434 U.S.

429
98 S.Ct. 787
54 L.Ed.2d 664

RAYMOND MOTOR TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al.,

Appellants,
v.
Zel S. RICE et al.
No. 76-558.
Argued Nov. 8-9, 1977.
Decided Feb. 21, 1978.

Syllabus
Wisconsin statutes, as a general rule, do not allow trucks longer than 55
feet or pulling more than one other vehicle to be operated on highways
within that State without a permit. Implementing regulations set forth the
conditions under which "trailer train" and other classes of permits will be
issued, and contain a great number of exceptions to the general rule.
Appellant motor carriers were denied permits to operate 65-foot doubletrailer units on certain interstate highways in Wisconsin on the ground that
their proposed operations were not within the narrow scope of the
regulations specifying when "trailer train" permits will be issued.
Appellants then filed suit in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief on the ground that the regulations barring their operation
of 65-foot doubles burden and discriminated against interstate commerce
in violation of the Commerce Clause. At the rial appellants presented
extensive, uncontradicted evidence that the 65-foot doubles are as safe as,
if not safer than, 55-foot singles when operated on limited-access, fourlane divided highways, and also presented uncontradicted evidence that
their operations are disrupted, their costs raised, and their service slowed
by the challenged regulations because they are forced to haul doubles
across the State separately or around the State or to incur delays caused by
using singles instead of doubles to pick up and deliver goods, and are
prevented from accepting interline transfers of 65-foot doubles. In addition
appellants' evidence showed that Wisconsin routinely allows a great
number and variety of vehicles over 55 feet long to operate on state
highways. A three-judge court ruled against appellants. Held : On the

record, the challenged regulations violate the Commerce Clause because

they place a substantial burden on interstate commerce and make no more
than the most speculative contribution to highway safety. The great
number of exceptions to the general 55-foot rule, and especially those that
discriminate in favor of local industry, weaken the presumption of validity
in favor of the general limit, because they undermine the assumption that
the State's own political processes will act as a check on local regulations
that unduly burden interstate commerce. Pp. 439-448.
D.C., 417 F.Supp. 1352, reversed and remanded.
John H. Lederer, Madison, Wis., for appellants.
Albert O. Harriman, Madison, Wis., for appellees.
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider on this appeal whether administrative regulations of the State of

Wisconsin governing the length and configuration of trucks that may be
operated within the State violate the Commerce Clause because they
unconstitutionally burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. The
three-judge District Court held that the regulations are not unconstitutional on
either ground. Because we conclude that they unconstitutionally burden
interstate commerce, we reverse.

* Appellant Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. (Raymond), a Minnesota

corporation with its principal place of business in Minneapolis, is a common
carrier of general commodities by motor vehicle. Operating pursuant to a
certificate of public convenience and necessity granted by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, see 49 U.S.C. 306-308, Raymond provides service
in eastern North Dakota, Minnesota, northern Illinois, and northwestern
Indiana. Its primary interstate route is between Chicago and Minneapolis. It
does not serve any points in Wisconsin.

Appellant Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware (Consolidated), a

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Menlo Park, Cal.,
also is a common carrier of general commodities by motor vehicle.
Consolidated operates nationwide, providing service under a certificate of
public convenience and necessity in 42 States and Canada. Among other routes,
consolidated carries commodities between Chicago, Detroit, and points east,
and Minneapolis and points west to Seattle. Unlike Raymond, Consolidated
does carry commodities between Wisconsin and other States and it maintains

terminals in Milwaukee and Madison where truckloads of goods are dispatched

and received.
4

Both Raymond and Consolidated use two different kinds of trucks. One
consists of a three-axle power unit (tractor) which pulls a single two-axle trailer
that is 40 feet long. The overall length of such a single-trailer unit (single) is 55
feet. This unit has been used on the Nation's highways for many years and is an
industry standard. The other type truck consists of a two-axle tractor which
pulls a single-axle trailer to which a single-axle dolly and a second single-axle
trailer are attached. Each trailer is 27 feet long, and the overall length of such a
double-trailer unit (double) is 65 feet.1

The double, which has come into increasing use in recent years, is thought to
have certain advantages over the single for general commodities shipping.2
Because of these advantages, Raymond would prefer to use doubles on its route
between Chicago and Minneapolis. Consolidated would prefer to use doubles
on its routes between Chicago, Detroit, and points east, and Minneapolis and
points west, as well as on its routes commencing and ending in Milwaukee and
Madison. The most direct route for all of this traffic is over Interstate Highways
90 and 94, both of which cross Wisconsin between Illinois and Minnesota.
State law allows 65-foot doubles to be operated on interstate highways and
access roads in Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, and all of the States west from
Minnesota to Washington through which Interstate Highways 90 and 94 run.

Wisconsin law, however, generally does not allow trucks longer than 55 feet to
be operated on highways within that State. The key statutory provision is
Wis.Stat. 348.07(1) (1975), which sets a limit of 55 feet on the overall length
of a vehicle pulling one trailer.3 Any person operating a single-trailer unit of
greater length must obtain a permit issued by the State Highway Commission.
In addition, 348.08(1) provides that no vehicle pulling more than one other
vehicle shall be operated on a highway without a permit.4

The Commission is authorized to issue various classes of annual permits for the
operation of vehicles that do not conform to the above requirements. In
particular, it may issue "trailer train" permits for the operation of combinations
of more than two vehicles "consist ng of truck tractors, trailers, semitrailers or
wagons which do not exceed a total length of 100 feet," 348.27(6).5 The
Commission may also "impose such reasonable conditions" and "adopt such
reasonable rules" of operation with respect to vehicles operated under permit
"as it deems necessary for the safety of travel and protection of the highways,"
348.25(3), including specification of the routes to be used by permittees.

The Commission has issued administrative regulations setting forth the

conditions under which "trailer train" and other classes of permits will be
issued. Although the Commission is empowered by 348.27(6) to issue "trailer
train" permits to operate double-trailer trucks up to 100 feet long, its regulations
restrict such permits to "the operation of vehicles used for the transporting of
municipal refuse or waste, or for the interstate or intra-state operation without
load of vehicles in transit from manufacturer or dealer to purchaser or dealer, or
for the purpose of repair." Wis.Admin.Code Hy 30.14(3)(a) (June 1975).
"Trailer train" permits also are issued "for the operation of a combination of
three vehicles used for the transporting of milk from the point of production to
the point of first processing," Hy 30.18(3)(a) (June 1976).

II
9

The overture to this lawsuit began when Raymond and Consolidated each
applied to the appropriate Wisconsin officials under 348.27(6) for annual
permits to operate 65-foot doubles on Interstate Highways 90 and 94 between
Illinois and Minnesota and, in Consolidated's case, on short stretches of fourlane divided highways between the interstate highways and freight terminals in
Milwaukee and Madison.6 The permits were denied because appellants'
proposed operations were not within the narrow scope of the administrative
regulations that specify when "trailer train" permits will be issued. Appellants
then fi ed suit in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
on the ground that the regulations barring the proposed operation of 65-foot
doubles burden and discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 3.7 The complaint alleged that the State's
refusal to issue the requested permits disrupts and delays appellants'
transportation of commodities in interstate commerce; that 65-foot doubles are
as safe as, if not safer than, the 55-foot singles that are allowed to operate on
Wisconsin highways without permits; and that the maze of statutory and
administrative exceptions to the general prohibition against operating vehicles
longer than 55 feet results in " 'over-length' permits [being] routinely granted to
classes of vehicles indistinguishable from those of the Plaintiffs in terms of
size, safety, and divisibility of loads . . . ." App. 18.

10

A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281.8

After a pretrial conference, the court directed the State to file an amended
answer setting forth every justification for its refusal to issue the permits
sought, "such as safety, for example." App. 25. The State's amended answer
advanced highway safety as its sole justification. Id., at 27-29. By agreement of
the parties, the case was tried on affidavits, depositions, and exhibits.

11

Appellants presented a great deal of evidence supporting their allegation that

65-foot doubles are as safe as, if not safer than, 55-foot singles when operated
on limited-access, four-lane divided highways. For example, the Deputy
Director of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, Federal Highway
Administration, United States Department of Transportation, testified on
deposition that the Bureau's five-year study of the accident experience of
selected motor carriers that use both types of trucks showed that doubles are
safer than singles in terms of the number of accidents, injuries, and fatalities per
100,000 miles, and in terms of the amount of property damage and number of
injuries and fatalities per accident. The deponent's own expert opinion was that
doubles are safer because of the articulation between the first and second
trailers, which allows greater maneuverability and prevents the back wheels of
the second trailer from deviating from the path of the front wheels of the tractor
(offtracking) as much as the back wheels of a 55-foot single; because loads
typically are distributed more evenly in doubles than in singles; and because
doubles typically have better braking capability than singles.

12

Other experts testified that 65-foot doubles brake as well as 55-foot singles,
maneuver and track better, are less prone to jackknife, and produce less splash
and spray to obscure the vision of drivers in following and passing vehicles.
These experts agreed that the difference in the amount of time needed to pass a
55-foot single and a 65-foot double has no appreciable effe t on motorist safety
on limited-access, four-lane divided highways. Appellants also produced
depositions and affidavits of state highway safety officials from 12 of the States
where 65-foot doubles are allowed on some or all highways; all shared the
opinion that 65-foot doubles are as safe as 55-foot singles.9

13

The State, for reasons unexplained, made no effort to contradict this evidence
of comparative safety with evidence of its own.10 The Chairman of the State
Highway Commission, while acknowledging the Commission's statutory
authority to issue the permits sought by appellants, testified that the regulations
preventing their issuance are not based on an administrative assessment of the
safety of 65-foot doubles, and he himself was "not prepared to make a
statement relative to the safety of these vehicles." App. 250. The reason for the
Commission's adoption of these regulations, according to the Chairman, was its
belief that the people of the State did not want more vehicles over 55 feet long
on the State's highways.11 The State produced no evidence nor has it made any
suggestion in this Court, that 65-foot doubles are less safe than 55-foot singles
because of their extra trailer, as distinguished from their extra length.12

14

Appellants also produced uncontradicted evidence showing that their

operations are disrupted, their costs are raised, and their service is slowed by
the challenged regulations. For example, Consolidated ordinarily finds it faster
and less expensive to use 65-foot doubles to carry interstate freight originating
from or destined for Milwaukee and Madison. To comply with Wisconsin law,
however, an interstate double bound for Wisconsin must stop before entering
the State and detach one of its two trailers. Consolidated then pulls each trailer
separately to the freight terminal in Milwaukee or Madison. Likewise, each
trailer of a double outbound from one of those cities must be pulled across the
Wisconsin state line separately, at which point they are united into a doubletrailer combination. Consolidated maintains a crew of drivers in Wisconsin
whose sole responsibility is to shuttle second trailers to and from the state line.
15

On routes through Wisconsin between Chicago and Minneapolis, both

Consolidated and Raymond are compelled to use 55-foot singles instead of 65foot doubles because each trailer of a double would have to be pulled by a
separate tractor on the portion of the route that is in Wisconsin. On its long
east-west routes from Detroit and Chicago to Seattle, Consolidated must divert
doubles south of Wisc nsin through Missouri and Nebraska in order to avoid
Wisconsin's ban.13 These routes would involve a considerably shorter distance
if Consolidated's trucks could go through Wisconsin.14

16

Finally, appellants' evidence demonstrated that Wisconsin routinely allows a

great number and variety of vehicles over 55 feet long to be operated on the
State's highways. App. 178-181.

17

The three-judge court ruled against appellants. 417 F.Supp. 1352

(W.D.Wis.1976) (per curiam ). The court found that the Wisconsin regulatory
scheme does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. at 1356-1358.
The court also considered "whether the burden imposed upon interstate
commerce outweighs the benefits to the local popul[ace]," id., at 1358, and
concluded that it did not. It thought that appellants had not shown that the
State's refusal to issue permits for appellants' 65-foot doubles had no relation to
highway safety, pointing to the fact that, other things being equal, it takes
longer for a motorist to pass a 65-foot truck than a 55-foot truck. Id., at 1359.
The court considered the expense imposed on appellants to be "of no material
consequence." Id., at 1361. We noted probable jurisdiction. 430 U.S. 914, 97
S.Ct. 1325, 51 L.Ed.2d 592 (1977).

III
18

Appellants challenge both branches of the District Court's holding. First, they
contend that the State's refusal to issue the requested "trailer train" permits

under 348.27(6) burdens interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce

Clause because it substantially interferes with the movement of goods in
interstate commerce and makes no contribution to highway safety. Second, they
argue that 348.27(4), authorizing issuance of "interplant" permits, see n. 5,
supra, discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce
Clause because it allows permits to be issued to carry the products of
Wisconsin industries, but not of other States' industries, over Wisconsin
highways in trucks longer than 55 feet. We find it necessary to address the
second contention only as it bears on the first.
19

By its terms, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . ." Long ago it was settled that even
in the absence of a congressional exercise of this power, the Commerce Clause
prevents the States from erecting barriers to the free flow of interstate
commerce. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852);
see Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-371, 96 S.Ct. 923, 927,
47 L.Ed.2d 55 (1976). At the same time, however, it never has been doubted
that much state legislation, designed to serve legitimate state interests and
applied without discrimination against interstate commerce, does not violate the
Commerce Clause even though it affects commerce. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-532, 69 S.Ct. 657, 661-662, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949);
see Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203-206, 6 L.Ed. 33 (1824); id., at 235
(Johnson, J., concurring). "[I]n areas where activities of legitimate local
concern overlap with the national interests expressed by the Commerce Clause
where local and national powers are concurrentthe Court in the absence of
congressional guidance is called upon to make 'delicate adjustment of the
conflicting state and federal claims,' H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
supra, at 553, 69 S.Ct. 657 (Black, J., dissenting), . . . ." Great A&P Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, supra, 424 U.S. at 371, 96 S.Ct. at 928; see Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2445, 53 L.Ed.2d 383
(1977).

20

In this process of "delicate adjustment," the Court has employed various tests to
express the distinction between permissible and impermissible impact upon
interstate commerce,15 but experience teaches that no single conceptual
approach identifies all of the factors that may bear on a particular case.16 Our
recent decisions make clear that the inquiry necessarily involves a sensitive
consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of
the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce. As the
Court stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844,
847, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970):

21

"Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting
interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges
can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 80 S.Ct. 313, 4 L.Ed.2d 852.
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."

22

Accord, Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, supra, 424 U.S. at 371-372, 96 S.Ct. at
927-928; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804, 96 S.Ct. 2488,
2495, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976); see also Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Comm'n, supra, 423 U.S. at 350, 97 S.Ct., at 2445.

23

In the instant case, appellants do not dispute that a State has a legitimate
interest in regulating motor vehicles using its roads in order to promote
highway safety. Nor do they contend that federal regulation has pre-empted
state regulation of truck length or configuration.17 They argue, however, that
the burden imposed upon interstate commerce by the Wisconsin regulations
challenged here is, in the language of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., "clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Appellants contend that the
regulations were shown by uncontradicted evidence to make no con ribution to
highway safety, while imposing a burden on interstate commerce that is
substantial in terms of expense and delay. They analogize this case to Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 79 S.Ct. 962, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1959),
where the Court invalidated an Illinois law, defended on the ground that it
promoted highway safety, that required trailers of trucks driven within Illinois
to be equipped with contour mudguards.

24

The State replies that the general rule of Pike is not applicable to a State's
regulation of motor vehicles in the promotion of safety. It contends that we
should be guided, instead, by South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510, 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938), which upheld over
Commerce Clause objections a state law that set stricter limitations on truck
width and weight than did surrounding States' laws. The State emphasizes that
Barnwell Bros. applied a "rational relation" test rather than a "balancing" test,
and argues that its regulations bear a rational relation to highway safety: Longer
trucks take longer to pass or be passed than shorter trucks.

25

We acknowledge, as did the Court in Bibb, that there is language in Barnwell

Bros. "which, read in isolation from . . . later decisions . . ., would suggest that
no showing of burden on interstate commerce is sufficient to invalidate local
safety regulations in absence of some element of discrimination against
interstate commerce." 359 U.S., at 528-529, 79 S.Ct., at 967. But Bibb rejected
such a suggestion by stating the test to be applied to state highway regulation in
terms similar in principle to the subsequent formulation in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.:

26

"Unless we can conclude on the whole record that 'the total effect of the law as
a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or
problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate
commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it' . . . we must
uphold the statute." 359 U.S., at 524, 79 S.Ct. at 965, quoting Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775-776, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1523, 89
L.Ed. 1915 (1945).

27

Thus, we cannot accept the State's contention that the inquiry under the
Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose
against the degree of interference with interstate commerce.

28

Nevertheless, it also is true that the Court has been most reluctant to invalidate
under the Commerce Clause " 'state legislation in the field of safety where the
propriety of local regulation has long been recognized.' " Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., supra, 397 U.S. at 143, 90 S.Ct. at 848, quoting Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, supra, 325 U.S. at 796, 65 S.Ct. at 1532 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). In no field has this deference to state regulation been greater than
that of highway safety regulation. See, e. g., Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S.
610, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385 (1915); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52
S.Ct. 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167 (1932); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 60 S.Ct.
726, 84 L.Ed. 969 (1940); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949).18 Thus, those who would challenge
state regulations said to promote highway safety must overcome a "strong
presumption of [their] validity." Bibb, supra, 359 U.S., at 524, 79 S.Ct. at 965.

29

Despite the strength of this presumption we are persuaded by the record in this
case that the challenged regulations unconstitutionally burden interstate
commerce. As we have shown, appellants produced a massive array of
evidence to disprove the State's assertion that the regulations make some
contribution to highway safety. The State, for its part, virtually defaulted in its
defense of the regulations as a safety measure. Both it and the District Court
were content to assume that the regulations contribute to highway safety

because appellants' 65-foot doubles take longer to pass or be passed than the
55-foot singles. Yet appellants produced uncontradicted evidence that the
difference in passing time does not pose an appreciable threat to motorists
traveling on limited access, four-lane divided highways.19 They also showed
that the Highway Commission routinely allows many other vehicles 55 feet or
longer to use the State's highways. In short, the State's assertion that the
challenged regulations contribute to highway safety is rebutted by appellants'
evidence and undercut by the maze of exemptions from the general trucklength limit that the State itself allows.20
30

Moreover, appellants demonstrated, again without contradiction, that the

regulations impose a substantial burden on the interstate movement of goods.
The regulations substantially increase the cost of such movement, a fact which
is not, as the District Court thought, entirely irrelevant.21 In addition, the
regulations slow the movement of goods in interstate commerce by forcing
appellants to haul doubles across the State separately, to haul doubles around
the State altogether, or to incur the delays caused by using singles instead of
doubles to pick up and deliver goods. See Bibb, 359 U.S., at 527, 79 S.Ct., at
966. Finally, the regulations prevent appellants from accepting interline
transfers of 65-foot doubles for movement through Wisconsin from carriers
that operate only in the 33 States where the doubles are legal. See id., at 527528, 79 S.Ct., at 966-967.22 In our view, the burden imposed on interstate c
mmerce by Wisconsin's regulations is no less than that imposed by the statute
invalidated in Bibb.23

31

One other consideration, although not decisive, lends force to our conclusion
that the challenged regulations cannot stand. As we have noted, Wisconsin's
regulatory scheme contains a great number of exceptions to the general rule that
vehicles over 55 feet long cannot be operated on highways within the State. At
least one of these exceptions discriminates on its face in favor of Wisconsin
industries and against the industries of other States,24 and there are indications
in the record that a number of the other exceptions, although neutral on their
face, were enacted at the instance of, and primarily benefit, important
Wisconsin industries. Viewed realistically, these exceptions may be the product
of compromise between forces within the State that seek to retain the State's
general truck-length limit, and industries within the State that complain that the
general limit is unduly burdensome. Exemptions of this kind, however, weaken
the presumption in favor of the validity of the general limit, because they
undermine the assumption that the State's own political processes will act as a
check on local regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce. See n.18,
supra.

IV
32

On this record, we are persuaded that the challenged regulations violate the
Commerce Clause because they place a substantial burden on interstate
commerce and they cannot be said to make more than the most speculative
contribution to highway safety. Our holding is a narrow one, for we do not
decide whether laws of other States restricting the operation of trucks over 55
feet long, or of double-trailer trucks, would be upheld if the evidence produced
on the safety issue were not so overwhelmingly one-sided as in this case.25 The
State of Wisconsin has failed to make even a colorable showing that its
regulations contribute to highway safety. The judgment of the District Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

33

It is so ordered.

34

Mr. Justice STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

35

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice
BRENNAN, and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join, concurring.

36

I join the opinion of the Court, but I add these comments to emphasize the
narrow scope of today's decision.

37

First, the Court's reliance on Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S.Ct.
844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970), does not signal, for me, a new approach to review
of state highway safety regulations under the Commerce Clause. Wisconsin
argues that the Court previously has refused to balance safety considerations
against burdens on interstate commerce. Brief for Appellees 8. This contention
misreads Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 79 S.Ct. 962, 3 L.Ed.2d
1003 (1959), which recognized the Court's responsibility to weigh the national
interest in free-flowing commerce against " 'slight or problematical' " safety
interests. Id., at 524, 79 S.Ct. at 964, quotingSouthern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex
rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 776, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1523, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945).

38

Second, the reliance on Pike should not be read to equate the factual balance
struck here with the balance established in Pike regarding the Arizona Fruit and
Vegetable Standardization Act. Arizona prohibited interstate shipment of
cantaloupes not "packed in regular compact arrangement in closed standard
containers." 397 U.S., at 138, 90 S.Ct., at 845, quoting Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 3503 C (Supp.1969). Application of the prohibition to the appellee grower would

have prevented it from processing its cantaloupes just across the state lin in
California, and would have required it to construct a packing facility in
Arizona. The State attempted to justify this burden on interstate commerce
solely by its interest "to promote and preserve the reputation of Arizona
growers by prohibiting deceptive packaging." 397 U.S., at 143, 90 S.Ct., at 848.
More specifically, Arizona wanted the appellee to package the cantaloupes in
the State so that the high-quality fruit could be advertised as grown in Arizona
rather than California. Although recognizing the legitimacy of the State's
interest, the Court refused to accord the concern much weight in the Commerce
Clause balancing:
39

"[T]he State's tenuous interest in having the company's cantaloupes identified

as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the requirement that the
company build and operate an unneeded $200,000 packing plant in the State."
Id., at 145, 90 S.Ct., at 849.

40

In short, despite the unchallenged existence and legitimacy of the State's

interest, the Court determined that the interest was not important enough to
justify the burden on commerce.

41

Neither the Pike opinion nor today's decision suggests that a similar balance
would be struck when a State legitimately asserts the existence of a safety
justification for a regulation. In Pike itself the Court noted that it did not
confront " 'state legislation in the field of safety where the propriety of local
regulation has long been recognized.' " Id., at 143, 90 S.Ct., at 848, quoting
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S., at 796, 65 S.Ct., at
1532 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In other words, if safety justifications are not
illusory, the Court will not second-guess legislative judgment about their
importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce. I
therefore join the opinion of the Court because its ultimate balancing does not
depart from this principle, as stated in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines:

42

"These safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged

in court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to
determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective. Policy
decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field." 359
U.S., at 524, 79 S.Ct., at 965.

43

Here, the Court does not engage in a balance of policies; it does not make a
legislative choice. Instead, after searching the factual record developed by the
parties, it concludes that the safety interests have not been shown to exist as a

matter of law.
44

Third, the illusory nature of the safety interests in this case is illustrated not
only by the overwhelming empirical data submitted by the appellants, but also
by the State's willingness to permit the use of oversized vehicles under the
numerous administrative exceptions for in-state manufacturers and important
Wisconsin industries. See ante, at 433-434, nn. 4-5, and 446-447. From 1973
through June 1975, the State issued 43,900 annual or general permits for the
use of vehicles longer than 65 feet. Brief of Plaintiffs before the District Court
in Case No. 75-C-172, App.C, 10-11. An additional 16,760 single-trip permits
were granted during the same period. Id., at 11. Despite the alleged safety
problems, the State regularly permitted the use of oversized vehicles merely to
lower the cost of transportation for in-state industries. The bulkiness of the
cargoes frequently did not justify the permits. See Deposition of Robert T.
Huber, Chairman of the Wisconsin State Highway Commission, 7-9, 21;
Deposition of Wayne Volk, Chief Traffic Engineer, Wisconsin Department of
Transportation, 31, 36, 49-50, 53. American Motors, one of the State's largest
employers, received permission to use oversized trucks on the 45-mile stretch
of highway between Milwaukee and Kenosha, even though the State's Chief
Traffic Engineer conceded that the road was heavily traveled. Deposition of
Wayne Volk, supra, at 32. Furthermore, Stoughton Body Co., a Wisconsin
manufacturer of trailers, received permits to pull oversized, double-trailer
vehicles on a two-lane highway to facilitate out-of-state deliveries. Id., at 52-54.
The record therefore suggests that the State in practice does not believe that
oversized, double-trailer vehicles present a threat to highway safety.

45

Nineteen years after Bibb, then, the Court has been presented with another of
those cases"few in number"in which highway safety regulations
unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. See 359 U.S., at 529, 79 S.Ct.,
at 967. The contour-mudflaps law burdened the flow of commerce through
Illinois in 1959 just as the length and configuration regulations burden the flow
through Wisconsin today. It was shown that neither the mudflaps law nor the
regulations contributed to highway safety. Giving the same legislative leeway
to Wisconsin that the Court gave to Illinois, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines
requires reversal of the judgment of the District Court.

Appendix A of the District Court opinion contains illustrations of both kinds of

trucks. 417 F.Supp. 1352, 1363 (W.D.Wis.1976) (per curiam ).

A double can carry a greater volume of general commodities than a single,

often without exceeding legal limits on gross vehicle weights. Thus, fewer

doubles than singles are needed to carry a given amount of cargo, with
consequent savings in fuel and drivers' time. In addition, because the trailers of
a double can be routed separately, cargo can be picked up from various
shippers, dispatched, and delivered to various destinations more quickly by use
of doubles than singles.
3

Subsequent to the District Court's decision, this section was amended to allow
single-trailer units up to 59 feet long to be operated without a permit "providing
the cargo or cargo space of the semitrailer is 45 feet or less in length and the
truck tractor is within the statutory limit in sub. (1)." 1977 Wis.Laws, ch. 29,
1487h, adding 348.07(2)(g).
Exempted from the length limit of 348.07(1) are combinations of mobile
homes and their towing vehicles, if their overall length does not exceed 60 feet,
348.07(2)(d), and implements of husbandry operated temporarily upon the
highway, 348.07(2)(e).

The District Court assumed that 348.08(1) generally allows double-trailer

trucks up to 55 feet long to be operated without permits. See 417 F.Supp., at
1354-1355. The State concedes that this assumption was erroneous. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 34-37. The section, however, does exempt from its permit requirement
combinations of two vehicles pulled by a third and "being transported by the
drive-away method in saddle-mount combination," where overall length does
not exceed 55 feet, 348.08(1)(a); combinations of farm tractors pulling two
trailers or one trailer and one implement of husbandry, if the combination is
used exclusively for farming and its overall length does not exceed 55 feet,
348.08(1)(b); and "tour trains" operated primarily on county and municipal
roads for recreational or educational purposes, 348.08(1)(c). The terms
"drive-away method" and "saddle-mount combination" in 348.08(1)(a) are
not defined by the statute or regulations, but they apparently refer to a method
of towing one four-wheel motor vehicle by resting its front wheels on the back
of a second four-wheel motor vehicle. See 49 CFR 390.9, 393.71, and
393.17 (1976).

The Commission also is authorized to issue annual permits to operate

overlength vehicles "to industries and to their agent motor carriers owning and
operating oversize vehicles in connection with interplant, and from plant to state
line, operations in this state," 348.27(4); "to pipeline companies or operators
or public service corporations for transportation of poles, pipe, girders and
similar materials . . . used in its [sic ] business," 348.27(5); "to companies and
individuals hauling peeled or unpeeled pole-length forest products used in its
[sic ] business," provided that overall length does not exceed 65 feet,
348.27(5); "to auto carriers operating 'haulaways' specially constructed to

transport motor vehicles," provided that overall length does not exceed 65 feet,
348.27(5); "to licensed mobile home transport companies and to licensed
mobile home manufacturers and dealers authorizing them to transport oversize
mobile homes," 348.27(7); to persons transporting "loads of pole length and
pulpwood exceeding statutory length . . . limitations . . . for a distance not to
exceed 3 miles from the Michigan-Wisconsin state line," 348.27(9); and to
other persons "[f]or good cause in specified instances . . . for a specified period
. . . [to] allow loads exceeding the size . . . limitations imposed by this chapter,"
348.27(3).
Section 348.25(4) provides that permits "shall be issued only for the
transporting of a single article or vehicle which exceeds statutory size . . .
limitations and which cannot reasonably be divided or reduced TO COMPLY
WITH STATUTORY SIZE . . . LIMITATIONS . . . ." the Commission by
regulation, however, exempts general, industrial interplant, and double-trailer
milk truck permits from this requirement. Wis.Admin.Code Hy 30.01(3)(c)
(June 1976). It appears that the Commission interprets 348.25(4) to require
only that it would be less economical, rather than physically impossible, to
divide a load. See App. 200, 210, 211-212.
6

Consolidated also sought authority to operate over Interstate Highway 894, an

alternative route which bypasses the Milwaukee metropolitan area.

The complaint named as defendants, individually and in their official capacities,

Rice, the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation; Huber, the
Chairman of the Wisconsin Highway Commission; Sweda and Young,
members of the Commission; Volk, the Chief Traffic Engineer of Wisconsin;
Versnik, the commanding officer of the Wisconsin State Patrol; and LaFollette,
the Attorney General of Wisconsin. We shall refer to the defendants
collectively as "the State."
The complaint also stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which the District Court rejected and which we do not
reach.

Section 2281 was repealed by Pub.L. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119, the day before the
three-judge court's decision in this case. The repeal, however, did not affect
actions commenced on or before its date of enactment. See 7 of Pub.L. 94381, 90 Stat. 1120.

According to a stipulated exhibit, at the time of trial only 17 States and the
District of Columbia did not allow 65-foot doubles on their highways. A few
more permitted their operation on designated highways, and the rest allowed
them on all highways. App. 278. For a more detailed summary of current state

laws regulating truck length and configuration, see American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials, Legal Maximum Dimensions and
Weights of Motor Vehicles Compared with AASHTO Standards (1976).
10

The State did introduce expert testimony that occupants of smaller vehicles are
more likely to be killed in collisions with large trucks than occupants of larger
vehicles. The study upon which this testimony was based did not distinguish
between 55-foot singles and 65-foot doubles, and the State's expert witness had
no opinion as to their relative safety. App. 154.

11

He also said that the state legislature, in response to this feeling, had declined to
enact legislation that would have allowed 65-foot doubles to be operated
without permits. He interpreted this legislative inaction as evidence of a
legislative intent that the Commission should not issue permits for such trucks,
despite its statutory power to do so.

12

Indeed, the State agrees that "[a]ppellants have shown that 65 foot twin trailers
have as good a safety record as other large vehicles." Brief for Appellees 13.

13

It appears that 65-foot doubles must be routed as far south as Missouri because
Iowa, which Interstate Highway 80 crosses on an east-west route, also bans 65foot doubles.

14

An officer of Consolidated estimated that it costs the company in excess of $2

million annually to make the various adjustments in operations that are required
by Wisconsin law. An officer of Raymond estimated that the company could
save up to $63,000 annually on fuel and up to $102,000 annually on drivers'
wages if it could use 65-foot doubles on its route between Chicago and
Minneapolis.

15

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 319, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1852),

distinguished between subjects "imperatively demanding a single uniform rule"
and subjects "imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the
local necessities." Other cases have distinguished between state regulations that
affect interstate commerce "directly," and those that affect it "indirectly." E. g.,
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488, 24 L.Ed. 547 (1878); Smith v. Alabama, 124
U.S. 465, 482, 8 S.Ct. 564, 571, 31 L.Ed. 508 (1888). And many cases have
distinguished between regulations that are an exercise of the State's "police
powers," and those that are "regulations of commerce." E. g., Railroad Co. v.
Fuller, 17 Wall. 560, 570, 21 L.Ed. 710 (1873); Smith v. Alabama, supra, at
482, 8 S.Ct., at 571.

16

See, e. g., Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44, 47 S.Ct. 267, 271, 71
L.Ed. 524 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362-

363, 63 S.Ct. 307, 319, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 768-769, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1519-1520, 89 L.Ed.
1915 (1945); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 552-553, 65
S.Ct. 657, 678-679, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
17

Congress has considered pre-empting this field, but it has not acted. See, e. g.,
S.Rep.No. 93-1111, p. 10 (1974); Hearings on Transportation and the New
Energy Policies (Truck Sizes and Weights) before the Subcommittee on
Transportation of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974).

18

The Court's special deference to state highway regulations derives in part from
the assumption that where such regulations do not discriminate on their face
against nterstate commerce, their burden usually falls on local economic
interests as well as other States' economic interests, thus insuring that a State's
own political processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome
regulations. Compare South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.,
Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 187, 58 S.Ct. 510, 514, 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938), with Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S., at 783, 65 S.Ct., at 1527. It
also derives from a recognition that the States shoulder primary responsibility
for the construction, maintenance, and policing of their highways, and that
highway conditions may vary widely from State to State. See Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523-524, 79 S.Ct. 962, 964, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003
(1959); Barnwell Bros., supra, 303 U.S. at 187, 58 S.Ct. at 514.

19

The District Court, without mentioning this evidence, suggested that language
in Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 144, 47 S.Ct. 548, 550, 71 L.Ed. 966 (1927),
and Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315, 45 S.Ct. 324, 325, 69 L.Ed. 623
(1925), established a principle "that for purposes of judicial review of state
highway legislation, size restrictions might be deemed inherently tied to public
safety . . . ." 417 F.Supp., at 1360. The language relied upon does not go so far,
and it antedates the era of the limited-access, four-lane divided highways
involved in this case. Size restrictions, like other highway safety regulations,
are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, but this presumption cannot
justify a court in closing its eyes to uncontroverted evidence of record.

20

The State's failure to present any evidence to rebut appellants' showing in itself
sets this case apart from Barnwell Bros., see 303 U.S., at 196, 58 S.Ct. at 519,
and even from Bibb, see 359 U.S., at 525, 79 S.Ct., at 965.

21

The District Court said: "That compliance with Wisconsin regulations imposes
added costs upon the plaintiffs is a fact of no material consequence." 417
F.Supp., at 1361, citing Bibb, supra, 359 U.S., at 526, 79 S.Ct., at 966. In Bibb,

the Court thought that the cost to carriers of installing the mudguards required
by Illinois would not, in itself, require invalidation of the Illinois law. See 359
U.S., at 526, 79 S.Ct., at 966. But the Court also made it clear that, "[c]ost
taken into consideration with other factors might be relevant in some cases to
the issue of burden on commerce." Ibid.
22

The State contends that its regulations do not interfere with interlining as
seriously as the Illinois law at issue in Bibb because 65-foot doubles "may
freely be hauled through Wisconsin, but, of course, they must be hauled one at
a time. . . . This does not prevent interlining, it just makes it more expensive."
Brief for Appellees 11. This contention overlooks the fact that in Bibb
interlining could have continued if either the originating or the connecting
carriers had been willing to bear the expense of installing the contour
mudguards required by Illinois law.

23

The State argues that this case is distinguishable from Bibb because the contour
mudguards required by Illinois were illegal in Arkansas, and the straight
mudguards required by Arkansas were illegal in Illinois. Here, by contrast, the
55-foot singles that are legal in Wisconsin are not illegal in any other State. But
the State fails to appreciate that the conflict between the Illinois and Arkansas
requirements in Bibb was important because of the added burden of delay and
expense that it imposed on carriers operating between the two States. The
conflict would have required such carriers to stop somewhere between Illinois
and Arkansas, either to shift cargo from one trailer to another, 359 U.S., at 526,
79 S.Ct., at 966, or to change mudguards on the original trailer, id., at 527, 79
S.Ct., at 966.
We also note that the interference with interlining that weighed in the Bibb
decision did not result from the conflict between the Illinois and Arkansas
requirements, but rather from the fact that many originating carriers did not
operate in Illinois and hence "would not be expected to equip [their] trailers
with contour mudguards." Id., at 528, 79 S.Ct., at 967.

24

Under Wis.Stat. 348.27(4) (1975), the Commission issues permits to

Wisconsin industries and their agent motor carriers to transport goods in trucks
over 55 feet long from plants in Wisconsin to the state line, and thence to
markets in other States, but it does not issue permits to industries with plants i
other States to transport goods in trucks over 55 feet long through Wisconsin to
markets in other States. The District Court's sua sponte speculation that
industries in States other than Wisconsin also might be eligible for permits
under 348.27(4), see 417 F.Supp., at 1357 n.9, is refuted by the record, see
App. 257-258, and was disavowed by the State, Tr. of Oral Arg. 30; see Brief
for Appellees 4.

Given our conclusion that the regulations preventing issuance of the requested
permits unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce, we find it unnecessary
to decide whether appellants would be entitled to relief solely on the basis of
the discrimination against interstate commerce embodied in 348.27(4).
Compare Brief for Appellees 4, and Brief for Association of American
Railroads as Amicus Curiae 20, with Reply Brief for Appellants 39. Neither do
we intimate that nondiscriminatory exceptions to general length, width, or
weight limits are inherently suspect. Cf. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 391396, 52 S.Ct. 581, 586-588, 7 L.Ed. 1167 (1932).
25

As one commentator has written, Commerce Clause adjudication must depend

in large part "upon the thoroughness with which the lawyers perform their task
in the conduct of constitutional litigation. Here, as in many other fields,
constitutionality is conditioned upon the facts, and to the lawyers the courts are
entitled to look for garnering and presenting the facts." Dowling, Interstate
Commerce and State Power, 27 Va.L.Rev. 1, 27-28 (1940).