G.R. No.

L-278
July 18, 1946
HAYDEE HERRAS TEEHANKEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, and LEOPOLDO ROVIRA, POMPEYO DIAZ, ANTONIO
QUIRINO and JOSE P. VELUZ, Judges of People's Court, respondents.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Kapunan, Jr. for respondent Director of Prisons.
Respondent Judges of People's Court in their own behalf.
HILADO, J.:
On February 16, 1946, we approved a minute resolution ordering that "petitioner Haydee Herras
Teehankee, upon her filing in this Court of a bond in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000)
and upon said bond duly approved, be forthwith set at liberty." This is now written to set forth at
length the reason underlying such order.
Petitioner was one of the persons detained by the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the
United States Army mentioned in the Court's decision in case of Raquiza vs. Bradford (75 Phil.,
50). As said in that decision, petitioner was apprehended by the said Counter intelligence Corps
Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically charged
with (a) "active collaboration with the Japanese," and (b) "previous association with the enemy."
(Ibid., p. 56.) When she, along with her co-detainees and co-petitioners in that case, was
delivered by the United States Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the
proclamation of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of December 29, 1944, she was
detained by said Government under that charge. And under that charged. And under the same
charge she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government during all the time
herein referred to.
Until the instant case was submitted for decision, no information had been filed against the
petitioner under the People's Court Act and the correlative provisions of the penal laws. When
petitioner submitted to the People's Court her petition dated October 2, 1945, seeking temporary
release under bail, said court by its order dated October 4, 1945, signed by Judge Antonio
Quirino, directed the Solicitor General, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, "to file his
comment and recommendation, as soon as possible." In compliance with said order, the office of
Special Prosecutors filed its recommendation dated October 5, 1945, wherein it was manifested
"that on the strength of the evidence at hand, the reasonable bail recommended for the
provincial release of the petitioner be fixed at fifty thousand pesos (50,000)."
Presiding Judge Leopoldo Rovira of the People's Court, in view of said recommendation,
entered an order dated October 9, 1945, referring the petition for reconsideration by the Fifth
Division of the Court, but adding that in his opinion "it should be denied notwithstanding the
recommendation of the Solicitor General for her provisional release under a bond of fifty
thousand pesos (50,000)." And on that same date Judge Pompeyo Diaz of the same court
entered an order disposing of the petition, as well as the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, in these words:
. . . . in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the
office of Special Prosecutors recommends as high as fifty thousands pesos (P50,000)
for her provisional release, it is ordered that the said petition for provinsional release
be, as it is hereby denied.
A motion to reconsider this order was denied by Judge Diaz on October 13, 1945.
Petitioner filed with this court a petition for certiorari and mandamus (Herras Teehankee vs.
Rovira, 75 Phil., 634), praying that the orders above mentioned be set aside, they having been
entered with abuse of discretion and without hearing granted to petitioner. This court, on
December 20, 1945, rendered a judgment the dispositive part of which provides and decrees as
follows:
Wherefore, it is the judgment of this court that (a) the order of the People's Court,
dated October 9, 1945, denying petitioner's petition for provisional release under bail,
and the order of said court, dated October 13, 1945, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said order of October 9, 1945, which we declare to have been
entered with grave abuse of discretion, be set aside; and (b) that for the proper
application of the pertinent constitutional, statutory, and reglementary provisions
alluded to in the body of this decision, a hearing of petitioner's application for bail be

held before the People's Court with due notice to the Solicitor General, as well as to
the petitioner, as hereinabove outlined, said hearing, whether summary or otherwise,
to be such as would enable the People's Court to exercise its sound discretion in the
disposal of the aforesaid petition. Without costs. So ordered.
Pursuant to this decision, the People's Court proceeded to hear the petition for provisional
release under bail in the presence of the petitioner on December 27, 1945. At such hearing,
notwithstanding the special prosecutor's statement that he had no objection to the petition,
Judge antonio Quirino asked him questions tending to compel disclosure of the prosecution's
evidence, to which petitioner objected upon the ground that, under the circumstances, the only
thing for the court to d was to grant the petition. The court reserved its decision, but petitioner
came to this court to raise the issue in the same case (Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, supra) in a
motion filed on January 2, 1946. This court, on January 11, 1946, resolved said motion as
follows:
Considering the motion of petitioner's counsel in G.R. No. L-101, Haydee Herras
Teehankee, petitioner, vs. Leopoldo Rovira et al., respondents, filed on January 2,
1946, and the answer thereto filed by respondent Hon. Antonio Quirino, as Associate
Judge of the People's Court, dated January 3, 1946; it appearing on page 16 of the
transcript Annex D of said motion that at the hearing held before the People's Court on
December 27, 1945, pursuant to the decision of this court, counsel for petitioner made
a verbal petition asking the People's Court to issue an order for petitioner's release on
bail in the amount of P50,000, said counsel announcing that should the People's Court
deny his said petition, he will seek the corresponding extraordinary legal remedy
before this court, and its appearing that the People's Court reserved its decision on
the said oral petition, which is, therefore, still pending resolution, which fact makes
petitioner's motion of January 2, 1946, premature; said motion is denied, but with
instruction for the People's Court to render its decision on the aforesaid verbal petition,
taking into account that when the Special Prosecutor in capital cases like the present,
does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in
the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after approval of the bail which it
should fix for the purpose; but if the court has reason to believe that the Special
Prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength
of the state's evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail; when, however,
the Special Prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that
the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or
jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he
exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the office of
Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and
may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he doe
not want to introduce provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the
rights of the defendant or detainee.
On the same date, January 11, 1946, at 4.05 p.m., the People's Court was served with a copy of
the above-quoted resolution. Since its receipt of said copy until this case was submitted, said
court has failed to decide petitioner's verbal application for release under bail presented on
December 27, 1945, and which it was instructed to decide; but on the contrary, respondent
Judge Antonio Quirino, for the second time, called said application for hearing on January 15,
1946, and insisted on addressing to the Special Prosecutor practically the same questions as
those which he had addressed to him at the hearing of December 27, 1945, and upon said
prosecutor's declining to answer with the presentation of a certificate, dated January 14, 1946, of
the Solicitor General to the effect "that the office of Special Prosecutors is not, for the present, in
a position to disclose the strength or nature of the evidence which it has at hand in the case of
the herein petitioner as it would imperial the success of the prosecution and jeopardize public
interest," ordered the arrest of said special prosecutor (Liwag) for alleged contempt of court, and
the application for bail was left undecided. That detention of Private Prosecutor Liwag gave rise
to the habeas corpus proceedings instituted in his behalf in case G.R. No. L-237 (42 Off. Gaz.,
934), on January 15, 1946, which resulted in the release of said official pursuant to an order, of
the same date, by Hon. Gregorio Perfecto, Associate Justice of this Court. The order issued by
Justice Perfecto was predicated upon"the instructions contained in our resolution of January 11,

1946, above quoted, to the effect that even where the People's Court believes that the special
prosecutor's attitude in not opposing the petitioner for provisional release under bail is not
justified, if the Solicitor General filed a statement under his official oath to the effect that the
disclosure of the evidence in the hands of the prosecutor may imperial the success of the
prosecution and jeopardize public interest, the authority of the People's Court to inquire into the
prosecution's evidence ceases and, therefore, the prosecutor cannot be held guilty of contempt
for refusing to answer the questions of the court. Respondent Judge Antonio Quirino filed before
this Court on January 17, 1946, a motion to reconsider the order issued by Justice Perfecto
which in truth was a motion to reconsider our instructions aforementioned, and this court by
unanimous vote denied the motion.
Based upon what had erroneously been done by the People's Court at this second hearing ,
petitioner filed a verified motion in said case G.R. No. L-1011 dated January 16; 1946, asking
this Court to grant her directly provisional release under bail. We denied the motion with the
qualification that "there having been unnecessary delay in the disposition by respondents of the
petition for provisional release under bail, said respondents are hereby directed to act on and
dispose of said petition without any further delay." This order of denial was founded on the
circumstance that the People's Court had not yet rendered its decision on the verbal petition,
and we then believed that, with the order of release issued by Justice perfecto in the habeas
corpus proceedings instituted by Special Prosecutor Liwag and with the unanimous denial by
this Court of the motion for reconsideration filed by Judge Quirino, our instructions had become
clear to the People's Court and that, therefore, they would be followed in subsequent
proceedings by said court if no new circumstances should develop. But after the People's Court
had been served with a copy of our order of denial, it held another hearing on January 28, 1946,
the third on the same petition, after which, instead of acting upon the verbal application for
provisional release under bail, it entered an order dated January 31, 1946, purporting to pass
upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the People's Court's order of October 9, 1945,
which had been set aside by our decision of December 20, 1945. However, in the body of its
order the People's Court held that, under the circumstances, it still had absolute discretion on
the matter, contrary to the instructions contained in our resolution of January 11, 1946; and upon
the basis of a secret knowledge acquired in a private conference had with the special prosecutor
at the back of the petitioner, it held further that there was "a myriad points which would establish
the guilt of the petitioner, contrary to our first resolution dated December 20, 1945, above
quoted, wherein we held that the hearing should be in the presence of the petitioner or at least
with due notice to her.
With the foregoing background, the instant proceedings were commenced and prosecuted.
Petitioner's original petition dated February 2, 1946, was for the writ of habeas corpus which, in
substance, alleges the facts stated in the preceding paragraphs except the last order of the
People's Court dated January 31, 1945, of which petitioner has not yet been notified. After
receiving copy thereof, petitioner filed a supplementary petition for certiorari dated February 4,
1946, praying that she be declared entitled to provisional liberty; that the People's Court's order
of January 31 be declared null and void because it is contrary to the Constitution and the rules of
court and entered with grave abuse of discretion, and that her immediate liberty under such bail
as the court might fix, be decreed. In paragraph 3 of said supplementary petition, counsel states
that, in view of the aforesaid order of the People's Court of January 31, he agrees that this
proceedings be considered as a combined proceeding in certiorari andhabeas corpus, the latter
in aid of the former.
Under date of February 4, 1946, the Director of Prisons, who is one of the respondents herein
represented by the office of the Solicitor General, filed his return wherein it is submitted that the
said petition for the writ of habeas corpus is improper. Under date of February 6, 1946, the said
Director of Prisons, by the same counsel, filed a "constancia" wherein he manifests that, in
connection with the supplementary petition, he reiterates what has been alleged in his aforesaid
return or answer dated the 4th of the same month.
It is significant that no answer to the aforesaid supplementary petition has been filed by the
People's Court.
On February 8, 1946, this Court by resolution ordered as follows:
The Solicitor General having filed a "constancia" to the supplementary petition, . . .,
and the time to file the People's Court's answer to said supplementary petition having
expired; it is ordered that the case be set for hearing . . .

None of the parties appeared when the case was called for oral argument.
The original petition for the writ of habeas corpus was verified. The supplementary petition was
not, it is true. But this omission is immaterial, since the facts upon which the present decision is
based are those appearing of record, those within the judicial notice of the Court, those alleged
in the verified petition, and those alleged or admitted in the respondents' answer.
Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 (People's Court Act), in its pertinent part, reads as
follows:
Provided, however, That existing provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
aforesaid political prisoner may, in the discretion of the People's Court, after due
notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail even prior
to the presentation of the corresponding information, unless the Court finds that there
is strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense.
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira (supra), that this proviso must be read and
understood in the light of such provisions of the Constitution as may bear on the subject so as to
harmonize the former with the latter and avoid their conflicting with each other. Of course, where
harmonization is impossible and conflict inevitable, the statute gives way to the Constitution.
This is in consonance with the well-settled rule that "in construing statutes with relation to
constitutional provisions, the courts take into consideration the principle that every statute is to
be read in the light of the Constitution and that the Constitution and a statute involving
constitutional rights will be construed together as one law." (11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law,
section 96.)
Section 1, paragraph 16, of Article III, of the Constitution, provides as follows:
All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not
be required. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have held in the same case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira (supra), "This constitutional
mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has
already been formally filed; it lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be
bailable, except those charge with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to
this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt
is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained, or otherwise
deprived of their liberty may have occasion to seek the benefit of said provision. But in order that
a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a
formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed undgr arrest,
detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights,
and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of
his guilt is strong. Indeed, if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged
under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its
benefit to one against whom the proper authorities may yet conclude that there exists no
sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter would
be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of
one already formally charged with a criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section 1,
paragraph 17), a fortiori this presumption should be indulged in favor of one not yet so charged,
although already arrested or detained."
It is argued that the subsequent words "before conviction" and "except those charged with
capital offenses," used in the aforequoted constitutional provision evidently qualify the words "all
persons," which should be read "persons charged or defendants." This is reading into the
Constitution a qualification that is absent therefrom, and its effect is to curtail individual freedom
which is one of the most precious treasures jealously protected in our Constitution. The words
"before conviction" do not necessarily qualify the words "all persons" to mean "persons charged
or defendants," because a person merely arrested with still no information against him is also a
person before conviction; i. e., one who has not bee convicted. All the phrase "except those
charged with capital offenses," being an exception to the general rule concerning "all persons,"
cannot be construed as qualifying the meaning of the words "all persons." The function of an
exception is neither to color nor dominate nor destroy the general rule. Indeed, it is often said
that an exception confirms the general rule. The rule that must seek in an exception the reasons
for its being, cannot justify its existence.

The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the
Constitution of the United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of many of the states
provide that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital
offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under
such provisions, bail is a matter of right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in
all cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of
right even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof is great. (6 C.J., sec. 168, pp. 953, 954.)
It is to be observed that the word "charged" is not used in the American constitution, the reason
being that no one would apply for bail unless he is detained for some charged either oral or in
writing made either by a private individual or by a public officer. Certainly the charge need not be
a formal information in order that a person detained may apply for bail. Thus, it has been said
that:
By the common law all offenses, including treason, murder, and other felonies, were
bailable before indictment found, although the granting or refusing of such bail in case
of capital offenses was a mater within the discretion of the court. (6 C.J., sec. 167, p.
953; emphasis ours.)
The provisions of our Rules of Court on the matter of bail which are intended to make effective
the constitutional provision on the same matter, contain a clear distinction between persons
formally charged and persons merely arrested. It is a distinction favorable to the petitioner. Thus,
sections 3 and 4 of Rule 110 use the words "the defendant" in providing for instances in which
such defendant may be bailed as of right or in the discretion of the court. Whereas section 6
which refers precisely to capital offenses uses the words "persons in custody for the commission
of a capital offense" in providing that he shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is not
strong. Had this provision, which is interpretative of the Constitution, been intended to refer only
to persons formally charged, it would have used the word "defendant" as the other provisions
above mentioned. The petitioner's case falls squarely under this section 6 of Rule 110, for she is
a "person in custody for the commission of a capital offense," and, therefore, she is entitled to
bail if the evidence of her guilt is not shown to be strong.
Technical and useless efforts have been made to draw a distinction between the situation of a
person detained and that a person already charged so as to exclude the former from the
constitutional protection. But the more efforts are made in that direction, the clearer becomes the
distinction in favor of the detainee. The presumption of innocence in favor of one against whom
there already is a formal charge (Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17) should clearly
be stronger in favor of one not yet so charged, though already arrested or detained. And since
the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is predicted upon the presumption of
innocence, such guarantee should obviously be stronger in favor of a person merely arrested or
detained than of a person already accused. The right to freedom is a sacred right,
complementing the right to life, and the guarantee contained in the fundamental law for the
preservation of such sacred right should not be lightly brushed aside. All doubts that may arise in
the construction of the Constitution and, in the instant case none exists should be resolved
in favor of individual freedom.
We reiterate now that, under the constitution, all persons, without distinction, whether formally
charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense, "shall before conviction be bailable," the
only exception being when the charge is for a capital offense and the court finds that the
evidence of guilt is strong. The power of the court to make sure finding implies a full exercise of
judicial discretion. It is for this reason that capital offenses are said to be bailable in the
discretion of the court. In construing section 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which
provides that "all prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, exception those charged with the
commission of capital offenses when proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is
strong," which is substantially the same as Article III, section 1, paragraph 16, of our constitution,
this Court, through Mr. Justice Moreland, said: "It is clear that even capital offenses are bailable
in the discretion of the Court before conviction." (Emphasis ours; United States vs. Babasa, 19
Phil., 198.)
And such discretion has not other reference than to the determination as to whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, in Marcos vs. Cruz (67 Phil., 82), this Court, through Justice
Imperial, held that "when the crime charged is punishable with death, the right to be admitted to

bail is discretionary on the court, depending on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong."
And this was a mere reiteration of a ruling laid down in a former case (Montalbo vs. Santamaria,
54 Phil., 955). In that case the accused was charged with murder with the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstance of treachery. The
accused applied for provisional release under bail. The judge refused to determine whether the
evidence of guilt was strong upon the belief that he had no discretion to grant the application.
The accused filed a petition for mandamus against him with this Court. And this Court, through
Mr. Justice Villamor, held:
The object of this application is to require the respondent judge to comply with his
ministerial duty of considering and deciding whether the proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong against the defendant, for the purpose of granting or
denying his provisional liberty. Suppliant does not ask that the matter be decided one
way or the other, but simply that it be decided. In other words, it is proposed not to
interfere with the judicial discretion to grant or deny the motion for provisional liberty,
but for enforce the exercise of said discretion according to the judgment and discretion
of the respondent. In this case a judge has declined to make a decision which the law
enjoins upon him. (Emphasis ours.)
And in the dispositive part this Court said:
. . . .Wherefore, the respondent judge is hereby ordered to determine whether in the
case at bar the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong against the
defendant, and to exercise judicial discretion in denying or granting the petition for
provisional liberty. Without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered. (Emphasis
ours.)
And this is the rule in the United States;
Although the right to bail in capital cases, except those in which the proof is evident or
the presumption great, is generally absolute, the determination as to whether the
evidence in any particular case comes within these exceptions is a matter for the
sound discretion of the court or officer hearing the application. (Emphasis ours; 8 C.J.
S., p. 56 on Bail.)
Primarily the prisoner cannot demand bail as a matter of right where the offense is a
capital one, since, upon ascertaining the character of the charge against him, the next
question would be as to the degree of proof and the nature of the presumption of guilt.
therefore the power to admit to bail generally becomes a matter of judicial discretion in
this class of cases, and, although the exercise of this discretion will not be controlled
unless manifestly abuse, it should be exercised with great caution. (Emphasis ours; 6
C.J., sec. 170, pp. 954, 955.)
It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that "all statutes are presumed to be enacted by
the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it.
They are, therefore, to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as
a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be
determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with
reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts ... " (59 C.J., 1038.)
Since the People's Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be
read as one law, and since the language used by this Court in construing the Constitution and
other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the
People's Court Act on the same subject, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in
cases of capital offenses before conviction is that the discretion provided in said Act is the same
discretion provided in the Constitution and similar statutes, that discretion having reference only,
as above stated, to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. To hold
that the People's Court has uncontrolled discretion in such cases to deny bail even where the
evidence of guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all, is to make the Act
offensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, and this is contrary to the
most elementary rules of statutory construction.
A statute, which provides that "'a person charged with an offense may be admitted to
bail before conviction, as follows" 1st, as a matter of discretion in all case where the
punishment is death; 2nd, as a matter of right in all other cases, and that "no person
shall be admitted to bail when he is charged with an offense punishable with death,
when the proof is evident and the presumption great," is inconsistent with the

constitutional provision that "all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless
for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great," since it
denies bail as a matter of absolute right in capital cases where the proof is not evident
nor the presumption great. (People vs. Tinder, 19 Cal., 539, 542; 81 Am. Dec., 77.)
It is to be observed in this connection that we hold no portion of the People's Court Act to be
unconstitutional, but, upon the contrary, we rely upon the presumption of constitutionality, and
because of that presumption we construe the Act in consonance with the mandates of the
Constitution.
It is an elementary principle that where the validity of a statute is assailed and there
are two possible interpretations, by one of which the statute would be unconstitutional
and by the other it would be valid, the court should adopt the construction which would
uphold it. It is the duty of courts to adopt a construction of a statute that will bring it
into harmony with the constitution, if its language will permit. (11 Am. Jur.,
Constitutional law, section 97.)
However, the discretion of the Court, as above described, is not absolute nor beyond control.
Indeed, its very concept repels the idea of unlimited power. It must be sound, and exercised
within reasonable bounds. Since judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of
the judge's individual opinion, the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided and
controlled by certain well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the
operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled
or uncontrollable discretion is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the
discretion to be exercised in Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised guided by law.
It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful; but
legal and regular." (Rex vs. Wilkee, 4 Burr., 2527, 2539; 98 Reprint, 327, cited in note 26 [a], 6
C.J., p. 954.)
The policy pervading our jurisprudence is to commit as little as possible to judicial
discretion, presuming that "'that system of laws is best which confides as little as
possible to the discretion of the judge that judge is best who relies as little as
possible upon his opinion." In pursuance of this policy, ever since the provisions "that
all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, where
the proof is great," become a part of the settled constitutional and statutory laws of
nearly all the states of the Union, the courts have endeavored, with more or less
success, to formulate some stable rules to guide their judgment. (In re Thomas, 20
Okl., 167, 171; 93 P., 980; 39 L. R. A., N.S. 752 and note, cited in 6 C.J., p. 955, note
31 [a].)
How exercised. The discretion exercised by the court in granting or refusing bail is not
an arbitrary but a judicial one; it is governed or directed by known and established
rules, and in truth cannot be otherwise applied then to decide whether or not the facts
bring the case within their operation. (6 C.J., p. 954.)
In this jurisdiction inferior courts are controlled in the exercise of their discretion, first, by the
applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which the
Supreme Court may promulgate under the authority of Article VIII, section 13, of the
Constitution; and, third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of
the laws of the land. Upon the basis of constitutional, legal and reglementary provisions
combined with well-known principles of practice and procedure, this Court in its resolution of
January 11, 1946, above quoted, gave the following instructions to the People's Court:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for
release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant
the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it
may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or to judge the adequacy
of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the
ground that the answer any particular question on the ground that the answer may involve a
disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court
may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor
General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and
control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present

evidence which he does not want to introduce provided, of course, that such refusal shall not
prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee.
The first instruction is predicated upon section 7 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in connection
with section 15 and 22 of the People's Court Act. Section 15 of the People's Court Act, in
entrusting the Office of Special Prosecutors with "the direction and control of the prosecution" in
cases mentioned in said Act "the provisions of any law or rules of court to the contrary
notwithstanding," necessarily confers upon said office the exclusive power, coupled with the
correlative responsibility, of deciding, among others, such questions as to whether or not it will
oppose bail petitioned by a detainee in any of said cases, whether or not it should adduce
evidence, and the kind of quantity thereof, or whether or not to reveal such evidence at the
hearing of any such petitions. The law assigns to the court and the public prosecutors their
respective powers and responsibilities in the judicial elucidation of these cases, just as in all
others. The very exigencies of an orderly and efficient administration of justice demand that the
judge should not invade the province of the prosecutors any more than the latter can invade that
of the former. If the prosecutor prosecutes, and the judge judges, each within his proper sphere,
neither need have any compunction over the discharge of his own mission.
Section 22 of the People's Court Act provides that the prosecution and trial of cases before said
court should be in accordance with rules of court, and section 7 of Rule 110 provides that at the
"hearing of an application for admission to bail made by any person who is in custody for the
commission of a capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on
the prosecution." The prosecutor is free to satisfy or not to satisfy that burden. The Solicitor
General is free to oppose or not to oppose the application for bail, as above stated, according to
what he believes to be in the best interests of the state. And it is unnecessary to say that if he
refuses to satisfy his burden because he does not oppose the application for bail, the usual
course open to the court leads to the granting of the bail.
When the first proviso of section 19 Commonwealth Act No. 682 and Article III, section 1,
paragraph 16, of the Constitution, refer to the case where the court finds that there is strong
"evidence" of the commission of a capital offense, they necessarily mean evidence properly
adduced by the parties or any of them before it, in the manner and form prescribed by the laws
and rules of judicial procedure. If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing
evidence in the case for any definite purpose, no law nor rule exists by which he may be so
compelled and the court before which the case is pending has to act without that evidence and,
in so doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or the law plots a certain
course of action to be taken by the court when certain evidence is found by it to exist, and the
opposite course if that evidence is wanting, and said evidence is not voluntarily adduced by the
proper party, the court' s clear duty would be to adopt that course which has been provided for in
case of absence of such evidence. Applying the principle to the case at bar, it was no more
within the power nor discretion of the court to coerce the prosecution into presenting its
evidence than to force the prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not to do so, as
they had a perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the
application for bail.
Let not the case of Payao vs. Lesaca (63 Phil., 210), be invoked in respondent's favor. True, in
said case this Court approved of the action of the trial court in considering the record of the
preliminary investigation in determining the question of bail. But it must be remembered, in the
first place, that at the same preliminary investigation the accused must, under the law, be
presumed to have been present; confronted with the witnesses her; had the right to crossexamine them, make objections, present her own evidence, and to be heard in her own defense;
and, in the second place, the provincial fiscal presented said record at the hearing (vide, page
214, volume cited on the question of bail) again in the presence of the accused who again had a
right to interpose objections, adduce evidence and be heard in defense. Had the fiscal not
presented said record at the hearing, it would not have been considered by the Court of First
Instance, since, generally, the record of the preliminary investigation before the justice of the
peace is not by itself a party of the record on the case in the Court of First Instance (United
States vs. Abuan, 2 Phil., 130).
In the case of Marcos vs. Cruz (67 Phil., 82), involving a capital crime, a preliminary
investigation ex parte was conducted by the Judge of First Instance previous to the arrest of the
defendants. After their arrest, the defendants asked for provisional release under bail, and the
petition was denied by respondent judge upon the ground that the evidence disclosed at the ex

parte preliminary investigation was strong and that, therefore, the defendants were not entitled
to bail. This Court disapproved the procedure followed by respondent judge as follows:
Se arguye que el Juez recurrido, antes de expedir el mandamiento de arresto de los
acusados, examino a los dos testigos de cargo que presento el Fiscal y que estas
pruebas establecieron asimismo la presuncion de culpabilidad de los acusados y el
requerimiento adicional de que las pruebas de culpabilidad deben ser evidentes.
Nopodemos prestar nuestro asentimiento a esta pretension. No debe olvidarse que
tales pruebas se recibieron en ausencia de los acusados y estos no tuvieron
oportunidad de verles declarar ni de repreguntarles . . . . Otras razones que impiden
el que tales pruebas se puedan tener en cuenta contra los acusados on: que el Fiscal
no las produjo ni ofrecio en la vista de las peticiones de libertad bajo fianza . . . En
tales circunstancias era deber del Juez recurrido requerir al Fiscal que presente sus
pruebas para demostrar que el delito imputado era capital, que las pruebas eran
evidentes y que la presuncion de culpabilidad era fuerte.
It is thus clear that the People's Court, in the exercise of its discretion, can consider no evidence
that has not properly been presented to it by the parties, and that, when the special prosecutor
elects not to oppose the application for bail and, consequently, refuses to present any evidence,
"the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release
after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose."
We said "in the proper exercise of its discretion," for the reason that, since such discretion has
reference to the weight of evidence, it should be exercised in favor of the applicant when there is
no evidence much less strong evidence presented by the prosecution. In other words, the
discretion should be exercised as if the court, after examining the evidence, found none against
the applicant. Of course, the discretion if negligible when no evidence is presented by the
prosecutor, but some amount of discretion still remains, for, as stated in or first instruction, the
discretion should be exercised in favor of the applicant "as a general rule." We used advisedly
these words "as a general rule," for there may be an exception, as that referred to in the second
instruction.
The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to satisfy his burden of
proof, but where the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude is not justified, as
when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court must possess a
reasonable degree of control over him in the paramount interest of justice. Under such
circumstance, the court is authorized by our second instruction to inquire from the prosecutor as
to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the
prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, recommending bail.
The course followed by the respondents was obviously predicated on this implied authority, but
the power of the court to that effect must have its limitation founded equally on the paramount
interest of justice. And we come now to our third instruction. The question made by the court to
the prosecutor may involve a disclosure of evidence that may imperil the success of the
prosecution or jeopardize the public interest. In such event, according to our third instruction, the
prosecutor may not be compelled to make the disclosure "if and when he exhibits a statement to
that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as Head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested
with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not even at the trial be ordered by the
court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce provided, of course, that such
refusal shall not prejudice the right of the defendant or detainee."
It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the official statement of the Solicitor
General on the question of whether or not the revelation of evidence may endanger the success
of the prosecution and jeopardize the public interest. This is so, for there is no way for the court
to determine that question without having the evidence disclosed in the presence of the
applicant, disclosure which is sought to be avoided to protect the interests of the prosecution
before the trial. In this connection, we bear in mind what Chief Justice Marshall said in Burr's trial
with reference to the power of the court to determine whether or not a document in the
possession of the President contains secret information. Chief Justice Marshall said that "much
reliance must be placed on the declaration of the President" and that "the court out to consider
the reasons which would induce the President to refuse to exhibit such a letter as conclusive on
it." Of course, the Solicitor General is not the President, but the question involved was one that
might affect the trial on the merits, unlike the matter before us which is a mere incident
concerning bail. Thus, to a certain extent the rule may be adopted by analogy. The Solicitor

General is a high officer of the Government, made responsible by law for the prosecution of
offenses before the People's Court, and he is in a better position than anyone else, including the
court itself, to determine the risks which a disclosure of his evidence may entail. Since the
judgement of the Solicitor General on this simple matter maybe deemed to be reliable and there
being no way for the court to verify it without running the risks sought to be avoided, it is made
final. If further developments show the Solicitor General to have betrayed his trust, he may
surely be called to account.
The power of the Solicitor General is not, however, unlimited under our third instruction. He
cannot refuse to make a disclosure when his refusal shall prejudice the right of the defendant or
detainee. The prosecutor may not, for instance, choose to make disclosures damaging to the
applicant, and later refuse to disclose other evidence favorable to her, on the pretext that such
disclosure may imperial the success of the prosecution.
It may be said that there is nothing in these instructions expressly indicating the course to be
followed by the People's Court in case the Solicitor General refuses validly to disclose his
evidence under our third instruction. This is so, because things that are self-evident need not be
expressly stated. The situation is clear. If the Solicitor General refuses validly to disclose his
evidence and, for that reason, no evidence lies before the court, then the situation comes under
our first instruction, and the petition for bail should be granted. We do not need to state this
expressly, for it is self-evident from the instructions themselves. We, do not have to repeat in the
third instruction what is already covered in the first. These instructions, which are simple and
clear, having reference to three different possibilities simply and clearly defined, are directed to
judges who are presumed to be versed in the law, and should not be clogged with repetitions
that can in no measure add to their lucidity.
It is our considered opinion that the procedure adopted by the People's Court, after the third
hearing of January 28, 1946, whereby it examined the special prosecutor's evidence in a private
inquiry without the presence of the petitioner, and upon the basis of knowledge acquired therein
it denied the application for bail., is improper, arbitrary, and constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion:
Firstly, because it violates our order of December 20, 1945, wherein it was held that the hearing
on applications for bail should be in the presence of the applicant or at least with due notice to
her, and, therefore, such private inquiry cannot be a part of the hearing. The knowledge or
information thus obtained was without the safeguards of confrontation, cross-examination and
opportunity to be heard in defense on the part of the prisoner and cannot be a proper ground for
denying bail, as ruled expressly by this court in Marcos vs. Cruz, supra;
Secondly, because such private inquiry is inconsistent with our three instructions above
mentioned. The procedure outlined in said three instructions is such as to allow no room for a
private conference between the court and the special prosecutor. If such kind of conference
were permissible, we would not have to qualify or limit the power of the court to inquire in the
three instances contemplated in our three instructions. The nature of such instructions is such as
clearly to show that nothing can be used against the applicant that has not been brought
properly before the court in her presence. It is precisely for this reason that the Solicitor General
is given the final word on the question of whether the disclosure of the prosecution's evidence
may endanger the success of the prosecution because there is no way for the court to make
such determination without having the evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant and
without thus running the risks sought to be avoided. If private conference were permissible, we
would not have required the solemn statement of the Solicitor General, and, instead, we would
have provided that, upon the prosecutor's refusal to disclose evidence in the presence of the
applicant, the court may call him to a private conference. But we did not do so, because a
private conference is strongly repugnant to the requirements of a hearing provided by law, and
thus the solemn statement of the Solicitor General is made the end of the court's power to
inquire legally in a case where the prosecutor does not oppose the granting of the bail; and
Thirdly, the knowledge acquired in such private conference is not different in character from a
Judge's personal or special knowledge, upon which, by well-settled rules of evidence, he, as
judge, has no right to act.
. . . . and it is hardly necessary to state that the judge has no right to act upon his own
person or special knowledge of facts as distinguished from that general knowledge
which might properly be important to other persons of intelligence. More than two
hundred years ago in Sir John Fenwick's trial, it was said by the solicitor general: "I do

not say that a judge upon his private knowledge ought to judge, he ought not. But if a
judge knows anything whereby the prisoner might be convicted or acquitted (not
generally known), then I do say he ought to be called from the place where he sate
and go to the bar and give evidence of his knowledge." In a Utah case one of the
briefs contained the statement: "The fact that the Utah Nursery Company, a
corporation, was personally known to the country judge, had been admitted in oral
argument by counsel for appellant and did not need to be proven." The court said that
nothing in the record supported the statement that it was admitted by counsel that the
corporation was a foreign corporation, and counsel would not seriously contend that
the personal knowledge of the judge meets the requirements of the law that proof of
the facts shall be made. The law is well settled upon the point that the judge's
personal knowledge cannot be used in criminal cases he should be, it not a
witness, certainly not a judge in civil cases, his knowledge must not be made
apparent to the jury. (1 Jones on Ev., 2 ed., pp. 644, 645, sec. 133.)
In a case where a Public Utility Commission issued a regulation of telephone rates upon data
gathered in a private investigation, Justice Cardozo said:
From the standpoint of due process the protection of the individual against arbitrary
action a deeper vice is this, that even now we do not know the particular or
evidential facts of which the Commission took judicial notice and on which it rested its
conclusion. Not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to find them out. When
price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in evidence upon a
trial, the party against whom the are offered may see the evidence or hear it and parry
its effect. Even if they are copied in the findings without preliminary proof, there is at
least an opportunity in connection with a judicial review of the decision to challenge
the deductions made from them. The opportunity is excluded here. The Commission,
withholding from the record the evidential facts that is has gathered here and there,
contents itself with saying that in gathering them it went to journals and tax lists, as if a
judge were to tell us, "I looked at the statistics in the Library of Congress, and they
teach me thus and so." This will never do if hearings and appeals are to be more than
empty forms. What the Supreme Court of Ohio did (in sustaining the order of the
Commission) was to take the word of the Commission as to the outcome of a secret
investigation, and let it go at that. "A hearing is not judicial, at least in any adequate
sense, unless the evidence can be known." (Ohio Bell Telephone Co. vs. Public
Utilities Commission, 301 U.S., 292; 57 Sup., 724.)
We shall now proceed to resume the attitude observed by respondent judges in connection with
the application for bail filed by the petitioner. It must be recalled that in our first decision of
December 20, 1945, we held, in connection with the application for bail filed by the petitioner,
that the People's Court should hold a hearing with due notice to both the Solicitor General and
the applicant, and that the order issued by the People's Court denying such application without
such hearing was null and void. It must be observed, furthermore, that the People's Court then
denied the petition only because the Solicitor General recommended a bail of P50,000 from
which it inferred that the crime involved must be serious, when said court admittedly granted bail
in the same amount to other detainees of the same class as the herein petitioner. After the
People' Court was notified of our aforesaid order, it held a hearing on December 27, 1945,
wherein the herein petition filed a verbal application for bail, which the special prosecutor did not
oppose. The court, however, instead of granting the bail, directed questions to the special
prosecutor to compel him to reveal his evidence. The applicant, without waiting for the decision
of the People's Court granting or denying the application for bail., came to this Court asking that
the People's Court be ordered to grant the bail applied for. We denied the petition as premature,
but we ordered the People's Court to render its decision on the aforesaid verbal petition in
conformity with the three instructions above mentioned. The People's Court called another
hearing on January 15, 1946, and notwithstanding the special prosecutor's having reiterated that
he had no objection to the application for bail, the court insisted on addressing to him practically
the same question as those made at the hearing of December 27, 1945. And upon the
prosecutor's declining to answer, supported by his presentation of a certificate of the Solicitor
General that the answer to said questions may imperial the success of the prosecution and
jeopardize the public interest, respondent court, through Judge Antonio Quirino, in violation of
our third instruction above mentioned, ordered the arrest of the special prosecutor for alleged

contempt of court. The petitioner came to this Court asking that she be granted bail in view of
the grave abuse of discretion committed by the People's Court, particularly by Judge Quirino.
We likewise denied that motion to give the People's Court the chance to dispose of the case in
accordance with law and the Constitution as construed by this Court. But the People's Court
called another hearing on January 28, 1946, in which again the special prosecutor reiterated that
he had no objection to the release under bail applied for, but the Peoples Court after asking him
some unimportant questions called him to a private hearing at the back of the applicant, to
inquire from him the strength of his evidence. Thereafter, the People's Court issued an order
disregarding, either knowingly or unwittingly, all the instructions issued by this Court, and
maintaining its alleged unbridled discretion on the matter, a theory which we have rejected in our
previous decision and instructions. And, what is worse, the People's Court, relying on
information acquired in private conference with the special prosecutor, declared that there was
"a myriad of points" against the applicant and denied the application. It will thus be observed
that, in connection with the application for bail filed by the petitioner, the People's Court has
disregarded the law and the Constitution, not only once but as many as four times first, on
October 9, 1945; second, on December 27, 1945; third, on January 15, 1946, when it ordered
the arrest of the special prosecutor who was acting in conformity with our instructions; and
fourth, on January 28, 1946, when it held a private conference with the special prosecutor. On
the first three occasions we exhausted all the measures to make the People's Court act in
accordance with its discretion vested by the law and the Constitution as construed by this Court
in its order and instructions. But all to no avail. Considering that this attitude of the People's
Court seriously affects petitioner's sacred right of individual freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution which has been delayed for nearly four months, this Court directly granted her
request for release under bail instead of ordering the People's Court to do so. Further delay was
thus avoided.
It is maintained that this body has no authority to grant provisional release under bail in a petition
for certiorari. The argument is advanced that all this Tribunal may do is to annul the Peoples
Court's order and remand the case for further proceedings. We recognize no such limitation. In
several certiorari cases, this Court in addition to annulling the attacked decision or order, issued
such other directives as were found to be necessary in the interest of justice. (Cf. Javier vs.
Paredes and Gregorio, 52 Phil., 910; Beech vs. Jimenez and Crossfield, 12 Phil., 212.) And it
must be recalled that this is a combined proceeding for certiorari and habeas corpus, the latter in
aid of the former, as above stated. And, furthermore, in a special civil action for certiorari, this
Court has the power to grant "such of the relief prayed for as the petitioner is entitled to, with or
without costs, as justice requires." (Rule 67, sec. 8.) One of the reliefs prayed for in the instant
case is that the petitioner be granted directly by this Court provisional release under bail, and
considering the unjustified delays suffered by the petitioner due to the insistent attitude of the
People's Court in disregarding the law and the Constitution as construed by this Court, it is our
considered opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for in the interest of justice.
Particularly so in the instant case which is a combine proceeding of certiorari and habeas
corpus.
So also the writ has always been held to be available to a prisoner entitled to be
admitted to bail and to whom such right has been denied.
Farrel vs. Hawley, 78 Conn., 150; 61 Atl., 502; 112 A.S.R., 98; c Ann. Cas., 874; 70
L.R.A., 686;
In re Schriber, 19 Idaho, 531; 114 p., 29; 37 L.R.A. (N.S.), 693;
Hight vs. United States, Morris (Ia.) 407; 43 Am. Dec., 111;
Ex parte Alexander, 59 Mo., 598; 21 Am. Rep. 393.
Peo. vs. McLeod, 1 Hill (N.Y.), 377; 25 Wend., 483; 37 Am. Dec. 328;
In re Thomas, Okl., 167; 93 L.R.A. (N.S.), 752;
In re Williamson, 26 Pa. St., 9; 67 Am. Dec., 374;
Ex Parte Newman, 38 Tex, Crim., 164; 41 S.W., 628, 70 A.S.R., 740;
State vs. Foster, 84 Wash., 58; 146 P., 169; LR. 19158 E., 340 and note.
Denial of Bail. Subject to statutory limitations, the writ of habeas corpus may be
used to procure the admission to bail of a party entitled thereto, whether in a criminal
case or a civil action, unless admittance is a matter of discretion and has been refused
by the proper authorities without any abuse of discretion. (Emphasis supplied.) (29
C.J., sec. 84, p. 94.)

U.S. U.S. vs. Hamilton, 3 Dall., 17; 1 Law ed., 490.

Ala. Ex. p. State, 205 Ala., 11; 87 S., 594; State vs. Lowe, 204 Ala., 288; 85 S.,
707; Ex p. Croom, 19 Ala., 561.
Ariz., In re Haigler, 15 Ariz., 150; 137 P., 423.
Ark. Ex p. White, 9 Ark., 222.
Cal., Ex p. Curtis, 92 Cal., 188; 28 P. 223; Ex p. Duncan, 53 Cal., 410.
Colo. Romeo vs. Downer, 69 Colo., 281; 193 P., 559.
Fla. Russel vs. State. 71 Fla., 236; 71 S., 27; Ex p. Nathan, 50 S., 38; Benjamin vs.
State, 25 Fla., 675; 6 S., 433; Holley vs. State, 15 Fla., 688; Finch vs. State, 15 Fla.
633.
Ind., Ex p. Richards, 102 Ind., 260; 1 N. e., 639; Ex p. Sutherlin, 56 Ind., 595; Ex p.
Moore, 30 Ind., 197;Ex p. Hefren, 27 Ind., 87; Lumm vs. State, 3 Ind., 293; State vs.
Best, 7 Blackf., 611.
Iowa. Ford vs. Dilley, 174 Iowa, 243; 156 N.W., 513.
Kan. In re Rolf, 30 Kan., 758; 1 P., 523.
Miss. Marley vs. State, 109 Miss., 169; 68 S., 75, 770; Street vs. State, 43 Miss.,
1; Ex p. Gray, 30 Miss., 673.
Mo. Alexander's Pet., 59 Mo. 598; 21 Am. R., 393.
Nev. Ex. p. Nagel, 41 Nev., 86; 167 P., 689.
N. I. Peo. vs. Folmsbee, 60 Barts., 480.
N. C. State vs. Herndon, 107 N.C., 934; 12 SRE., 268:
State vs. Wiley, 64 N.C., 821; State vs. Edney, 60 N.C., 463.
The power of the Supreme Court or of a justice thereof, to bail in all cases, whether it
be treason, murder, arson, or any other offense, is indisputable. (People vs. Van
Horne, 8 Bar., 158; People vs. Perry, 8 Abb., Pr., N.S., 27, cited in note on p. 758, 39
L.R.A., new series.)
The Supreme Court of the United States has power to admit to bail on a charge of
high treason. (U.S. vs. Hamilton, 3 Dal., 17; 1 Law. ed., 490, cited in note on pp. 758,
759; 39 L.R.A., new series.)
To hold this Court powerless to grant bail directly under the circumstances of the instant case is
certainly to destroy the great function of the highest tribunal of the land created by the
Constitution as the ultimate bulwark of the liberties of the people.
No costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., and Bengzon, J., concur.

[G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000]

MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON.
ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner ManoletLavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an
act providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination, providing penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made
without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on April
3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter,
then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners
room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the
police received reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in
motion. At around 8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room
308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door,
the police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon
they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the

arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997 against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550. Edp
On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful
Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the A
bove Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which
He is Charged."[1]
On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the
same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla,
Jennifer Catarman, and AnnalynTalingting. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q97-70866 to Q-97-70874. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the
informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in
prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual
intercourse."
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine
cases.
On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioners Omnibus Motion, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the
accused under detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with
the Rules. He must therefore remain under detention until further order of
this Court;
2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby
granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a
total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the
trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of
these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
3. Let these cases be set for arraignment on May 23, 1997 at 8:30 oclock in
the morning.[2]
On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those
filed in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his motion, he
asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997.[3] Then on May 22,
1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment.[4] Misedp
On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioners motions to reduce bail
bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him
released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in
the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial conference
was set on June 7, 1997.
On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the Court of
Appeals, assailing the trial courts order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated May 23,
1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of May
16, 1997, respectively.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against
petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated.
On June 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the conditions imposed under Nos. 2-a)

and 2-b),[5] of the May 23 (should be May 16), 1997 Order, are separable,
and would not affect the cash bond which petitioner posted for his
provisional liberty, with the sole modification that those aforesaid conditions
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, the May 16, May 23 and May 23,
1997 Orders are MAINTAINED in all other respects.[6] Misoedp
The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the
grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making
arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioners bail bonds to be moot and academic. It
noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned, represented by lawyers,
he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been released from detention."
The Court of Appeals thought that the aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were
contrary to Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
With respect to the denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations against him, the
appellate court held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari before
it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motion to quash on
appeal should the decision be adverse to him.
Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred[7] __
1.......In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the
approval of petitioners bail bonds "shall be made only after his arraignment"
is of no moment and has been rendered moot and academic by the fact that
he had already posted the bail bonds and had pleaded not guilty to all the
offenses;
2.......In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not only
because it was made under compelling circumstance which left petitioner no
option to question the respondent Judges arbitrary action but also because
it emanated from a void Order;
3.......In ruling that the denial of petitioners motion to quash may not be
impugned in a petition for certiorari; and
4.......In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be
validly charged for violation of Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 under several
informations corresponding to the number of alleged acts of child abuse
allegedly committed against each private complainant by the petitioner.
We will deal with each of these contentions although not in the order in which they are stated by
petitioner.
First. As already stated, the trial courts order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four conditions for
the grant of bail to petitioner:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the
trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of
these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands;
and Edpmis
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the
validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner
takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16,
1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to the approval
of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void and that his arraignment was also
invalid because it was held pursuant to such invalid condition.
We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity of the
conditions imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because
petitioners contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions for bail.

In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court
apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early
arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their
cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioners bail bonds
should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial
can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is
unjustified, since under Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This
seems to be the theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997 order conditioning the grant of bail to
petitioner on his arraignment.
This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases where it
is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is
dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place,
the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting
bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under
Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the
accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"
while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail.[8]
It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall
be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void.
The condition imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive
his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is
in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The
failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his
bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in
the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at
the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether
of innocence or of guilt,[9] (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes,[10] and
(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused
may appear by counsel or representative.[11] At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is
required and cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza,[12] in an opinion by Justice,
later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has
been arraigned.
Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by absenting
himself from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed even in his absence.
So it thought that to ensure petitioners presence at the arraignment, petitioner should be denied
bail in the meantime. The fly in the ointment, however, is that such court strategy violates
petitioners constitutional rights.
Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of petitioner on
May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioners contention, the arraignment did not
emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the
arraignment." Even without such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted.
In sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the
subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to quash
is denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right
to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial on the merits or on appeal if
an adverse judgment is rendered against him. However, he argues that this case should be
treated as an exception. He contends that the Court of Appeals should not have evaded the

issue of whether he should be charged under several informations corresponding to the number
of acts of child abuse allegedly committed by him against each of the complainants.
In Tano v. Salvador,[13] the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion
to quash, nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where there are special
circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused
may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided against him. This is such a case.
Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of the number of sexual acts allegedly
committed by him and the number of children with whom he had sexual intercourse, or whether
each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the presentation of
evidence by either party. It is important to petitioner as well as to the prosecution how many
crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one offense of sexual abuse regardless of the
number of children involved, it will not matter much to the prosecution whether it is able to
present only one of the complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a
child constitutes a separate offense, it will matter whether the other children are presented
during the trial. Scjj
The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals. However, instead of
remanding this case to the appellate court for a determination of this issue, we will decide the
issue now so that the trial in the court below can proceed without further delay.
Petitioners contention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only one offense of
child abuse, regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and the number of acts of sexual
intercourse committed with them (twelve). He argues that the act of sexual intercourse is only a
means of committing the offense so that the acts of sexual intercourse/lasciviousness with
minors attributed to him should not be subject of separate informations. He cites the affidavits of
the alleged victims which show that their involvement with him constitutes an "unbroken chain of
events," i.e., the first victim was the one who introduced the second to petitioner and so on.
Petitioner says that child abuse is similar to the crime of large-scale illegal recruitment where
there is only a single offense regardless of the number of workers illegally recruited on different
occasions. In the alternative, he contends that, at the most, only four informations,
corresponding to the number of alleged child victims, can be filed against him.
Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being prosecuted, provides:
Sec. 5 Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. __ Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, [14] whether male or female, is or
is deemed under 18 years of age. Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs when
the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group.
Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the circumstances
mentioned in Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The offense is
similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape
or lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate information. This conclusion is
confirmed by Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period;

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second
paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to
petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
SO ORDERED. Sjcj
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 7081

September 7, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.
Chas A. McDonough, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. The complaint alleged:
That on or about September 15, 1910, and before the filing of this complaint, in the
city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Tan Teng did willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, and employing force, lie and have carnal intercourse with a certain
OlivaPacomio, a girl 7 years of age.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found the defendant
guilty of the offense ofabusosdeshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the
Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days
of prisioncorreccional, and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error in this
court:
I. The lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having
taken a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail
and regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the
physical condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease.
II. The lower court erred in holding that the complainant was suffering from a venereal
disease produced by contact with a sick man.
III. The court erred in holding that the accused was suffering from a venereal disease.
IV. The court erred in finding the accused guilty from the evidence.
From an examination of the record it appears that the offended party, OlivaPacomio, a girl seven
years of age, was, on the 15th day of September , 1910, staying in the house of her sister,
located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila; that on said day a number of Chinamen were
gambling had been in the habit of visiting the house of the sister of the offended party; that
OlivaPacomio, on the day in question, after having taken a bath, returned to her room; that the
defendant followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave him;
that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he threw the said Oliva upon the
floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in that position for some little time.
Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of OlivaPacomio discovered that the latter
was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery
that Oliva related to her sister what happened upon the morning of the 15th of September. The
sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were
collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant
was not present at first. later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had
attempted to violate her.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of
his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the

venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting
from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of
having a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that the
defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of Oliva, on
the ground that because of her tender years her testimony should not be given credit. The lower
court, after carefully examining her with reference to her ability to understand the nature of an
oath, held that she had sufficient intelligence and discernment to justify the court in accepting
her testimony with full faith and credit. With the conclusion of the lower court, after reading her
declaration, we fully concur. The defense in the lower court attempted to show that the venereal
disease of gonorrhea might be communicated in ways other than by contact such as is
described in the present case, and called medical witnesses for the purpose of supporting the
contention. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question said:
We shall not pursue the refinement of speculation as to whether or not this disease
might, in exceptional cases, arise from other carnal contact. The medical experts, as
well as the books, agree that in ordinary cases it arises from that cause, and if this
was an exceptional one, we think it was incumbent upon the defense to bring it within
the exception.
The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon hers for some
moments. The defendant was found to be suffering from gonorrhea. The medical experts who
testified agreed that this disease could have been communicated from him to her by the contact
described. Believing as we do the story told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the
disease with which Oliva was suffering was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the
defendant. Proof, however, that Oliva constructed said obnoxious disease from the defendant is
not necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is only corroborative of the truth of Oliva's
declaration.
The defendant attempted to prove in the lower court that the prosecution was brought for the
purpose of compelling him to pay to the sister of Oliva a certain sum of money.
The defendant testifed and brought other Chinamen to support his declaration, that the sister of
Oliva threatened to have him prosecuted if he did not pay her the sum of P60. It seems
impossible to believe that the sister, after having become convinced that Oliva had been
outraged in the manner described above, would consider for a moment a settlement for the
paltry sum of P60. Honest women do not consent to the violation of their bodies nor those of
their near relatives, for the filthy consideration of mere money.
In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by
the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he was
arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself.
Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question in his sentence, said:
The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions,
and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more
to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property
taken from the person of a thief.
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the examination
was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was
suffering from said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been
found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the
stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So also if
the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of
the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the
purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property
and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used against him
as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony
against himself.

The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignment of error is
not a new question, either to the courts or authors. In the case of Holt vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245),
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court upon this question, said:
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be
material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and
compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not considering
how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is
exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if
material, is competent.
The question which we are discussing was also discussed by the supreme court of the State of
New Jersey, in the case of State vs. Miller (71 N.J. law Reports, 527). In that case the court said,
speaking through its chancellor:
It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the jail in which the accused was
confined, to testify to wounds observed by him on the back of the hands of the
accused, although he also testified that he had the accused removed to a room in
another part of the jail and divested of his clothing. The observation made by the
witness of the wounds on the hands and testified to by him, was in no sense a
compelling of the accused to be a witness against himself. If the removal of the
clothes had been forcible and the wounds had been thus exposed, it seems that the
evidence of their character and appearance would not have been objectionable.
In that case also (State vs. Miller) the defendant was required to place his hand upon the wall of
the house where the crime was committed, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not his
hand would have produced the bloody print. The court said, in discussing that question:
It was not erroneous to permit evidence of the coincidence between the hand of the
accused and the bloody prints of a hand upon the wall of the house where the crime
was committed, the hand of the accused having been placed thereon at the request of
persons who were with him in the house.
It may be added that a section of the wall containing the blood prints was produced before the
jury and the testimony of such comparison was like that held to be proper in another case
decided by the supreme court of New Jersey in the case of Johnson vs. State (30 Vroom, N.J.
Law Reports, 271). The defendant caused the prints of the shoes to be made in the sand before
the jury, and the witnesses who had observed shoe prints in the sand at the place of the
commission of the crime were permitted to compare them with what the had observed at that
place.
In that case also the clothing of the defendant was used as evidence against him.
To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony of a physician
or a medical expert who had been appointed to make observations of a person who plead
insanity as a defense, where such medical testimony was against necessarily use the person of
the defendant for the purpose of making such examination. (People vs. Agustin, 199 N.Y., 446.)
The doctrine contended for by the appellants would also prevent the courts from making an
examination of the body of the defendant where serious personal injuries were alleged to have
been received by him. The right of the courts in such cases to require an exhibit of the injured
parts of the body has been established by a long line of decisions.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled
to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr.Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question before us, said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in
whatever form exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself
up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the
law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles a clearreductio

ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the
privilege, . . .buttestimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec. 2263.)
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisonersbefore trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner,
144 N. Y., 119.)
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a
defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an application of the prohibition
under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by
the court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because
it does not call upon the accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his
testimonial responsibility. Mr.Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the accused,
is not testimony but his body his body itself.
As was said by Judge Lobingier:
The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and
the mere fact that an object found upon his body was examined seems no more to
infringe the rule invoked than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the
person of a thief.
The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary department of the
Government from examining the body of persons who are supposed to have some contagious
disease.
We believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from the venereal
disease, as above stated, and that through his brutal conduct said disease was communicated
to OlivaPacomio. In a case like the present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct
proof. Such crimes as the present are generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In cases of
rape the courts of law require corroborative proof, for the reason that such crimes are generally
committed in secret. In the present case, taking into account the number and credibility of the
witnesses, their interest and attitude on the witness stand, their manner of testifying and the
general circumstances surrounding the witnesses, including the fact that both parties were found
to be suffering from a common disease, we are of the opinion that the defendant did, on or about
the 15th of September, 1910, have such relations as above described with the said
OlivaPacomio, which under the provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code makes him guilty of
the crime of "abusosdeshonestos," and taking into consideration the fact that the crime which
the defendant committed was done in the house where OlivaPacomio was living, we are of the
opinion that the maximum penalty of the law should be imposed. The maximum penalty provided
for by law is six years of prisioncorreccional. Therefore let a judgment be entered modifying the
sentence of the lower court and sentencing the defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six
years of prisioncorreccional, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2154

April 26, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO OTADORA, ET AL., defendants.
HILARIA CARREON, appellant.
Victorino C. Teleron for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E.
Torres for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
In August, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Antonio Otadora and Hilaria Carreon
were charged with the murder of the spouses Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon. Otadora

pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Denying her guilt, Hilaria Carreon was
tried, found guilty and sentenced to death and other accessory penalties. The court declared that
with promises of monetary reward, she had induced Antonio Otadora to do the killing. Motive for
the instigation was the grudge she bore against the deceased spouse on account of disputes
with them over inherited property. This woman convict appealed in due time.
Her attorney filed here a voluminous brief wherein he attempted painstakingly to break down the
position of the prosecution and to expound the theory that Antonio Otadora is the only person
responsible for the slaying, and that Hilaria Carreon is just "the unfortunate victim of a vicious
frame-up concocted against her." She necessarily had to offer a satisfactory explanation for the
conduct of Otadora, who has pleaded guilty and has declared for the prosecution against her,
explaining the circumstances under which she had promised to him compensation for liquidating
the unfortunate couple.
There is no question about these facts:
Early in the morning of June 16, 1947, Leon Castro and his wife Apolonia Carreon were shot
dead in their house in the City of Ormoc, Leyte. In the afternoon of June 21, 1947, Antonio
Otadora was arrested in Ormoc City while preparing to escape to Camotes Island, Cebu. The
next day he confessed in an extra-judicial statement (Exhibit 1) wherein he implicated the herein
accused and appellant Hilaria Carreon asserting that, with offers of pecuniary gain, the latter had
induced him to commit the crime. On June 25, 1947, a complaint for double murder was filed
against both defendants in the justice of the peace court of Ormoc, Leyte. Preliminary
investigation was waived and the record was forwarded to the court of first instance, where on
September 3, 1947, Otadora pleaded guilty with the assistance of counsel. Hilaria Carreon
pleaded not guilty, and asked for a separate trial, which was immediately held, with Otadora as
the first witness for the prosecution.
The evidence presented on behalf of the People proved that:
(1) Apolonia Carreon was the sister of Hilaria. Due to a family quarrel, Apolonia filed in August,
1946, a criminal complaint for serious threats against Hilaria and her husband Francisco Galos
(Exhibit P-1). These were arrested and had to file a bond. The case was later withdrawn by
Apolonia upon the advice of friendly mediators.
In December of 1946, Leon Castro as guardian ad litem of some minors surnamed Carreon filed
a civil complaint for partition of real property and damages against Hilaria Carreon. This suit was
set for hearing on June 24, 1947.
(2) Antonio Otadora met Hilaria Carreon sometime in April, 1947, through AmandoGarbo.
Thereafter they converse on several occasions. In the early part of May, 1947, she saw him
going to barrio Matica-a and then she told him that if he would liquidate the spouses Leon
Castro and Apolonia Carreon she would give him P3,000. He did not agree. In the last week of
May he was invited to Hilaria's house. The proposal was renewed, better conditions being
offered. (1/3 of P10,000 plus carabaos, plus P300.) He must have demurred alleging that he had
no adequate weapon, Hilaria is reported to have engaged to supply it.
(3) Around the first week of June, 1947, Hilaria Carreon sent for Otadora. She gave him the
revolver Exhibit A; but the revolver turned out to be defective so he handed it back to Hilaria. The
latter ordered it repaired by BenignoBaltonado who had previously sold it to her. Three days
later, Baltonado returned the gun in good condition with more than ten bullets, and appellant in
turn delivered the weapon to Otadora who was then in her house, advising him at the same time
to carry out soon their plan so that Leon Castro may not attend the hearing of the civil case.
Appellant also gave Otadora the bolo Exhibit B, a pair of trousers of her husband Francisco
Galos (Exhibit C), a hat Exhibit D and a flashlight Exhibit E.
(4) Otadora set out to do his part in the morning of June 16; but Apolonia was not in her
residence. He reported to appellant the next day and the latter urged him to execute it that day,
giving him P6.50 for transportation. That night, at about one o'clock, Antonio climbed up the
house of the Castros, passing through the window. He saw them sleeping side by side. He
opened the door to the kitchen to prepare his exit. Returning to the place where the couple lay,
he stumbled on Leon Castro, who exclaimed, "who are you?".Otadora replied, "I am" "I don't
have any purpose except you, get up and fight." As Castro was about to stand up, Otadora fired.
Apolonia was awakened, and embraced her husband who meantime had fallen. Otadora shot
her too. The couple died immediately of shock and hemorrhage.
(5) After committing the murders, Otadora returned to barrio Matica-a intending to go to Hilaria's
home; but as he was nearing the kitchen, Francisco Galos signalled him to go away. (He was

seen, crossing the cornfield near Hilaria Carreon's house by Juanita Garbo, who so testified in
court.) Otadora went to his home in SitioHubas. On June 20, at a dance, he received word from
Hilaria through her husband Galos, that he was wanted by the police, and that he should
decamp. the next morning he passed by the residence of Hilaria, and the latter gave him P5,
plus two packages of cigarettes, adding that he should not attempt to visit her further, because
she was being watched. The next day, she again sent him P45 through AmandoGarbo, who
delivered the money at the back of the house of Menes Tahur in Canangca-an. After receiving
the money, Otadora prepared to escape to Camotes Islands. But he was caught before he could
run away.
The above statement of principal facts is a condensation of the testimonies of Antonio Otadora,
BenignoBaltonado, AmandoGarbo, Alejandro Bensig, MacarioBensig, Juanita Garbo, and
others. It is substantially in accord with the findings of His Honor, the trial judge. Of course it is
founded mainly upon the declarations of Antonio Otadora that necessarily are persuasive
inasmuch as he himself admits his direct participation and his assertions are fully corroborated
by a series of circumstances competently established.
Hilaria denied connection with the assassination. And naturally the defense exerted effort to
discredit Otadora's version, by submitting the following theory:
Antonio Otadora planned a revenge upon Castro because the latter as a spy caused the death
of his father Sergio Otadora at the hands of the Japanese. He, however, found himself in the
necessity of eliminating Apolonia Carreon because the latter was a witness to his deed. On the
other hand, Antonio Otadora (and the other witnesses who are his relatives) also desire to take
revenge upon Hilaria Carreon because the latter, during the Japanese occupation, saved Leon
Castro from death at the hands of the guerrillas. The defense says that to those who had been
prejudiced by the espionage activities of Leon Castro, Hilaria Carreon appears to be just as
responsible as Leon Castro.
The theory can not be lawfully accepted. Firstly, Otadora denies that his father died at the hands
of the Japanese. Secondly, the alleged "saving" of Leon Castro was not sufficiently established.
Loreto Micabel, the superior officer of the guerrillas, who ordered the release of Leon Castro, did
not mention Hilaria as one of those who interceded for the prisoner (p. 286, stenographic notes).
Thirdly, nobody in his right senses holds Pedro criminally responsible for the crime of Juan
simply because a few days before the crime Pedro saved Juan from drowning.
On the other hand, the grudge which Otadora supposedly held against Castro, readily explains
why for a consideration he undertook to kill. It is likewise probable that knowing such desire for
vengeance, Hilaria selected him to carry out the dangerous and delicate job. And if it is true that
Hilaria saved Leon Castro during the Japanese occupation, it is very likely that she hated her
"ungrateful" brother-in-law and sister, (who on two subsequent occasions brought her to court),
so much that she hired Otadora to eliminate them.
The assertions of Otadora are decisively ratified by BenignoBaltonado who swore that it was
Hilaria who had purchased the murderous gun from him for P55, and who ordered him to fix it;
that on the third day he returned the gun to her in her home with rounds of ammunition; and that
Otadora was there on that occasion. The remarks and arguments of counsel on pages 87-92 of
his brief do not, in our opinion, destroy Baltonado's credibility.
Then there is the witness AmandoGarbo, whose brother Esteban is married to the sister of
Hilaria, and whose sister married a younger brother of Hilaria. AmandoGarbo declared that he
was on friendly terms with Hilaria, taking care of her fighting cock; that in December, 1946 in the
fiesta of Palompon, she tried to persuade him to kill the spouses Castro; that he declined; that
she asked him to look for another for another whom she could hire; that he introduced Hilaria to
Antonio Otadora; that it was he who, at the request of Hilaria, secretly delivered P45 in paper
bills of different denominations to Antonio Otadora after the crime was committed.
And Juanita Garbo, niece of Hilaria Carreon, confirmed the various meetings of Otadora and
Hilaria in the latter's house. And there is the witness MacarioBensig who swore that in May,
1947, at Tabogocon, Ormoc City, during the wedding of his brother Benito with Luisa Pilapil in
May, 1947, Hilaria Carreon told him that if he would kill Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon he
would be given money as a reward.
Again there is the witness Sgt.Tomada who said that when the accused Hilaria Carreon was
arrested on June 25, 1947, she was committed to his custody because there was no adequate
place in the municipal jail for her; that she requested him confidentially to get a lock of hair of

Antonio Otadora explaining to him that if that hair is burned Otadora would become insane, and
therefore would not be able to declare against her.
Further corroboration of appellant's criminal connection with the bloody affair is the undisputed
possession by Otadora of the pants of Francisco Galos (Exhibit C) and his hat Exhibit D. It
appears that when Francisco Galos denied ownership of the pants he was ordered to put it on;
and the judge found that it fitted him perfectly. This incident gave the defense opportunity for
extended argument that the constitutional protection against self-incrimination had been
erroneously disregarded. But we discover in the record no timely objection upon that specific
ground. And it is to be doubted whether the accused could benefit from the error, if any.
Furthermore, and this is conclusive, "measuring or photographing the party is not within the
privilege" (against self-incrimination). "Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or
shoes. Nor is the requirement that the party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be
done." (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 878, quoted in Beltran vs. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil.,
570, 576).
In conclusion, we are fully satisfied from a reading of the whole expediente that the appellant
induced Antonio Otadora to commit the double murder, and furnished him with the deadly
firearm. She is just as guilty as if she herself had perpetrated the murderous assaults. The
slaying is qualified by the circumstance of treachery. It is aggravated by evident premeditation;
but for lack of sufficient votes the appellant is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment for each
murder, (not exceeding 40 years, art. 70, Rev. Penal Code), and to indemnify the heirs of the
Castros in the sum of P4,000. The appealed judgment will be thus modified.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Prec. Rec. No. 714-A

July 26, 1937
MARIA BERMUDEZ, complainant,
vs.
LEODEGARIO D. CASTILLO, respondent.
G. Viola Fernando for complainant.
Office of the Solicitor-General hilado for the Government.
The respondent in his own behalf.
DIAZ, J.:
In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the SolicitorGeneral against the respondent, in connection with this administrative case, said respondent
filed, in addition to other evidence in support of this defense, the six letters which, for purposes
of identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37. He then contended, as he now
continues to contend, that said six letters are the complainant's, but the latter denied it while she
was testifying as a witness in rebuttal. she admitted, however, that the letters marked as Exhibits
38, 39 and 40 were in her own handwriting.
As the respondent believed that the three letters admitted by the complainant to be hers were
insufficient for purposes of comparison with those questioned in this case and as he was
determined to show that said Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were the complainant's, he required her to
copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. The complainant, upon
advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to subject her,
invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 and the
other letters already in the respondent's possession, were more than sufficient for what he
proposed to do. The investigator, upholding the complainant, did not compel her to submit to the
trial required, thereby denying the respondent's petition. As respondent did not agree to this
decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the investigator and the
Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be ordered to require and compel the
complainant to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by copying said Exhibits 32 to 37 for
that purpose.
The question raised before this court is not new. In the case of Beltran vs. Samson and
Jose ([1929], 53 Phil., 570), a similar question was raised before this court. The respondents

therein desired to compel the petitioner to write by hand what was then dictated to him. The
petitioner, invoking the constitutional provision contained in section 3, paragraph 3, of the Jones
Law which reads: ". . . nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to witness against himself",
refused to write and instituted prohibition proceedings against the therein respondents. This
court granted the petition and ordered the respondents to desist and abstain absolutely from
compelling the petitioner to take down dictation by hand for the purpose of comparing his
handwriting. The reasons then adduced therein can and must be adduced in this case to decide
the same question; and all the more so because Article III, section 1, No. 18, of the Constitution
of the Philippines is worded in such a way that the protection referred to therein extends to all
cases, be they criminal, civil or administrative. The constitution provides: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." It should be noted that before it was attempted to
require the complainant to copy the six documents above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth
before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath, and under said oath she
asserted that the documents in question had not been written by her. Were she compelled to
write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that said documents had really
been written by her, it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury, inasmuch as
it would be warranted by article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful
statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made a lieu of an oath shall commit
any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the preceding articles of this section, shall
suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
The respondent invokes in his support the doctrine laid sown in Ex Parte Crow (14 Pac. [2d
series], 918), to the effect that ". . . a witness may not arbitrarily refuse to answer a question on
the ground that his answer might incriminate him when the court can determine as a matter of
law that 'no direct answer which the witness may make can tend to criminate him.'" It must be
taken into account that the question asked the petitioner in said case, as stated by the
prosecuting attorney, was only a preliminary question, as it was simply attempted to learn from
her who was with her on a certain occasion, and on what date, to the best of her recollection,
had she visited Dr.Groose. She refused to answer said questions alleging that her answer might
incriminate her. The court upheld her saying:
We are therefore of the opinion that the trial court erred when it determined as a
matter of law that petitioners answer to the questions propounded could have no
tendency to incriminate her. They clearly might have such tendency, and it was
petitioners right and privilege to decline to answer any of the above-mentioned
questions upon the ground stated. We fully realize the difficulty encountered in the
prosecution of cases under section 274 of the Penal Code when those present and
capable of establishing the facts are unwilling to testify because of fear of subjecting
themselves to prosecution. But the constitutional and statutory guaranties accorded to
petitioner cannot be swept aside merely because they may result in making difficult, or
even impossible, the conviction of the accused.
The respondent likewise invokes in his support doctrine laid down in re Mackenzie (100 Vt.
Rep., 325). This court is of the opinion that what had been said in the above-cited case is not
applicable to the case under consideration. The petitioner Mackenzie, upon being required after
he had pleaded guilty of intoxication to disclose the person or persons who had furnished him
the liquor, said that they were stranger to him, whom he met late in the evening in Barre. The
court, considering his alleged disclosure unsatisfactory, ordered him committed to jail until he
should tell the truth or until further orders. He instituted habeas corpus proceedings in his favor
alleging in his pleading that as he had already made a truthful disclosure, the result of his
commitment would be to compel him to deny his former statements and make others which
would make him guilty of perjury. The court, deciding the question, said:
The privilege against self-crimination is a personal one. . . . But the privilege is an
option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry. Hence, when an ordinary witness is on
the stand, and self-criminating act relevant to the issue is desired to be shown by him,

the question may be asked, and then it is for the witness to say whether he will
answer it or claim its privilege, for it cannot be known beforehand what he will do.
It further state that "the proper place in which to claim the privilege is in the trial court, when the
question is propounded, not here." This is exactly the case of the herein complainant. She
opportunely invoked the privilege when it was desired to subject her to trial by copying the six
letters in question, which Mackenzie failed to do.
It is true that in said case of Mackenzie, it was likewise stated that "No reason appears why the
examination on disclosure should not be subject to the ordinary rule of cross-examination. The
person making the disclosure is in the petition of a witness called by the State, and is subject to
the rule permitting the impeachment of such a witness. It is no invasion of the constitutional
guaranty against self-crimination to compel the witness to answer questions relating to the
truthfulness of his previous testimony." This court, however, is of the opinion that the foregoing is
not applicable to the case of the herein complainant, firstly, because she has made no
disclosure; she confined herself to denying the letters in question were hers when the
respondent, appressing in court with them, said rather than insinuated, that they were hers,
presenting in support of his statement, other letters which, by reason of the handwriting, were to
all appearances similar thereto; and secondly, because her testimony, denying that she was the
author of the letters in question, may be attacked by means of other evidence in the possession
of the respondent, which is not precisely that coming from the complaint herself.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and
prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is
desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at
least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, one for all, to
furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is the opinion that in order that
the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead
letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
In view of the foregoing consideration and holding, as it is hereby held, that the complainant is
perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her, the respondent's petition is denied. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 32025

September 23, 1929
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial
Fiscal of Isabela, respondents.
Gregorio P. Formoso and Vicente Formoso for petitioner.
The respondents in their own behalf.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent
judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting
from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's
handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to
be falsified.
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the
order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again which
the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative
Code and on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718); United
States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145); United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited by

counsel for the respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the
judge in the order in question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or
misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of
persons cited to appear.
And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional provision
invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the order
against which these proceedings were taken.
Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni
se le obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningunproceso criminal" and has been incorporated
in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section 56.
As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones
Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."
This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover, as we are concerned
with a principle contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several
states of the United States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various
phrasings have a common conception.
In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wording in the
constitutional clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore
immaterial that the witness is protected by one constitution from 'testifying', or by
another from 'furnishing evidence', or by another from 'giving evidence,' or by still
another from 'being a witness.' These various phrasings have a common conception,
in respect to the form of the protected disclosure. What is that conception? (4
Wigmore on Evidence, p. 863, 1923 ed.)
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man
accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and
the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and
the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in
favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their
invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition
is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing
of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact
which the accused has a right to hold secret. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 20, page 434
and notes.) (Emphasis ours.)
The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation
by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether
he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within
the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
Whenever the defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a
certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to
write in open court in order that the jury maybe able to compare his handwriting with the one in
question.
It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) inasmuch as the
defendant, in offering himself as witness in his own behalf, waived his personal privileges.
Of like character is the case of Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374,378), where the judge asked the
defendant to write his name during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily.
But the cases so resolved cannot be compared to the one now before us. We are not concerned
here with the defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the
petitioner for the supposed falsification, and still less as it a question of the defendant on trial

testifying and under cross-examination. This is only an investigation prior to the information and
with a view to filing it. And let it further be noted that in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the
defendant performed the act voluntarily.
We have also come upon a case wherein the handwriting or the form of writing of the defendant
was obtainedbefore the criminal action was instituted against him. We refer to the case of
People vs. Molineux (61 Northeastern Reporter, 286).
Neither may it be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of Sprouse
vs. Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting.
We cite this case particularly because the court there gives prominence to the defendant's right
to decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. The following appears in the body of
said decision referred to (page 307 of the volume cited):
The defendant had the legal right to refuse to write for Kinsley. He preferred to accede
to the latter's request, and we can discover no ground upon which the writings thus
produced can be excluded from the case. (Emphasis ours.)
For the reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert (41 Mich., 709; 3 N. W.,
199), that the defendant could not be compelled to write his name, the doctrine being stated as
follows:
The defendant being sworn in his own behalf denied the endorsement.
He was then cross-examined the question in regard to his having signed papers not in
the case, and was asked in particular whether he would not produce signatures made
prior to the note in suit, and whether he would not write his name there in the court.
The judge excluded all these inquiries, on objection, and it is of these rulings that
complaint is made. The object of the questions was to bring into the case extrinsic
signatures, for the purpose of comparison by the jury, and we think that the judge was
correct in ruling against it.
It is true that the eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited (volume 4, page 878), says:
Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor it is
the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the
party move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. Requiring him to
make specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him to move his body . . ."
but he cites no case in support of his last assertion on specimens of handwriting. We
note that in the same paragraph 2265, where said authors treats of "Bodily Exhibition."
and under preposition "1. A great variety of concrete illustrations have been ruled
upon," he cites many cases, among them that of People vs. Molineux (61 N. E., 286)
which, as we have seen, has no application to the case at bar because there the
defendant voluntary gave specimens of his handwriting, while here the petitioner
refuses to do so and has even instituted these prohibition proceedings that he may not
be compelled to do so.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application
of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent
fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that
of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of
documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same
eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864):
. . . 2264. Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. 1. It follows that the
production of documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or partywitness) in response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other
form of process treating him as a witness ( i.e. as a person appearing before a tribunal
to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truthtelling), may be refused under
the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded. (And he cites the case
of People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119; 38 N.E., 1003)

We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one
who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of
his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of
documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of
the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. And
for this reason the same eminent author, Professor Wigmore, explaining the matter of the
production of documents and chattels, in the passage cited, adds:
For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents
or chattels be already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by
testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the process, still no line can
be drawn short of any process which treats him as a witness; because in virtue it
would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or authenticity or origin of the
articles produced. (Ibid., pp. 864-865.) (Emphasis ours.)
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be
a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means
complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege.
This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it
should be remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear
that the defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if
they did not refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional
privilege, as they could certainly do.
The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed,
maybe waived by any one entitled to invoke it. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 29, page 442,
and cases noted.)
The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145), were the
defendant did not oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence
against him.
In the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62), it was plainly stated that the court preferred to
rest its decision on the reason of the case rather than on blind adherence to tradition. The said
reason of the case there consisted in that it was the case of the examination of the body by
physicians, which could be and doubtless was interpreted by this court, as being no compulsion
of the petitioner therein to furnish evidence by means of testimonial act. In reality she was not
compelled to execute any positive act, much less a testimonial act; she was only enjoined from
something preventing the examination; all of which is very different from what is required of the
petitioner of the present case, where it is sought to compel him to perform a positive, testimonial
act, to write and give a specimen of his handwriting for the purpose of comparison. Besides, in
the case of Villamor vs. Summers, it was sought to exhibit something already in existence, while
in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely
sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in
existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.
Similar considerations suggest themselves to us with regard to the case of United States vs.
Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), wherein the defendant was not compelled to perform
any testimonial act, but to take out of his mouth the morphine he had there. It was not
compelling him to testify or to be a witness or to furnish, much less make, prepare, or create
through a testimonial act, evidence for his own condemnation.
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and
those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner
to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

Without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN VERGARA,

JONA SARVIDA, MILAGROS MAJOREMOS, MAJORIE JALALON, MAY JOY
MENDOZA (@ May Joy Sandi), and JOY SABALLA (@ Josephine Saballa),
MABELYN B. VERGARA, RIO SARVIDA, FRANCISCO MAJOREMOS, in their respective
behalves and in behalf of ROY JALALON, ROMMEL MENDOZA and DELFIN
SABALLA, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Ormoc, Branch 12; SPO3 ANGELO S. LLENOS
and the CITY JAIL WARDEN OF ORMOC; and ELEUTERIA P.
BOLAO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave.,
Paraaque City. On December 24, 2001, they were arrested by Ormoc City policemen by
authority of a Warrant of Arrest dated November 19, 2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona
in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution and Partition
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12).[1]
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao, as
Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners be held
guilty of indirect contempt for not complying with the probate courts order dated October 9, 1999
directing them to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.[2]
It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers, respondent
Bolao included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of the estate. The
probate court issued the assailed Order dated October 5, 1999, portions of which read as
follows:
1. SUBMITTED FOR RESOLUTION is an omnibus motion filed by the Petitioner-Administratrix,
informing among others, the submission of the Inventory of the Estate of the decedent, referred
as Motion-Annex A thereof. The Inventory shows that the properties left by the deceased
consists of Real and Personal Properties, as well as Credits and Collectibles, itemized under
letter heading A, B, and C of the Inventory, respectively.
2. The Real Properties are occupied by some lessees, namely: Cargo Bridge Philippines
Corporation, represented by its President Mr. Bernhard Ashauer, Jr.; Mrs. Lea Amorcillo, Mrs.
Milagros Majoremos, Mr.DaniloAguylo, Mrs. Marjorie Jalalon, Mrs.JonaSarvida,
Mrs.AnalynMalunes, Mrs. Edna Rubi, Mrs. Josephine Saballa, Mr. Benjamin Vergara, Mr.
Jerry Peligro, Mrs. Mary Joy Sandi, and Mr. Jaime Cabarse, all inside the Allers Property
Compound at 8110 Dr. A. Santos Ave., San Dionisio, Paraaque City.
5. It is further shown that all known intervenors, lessees and heirs were served of the motion and
notified of the hearing, with no opposition except intervenorBerlito P. Taripe, based on his
claim against the estate, which may be treated in due time for claims against the
estate. However, the motion under consideration refers to the return to the court of the true
Inventory of the Estate of the deceased within three (3) months as directed under Section 1,
Rule 83 which sets a specific period of time to submit, otherwise it is violated. The opposition is
not tenable.
6. Finding the motion meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. As prayed for, the Inventory of
the Estate attached therewith as Motion-Annex A (sic) and considered as a compliance of the
required return of the true Inventory of the estate of the decedent.
7. Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are directed to pay their
respective monthly rental regularly starting the month of August, 1999, including arrears
if any, to the duly appointed Special AdministratrixMrs.Eleuteria P. Bolao, until further
notice.

Let copies of this Order together with the Inventory served to all above-cited.
SO ORDERED.[3] (Emphasis Ours)
Copies of the order were sent on October 12, 1999 to petitioners via registered mail.[4]
Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolao, as Special Administratrix, the probate
court issued a writ of execution on March 3, 2000 to enforce the aforesaid order dated October
5, 1999. The Sheriff submitted a return dated August 10, 2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he
met with petitioners but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had already
collected from them three months advance rentals.[5]
On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolao filed a motion to require petitioners to explain why
they should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the October 5, 1999 order of the
probate court.[6] Petitioners were served copies of the motion by registered mail. [7]The probate
court granted the motion in its Resolution dated September 7, 2000, portions of which read as
follows:
The Motion to Exclude Certain Parcels of Land as part of the Estate of the decedent is also
denied for lack of merit. The properties sought to be excluded by intervenorBertito P. Taripe are
titled/registered in the name of the decedent and therefore they should be included in the
inventory of the intestate estate of AnselmaAllers. If intervenor has claims against the estate, he
should file a separate action against the Administratrix in accordance with Rule 87 of the
Revised Rules of court. As it is, intervenor cannot claim ownership over properties registered in
the name of the decedent by mere motion.
The Return of the Deputy Sheriff of the Writ of Execution is noted.
Petitioners motion to let the lessees explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
disobeying the Courts order is granted. All lessees listed on the Writ of Execution are hereby
ordered to explain within twenty (20) days from receipt of this order why they should not be cited
for indirect contempt of the Court for disobeying the Courts Order dated October 5, 1999, and
the Writ of Execution dated May 29, 2000.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis Ours)
Petitioners were furnished copies of the said Order on September 27, 2000 by registered mail.[8]
Six months later, in a letter dated March 18, 2001, some of the petitioners, together with
the other tenants of the property, informed the probate court that they are freezing their monthly
rentals as they are in a quandary as to whom to pay the rentals.[9]
Respondent Bolao then filed on March 20, 2001, a motion to cite petitioners in contempt,
which was set for hearing on May 11, 2001. [10] In its Order dated May 11, 2001, the probate court
found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each
and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate courts order for them to pay
rentals.[11]
Petitioners again wrote the probate court on June 11, 2001 asking that the indirect
contempt slapped against them be withdrawn. They stated that their failure to attend the May 11,
2001 hearing was due to financial constraints, most of them working on construction sites,
receiving minimum wages, and repeated that the reason why they are freezing the monthly
rentals is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it.[12]
Upon motion of respondent Bolao, the probate court, per its Order dated November 16,
2001, issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On December 24, 2001, petitioners
were arrested.
On December 26, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.[13] On January 3, 2002, the appellate court ordered the
temporary release of petitioners.[14] After due proceedings, the appellate court rendered its
decision on March 26, 2002 denying the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. This Courts resolution ordering the temporary release of the lessees is hereby
RECALLED. The lessees are ordered REMANDED to the custody of the Jail Warden of Ormoc
City until they have complied with the orders of the probate court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed herein petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based on the following grounds:

I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER
5, 1999 (ANNEX E) PARTICULARLY THE PORTION THEREOF WHICH SUMMARILY
DIRECTED THE LESSEES TO TURNOVER THEIR MONTHLY RENTALS OF THE
APARTMENTS OF BERLITO P. TARIPE TO ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO AS SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATRIX, IS UNLAWFUL;
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR INDIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT FILED BY RESPONDENT ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO AGAINST THE
LESSEES IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY AND THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO
GRANTING SAID MOTION AND DECLARING THAT THE LESSEES ARE GUILTY OF
INDIRECT CONTEMPT IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE COURT
A QUO TO ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST AND THE SAID WARRANT SO ISSUED AS WELL
AS THE ACTUAL ARREST OF SAID LESSEES IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, ARE
UNLAWFUL;
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE TEMPORARY RELEASE OF
THE LESSEES PERMANENT.[16]
The crux of petitioners arguments is that they were not notified of the motion filed by
respondent Special AdministratrixBolao, submitting an inventory of the estate of the late
Anselma P. Allers, which includes the property occupied by them. Such being the case,
petitioners contend that the order dated October 5, 1999 granting the motion and directing them
to pay the rentals to Bolao is unlawful hence, their refusal to comply with it is not contumacious.
[17]
They also assail the appointment of respondent Bolao as Special Administratrix for having
been made without the required bond, [18] and that she has no authority to file the motion for
indirect contempt, as her powers are limited.[19]
When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice was
served must prove the fact of service. [20] The burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence.[21] In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts
showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13. In the present case, as proof that petitioners
were served with copies of the omnibus motion submitting an inventory of the estate of
deceased Allers, respondent Bolao presented photocopies of the motion with a certification by
counsel that service was made by registered mail, together with the registry receipts. [22] While
the affidavit and the registry receipts proved that petitioners were served with copies of the
motion, it does not follow, however, that petitioners in fact received the motion. Respondent
Bolao failed to present the registry return cards showing that petitioners actually received the
motion.[23] Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves, they must
be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. [24] Respondent also
failed to present a certification of the postmaster that notice was duly issued and delivered to
petitioners such that service by registered mail may be deemed completed.[25]
Nonetheless, even in the absence of proof of actual receipt by the petitioners, the subject
orders issued by the probate court are valid and enforceable. Petitioners cannot deny the fact
that they had actual knowledge of the said orders. They have admitted in their letter dated March
18, 2001 addressed to the probate court that they received the courts order dated October 5,
1999 barely 2 months before,[26] or sometime in January 2001. Instead of complying with the said
order, they froze payment of their rentals for the reason that they are caught in the middle of the
dispute and are not sure to whom to give the rentals. When respondent Bolao filed the motion to
cite them in indirect contempt, setting the hearing on May 11, 2001, again, records show that
they had actual knowledge of the same. In their second letter, dated June 11, 2001, addressed
to the probate court, they acknowledged that they knew of the hearing set on May 11, 2001, and
the reason for their failure to attend was due to financial constraints.[27] They likewise admitted in
said letter that they knew of the courts order dated May 11, 2001 finding them guilty of indirect
contempt.[28] Petitioners therefore cannot cry denial of due process as they were actually notified
of the proceedings before the probate court. Thus, under the circumstances, it is not imperative
to require proof of a formal notice. It would be an idle ceremony where an adverse party, as in
this case, had actual knowledge of the proceedings.[29]
When petitioners refused to remit the rentals to respondent Bolao per Order dated
October 5, 1999, a written charge of indirect contempt was duly filed before the trial court and
hearing on the motion set on May 11, 2001. As previously stated, petitioners did not attend said

hearing despite knowledge thereof; instead, they wrote the court on June 11, 2001 asking that
the contempt findings against them be withdrawn. Clearly, they were given the opportunity to be
heard, and as aptly stated by the court, they were given more than sufficient time to comply with
the Order dated October 5, 1999.[30]
Despite the foregoing, we find that the trial courts finding of contempt and the order
directing the imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the power to
punish to contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.[31]
In Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,[32] the Court quoted the pronouncements of some
American courts, to wit:
Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt has been restricted
by statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where a contemnor fails or refuses to obey
an order of the court for the payment of money he may be imprisoned to compel obedience to
such order. [Fla.-Revell v. Dishong, 175 So. 905, 129 Fla. 9; Va. Branch v. Branch, 132 S.E. 303;
144 Va.244]. (17 C.J.S. 287).
...
. . . It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purpose
cannot be resorted to until all other means fail [Mich.-Atchison, etc. R. co. v. Jennison, 27 N.W.
6, 60 Mich. 232], but the courts power to order the contemnors detension continues so long as
the contumacy persists [Ark.-Lane v. Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168 Ark. 700] (17 C.J.S. 289).[33]
which we hereby adopt as proper guidelines in the determination of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the order of the trial court finding petitioners guilty of indirect
contempt of court and directing their imprisonment for their contumacious refusal to pay the
rentals to the administratrix.
In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly
provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to
civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense.[34] It means any liability to pay arising out of a
contract, express or implied.[35] In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the
estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the
administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal reason that they were
not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P.
Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is
covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court to wit:
SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission
to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by
order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)
because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39,
which provides:
SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the performance of any act
other than those mention in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of judgment shall be
attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom
the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law to obey the same,
and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money, thus:
SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. (a) Immediate payment on
demand. The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the
judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all
lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment
obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt
under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present
at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing
sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court
that issued the writ.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to receive payment,
the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall

turn over all the amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court of
the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable, deposit said amounts to a
fiduciary account in the nearest government depository bank of the Regional Trial court of the
locality.
The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the deposit to the
account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of court shall then deliver said payment to
the judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the
judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of court for disposition as
provided by law. In no case shall the executing sheriff demand that any payment by check be
made payable to him.
(b) Satisfaction by levy. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in
cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature
whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving
the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon,
sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer
shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal
properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the
judgment obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest
in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as
under a writ of attachment.
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on debts due the judgment
obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and
other personal property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of third
parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his
possession or control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment
shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days from service of
the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment obligor has sufficient funds or
credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment. If not, the report shall state how much funds or
credits the garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified
bank check issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the
judgment obligee within ten (10) working days from service of notice on said garnishee requiring
such delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid directly to the court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits sufficient to
satisfy the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall have the right to indicate the
garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to deliver the amount due; otherwise, the choice
shall be made by the judgment obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a) with respect
to delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a) while Section 10 of the same Rule
refers to execution of judgments for specific acts such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other
specific acts vesting title; sale of real or personal property, delivery or restitution of real property,
removal of improvements on property subject of execution and delivery of personal property.
The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9 as quoted
above. Until and unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted
to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be
resorted to by the courts.[36] In Sura vs. Martin, Sr.,[37] we held that:
Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court (for failure to
satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency) would, in effect, violate the Constitution.
Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to
comply with the probate courts order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be held
guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court, which directs
therein the Sheriff, thus:

Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of the goods and
chattels of said lessees you may cause to be made the sum sufficient to cover the aforestated
amounts, but if no sufficient personal properties are found thereof to satisfy this execution, then
of the real properties you make the sums of money in the manner required by law and make
return of your proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period.[38]
It was the sheriffs duty to enforce the writ.[39]
Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for
payment of money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank
check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon
the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be
disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the
personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are
insufficient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the
personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When there is
more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees,
he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any
interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect
as under a writ of attachment.
The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect
from petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from petitioners
personal/real properties sufficient to cover the amounts sought to be collected. [40] It was not
addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution of
judgments,[41] and it was due to the latters failure that the writ was not duly enforced.
In fine, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the Decision dated
November 16, 2001 of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review on certiorari to be with merit, the decision
dated March 26, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its
Resolution dated January 3, 2002 ordering the temporary release of petitioners is made
permanent. The Warrant of Arrest dated November 19, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Ormoc City (Branch 12) in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 is DEEMED RECALLED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24447

June 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WILLY OBSANIA, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Maximo V. Cuesta, Jr. for defendant-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
Before us for review, on appeal by the People of the Philippines, is an order, dated January 8,
1965, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing, upon motion of the defense, an
indictment for rape against Willy Obsania.
On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, ErlindaDollente,
the 14-year old victim, and her parents, CiriacoDollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the
municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, 1 alleging
That on or about the 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the
afternoon, particularly in sitioCawakalan, barrio of Capulaan, municipality of Balungao,

Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and
intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have carnal
knowledge of the complainant ErlindaDollente, against her will and on the roadside in
the ricefields at the above-mentioned place while she was alone on her way to barrio
San Raymundo.
After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further
proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused,
embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense
was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege
"lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd
designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quogranted the motion and ordered
dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to
allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court
jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.
Two issues are tendered for resolution, namely: first, are "lewd designs" an indispensable
element which should be alleged in the complaint?, and, second, does the present appeal place
the accused in double jeopardy?
Both must be answered in the negative.
The accused, in his motion to dismiss, as well as the trial judge, in his order of dismissal, rely
basically on the ruling in People vs. Gilo (L-18202, April 30, 1964). In the case which involved a
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness this Court, in passing, opined that "lewd design" is
... an indispensable element of all crimes against chastity, such as abduction,
seduction and rape, including acts of lasciviousness ... an element that characterizes
all crimes against chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent of the offender,
and such element must be always present in order that they may be considered in
contemplation of law.
Nothing in the foregoing statement can be reasonably interpreted as requiring
an explicit allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for rape. We hold in no uncertain terms that
in a complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd design" or "unchaste motive", for to
require such averment is to demand a patent superfluity. Lascivious intent inheres in rape and
the unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself the carnal knowledge of a woman
through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age. 2
It is clear that the complaint here satisfies the requirements of legal sufficiency of an indictment
for rape as it unmistakably alleges that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant by
means of violence and intimidation. We therefore hold that the trial judge erred in dismissing the
case on the proffered grounds that the complaint was defective for failure to allege "lewd design"
and, as a consequence of such infirmity, that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. The error of the trial judge was in confusing the concept of jurisdiction with that of
insufficiency in substance of an indictment.
We come now to the more important issue of double jeopardy. The accused maintains that
"assuming, arguendo, that the argument is right that the court a quo has jurisdiction, the appeal
of the Government constitutes double jeopardy."
An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would thereby
be placed in double jeopardy. 3 Correlatively, section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense

charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the
following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quo was a
competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded
not guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and decisive question is whether the
dismissal of the case was without the express consent of the accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon his
motion to dismiss. However, he vehemently contends that under the prevailing jurisprudence,
citing People vs. Bangalao, et al. (94 Phil. 354, February 17, 1954), People vs. Labatete (L12917, April 27, 1960), People vs. Villarin (L-19795, July 31, 1964), and People vs. Cloribel (L20314, August 31, 1964), an erroneous dismissal of a criminal action, even upon the instigation
of the accused in a motion to quash or dismiss, does not bar him from pleading the defense of
double jeopardy in a subsequent appeal by the Government or in a new prosecution for the
same offense. The accused suggests that the above-enumerated cases have abandoned the
previous ruling of this Court to the effect that when a case is dismissed, other than on the merits,
upon motion of the accused personally or through counsel, such dismissal is to be regarded as
with the express consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to have waived 4 his
right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is estopped 5 from claiming such defense on appeal by
the Government or in another indictment for the same offense.
This particular aspect of double jeopardy dismissal or termination of the original case without
the express consent of the defendant has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings
from this Court. We must untangle this jurisprudential maze and fashion out in bold relief a ruling
not susceptible of equivocation. Hence, a searching extended review of the pertinent cases is
imperative.
The doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was enunciated and formally labelled as such for the
first time in 1949 in People vs. Salico, supra, with three justices dissenting. 6 In that case, the
provincial fiscal appealed from the order of the trial court dismissing, upon motion of the
defendant made immediately after the prosecution had rested its case, an indictment for
homicide, on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that the crime was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or, more specifically, that the municipality of
Victorias in which the crime was allegedly committed was compromised within the province of
Negros Occidental. Rejecting the claim of the accused that the appeal placed him in double
jeopardy, this Court held that the dismissal was erroneous because the evidence on record
showed that the crime was committed in the town of Victorias and the trial judge should have
taken judicial notice that the said municipality was included within the province of Negros
Occidental and therefore the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court
of first instance of the said province. In ruling that the appeal by the Government did not put the
accused in peril of a second jeopardy, this Court stressed that with "the dismissal of the case by
the court below upon motion of the defendant, the latter has not been in jeopardy," and
"assuming, arguendo, that the defendant had been already in jeopardy in the court below and
would be placed in double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has waived his constitutional
right not to be put in danger of being convicted twice for the same offense." Mr. Justice
Felicisimo Feria, speaking for the majority, reasoned that
... when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his
action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or
privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial
on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs. Marapao (85 Phil. 832, March 30,
1950),Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil. 299, March 5, 1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil. 53,
March 28, 1952), Co Te Hue vs. Encarnacion (94 Phil. 258, January 26, 1954), and People vs.
Desalisa (L-15516, December 17, 1966).
In Marapao, the defendant was indicted for slight physical injuries in the municipal court of
Sibonga, Cebu. After the prosecution had rested its case, a continuance was had, and when trial
was resumed, the court, upon motion of the defense, ordered the case dismissed for failure of
the prosecution to appear. However, the court reconsidered this order upon representation of the
fiscal who appeared moments later, and ordered the defense to present its evidence. The
accused moved to get aside the latter order on the ground that it placed him in double jeopardy.
Acceding to this motion, the court dismissed the case. Subsequently, the accused was charged
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu with the offense of assault upon a person in authority,
based on the same facts alleged in the former complaint for slight physical injuries. Again, upon
motion of the accused, the trial court dismissed the new indictment on the ground of double
jeopardy. From this order, the prosecution appealed. In upholding the appeal of the Government,
this Court observed that although the information for assault necessarily embraced the crime of
slight physical injuries for which the accused was indicted in the justice of the peace court,
... it appears that the appellee was neither convicted nor acquitted of the previous
charge against him for slight physical injuries, for that case was dismissed upon his
own request before trial could be finished. Having himself asked for such dismissal,
before a judgment of conviction or acquittal could have been rendered, the appellee is
not entitled to invoke the defense of double jeopardy...
In Gandicela, this Court had occasion to reiterate the Salico ruling:
But where a defendant expressly consents to, by moving for, the dismissal of the case
against him, as in the present case, even if the court or judge states in the order that
the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice on the
part of the fiscal to file another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. (People vs. Ylagan, 58
Phil. 851; People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722.).
And in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused in that case, this Court held:
According to Section 9 of Rule 13, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than upon
the merits at any stage before judgment, without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information,
and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge, the dismissal of the case shall be
definite or a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; but if it is dismissed
upon the petition or with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be
without prejudice or not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because, in
the last case, the defendant's action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver
of his constitutional right not to be prosecuted again for the same offense.
In Pinuela, as in Salico, the prosecution had presented its evidence against the defendant, and
the trial court, upon motion of the accused, dismissed the criminal action for lack of evidence
showing that the crime charged was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. On appeal by the
Government, this Court found that the evidence showed otherwise and, like in Salico, the
majority rejected the plea of double jeopardy interposed by the accused on the ground that his
virtual instigation of the erroneous dismissal amounted to a waiver of his right against a second
jeopardy.
In Co Te Hue, it was the theory of the petitioner that the charge of estafa filed against him having
been dismissed, albeit provisionally, without his express consent, its revival constituted double
jeopardy which bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. This claim was traversed
by the Solicitor General who contended that considering what had transpired in the conference
between the parties, the provisional dismissal was no bar to the subsequent prosecution for the
reason that the dismissal was made with the defendant's express consent. This Court sustained
the view of the Solicitor General, thus:
We are inclined to uphold the view of the Solicitor General. From the transcript of the
notes taken at the hearing in connection with the motion for dismissal, it appears that

a conference was held between petitioner and the offended party in the office of the
fiscal concerning the case and that as a result of that conference the offended party
filed the motion to dismiss. It also appears that as no action has been taken on said
motion, counsel for petitioner invited the attention of the court to the matter who acted
thereon only after certain explanation was given by said counsel. And when the order
came the court made it plain that the dismissal was merely provisional in character. It
can be plainly seen that the dismissal was effected not only with the express consent
of the petitioner but even upon the urging of his counsel. This attitude of petitioner, or
his counsel, takes this case out of the operation of the rule.
In essence, this Court held that where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with
the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel, there can be no
double jeopardy under section 9, Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
This decision subscribes substantially to the doctrine on waiver established in Salico.
The validity and currency of the Salico doctrine were intimated in the recent case of People vs.
Fajardo (L-18257, June 29, 1966), and six months later were reaffirmed in People vs. Desalisa,
supra.
In Fajardo, this Court, through Mr. Justice QuerubeMakalintal, observed:
The record does not reveal that appellees expressly agreed to the dismissal of the
information as ordered by the trial Judge or that they performed any act which could
be considered as express consent within the meaning of the rule. While they did file a
motion asking that the case be quashed or that a reinvestigation thereof be ordered,
the court granted neither alternative. What it did was to order the prosecution to
amend the complaint. This order was in effect a denial of the motion to quash, and it
was only after the prosecution failed to amend that the court dismissed the case on
that ground. Consequently, even under the theory enunciated in some decisions of
this Court (People vs. Salico, etc.) that if a valid and sufficient information is
erroneously dismissed upon motion of the defendant he is deemed to have waived the
plea of double jeopardy in connection with an appeal from the order of dismissal,
appellees here are not precluded from making such plea.
To paraphrase, had the dismissal been anchored on the motion to dismiss, the defendants
would not have been entitled to protection against double jeopardy.
Then in Desalisa, this Court, in a unanimous decision penned by Mr. Justice Jesus Barrera, held
that
... The ruling in the case of Salico, that the act of the defendant in moving for the
dismissal of the case constitutes a waiver of the right to avail of the defense of double
jeopardy, insofar as it applies to dismissals which do not amount to acquittal or
dismissal of the case on the merits, cannot be considered to have been abandoned by
the subsequent decisions on the matter. (Emphasis supplied)
x xx
x xx
x xx
... an appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal complaint)
by the trial court will not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon
motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an
acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and
(3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal; so that
should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. (Emphasis supplied)
The doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double jeopardy was first enunciated
in Acierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction,
upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting the
jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea of second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel
is in quintessence the same as the doctrine of waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other
than on the merits, sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his
express consent and bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on
appeal or in a new prosecution for the same offense.

In Acierto, the defendant was charged before a United States court-martial with having
defrauded the Government of the United States, through falsification of documents, within a
military base of the United States in the Philippines. The challenge by the accused against the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal was brushed aside, and he was convicted. On review, the
verdict was reversed by the Commanding General who sustained Acierto's position on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, he was convicted of estafa and falsification based
on the same facts by the Court of first Instance of Rizal. On appeal to this Court, he claimed
former jeopardy in the court-martial proceedings, asserting that the military court actually had
jurisdiction. In a unanimous 7 decision, this Court, through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason, ruled:
This is the exact reverse of the position defendant took at the military trial. As stated,
he there attacked the court-martial's jurisdiction with the same vigor that he now says
the court-martial did have jurisdiction; and thanks to his objections, so we incline to
believe, the Commanding General, upon consultation with, and the recommendation
of, the Judge Advocate General in Washington, disapproved the court-martial
proceedings.
x xx
x xx
x xx
Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military authorities, the defendant
was estopped from demurring to the Philippine court's jurisdiction and pleading double
jeopardy on the strength of his trial by the court-martial, A party will not be allowed to
make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would
result in brazen deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary
principles of right dealing and good faith, for an accused to tell one court that it lacks
authority to try him and, after he has succeeded in his effort, to tell the court to which
he has been turned over that the first has committed error in yielding to his plea.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al. (96 Phil. 827, April 30,
1955); People vs. Reyes, et al. (98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956); People vs. Casiano (L-15309,
February 16, 1961), and People vs. Archilla (L-15632, February 28, 1961).
The defendants in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al., were charged as accessories to the crime of
theft committed by their brother, Anselmo, the principal accused. The latter pleaded guilty to
simple theft and was sentenced accordingly. The former pleaded not guilty and subsequently
filed a motion to quash on the ground that being brothers and sisters of the principal accused,
they were exempt from criminal responsibility for the acts charged against them in the
information. Thereupon, the prosecution moved to amend the information so as to allege that the
defendants profited from the effects of the crime. In view of this development, counsel for the
defendants moved to withdraw their motion to quash, and objected to the proposed amendment
which sought to change materially the information after plea without the consent of the accused.
Without acting on the petition to withdraw the motion to quash, the trial court denied the motion
of the prosecution on the ground that the proposed amendment would substantially affect the
fundamental rights of the accused who were exempt from liability under the information because
of their relation to the principal culprit. Then the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case
against the alleged accessories with reservation to file a new information. The court ordered the
dismissal without ruling on the reservation. Subsequently, a new information was filed virtually
reproducing the previous one except that now there was an added allegation of intent to gain.
The lower court quashed the new information upon motion of the accused on the ground of
double jeopardy. On appeal by the prosecution, this Court, thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held
that the plea of double jeopardy was erroneously sustained because
In the first place, the accused-appellees herein filed a motion to quash on the ground
that they incurred no criminal liability under the facts alleged in the information in the
preceding case, No. Q-972, and the trial court instead of allowing the withdrawal of the
motion to quash, virtually sustained the same when it denied the fiscal's motion to
amend, thereby forcing the latter to dismiss the case; hence, it can not be held that
the former case was terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Secondly, the defendants themselves showed that the information in the previous
case was insufficient to charge them with any criminal offense, in view of their

relationship with the principal accused; and it is well established doctrine that for
jeopardy to attach, there must be an information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction. Lastly, the herein accused having successfully contended that
the information in the former case was insufficient to sustain a conviction, they cannot
turn around now and claim that such information was after all, sufficient and did place
them in danger of jeopardy of being convicted thereunder. If, as they formerly
contended, no conviction could be had in the previous case, they are in estoppel to
contend now that the information in the second case places them in jeopardy for the
second time. Their case comes within the spirit of the rule laid down in People vs.
Acierto.
Again, in People vs. Reyes, et al., supra, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Paras,
reiterated the Aciertoruling thus:
Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case is
dismissed upon the petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint or
information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution
for the same offense and the defendant is estopped from alleging in the second
information that the former dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information
was valid.
In this particular case, upon motion of the defendants, the trial court dismissed the information
because it did not allege the use of violence, notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged
was coercion under article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, however, this Court ruled
that the dismissal was erroneous because "although the offense named in the information is
coercion, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable provision is the first paragraph, since
the second paragraph also speaks of 'coercions'. Inasmuch as the recitals in the information do
not include violence, the inevitable conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that
described and penalized in the second paragraph."
We come now to the case of People vs. Casiano. In this case the accused was charged with
estafa in a complaint filed with the justice of the peace court of Rosales, Pangasinan. The
accused waived her right to preliminary investigation and the record was accordingly forwarded
to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where the provincial fiscal filed an information for
"illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes." Upon arraignment the defendant
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the defense filed a motion to dismiss on the thesis that there
had been no preliminary investigation of the charge of illegal possession and use of false
treasury or bank notes, and that the absence of such preliminary investigation affected the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The motion was granted on the ground that the waiver made by the
defendant in the justice of the peace court did not deprive her of the right to a preliminary
investigation of an entirely different crime. On appeal to this Court, it was held that the dismissal
was erroneous because the allegations of the information filed in the Court of First Instance
were included in those of the complaint filed in the justice of the peace court where the
defendant had already waived her right to a preliminary investigation. On the question of
whether the appeal placed the defendant in double jeopardy, this Court, thru Mr. Chief Justice
(then Associate Justice) Concepcion, observed that the situation of Casiano was identical to that
of the accused in Acierto
... were she to plead double jeopardy in this case, for such plea would require the
assertion of jurisdiction of the court of first instance to try her and that the same erred
in yielding to her plea therein for lack of authority therefor. In the language of our
decision in the Acierto case, it is immaterial whether or not the court a quo had said
authority. It, likewise, makes no difference whether or not the issue raised by
defendant in the lower court affected its jurisdiction. The fact is that she contested its
jurisdiction and that, although such pretense was erroneous, she led the court to
believe that it was correct and to act in accordance with such belief. The elementary
principles of fair dealing and good faith demand, accordingly, that she be estopped
now from taking the opposite stand in order to pave the way for a plea of double
jeopardy, unless the rule of estoppel laid down in the Acierto case is revoked. As a

matter of fact, said rule applies with greater force to the case at bar than to the Acierto
case, because the same involved two (2)separate proceedings before courts deriving
their authority from different sovereignties, whereas the appeal in the case at bar is
a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court, which like this Supreme Court, is
a creature of the same sovereignty. In short the inconsistency and impropriety would
be more patent and glaring in this case than in that of Acierto, if appellant herein
pleaded double jeopardy in this instance.
This Court then forthnightly stated that "the rule of estoppel applied in the Acierto case should be
maintained, because:
1. It is basically and fundamentally sound and just.
2. It is in conformity with the principles of legal ethics, which demand good faith of the
higher order in the practice of law.
3. It is well settled that parties to a judicial proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a
theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court.
x xx
x xx
x xx
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it
had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that
it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S. 861-863). However, if the lower court
had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such
theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the
lower court hadjurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties,
has no bearing thereon.
Twelve days after Casiano, this Court, in People vs. Archilla, supra, invoked anew the doctrine of
estoppel. In this case Alfreda Roberts, together with Jose Archilla, was charged with bigamy.
After pleading not guilty, Roberts, through his counsel, filed a motion praying that the complaint
be quashed with regard to her on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute the
offense charged for failure to aver that "insofar as Alfreda Roberts is concerned, her marriage to
Jose Luis Archilla was her second marriage ..." On appeal, the prosecution contended that the
trial court erred in granting the motion to quash, because the complaint was sufficient and at
least charged the accused as an accomplice. The defendant maintained that even if that were
true, the quashing of the information amounted to her acquittal which prevented the prosecution
from taking the said appeal as it would place her in double jeopardy. Mr. Justice Felix Bautista
Angelo, writing for the majority, ruled that the trial court erred, and proceeded to emphasize that
the accused
... cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after inducing the trial
court to commit an error which otherwise it would not have committed. In other words,
appelleecan not adopt a posture of double dealing without running afoul with the
doctrine of estoppel. It is well-settled that the parties to a justiciable proceeding may
not, on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower
court (Williams v. McMicking, 17 Phil. 408; Molina v. Somes, etc.). Consequently,
appellee is now estopped from invoking the plea of double jeopardy upon the theory
that she would still be convicted under an information which she branded to be
insufficient in the lower court.
The accused in this case now before us nevertheless insists that the Salico doctrine and
"necessarily analogous doctrines" were abandoned by this Court in Bangalao, Labatete,
Villarin and Cloribel.
In Bangalao, the complaint filed by the victim's mother alleged that the rape was committed "by
means of force and intimidation" while the information filed by the fiscal alleged that the offended
party was a "minor and demented girl" and that the defendants "successively had sexual
intercourse with her by means of force and against the will of Rosita Palban." After the accused

had pleaded not guilty, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the offense of rape charged by the fiscal since it was
distinct from the one alleged in the complaint which did not aver that the victim was a demented
girl". The lower court sustained the motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On
appeal by the prosecution, this Court held that the trial judge erred in dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction, but ruled, however, that the appeal could not prosper because it placed the
accused in double jeopardy.
As the court below had jurisdiction to try the case upon the filing of the complaint by
the mother of the offended party, the defendants-appellees would be placed in double
jeopardy if the appeal is allowed.
After mature analysis, we cannot agree that this Court in Bangalao impliedly abandoned the
Salico doctrine on waiver. Bangalao was decided solely on the question of jurisdiction. This
Court, however, after holding that the lower tribunal had jurisdiction, decided outright to repress
the appeal by the Government on the ground of double jeopardy without considering whether
the appealed order of dismissal was issued with or without the express consent of the accused
(this aspect of double jeopardy not being in issue). Hence, the ruling in Salico that the
dismissal was with the express consent of the accused because it was granted upon his
instigation thru a motion to dismiss was not passed upon in Bangalao.
A case of striking factual resemblance with Salico is People vs. Ferrer (100 Phil. 124, October
23, 1956). In this case, after the prosecution had rested, the accused filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court had not been published. Acting on
this motion, the lower court dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed. This Court found that
the evidence on record, contrary to the finding of the trial court, amply proved the jurisdiction of
the lower tribunal. However, without the defendant interposing the plea of double jeopardy, this
Court held that "the Government however meritorious its case cannot appeal the order of
dismissal without violating the right of the defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy." Again,
like in Bangalao, this Court did not consider the nature of dismissal whether it was with or
without the express consent of the defendant.
The accused in the case at bar avers that the Salico doctrine
was formally and expressly abandoned in People vs. Labatete, supra. In the latter case, the trial
court, upon motion of the defendant, dismissed the original information for estafa on the ground
that it did not allege facts constituting the offense charged. The information recited that the
accused had contracted a loan from the complainant, giving as security the improvements and
products of his property (a piece of land), without averring that the said property, which was
allegedly mortgaged by the accused to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, formed part of
the security. Consequently, the fiscal filed an amended complaint alleging that the accused also
gave as security the land in question, which he later mortgaged to the damage and prejudice of
the complaining creditor. This amended information was also dismissed upon motion of the
defendant on the ground of double jeopardy. This Court, in sustaining the appealed order of
dismissal, held:
If the amended information were to be admitted, the accused will be deprived of his
defense of double jeopardy because by the amended information he is sought to be
made responsible for the same act of borrowing on a mortgage for which he had
already begun to be tried and acquitted by the dismissal of the original information.
x xx
x xx
x xx
... the trial court found that the accused could not be found guilty of any offense under
the information. The judgment entered was not one of dismissal but of acquittal, and
whether the judgment is correct or incorrect, the same constitutes a bar to the
presentation of the amended information sought to be introduced by the fiscal.
(Emphasis supplied)
In not applying the Salico doctrine, this Court, through Mr. Justice Alejo Labrador, expounded:
... The judgment of the trial court (in People vs. Salico) was in fact
an acquittal because of the failure on the part of the fiscal to prove that the crime was
committed within the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment was in fact a final
judgment of acquittal. The mere fact that the accused asked for his acquittal after trial

on the merits (after the prosecution had rested its case) is no reason for saying that
the case was "dismissed" with his express consent and he may again be subjected to
another prosecution.
From the above named statement, it is clear that what in Salico was repudiated in Labatete was
the premise that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and not the conclusion that a
dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused, is deemed to be with his express
consent and therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead double jeopardy in the event of
an appeal by the prosecution or a second indictment for the same offense. This Court,
in Labatete, merely pointed out that the controverted dismissal in Salico was in fact an acquittal."
Reasoning a contrario, had the dismissal not amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver
would have applied and prevailed. As a matter of fact we believe with the majority in Salico that
the dismissal therein was not on the merits and therefore did not amount to an acquittal:
If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal,
inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted for the same
offense before a court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case
the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Granting, however, that the Salico doctrine was abandoned in Labatete, it was resurrected
in Desalisa. Moreover,Labatete never mentioned the doctrine of estoppel enunciated
in Acierto which had been repeatedly reaffirmed.
To bolster his contention that the Salico doctrine has been dropped from the corpus of our
jurisprudence, the accused cites People vs. Villarin, supra. Here the accused appealed to the
Court of First instance his conviction in the inferior court for acts of lasciviousness with consent.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the fiscal charged the accused with corruption of
minors. Villarin pleaded not guilty, and before the case could be heard, his counsel filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the information did not allege facts constituting the crime charged.
Acting on this motion, the trial court dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution, this
Court thru Mr. Justice Felix Angelo Bautista, held that the dismissal was erroneous, but that this
error
... cannot now be remedied by setting aside the order dismissal of the court a quo and
by remanding the case to it for further proceedings as now suggested by the
prosecution considering that the case was dismissed without the express consent of
the accused even if it was upon the motion of his counsel, for to do so would place the
accused in double jeopardy. The only exception to the rule on the matter is when the
dismissal is with the consent of the accused, and here this consent has not been
obtained. (Emphasis supplied)
Villarin gives the impression, as gleaned from the above statement, that this Court therein
sustained the plea of double jeopardy on the ground that dismissal was without the express
consent of the defendant as it was ordered "upon the motion of his counsel" and not upon
motion of the defendant himself. This conclusion is rather unfortunate and must be rectified, for
the settled rule is that the acts of counsel in a criminal prosecution bind his client. Thus,
in People vs. Romero (89 Phil. 672, July 31, 1951), this Court held categorically that
The fact that the counsel for the defendant, and not the defendant himself personally
moved for the dismissal of the case against him, had the same effect as if the
defendant had personally moved for such dismissal, inasmuch as the act of the
counsel in the prosecution of the defendant's cases was the act of the defendant
himself , for the only case in which the defendant cannot be represented by his
counsel is in pleading guilty according to Section 3, Rule 114, of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
On this consideration alone, we cannot agree with the accused in the case at bar that this Court
in Villarin intended to abandon the Salico ruling. Had the motion to dismiss filed by Villarin's
counsel been considered as one made by the defendant himself, as should have been done, the
Villarin case should have been resolved consistent with the doctrine of waiver in Salico and/or
that of estoppel in Acierto.

As a final citation in support of his theory, the accused in the case at bar invokes People vs.
Clolibel, supra, where this Court, in sustaining the plea of double jeopardy interposed by the
defendants, stated inter alia:
In asserting that Criminal Case No. 45717 may still be reinstated, the petitioner adopts
the ruling once followed by the Court to the effect that a dismissal upon the
defendant's own motion is a dismissal consented to by him and, consequently, will not
be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because, his action in having
the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the
reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits
and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil.
772) But, this authority has long been abandoned and the ruling therein expressly
repudiated.
Thus, in the case of People v. Robles, G.R. No. L-12761, June 29, 1959, citing People
v. Bangalao, L-5610, February 17, 1954; People v. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954;
People v. Abano, L-7862, May 17, 1955; and People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23,
1956, We said:
... In reaching the above conclusion, this Court has not overlooked the ruling
in People vs. Salico, 47 O.G. 4765, to the effect that a dismissal upon
defendant's motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense as said dismissal was not without the express consent of the
defendant, which ruling the prosecution now invokes in support of its
appeal; but said ruling is not now controlling, having been modified or
abandoned in subsequent cases wherein this Court sustained the theory of
double jeopardy despite the fact that dismissal was secured upon motion of
the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, the rule that a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the express consent
of the defendant, has no application to a case where the dismissal, as here, is
predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial. (People vs. Tacneng, et al.,
G.R. No. L-12082, April 30, 1959). (emphasis supplied)
The above statements must be taken in the proper context and perspective. As previously
explained, Bangalao, Ferrer, and even Labatete, did not actually abandon the doctrine of waiver
in Salico (and not one of the said cases even implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of
estoppel established in Acierto). In Diaz, Abao,Tacneng and Robles which are cited above, like
in Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants, were considered acquittals
because they were all predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure
of the Government to prosecute. Therefore, even if such dismissals were induced by the
accused, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines
presuppose a dismissal not amounting to an acquittal.
This Court, through Mr. Justice MarcelianoMontemayor, held in People vs. Diaz (94 Phil. 714,
March 30, 1954):
Here the prosecution was not even present on the day of trial so as to be in a position
to proceed with the presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. The
case was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without asking for postponement
or giving any explanation, just failed to appear. So the dismissal of the case, though at
the instance of defendant Diaz may, according to what we said in the Gandicela case,
be regarded as an acquittal. (emphasis supplied)
A similar result was reached by this Court thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, in People vs.
Abano (97 Phil. 28, May 27, 1955), in this wise:
After a perusal of the documents attached to the petition for a writ of certiorari, we fail
to find an abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge. He took pains to
inquire about the nature of the ailment from which the complaining witness claimed
she was suffering. He continued the trial three times, to wit: on 27 May, 1 and 12
June. The defendant was entitled to a speedy trial. When on 15 June, the last day set
for the resumption of the trial, the prosecution failed to secure the continuance thereof

and could not produce further evidence because of the absence of the complaining
witness, the respondent judge was justified in dismissing the case upon motion of the
defense ... The defendant was placed in jeopardy for the offense charged in the
information and the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal would place
him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. (emphasis supplied)
Then in People vs. Tacneng (L-12082, April 30, 1959), Mr. Justice Pastor Endencia, speaking for
a unanimous Court, stressed that
... when criminal case No. 1793 was called for hearing for the third time and the fiscal
was not ready to enter into trial due to the absence of his witnesses, the herein
appellees had the right to object to any further postponement and to ask for the
dismissal of the case by reason of their constitutional right to a speedy trial; and if
pursuant to that objection and petition for dismissal the case was dismissed, such
dismissal ammounted to an acquittal of the herein appellees which can be invoked, as
they did, in a second prosecution for the same offense. (emphasis supplied)
And this Court proceeded to distinguish the case from People vs. Salico, thus:
We are fully aware that pursuant to our ruling in the case of Peo. v. Salico, 45 O.G.
No. 4, 1765-1776, and later reiterated in Peo vs. Romero, L-4517-20, July 31, 1951, a
dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense as said dismissal was not without the express consent of the
defendant. This ruling, however, has no application to the instant case, since the
dismissal in those cases was not predicated, as in the case at bar, on the right of a
defendant to a speedy trial, but on different grounds. In the Salico case, the dismissal
was based on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution did not show that the
crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which, on appeal, we
found that it was, so the case was remanded for further proceedings; and in the
Romero case the dismissal was due to the non-production of other important
witnesses by the prosecution on a date fixed by the court and under the
understanding that no further postponement at the instance of the government would
be entertained. In both cases, the right of a defendant to a speedy trial was never put
in issue. (emphasis supplied)
The gravamen of the foregoing decisions was reiterated in People vs. Robles (L-12761, June
29, 1959) where the trial court, upon motion of the defendant, dismissed the case on the ground
that the failure of the prosecution to present its evidence despite several postponements granted
at its instance, denied the accused a speedy trial. In rejecting the appeal of the Government, this
Court held:
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold that the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 11065 is not provisional in character but one which is tantamount to acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
In Cloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from September 27,
1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial, after
numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of the prosecution. On the latter date, the
prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon motion of defendants, the case was dismissed.
This Court held "that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a 'dismissal' but an
acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to
speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that there is no parallelism between
Cloribel and the cases cited therein, on the one hand, and the instant case, on the other. Here
the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the
complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on
the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The
appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate the action on
the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the other related cases the dismissal amounted to an
acquittal because the failure to prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.

The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non
conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through
his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily
amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is set aside. This case is hereby remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.