BHOPAL TRAGEDY

INTRODUCTION
Bhopal, India
Bhopal is the capital of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh and the administrative
headquarters of Bhopal district and Bhopal division. The city was the capital of the former
Bhopal State. Bhopal is surrounded by hills. The plant of Union Carbide Indian Limited
(UCIL) is situated in the north, adjacent to densely populated slum wards and the railway
station.

Figure 1: Position of Slums, Arera Hills and Union Carbide Factory

Union Carbide in India

India, being one of the most populated countries in the world, gained independence from
British in 1947. After independence, the Indian Government followed the policy of selfsufficiency and limited number of foreign investment in the country, one of them being
United States based chemical company, Union Carbide. Union Carbide was founded in 1917
and Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation (UCC) was one of the largest chemical and
polymer companies in the United States. A subsidiary of UCC, Union Carbide India Limited
(UCIL), built a pesticide factory in Bhopal, the capital city of Madhya Pradesh in 1969. UCIL
was 50.9% owned by Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and 49.1% by Indian investors
including the Government of India and government-controlled banks.
(S. Tamer Cavusgil, Gary Knight, John R. Riesenberger, Hussain G. Rammal, Elizabeth L.
Rose (2014). International Business. Pearson Australia. p. 141. ISBN 978-1-4860-1138-4.)

Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) was a diversified manufacturing company incorporated
in 1934. Employing approximately 9,000 people at the height of its business operations,
UCIL operated 14 plants in five divisions. UCIL's annual sales were nearly $200 million and
UCIL shares were publicly traded on the Calcutta Stock Exchange, with UCC owning just
over half the shares. The other stockholders included Indian financial institutions and
thousands of private investors in India.
The design, engineering and construction of the Bhopal plant was a UCIL project from
beginning to end. The project took eight years to complete (from 1972 to 1980). It involved
hundreds of Indian engineers and designers from UCIL and major Indian engineering firms,
dozens of Indian subcontractors and thousands of Indian construction workers. UCC did not
design, construct or operate the Bhopal plant. All of the decisions with respect to the plant
and its design, construction, and operation were made either by UCIL or mandated by GOI
policies and directives.
(http://www.bhopal.com/History-of-UC-India-Limited)

The Union Carbide India Limited Plant

Figure 2: Union Carbide India Limited plant

The safety equipment provided for the Bhopal plant were as follows:

1. Vent gas scrubber

It was designed to neutralize the toxic release material released from various
equipment of MIC plant. However, it was not capable of controlling the runaway
reaction. (Further, it was not operational that night).
2. Flare tower
It was designed to burn out excess CO and MIC vapours at a controlled rate and was
not capable of burning the huge amounts released that night. (Further, it was under
maintenance that night).
3. MIC storage 30 tons refrigeration system.
It was installed to keep the storage tank material below 5oC. (However, the system
had been shut down in May 1984 to save power, approx. $ 20/day).
4. Water spray.
This could be used to knock out the toxic chemical vapour by spraying large amount
of water. But, while the toxic gases were released at 30-m (100 ft) above ground, the
water spray could not reach that height and hence could not knock out any gas.
5. Danger alarm (siren).
Installed for warning the community people, was switched off after 5 min as per the
revised company policy. Thereafter, only the muted siren for the plant personal was
sounded. No plant person died due to the gas. If the loud alarm for the community had
been sounded for long, many would have escaped before the gas overpowered them.
6. Evacuation plan.
It was only made for the plant personal, not for the community.
The management had told the workers that the Bhopal plant was designed and built on the
basis of 20 years experience in making MIC in the West Virginia, USA plant.
(Chouhan, T.R. (2004), Bhopal - The Inside Story, 2nd edition, Goa, India:
Other India Press; New York, USA: The Apex Press.)

Designing the disaster

In March 1985, Union Carbide issued an investigation report that included the piping and
instrumentation diagram (P&ID). The P&ID shows the MIC storage tank design. Provides
design information that explains how equipment reliability contributed to the Bhopal disaster.

Figure 3: P&ID of MIC storage tank design

Figure 4: MIC storage tank

The MIC produced at the factory was stored in two stainless steel storage tanks, designated as
Tanks 610 and 611. An identical tank (Tank 619) received contaminated material from either
Tank 610 or 611 on an emergency basis only. This tank provided extra storage volume to
allow for an adequate response to a potential thermal runaway reaction. A nitrogen blanket
was used to maintain slight pressure inside the MIC storage tanks while continuously purging
MIC vapor into the process vent header (PVH).
The tanks were equipped with the two centrifugal pumps. Each of the pumps had a specific
function. The transfer pump exported stored MIC into the derivatives unit as needed to
produce pesticides. The circulation pump processed MIC through a fluorocarbon-based
refrigeration system. The refrigeration system kept the stored MIC temperature near 0C to
prevent a thermal runaway reaction. The pumps were connected to four flanged nozzles on
the side of each tank head. Both pumps circulated MIC through internal pipe extensions that
dropped to the tank bottom, as shown in the P&ID. The discharge lines returning to the tank
were provided so that the pumps would operate continuously.

West Virginia plant and Bhopal plant

Table 1: Comparison between West Virginia plant and Bhopal plant
West Virginia plant
All lines and instruments spread out over

Bhopal plant
On one single manhole

whole tank
Computerized control
PVH and RVVH lines: 304 SS

No computerized control
C-Steel (although prohibited due to safety

considerations)
Unit storage tank between MIC manufacture No such tank
and large storage tank to check purity
Four Vent Gas Scrubbers (VGS, inbuilt

One vent gas scrubber (no redundancy)

redundancy)
VGS had no atmospheric vent

VGS released gases into air. This caused the

Two flare towers (FT, inbuilt redundancy)

Designed for emergency MIC release
VGS, FT operational around the clock due

tragedy
One flare tower (no redundancy)
Designed for occasional releases only
Not available when shutdown for repairs

to redundancy
Intermediate, non-interactive refrigerant

Direct brine as coolant: could react with

a-Naphthol added through pipe line

MIC in case of leak

a-Naphthol added manually from jute sacks
after opening MIC reactor manhole. Several
other hazardous operations performed

Pressure, temperature, level instruments

manually
Not trustworthy; temperature indicator

functioned well
PVH and RVVH lines from storage tank

worked only the first few months

Lines from other equipment also joined

direct to VGS and flare tower

these lines. Probability of contamination of

MIC high

MIC storage temperature less than or equal

Less than or equal to 5 degree Celsius when

to 5 degree Celsius

drums being filled to minimise vapour loss.

Refrigeration shutdown since May 1984.
Power saved (approximately $ 20/day)

Operation and maintenance under trained,

greater than cost of MIC vapour loss

Not so (training and number declined)

experienced staff, enough in number

Complete evacuation plan for community in

No evacuation plan for community

place
Hospital, train, road, river transport, police,

No such arrangements existed

civic administration informed in an

emergency
(Chouhan, T.R. (2004), Bhopal - The Inside Story, 2nd edition, Goa, India:
Other India Press; New York, USA: The Apex Press.)

Chemical reaction for production of Methyl Isocyanate and Carbaryl

Methyl isocyanate (MIC) is a colourless highly flammable liquid that evaporates quickly
when exposed to the air. It has a sharp, strong odour. Methyl isocyanate is an organic
compound with the molecular formula CH3NCO. Synonyms are isocyanatomethane, methyl
carbylamine, and MIC. Methyl isocyanate is an intermediate chemical in the production of
carbamate pesticides (such as carbaryl, carbofuran, methomyl, and aldicarb). The chemical
reaction involved to produce methyl isocyanate is as shown below in figure 3.
Figure 5:
Chemical

CH3NH2
Methylamine

COCL2
Phosgene

CH3N=C=O

Methyl Isocyanate

reaction to
produce
methyl
isocyanate

Methyl Isocyanate is then used to produce carbaryl by reacting the methyl isocyanate with naphthol as shown in figure 4.
CH3N=C=O

Methyl Isocyanate

C10H7OH
-naphthol

Figure 6: Chemical reaction to produce carbaryl

(Buku safety kita sem ni)

C12H11NO2
carbaryl

2HCL

Methyl isocyanate reaction with water

Methyl isocyanate reacts readily with many substances that contain N-H or O-H groups. With
water, it forms 1,3-dimethylurea and carbon dioxide with the evolution of heat (325 calories
per gram of MIC)

Figure 7: MIC reaction with water if water is in excess

At 25 C, in excess water, half of the MIC is consumed in 9 min. If the heat is not efficiently
removed from the mixture, the rate of the reaction will increase and rapidly cause the MIC to
boil. However, if MIC is in excess, 1,3,5-trimethylbiuret is formed along with carbon dioxide.

Figure 8: MIC reaction with water if MIC is in excess

In the Bhopal incident, it can be said that due to the presence of water, with the reaction being
exothermic, the pressure within the storage tank is higher than normal and above safe
pressure limits. Thus, causing an eruption and for the MIC to be dispersed to the public.

Bhopal Gas Disaster Chronology

The timeline below documents the incidents leading up to and resulting from the 1984
Bhopal Plant Disaster.
Table 2: Keys for Bhopal Plant Disaster

Colour
Brown

Key
Signification
central (India), state (Madhya Pradesh), or
city (Bhopal) government measures
relating specifically to UCC, UCIL, Bhopal

Green

plant, or immediate neighborhood of plant

general India national legislation relevant to

Red
Violet

conduct of business
casualty-producing plant incidents
economic conditions relevant to Bhopal
plant profitability

Table 3: Chronology of Bhopal Gas Disaster

Year
1956

Events
Indian Parliament adopts Companies Act of
1956 which requires affiliates of foreign
companies to register as separate companies
under Indian law and imposes limits on
foreign investment and participation in all
Indian companies.
Union Carbide reduces its share of
ownership in its Indian subsidiary (then
called National Carbon Company (India)
Limited from 100% to 60% in accordance
with new Indian law by registering as an
Indian company and selling shares to Indian
citizens. All but one or two UCIL board
members, all
UCIL executives, and all regular or seasonal

1966

employees are Indian nationals.

Indian market for fertilizers and pesticides
is expanding as government adopts a range
of policies, including efforts to increase
yields and reduce post-harvest losses of
crops to pests, to make India self-sufficient
in food. India had depended heavily on
outside food aid in earlier part of the
decade, and government wished to end this.
The domestic production of pesticides in
1966 is 14,000 metric tonnes, well short of
what the government wants to supply to
farmers.

Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL) establishes

a new Agricultural Products Division to take
advantage of growing Indian market for
fertilizers and pesticides. Initial activity
involves only local formulation (diluting
technical grade concentrate to make
products for sale to users).
UCIL applies for license to carry out the
1968

whole production process in India.

Government of India approves UCIL plans
to build fertilizer/pesticide formulation plant
in Bhopal.
State of Madhya Pradesh leases land in the
Kali Parade area of Bhopal for the plant to
UCIL on a 99-year lease in an area zoned
for industrial use. The area around plant is
relatively unpopulated at time though there
are two lakes nearby and the main Bhopal
railroad station was about 2 miles from the
plant site. Total population of City of
Bhopal is estimated to be about 300,000
(the 1961 census put it at 102,000 but
considerable in-migration from surrounding
countryside had occurred).
Adoption of Indias 4th five-year plan, to
run 1969-74. Plan goals include reducing
unwholesome dependency on foreign
agencies, particularly foreign corporations.
The Plan outlines goals of
requiring foreign investors to enter into joint
ventures rather than establish wholly-owned
subsidiaries, and reaffirms requirements to

train and employ Indian nationals at all

levels of operation, to use made-in-India
equipment and components whenever they
are available, and to transfer technology to
Indian affiliates. These requirements meant
that the government was strongly interested
in having chemical plants located within the
country develop capacity to undertake all
steps from raw material through
intermediate chemicals through final
product on-site rather than relying on
1969

imported intermediates.
Bhopal plant begins operating. Initial
operations consisted of making raw
fertilizer and formulating (diluting to usable
strengths) pesticides with US-origin
technical grade chemical concentrates.
UCIL industrial chemists develop a method
of producing alpha-napthol that UCIL
anticipates being able to scale up to
economically competitive production

1970

volumes.
UCIL is reconsidering its business plan as
the large-scale making of alpha-napthol
turns out to be more challenging than it

1972

anticipated.
Government of India begins pressing UCC
and UCIL to have UCIL plants shift from
formulation using US-source chemicals to
full production in India. It makes issuing an
operating license for the Bhopal plant
conditional on its using domestically-made
alpha-napthol.

Government of India establishes National

Committee for Environmental Planning and
1973

Coordination.
Indian Parliament adopts Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act 1973. Among other strong
controls on flows of money in and out of
India it establishes a scheme for government
control over Indian firms decisions on
hiring foreigners as employees or
contractors.
Indian Government approves UCC-UCIL
Design Transfer Agreement and Technical
Services Agreement under which UCC will
provide the basic process design of a plant
capable of producing SEVIN (a carbaryl
pesticide used on cotton and other crops)
and training for Indian operators of plant.
Design Transfer Agreement limits UCC to
provision of the process design and
materials specification. Detailing the design
and building the plant are to be undertaken
by Indians nationals employed by or
contracting with UCIL. Government also
uses powers to license technology imports
to guide selection of suppliers of
components for plant to Indian firms as
much as possible.
Engineers employed by UCIL who will be
involved in plant design visit UCC
Technical Center in
West Virginia to earn about US plant
specifications and start process of adapting

1974

them to Indias conditions.

Indian Parliament adopts legislation
requiring that Indian companies partly
owned by foreigners reduce foreigners
ownership share. For companies with 60%
foreign ownership, the new legal maximum
is 50.9%. UCIL complies by the end of
1978 through sale of additional shares of
stock offered only to Indians; these shares
were held by 24,000 different persons or
entities, with the Government of India itself
holding 25% of UCIL stock.
Indian Parliament adopts Water (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) and Air
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Acts.
These establish the central government as
the main standard-setter while leaving
enforcement to state governments. Both
Acts increase penalties for causing pollution
but do not specify any emissions or ambient

1975

standards.
New Master Plan for City of Bhopal
establishes a separate district for hazardous
industry in an open area 15 miles from
centre of town, and zone the area where
UCILs plant has been constructed for
commercial and light, non-hazardous,
industry only. City authorities want UCIL to

31 Oct 1975

move its operations to this area.

Indian Government licenses UCIL to
produce up to 5,000 tons of carbaryl
pesticides a year in
Bhopal plant

UCIL hires Humphreys and Glasgow

Consultants Private Limited, an Indian
subsidiary of London based Humphreys and
Glasgow, to detail the plant design and
1976

supervise construction.
Madhya Pradesh Town and Country
Planning Board classifies the UCIL plant as
general industry rather than hazardous
industry. This allows plant to stay in its
established location rather than move to

1977

Bhopals new hazardous industry zone.

Bhopal plant begins production of pesticides
and begins $2.5 million project to expand
alpha-napthol production unit to
accommodate Sevin production.
India hit by drought; farmers need loans
from government to ride out the loss of
harvests. They also cut back on pesticide

1978

purchases.
Bhopal plants new alpha-napthol units
components fail soon after startup. $2
million reconstruction project begun.
Production of pesticides continues using
alpha-napthol imported from UCCs US
plants.
UCC and UCIL decide to shift Bhopal plant
to methyl isocyanite (MIC) process to
produce SEVIN because parent UCC
regarded this process as more economical
and efficient than its previous way of
producing it. New Bhopal MIC unit based

on design of UCCs MIC unit in Institute,

West
winter

Virginia.
Progress review of Bhopal project at UCC
headquarters. Concerns about cost of
building plant and reduced estimates of
potential pesticide sales lead to
consideration of whether Bhopal project can
be scaled back. Decision is to continue as

24 Nov

construction is too far advanced.

Welding spark ignites nearby chemicals
because welder unaware of and supervisor
did not point out nearby flammables. Fire
causes Rs. 6.2 million ($730,000) in

1978-79

property damage, but no injuries to workers.

20 UCIL engineers sent to UCCs West
Virginia MIC plant for training in plant

1979

operation and safety.

UCC engineers sent to India for pre-startup
inspection of Bhopal plant report multiple
deficiencies in safety measures. They also
advise UCIL management of need to
develop contingency plan for alerting and
evacuating nearby population in event of
major gas leak. UCIL management later
reports it had developed such plans; city and
state government officials claimed in 1984
that they were not aware of any such plans.

June

UCC Eastern Division brings up question of

Bhopal plant at a global strategy meeting
because of concern that it, like Institute WV
plant, is too large for the market. Proposals
to export part of Bhopal plants production

are not adopted because of potential

negative effects on UCC subsidiaries in
other countries.
UCC sends 8 US engineers and technicians
to Bhopal plant to assist with startup and
1980

early operation of MIC unit.

Government loans to farmers come due.
Farmers shift to less expensive pesticides.
Many of the newer pesticides are synthetic
pyrethroids that are also safer in Indian
conditions than carbaryl types like Sevin.
Indian Government upgrades National
Committee for Environmental Planning to
cabinet-level Department of Environment.
Both national and most state governments
(including Madhya
Pradesh) have Pollution Control Boards to

March

inspect and enforce environmental laws.

Government approves UCIL application to
retain 1 UCC engineer through 31 May
1981; renews approval through 31 May
1982 and then to 31 December 1982.
7 of the 8 UCC engineers and technicians
sent from West Virginia return home. The
remaining engineer continues to serve as
plant manager until June 1982, then remains

fall

as a consultant.
A second UCC engineer team visits the
Bhopal plant and repeats warnings about

1981

lack of contingency plan.

Rebuilt alpha-napthol unit started up; fails
again and is shut down. Alpha-napthol

imports continue.
Bhopal plant returns a modest profit for the
year.
National census puts City of Bhopal
population at 895,815. Significant
populations of recent arrivals from the
countryside have settled in shanty towns
June

near UCIL plant.

UCIL/UCC review of Bhopal plant
operation shows that the variable cost of
producing alphanapthol in Bhopal is 4x the
US cost and the variable cost of producing
SEVIN in Bhopal are 3.5x US costs. UCC
and UCIL are both aware that new-formula
pesticides coming onto market in India and
other countries are likely to reduce demand
for SEVIN.
UCC wants UCIL to import MIC from UCC
plant in West Virginia; Government of India
refuses
permits because it wants the making of MIC

24 Dec

undertaken in India.
1 supervisor and 2 workers exposed to
phosgene leak during a maintenance
operation; one of the workers dies from
effects of phosgene inhalation.
UCIL management says he was at fault for
removing his gas mask; workers claim
supervisors gave insufficient warnings.
Accident reported to
UCC; UCC response plan includes
additional training and some design

1982 (uncertain)

changes.
UCIL notes growth of shantytowns near the
Bhopal plant and asks the city to establish a
greenbelt zone around it to prevent further

10 Feb

shantytown expansion. City does not act.

25 workers injured when a pump seal fails
and significant quantities of MIC, phosgene,
and hydrochloric acid gases escape into
plant. Some treated on-site; 16 sent to local

Feb

hospital
Workers help a local journalist get into
plant; he observes and writes about poor
condition of plant and lax safety routines.
Local newspaper publishes the story but its
warnings that a massive leak is likely are
ignored.
India Labour Department investigates the
Dec. 1981 fatal accident and recommends
corrective measures.
Bhopal plant is operating at less than half
capacity because of weak market for its
products. Local competitors making cheaper

spring

pesticides continue gaining market share.

Either UCIL asks UCC to send engineering
team to inspect plant, or UCC does on own
initiative (accounts vary, usually
consistently with author effort to show UCC
was or was not in close control of plant

22 April

during the post-disaster litigation).

3 electricians suffer minor burns when one
drops a screwdriver into an electrical panel
and it shortcircuits.
State inspectors recommend better

May

insulation of circuits.
UCC engineers inspect Bhopal plant, issue
Operational Safety Survey on conditions in
plant, warn there is real danger of a runaway
reaction; suggest measures to avert danger
UCIL management reports to UCC on
follow-up, saying they will undertake all
suggested measures, but do not act on the
recommendation to increase the range of the
firewater spraying system from 15 meters to
35 meters so it can reach the top of the MIC
vent pipe. The last UCIL communication on
followup, dated 26 June 1984, says all
changes have been made except one to the
SEVIN feed tank, which will be completed
when the needed control valve is delivered

summer

in about a month.
Jagannathan Mukund, Indian citizen trained
at Institute WV plant, replaces US national
Warren Woomer as plant manager.
UCIL has to admit failure of efforts to scale
up alpha-napthol production; alpha-napthol
unit shut down as too unprofitable to run.

Aug

Worker transfers begin.

Splash of liquid MIC at plant injures a

Sept

chemical engineer
UCIL applies for extension of its Foreign
Collaboration Agreement with UCC through
December 1987 so it can continue importing

fall

alpha-napthol.
Indian government approves UCIL
application for renewal of Foreign
Collaboration Agreement with
UCC, but only to 1 Jan 1985.

6 Oct

Leaks of MIC, hydrochloric acid, and

chloroform injure 3 workers seriously
enough to require brief hospitalization; 15
others less affected are given first aid at
plant. Some panic in neighbouring
shantytown. State inspectors note several
violations of normal operating procedures
and recommend measures including red tags
on equipment that should not be used.
Labour unions complain to Madhya Pradesh
Ministry of Labour about conditions in
plant. Also begin occasional public
demonstrations.
Madhya Pradesh state labour ministry
inspectors inspect plant but they are
mechanical engineers with limited
competence to assess safety of chemical
plants. Labour Ministry officials do enter
complaints with courts, but these will not be
taken up for some time owing to long list of
pending suits.
Madhya Pradesh minister of labour says the
plant is safe and berates opposition for its
worries during question time in a December

31 Dec

session of the state legislature.

Warren Woomer, the last remaining

1983

American employee, leaves Bhopal plant.

Various cost-cutting measures undertaken.
Staff morale declines through the year as
layoffs and resignations take effect.
Experienced workers leave and are replaced
by less experienced workers from other
units of Bhopal plant or other UCIL plants.

Madhya Pradesh State Pollution Control

Board requires companies to declare what
they are emitting into the air. UCIL declared
carbon dioxide only, not the other gasses
(including phosgene and MIC) that
occasionally leak. Board lacks sufficient
inspectors to follow up, even after animals
die from drinking water from a stream just
outside the plant polluted by fluid runoff
Sept.

from the plant.

Chief of National Pollution Control Board
visits plant area while in Bhopal. Orders
UCIL to fix flaws in effluent evaporation
pond that permit leaks onto adjacent land.

fall

UCIL complies.
Proposal to salvage investment in Bhopal
plant by converting part of it to produce
new carbofuran pesticide and supply it to
India and other markets are rejected as

Dec.

economically unfeasible by UCC.

Jumper pipe connected between pressure
valve header and relief valve header on MIC
tanks to simplify maintenance.
Bhopal plant manager Jagannathan Mukund
given UCC safety award for operating 12

1984

months without serious incident.

Bhopal plant operating at 1/5 capacity
owing to weak demand. Losses near $4
million since 1980.
Successive reductions in personnel mean
only 1 supervisor and 6 workers are present
on each shift in the MIC unit (company

guidelines state that the MIC unit should

have 3 supervisors and 12 workers on each
shift).
Training of supervisors and workers has
April

become less rigorous.

Madhya Pradesh government legalizes the
shanty towns that have grown up just
outside UCIL plant since 1978 by granting
dwellers certificates of ownership of the
land they occupy.
Bhopal population estimated to be close to
900,000 and the shanty towns are notably

May

larger than they had been in 1981.

UCC approves UCIL proposals to write off
the alpha-napthol unit, sell rest of Bhopal
plant while retaining MIC unit, reduce UCC
ownership share of UCIL to 40% so UCIL
can be more independent. Neither the UCC
share reduction nor the plant sale had been
carried out by

June or July

December.
Bhopal Town Planning Board lists 18
factories as obnoxious and therefore to be
monitored particularly carefully. UCILs

Sept

Bhopal plant was not included on the list.

UCIL engineers inspect plant, report to
UCIL top management that 1) gas scrubber
is functioning poorly, 2) there are poor
communication between plant production
and maintenance staff, 3) workers lack
instruction on what do in event of runaway
reaction, 4) safety meetings are held only
half as often as specified in company rules.

UCC engineers survey MIC plant in

Institute, West Virginia. They report
concerns about some aspects of plant
operation there and possibility of a runaway
reaction in the MIC storage tanks (larger
than the tanks installed in the Bhopal plant).

Oct

UCC considers idea of dismantling Bhopal

plant and shipping equipment to Brazil or
Indonesia.
Asked UCIL to draw up feasibility study
and cost estimates. UCIL reports back 29
Nov. Question of what to do is pressing
because the plant will have no source of
alpha-napthol when UCILs Foreign
Collaboration Agreement with UCC expires

7-22 Oct

on 1 Jan 1985.
Remaining phosgene and methylamine
stocks at Bhopal plant are used up in
making a last batch of MIC. 42 tons are put
into Tank E610; about 20 tons into Tank
E611. UCIL plan is to withdraw it a ton at a
time In November and December and react
it with alpha-napthol to produce SEVIN.
The storage tanks are isolated and the MIC
production unit is shut down for
maintenance after the batch is finished; MIC
unit production workers are assigned to

31 Oct

other tasks.
Curfew imposed in Bhopal after intercommunal riots sparked by news Sikh
guards had assassinated Prime Minister

Indira Gandhi. Plant activities curtailed for

several weeks because curfew affects ability
of second shift to leave work and of third to
arrive for work on time are affected.

2 Dec

Condition of plant safety systems at start of

second shift
Vent gas scrubber

on standby since

(uses caustic soda to

MIC not in active

neutralize toxic gas

production but

exhaust from MIC

could be activated

plant and storage

by plant operators in

tanks before release

event of need

thru vent stack or

flare)
Flare (burns toxic

insufficient capacity

gasses to neutralize

to burn large

them)

volumes
of escaping gas;
shut down in
November
for replacement of a
corroded pipe; MIC
process vents
rerouted to the vent
gas scrubber while

Refrigeration system

repairs proceed
shut down June

(keep MIC at

1984 and coolant

temperatures of 0-5

(Freon) drained for

degrees C (32 to 42

use elsewhere in

degrees F) where it is plant

less reactive)

Firewater spray pipes functional but

(to control escaping

insufficient height to

gasses, cool over-

reach top of vent

heated equipment or

stack

douse fires)
Safety valve between Operational;
MIC storage tanks

designed to hold

and MIC holding

MIC in at normal

tank in SEVIN

pressures and

production area

release it if pressure
too high.

Contradiction of views on the events that happened on 2nd December 1984 between 9
and 11 pm (two versions of how water entered the storage tank 610)
Version 1: Water-washing of pipes
8-9 pm
Second-shift production superintendent orders MIC plant supervisor to flush several pipes
running from the phosgene system to the scrubber via the MIC storage tanks. MIC unit
workers are in charge of the flushing, but maintenance department is responsible for inserting
the slip bind (a solid disk) into pipe above the water washing inlet as plant manual requires.
These take 30 minutes-2 hours to install. The MIC unit workers were apparently not aware
that installation is a required safety procedure, and slip bind is not installed first. Temperature
of MIC in tanks is between 15 and 20 degrees C.

9.30pm
Water washing begins. One bleeder valve (overflow device) downstream from the flushing
was blocked so water did not come out as it was supposed to. It accumulated in the pipes. A
worker shut off the water flow but the plant supervisor ordered that the washing resume. By
then water had risen past a leaking isolation valve in the lines being washed and got into the
relief valve pipe 20 feet above ground.

10.30 pm
Water has flowed from the relief valve pipe through the jumper pipe into the process pipe
through valves normally kept open. Water gets through an open blow-down valve that is part
of the nitrogen pressurization system. It is unclear whether the valve had been left open or
had failed to fully seal when last closed. Water then flows into tank E610 via a normally-open
isolation valve.

10.30-10.45 pm
Second shift goes off work; third shift comes on. Washing continues after second shift worker
briefs third shift worker on progress of the job.

Version 2 : Sabotage
Water washing proceeded as described but none of the water used for washing traveled far
enough down the right pipe to enter Tank E610. Around 10.30 pm A disgruntled worker
removes a pressure gauge on a pipe leading to Tank E610 and connects a water hose to the
coupler. Water enters Tank E610.

Shared account of responses to detection of problems

11 pm
Third shift control room operator notices pressure gauge connected to Tank E610 has risen
from a reading of about about 2 psi at the start of the shift to 10 psi. This is within the normal
2-25 psi range, so arouses no concern. Control room lacks any reliable way of monitoring
tank temperature.

About 11.30 pm
Workers in area notice MIC smell, see MIC leak near the scrubber. Found MIC and dirty
water coming out a branch of the relief valve pipe on the downstream side of the safety valve,
away from the tank area. They set up a water spray to neutralize the leaking MIC and inform

control room personnel of situation and their actions. They then take their regular tea break,
continuing to discuss the situation and what they should do next.

3 December
About 12.15 am
Control room operator notices that control room pressure indicator for Tank E610 reads 25-30
psi.

About 12.30 am
Control room operator notices that needle on pressure indicator for Tank E610 is pinned to
the maximum reading of 55 psi. Control room operator goes out to tank area to check gauges
on tank. While in tank area he hears a safety valve pop, hears rumbling in tank, and feels heat
emanating from it. Returns to control room to engage the gas vent scrubber. Caustic soda
does not flow as it should. A cloud of gas escapes from the scrubber stack.

12.40 am
Plant supervisor suspends operation of the MIC plant, turns on the in-plant and external toxic
gas sirens. External sirens audible in nearby neighborhoods are turned off after about five
minutes. Operators turn on the fire water sprayers but water cannot reach the gas cloud
forming at the top of the scrubber stack. Efforts to cool Tank E610 with the refrigeration
system fail because the Freon had been drained. Gas escapes for about 2 hours.

before 1 am
Plant supervisor realizes that tank E619, the designated spare, is not empty, so workers
cannot relieve the pressure in E610 by transferring any MIC to E619.

by 1 am
Gas smell is obvious outside the plant; nearby residents awake at the time or awakened by
noise and smelling the gas odor start fleeing in panic.

1.30 am
Bhopal police chief informed of leak and panic by an on-duty officer who ran to his house;
no significant police mobilization follows.

about 2.30 am
Bhopal plant external siren for warning the neighborhood is turned on again

about 3 am
Army engineer units with trucks are mobilized after a retired brigadier general requests help
evacuating workers from his factory near the UCIL plant (but not under the strongest gas
concentrations). Army unit then expands operations to assist general populace by transporting
injured to hospitals and clinics. Some mobilization of city ambulances. Medical personnel
hearing of situation head to hospitals and clinics.

Before 8 am
Madhya Pradesh governor orders closure of plant plus arrest of plant manager and 4 other
employees.
Afternoon
Head of India Pollution Control Board informed of accident. Efforts to learn details from
Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board fail because phone calls cannot get through. Phone
conversation with UCIL office in New Delhi (also unable to get phone calls through to the
plant) provides some information about possible causes.

Late afternoon
Indian Central Bureau of Investigation takes control of plant and UCIL records there. CBI
agents begins interviewing plant supervisors and workers; bar entry by anyone else, including
other UCIL employees.
Dec
Many government offices and businesses in Bhopal closed; dead buried or cremated in
accordance with their families religious traditions; initial treatment of injured proceeds.
18-19 Dec
Under government supervision the MIC still in storage at the UCIL is plant is neutralized by
combining with alpha-napthol to make finished pesticides. Local population leaves town as a
precaution.
(Peterson, M.J. "Case Study: Bhopal Plant Disaster". International Dimensions of Ethics
Education Case Study Series (2009))

Causes behind the Bhopal gas disaster

The order for water washing was given without

Placing slip blinds

Checking related lines
Disconnecting various lines
o Sodium hydroxide (NaOH) solution, in the VGS unit and field storage tanks,
was insufficient for neutralization of such a large amount of gas.
o The pressure control valve for the MIC storage tank (610) had not been
functioning for over a month.Water entered through this route.
o The temperature sensor and alarm for the MIC storage tank had not been
working for almost 4 years. Therefore, regular recording of temperature in the
log sheets was not done. According to the officers this parameter was not
important. However, it could have warned of the runaway reaction occurring
much earlier.
o The refrigeration unit (30 tons capacity) had been down for over an year, and
was totally shutdown in May 1984. As a result, the MIC tank was at ambient
temperature while the MIC manual had strongly recommended keeping MIC
below 5 degree Celsius.
o The vent gas scrubber was not operating at the time of the accident.
o The flare tower had been under maintenance since November 25, 1984 and
maintenance was not completed until the accident. The job could have been
completedwithin 8 h but for the shortage of staff.
o Manpower was reduced in all categories
o Fire and rescue squad (emergency squad) members were not qualified and

trained to handle such an accident.

o There was no maintenance supervisor for the night shift.
Nobody was aware of such types of runaway reactions in the storage tank and
therefore proper emergency steps were not taken.
o MIC plant operating personnel did not have the qualifications and training that
were necessary. Training had been reduced over the years.

o The agreement between the union and the management was completed in 1983
by-passing the safety rules.
o Improper behavior ofmanagementwith the operating personnel.
o Incorrect modifications of the relief valve vent header (RVVH) and process
vent header (PVH) by providing interconnectionwith a jumper line in the MIC
storage area.
o The design and technology given by the Union Carbide Corporation was not
safe and sufficient for preventing contamination and controlling runaway
o reaction.
o The loud siren did not start at the proper time and was shut down after 5 min
since the siren policy had been modified.
o There was no evacuation plan for the neighboring area/communities. Even
after the accident the neighboring communities were not informed.
o The plant superintendent did not inform outside agencies about the accident.
Initially, he denied the accident, and then stated that MIC gas was like a tear
gas and the effects would be temporary. No effective antidote was told.
o The civic authorities did not knowthe treatment since they had not been
informed of the extremely hazardous nature of the material stored.
o Keeping all the above developments in mind, no one should be surprised that
such a major accident took place. It was waiting to happen.
(Chouhan, T.R. (2004), Bhopal - The Inside Story, 2nd edition, Goa, India:
Other India Press; New York, USA: The Apex Press.)

Fault tree analysis of disaster

Table 4: Symbols and denotation
Symbol

Denotation
RECTANGLE denotes an event that results
from the combination of fault events
through the logic gate
CIRCLE denotes a basic fault event

AND Gate denotes the situation in which an

output event occurs only when all the input
events occur
OR Gate denotes the situation in which an
output event occurs if any one or more of
the input events occur
(Roland, H.E. & Moriarty, B., System Safety Engineering and Management, A WileyInterscience Publication, JOHN WILEY & SONS, Toronto and Singapore, 1983.)

Figure 9: Overall fault tree diagram

Figure 9: Figure 1; Ineffective workforce

Figure 10: Figure 2; Failure of plant due to diminished design specifications of plant

Figure 11: Figure 3; Incorrect management decisions

Figure 12: Figure 4; Poor maintenance of plant

Aftermath of Bhopal Incident

Human impact
Table 5: Clinical symptoms observed during acute and sub-acute phase (1-6 months)
following methyl isocyanate exposure

Table 6: Clinical symptoms observed during chronic phase (6 months onwards) following
methyl isocyanate exposure

Health Effects
Table 7: Route of entry of methyl isocyanate and its effect
Route of entry
Ingestion
Inhalation

Effect
Toxic if swallowed.
Fatal if inhaled. May cause allergy or
asthma symptoms or breathing difficulties if

Eyes

inhaled.
Fatal in contact with skin. Causes skin
irritation. May cause an allergic skin

reaction.
Skin
Causes serious eye damage.
*Extensive details on MIC can be referred to the Material Safety Data Sheet attched.

Toxicity of Methyl Icocyanate

Prior to the gas leak in Bhopal, there was only one known study on the toxicity of methyl
icocyanate (MIC), by Kimmerle & Eben (1964). In 1963 and 1970 the Union Carbide
Corporation commissioned animal studies, but did not publish any conclusions. However,
after the gas leak much was learned about the toxicity of MIC.
Background
The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), has set workplace
standards for MIC at 0.02ppm. The estimated mean MIC concentration in the cloud was 27
ppm, which is 1400 times the OSHA standard. The range of the MIC concentration in the
cloud was 0.12-85.6ppm. With people exposed to such a high concentration of MIC there
were many acute and long-term health effects.
Acute Effects
Immediate effects of the MIC leak included: burning, redness and watering of the eyes,
coughing, difficulty breathing, corneal damage, redness of the skin, vomiting,
unconsciousness, fatigue and death. The majority of all deaths within the first four days of the
leak were caused by pulmonary edema, or fluid build-up in the lungs.
Long-Term Eye Effects

Early studies conducted 8-60 days after exposure to MIC revealed that those affected by the
gas leak reported severe eye burning, watering, pain, redness, sensitivity to light and eyelid
swelling. Follow-up studies 9 months to 2 years later reported that eye problems including
persistent eye watering, burning, itching, redness, conjunctivitis, and deficiency of tear
secretion were still present among those affected by the leak. Andersson et al (1990),
conducted a follow-up study of 93% of previously surveyed exposed and control Bhopal
residents 3 years after exposure. The results revealed an increased risk of eye infections,
watering, irritation and excess cataracts among those exposed.
Long-Term Respiratory Effects
Follow up studies 2-3 months after the accident were conducted on 1, 279 exposed men,
women and children. Of 903 subjects who had x-rays, 164 were abnormal. Of 783 subjects
who had spirometry, 39% had some form of respiratory impairment. Kamat et al (1987)
studied 113 exposed patients at 3 months, 6 months and 2 years after exposure. Symptoms
included cough, sputum, chest pain and dyspnea (shortness of breath). These symptoms
improved during first year but intensified during second year. Pulmonary function also
declined progressively during the two year period of observation. Cullinan et al (1997)
surveyed 454 adults for respiratory symptoms and pulmonary function 10 years after the
accident. Among those who lived closest to the plant, there was still an increased prevalence
of cough and dyspnea and decreased lung function.
Reproductive Effects
Kanhere et al (1987) conducted a large study on pregnancy outcomes in Bhopal after the gas
leak and identified 2,566 cases who were pregnant at the time of exposure and 1,218 controls
from an unaffected area. The age standardized miscarriage rate was 23.6 % in the affected
area versus 5.6% in the control area. Neonatal mortality rates were also higher in the affected
area at 60.9% compared to 11.8% in the control area. Exposed women also reported
menstrual cycle disruption and dysmenorrhea, or severe uterine pain during menstruation.

Psychological Effects

Psychological problems of Bhopal survivors fell into 4 categories: post traumatic stress
disorder, pathological grief reactions, emotional reactions to physical problems, and
exacerbation of pre-existing psychiatric problems. One year after the leak, a study by the
Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR) revealed that mental health problems were as
high as 132.9 per 1,000 people in affected areas compared to 24.85 per 1,000 people in
unaffected areas. In 1990 the rate in the affected areas was still three times higher than
unaffected areas.
Effects on Children
The health effects of the gas leak were similar in children compared to those in adults.
Studies have shown there is a higher incidence of psychiatric illness, acute respiratory
infections, and infections of skin, eyes and ears reported among children from the affected
gas leak area compared to control groups. There have been some reports of intellectual
impairment in the children affected by the gas leak and also some reports of higher incidence
of cleft lip. Also, Ranjan et al (2003) found that boys born to parents exposed to the gas are
significantly shorter than unexposed cohorts.
Other Long-Term Health Effects
There have been several animal studies and human studies regarding the effect of MIC on the
immune system, but there have been no definitive conclusions. Also, a population based
cancer registry was established in Bhopal in 1986. The onset of the gas leak related cancers
were not expected to occur before a thirty to forty year lag period. Although, in 2003 it was
stated that cancers of the lung increased up to 20% in Bhopal compared to other cities in
India.

Environmental Impact

The Bhopal gas leak caused extensive damage to the environment surrounding the Union
Carbide factory. The impacts were both immediate and long-term. Due to improper clean up
in the area, Bhopal residents are still affected by the negative consequences of the gas leak.
Immediate Effects
In the days following the gas leak, the leaves on the trees near the factory yellowed and fell
off the branches. Around 2,000 animals, mostly livestock such as goats and buffalo, were
killed by the gas leak. The Indian government prohibited fishing in the area for fear that the
rivers and lakes were polluted. The food supply in Bhopal became scarce due to suppliers'
fears of food safety. Nearby crop growth was also affected by the leak. According to
authorities, 36 wards in the region were considered to be gas affected. These 36 wards
contained a population of some 520,000 people.
Long-Term Effects
Since the Bhopal gas leak, there have been persistent environmental problems due to
improper clean up. Past attempts to decontaminate the environment in and around Bhopal
were incomplete. The clean up responsibilities shifted from Union Carbide Industries to the
Madhya Pradesh government in 1998. Since this time, money and accountability for the leak
have become a problem. As a result, drinking water contamination has become a major issue.
Water Contamination
Bhopal's underground water supply is polluted with toxic chemicals such as heavy metals and
persistent organic pollutants. The contamination is not only due to the Bhopal gas leak, but
also to Union Carbide's practices prior to the leak. The improper treatment of chemicals has
contributed to the water pollution. As a result of the contamination, the water in Bhopal is
unsafe for drinking.
Greenpeace Research Laboratories conducted water sample testing in 1999 and determined
the levels of contaminants in Bhopal's water supply. The wind in this area blows to the North
and to the East, which is why the particular sites were chosen. Greenpeace believed these
areas would have the highest contamination levels from chemicals being carried by the wind.
Greenpeace Research Laboratories found volatile organic compounds in Bhopal's drinking
water supply. The level of trichloroethene was 50 times higher than the EPA safety limits.

Trichloroethene can impair fetal development. The list of volatile organic compounds found
included:

Chlorinated benzenes

Chlorinated ethenes

Chloroform

Carbon tetrachloride

Trichloroethene

In addition to VOC's, Greenpeace Research Laboratories also found elevated levels of heavy
metals in the water. The heavy metals detected included:

Mercury

Chromium

Copper

Nickel

Lead

Heavy metals bioaccumulate in both aquatic and terrestrial organisms and are toxic to
humans. One water sample found mercury to be 12% of the overall weight of the sample.
Other chemicals found in the water were toxic organochlorides such as:

Chlorinated ethanes

Chlorinated hexanes

DDT

Hexachlorobutadiene

Hexachlorobutadiene is a potent kidney toxin and is under review as a possible human

carcinogen.
These chemicals persist in the drinking water supply because the water was never fully
decontaminated. Although the water is labeled unfit for drinking, Bhopal residents still
consume the contaminated water.
Soil Contamination
In addition to water testing, Greenpeace Research Laboratories also performed soil testing to
check for contamination. They tested several sites near the Union Carbide plant. Greenpeace
found the metal levels in the soil similar to uncontaminated soil. The only metal with high
concentrations was copper, which can naturally vary in nature and was unlikely due to the gas

leak. The researchers concluded that the activities at the Union Carbide plant including the
gas leak did not contaminate the surrounding soil.
Lasting Impact
Activist groups have urged Dow Chemicals (the current owner of the Union Carbide plant) to
clean up the environment surrounding Bhopal. These groups have urged the local government
to request that Dow Chemicals pay for the clean up. Although a legal settlement resulted in
the Madhya Pradesh government having jurisdiction over the clean up, activist groups believe
Dow Chemicals must still be held accountable. Due to a lack of money and no one taking
responsibility, the efforts to clean up the environment came to a halt. The impact of this
decision is that until the drinking water is decontaminated, the residents of Bhopal will
continue to be exposed to the toxic chemicals.
(http://enhs.umn.edu/current/2008studentwebsites/pubh6101/bhopal/health.html)
The second poisoning of Bhopal
For fifteen years before the gas disaster Union Carbide had routinely dumped highly toxic
chemical wastes inside and outside its factory site. Some were buried, some simply lay
heaped on the soil, open to the elements. Thousands of tons of pesticides, solvents, chemical
catalysts and by-products lay strewn across 16 acres inside the site. Huge evaporation ponds
covering an area of 35 acres outside the factory received thousands of gallons of virulent
liquid wastes. After the catastrophic gas leak, the factory was locked up and left to rot, with
all the chemicals and wastes still there. Union Carbide left the factory and its surrounds
without cleaning them. As each years monsoon battered the decaying plant and rain
overflowed the huge ponds, the toxins seeped down through the sandy soil, and filtered into
underground channels and pools. Wells drawn from these ground water pools serve around
40,000 people living in eighteen townships. Among them is JP Nagar, the community most
devastated by the gases of 1984.
(http://bhopal.org/second-poisoning/bhopal-second-poisoning/)

Remediation after incident

Environmental remediation (action plans) in and around Bhopal in Expert Roundtable
Immediate Measures:
A) Securing the site and preventing annual surface water runoff
1. Fencing and guarding of the UCIL site and landfill area within the SEP to prevent
access to people
Repeatedly broken boundary walls of the UCIL site and lack of security personnel
provides uninterrupted access to local people. Considering the presence of toxic
waste, dump sites and contaminated machinery, this is a cause of serious health
concern, particularly for children, who are found playing in the premises.
2. Stopping construction at the SEP area
There is a risk of the land in the SEP area being used by the owners for residential
purposes, which at present may not be suitable due to its contaminated nature.
3. Measures to be taken to protect annual surface water runoff from the site during
monsoon
Every year the areas around the UCIL site gets flooded with the runoff from the site
during the monsoon. Local people have been reporting health hazards which they
attribute to this contaminated water. One suggestion is to collect the rain water at the
lowest point in a sump and an ex-situ treatment could be done before it leaves the
area.
B) Excavation, recovery and characterisation of waste dumped at the plant site
1. Clearing vegetation and dewatering the site
Dense vegetation and waterlogging at the site in the past has made it difficult to
explore the presence of dumped waste at the site. Vegetation is to be removed only to
the extent of facilitating these studies and not compromising on its capability to
prevent further spread of contamination. The recovered water may need to be
tested/treated prior to disposal.
2. Identification and refurbishment of a temporary storage area for the excavated waste
A temporary area to store the excavated waste is to be identified and refurbished well
before the excavation and recovery of waste. It would facilitate determination of
volume and characterisation of the waste and secure it to prevent spread of
contamination. This could also be used to store the waste excavated from the dump
site within the SEP area. The storage area could be in addition to the existing and may
be considered for further use as a permanent encapsulation.
3. Excavation and recovery of dump materials from already identified and new sites

It has been reported and discussed that excavation of the site done by M/s Ramky
Limited in 2005 was incomplete. NEERINGRI study in 2010 spotted four new dump
sites that were not known earlier. It is important to excavate all these sites properly to
estimate the actual volume of waste and contaminated soil present at the site.
4. Recovery of mercury present in drains, pan filters, soil with the help of local
community
Local people have been reporting presence of dumped mercury at the site. Mercury is
known to be highly toxic and its presence poses threat to their health. Appropriate
containers should be used to contain the mercury.
5. Characterisation and inventorisation of the collected waste for proper treatment and/or
disposal
Considering the uncertain volume and composition of the waste, this would help in
selecting the technology options for remediation/disposal.
C) Characterisation and inceneration of the stored waste at the site
1. Trial at the Pithampur incinerator with ten tonnes of similar waste from HIL, Kerala
Considering that five of the six trials conducted till date by CPCB have failed to
comply with the norms, it is necessary to conduct further trials taking local
community in confidence. A third party monitoring institution such as an IIT could be
involved. The incinerator performance is to be stabilised during the trials, which so
far involved waste from pharmaceutical and paint industries. This waste was not
similar to the waste at UCIL, Bhopal.
2. Characterisation results of the stored waste to be made public and if required, further
characterisation and inventorisation to be done in parallel with the trials
There is a lack of clarity on the waste characterisation, particularly the 164 tonnes of
excavated soil. If required, further characterisation of the packed waste is to be done
to be sure about the possible remedial options.
3. Waste with high calorific value and hazardous in nature to be incinerated with
continuous stack monitoring and remaining waste to be dealt with suitable
decontamination and/or remediation measures
If the characterised waste is found to be incinerable and the performance of the
incinerator is stabilised, it is suggested to incinerate the waste already packed. It
should be done under the supervision of CPCB.
D) Groundwater contamination assessment and remediation outside the plant site
1. Field investigation and lab analysis of the groundwater
Considering the gaps in earlier findings, a thorough assessment of the type of
contamination and its lateral spread around the UCIL should be done. This would also

help in understanding the technology options and magnitude of the remediation work.
Geohydrological study at the site and SEP to know the sources of contamination may
also help in developing clarity on this.
2. Possibility of hydraulic containment to be explored as an interim measure
Hydraulic containment is an interim measure which will stop the contamination from
leaving the UCIL site and the SEP area. This could be deployed while the site is being
decontaminated.
3. Remediation/containment plan to be developed and implemented
Based on the field investigation and lab analysis, an appropriate containment/remedial
plan should be developed and implemented.
E) Characterisation and remediation of waste dumped in landfill in the SEP area
1. Characterisation of waste and development of a basket of
disposal/decontamination/remediation options
Waste dumped at the landfill in the SEP is to be characterised, followed by an
assessment and development of a basket of suitable options. The landfill is damaged
and this waste could be recovered and stored in a temporary storage within the UCIL
site considering the need to estimate the volume and nature of waste. Moreover, the
SEP area is to be secured and made inaccessible to local community.
2. Disposal/remediation of the waste and decontamination of the landfill area
Remediation plan is to be finalised based on considerations of time schedule, lifecycle cost, overall efficiency and sustainability of the alternatives. Considering SEP as
a potential source of contamination, it would be critical to complete the remediation
as soon as possible.
F) Remediation of entire SEP area
1. Assessment of the need of geohydrological and contamination analysis based on
previous reports
It was agreed that SEP area is not satisfactorily studied. However, all previous reports
that have studied SEP are to be revisited to finalise the need of further studies. Critical
data gaps, if present, should be identified and addressed, in parallel, to the extent
possible.
2. If required, SEP to be studied for waste characterisation and source of groundwater
contamination
Considering the limited information on SEP and groundwater contamination, it was
considered important to be sure of the possibility of connection between the two.
3. Development and implementation of the remediation plan keeping residential purpose
in mind
It was realised during the discussions that the SEP area is in the middle of the city and
can be used for residential purposes if remediated properly.

G) Detoxification, dismantling and decommissioning of the UCIL plant, machinery and

structure
1. MIC plant including the vent, vent scrubber, storage tanks and control room to be
strengthened and preserved
It came out during the discussion that these parts of the plant are relatively in better
condition. It was a consensus to preserve these as part of a memorial after
decontamination as suggested by IICT.
2. Remaining parts of the site to be decontaminated, dismantled and decommissioned as
recommended by IICT
Remaining plant structure is a hindrance in exploring new dump sites and is not
strong enough to preserve. It is therefore necessary to decontaminate and dismantle
such structures as proposed by IICT.
H) Remediation and fate of the UCIL site
1. Geohydrological and contamination studies for the site based on stratified judgmental
sampling
A detailed analysis on level and possible sources of groundwater contamination
(including free phase organic compound i.e. NAPL) should be conducted with
involvement of local community. This could be done after the site is cleared of
vegetation, structure and waterlogging.
2. Development of a basket of decontamination/disposal methods accordingly
Incomplete understanding of geohydrology and contamination level at the site makes
it difficult to shortlist one particular method of decontamination. A basket of methods
need to be developed while deciding upon the final decontamination method.

3. Remediation plan based on future use as memorial and a centre of excellence

It was agreed by the group that some parts of the UCIL site must be preserved as a
memorial. The rest of the area can be used for developing A centre of excellence for
industrial disaster and/or hazardous waste management
4. An international competition on master planning for conversion of the site
An international competition is expected to bring out the best and most innovative
solution for master planning and linking it with the remediation of the site. It may also
raise awareness about the whole issue globally. It should be done along with the local
community.
5. Implementation of the remediation plan and conversion of the site to a memorial and
centre of excellence
It should be connected with the remediation of the site and long-term monitoring.

(The Centre for Science and Environment Report of April 25-26, 2013, Expert
Roundtable citation)

Incomplete
1. Conclusion (1 page)
2. Future prevention (1 page)
3. Suggestions by group members
4. References