389 U.S.

477
88 S.Ct. 639
19 L.Ed.2d 716

W. Willard WIRTZ, Secretary of Labor, Petitioner,

v.
LOCAL UNION NO. 125, LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH
AMERICA, AFLCIO.
No. 58.
Argued Nov. 8 and 9, 1967.
Decided Jan. 15, 1968.

Louis F. Claiborne, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mortimer Riemer, Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a companion case to No. 57, Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 88 S.Ct. 643, 19 L.Ed.2d 705. Petitioner, the Secretary of
Labor, filed the action in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, under 402(b) of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 482(b). His complaint challenged the
validity of a general election of union officers conducted by the respondent
Local Union on June 8, 1963, and the validity of a runoff election for the single
office of Business Representative made necessary by a tie vote for that office at
the June 8 election. The complaint alleged, in part, violations of 401(e), 29
U.S.C. 481(e), in permitting members not 'in good standing' to vote and to run
for office on both occasions. However, the only allegation that internal union
remedies had been exhausted, as is required by 402(a), was in regard to the
runoff election of July 13; the complaint stated that the loser in the runoff
election, one Dial, protested and appealed to the General Executive Board of
the International Union concerning the conduct of that election and, having
received a final denial of his protest by the General Executive Board, filed a
timely complaint with the Secretary. The District Court held that the omission
in the complaint of an allegation that a member complained internally about the
conduct of the June 8 general election was fatal to the Secretary's action

addressed to that election and dismissed that part of the complaint. D.C., 231
F.Supp. 590. The Secretary appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. During pendency of the appeal, respondent Local conducted its next
regular triennial election of officers. The Court of Appeals thereupon vacated
the judgment of dismissal and remanded to the District Court with instructions
that the portion of the Secretary's complaint dealing with the June 8 election be
dismissed as moot. 6 Cir., 375 F.2d 921.1 We granted certiorari. 387 U.S. 904,
87 S.Ct. 1686, 18 L.Ed.2d 621. In light of our decision today in Wirtz v. Local
153, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., supra, the action of the Court of Appeals must
be reversed; we there held that '* * * the fact that the union has already
conducted another unsupervised election does not deprive the Secretary of his
right to a court order declaring the challenged election void and directing that a
new election be conducted under his supervision.' 389 U.S., at 475, 88 S.Ct., at
650.
2

In the circumstances we might remand to the Court of Appeals to decide the

merits of the Secretary's appeal. The issue on the merits is whether the District
Court erred in holding that the Secretary in his suit may not challenge the
alleged violations affecting the general election of June 8 because Dial
specifically challenged only the runoff election of July 13 with respect to the
office of Business Representative. The merits of this question have been fully
briefed and argued in this Court and the underlying issue of statutory
construction has already been the subject of several and conflicting rulings by
various federal courts. 2 The interests of judicial economy are therefore best
served if we proceed to resolve this important question now.

Respondent Local is governed by the Constitution and the Uniform Local

Union Constitution of the Laborers' International Union of North America.
Under the Uniform Local Union Constitution as it existed during the period
relevant here, a member's good standing was lost by failure to pay membership
dues within a specified grace period, and the member was automatically
suspended without notice and with loss of all membership rights except the
right to readmission (but as a new member) upon payment of a fee. The
eligibility of voters and candidates in both elections in this case was determined
by reference to a report to the International Union of the names of members for
whom a per capita tax had been paid. This report included some 50 to 75
members who were delinquent in the payment of their Local dues and had
therefore actually lost good standing under the provisions of the Uniform Local
Union Constitution. The cause of this patent disregard of the Local's own
constitution was the practice of its Secretary-Treasurer of paying from Local
funds the per capita tax of delinquent members selected by him, thus making it
appear on the per capita tax report that those members had met their dues

obligations when in fact they had not.3 The Secretary's investigation disclosed
that approximately 50 of the members voting in the June 8 general election and
approximately 60 voting in the July 13 runoff election were ineligible to vote;
and that 16 of the 27 candidates for office in the general election, including
Dial's opponent who ultimately won the runoff, were ineligible for the same
reason.
4

The question is one of statutory construction and must be answered by

inference since there is lacking an explicit provision regarding the permissible
scope of the Secretary's complaint. On the facts of this case we think the
Secretary is entitled to maintain his action challenging the June 8 general
election because respondent union had fair notice from the violation charged by
Dial in his protest of the runoff election that the same unlawful conduct
probably occurred at the earlier election as well.4 We therefore need not
consider and intimate no view on the merits of the Secretary's argument that a
member's protest triggers a 402 enforcement action in which the Secretary
would be permitted to file suit challenging any violation of 401 discovered in
his investigation of the member's complaint.

We reject the narrow construction adopted by the District Court and supported
by respondent limiting the Secretary's complaint solely to the allegations made
in the union member's initial complaint. Such a severe restriction upon the
Secretary's powers should not be read into the statute without a clear indication
of congressional intent to that effect. Neither the language of the statute nor its
legislative history provides such an indication; indeed, the indications are quite
clearly to the contrary.

First, it is most improbable that Congress deliberately settled exclusive

enforcement jurisdiction on the Secretary and granted him broad investigative
powers to discharge his responsibilities,5 yet intended the shape of the
enforcement action to be immutably fixed by the artfulness of a layman's
complaint which often must be based on incomplete information. The expertise
and resources of the Labor Department were surely meant to have a broader
play. 6 Second, so to constrict the Secretary would be inconsistent with his vital
role, which we emphasize today in Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers
Assn., supra, in protecting the public interest bound up in Title IV. The Act was
not designed merely to protect the right of a union member to run for a
particular union office in a particular election. Title IV's special function in
furthering the general goals of the LMRDA is to insure free and democratic
union elections, the regulations of the union electoral process enacted in the
Title having been regarded as necessary protections of the public interest as
well as of the rights and interests of union members.

We can only conclude, therefore, that it would be anomalous to limit the reach
of the Secretary's cause of action by the specifics of the union member's
complaint. In an analogous context we rejected such a limiting construction of
the National Labor Relations Board's authority to fashion unfair labor practice
complaints. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 306309, 79 S.Ct. 1179,
3 L.Ed.2d 1243; National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 369, 60 S.Ct.
569, 84 L.Ed. 799. 7

Respondent argues, however, that the spirit and letter of the statutory
requirement that the member first exhaust his internal union remedies before
the Secretary may intervene compels the suggested limitation. It contends that
even to allow the Secretary to challenge the earlier election for the same
violation established as having occurred in the runoff election would be
inconsistent with Congress' intention to allow unions first opportunity to redress
violations of 401. This argument is not persuasive.

It is true that the exhaustion requirement was regarded by Congress as critical

to the statute's objective of fostering union self-government. By channeling
members through the internal appellate processes, Congress hoped to accustom
members to utilizing the remedies made available within their own
organization; at the same time, however, unions were expected to provide
responsible and responsive procedures for investigating and redressing
members' election grievances. These intertwined objectives are not disserved
but furthered by permitting the Secretary to include in his complaint at least any
401 violation he has discovered which the union had a fair opportunity to
consider and redress in connection with a member's initial complaint.

10

Here the Secretary sought to challenge the June 8 general election, alleging that
the same unlawful conduct occurring in the runoff affected the general election
held only five weeks before. Dial's complaint had disclosed the fraudulent
practice with respect to the runoff, and he was apparently able to prove at the
hearing before the General Executive Board that that practice enabled nine
ineligible members to vote in the runoff election; but his protest was denied
because he had lost by 19 votes. The Secretary's investigation, however,
discovered that a much larger number of ineligible members had been permitted
to vote in that runoff election and that the Secretary-Treasurer responsible for
the falsification prepared the per capita tax reports used to determine the
eligibility of voters and candidates at both elections. Yet in the face of Dial's
evidence raising the almost overwhelming probability that the misconduct
affecting the runoff election had also occurred at the June 8 election, the union
insists that it was under no duty to expand its inquiry beyond the specific
challenge to the runoff election made by Dial. Surely this is not the responsible

union self-government contemplated by Congress in allowing the unions great

latitude in resolving their own internal controversies. In default of respondent's
action on a violation which it had a fair opportunity to consider and resolve in
connection with Dial's protest, the Secretary was entitled to seek relief from the
court with respect to the June 8 election. Again, Congress, having given the
Secretary a broad investigative power, cannot have intended that his right to
relief be defined by a complaining member's ignorance of the law or the facts or
by the artlessness of the member's protest.
11

Because the complaint as to the June 8 election was dismissed for deficiency in
pleading, the factual allegations have not been tried. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court with direction to
enter a judgment reversing the District Court's judgment of dismissal and
directing further proceedings by that court consistent with this opinion.

12

It is so ordered.

13

Reversed and remanded with direction.

14

Mr. Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this

case.

The order of dismissal in the District Court was entered July 14, 1964. On
April 18, 1966, the District Court entered an order granting the Secretary's
motion for summary judgment regarding the portion of his complaint directed
to the runoff election of July 13, 1963, for the office of Business
Representative. The runoff was conducted under the Secretary's supervision on
June 11, 1966, the same day the union conducted the unsupervised intervening
election. Dial lost the runoff.

Compare Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6, 2 Cir.,
381 F.2d 500; Wirtz v. Local Unions No. 9 et al., IUOE, 10 Cir., 366 F.2d 911;
Wirtz v. Local 174, Musicians, 65 L.R.R.M. 2972; and Wirtz v. Local 450,
IUOE, 63 L.R.R.M. 2105, which more or less support the view of the District
Court herein, with Wirtz v. Local Unions No. 406, IUOE, D.C., 254 F.Supp.
962; Wirtz v. Local 705, Hotel Employees, 63 L.R.R.M. 2315; and Wirtz v.
Local Union 169, International Hod Carriers, D.C., 246 F.Supp. 741, which
support a broader view.
These conflicting views particularly justify our resolution of the question

without remanding to the Court of Appeals. In contrast, the issue in No. 57,
Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., supra, which we did remand to
the Court of Appeals, was whether a standard not questioned by any party was
properly applied to the particular facts.
3

The International Constitution required respondent Local to remit to the

International a per capita tax payment of $1 per member per month. These
payments were to be made only for members who had in fact made current
payment of their dues to the Local.

See Wirtz v. Local Union 169, International Hod Carriers, supra, n. 2, at 246
F.Supp. 751753.
Although the eligibility of Dial's opponent in the runoff was an issue before the
District Court on the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, the judgment
was granted on the ground of voter ineligibility; that judgment is not before us.

The Secretary's authority under 601, 29 U.S.C. 521, both supplements his
investigative mandate under 402(b) and authorizes inquiry without regard to
the filing of a complaint by a union member. But when the Secretary
investigates pursuant to 601 without a member's complaint, his remedy is
limited to disclosure of violations discovered. Whether violations of 401
uncovered by a 601 investigation may be the predicate of a member's protest
to the union and an enforcement proceeding under 402 if the union denies
relief is a question we need not and do not reach in this case.

Senator Kennedy's reference to the Secretary as the complaining 'union

member's lawyer,' 104 Cong.Rec. 10947, Leg.Hist. 1093 (Dept. Labor 1964),
does not support the District Court's conclusion. The lawyer's function is to use
his skills to give shape and substance to his client's often incompletely
expressed complaint.

The fact that the National Labor Relations Act does not require prior exhaustion
of internal union remedies does not destroy the analogy; nothing in our holding
today dispenses with the exhaustion requirement of 402(a).