429 U.S.

24
97 S.Ct. 200
50 L.Ed.2d 190

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

v.
Norma Andalis BAGAMASBAD.
No. 75-1666.
Nov. 1, 1976.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent, an alien who had overstayed her tourist visa by four years, applied
to have her status adjusted to that of permanent resident alien pursuant to 8
U.S.C. 1255(a). That section authorizes the Attorney General in his discretion
to change the status of an alien who is physically present in the United States to
that of a permanent resident, but only if, among other things, the alien would be
eligible for an immigrant visa and admissible into the United States as a
permanent resident.* The District Director of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) denied respondent's application as a matter of
discretion because she had made serious misrepresentations to the United States
consul who had issued her visa. For the same reasons, the immigration judge
presiding at a later deportation hearing also declined to exercise his discretion
in her favor. Neither the District Director nor the immigration judge addressed
himself to whether respondent satisfied the specific statutory requirements for
permanent residence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding that
the circumstances fully supported the discretionary denial of relief and
concluding that "the immigration judge could properly pretermit the question of
statutory eligibility and deny the application . . . as an exercise of discretion."

A divided Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that although the immigration
judge had properly exercised his discretion to deny respondent's application, the
statute required the judge to make findings and reach conclusions with respect
to respondent's eligibility for admission into this country as a permanent
resident. 531 F.2d 111 (CA3 1976). Disagreeing as we do with the Court of
Appeals, we grant the petition for certiorari filed by the INS and the motion by
respondent to proceed in forma pauperis and reverse the judgment of the Court

of Appeals.
3

(1, 2) As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on
issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 1378, 87 L.Ed.
1774 (1943); Silva v. Carter, 326 F.2d 315 (CA9 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
917, 84 S.Ct. 1181, 12 L.Ed.2d 186 (1964); Goon Wing Wah v. INS, 386 F.2d
292 (CA1 1967); De Lucia v. INS, 370 F.2d 305, 308 (CA7 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 912, 87 S.Ct. 861, 17 L.Ed.2d 784 (1967). Here, it is conceded that
respondent's application would have been properly denied whether or not she
satisfied the statutory eligibility requirements. In these circumstances, absent an
express statutory requirement, we see no reason to depart from the general rule
and require the immigration judge to arrive at purely advisory findings and
conclusions as to statutory eligibility.

In arriving at its contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on a dictum in

Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 76 S.Ct. 919, 100 L.Ed. 1242 (1956), which
involved a similar provision, 8 U.S.C. 1254(a), authorizing the Attorney
General in his discretion to grant relief from deportation if certain eligibility
requirements are met. In the course of affirming the discretionary denial of
relief, the Court indicated that the statute entitled the applicant to a ruling on
his eligibility. But the statement followed a reference to immigration
regulations which then expressly required a determination of eligibility in each
case. 351 U.S. at 352-353, 76 S.Ct. at 923. These regulations have been
superseded, and the regulation applicable to this case has no such requirement.
8 CFR 242.18(a) (1976).

(3) The Court of Appeals also thought it advisable to require the making of
eligibility findings in 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) proceedings to foreclose the
possibility that a United States consul to whom an alien might later apply for an
immigration visa would mistakenly construe the immigration judge's exercise
of discretion as a finding of statutory ineligibility binding on the consul. But the
basis for the immigration judge's action must be set forth in writing under 8
CFR 242.18(a) (1976). Where, as here, his action is discretionary, it will be
clear to any United States consul that no eligibility determination has been
made. The consul will be free to give such findings as have been made their
appropriate weight, if any, see Cartier v. Secretary of State, 165 U.S.App.D.C.
130, 137, 506 F.2d 191, 198 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947, 95 S.Ct. 1677,
44 L.Ed.2d 101 (1975); Talavera v. Pederson, 334 F.2d 52, 57 (CA6 1964), and
to make his own legal judgment on eligibility.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

67

So ordered.

That section provides:

"The status of an alien, other than an alien crewman, who was inspected and
admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes
an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an
immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence,
and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his
application is approved." (Emphasis added.)
If adjustment of status is denied, and the alien leaves the country, such alien is
free to apply to a United States consul in the country to which he or she is
deported for an immigrant visa. Title 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) was enacted so that
such aliens would not inevitably be required to leave the country and apply to a
United States consul in order to obtain permanent-resident status.