238

CHAPTER

Case Analyses

14. EINacional, www.el-nacional.eom/www/si:e/p_coni:enido.php.

15. EINacional, January 2008.
16. Ultimas Noticias, January 13, 2008.
17. The announcement of these measures was not covered in the portal of the Ministeri
del Poder Popular para la Information y la Comunicacion (MINCI). I have therefore resorte
to periodical sources.

TEN

Bolivia
Origins and Policies of the Movimiento al Socialismo

RAUL

MADRID

I Bolivia, as in much of Latin America, the Left is resurgent. In 2005 Evo Morales,
the indigenous leader of a relatively new leftist party, the Movimiento al Socialismo
(MAS), or the Movement toward Socialism, captured the presidency with a majority
i f the popular vote, the first time any presidential candidate has won an electoral
majority since the return to democracy in 1982. Morales and the MAS followed up
iiti'. vit:lory with equally resounding triumphs in various other elections, including
ihr 1009 presidential and legislative elections.
What explains the resurgence of the Left in Bolivia? Why has the Left come back
h t o power, and what does this mean for public policy and democracy in Bolivia?
This chapter argues that the rise of the MAS been driven by some of the same
tors lhat have led to the ascension of the Left elsewhere in Latin America, namely,
King disenchantment with market-oriented policies and the parties that implet Mini them. 1 This does not mean that Bolivians became significantly more likely
ientily themselves as leftists. In Bolivia and most other Latin American countries,
percentage of people who identity as leftists has risen only modestly in recent
fn (Seligson 2007; Arnold and Samuels in chapter 1 of this volume). Nevertheless,
I

for market-oriented policies, especially privatization, declined significantly

mi', the late 1990s and early 2000s, and disenchantment with the existing parties
the performance of democracy grew (Madrid 2010; Baker and Greene 2011). The
M we shall see, was able to capitalize on this disenchantment.
hr MAS appealed to the growing pool of disaffected voters in part by develI -1 ii.iiluiuii.il leftist agenda. Ii opposed trade liberalization, privatization, and
: i" alibi rd polli lei and 1 ailed for income redistribution, agrarian reform, and
rirtiliiiiull/titlnii ol ri.itLiral resoim rv h also harshly criticized the traditional par?

Mirrupt ah>l ni'-lt.-. ti%. in-.i mn 1. til', ih.it win SIILM-I vitNH in l<ni-i|Ui mU'if.sls

i T.in, ifcli .In;

I

|]

, , , . !

I,,

| h j

h> i.l.lhi..ii As. i" I V- I: 1. (. MIII : I.% making clear I ihflJl

i|

11

I , . ; ,

, | j i | .

,.

| H U H

. I .

. . , ! . .

, . . . , , , , ! . - !

L N . I

I M M

, , i i ,

| H i |

240

Case Analyses

Bolivia

241

have taken power in the past decade. But the MAS has eschewed exclusionary ethn

\ (Ul )P) came to an end amid a severe economic crisis in 1985. The Movimiento de

appeals in favor of a more inclusive approach. Thus, it has also actively pursued tl

*|uierda Revolucionaria (MIR) was the only left-wing patty that fared well in the

support of nonindigenous as well as indigenous voters and has recruited many whitl

lis that followed, and it did so in patt by shifting to the right. The MIR embraced

and mestizo leaders and organizations to the patty.

iiket-oriented policies and formed an alliance with Accion Democraticay Naciona-

The Morales administration was elected on a relatively radical platform, and i

1 (ADN), the party of the former dictator and long-time MIR opponent General

power it has moved rapidly to fulfil! many of its campaign promises. It has created

pii^ii Banzer. None of the more radical left-wing parties, meanwhile, managed to win

new constitution, it has enacted an agrarian reform plan, and it has asserted great:

p p r r than a small fraction of the national vote.

state control over the gas industry. The Morales administration has also often engaj
in radical, even incendiary, rhetoric. It has frequently characterized itself as a revoli

Ai the outset, the MAS provided little indication that it would be any more sucffcfiil than previous leftist parties. Indeed, the MAS and its precursors achieved

tionary government intent on bringing sweeping changes to Bolivian society, it h;

fefily modest results in the first few elections in which they competed. In the 1997

distanced itself from the United States, and it has embraced the icons of the Latil

Ken ions, for example, the predecessor of the MAS, the Asamblea Soberania de los

American Left, from Fidel Castro to Hugo Chavez. Nevertheless, in some ways th

ileblos (ASP), won only 3% of the national vote. The MAS finished a surprising

Morales administration's record of governance has been more radical in rhetoric thai

pond in the 2002 elections with 20.9% of the valid vote, however, and then built on

in reality. Specifically, the economic and social policies of the Morales administratiol

performance in subsequent elections. In the 2005 presidential elections, Morales

have not represented a dramatic break with the past in large part because a variei

d die MAS won 53% of the valid vote, more than 25 percentage points ahead of the

of political, ideological, economic, and administrative constraints have hindered rhg]

mier-up, Jorge Quiroga of Poder Democratico y Social (PODEMOS). The MAS

government from pursuing the more radical economic and social policies favored

illnwcd up this victory with decisive triumphs in the 2006 Constituent Assembly

its social movement base. Thus, the Morales administration's economic and socii
policy is most appropriately coded as heterodox, like the policies of Argentina ani
Ecuador, rather than statist, like Venezuela's.
The Morales administration's orientation toward democracy, meanwhile, is prf
dominantly plebiscftarian, although it contains elements of radical and liberal
proaches to democracy. Like a liberal democracy, the Morales administration
respected human rights and civil liberties and has carried out free and fair electio:
Like a radical democracy, the government has encouraged social mobilization and
engaged in a continual dialogue with the leaders of social movement organizatio

tl die 2009 general elections, as well as in several referenda held during that period.
b e d , in the 2009 general elections, Morales was reelected with an astonishing 64%
(he valid vote.
it rose to prominence, the MAS underwent an internal transformation. As the
uductory chapter notes, the MAS is an example of the movement Left. It emerged
rural social movements, and these groups continue to form the backbone of the
S, but it has expanded to include a diverse array of social movements. The prede10 r of the MAS, the ASP, was first created in 1995 at the instigation of several largely
lllgenous, rural social movement organizations, including the principal confedera-

Nevertheless, the administration also has sought to weaken horizontal accountab;

itl highlands peasant unions, the Confederacion Sindical Unica deTrabajadores

ity and concentrate power in the executive branch. It has used referenda, electioi

ipesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB)- The main force behind this decision came from

and mass mobilizations to overhaul the country's political institutions, weaken

powerful coca growers' unions in the Department of Cochabamba, which had

opposition, and push its policy agenda. Thus, the impact of the MAS on Bolivli
democracy has been decidedly mixed. Although the MAS has helped boost potli

d control of the CSUTCB in the early 1990s. The coca growers' unions domiA1 - tl the leadership of the party duting its early years, and their members provided

participation and increase mass sarisfaction with democracy, particularly among

t ul the party's initial base of support. Beginning in the 2000s, however, the MAS

indigenous population, it has exacerbated political and regional polari/,ation and

lied OUI EO other social movements throughout Bolivia, including many urban,

dcrmincd democratic- checks and balances.

ii/ii-dninin,iU'd groups. A wide variety of unions, neighborhood associations,

n.idr UIQI i.muii',. Mhli u organizations of teachers, truckers, street vendors,

i !> i'i ii mi Evolution of the MAS

i Iv mi

"- ' A-

' wpriiiftg ,' e ih n ihi I fl bad tm i \ ri :'

,J 1,,. h>n wflfkit'li Joined the puny and helped it win support in urban, mestizo-

miftiti 'i " u whi n tl h*d Ebrm< fly buuti weak,

ii. iipueiufi ,.i r .- ! - ..Km .h : [ v. tlso ehfmgad svtr tim. During Iti rly
nit hurt 1 tihlfl ihi r"'- '- iii|ii Bid Hfumg 1 tfiiij nl Ii -<! n

242

Case Analyses

founding, the ASP was headed by Alejo Veliz, who was the party's presidential candi

1 off workers, closed many of the mines, and opened up the economy to foreign

date in the 1997 elections, and Morales occupied the second-most-important positio

n d e and investment. These measures succeeded in bringing down inflation, which

in the party. Personal disagreements between Morales and Veliz led the ASP to spill
up in 1998, and Morales and his supporters founded a new party, borrowing the registration of a defunct left-wing party, Movimiento al Socialismo. In the past decad
Morales has gradually consolidated control of the party, emerging as its unquestionej

It'll Irom more than 11,000% in 1985 to 11% in 1987 and remained low in the years that
HJo\ved. They also helped restore economic vigor, although GDP growth remained
llutively modest, increasing by 3.5% annually in real terms between 1986 and 1997
PN UD 2002, 83). The three partiesthe MNR, the ADN, and the MIRthat pre-

leader. He exercises a great deal of influence over all aspects of the party, from chous"
ing its candidates to deciding its policy agenda.

l over this economic growth and stability were initially rewarded with the support
1 the majority of the electorate. In 1989, for example, these three parties won 72.4%

Morales's control over the MAS is made possible in part by its weakly institution
alized nature: the party lacks the rules and bureaucracy of older parties.2 Moreovcij

h e total vote nationwide.

Over time, however, disenchantment with these three parties, known as the tradi-

Morales's personal popularity strengthens his authority: Morales routinely wins r

iOhu] parties, and their policies began to emerge. By 2004, only 23.4% of the popu-

votes than any of the party's other candidates in elections. He has become so populfl

Iljon reported that they had confidence in parties, making them the least trusted

that some analysts now speak of a cult of Evismo that is similar to the personality cull

iBtitution in Bolivia that year (Seligson, Moreno Morales, and Blum 2004, 102).

surrounding other Latin American populist leaders, such as Juan Peron in Argentina

duiiy people came to view the traditional parties as corrupt and self-serving or-

or Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in Peru ("En ia emancipacion . . . " 2006; Madt'ia

i4in/,uions. The economic difficulties that Bolivia encountered beginning in the

200S, 492).

|lp 1990s contributed to this disenchantment. Between 1998 and 2003, the Bolivian

In its increasing personalization of power, the Morales administration has c

enomy stagnated. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (2006a),

to resemble the governments of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Hugo Chavez

pllvia's gross domestic product per capita was lower in 2005 than it had been in 1998.

Venezuela (see chapters 9 and 11). Nevertheless, as Levitsky and Roberts argue 1

Iflly as a result, support for market policies evaporated and social protests acceler-

the introduction, the MAS differs from these governments in chat social movement

have considerably more influence in Bolivia than they do in Ecuador or Venezuela

Social movement leaders make up almost the entirety of the party's National Lcad@l
ship (Direccion Nacional), which helps define the party's policies. Morales also c

tl. The percentage of people who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that
Vati/ation had been beneficial to the country declined from 55% in 1998 to 25% in

Hi (I .atinobarometro 2005, 76). Social protests, meanwhile, rose from an average of

onth during the first administration of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (1993-97)

suits regularly with a broader group of social movement representatives through t

1 per month during the government of Hugo Banzer (1998-2001) and a high of 52

National Coordinator for Change (CONALCAM) as well as in assemblies (amp,

| J !liomh during the administration of Carlos Mesa (2003-5) (Laserna 2007,109).

dos) and biannual congresses. According to the leaders of the MAS, all of the

>M ni these protests focused specifically on neoliberal policies. This was true of the

major policy decisions in recent years have been discussed first with the party's s

BUI Water Wars of 2000, which opposed efforts to privatize the water supply in

movement base (Carlsen 2007, 5). Thus, although Morales has consolidated his c
trol of the party, authority is still more diffused in the MAS than it is in the Ci

Batumi gas through Chile.

Chavez administrations. As the MAS senator and former vice-presidential candU|

Antonio Peredo told me, "Morales is very strong, but he is not all powerful."

I etty ul Cochabamba, and the Gas Wars of 2003, which sought to block the export

pThe discontentment with the government and its market-oriented policies was
M< ul,nly noticeable in indigenous areas. The indigenous population had always
I worse off than the nonindigenous population in Bolivia, but in the late 1990s
lily .Minns, ilic socioeconomic situation of rural indigenous people actually grew

Explaining the Rise of the MAS

Mb The percentage of rural indigenous people living in extreme poverty rose from

The success of the MAS stems in part from growing disau h.mimrni wiili iirnlj|if|H
policies and the parties that implemented them.'1 Nenllbeml pulli lr* were In .1 Imjljj

merited in Bolivia In igls In mpnnrir LU thi uwn wtmon

country 4uJlH| thi UQP idinlnbfn
RMIO(M1 I

fli

'

tub rhm rn^ulln] H

H l%\ Mevimii Rio Nad

i 1 1 In i-n- \\\M\\ [l

li 11 ' :

in govi mmi ni

OIUBH
r

ndtM

'<> I'i'j/ to 72% in ZQQl. although the poverty rate declined slightly among the
Iniijgneui population (llall and P&trlnos 2,00(5). The failure of the leading
P N to bring eo
(,lt>

nil DI > > <i propii l to the indigenous arms led their share of

inf-hi ii - Weti Utii iti -tdih if .1..l.id :...., i In mid) die MNR, the ADN,

i 1H1 I [IP '! > 1

1 - ol ihi

JW "" in pw IBI H ffh < i rnrtjurhy 1

244

Case Analyses

Bolivia

the population reported growing up in a home in which an indigenous language was

languages identify as mestizo father than indigenous, in large part because of social

spoken, but in 1997 these three parties accounted for only 49.5% of the vote in these

discrimination against the indigenous population. In various surveys, less than 20%

provinces, and by 2002 their share had fallen to 31.5%.

1.1 the population has typically identified as indigenous. Moteover, those people who

The MAS filled the void created by the decline of the traditional parties. It wooed

do self-identify as indigenous are divided among Quechuas, Aymaras, and various

the support of disaffected voters with its steadfast opposition to the government's

lowlands indigenous groups. To win support of people from these varied backgrounds

policies and its strong nationalist and anti-establishment rhetoric. The leaders of the

and identities, the MAS needed to adopt an inclusive approach.

MAS vigorously opposed the neoliberal mode!, criticizing privatization, free trade1

Previous indigenous-based parties in Bolivia fared poorly, largely because they had

agreements, and the government's plans to export gas through Chile, Bolivia's histori-

failed to adopt an inclusive approach. Some of these parties, such as the Movimiento

cal enemy. They argued that the government's policies had impoverished the country*

uligena Pachacuti (MIP) of Felipe Quispe and other so-called Indianista parties,

and undermined Bolivian sovereignty, and they vowed to create jobs, redistribute 1

ilienated not only whites and mestizos but also many indigenous people with their

land and wealth, and reassert state control over the country's natural resources.
The MAS also sought to activate ethnic loyalties. The MAS, as we have seenj
had roots in the country's indigenous organizations, and these organizations helped

Musionary rhetoric. Quispe, for example, was famous for denouncing whites and
n t i z o s and for proposing rhe creation of an Aymara nation. Other indigenous par, known as the Katarista parties, avoided exclusionary rhetoric, but these parties

the party campaign intensively in indigenous areas, providing activists, food, trans-1

I ply failed to recruit white, mestizo, or even Quechua leaders to their patties or to

portation, and venues. Unlike the traditional parties, the MAS recruited numerou,

tttahlish ties with organizations outside of Aymara-speaking areas. Not surprisingly,

indigenous leaders as candidates, which enhanced the party's appeal among the indig'

gBsc parties fared poorly ourside of the Aymara hearrland.

enous population. The MAS also embraced traditional indigenous demands, such a

The MAS's inclusive approach, by contrast, helped it win support from people

land reform, local autonomy, bilingual education, and the recognition of indigenou.

i ill different kinds of ethnic backgrounds, according to my analysis of a 2006 sur-

systems of justice. It campaigned particularly vigorously against the government^

coca eradication programs, arguing that the coca leaf played an imporrant role

f by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (Madrid 2008). The MAS fared
nn. nlarly well among people who self-identified as indigenous, winning 71.1% of

indigenous culture. In addition, the leaders of the MAS made symbolic appeals I

f votes, but self-identified indigenous people represented only 28% of the MAS's

the indigenous population, portraying the party as the legitimate representative <

1 vole in the 2005 elections. It was the large mestizo vote that was crucial to the

the indigenous population and using indigenous languages, clothing, and symbol!
in the campaign.

I'i victory in 2005. The MAS won 51% of the vote of people who self-identified as
fetlfo, and mesrizos represented 62% of the party's total vote in the 2005 elections.

The MAS also made great efforts to be inclusive, howevet. Its leaders eschewM
exclusionary language and repeatedly emphasized that the party was open to I

I than two-thirds of the mestizos who reported voting for the MAS had grown
peaking an indigenous language. Indeed, these indigenous-language-speaking

people. Initially, the vast majority of the party's candidates for office were i lulls

jtl&js accounted for 43% of the MAS's total vote. Aymara-speakers were some-

enous people, but as time went on the MAS recruited many whites and mestizos J

IE liioiv likely to support the MAS than Quechua-speakets, but both groups over-

candidates. Indeed, in 2002 and 2005, the party's vice-presidential candidates 1

11 M 1' supported rhe party in 2005.

a majority of the party's senators were white ot mestizo. The MAS also estabilfl

he MAS's leftist platform also helped it win high levels of support (Romero Bal-

close ties to numerous urban mestizo-dominated organizations. In the 2,005 '

s ="".,', i'ji; Scligson et al. 2006, 89-90). According to my analysis of the 2006

dons, for example, the MAS forged an alliance with a mestizo-dominated party, I

-. m, 11, m Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey, more than three-quarters

Movimiento Sin Miedo, which was led by the mayor of l,:i I'.iz. In addition, tlir MA

Mflpli win 1 identified (hemsclves as left-of-center reporred voting for the MAS

developed a broad-based platform and policy agenda in order to appeal to peopl^H

all ethnic backgrounds, rather than focusing strictly on rural, Indigenous Issuei,
The MAS's inclusive approach wai necessary In part beufltiie of the tiHlurfl
rilniu idfliirirkation in Bolivtei Although ipproidmati ly hill *i tin Holh I m pepl
IdU.m HjiPril ... M,-!-.K

l i f l f y i p i mail of ihi

I 1 of inriigeiwii

1 Mild left-of-center voters represented almost half of the MAS's vote that
I (lr win* ,up|.mi.'d ilic nationalization of the gas industry, who supported
u ! .tn'iujH Film atliin, 01 who hail participated in protests against the Mesa
itiBB wgft ilfg Mj-iiith jiirly moM lllly to support tlir MAS in ehf 1095
1 1.. 1

1 \f) I,, ..dduiMU. ii M . V , i.,,, ,1 dlipraportluimti I) #1II

246

Bolivia

Case Analyses

among che poor, older people, highlands residents, and members of unions, peasant
organizations, and trade associations. Surprisingly, urban voters were just as likely to
support the MAS as rural voters once other factors were controlled for.
The MAS's rise to power thus has been fueled by a combination of inclusive ethnic

24/

1 lists, such as Iran, Russia, and the People's Republic of China. 7 In 2007, for example,
Morales and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met in La Paz and issued a
joint declaration establishing a $1.1 billion industrial cooperation plan (Fernandez
into, 90-91).

appeals and nationalist, antineoliberal, and anti-establishment rhetoric. The MAS

Relations with the United States, by contrast, have deteriorated. Morales has fre-

has won support not only among indigenous voters, but also among traditional

quently criticized the U.S. government and has accused it of being involved in plots

populist constituenciesthat is, urban mestizos with left-of-center, nationalist, and

against him. The Morales administration, for example, has accused the United States

anti-establishment views. In power, the Morales administration has worked hard to

ill funding opposition groups and of trying to overthrow his government. In late
B08, Morales expelled the U.S. ambassador, Philip Goldberg, saying, "We do not

satisfy these varied constituencies.

want peoplehere who conspire against democracy.1' The United States responded by
gelling the Bolivian ambassador to the United States. Even more importantly, in

The MAS in Power

laic' 2008 the George W. Bush administration announced that Bolivia was "failing

Since taking office, the Morales administration has veered between radicalism and

I cooperate with the United States on important efforts to fight drug trafficking"

moderation, with its most radical actions centered in the areas of foreign policy and

and suspended its access to trade preferences under the Andean Trade Promotion

institutional reform. The government has dramatically altered the country's interna-

iiul Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) (Mathis 2009,1). This put at risk the jobs of

tional alignments, forging close alliances with the Venezuelan administration of Hugo
Chavez and other left-wing governments and distancing itself from the United States.
The Morales administration also has moved to radically ovethaul Bolivia's political I
institutions. In economic and social policy, however, the Morales administration's
record of governance has been more radical in rhetoric than in reality. The Morales

ftp proximately 40,000 Bolivians who work directly or indirectly in manufacturing

Hi ins that depend on exports to the United States (Fernandez 2010, 87). The Morales
administration retaliated by expelling the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency from the
fctiuniry.
Nevertheless, the Bolivian government under Morales has continued to fight nar-

administration has certainly shifted Boiivian economic and social policy in a n

fioik's trafficking. The government recently announced that narcotics seizures have

heterodox direction, but it has yet to carry out sweeping state intervention. As wfiB

j increased markedly under the Morales administration, although this may partly re-

shall see, in these areas, the radical impulses of the Morales administration have been

L't higher levels of trafficking {"Growing evidence" 2010, 5). The government also
1 increased the amount of voluntary coca eradication and has carried out some

tempered by a variety of constraints.

breed eradication, while at the same time expanding the amount of coca that farmers
F O R E I G N

P O L I C Y

( allowed to grow legally.

The government's foreign policy represents a significant departure from past policies
because it has forged new alignments and traditional ones have frayed. The Morales 1

Tlie Morales administration hoped that relations with the United States would
iipKive significantly once Obama took office, but as of late 2010 that had not oc-

administration has established new alliances with the government of Hugo Chavez

Iffcd, in spite of some conciliatory statements by both sides. The Obama adminis-

in Venezuela and the regime of Fide! and Raul Castro in Cuba and has received]

ailtm has continued to provide some assistance to Bolivia through the U.S. Agency

assistance from both countries. Cuba, for example, has sent considerable numbers I

1 International Development for antinarcotics activities as well as aid for economic

of medical personnel to Bolivia, while in recent years, Venezuela has been providing!

vrlnpineni and democracy-building programs. Nevertheless, the Obama adminis-

approximately $70 million in annual assistance, including military aid (Fcmande;

pjen I us yet to restore trade preferences for Bolivia, and relations remain relatively

2010, 85). Bolivia also has joined several new regional organizations iliai (lhaVez \v&%

tniy,

promoted, such :is die Banco del Stir, .1 regional development hunk; I'etToAmirim

SGONOMIC POLICY

,iii oil and g u inltlwtlvr; and ilir hnlivarimi Altemuiive for the Amei'loui (ALBA), %
rg|l0ni'! II " i ' - t . H . !-!!!!!. r.l.lp IN. .MM l.j jM,.vl,t, .III llhHMIIV. h ( Mf= ! u M K ., I ! , , U...I,
' i

[..; J 1.

i v i t h

' - i i - - !

. M I .

-.

'i-

. , i > i

. , , i

M i l d , , , .

-::

, , ,

I,,

i d d U i o n

........ hii i-.:i-L.- -i . 1..:. i iifi - h i , isffli tradttienil I :

t h i

nu&Ufi

flntrasi m fcpslp i'L .-. 1 in- M.u.ii. 11 ulminlstiaUon's economic policy has udllb
g IUfprlftn|

li|!

'

iJjML.M,-

tin pttverHmem h*i puniu

ulillh

riiHil

pi||

V, I f i i i f v r i an.I I'. 1...-, ...,,. In.!

nsmii polli si mblll nlwi Wftwii

248

Bolivia

Case Analyses

24P

and fiscal discipline, almost to order and as prescribed by the IMF . . . [and it] has

olicy. The Morales administration has imposed selective trade restrictions, such as a

made no moves whatsoever . . . to challenge the existing structure of a neoliberal

mporary ban on the export of cooking oil, but by and large it has maintained open

capitalist state" {2007, 112-13). Webber similarly argues that "in the MAS's first year

,ide policies. Its weighted average tariff rate was only 4.1% in 2008, although it did

in office deep patterns of continuity with the inherited neoliberal economic model

uintain some nontariff barriers (Heritage Foundation 2010). Bolivia has declined to

have been discernible in terms of the implementation of key economic policies and

i;n a free trade agreement with the United States, but the Morales administration has

the class interests they serve" (2008, 82).

To be sure, the Morales administration has expanded state intervention in the

mght to maintain access to U.S. markets and was upset when its trade preferences
irough ATPDEA were suspended.

economy. It has increased its control over the natural resource sector, and it has na-

The Morales administration's heterodox economic policies have generated mostly

tionalized some foreign-owned companies. Despite its periodic criticisms of capital-

nskive results so far. In the past four years, the Bolivian economy has grown more

ism, however, the government has not sought to carry out a transition to socialism or j

lan at any rime in the last three decades, and in 2009 Bolivian economic growth

change the existing pattern of development, which is focused largely on the export of

.is projected to be the highest in the region (Weisbrot, Ray, and Johnston 2009,

natural resources (Gray Molina 2010).8 Indeed, official government documents have

Foreign investment has risen somewhat in recent years, although it is still much

explicitly precluded a transition to socialism, and Alvaro Garcia Linera has argued

ivver than it was in the 1990s and early 2000s, and Bolivia has benefired from hav-

that the country must proceed through various stages of industrial capitalism before

1^ a significant portion of its foreign debts forgiven by the World Bank and the

moving toward socialism (Webber 2008, 82). Moreover, the government has largely

un-American Development Bank (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007, 1). The Morales

respected private property and has sought to encourage private investment. Garcia

(ministration has successfully diversified its trade partners, and its dependence on

Linera, for example, has emphasized that "the government of president Morales re-

ir I Jnited States has declined considerably. Brazil is now the country's largest expott

spects private property, respects religion, respects healthy business activity, guarantees!

irtrket, followed by South Korea (Weisbrot, Ray, and Johnston 2009, 25). Bolivia also

private participation in education and health" (89-90).

in run a large trade surplus in recent years, owing in part to its increased exports of

The government's most important economic reform initiative to date has been J

Btocarbons. In 2008, for example, the trade surplus totaled 13.3% of GDP (13). The

the partial nationalization of the Bolivian natural gas industry. The nationalizationI

dr surplus, along with the increased foreign investment and debt forgiveness mea-

program obliged foreign gas companies that had been privatized in the 1990s to scfl

ii -., have bolstered Bolivia's current-account position and enabled it to accumulate

back to the Bolivian government enough shares to give the Bolivian state gas com-1

I.i.iiiiial international reserves. Bolivia's strong current-account position enabled

pany majority ownership in their Bolivian operations. A couple of companies t h a n

r Morales administration to opt not to renew its Standby Agreement with the In-

failed to reach an agreement with the Bolivian government had 50% plus one of tin 11

fh'itional Monetary Fund when it expired in 2006 (Webber 2008, 82).

shares taken over by decree in May 2008. The Morales administration also obligcM

Noi all economic indicators have been positive, however. The economic growth

all foreign-owned gas companies to negotiate new contracts that dramatically i r

gt Molivia has experienced in recent years has yet to make a significant impact on

creased the prices, royalties, fees, and taxes that these companies must pay to th|

u mployinent or poverty. Moreover, inflation has increased significantly during the

Bolivian government. As a result of these changes, the amount of funds thai ihg

ft few years of the Morales administration, reaching double digits in 2007 and

Bolivian government earns from gas revenues skyrocketed, reaching $967 million I

l, ill hough ir declined in 2009 and is still quite low by historical standards in

2007 {Gray Molina 20to). Total government revenues, meanwhile, rose from 31.7%!

li In Some observers question the long-term sustainability of the Morales admin-

GDP in 2005 to 48.4% in 2008 (Weisbrot, Ray, and Johnston 2009, 12).

(lion's economic policies, particularly given the country's dependence on natural

The Motales administration has used these increased revenues to boost govfli

iports and its difficulty fulfilling production quotas (see chapters 3 and 4). Nev-

ment spending somewhat, but spending increases have not matched revenue r.nmil

fldens, on balance the performance of the Bolivian economy under Morales has

As a result, the government ran large fiscal .surpluses between 1006 and IO08 (Wet

1 |sed 10 far.

brot, Kay, and Johnston IQQ$, ij), The govnnrm m * I * 1 boil spending 1 onildi $m

In; 1. ItmdliiKuul
gefti isf'ftflsedd^6liibui^iipoll^hilpdfliiiBuJ
-iv.,i,i fin KPftomii dewnttim thai Rfflktdfflukifthi wgiemhit) u
1 ! 1
h 1i
- l! Hi i mn^i! lilftR in \u inn Fnatisnil

IQGIAJ POl n v
1

I.!-.

I.

- I . u\u ,l\\::.U Ml .... Lll poljl 1 |S W\ If I.I. MM lip. InSIfftd Oil J M ] ? *

nj HF hfi.,,,1. iting polities thil

.^ M- pftviaus fptwnmwii

El hfiijf

2$o

Case Analyses

nificantly increased social spending, but many of its social programs, such as the
Bono Juancito Pinto and the Bono Juana Azurduy, are relatively inexpensive and a
targeted rather than universalistic. Thus, in social policy as well, the Morales administration is most appropriately classified as heterodox.
The Morales administrations land reform initiative, which it enacted in 2006I

Buhvii!

the minimum age at which one became eligible for it from 65 to 60 (Miiller 2009).
I he Morales government has also announced reforms to the private pension system
; created duting the Sanchez de Lozada administration ("El Gobierno Sacara" 2008).
F

l be government does not intend to return to the public pay-as-you-go pension sys-

tem that was in force before 1996, however. Rather it plans to maintain the exist-

after a protracted struggle in the Senate, is largely in keeping with the land reform I

ing pension system, in which workers contribute to individual retirement accounts,

principles laid down in the Sanchez de Lozada administration's 1996 land reform

fecept that the government instead of the private sector will manage the accounts.

measure (Hertzler 2007; Kohl and Farthing 2008). Only unproductive large estates!

The Morales administration has not yet carried out major reforms to either the

are subject to expropriation, and the productivity requirements are relatively low. I

health care or the educational system, but it has undertaken a number of initiatives in

Moreover, landowners whose property is expropriated are eligible for compensation

these areas. For example, the government has expanded literacy programs, enrolling

from the government (Kohl and Farthing 2008, 10). In announcing the reform, t h

hundreds of thousands of Bolivians. It also has proposed an expansion of the teaching

Morales administration promised to redistribute 20 million hectares, or 13% of Bo-]

of indigenous languages, history, and religious beliefs, although this initiative bogged

livia's land, over five years (Hertzler 2007). However, the land reform measure hai

own in the face of opposition ftom the Catholic Church and others. In the health

progressed more slowly than planned, and much of the land that has been redistrib^ ]

Ifttor, the government has opened new hospitals, increased the availability of eye

uted to date has belonged to the state (Veltmeyer and Petras 2007,111-12). As of earl^

11 j'.cry for cataracts and other serious diseases, and established a program to eliminate

2008, the government had redistributed only 1.3 million acres (Kearns 2008). Thj

Ilild malnutrition (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007). It is also working to incorporate

Morales administration seems determined to proceed with its land reform initiative,

traditional indigenous medical practices. Perhaps most importantly, in 2009 the gov-

however, and in early 2009 voters approved a referendum that limited purchases on

ernment announced the introduction of the Bono Juana Azurduy program, which

private land to 5,000 hectares.

Other important social policy initiatives of the Morales administration, such 1

1 provide smail payments to uninsured mothers who make prenatal and postnatal
I l e a l visits. The government also has proposed an ambitious universal health care

the Bono juancito Pinto program, have also been well within the parameters of pre-

Fitem for all women, children, and the elderly, but this measure has yet to come

vious social policies. The Bono Juancito Pinto program, which is modeled on exisi

) fruition. Thus, although the Morales administration has implemented significant

ing programs in El Alto, Bolivia, as well as elsewhere in Latin America, provides .

forms, it has yet to radically transform Bolivian social policy.

small monthly cash payment of 200 bolivianos {approximately $29) to families whosd
O R I E N T A T I O N TOWARD DEMOCRACY

children regularly attend school. It was initially directed only at children of primar]
school age, but it was recently expanded to cover students through the eighth grade,

olivia under the Morales administration most closely corresponds to what Lev-

which will enable it to reach almost 1.8 million children (OEI 2008). The Morale!

1 iind Roberts refer to in the introductory chapter as a plebiscitarian democracy,

administration believes that the Bono Juancito Pinto, along with other governmen

hough it contains elements of other democratic types as well. Like Hugo Chavez

programs, will help reduce the poverty rate from 59.9% (currently) to 42.4% in 2 0 t |

i Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Morales has used repeated elections, ref-

("La nueva renta" 2008). Some observers, however, have criticized the Bono Juancigj

111 l.i, and social mobilization to concentrate power, advance his policy agenda, and

Pinto as a populist political measure that fails to address the structural origins I

pfijrm Bolivia's political institutions.

poverty (Kohl and Farthing 2008, 9-10).

The Morales administration has enacted some important reforms to the \n-n
sion system, but these measures also have fallen short of being radii fll 1 hanges, H
example, the govern men is Kc-nia Dignidad program, which provides u tioncontr]|fl
lory pension to Bolivian eitlitnj ova age fiOi is merely an expansion ol \\ l a n g a

program th waa Jmpltouncwi during thafirstSfahi d' U ujfl ulmlnUtnclH

ilchougfa ihi ' d idmlntaMtlen In n i - 1 A I %\ tin \- B 1M ""| lewsa

When the Morales administration first came to power in 2006, the opposition
Biilnillrd both the Senate and a majority of the departmental government. The
| | ilr-. administration successfully undermined the opposition through avariety of
)gm

Pel example! Morales carried out a tax reform that deprived the depart-

1 Rttl gevi mm. m . MI ,I significant portion of their tax revenue. He also sponsored
H !'i " ' ri ndiim thut led to the removal f thi opposition prefects (governors) of

=
i .i-.M.i., mi I I !'. ';!!.. umiai.d. pimlnal shrfi against mimiroui appeal

2$2

Case Analyses

tion figures, including Manfred Reyes Villa, the former prefect of Cochabamba; La

Sucre, Bolivia's original capital, where the Constituent Assembly was being held. The

onel Fernandez, the former prefect of Pando; and five forfner presidents.9 Various oil

M AS's refusal to consider such a move led to violent protests in Sucre that brought the

servers have argued that at least some of these prosecutions are politically inspired. |

issembly to a halt. To avoid the protesters, the MAS shifted the assembly to a military

The government also has used protests and other forms of social mobilization

Icility outside of Sucre, which led the opposition to boycott the meeting. The MAS

to intimidate the opposition. The coca growers' unions and other social movemei

hen approved the new constitution without the participation of the opposition, by a

actors who form the core of the MAS have a long tradition of using social protej

Rite of 136 of the 138 delegates present, which represented barely a majority of the full

to achieve their aims, and these protests have continued since the MAS took pow

Imistituent Assembly. The constitution was subsequently approved by more than

Indeed, Laserna reports that the number of social conflicts per month was highei

j(o% of voters in a January 2009 referendum.

the first year of the Morales administration than in any recent Bolivian governmea

The new constitution brought about sweeping changes to the Bolivian state that

except that of Carlos Mesa (2007,109). Social movements have demonstrated in fro 11

Strengthened executive authority and undermined horizontal accountability. One of

of the Congress to put pressure on the legislators to approve national referenda on t

fle most controversial aspects of the new constitution was the provision allowing for

new constitution and on agrarian reform. Groups tied to the MAS also pressured en

he president to serve two consecutive five-year terms. In negotiations with the op-

prefects of Cochabamba and La Paz, both of whom were members of the opposition

position in late 2008, howcvei, Morales agreed to serve only one term under the new

to resign or ar least acquiesce to the Morales administration's policies. MAS supporj

(institution in addition to the term he had served under the previous constitution. 10

ers even set fire to the governor's palace in Cochabamba, causing the prefect, ManfnJ

Nevertheless, the new constitution strengthened Morales's hold on power in other

Reyes Villa, to flee.

fays. It called for the direct election of Supreme Court justices and lowered from

The Morales administration also has taken other steps that undermine horizon

Wn thirds to a simple majority the percentage of congressional support required to

accountability. Morales has frequently criticized the National Electoral Court and h

onlirm governmental appointees to certain posts, such as the human rights ombuds-

put pressure on some of its members to resign. He also has appointed his support?!

RBIU the comptroller general, and the National Electoral Court. This made it easier

to traditionally independent institutions, such as the Comptroller General's Off

I the Morales administration to place its allies in key positions. The new constitu-

In addition, the Morales administration has sought to gain control over the traditio

8n also helped the Morales administration gain control of the legislature by chang-

ally conservative judiciary through various measure including lowering judicial so]
ries. These efforts led to numerous resignations, but the Morales administration a
the legislature were initially unable to come to an agreement on their replacement

: system used to elect legislators, creating some reserved legislative seats for
ptllgenous people, removing legal immunity from legislators, and allowing elected
als to be subject to recall elections. Finally, the new constitution recognized

In early 2010, however, the MAS used its newfound dominance of the legislatj

Hilip.cnous systems of justice; declared Bolivia a plurinational state; called for a large

to push through a law authorizing Morales to appoint 5 Supreme Court justices,]

i for the state in economic and social policy; granted a wide variety of economic,

Constitutional Tribunal judges, and 3 members of the Judicial Council.

The Morales administration's most sweeping political reform to date was the ovi
haul of the constitution. One of the new government's first acts was to call elcciiti
for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. In these elections, the 1
and its allies won a majority of seats in the assembly, but they fell short ol the t
thirds margin necessary to make constitutional amendments. The MAS then passd
a law stipulating that the Constituent Assembly had founding powers, which wflH
have enabled it to enact the new constitution by a majority vote. This m o v i l
vigorously resisted by the opposition, however! and \W result was a shutdown off
(AHiMiiunit A-.-.t iiifiv during Its firn iln monthi of operation, Thin dmdloi 1 leef
1,, bi i<-M,ivr.l in h I.iu.iv ..' whin 1 hi' MAS nhwMntl^ ign $i io Ehi rwo-tha
requirc-mi in- J I. - . n l i . i. -. ,] I ..n-.imi, MI A-.-., IMI.I<. iubliqUI I"'-. I- " " I f l t b r a &

in 1 ...,.,,.. .,.

.. . 1 ,i:. ; u el

1,: phj 1 te <: \ %n\l\ I yp\\ ' '" I a E*ti |

, and cidtural rights to Bolivian citizens; and provided for departmental, provinu\ municipal, and indigenous autonomy, not just the departmental-level autonomy
1-41 1 he opposition had wanted.
I 1 ailed for by the new constitution, general elections were held in December
-, ami Morales and the MAS achieved a historic victory. Morales won reelection
I 64% of the vote, but even more importantly, the MAS gained more than two11 il 1 hi' scats In both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. This should make
patlvely easy for the government to pass legislation and constitutional amendpntfl In the future,
Uihou|h the Mi naif, idmlnlitratlon on the whole has behaved like a plebiscitar| ii n

" ft ll hp fWpSBtfd MRU fundamental principles of liberal demociet v

i n h i i und i

lowbt have btn tn$ &nd falfi m

Bl .:HI-i : i. .,!:-. I .- I I

!!,. If) r ,.

ling to tin asm ismi RHPI

,,.:..:;'

254

Bolivia

Case Analyses

255

and turnout, and partly as a result, voter turnout has increased in recent years, par-

The level of satisfaction with democracy increased by a greater margin among

ticularly in indigenous areas.11 In addition, the government has generally respected

self-identified indigenous people than among whites and mestizos. In 2006, 63% of

human rights and civil liberties, including freedom of speech and association and

I teople who self-identified as indigenous reported being satisfied ot very satisfied with

freedom of the press. According to a U.S. Department of State report, "the number of

democracy, as opposed to 60% of mestizos and 58% of whites. In 2004, by contrast,

media outlets, including printed press, television, and radio, was extensive, and airing

only 48.9% of indigenous people reported being satisfied with democracy, roughly

of various viewpoints, many expressing opposition to the government, continued"

die same level of satisfaction with democracy expressed by mestizos and whites. The

(2010). Morales has not been shy about criticizing the media in often harsh terms,

percentage of Bolivians who believe that their country is democratic also rose con-

however, and the state-owned media outlets have devoted disproportionate coverage

viderably in the wake of Morales's election. According to LAPOP surveys, 68.5% of

Bolivians stated that Bolivia was somewhat or very democratic in 2006, up from

to the MAS's candidates.

The Morales administration also has followed some of the tenets of radical democ- I

I 58.7% in 2004. Again, self-identified indigenous people experienced a greater increase

than did whites or mestizos in their evaluations of Bolivian democracy.

racy. As discussed previously, the government has consulted regularly with its soda]
movement bases through assemblies and congresses, and it has even created somet]

Although the majority of the population has supported the Morales administra-

new channels for such consultation to take place. For example, shortly after taking

tion and appeals to be pleased with the progress of democracy In Bolivia in recent

office, the Morales administration created an organization, the National Coordina-

I years, a significant minority has vigorously opposed the regime. Bolivia has thus be-

tor for Change (CONALCAM), to bring together the heads of the social movement!

come increasingly polarized. Polarization has taken place partly along regional lines.

organizations with the president, his ministers, and congressional leaders in order ttf

The eastern departments, where the opposition to the Morales administration is cen-

discuss government policies. The Morales administration also has permitted consid

| HTed, all voted for autonomy in 2006 and 2008 referenda, and a majority in these

erable autonomous social mobilization. Many of the groups mobilizing on the Lelj

[ Bbftrtm'ents have typically voted against Morales and the MAS. Some people fear

have only loose ties to the MAS, and the government is not able entirely to contro
their actions. Moreover, the opposition also has frequently used social mobilization

thai 1 he eastern departments might even try to secede, leading to a violent confronta\ lion. Indeed, the worst incident of violence in Bolivia to date occurred in the eastern

to make their demands. The violent protests in Cochabamba, for example, involved!
both right-wing groups and left-wing groups who acted independently from the

~h

and at times against its wishes (Webber 2008). Opponents of the MAS, as well i
supporters of it, also carried out protestsat times violentin Sucre during the ffl

^ f c r t m e n t of Pando where 13 people died in a clash between supporters and oppo-

flpni.s of Morales. Nevertheless, secession appears unlikely at present, in part because

the military would oppose such a move and the main opposition leaders have rejected
he 1 alls for secession by more radical leaders and movements. The MAS, moreover,

bate over whether to move the capital there. The eastern departments also have sec]

i numerous supporters in the eastern departmentsMorales won 51% of the vote

numerous protests, especially by opponents of the MAS. For example, various groupi

ft laiija, 45% in Pando, 41% in Santa Cruz, and 38% in Beni in the 2009 elections

including truckers, carried out demonstrations in Santa Cruz in early 2008 over t
government's ban on the export of cooking oils and other agricultural products.
Perhaps the most positive democratic development under the Morales administi

I this would complicate any efforts by these departments to secede. Nevertheless,

fenal and political polarization has clearly worsened over time and represents a
fious threat to stability.

tion has been the increase in support for democracy and democratic institutions I
Bolivia. Bolivians are now more likely to feel pride or trust in their country's politi^i

Explaining

institutions, they are more likely to express satisfaction with Bolivian democracy, ilfj
they are more likely to reject military coups and to prefer democracy to othci loin

the MAS's Policy

Choices

Hi iplalns the MAS's policy approach? Why has the Morales administration radi-

of government. According to the Lati nob aro metro surveys, the proportion of pstifl

U| -Till id dit-1 oiinii y'<, internniional alignments and sought to overhaul the coun-

who were satisfied or very satisfied with democracy in Bolivia lose from 14% in IQS

m poll Hi .1! Institutions, while showing more moderation with respect to economic

in |i% in iOQ7ancl5o% In 1,009 Uooj, 2007,1QQ), Similarly, lurv^yi 1 wrlid "in I

i ,-, lal pulley?

the Uiln Ainrii, JII i'i,i,h, 1 Ipinlan Project feuntl dun " " ." "f Bollvtuu m\

I In radii all in oi IIH- MAS with rttprtl to fonlgn policy can be explains! 10 .1

thai ehi

>> I I

I i Ith itn

ihti -i.

u | fum ileni 4 I

I ibgf** b) till !"

1 1 [Mlii i

I tJ Mi.ii.-iM. m, 1 li.it kid li.idiiimuilv

Itli si

f tHi ' t4i 11 aj ihi f-i-vv I- IttiJflf I

2^6

Boliv

Case Analyses

I las vigorously criticized these market-oriented policies, it has not wanted to return to

Morales, spent years in the coca growers' unions fighting U.S.-led efforts to eradicate
the coca plantations that were their livelihood. Other leaders of the MAS came from

die failed policies of the past either. Indeed, the MAS's emphasis on fiscal responsibil-

social movements, such as neighborhood groups and unions, which had protested

ity and its effort to maintain access to foreign markets and attract foreign investment

economic adjustment policies sponsored by the United States. In addition, since I

,ue presumably at least partly due to a desire to avoid a repeat of the disastrous UDP

2002, the MAS has experienced an influx of left-wing intellectuals, such as Alvaro

administration.

Garcia Linera and Antonio Peredo, who have equally critical views of U.S. hegemony.

The MAS's heterodox economic and social policy is also the product of certain

Thus, much of the leadership of the MAS came to power seeking to distance Bolivia

t(mstraints, which have hindered its ability to carry out sweeping economic and social

from the United States and to adopt a more independent foreign policy.

reforms but which have not affected foreign policy to the same degree. As Weyland

The origins of the MAS also help to explain the Morales administration's effort

notes in chapter 3, during Morales's first term, he could not simply legislate whatever

to transform Bolivia's political institutions. The MAS is a new party composed <

policies he desired because the MAS did not have a majority of the seats in the Sen-

political outsiders with few links to the political establishment. Thus, it has had little

ate, nor did it control two-thirds of the Constituent Assembly. The opposition also

stake in the existing political institutions that it has sought to overhaul. Moreover,

Used its control of most of the departmental governments, the judiciary, and the state

many of the social movements that form part of the MAS have traditionally had a

Bureaucracy to stymie the governments policy agenda (Kohl and Farthing 2008). As
suit) in many instances the government had to implement measures that fell short

hostile attitude toward the Bolivian state, and their members have benefited kttld
from existing state institutions. Indeed, the coca growers' unions have fought, at tima
violently, against the state. As a result, it is not surprising that the leaders of thesJ
movements would want to transform state institutions.
The Morales administration's efforts to overhaul existing political institutions als>

Igr its preferred policies.

I

In addition, the MAS has faced important economic constraints. Bolivia is one of

J the poorest countries in Latin America, and it continues to depend on foreign couniri(=s and institutions for finance as well as export markets. Thus, the Morales admin-

stem from strategic calculation. Like the governments of Correa in Ecuador am

istration cannot afford to antagonize foreign investors, creditors, and governments.

Chavez in Venezuela, the Morales administration has moved to overhaul existml

1^1 though the country's incteasingly valuable natural gas reserves have reduced rhese

political institutions in order to expand and prolong the party's hold on power. Tl

onoiuic constraints, they have not eliminated them by any means. This depen-

leaders of the MAS believe that the transformations it intends to carry out will take i

flfc on foreign markets and investors became apparent during the negoriations over

long time and will run into significant opposition. Thus, the government has de

1 nationalization of the gas industry when Bolivia was forced to back down from

erately designed the reforms so as to strengthen the authority of the executive ;

I original demands in the face of objections from foreign firms and governments

undermine the opposition.

The absence of radicalism in economic and social policy, meanwhile, is partly
reflection of the ideological climate in the region. The ideational environment
Latin America has shifted considerably in the past couple of decades. The down fill

Luotna and Gordon 2006).

finally, the low technical and administrative capacity of the Bolivian government
* made it difficult to carry out sweeping reforms. As Kohl and Farthing note, "BoI has a limited stock of trained professionals with the managerial and technical

communist regimes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as the econori

Rgcessary for effectively running the country" {2008,18). Although the MAS has

problems experienced by Cuba, has undermined support for socialism. Although

i M influx of intellectuals in recent years, the party has a shortage of cadres with

MAS and other leftist parties have vigorously denounced the market-oriented mfl

i/nh ,i\ '.kills, and it continues to be dominated by social movement leaders who

that has dominated the region for the past two decades, they have failed to tome

II illi have little formal education. This has complicated the task of governing. The

with a coherent alternative. Leaders of the MAS have promoted "Andean c a p i t i s

and the idea of "living well," but these are vague and Idealistic notions dial provl
few guidelines lor trade or finaiuial policy or lor dt-iri mining ihr appropriate Ir

. limn in'.', Ln It of administrative capacity became apparent during the gas reform

.:,j|l

ilarly the governments lack of data on land ownership,

(Jio hi d. . id <\ 111 ..r.-Mi.ni reform projei 1 ("El gobierno no dene datos" 2006).

of .staif Intervention In the economy, The MAS's failure to eemplitsly abandon tl

mwkei "t.r-ni, d n . ., i. I nut- lUe ittm In pari from polltli il liuning, n i mi l a

idmlnistrailon committed numerous errors in drafting the reform contracts.

(lull tl problems, pi

11 ull 'lir MAMni-.Mfin, 1... 1 tu NP( tli lui n IUIIUMII.II fill short of what ii tnljjlu

(.kij>i. i -}i mg|! -L. i frnlnl] th I illi d polii li ntl d>, I !i iPpivi mmeni aftki

ttjiei i, i .

i J. i ,. .... .,;i.: -,.. mifkfi urii " I i !i i - klihoH^ &i

h . . .

t i H i i

li

I B |

life

- ;

I f u r i f y

258

Case Analyses

Bolivia

t i o n a l r e f o r m s . M a j o r c h a n g e s i n foreign policy, u n l i k e s w e e p i n g social o r e c o n o m i c

2. T h e MAS's leaders made a decision early on not to convert it into a full-fledged parry

r e f o r m s , d o n o t typically requir e a p p r o v a l o f t h e legislature. N o r d o m o s t m a j o r for- j

because of the negative attributes they associate with parties. These leaders typically refer to i t

eign policy c h a n g e s involve significant e c o n o m i c c o m m i t m e n t s o r require significant

li a political instrument rather than a party.

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e capacit y t o i m p l e m e n t . M a n y o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms d o n o t req u i r e significant e c o n o m i c c o m m i t m e n t s o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e capacity t o i m p l e m e n t

either, a l t h o u g h political obstacles c e r t a i n l y have i m p e d e d t h e i r e n a c t m e n t .

3. The ability of the social movements to exercise policy influence is limited somewhat by
their lack of trained professionals. Relatively few of Morales's ministers and top policymakers
i have come from the social movements, and those who have been movement leaders have typiI Cillv not lasted long in cheir positions, owing in part to their lack of training.
4. Antonio Peredo, interview by author, La Paz, July 22, 2004.
5. For a more detailed analysis of the MAS's rise, see Madrid 2008.

Conclusion

(>. By contrast, the MAS won die support of less than half of the people who self-identified

T h e M o r a l e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s b e e n i n p o w e r o n l y four years, b u t it already has I

m a d e a m a j o r m a r k o n Bolivian politics. I t h a s r e o r i e n t e d t h e c o u n t r y ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l
a l i g n m e n t s , r e w r i t t e n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , increased state c o n t r o l o f t h e n a t u r a l i
sources sector, a n d created s o m e i m p o r t a n t n e w social p r o g r a m s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e s f
m e a s u r e s h a v e n o t g o n e far e n o u g h for s o m e o f t h e M A S ' s s u p p o r t e r s o n t h e Lefti

It s e e m s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e M o r a l e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n will radicalize its e c o n o m i c a n d

social policies i n its s e c o n d t e r m , however. A l t h o u g h t h e M A S ' s o v e r w h e l m i n g vict o r y i n t h e 2 0 0 9 elections has r e m o v e d s o m e o f t h e political c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t f o r m e r ^
financial,

bureaucratic,;

t e c h n o l o g i c a l obstacles t o c a r r y i n g o u t s w e e p i n g e c o n o m i c a n d social r e f o r m s . M o r s
over, t h e r e a r e n u m e r o u s i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is well a w a r e o f t i n
d a n g e r s o f u n r e s t r a i n e d s p e n d i n g a n d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f foreign t r a d e a n d i n v e s t m e n i

W h a t seems m o r e likely is t h a t t h e M o r a l e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n will c o n t i n u e t o c h l l

a w a y a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s o f h o r i z o n t a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i n o r d e r t o c o n s o l i d a t e its h o J
o n power. A l t h o u g h Bolivia u n d e r M o r a l e s certainly has m a d e progress i n terms (
b o o s t i n g p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for d e m o c r a c y a n d d e m o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , it has u n d e r '
m i n e d t h o s e s a m e i n s t i t u t i o n s b y c o m p r o m i s i n g t h e i r political i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
w h i l e t h e M o r a l e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has i n c r e a s e d p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d i n a c f l
r a t e d m a r g i n a l i z ed sectors, s u c h as t h e i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n , this has c o m e ;ii r
cost o f greater political a n d regional p o l a r i z a t i o n . T h e Left i n Bolivia has s h o w n t
it is c a p a b l e o f g e n e r a t i n g e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d stability at least in the s h o r t t e r m , .
it h a s y e t t o s h o w t h a t i t c a n b r i n g a b o u t political stability o r systematically .stri'ii^thi
Bolivian d e m o c r a c y .

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hemselves on the left-right ideological continuum or did not respond.

7. To the surprise of many, the Morales administration also has improved relations with
I iulivia's traditional nemesis Chile.
8. For example, in August 2008 Morales stated that a nongovernmental survey had found
ft> ilirpen socialism" in the country. See "Morales anuncia" 2008.
'). Reyes Villa ended up being Morales's principal opponent in the 2009 presidential elecDrins, and he chose Fernandez as his running mate.
in. Morales seemed to back away from this commitmen t in statements he made after his
R c t n i y in the 2009 presidential elections.
. The Morales administration lowered the voting age, for example, and put pressure on
I National Electoral Court to remove barriers to voter registration and to open more voting
in rural areas.
f 11. T h e data presented here represent the authors own analyses of LAPOP survey data.

t o t h e Bolivian e c o n o m y .

i,nl u

\A significant percentage of the interviewees (24.5%) in this survey did not know how to place

ltb.il most Bolivians wanted socialism and that "if t h e people ask us for socialism, we are going

m a n y o f w h o m h a v e called for m o r e radical social a n d e c o n o m i c reforms.

b o u n d it, t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o face significant

centrist and approximately one-third of the people who classified themselves as on the Right.

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