234 U.S.

342
34 S.Ct. 833
58 L.Ed. 1341

HOUSTON, EAST & WEST TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY

and Houston & Shreveport Railroad Company et al., Appts.,
v.
UNITED STATES, the Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
No. 567.

TEXAS & RACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Appts.,

v.
UNITED STATES, the Interstate Commerce Commission et al.
No. 568.
Nos. 567 and 568.
Argued October 28 and 29, 1913.
Decided June 8, 1914.
[Syllabus from pages 342-344 intentionally omitted]
Messrs. Hiram M. Garwood, James G. Wilson, and Maxwell Evarts for
appellants in No. 567.
Messrs. Thomas J. Freeman, George Thompson, and W. L. Hall for
appellants in No. 568.
Assistant Attorney General Denison and Mr. Thurlow M. Gordon for the
United States.
Mr. P. J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Messrs. R. G. Pleasant, Luther M. Walter, John S. Burchmore, M. W.
Borders, and W. M. Barrow for intervener, the Railroad Commission of
Louisiana, in No. 567.

Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court:

These suits were brought in the commerce court by the Houston, East & West
Texas Railway Company and the Houston & Shreveport Railroad Company,
and by the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, respectively, to set aside an
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, dated March 11, 1912, upon the
ground that it exceeded the Commission's authority. Other railroad companies1
intervened in support of the petitions, and the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Railroad Commission of Louisiana intervened in opposition. The
petitions were dismissed. 205 Fed. 380, 391.

The order of the Interstate Commerce Commission was made in a proceeding

initiated in March, 1911, by the Railroad Commission of Louisiana. The
complaint was that the appellants, and other interstate carriers, maintained
unreasonable rates from Shreveport, Louisiana, to various points in Texas, and,
further, that these carriers, in the adjustment of rates over their respective lines,
unjustly discriminated in favor of traffic within the state of Texas, and against
similar traffic between Louisiana and Texas. The carriers filed answers;
numerous pleas of intervention by shippers and commercial bodies were
allowed; testimony was taken and arguments were heard.

The gravamen of the complaint, said the Interstate Commerce Commission,

was that the carriers made rates out of Dallas and other Texas points into
eastern Texas which were much lower than those which they extended into
Texas from Shreveport. The situation may be briefly described: Shreveport,
Louisiana, is about 40 miles from the Texas state line, and 231 miles from
Houston, Texas, on the line of the Houston, East & West Texas and Houston &
Shreveport Companies (which are affiliated in interest); it is 189 miles from
Dallas, Texas, on the line of the Texas & Pacific. Shreveport competes with
both cities for the trade of the intervening territory. The rates on these lines
from Dallas and Houston, respectively, eastward to intermediate points in
Texas, were much less, according to distance, than from Shreveport westward
to the same points. It is undisputed that the difference was substantial, and
injuriously affected the commerce of Shreveport. It appeared, for example, that
a rate of 60 cents carried first-class traffic a distance of 160 miles to the
eastward from Dallas, while the same rate would carry the same class of traffic
only 55 miles into Texas from Shreveport. The first-class rate from Houston to
Lufkin, Texas, 118.2 miles, was 50 cents per 100 pounds, while the rate from
Shreveport to the same point, 112.5 miles, was 69 cents. The rate on wagons
from Dallas to Marshall, Texas, 147.7 miles was 36.8 cents, and from
Shreveport to Marshall, 42 miles, 56 cents. The rate on furniture from Dallas to

Longview, Texas, 124 miles, was 24.8 cents, and that from Shreveport to
Longview, 65.7 miles was 35 cents. These instances of differences in rates are
merely illustrative; they serve to indicate the character of the rate adjustment.
4

The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the interstate class rates out
of Shreveport to named Texas points were unreasonable, and it established
maximum class rates for this traffic. These rates, we understand, were
substantially the same as the class rates fixed by the Railroad Commission of
Texas, and charged by the carriers, for transportation for similar distances in
that state. The Interstate Commerce Commission also found that the carriers
maintained 'higher rates from Shreveport to points in Texas' than were in force
'from cities in Texas to such points under substantially similar conditions and
circumstances,' and that thereby 'an unlawful and undue preference and
advantage' was given to the Texas cities, and a 'discrimination' that was 'undue
and unlawful' was effected against Shreveport. In order to correct this
discrimination, the carriers were directed to desist from charging higher rates
for the transportation of any commodity from Shreveport to Dallas and
Houston, respectively, and intermediate than were contemporaneously charged
for the carriage of such commodity from Dallas and Houston toward Shreveport
for equal distances, as the Commission found that relation of rates to be
reasonable. 23 Inters. Com. Rep. 31, 46-48.

The order in question is set forth in the margin.2 The report states that under
this order it will be the duty of the companies 'to duly and justly equalize the
terms and conditions' upon which they will extend 'transportation to traffic of a
similar character, moving into Texas from Shreveport, with that moving wholly
within Texas,' but that, in effecting such equalization, the class scale rates as
prescribed shall not be exceeded.

In their petition in the commerce court, the appellants assailed the order in its
entirety, but subsequently they withdrew their opposition to the fixing of
maximum class rates, and these rates were put in force by the carriers in May,
1912. The attack was continued upon that portion of the order which prohibited
the charge of higher rates for carrying articles from Shreveport into Texas than
those charged for eastward traffic from Dallas and Houston, respectively, for
equal distances. There are, it appears, commodity rates fixed by the Railroad
Commission of Texas for intrastate hauls, which are substantially less than the
class, or standard, rates prescribed by that Commission; and thus the
commodity rates charged by the carriers from Dallas and Houston eastward to
Texas points are less than the rates which they demand for the transportation of
the same articles for like distances from Shreveport into Texas. The present
controversy relates to these commodity rates.

The point of the objection to the order is that, as the discrimination found by
the Commission to be unjust arises out of the relation of intrastate rates,
maintained under state authority, to interstate rates that have been upheld as
reasonable, its correction was beyond the Commission's power. Manifestly the
order might be complied with, and the discrimination avoided, either by
reducing the interstate rates from Shreveport to the level of the competing
intrastate rates, or by raising these intrastate rates to the level of the interstate
rates, or by such reduction in the one case and increase in the other as would
result in equality. But it is urged that, so far as the interstate rates were
sustained by the Commission as reasonable, the Commission was without
authority to compel their reduction in order to equalize them with the lower
intrastate rates. The holding of the commerce court was that the order relieved
the appellants from further obligation to observe the intrastate rates, and that
they were at liberty to comply with the Commission's requirements by
increasing these rates sufficiently to remove the forbidden discrimination. The
invalidity of the order in this aspect is challenged upon two grounds:

(1) That Congress is impotent to control the intrastate charges of an interstate

carrier even to the extent necessary to prevent injurious discrimination against
interstate traffic; and

(2) That, if it be assumed that Congress has this power, still it has not been
exercised, and hence the action of the Commission exceeded the limits of the
authority which has been conferred upon it.

10

First. It is unnecessary to repeat what has frequently been said by this court
with respect to the complete and paramount character of the power confided to
Congress to regulate commerce among the several states. It is of the essence of
this power that, where it exists, it dominates. Interstate trade was not left to be
destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local government. The purpose was to
make impossible the recurrence of the evils which had overwhelmed the
Confederation, and to provide the necessary basis of national unity by insuring
'uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating state legislation.'
By virtue of the comprehensive terms of the grant, the authority of Congress is
at all times adequate to meet the varying exigencies that arise, and to protect the
national interest by securing the freedom of interstate commercial intercourse
from local control. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 224, 6 L. ed. 23, 70, 76;
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446, 6 L. ed. 678, 688; Mobile County v.
Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 696, 697, 26 L. ed. 238, 240; Smith v. Alabama, 124
U. S. 465, 473, 31 L. ed. 508, 510, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep.
564; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 47, 53, 54, 56 L. ed. 327, 345, 347, 348, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44,

32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v.

Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 398, 399, 57 L. ed. 1511, 1540, 1541, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.)
1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729.
11

Congress is empowered to regulate,that is, to provide the law for the

government of interstate commerce; to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for its
'protection and advancement' (The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564, 19 L. ed.
999, 1001); to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and insure its safety'
(Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 696, 697, 29 L. ed. 238-240); 'to
foster, protect, control, and restrain' (Second Employers' Liability Cases
[Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.] 223 U. S. 1, 47, 53, 54, 56 L. ed.
327, 345, 347, 348, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A.
875). Its authority, extending to these interstate carriers as instruments of
interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control their operations
in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic
that the control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the
efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under
which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without
molestation or hindrance. As it is competent for Congress to legislate to these
ends, unquestionably it may seek their attainment by requiring that the agencies
of interstate commerce shall not be used in such manner as to cripple, retard, or
destroy it. The fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce, as well
as of interstate commerce, does not derogate from the complete and paramount
authority of Congress over the latter, or preclude the Federal power from being
exerted to prevent the intrastate operations of such carriers from being made a
means of injury to that which has been confided to Federal care. Wherever the
interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the
government of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and not
the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for otherwise
Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority, and the
state, and not the nation, would be supreme within the national field. Baltimore
& O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 618, 55 L. ed.
878, 882, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20,
26, 27, 56 L. ed. 72, 74, 75, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 3 N. C. C. A. 822; Second
Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U.
S. 48, 51, 56 L. ed. 345, 346, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C.
C. A. 875; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co. 224 U. S.
194, 205, 213, 56 L. ed. 729, 733, 737, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Minnesota Rate
Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 431, 57 L. ed. 1554, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.)
1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Behrens, decided April 27,
1914 [233 U. S. 473, 58 L. ed. , 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 646].

12

In Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra, the

argument against the validity of the hours of service act (March 4, 1907, chap.
2939, 34 Stat. at L. 14, 15, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1321) involved the
consideration that the interstate and intrastate transactions of the carriers were
so interwoven that it was utterly impracticable for them to divide their
employees so that those who were engaged in interstate commerce should be
confined to that commerce exclusively. Employees dealing with the movement
of trains were employed in both sorts of commerce; but the court held that this
fact did not freclude the exercise of Federal power. As Congress could limit the
hours of labor of those engaged in interstate transportation, it necessarily
followed that its will could not be frustrated by prolonging the period of service
through other requirements of the carriers, or by the commingling of duties
relating to interstate and intrastate operations. Again, in Southern R. Co. v.
United States, 222 U. S. 20, 26, 27, 56 L. ed. 72, 74, 75, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 3
N. C. C. A. 822, the question was presented whether the amendment to the
safety appliance act (March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. at L. 943, chap. 976, U. S. Comp.
Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1314) was within the power of Congress in view of the fact
that the statute was not confined to vehicles that were used in interstate traffic,
but also embraced those used in intrastate traffic. The court answered
affirmatively, because there was such a close relation between the two classes
of traffic moving over the same railroad as to make it certain that the safety of
the interstate traffic, and of those employed in its movement, would be
promoted in a real and substantial sense by applying the requirements of the act
to both classes of vehicles. So, in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra,
it was insisted that while Congress had the authority to regulate the liability of
a carrier for injuries sustained by one employee through the negligence of
another, where all were engaged in interstate commerce, that power did not
embrace instances where the negligent employee was engaged in intrastate
commerce. The court said that this was a mistaken theory, as the causal
negligence, when operating injuriously upon an employee engaged in interstate
commerce, had the same effect with respect to that commerce as if the
negligent employee were also engaged therein. The decision in Employers'
Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463, 52 L. ed. 297, 28
Sup. Ct. Rep. 141, is not opposed, for the statute there in question (June 11,
1906, chap. 3073, 34 Stat. at L. 232, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1316)
sought to regulate the liability of interstate carriers for injuries to any employee
even though his employment had no connection whatever with interstate
commerce. See Illinois C. R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 58 L. ed. , 34
Sup. Ct. Rep. 646.

13

While these decisions sustaining the Federal power relate to measures adopted
in the interest of the safety of persons and property, they illustrate the principle

that Congress, in the exercise of its paramount power, may prevent the common
instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being
used in their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce. This is
not to say that Congress possesses the authority to regulate the internal
commerce of a state, as such, but that it does possess the power to foster and
protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or appropriate
to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate carriers may thereby be
controlled.
14

This principle is applicable here. We find no reason to doubt that Congress is

entitled to keep the highways of interstate communication open to interstate
traffic upon fair and equal terms. That an unjust discrimination in the rates of a
common carrier, by which one person or locality is unduly favored as against
another under substantially similar conditions of traffic, constitutes an evil, is
undeniable; and where this evil consists in the action of an interstate carrier in
unreasonably discriminating against interstate traffic over its line, the authority
of Congress to prevent it is equally clear. It is immaterial, so far as the
protecting power of Congress is concerned, that the discrimination arises from
intrastate rates as compared with interstate rates. The use of the instrument of
interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner so as to inflict injury upon that
commerce, or some part thereof, furnishes abundant ground for Federal
intervention. Nor can the attempted exercise of state authority alter the matter,
where Congress has acted, for a state may not authorize the carrier to do that
which Congress is entitled to forbid and has forbidden.

15

It is to be notedas the government has well said in its argument in support of

the Commission's orderthat the power to deal with the relation between the
two kinds of rates, as a relation, lies exclusively with Congress. It is manifest
that the state cannot fix the relation of the carrier's interstate and intrastate
charges without directly interfering with the former, unless it simply follows
the standard set by Federal authority. This question was presented with respect
to the long and short haul provision of the Kentucky Constitution, adopted in
1891, which the court had before it in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Eubank, 184
U. S. 27, 46 L. ed. 416, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277. The state court had construed this
provision as embracing a long haul, from a place outside to one within the state,
and a shorter haul on the same line and in the same direction between points
within the state. This court held that, so construed, the provision was invalid as
being a regulation of interstate commerce because 'it linked the interstate rate
to the rate for the shorter haul, and thus the interstate charge was directly
controlled by the state law.' See 230 U. S. pp. 428, 429. It is for Congress to
supply the needed correction where the relation between intrastate and
interstate rates presents the evil to be corrected, and this it may do completely,

by reason of its control over the interstate carrier in all matters having such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is necessary or
appropriate to exercise the control for the effective government of that
commerce.
16

It is also clear that, in removing the injurious discriminations against interstate

traffic arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates, Congress is not
bound to reduce the latter below what it may deem to be a proper standard, fair
to the carrier and to the public. Otherwise, it could prevent the injury to
interstate commerce only by the sacrifice of its judgment as to interstate rates.
Congress is entitled to maintain its own standard as to these rates, and to forbid
any discriminatory action by interstate carriers which will obstruct the freedom
of movement of interstate traffic over their lines in accordance with the terms it
establishes.

17

Having this power, Congress could provide for its execution through the aid of
a subordinate body; and we conclude that the order of the Commission now in
question cannot be held invalid upon the ground that it exceeded the authority
which Congress could lawfully confer.

18

Second. The remaining question is with regard to the scope of the power which
Congress has granted to the Commission.

19

Section 3 of the act to regulate commerce provides (24 Stat. at L. 3798 380,
chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 3154, 3155):

20

Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or
any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any
particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular
description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in
any respect whatsoever.'

21

This language is certainly sweeping enough to embrace all the discriminations

of the sort described which it was within the power of Congress to condemn.
There is no exception or qualification with respect to an unreasonable
discrimination against interstate traffic produced by the relation of intrastate to
interstate rates as maintained by the carrier. It is apparent from the legislative
history of the act that the evil of discrimination was the principal thing aimed
at, and there is no basis for the contention that Congress intended to exempt

any discriminatory action or practice of interstate carriers affecting interstate

commerce which it had authority to reach. The purpose of the measure was
thus emphatically stated in the elaborate report of the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce which accompanied it: 'The provisions of the bill are
based upon the theory that the paramount evil chargeable against the operation
of the transportation system of the United States as now conducted is unjust
discrimination between persons, places, commodities, or particular descriptions
of traffic, The underlying purpose and aim of the measure is the prevention of
these discriminations' (Senate Report No. 46, 49th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 215).
22

The opposing argument rests upon the proviso in the 1st section of the act
which, in its original form, was as follows: 'Provided, however, that the
provisions of this act shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or
property, or to the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of property,
wholly within one state, and not shipped to or from a foreign country from or to
any state or territory as aforesaid.' When the act was amended so as to confer
upon the Commission the authority to prescribe maximum interstate rates, this
proviso was re-enacted; and when the act was extended to include telegraph,
telephone, and cable companies engaged in interstate business, an additional
clause was inserted so as to exclude intrastate messages. See acts of June 20,
1906, chap. 3591, 34 Stat. at L. 584; June 18, 1910, chap. 309, 36 Stat. at L.
539, 545, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288.

23

Congress thus defined the scope of its regulation, and provided that it was not
to extend to purely intrastate traffic. It did not undertake to authorize the
Commission to prescribe intrastate rates, and thus to establish a unified control
by the exercise of the rate-making power over both descriptions of traffic.
Undoubtedlyin the absence of a finding by the Commission of unjust
discriminationintrastate rates were left to be fixed by the carrier, and subject
to the authority of the states, or of the agencies created by the states. This was
the question recently decided by this court in the Minnesota Rate Cases
(Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33
Sup. Ct. Rep. 729. There, the state of Minnesota had established reasonable
rates for intrastate transportation throughout the state, and it was contended
that, by reason of the passage of the act to regulate commerce, the state could
no longer exercise the state-wide authority for this purpose which it had
formerly enjoyed; and the court was asked to hold that an entire scheme of
intrastate rates, otherwise validly established, was null and void because of its
effect upon interstate rates. There had been no finding by the Interstate
Commerce Commission of any unjust discrimination. The present question,
however, was reserved, the court saying (230 U. S. p. 419): 'It is urged,
however, that the words of the proviso' (referring to the proviso above-

mentioned) 'are susceptible of a construction which would permit the

provisions of 3 of the act, prohibiting carriers from giving an undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any locality, to apply to unreasonable
discriminations between localities in different states, as well when arising from
an intrastate rate as compared with an interstate rate as when due to interstate
rates exclusively. If it be assumed that the statute should be so construed, and it
is not necessary now to decide the point, it would inevitably follow that the
controlling principle governing the enforcement of the act should be applied to
such cases as might thereby be brought within its purview; and the question
whether the carrier, in such a case, was giving an undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to one locality as against another, or subjecting any
locality to an undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, would be
primarily for the investigation and determination of the interstate Commerce
Commission, and not for the courts.'
24

Here, the Commission expressly found that unjust discrimination existed under
substantially similar conditions of transportation, and the inquiry is whether the
Commission had power to correct it. We are of the opinion that the limitation of
the proviso in 1 does not apply to a case of this sort. The Commission was
dealing with the relation of rates injuriously affecting, through an unreasonable
discrimination, traffic that was interstate. The question was thus not simply one
of transportation that was 'wholly within one state.' These words of the proviso
have appropriate reference to exclusively intrastate traffic, separately
considered; to the regulation of domestic commerce, as such. The powers
conferred by the act are not thereby limited where interstate commerce itself is
involved. This is plainly the case when the Commission finds that unjust
discrimination against interstate trade arises from the relation of intrastate to
interstate rates as maintained by a carrier subject to the act. Such a matter is one
with which Congress alone is competent to deal, and, in view of the aim of the
act and the comprehensive terms of the provisions against unjust
discrimination, there is no ground for holding that the authority of Congress
was unexercised, and that the subject was thus left without governmental
regulation. It is urged that the practical construction of the statute has been the
other way. But, in assailing the order, the appellants ask us to override the
construction which has been given to the statute by the authority charged with
its execution, and it cannot be said that the earlier action of the Commission
was of such a controlling character as to preclude it from giving effect to the
law. The Commission, having before it a plain case of unreasonable
discrimination on the part of interstate carriers against interstate trade, carefully
examined the question of its authority, and decided that it had the power to
make this remedial order. The commerce court sustained the authority of the
Commission, and it is clear that we should not reverse the decree unless the law

has been misapplied. This we cannot say; on the contrary, we are convinced
that the authority of the Commission was adequate.
25

The further objection is made that the prohibition of 3 is directed against

unjust discrimination or undue preference only when it arises from the
voluntary act of the carrier, and does not relate to acts which are the result of
conditions wholly beyond its control. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 18, 45 L. ed. 719, 725, 21 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 516. The reference is not to any inherent lack of control arising out of
traffic conditions, but to the requirements of the local authorities, which are
assumed to be binding upon the carriers. The contention is thus merely a
repetition in another form of the argument that the Commission exceeded its
power; for it would not be contended that local rules could nullify the lawful
exercise of Federal authority. In the view that the Commission was entitled to
make the order, there is no longer compulsion upon the carriers by virtue of
any inconsistent local requirement. We are not unmindful of the gravity of the
question that is presented when state and Federal views conflict. But it was
recognized at the beginning that the nation could not prosper if interstate and
foreign trade were governed by many masters, and, where the interests of the
freedom of interstate commerce are involved, the judgment of Congress and of
the agencies it lawfully establishes must control.

26

In conclusion: Reading the order in the light of the report of the Commission, it
does not appear that the Commission attempted to require the carriers to reduce
their interstate rates out of Shreveport below what was found to be a reasonable
charge for that service. So far as these interstate rates conformed to what was
found to be reasonable by the Commission, the carriers are entitled to maintain
them, and they are free to comply with the order by so adjusting the other rates,
to which the order relates, as to remove the forbidden discrimination. But this
result they are required to accomplish.

27

The decree of the Commerce Court is affirmed in each case.

28

Affirmed.

29

Mr. Justice Lurton and Mr. Justice Pitney dissent.

The Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Company of Texas, the St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company, and the St. Louis Southwestern Railway
Company of Texas.

'This case being at issue upon complaint and answers on file, and having been
duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full investigation of the matters
and things involved having been had, and the Commission having, on the date
hereof, made and filed a report containing its findings of fact and conclusions
thereon, which said report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:
'It is ordered, that defendants the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, the
Houston, East & West Texas Railway Company, and Houston & Shreveport
Railroad Company, be, and they are hereby, notified and required to cease and
desist, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and for a period of not less than
two years thereafter abstain, from exacting their present class rates for the
transportation of traffic from Shreveport, Louisiana, to the points in Texas
hereinafter mentioned on their respective lines, as the Commission in said
report finds such rates to be unjust and unreasonable.
'It is further ordered, that defendant the Texas & Pacific Railway Company be,
and it is hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force, on or before
the 1st day of May, 1912, and maintain in force thereafter during a period of not
less than two years, and apply to the transportation of traffic from Shreveport,
Louisiana, to the below-named points in Texas, class rates which shall not
exceed the following, in cents per 100 pounds, which rates are found by the
Commission in its report to be reasonable, to wit: (rates inserted).
'It is further ordered that defendants the Houston, East & West Texas Railway
Company and Houston & Shreveport Railroad Company be, and they are
hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force, on or before the 1st
day of May, 1912, and maintain in force thereafter during a period of not less
than two years, and apply to the transportation of traffic from Shreveport,
Louisiana, to the below-named points in Texas, class rates which shall not
exceed the following, in cents per 100 pounds, which rates are found by the
Commission in its report to be reasonable, to wit: (rates inserted).
'It is further ordered, that defendant the Texas & Pacific Railway Company be,
and it is hereby, notified and required to cease and desist, on or before the 1st
day of May, 1912, and for a period of not less than two years thereafter abstain,
from exacting any higher rates for the transportation of
any article from Shreveport, Louisiana, to Dallas, Texas, and points on its lines
intermediate thereto, than are contemporaneously exacted for the transportation
of such article from Dallas, Texas, toward said Shreveport for an equal
distance, as said relation of rates has been found by the Commission in said
report to be reasonable.
'It is further ordered, that defendants the Houston, East & West Texas Railway

Company and Houston & Shreveport Railroad Company be, and they are
hereby, notified and required to cease and desist, on or before the 1st day of
May, 1912, and for a period of not less than two years thereafter abstain, from
exacting any higher rates for the transportation of any article from Shreveport,
Louisiana, to Houston, Texas, and points on its line intermediate thereto, than
are contemporaneously exacted for the transportation of such article from
Houston, Texas, toward said Shreveport for an equal distance, as said relation
of rates has been found by the Commission in said report to be reasonable.
'And it is further ordered, that said defendants be, and they are hereby, notified
and required to establish and put in force, on or before the 1st day of May,
1912, and maintain in force thereafter during a period of not less than two
years, substantially similar practices respecting the concentration of interstate
cotton at Shreveport, Louisiana, to those which are contemporaneously
observed by said defendants respecting the concentration of cotton within the
state of Texas, provided the practices adopted shall be justifiable under the act
to regulate commerce, and applicable fairly under like conditions elsewhere on
the lines of such defendants.'