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Pilot Project On District Autoonomy in Indonesiaerrazzi
Pilot Project On District Autoonomy in Indonesiaerrazzi
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Christoph Beier backstopped the Support for Decentralization (SfDM) project in the Ministry of
Home Affairs during 1991-94 from the University of Bochum where he is a lecturer in the Department
of Economic and Social Geography. He has been acting as long term advisor (based in Jakarta, and
on leave from the University) since 1995.
Gabriele Ferrazzi has lectured in management and worked in management training, economic and
business development and rural development initiatives in Canada. In Indonesia he has worked as
institutional development advisor to regional planning boards and as the training and bottom-up
planning coordinator for the Sulawesi Regional Development Project. Since 1993, as an independent
consultant , he has taken part in the efforts of the GTZ to initiate a postgraduate level district planning
program at the Bandung Institute of Technology and GTZs efforts to support the decentralization
process in general through the SfDM.
2
This is the last year for which complete data on the budgets of all government levels are available.
Because in this section only average numbers are provided, one should be aware of vast
discrepancies between the budget numbers of government entities at the same government level.
4
The exchange rate as of April 1997 is about 1,430 Rupiah to the German Mark.
3
With the entrenchment of the New Order, and the task of nation building
showing at least partial success, the government has been giving more attention to
the issue of decentralization, under pressure from internal and external dynamics in
the social, political and economic spheres. However, unlike other east and
southeast asian countries facing similar pressures (e.g. Korea, Philippines, and
Nepal) Indonesia has yet to implement a major country wide decentralization
program. In this article we briefly review the Indonesian governments recent
preparation for implementing significant decentralization on this scale, i.e. the
District Autonomy Pilot Program (DAPP). In conveying the issues and tentative
findings we rely in large part on our close involvement in the Ministry of Home
Affairs Support for Decentralization Measures project, through the German
technical partner supporting the project 5. Additionally, information, reports and views
from Indonesian sources and other observers have been used to derive a more
complete picture.
We first outline the policy and legislative framework for decentralization in
the New Order, and we then describe the DAPP within that context. A preliminary
assessment of the DAPP to this point is then offered, and we end with a more
general assessment for the prospects for decentralization in Indonesia.
2.
The authors have been involved in the decentralization arena in Indonesia for several years, primarily
under the auspices of the Support for Decentralization Measures (SfDM) project, a Ministry of Home
Affairs (MoHA) initiative supported by the German Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ). While we deeply appreciate the opportunity provided by the project, and GTZs support for
our dissemination activities, we are fully responsible for the views put forward in this paper.
2
In April of 1995 Indonesia initiated a two year district autonomy pilot project
(Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Daerah; DAPP in its English acronym). Involving 26
districts initially, the stated aim of the government is to increase autonomy
throughout the nation based on the results of this preliminary phase (MENPAN,
1994). Even before this date, starting in late 1994, the Minister of State for
Administrative Reform, in conjunction with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA),
negotiated the conversion of the vast majority of deconcentrated units of the central
and provincial governments in the 26 districts to units responsible directly to the
district head. By the time of the formal announcement, made on April 25 (and
commemorated as Autonomy Day henceforth) a set of responsibilities were
formally devolved in a crash program of government and regional regulations.
Resources to discharge these responsibilities and personnel reassignments to the
regions were to complement this measure.
Most Ministries and provincial Governors were supportive and cooperative,
but some had deep reservations. Some government departments or agencies were
able to stay out of the initiative, arguing that they needed to maintain their presence
in the district. Others sought to reduce the scope of the transfer of functions that
were formerly undertaken in the departmental arms at the district level. Intense
discussions were required to reach MENPAN-Ministry understandings in these latter
cases (Jakarta Post, 1995; Kompas, 1995), and compromises were made.
DAPP was clearly explained as the first step in strengthening the autonomy
of all second level regions (districts and urban centers). The first two year pilot was
to be a learning exercise to determine the best way to shape district autonomy and
how to implement it properly. The monitoring and evaluation system was to play an
important role in this process. MENPAN and MoHA were jointly made responsible
for the monitoring and evaluation and were to report on the findings to the
President.
4.
review of the development of this system see Ferrazzi and Beier, 1997,
forthcoming).
However valid some of the goals may be in theoretical terms, the
assessment of the DAPP against them is methodogically difficult but also to some
extent inappropriate in view of the actual scope of the initiative. It may be better to
employ a more modest framework for assessing the DAPP for the time being. Key
questions that may be answerable at this stage are as follows;
1. Does the DAPP represent a significant step in decentralization?
2. To what extent has the process of designing and implementing DAPP been
consistent with the goals of decentralization?
3. To what extent has regional autonomy been enhanced through DAPP?
4. How likely are the changes made in the framework of DAPP to be supportive of
the general goals attributed to it?
These questions will be addressed in turn in the following sections.
4.1
Significance of DAPP
DAPP remains to be fully assessed and is only now being discussed more widely.
Our initial thoughts are offered below.
4.3
CENTRAL LEVEL
Agricultural subsectors:
CENTRAL LEVEL
FUNCTIONS
(tasks)
food crops
13 (55)
animal husbandry
13 (91)
cash crops
14 (74)
Fisheries
13 (36)
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CENTRAL LEVEL
Transmigration
CENTRAL LEVEL
Village Development
CENTRAL LEVEL
Civil Records
CENTRAL LEVEL
Social Welfare
CENTRAL LEVEL
CENTRAL LEVEL
Health
CENTRAL LEVEL
Education
6 (44)
CENTRAL LEVEL
Industry
CENTRAL LEVEL
Trade
CENTRAL LEVEL
Mining
CENTRAL LEVEL
Employment
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Public Works:
14
6 (36)
16
Irrigation
Roads
2 (7)
General Construction
Tourism
Mining
Employment
Forestry
The public works sectors (roads and irrigation), tourism and to some extent
the education sectors have seen significant transfers of functions. For the roads
sector, the upkeep of national roads was turned over to the districts. For irrigation,
the district also became responsible for the upkeep of larger scale irrigation
systems. In the tourism sector, approval and supervision over a broader range of
tourism facilities was given to the district.
Others district Dinas, while accepting new transfers on paper in the
framework of DAPP, had actually already received these functions via other legal
instruments years before or had defacto been undertaking these functions (the
agricultural subsectors in particular). Other Dinas received but a token increase in
their functions (the Health Dinas for example only received medicine
storing/distribution).
If the central level departments were less than generous in the negotiation
stage, they were sometimes also less than gracious following their initial
agreements. Soon after the agreements, some departments took action to limit the
scope of transferred functions. For example soon after the inauguration of DAPP,
the district was suddenly limited in its authority over permits for mineral exploitation
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for tracts of land exceeded 5 hectares, even though no such limitation was agreed
within DAPP.
In general, there has been a tendency to only transfer functions which are
not linked to sizeable soures of revenues. Many of these dry functions, as they
are labelled in Indonesia, relate to the guidance and strict implementation tasks.
For those functions that have included opportunities for revenue generation, the
realization of the transfer of the functions has been plauged by reversals, limitations
and delays. The sign in front of the office may have changed but that has been no
clue as to whether the functions normally carried out in these deconcentrated arms
have been transferred as a whole, or whether some have been excluded from the
DAPP, or whether some have been included in the DAPP but as yet not
implemented in practice.
In principle, according to Indonesian regulations, all functions transferred to
lower levels must be accompanied by attendant resources; staff, assets and routine
and development funds. In DAPP, this principle has been grossly breached,
especially in relation to the development budget. This alone has meant that the
resources available to implement the functions in the 26 districts have been less
than when these functions were held in the deconcentrated arms of higher levels,
and less than most of their non-participating neighbouring districts continue to
receive from higher levels. For the clients and public touched by the affected
services, the DAPP has in many cases meant a reduction rather than improvement
in services. The inability (some would say unwillingness) to transfer the requisite
funding has been particularly deleterious for districts with a low level of own
revenues (ex. Aileu in East Timor). These districts now must support a greater
number of Dinas with their own routine funds, and they are often denied the
development budget that were once attached to these functions. Only for districts
with a substantial own revenue base (ex. Badung in Bali), has this problem been
attenuated by an infusion from the district budget.
The districts have voiced their concern over the lack of substantial functions
in DAPP, but some sectors and some districts have also voiced their satisfaction.
Some have indicated that the functions transferred have been or will be an added
burden, though this sentiment seems to be linked to the lack of transfer of requisite
resources. Overall, it would seem that the DAPP represents a modest step in
decentralization in terms of added functions, but the full impact of this modest
initiative is less than optimal due to the failure to pass on the required financial
resources passed.
4.4
At this early stage of the DAPP, much of the attention is focused on ensuring
that the original intent is met in terms of the full and real transfer of functions and
the requisite financial resources. Nevertheless some officials are anxious for
confirmation that DAPP is indeed a success in tems of the stated broad goals of
decentralization and DAPP in particular (DAPP seems to have been atributed with
most goals associated with decentralization). It seems premature to make such
assessments in our view, and there is the real danger that if done too early, before
all of the functions and resources entailed in DAPP have been fully transferred, the
districts could be unfairly judged. Unfavourable impacts may to a large extent
reflect the problems of inadequate transfers, and the blame would be better placed
with higher levels controlling the transfers.
Despite the problems with the DAPP monitoring and evaluation system,
Indonesian officials are reasonably aware of some of the bigger hurdles facing
DAPP. However, officialdom could greatly benefit from a lively dialogue, with many
and various stakeholders, on the issues surrounding DAPP and those issues
occasionally surfacing in the mass media or intellectual/international circles. The
lessons to be drawn from the DAPP are beginning to emerge, and they need a full
airing.
Some of the issues brought to the fore in DAPP relate to the resistance met
in the sectors and the first regional level. The approach to communication and
negotiation needs to be reformulated if further steps are to be more successfully
implemented in the field. It may also be necessary to address the issue of the
autonomous role of the provincial level to give some certainty or vision for what it
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CONCLUSION
The District Autonomy Pilot Program marks a significant departure from the
pattern of delay and uncertain progress in realizing the objective of increasing
regional autonomy at the second regional level, in accordance with stated national
policies and general regulations. The initiative has been generally well received by
the districts, but less so by some cental sectoral departments and first regional
levels. However, even some districts are currently frustrated with the slow pace of
the transfers, and the lack of adequate financial resources to undertake the new
functions. The top down approach to the design of DAPP accounts for some of this
resistance and poor implementation, and points to a host of issues that have yet to
be adequately addressed in the limited decentralization dialogue in Indonesia.
As a beginning, the DAPP cannot be faulted; even if it is rather modest in its
scope and likely impact, it is after all fairly significant in symbolic terms and also
significant in practice for certain sectors.
A more thorough assessment needs to
be made to determine whether it has been successful in terms of various evaluation
categories and success indicators. If this assessment is indeed made with the
Indonesian governments broad goals in mind, then it is likely that the DAPP will fall
short of being a success. But if DAPP is viewed as one step toward meaningful
regional autonomy, if it leads to a richer and broader dialogue, and if it generates a
more pro-active stance from the regions themselves in voicing their views and
needs, then DAPP will augur well for the future.
REFERENCES
Anderson, B. (1972). The idea of power in Javanese culture, in Holt, C. et. al.
(eds), Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
Beier, C. (1996). Perspektif untuk Peranan Departemen Teknis,
Desentralisasi, 10, 1996, pp. 3-10.
Buletin
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