNIT
DEGREE OF MECHANIZATION OF WORK
PLOUGHING
SOWING
--HARVESTING
--HARROWING
P. INDICATORS OF STATE FARMS (DZS) AND MACHINE TRACTOR STATIONS
O. INDICATORS OF AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES (APK)
75

G. ANIMAL HERDS BY MAIN CATEGORIES OF FARM ORGANIZATIONS

CATTLE
COWS
C O W S FOR MILK
BUFFALOES
C O W S OVER 3 YEARS OLD
SWINE
SOWS
SHEEP
EWES
GOATS
NANNIES
HORSES
ASSES
MULES
HARES
POULTRY
BEE FAMILIES
H. AGRICULTURAL LABOR
TOTAL OCCUPIED IN AGRICULTURE
WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES
WITH MIDDLE EDUCATION
WITH HIGHER EDUCATION
COOPERATIVE PEASANTS
OTHERS
I. FIXED CAPITAL IN AGRICULTURE
BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES
MACHINES AND INVENTORIES
BASIC ANIMAL HERDS
PERMANENT PLANTATIONS
J. MAIN CATEGORIES OF MACHINERY BY ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS
TRACTORS
PHYSICAL UNITS
1 5 HP UNITS
COMBINES
GRAIN
CORN
ROW HARVESTERS
STRAW CUTTERS
TRACTOR PLOWS
SEED DRILLS
CULTIVATORS
FERTILIZER SPREADERS
PEELERS/SHELLERS
ROLLERS
DISK HARROWS
ROTATING HOES

APPENDIX C.
Data Series Available in the Romanian Economic Data Bank

77

CONTENTS OF THE ROMANIAN AGRICULTURAL DATA BANK

A. CULTIVATED AREA AND ANNUAL OUTPUT BY (1) STATE FARMS,
(2) OTHER STATE UNITS, (3) COOPERATIVE FARMS, (4) PLOTS
OF COOPERATIVE FARMERS, (5) PRIVATE FARMS FOR THE
FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF CROPS:
TOTAL CEAEALS
WHEAT AND RYE
BARLEY
OATS
CORN

TOTAL POTATOES, LEGUMES AND MELLONS

POTATOES
LEGUMES
ONIONS
CABBAGE
TOMATOES
PEPPERS

TOTAL SEED LEGUMES

PEAS
BEANS
SOYA
TOTAL TECHNICAL PLANTS
TEXTILE PLANTS
HEMP FOR FIBER
TOTAL OIL SEED PLANTS
SUNFLOWER
OTHER PLANTS FOR INDUSTRY
SUGAR BEETS
TOBACCO
TOTAL MEDICINAL AND AROMATIC PLANTS

FODDER PLANTS
PERENNIAL HAY
ANNUAL HAY
ANNUAL SILEAGE
FODDER ROOTS
PLANTS FOR SILEAGE
GRAPES
PLUMS
APPLES
PEARS
PEACHES
CHERRIES
APRICOTS
NUTS
STRAWBERRIES

B. ANIMAL PRODUCTION FROM (1) STATE FARMS, (2) OTHER STATE

UNITS, (3) COOPERATIVE FARMS, (4) PLOTS OF COOPERATIVE
FARMERS, (5) PRIVATE FARMS
TOTAL MEAT
BEEF
PORK
POULTRY
TOTAL MILK
COW MILK
WOOL
EGGS
C. PRODUCTIVITY PER ANIMAL FOR (1) STATE FARMS AND
COOPERATIVE FARMS
MILK PER COW
MILK PER SHEEP

WOOL PER SHEEP

EGGS PER HEN

D. INDICES OF GROSS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

CROP PRODUCTION
ANIMAL PRODUCTION
78

E. NUMBER OF ANIMALS FOR (1) STATE FARMS, (2) OTHER STATE UNITS.
(3) COOPERATIVE FARMS, (4) PLOTS OF COOPERATIVE FARMERS,
AND (5) PRIVATE FARMS
TOTAL CATTLE
FEMALE CATTLE FOR REPRODUCTION

TOTAL SHEEP
FEMALE SHEEP FOR REPRODUCTION

TOTAL PIGS
FEMALE PIGS FOR REPRODUCTION

TOTAL GOATS
TOTAL POULTRY
EGG PRODUCERS

F. AGRICULTURAL LAND
AGRICULTURAL SURFACE
TOTAL ARABLE LAND
ARABLE LAND IN GREENHOUSES
PASTURES
MEADOWS
VINEYARDS
FRUIT ORCHARDS
FOREST LAND
SWAMPS AND LAKES
OTHER SURFACE
TOTAL UNDER IRRIGATION
AGRICULTURAL SURFACE
ARABLE LAND
G. AGRICULTURAL LAND BY (1) STATE FARMS, (2) OTHER STATE UNITS,
(3) COOPERATIVE FARMS, ' 4) PLOTS OF COOPERATIVE FARMERS, AND
PRIVATE FARMS
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL SURFACE
ARABLE LAND
PASTURES
MEADOWS
VINEYARDS
ORCHARDS

IRRIGATED LAND
-ARABLE LAND
WHEAT
CORN
SUNFLOWER
SUGAR BEETS
SOYA
LEGUMES
ALFALFA
-PASTURES AND MEADOWS
-VINEYARDS
-ORCHARDS

H. PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY

TRACTORS
PHYSICAL UNITS
1 5 HP UNITS
PLOWS FOR TRACTORS
MECHANICAL CULTIVATORS
DISK HARROWS
MECHANICAL SEEDERS
CHEMICAL FERTILIZER MACHINES

SPRAYING MACHINES
GRAIN COMBINES
CORN COMBINES
AUTOPROPELLED COMBINES
COMBINES FOR SILEAGE PLANTS

79

I. FIXED CAPITAL IN AGRICULTURE

J. INVESTMENTS IN FIXED CAPITAL IN AGRICULTURE
K. COMMISSIONED FUNDS IN AGRICULTURE
L. LABOR IN AGRICULTURE
TOTAL OCCUPIED
WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES
AGRICULTURAL SPECIALISTS
W I T H HIGHER EDUCATION
AGRONOMISTS
ANIMAL SPECIALISTS
VETERINARIANS
MECHANICAL ENGINEERS
W I T H MIDDLE-LEVEL EDUCATION
AGRONOMISTS
ANIMAL SPECIALISTS
VETERINARIANS
M. CHEMICAL FERTILZERS USED BY (1) TOTAL, (2) STATE FARMS AND
(3) COOPERATIVE FARMS
NITROGEN
PHOSPHATE
POTASSIUM
N. PRINCIPAL INDICATORS OF STATE FARMS
NUMBER OF UNITS
TOTAL PERSONNEL
FIXED CAPITAL
ANNUAL INVESTMENTS
TOTAL TRACTORS
PHYSICAL UNITS
1 5 HP UNITS
PLOWS FOR TRACTORS
MECHANICAL CULTIVATORS
DISK HARROWS
MECHANICAL SEEDERS
CHEMICAL FERTILIZER SPREADERS
SPRAYING MACHINES
GRAIN COMBINES
CORN COME:INES
SELF-PROPELLED COMBINES
TRUCKS
"INDICES OF GROSS AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
C R O P PRODUCTION
ANIMAL PRODUCTION

80

O- INDICATORS OF MACHINE TRACTOR STATIONS

NUMBER OF UNITS
PERSONNEL
FIXED CAPITAL
ANNUAL INVESTMENTS
TOTAL TRACTORS
PHYSICAL UNITS
1 5 HP UNITS
PLOWS FOR TRACTORS
MECHANICAL. CULTIVATORS
DISK HARROWS
MECHANICAL SEEDERS
CHEMICAL FERTILIZER SPREADERS
SPRAYING MACHINES
GRAIN COMBINES
CORN COMBINES
SELF-PROPELLED COMBINES
TRUCKS
TOTAL WORK EXECUTED
PLOWING
SEEDING
CULTIVATING
GRAIN HARVESTING
TOTAL WORK DONE FOR AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
P. INDICATORS FOR AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE UNITS
COOPERATORS APT OF WORK WHO WORKED
FIXED CAPITAL
ANNUAL INVESTMENTS
TOTAL CREDITS FROM THE STATE
INDICES OF GROSS AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
C R O P PRODUCTION
ANIMAL PRODUCTION

81

APPENDIX D.
Preliminary Specifications and Estimates of an Econometric Model
of Socialist Agriculture

82