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Between Islamists and Liberals Saudi Arabia
Between Islamists and Liberals Saudi Arabia
This article will examine a new phenomenon in domestic Saudi Arabian politics,
namely the emergence of a constituency made up of former Islamists and liberals,
Sunnis and Shiites, calling for democratic change within an Islamic framework through
a revision of the official Wahhabi1 religious doctrine.
Since the end of the 1990s, the Saudi intellectual field has been subject to significant internal developments that have led to the splitting up of its Sunni Islamist
component into three main orientations. First are the prominent members of the former
al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Awakening, the Islamist opposition of the early
1990s), such as Salman al-Awda or Aidh al-Qarni, who have decided to move away
from domestic political issues and to restrain their activity to the religious field. In
other words, the government has co-opted them and uses them as a substitute for the
Council of Senior Ulama (Hayat Kibar al-Ulama), whose legitimacy and influStphane Lacroix is a PhD candidate and teaching assistant at Sciences-Po Paris.
1. Although one has to be very careful when using the word Wahhabism, which in recent decades
has become more of a political anathema than a suitable tool for the social scientist, this term can
nevertheless be used as an operational concept on the condition of it being given a proper definition. I
thus define Wahhabism as the religious tradition developed over the centuries by the ulama of the
official Saudi religious establishment founded by the heirs of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, an establishment which in turn considers itself as the legitimate guardian of this tradition. However, the Wahhabis
never refer to themselves as such, and always use the terms Salafi (with reference to al-salaf al-salih or
pious ancestors) or Ahl al-Tawhid (People professing the absolute unity of God). It is worth noting that
not only the Wahhabis stricto sensu (i.e. the ulama of the official religious establishment) call themselves Salafis in Saudi Arabia, but also most of the Islamists.
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL VOLUME 58, NO. 3, SUMMER 2004
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ence have suffered a first blow with the Gulf War2 and a second blow with the successive deaths of its two most respected figures, Shaykh Ibn Baz and Shaykh Ibn
Uthaymin, in 1999 and 2001. Second are the Islamists who have chosen to venture
into global Salafi-Jihadi politics, acting as ideologues or spokesmen for the new radical trend. Third are those who have taken a middle way. They are the focus of the
present study.
As early as 1998, these activists and thinkers began reformulating their calls for
political reform in an Islamo-democratic fashion while expressing unprecedented criticism of the Wahhabi religious orthodoxy, thus insisting on the necessity to combine
political reform with religious reform. It is on this basis that they have striven to
forge alliances with individuals belonging to the remaining (non-Sunni Islamist) components of the Saudi intellectual field, mainly liberals and Shiites. Through their
efforts, they have managed to create with those a common democratic, nationalist,
and anti-Wahhabi political platform, thereby giving birth to a new trend within the
Saudi political-intellectual field. This trend thus stands out both because of the novelty of its religio-political discourse and because of the extreme diversity of its proponents, who come from very different generational, regional, and intellectual backgrounds, reflecting in a way the Kingdoms own diversity. While some of these intellectuals refer to themselves as wasatiyyun (advocates of wasatiyya3 ), tanwiriyyun
(enlighteners) or even aqlaniyyun (rationalists), most of them agree on defining
themselves as islahiyyun (reformists), and, as Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim put it less formally in March 2003, as a bunch of liberal Islamists or Islamist liberals.4 Thus,
we will use the term Islamo-liberal reformism to designate the new trends intellectual framework, and we will refer to its sympathizers as Islamo-liberals.
There is no doubt that the tragic events of September 11, 2001 served as something of a catalyst for this Islamo-liberal reformism. Prior to that date, these intellectuals expressed their views informally in private salons, Internet forums and articles
in the press. But in the wake of the attacks, they took advantage of the new political
climate prevalent in the Kingdom to create a wider consensus on their ideas and to
formalize their aspirations into political manifestos and petitions, the most elaborate
of which was presented to Crown Prince Abdallah in January 2003. Therefore the
2. The Council of Senior Ulama, which represents the highest institution in the official religious
establishment, was at that time compelled to issue a fatwa (religious statement) allowing foreign troops
into Saudi Arabia.
3. This Arabic term, which can have both a religious significance (i.e. moderation) and a political one
(i.e. balancing the liberal left and the Islamist right), has been used by the Islamo-liberals since 1998
but is no longer specific to them. Indeed, since the Riyadh bombings in May 2003, the term wasatiyya
has become widely used among Saudi Islamists notably Salman al-Awda, Aidh al-Qarni, and Safar
al-Hawali fearing of being assimilated to the radical Jihadis and willing to stand out as moderates. The
use of this term aims at granting religious legitimacy to this moderation, the idea of wasat being
frequently mentioned in the Quran. (See for example Sura II, al-Baqara, 143: And thus We have made
you a community of moderation (wasat).)
4. 104 intellectuels proposent une profonde rforme en Arabie Saoudite, [104 Intellectuals Propose a Profound Reform in Saudi Arabia], Le Monde, March 5, 2003.
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5. Dialogue between Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, March 12, 2003 (http://
bb.tuwaa.com/showthread.php?s=c07110b4f71da52c9d23d11bb403b536&threadid=11198 ).
6. Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim, al-Nizam al-Huquqi al-Islami wa Azmat al-Wasail al-Dimuqratiyya
ka Namudhaj li-l-Jadal al-Fiqhi [The Islamic Legal System and the Crisis of Means Democracy as
a Paradigm for Legal Debate], al-Watan, November 21 and 28, 2002.
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of which, in terms of values, must differ according to the nature of the society where
it is applied. In short, democratization neither means westernization, nor secularization, which most Islamists still have great difficulty accepting.7
In other writings, al-Qasim calls for the creation of a genuine civil society,
without which his concept of an Islamic democracy would be meaningless.8 Interestingly enough, al-Qasim considers jihad to be a pillar of an Islamic civil society: The
principal characteristic of jihad is that it must be decided independently of the official
political authority, which makes it a tremendous means of pressure on the authority to
ensure it protects the country out of fear that jihad might otherwise be declared.9
Al-Qasim also strives to demonstrate that Saudi nationalism is not incompatible
with Islam. The only problem with nationalism has been its instrumentalization by
the secular authoritarian Arab states, leading to its rejection by Islamists who came to
consider it an integral part of the regimes they were fighting. However, the idea of
Watan (homeland), he argues, is found in the Quran. Moreover, the Prophet loved
his native city of Mecca, to the extent that several hadiths recount that, when he was
in Medina, he felt deeply homesick.
Finally, al-Qasim believes it is essential to overcome the divide between Islamists and liberals in Saudi society. He insists that only the lack of mutual knowledge
and understanding is responsible for the distrust between the two groups and says he
is confident that the increase in the level of communication within the intellectual
field will help to solve this problem.10
However, al-Qasims liberal conceptions in the realm of politics do not apply to
social issues. When asked his opinion about whether women should have the right to
drive, he answers that, given the current conditions in Saudi Arabia, he opposes granting it to them. In another interview, he warns against the dangers of mixing genders
in working places, since it can give a man the opportunity to be alone with a woman,
which is prohibited in Islam.11 This example tells a lot about the difference between
political liberalism and social liberalism in Saudi Arabia.
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There exist, according to al-Hamid, two forms of Salafism, one innovative, the
other conservative. The latter is closely associated with the Saudi religious establishment. Ibn Taymiyya has fashioned a discourse capable of dealing with the problems
of his era, and in this sense, he is an innovator. However, those of his disciples who
have today made him an absolute reference and hope to solve our contemporary
problems with his ideas are imitators and conservative Salafis. For al-Hamid, what
we need are people who base themselves on the Book and the Sunna to find solutions
to the particular problems we face: globalization, human rights, civil society, United
Nations, etc Can one find in Ibn Taymiyyas medicine chest remedies to these
problems?
What al-Hamid calls for, on the whole, is a revival of the real Salafism, in its
innovative and animated form, or, in his words, to return to the methodology of the
13. For his biography, Al-Duktur Abdallah al-Hamid Yalhaq bi-Nadi Tuwa [Doctor Abdallah
al-Hamid Joins Tuwa Club], www.tuwaa.com, May 9, 2003.
14. Authors interview with Abdallah al-Hamid, Riyadh, June 2003.
15. Tajdid al-fikr al-dini [The Renewal of Religious Thinking], Al-Sharia wal-Hayat [Shari a
and Life], Al-Jazeera TV, May 26, 2002.
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pious ancestors and not simply to their productions, with a clear vision of what the
maqasid (objectives) of the sharia ought to be.16 This vision may remind us of the
ideas of Muhammad Abduh and his disciples from the Egyptian religious reform
movement of the early 20th century. However, although it might not sound novel
elsewhere in the Muslim world, this type of discourse is completely new among Saudi
Islamists.
This rereading of the texts is meant to show that, originally, the Muslim faith is
double. It requires spiritual and social progress. But men of religion, who were not
equipped to deal with the present, have neglected the social, temporal, practical
principles imposed by religion and have most of the time concentrated on the spiritual, the metaphysical and the theoretical. Thus the duties imposed by religion have
been restricted to the ritual, and the requirements concerning the life of the community have been neglected.17 However, as al-Hamid argues, in the Islam of the pious
ancestors, politics cannot be distinguished from religion; and human rights, civil
society or shura (consultation) are established realities. What he calls for is a return to
these values.
It is therefore out of his reflection on Islam that al-Hamid calls for respect for
human rights, the establishment of a civil society and the rule of shura. He insists on
the use of this last term: I prefer the use of shura to the use of democracy because
what we need is something that is a product of our own culture, not imported concepts.18 It is perhaps this manner of framing the debate that most clearly illustrates
the difference of approach between al-Hamid and al-Qasim. As for Hasan al-Maliki,
it is from yet another angle that he addresses the problem.
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in the Kingdom. His latest one, a fierce critique of the Saudi school curricula, was published shortly after September 11th (al-Maliki insists that this timing was a pure coincidence), and triggered a scandal, to the extent that its author was dismissed from his job, to
which he has never been reinstated.
Hasan al-Maliki repeatedly insists that he is not a politician and does not intend to
become one. However, if his writings do not directly target the Saudi political system,
they nevertheless shake some of its most essential pillars: the writing of history, the school
curricula, and the Wahhabi tradition.
It is in his book To Save Islamic History20 that he exposes for the first time his views
on the way Islamic history is taught in Saudi Arabia. According to him, things are presented as if the pious ancestors were infallible, which, al-Maliki argues, is completely
false. The salaf are not, in this respect, different from the other human beings; some of
them have succeeded in what they have undertaken and others have failed. Al-Maliki does
not hesitate to blame several characters central to Saudi historiography: the Caliph
Muawiyya, whom he describes as a tyrant and an opportunist, and Ibn Taymiyya, whose
extreme positions, especially those related to takfir (excommunication), he denounces. For
al-Maliki, a reform of Saudi society could only succeed if it began with an unbiased
rewriting of history, so that people can learn from the past.21
In the same spirit, he violently attacks Saudi curricula, concentrating his criticism
on one of the pillars of Wahhabi religious learning, the subject called Tawhid (the
uniqueness of God). In his book The Curricula: a Critical Reading of the Prescriptions of
Tawhid for the Classes of General Education,22 he demonstrates that the school books
used by young Saudis are replete with attacks against non-Wahhabi Muslims. Saudi students are incited to excommunicate them, to wage jihad upon them in certain instances
and, in any case, to be careful never to mix with them, even if this means making ones
hijra to the land of Islam. In the case of non-Muslims, the attacks are even more virulent, as al-Maliki denounces. But he goes further than this in his criticism, and this is
where his book becomes truly polemical. Saudi school books are only one of the multiple
expressions of a wider phenomenon. The real culprit, he maintains, is Wahhabism.
As we have just seen in those two cases, the critique of the Wahhabi dogma is the
mainspring of al-Malikis work. But this critique is in fact twofold. On the one hand,
al-Maliki criticizes the works of its primary sources of inspiration, Ibn Taymiyya and
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who have exercised their right to ijtihad, and have, like any
other mujtahid (the one who practices ijtihad), made mistakes.23 For example, in
another polemical work, The Imperfections of the Elucidation of Doubts,24 he attacks
20. Hasan al-Maliki, Nahwa Inqadh al-Tarikh al-Islami (To Save Islamic History), (n.d., n.p.).
21. Iadat Qiraat al-Tarikh al-Islami (The Rereading of Islamic History), Al-Sharia walHayat, Al-Jazeera TV, December 13, 2000.
22. Hasan al-Maliki, Manahij al-Talim : Qiraa Naqdiyya li-Muqarrarat al-Tawhid li-Marahil alTalim al-Amm [The Curricula: a Critical Reading of the Prescriptions of Tawhid for the Classes
of General Education], (n.d., n.p.).
23. Dialogue between Hasan al-Maliki and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, June 26, 2003.
24. Hasan al-Maliki, Naqs Kashf al-Shubuhat [The Imperfections of the Elucidation of Doubts],
(n.d., n.p.).
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one of Ibn Abd al-Wahhabs core books, The Elucidation of Doubts, denouncing
once more the extremism that he exhibits regarding takfir. On the other hand, he
castigates the extreme doctrinal rigidity of Wahhabism, which he ironically calls altayyar al-madhhabi literally the school-trend implying that Wahhabism,
which initially saw itself as going beyond the distinction between the established
juridical schools, has indeed become the contrary of what it had envisioned to be: a
new school, the particularity of which is to be even more rigid than all the others.25 In
this respect, he agrees with al-Hamid on the necessity of getting rid of this caricature
of Salafism that Wahhabism has become and of returning to the original idea, that of
a conscious and innovative Salafism, capable of giving rise to a civil society and of
permitting the establishment of shura.
Al-Malikis iconoclastic views have caused him much trouble: first, as we mentioned, the Ministry of Education dismissed him. It is even rumored that Salih alLuhaydan and Salih al-Fawzan, two senior shaykhs from the official religious establishment, personally asked for his removal. Second, the Salafi-Jihadi shaykhs made
him one of the main targets of their writings. For example, on August 14, 2001, Ali
al-Khudayr posted on the Internet a Statement on Hasan al-Maliki26 in which he
called him a defender of the grave worshippers, the murjia and the Shiites and
condemned his slander about the pious ancestors. Without going so far as to excommunicate him, he nonetheless called for al-Maliki to be tried by a religious court.
Other such statements, some of them signed by Nasir al-Fahd, Hamud al-Shuaybi
and Abdallah al-Sad, followed. However, as we will see, it is not just al-Maliki
among these Islamo-liberals who has incurred the wrath of the jihadi shaykhs.
25. Dialogue between Hasan al-Maliki and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, June 26, 2003.
26. Ali al-Khudayr, Bayan fi Hasan al-Maliki (Statement on Hasan al-Maliki),
www.alkhoder.com, August 14, 2001.
27. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Al-Hijra ila-l-Mustaqbal Maqati min Sira Ruhiyya [Exile to the
Future Extracts from a Spiritual Biography], Al-Majalla, May 28, 2000.
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ber 1998, he was appointed Imam at one of Riyadhs small mosques. In February
1999, he published his first article in al-Hayat, which he called: Was Ibn Abi Dawud
the Victim of an Injustice?28 In this historical reflection, he aims to demonstrate that
Ibn Hanbals status as the great Imam the Wahhabis extol today came more as a result
of a Caliphs political calculation than as a natural consequence of his own qualities.
He also underlines the paradox of Ibn Hanbal excommunicating mutazili Shaykh Ibn
Abi Dawud while ignoring Caliph al-Mamuns own mutazilism. This article came
as a bombshell in conservative religious circles. The extremely influential Shaykh
Hamud al-Shuaybi published a statement denouncing al-Nuqaydans words, and a
book was even written to refute them. The pressure exerted by al-Shuaybi was so
intense that al-Nuqaydan lost his position as an Imam. It is with this turn of events
that his career as a journalist began in earnest: He started publishing new articles and
in September 2000, he was appointed editor of the religious section for the Saudi
daily al-Watan. He was dismissed two years later and has been working since then as
a freelance journalist.29
What we urgently need is an enlightened understanding of the sharia, the
sacred texts and their maqasid (objectives) taking into account the considerable evolutions and winds of change that blow upon nations and cultures,30 al-Nuqaydan writes.
And he even goes further when confessing in private: What we must have is a genuine revolution of concepts: it is the masalih (interests) and the maqasid that ought to
determine the way we read the Quran, not the contrary. The Quran is an open book;
with it, everything is possible. A wide-ranging and enlightened ijtihad would therefore provide the miraculous cure capable of rousing the Umma out of its torpidity.
This, he explains, is where the socio-political reform Saudi Arabia and the Muslim
world have been waiting for will come from.31
It is not so much that al-Nuqaydan is more liberal in his ideas than most Islamoliberals, but, in order to make his voice heard, he does not hesitate to use expressions
likely to shock his readers. For example, he writes that Islam needs a Lutheran
reform, and that we need a new Islam. He evens defines himself as a humanist, no
matter how shocking this denomination would sound to hard-liners.32 In his articles,
he tends to deal with sensitive themes, always defending the position contrary to the
one adopted by the dominant Wahhabi discourse. For instance, in December 2001 he
published an article called Judgment on the Womans ID,33 in which he vigorously
28. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Hal Kan Ibn Abi Dawud Mazluman ? [Was Ibn Abi Dawud the Victim
of an Injustice?], Al-Hayat, February 23, 1999.
29. Authors interview with Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Riyadh, June 2003.
30. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Hakadha Taallamtu fi-l-Masajid (This Is How I Was Taught in the
Mosques), www.elaph.com, February 8, 2002.
31. Authors interview with Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Riyadh, June 2003.
32. Dialogue between Mansur al-Nuqaydan and Muntada al-Wasatiyya, www.wasatyah.com,
December 28, 2002 (removed from Muntada al-Wasatiyya shortly after).
33. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Hukm Bataqat al-Mara [Judgment on the Womans ID], on
www.alnogaidan.com.
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defended the project of granting women personal identification. In two separate articles, he
criticized the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Hayat alAmr bil-maruf wal-Nahi an al-Munkar) questioning its role, and finally arguing that its
existence is a bida (blameworthy innovation)!34 More recently, he drew a clear link between
Wahhabism with its inclination to takfir and the terrorist violence the country has been experiencing since May 2003.35 This last article caused him to be sidelined for two months.
His obstinacy and penchant for provocation made al-Nuqaydan the jihadists primary
target, and they acted all the more ferociously towards him as he used to be one of them. In their
eyes, he came to represent the archetypal traitor. This is how one should understand the relentlessness and determination that they showed against him. Finally, on January 24, 2003, after
numerous pamphlets, manifestos, and books had been written to denounce his intellectual dangerousness, four leading jihadi shaykhs, among them Ali al-Khudayr and Ahmad al-Khalidi,
accused him of apostasy for the statements he made during his interview with the forum Muntada
al-Wasatiyya (the Forum of wasatiyya, as defined above in footnote 3) in December 2002. They
demanded that the punishment ordained for apostates death be applied to him, if the
sharia is really the law in this country.36
However, al-Nuqaydan refused to give in to intimidation. A few days later, he
replied to those who claimed the right to set themselves as judges of his words through
an article entitled What I think of the Decrees of Takfir.37 Showing that he has no
intention of putting an end to his criticism, he overtly called for a repudiation of
Wahhabism, as well as any other form of Salafism, and a revival of Irja, an early
Islamic school of thought that was characterised by its insistence on keeping an apolitical attitude and its refusal to judge the faith of others.38 Wisdom today demands
that we make every effort to teach people Irja in faith. Because Salafi thought
in its contemporary meaning contains by nature an inclination to takfir and
exclusivism. Salafism has thus become a term which al-Nuqaydan regards with great
suspicion: I feel intellectually close to such thinkers as al-Hamid and al-Qasim. But
the great difference between us is that they call themselves Salafis and continue to
believe in this golden age of the first hegirian centuries.39 Now, let us take a look at
the other components of this Islamo-liberal constituency.
34. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Dawa ila Taqnin Wazifat Rijal al-Hisba [Call for a Regulation of the
Prerogatives of the Religious Police], Al-Majalla, April 30, 2000, and Al-Amr bi-l-Maruf wa-l-Nahi
an al-Munkar [The Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice], Al-Watan, February 25, 2002.
35. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Al-Fikr al-Jihadi al-Takfiri Wafid am Asil Darib bi-Judhurihi?
(The Jihadi Takfiri Thought Coming from the Outside or Deeply Rooted in the Country?], AlRiyadh, May 11, 2003.
36. Bayan fi Riddat Mansur al-Nuqaydan [Statement on the Apostasy of Mansur al-Nuqaydan],
www.alkhoder.com, January 24, 2003.
37. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Rayi fi Sukuk al-Takfir [What I think of the Decrees of Takfir],
www.elaph.com, February 14, 2003.
38. The accusation of Irja has in the last decades been at the center of the debates within the Saudi
religious circles, especially between the Islamists and some of the Wahhabi ulama, each group accusing
the other of being Murjia, or adepts of Irja. It is within this context that al-Nuqaydans call for a revival
of Irja must be understood as a new challenge to both the Islamists and the Wahhabi establishment.
39. Authors interview with Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Riyadh, June 2003.
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not hide from you that the changes that have occurred have made certain Arab nationalist principles unsuitable for this age. Arab nationalists thus have to adapt to the
evolutions, to the requirements and to the circumstances of the era.43 Since September 11th, the necessity of joining forces in the face of adversity has made Tayyibs
calls even more pressing. Interviewed on Tuwa in May 2003, he made this goal the
central theme of his speech: Making peace, getting together, coming to an agreement
call it as you like is nowadays an urgent and pressing necessity, that cant be
postponed in this sense, it is exactly like the question of reform itself and has no
less importance.44 On May 17, 2003, he put his calls into a concrete form by taking
part in a meeting with Safar al-Hawali.45 Asked about the impression he had of the
shaykh, Tayyib answered: Believe me, I found nothing in him but nobleness and
magnanimity and a fabulous ability to understand and an incredible exaltation
for the superior interests of the nation. And for those who would still doubt his
sincerity, he adds: My relations with the religious trend, its figures and leaders are
not mere tactical relations, as some imagine. They are, on the contrary, the fruit of
true convictions, in the name of the common good of this country. And Tayyib
concludes: I am entirely convinced that there exist between us and them common
principles and denominators, on which we all agree and that we want with seriousness and loyalty to develop and to promote particularly in those difficult and
crucial times.46 This last sentence seems to sum up perfectly the Islamo-liberal project.
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intransigence represented an ever greater danger for them than the power of the royal
family. As Fandy argues, their isolation on the local scene made them subscribe to
this new discourse in order to be connected with the global world, and particularly its
western core.47 The rise of a Saudi Islamo-liberal reformist constituency from 1998
onwards therefore gave Shiite intellectuals an opportunity to reintegrate themselves
into the local context, and their discourse subsequently experienced a few changes.
Democracy, human rights and civil society still constitute the core of their rhetoric,
but two new elements have appeared. First, one can notice a greater emphasis on
Islam in comparison with the beginning of the 1990s. As Shaykh Zaki al-Milad puts
it: we, as Shiites, no longer want to be systematically counted amongst the liberals.
We wish to propose a project that is at the same time democratic and Islamic.48 This
same idea is at the center of Muhammad Mahfuzs latest book, Islam and the Challenges of Democracy, in which he writes: We will not progress and evolve significantly at every level of our existences unless we follow the teachings of Islam. []
The only way for us, as Arabs and Muslims, to evolve and to progress is to combine
Islam and democracy.49 Mahfuzs discourse thus perfectly echoes that of the Sunni
Islamo-liberals. Indeed, to make this combination possible, we call for a civilizing
and humanist reading of Islam, as he writes, before embarking on a lengthy praise of
ijtihad. Second, the Shiite leaders today champion Saudi nationalism, which they
have learned to instrumentalize in their political discourse. We are Saudi and we love
our country. All that we ask for is the unity of the Saudi nation to truly become a
reality. It is in this framework, and in no other, that we want the Shiite question to be
settled,50 Muhammad Mahfuz explains. We no longer want to be assimilated to the
rest of the Shiites who live in the Gulf and to be suspected of being a fifth column of
the neighbouring states. We want to be a fully-recognized constituent of the Saudi
nation,51 Shaykh Zaki al-Milad adds.
The discourse used by Shiite intellectuals is therefore very close to that of the
other Islamo-liberals weve mentioned. Indeed, one can consider them an integral
constituent of the Islamo-liberal reformist project. In addition, several channels of
communication and interaction have been created between Sunni and Shiite Islamoliberals. For example, the Tuesday salon, founded in 2000 in Qatif and supervised
by Jafar al-Shayib, has received as speakers several prominent figures of Sunni Islamoliberal reformism, such as Abdallah al-Hamid and Tawfiq al-Qusayyir.52 In an unprecedented move in Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Hasan al-Saffar, the historical leader of
the Saudi Shiite movement, was invited to give a lecture on social peace at the
47. Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, (Baginstoke: Macmillan, 1999),
pp.211-212.
48. Authors interview with Shaykh Zaki al-Milad, Qatif, June 2003.
49. Muhammad Mahfuz, al-Islam wa Rihanat al-Dimuqratiyya [Islam and the Challenges of Democracy], (Beirut : Al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-Arabi, 2002), pp.204-205.
50. Authors interview with Muhammad Mahfuz, Qatif, June 2003.
51. Authors interview with Shaykh Zaki al-Milad, Qatif, June 2003.
52. Authors interview with Jafar al-Shayib, Qatif, June 2003.
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weekly salon of Rashid al-Mubarak in Riyadh in April 2001. The organizer of the
event was none other than Abdallah al-Hamid, and many of the Islamo-liberals attended.53
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out their project of creating a political platform that would unify the whole of the
Saudi intellectual field and, beyond the elite, the entire Saudi society itself. This
construction of a unitary political discourse has taken place in several stages, principally by the way of manifestos and petitions, reminding observers of the frenzy that
Saudi Arabia had witnessed in the wake of the Gulf War.
57. Ala Ayy Asas Nataayish [How We Can Coexist?], posted at http://www.islamtoday.net/
bayan/bayanm.cfm on April 29, 2002 the English translation is available at http://
www.americanvalues.org/html/saudi_statement.html.
58. In 1991, Ibn Jibrin issued a fatwa declaring the Shiite infidels and authorizing their murder. (See
Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, (Baginstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 206.
59. Yusuf al-Dayni, Bayan al-Muthaqqafin al-Saudiyyin Najah Dakhili wa Ikhfaq Khariji (The
Saudi Intellectuals Manifesto A Success at Home and a Failure Abroad), al-Watan, May 5, 2002.
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However, al-Qasims risky bet has failed. The shaykhs from the growing SalafiJihadi trend, acting here as guardians of the Wahhabi Orthodoxy and of the sacrosanct
principle of al-wala wa-l-bara (loyalty to fellow Muslims and rejection of the
infidels), violently criticized the content of the manifesto and attacked al-Awda and
al-Hawali for supporting it.60 The pressure on the two shaykhs became so strong that
they were forced into signing an explanatory manifesto in which they purely and
simply contradicted every single argument and principle they had stood for in the
first text.61 Similarly, many of the signatories published separate statements in which
they announced their withdrawal from the list.62 Those moves triggered a shower of
criticism in the Saudi press and on the Internet, mainly directed against the Islamist
signatories for their opportunism. After two months of a genuine media-frenzy
surrounding the issue, nothing was left of the manifesto.
This first attempt to bring together the Saudi intellectual field on an Islamoliberal and nationalist platform thus seems to have come to nothing. However, the
long debate that followed the publication of the text gave the Islamo-liberal reformists, and their ideas, an unprecedented visibility on the Saudi scene. And they were
definitely going to take advantage of it to carry on with their socio-political project.
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and regional parliaments (majlis al-shura); and complete freedom of speech, assembly, and organization to allow the emergence of a true civil society. As for economic
demands, the signatories call for a fair distribution of wealth, serious measures against
corruption and waste, and the diversification of the countrys revenues. A third concern, addressed under the rubric of The Dangers that Threaten National Unity, deals
with social issues: the respect of human rights; the ending of discrimination; the
improvement of public services; the struggle against unemployment; and the role of
women, who are described as half of the society and who should be given the rights
bestowed upon them by the sharia. Moreover, the signatories ask the rulers to take
immediate measures as a proof of their determination to effect reform: the liberation
or fair trials of all political prisoners, the reinstatement of all the intellectuals
dismissed from their jobs, and the right for all to express themselves freely without
risk of having their passport seized or losing their jobs. Finally, they demand the
organization of a national dialogue conference in which all regions and social groups
would be represented. Yet it appears that, in order to assemble a wide consensus
within the intellectual field, the Islamo-liberals avoided addressing some of the most
controversial issues. First, the issue of a reform of the Saudi curricula, which had for
months been at the center of violent disputes between certain liberals and Islamists in
the press and on the Internet, has simply been dropped. Second, the question of the
role of women in Saudi society, which had been an important focus for the disputes as
well, is merely alluded to, and many consider that it has not received the attention it
deserves.
Although the language of the text may not sound as religious as, say, that of the
Memorandum of Advice (Mudhakkarat al-Nasiha), which was presented to King
Fahd by 107 ulama and Islamist activists in 1992, let us not be mistaken: the signatories are careful enough to state several times in the document that the sharia is the
appropriate framework for all the reforms they demand. Moreover, although it is
evident that the signatories endorse such concepts between lines, the words democracy and parliament are absent and all that can be found within the text is a reference to the Islamic institution of shura. As al-Hamid, one of the authors of the text
and whose influence is evident on this choice of terminology, argues, the aim is to
root the reformist discourse in Islam.65 This ambiguity of an Islamic discourse with
a liberal smell, or a liberal discourse with an Islamic smell, explains why most Western and even Arab media misunderstood the initiative. Indeed, after many
articles described the document as a liberal petition, some newspapers, such as the
Washington Post,66 preferred to warn their readers against a text written by dangerous
fundamentalists opposed to the United States.
If one takes a close look at the list of signatories, one will indeed find the whole
Islamo-liberal reformist conglomeration in full force: the Islamist wing which,
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although not as numerous as the liberal one, played a key role in the project67 is
notably represented by Abdallah al-Hamid, Hamad al-Sulayfih, and Sulayman alRashudi, three of the six founding members of the Committee for the Defense of
Legitimate Rights; Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim, whom we introduced earlier; Tawfiq alQusayyir, a former professor of physics and a signatory of the Memorandum of
Advice; Muhammad al-Harfi, an Islamic researcher; Fayz Jamal, a writer; Abd alMuhsin Hulliyat Muslim, a poet and a journalist; Muhammad Salah al-Din, a senior
journalist at al-Madina newspaper and a publisher; Abdallah Farraj al-Sharif, a journalist at al-Madina; Abdallah bin Bejad al-Utaybi, a journalist at al-Watan, intellectually close to al-Nuqaydan; Abd al-Humaid al-Mubarak, a Sunni shaykh from the
Eastern Province; and Shaykh Ahmad Salah Jamjum, a former Minister of Trade. The
liberal wing is represented by intellectuals such as Muhammad Said Tayyib; Matruk
al-Falih, a political science professor at King Saud University; Khalid al-Dakhil, a
sociology professor at King Saud university; Qinan al-Ghamidi, a former editor-inchief of al-Watan; Abd al-Aziz al-Dukhayyil, a former minister of finance; Abid
Khazindar, a literary critic and a former Arab nationalist militant imprisoned in the
70s; and, last but not least, the well-known novelist Turki al-Hamad.68 As for the
Shiite wing, it includes Muhammad Mahfuz, Jafar al-Shayib, Shaykh Zaki al-Milad
and al-Watan journalist Najib al-Khunaizi twenty people in total. The fact that two
of the intellectuals we introduced earlier Mansur al-Nuqaydan and Hasan al-Maliki
are missing from this list does not mean that they disagree with the demands. On
the contrary, both of them have expressed their entire support for the document.69
However, they simply preferred not to get directly involved in politics, considering
that their role which they see as definitely no less important is elsewhere.
If How we can Coexist somehow represented the external part of the Islamoliberal reformists political program, then Vision for the Present and the Future of
the Homeland can certainly be considered as the internal one. Thus, these intellectuals have not only managed to orchestrate a historic rapprochement between two forces
long considered mutually opposed, the liberals and the Islamists, but they have, manifesto after manifesto, succeeded in constructing a moderate Islamo-liberal reformist
and nationalist discourse, around which they created a wide consensus.
67. This dimension was largely overlooked by Richard Dekmejian in his article on The Liberal
Impulse in Saudi Arabia, Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 3, (Summer 2003), pp. 400-413. The
reason for this is that he relied on the statistical method which, in this case, allowed him to show that the
majority of the group of signatories are individuals usually categorized as liberals, but didnt permit him
to determine where the groups intellectual center of gravity is situated.
68. However, Turki al-Hamad has ideologically speaking little to do with the Islamo-liberal
trend as we described it here. He himself confesses that he didnt sign the petition which he considers
as much too Islamist out of conviction, but only to prove to its authors, who accused him of not
being willing to sign because he feared the consequences, that he did not. (Authors interview with Turki
al-Hamad, Riyadh, June 2003).
69. For Hasan al-Maliki, see his dialogue with Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com; for Mansur al-Nuqaydan,
authors interview, Riyadh, June 2003.
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GOVERNMENTAL REACTIONS:
CROWN PRINCE ABDALLAH AND THE ISLAMO-LIBERALS
The first reactions to the petition have overall been quite positive, starting with
that of Crown Prince Abdallah who received forty of the signatories in his palace and
assured them of his support, before adding that he is not the only person in command
and that the process of reform will take time.70 A few days after this historic meeting,
an authentic Riyadh spring was launched in the Saudi government-controlled press,
which witnessed a proliferation of reform-oriented articles implicitly supporting the
charter in its general outlines.
The first concrete step taken by Crown Prince Abdallah towards the Islamoliberal reformists was the organization in June 2003 of the national dialogue conference which they had asked for in their petition. For the first time in the countrys
history, thirty ulama belonging to all the confessional groups present on the Saudi
territory Salafi and non-Salafi Sunnis, Sufis, Twelver and Ismaili Shiites
were invited to sit together under the Crown Princes auspices. The debates led to the
adoption of a charter71 which can be considered a first response to the Islamo-liberals
political and religious demands. On the political level, the text recognizes the necessity of implementing reforms and ensuring freedom of speech and a better distribution of wealth. The subsequent announcement in October 2003 of partial municipal
elections to be held in 200472 may be seen as a first concrete move in that direction.
On the religious level, the document is a severe blow to the official Wahhabi doctrine.
First, it acknowledges the intellectual and confessional diversity of the Saudi nation,
which is contrary to traditional Wahhabi exclusivism. Second, it criticizes one of
Wahhabisms juridical pillars, the principle of sadd al-dharai (the blocking of
the means), which should from now on be used only with measure and moderation.
It is notably in pursuing this principle which requires that actions that could lead to
committing sins must be prohibited that women do not have the right to drive in
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, among the ulama invited to attend the conference, none of
the figures of the official Wahhabi establishment were present, which obviously denotes a willingness to marginalize it.
However, the Crown Princes stance on Islamo-liberal reformism doesnt seem
to be shared by all his brothers, either because they are opposed to the new intellectuals reformist and anti-Wahhabi views, or because they fear that the Islamo-liberals
might reinforce Abdallahs position and legitimacy within the royal family. Thus,
70. Authors interview with Matruk al-Falih, who attended the meeting, Riyadh, June 2003.
71. Al-Saudiyya: Munaqashat Sariha Hawla al-Taaddudiyya al-Madhhabiyya wa Hurriyat alTabir wa Huquq al-Mara wa Muwajahat al-Ghuluw [Saudi Arabia: Sincere Discussions About
Confessional Pluralism, Freedom of Speech, Womens Rights and the Fight Against Extremism], AlSharq al-Awsat, June 22, 2003.
72. Saudis Announce First Elections, www.bbc.co.uk, October 13, 2003; for the text of the governmental decree, Nass Qirar al-Hukuma al-Saudiyya bi-l-Intikhabat fi-l-Majalis al-Baladiyya [Text
of the Saudi Governments Decision to Hold Elections for Municipal Councils], www.elaph.com,
October 13, 2003.
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the Islamo-liberal issue seems to have become a bone of contention among the
ruling lite.
CONCLUSION
The emergence in Saudi Arabia of an Islamo-liberal trend, constituting a unitary reformist movement seeking a compromise between democracy and Islam, represents a significant evolution towards Post-Islamism,73 a phenomenon not unique to
Saudi Arabia. Indeed, this movement may remind us of similar evolutions in other
Islamic countries, such as, for instance, the efforts made in Egypt to found a Wasat
party, aimed at unifying Islamists and Christians on an Islamo-democratic platform.74
However, there is, as weve seen, much more novelty in Saudi Islamo-liberal
reformism. Indeed, while earlier Saudi reformist trends had focused primarily on
political change, the new reform movements main characteristic is that it presents
political reform as inseperable from religious reform. In other words, for Islamoliberal reformists, no democratic change may come about without a comprehensive
revision of Wahhabi religious doctrine. This Islamo-liberal trend is therefore not only
Post-Islamist, it might also be dubbed Post-Wahhabi.
The first question that arises is the durability of such a heterogeneous movement. Indeed, one could assume that there is nothing more to the Islamo-liberal trend
than the temporary agreement of various forces seeking political change on a minimalist
platform. And it is true that some of the most delicate issues the reform of the
curricula and the place of women in Saudi society have not been fully addressed
and could become a bone of contention. What we have argued here, however, is that
Islamo-liberal reformism, more than an opportunistic alliance, is the expression of a
significant evolution within the Saudi intellectual field. This guarantees that it will
show unless subjected to very strong pressure a good degree of resilience.
The second question is the future of relations between the Crown Prince and the
Islamo-liberals. Abdallah has up to now shown support for their reformist and critical project. But will he be able to impose his views on his brothers, some of whom
have very different opinions regarding this issue, at the risk of breaking the sacrosanct
family consensus? And, in the end, is he really ready as the Islamo-liberals demand
to found a new Saudi Arabia, based on the inclusive value of nation and not the
exclusive one of Wahhabism? This would indeed mean transforming the traditional
tribal-Wahhabi legitimacy of the Al Saud family into a modern nationalist one and
73. Gilles Kepel points at this phenomenon when he describes the new orientation taken by those
militants who now, in the name of democracy and human rights, are looking for common ground with the
secular middle class. They have put aside the radical ideology of Qutb, Mawdudi, and Khomeini; they
consider the jihadist-salafist doctrines developed in the camps of Afghanistan a source of horror, and
they celebrate the democratic essence of Islam. Islamists defending the rights of the individual stand
shoulder to shoulder with secular democrats in confronting repressive and authoritarian regimes. Gilles
Kepel, Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 368.
74. See Joshua A. Stacher, Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party,
Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, (Summer 2002), pp. 414-432.
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would imply a radical change of socio-political alliances. Such a move, in the current
context of growing domestic instability, could be politically risky.
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