The Principle of Consent in Latin and Anglo-American Independence 5 8 5

principle of consent and other major components of natural right doctrines

(contractualism or the sovereignty issue) are frequently treated without paying any
attention to this condition.
I now return to the problem posed at the beginning of this work, namely, the
limitations imposed by ideological presuppositions on discourse. In studies of the
Anglo-American intellectual world the principal theories informing colonial writings
address the works of eighteenth-century English authors like Locke, British common
law, documents like the Bill of Rights, and occasionally other aspects of the British
political tradition such as the nation's mixed constitution.
Analytical limitations may arise from the universal tendency to emphasise the
successes of national histories or from the post-Reformation intellectual gap. Through
a mechanism similar to that of liberal Latin Americanist historiography, the widespread
rejection of Catholic intellectual production may in the past have diminished the
perceived role of natural law, not only in political theory but also in eighteenth-century
social life.67
However a bias can also be seen on die odier side of this often tacit controversy, a
bias discernible even in some of the best works to have enriched the history of
political theory by demonstrating the links between 'modern 7 and medieval theories.
That same bias becomes visible when, in order to demonstrate the medieval roots of
the idea of natural law, such theories arc presented as the culmination of a long
process of historical evolution:
Perhaps it would be more satisfying if the idea of natural rights had entered Western
political thought with a clatter of drums and trumpets in some resounding
pronouncement like the American Declaration of Independence or the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. In fact, though, this central concept
of Western political theory first grew into existence almost imperceptibly in the
obscure glosses of the medieval jurists. 66
This is a partially true statement that does not take account of the diverse function
natural rights had at different times. 69 As Convin remarks about the distinct fates of
such laws in continental Europe (where monarchical power
67

Zuckert, Natural Rights, p. xvi. A passage from a 1772 Boston declaration serves as an
example of this rebuttal, which was already fierce in the colonial period. It argues for
tolerance and, basing itself on Locke, maintains that only subversive sects from the
civilian government should be excluded from the benefits of tolerance, while specifying
that 'Roman Catholics or Papists are excluded' on the strength of their teachings
ordaining the deposition of excommunicated Ptinces and the merciless slaying of those
they call heretics. Boston Declaration Votes and proceedings. r>11 Ticrncy, 7 'be Idea of Natural
Rights, p. 344.
G0
However, the author is perfectly aware of the decisive function of historical context and
thc- varicd fates natural rights because of it: each particular theory was shaped partly as
response to a specific set of contingent circumstances. So a history of natural rights
theories -< .....................................Hi texts.'Ticrncy, TbNdea of Natural Rights.

The Principle of Consent in Lata and Anglo-American Independence 5 8 3

consentimiento debe ser libre y espontaneo.' And he adds, Tor la misma razn
es injusto y arbitrario castigar o perseguir a los que rehusan prestarse a una

nueva sociedad, pues no perteneciendo a ella, ni habindosele sometido, es

violenta y tirnica toda autoridad que quiera ejercerse sobre ellos.' 61 Further on,
while summarising the conditions neccssary to form a nation, Senz, like
Pufendorf before him, makes consent die top priority: 'para el establecimiento
ordenado y legitimo de una sociedad son necesarias tres cosas; primera, el
convenio o consentimiento de todos los asociados entre- si y unos con otros,
por el cual se comprometan a reunirse en sociedad y sostenerla con los
recursos que ellos mismos deben facilitar ...'6
Saenz's remarks cannot be read without reference to the profound conflicts
around attempts to impose a Unitarian state on the reluctant people of the
River Plate. It was this very principle that was the keystone of the River Plate's
opposition to the 1 8 1 9 and 1 8 2 6 Unitarianst constitutions, though that same
principle could have been used to support the opposite position, as can be seen
when the Argos de Buenos Ayres says in 1 8 2 3 : las provincias argentinas, dado
que fue por Buenos Aires el primer grito de independencia, por un
consentimiento unnime de viva voce se comprometieron a formar un solo
estado, o ms bien el que tenan bajo el rgimen de los virreyes ... . ' 63 It would
safeguard Buenos Aires from the threat of the other provinces to its monopoly
on customs and its control of trade and navigation in die River

[Tor there to be a true association, the joining together of all the wills or consents
of die associates is necessary.' Anyone not wishing to conform 'does not belong to
the society and may voluntarily withdraw from it.' Consequently no man may be
obliged to enter into an association against his will for his consent must be free
and spontaneous.' And he adds: Tor this same reason it is unjust and arbitran- to
punish or persecute those who turn dicir backs on a new society, for, not belonging
10 it, nor having subjcctcd themselves to it, any attempt at wielding authority over
diem is violent and tyrannical.) Antonio Saenz, 'Instituciones Elementales sobre el
Derecho Natural y de Gentes' Course given at Universidad de Buenos Aires
between 1822-5 (Buenos .Aires, 1939), pp. 62 & 65. 02 ['Three things are necessary
in the orderly and legitimate establishment of a society: firstly, the agreement or
conscnt of all its associates amongst themselves and cach with the other, by which
they undertake to join together in society and uphold it with the resources which
they themselves shall furnish ...'] Senz, 'Instituciones Elementales,' p. 66. Senz
then goes on to say, 'La mayor parte de las sociedades no se lia formado de este
modo. La ambicin de hombres poderosos, la fuerza con que se han alzado por lo
general algunos guerreros afortunados y diestros, el temor de los pueblos
amenazados, y muchas veces asolados, han sido las bases sobre que se lian
fundado la mayor parte de los Imperios del Mundo.' [Trans. 'Most societies have
not been formed this way. The ambition of powerful men, the force with which
certain fortunate or cunning warriors have in general risen to power, the fear of
threatened and often devastated peoples, have been the bases on which most
World Empires have been founded. 1 63 ('-..given that the first cry for
independence, for unanimous outspoken conscnt, came from Buenos Aires, the
Argentine provinces undertook to form a single state, or rather the same one they
had had under the regime of the viceroys ...'] El Argot dc Buenos Ayres, 12/04/1823,
continuation of'La Banda Oriental no tiene derecho a la secesin*.
5 8 4 Jos Carlos Cbiarawonte

Plate.64 And, surprising though it may seem, in the second half of the century we find a
second generation Romantic like Bartolom Mitre repeatedly ta long refuge in natural law
in his rejection of the San Nicols Accord, which summoned Congress to establish die
1 8 5 3 Constitudon:
Las autoridades se fundan sobre dos principios, dir ms bien, sobre dos especies de derechos,
sobre el derecho natural, sobre el derecho escrito.
Ln autoridad creada por el acuerdo de San Nicols, no se funda sobre el derecho natural, desde que es
una autoridad desptica, sin reglas, sin ley, sin lmites, sin contrapeso. Es una autoridad mayor que la
del pueblo, y ms fuerte que la libertad. Por esto es contra naturaleza.65

There are some conclusions to be drawn from all this. First, awareness of che influence of
the law of nature and nations has been more marked in US than Latin Americanist
historiography. Second, the various references to the Taw of nature' and Taw of nations' in
US historiography should be understood as touching on the doctrines of non-scholastic
trends in natural law, while in Latin Americanist historiography both may be present. Third,
1 have not only considered the influence of Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke here but have
also given some emphasis to authors like Burlamaqui and Vattel, who are almost
completely overlooked in Latin Americanist historiography. Fourth, despite its broader
outlook, the natural law approach of US historiography suffers from certain limitations,
principa! amongst which is that it docs not reckon with the British legal tradition's links to
scholastic natural law and European natural law (visible in the Bill of Rights or even Magna
Carta, especially in the principle of consent). Fifth, in this regard a reaction against the
excesses of earlier interpretations of the Anglo-American revolution in terms of economics
and the class struggle is apparent.66 This may also explain the fact that the issue of
consent is often treated with a certain contempt as a recurring commonplace. Sixth, in
Latin Americanist historiography, the evaluation of the law of nature and nations in the
independence process is still effectively relegated to part of Catholic historiography.
Seventh, in both Latin Americanist and Anglo-American historiography the

The Principle of Consent in Ljitin and s 1 nglo-American independence 5 81

between ihe Spanish and die Anglo-American independence movements. In both cases
die American subjects of the Spanish and English crowns deiended their claims to
autonomy by arguing that the original contract was with the monarch, not the English
or Spanish nations. Faced with the claim that the metropolis be recognised as a

64See J. C. Chi a ra monte, Ciudades, pp. 226 ff.

65J'Authorities are founded on two principles or, rather, on two
kinds of laws: either on the natural law, or on the written law.
66The authority created by the San Nicols Accord is not
founded on the natural law, for it is a despotic authority,
without rules, without lawfulness, without limits or balances. It
is an authority greater than the people, and stronger than
freedom. It goes against nature itself, 'j Bartolom Mitre,
'Discurso contra el acuerdo de San Nicols,' 21 June 1852, in
Annys, vol. 1 (Buenos Aires, 1902), p. 14. 06 This can be seen
in the historiographical debate over the constitutional ideas of
the 1760s and 1780s, and whether the revolution was the
result of ideas and ideals or material interests. Grey, 'Origins,'
p. 848. See Wood, Radicalism, p. 3 if.

surrogate authority for the monarchy, crioHos in Spanish America argued that their
political links lay with the Castilinn crown, nor the Spanish nation. With the throne
vacant, they were simply taking back sovereignty. To stave off the British Parliament's
efforts to impose its authority over its American colonics by invoking the virtual
representation of the colonists in its bosom, the larcer responded in a similar vein to
Spanish America, arguing that thev depended on die crown, not Parliament. 67
'Hie salienr difference between the two lies in the fact that the argument in the
Anglo-American colonies resulted immediately in the corollary of independence. By
meeting the British Parliament's efforts head-on the colonists were defending the
sovereignty of their existing representative government, the fundamental organ of
which was the Assemblies which, unlike die Cabildos, were elected bodies with a
legislative capacity, especially in terms of taxation. Therefore, faced with the claim of
a single sovereign power in the British Parliament, the only way of maintaining the
sovereignty of dieir Assemblies was to sever colonial ties.
In Spanish America, however, the criollos found themselves facing two very different
situations. The absence of sovereign bodies and any genuine experience of
representative government meant that could not defend something non-existent. On
the other hand, the vacancy of the throne meant diat the situation could also be
approached in terms of natural law by appealing direcdy to the doctrine of die pactum
suhjectionis. Faced with the dilemma of whether to dissolve or maintain links with the

Castilian crown, diere was of course momentary lack of definition.

On the one hand, die colonists were defending an existing representative, sovereign
organisation; on the other, the right to establish a sovereign autonomy through the
retroversion of power.58 But, as in Anglo-America,

5 8z Jos Carlos Chi a ram ule

the persistent importance of the principle of 'consent' is striking in the formation of
die new Spanish American states. The new sovereign bodies considered themselves
heirs to the Castihan crown. They jealously defended their independence and tended
to develop confederal forms of political association, finding in the principle of consent
the best safeguard for this new-found independence. The argument was used over
and again by the sovereign organisations representing Latin American cities (and
later on provinces or states) in rejecting any decisions taken without their consent.
Let us look at some examples from different dates. In February i 8 i z the Chilean
Camilo Henrquez argued that die establishment of authority was the result of a

67 When the young Alexander Hamilton discusses Parliament's right to rule the colonies,
he argues as follows:' He is King of America, by virtue of a compact between us and the
Kings of Great Britain. These colonics were planted and settled by the Grants, and under
the Protection of English Kings, who entered into covenants with us for themselves, their
heirs and successors; and it is from these covenants, that the duty of protection on their
part, and the dury of allegiance on ours arise.' Hamilton, Papers, p. 90.In the ease of Brazil,
though monarchical continuity wrested lorce from the argument based on pactum
snbjcc/mis, natural law arguments arc nevertheless snll deployed. The Farroupilhn
Revolution was justified by its main leader with certain classic arguments drawing on the
Jaw of nations: 'Dcsligado o Povo rio-grandense de Comunhao Brasiletra rcassume todcron direitor. da primitiva liberdade; tisa dirciios imprescritivcs, consiituindo-sc Republic;!

human need for safety in society through 'un consentimiento libre': 'Establezcamos
pues,

como

principio,

que

la autoridad

suprema trae

su

origen

del

libre

consentimiento de los pueblos, que podemos llamar pacto, o alianza social. '68
With respect to Brazil, Diogo Antonio Feij proclaimed in the Lisbon Courts in
1822:
Nenhuma associaco justa, quando nao tern por base a livre convenco dos
associados: nenhuma sociedade c verdadcira, quando nao tern por hm as vantagens
clos individuos que a compem. Um hrnern nao pode, nao deve impor leis a outro
hrnern: um povo no tem direito algum a obrigar outro povo a sujeitar-se as suas ins
ti tu ip oes sociais. O despotismo tem podido atropelar estas verdades, mas o
sentimento dlas ainda nao pode ser de urna vez sufocado no coracao do hrnern, de
24 de agosto, e que far em toda a posteridade a gloria de seus emprendedores. 69
Restating the notions of some of the leading writers on die law of nations (in a text
where Pufendorf s influence is visible), the first Vice-Chancellor of the University of
Buenos Aires and Professor of Institutions of the Law of Nature and Nations, Antonio
Saenz wrote: 'Para que resulte una verdadera asociacin es precisa la reunin de
todas las voluntades o consentimientos de los asociados.' Anyone not wishing to
conform, 'no pertenece a la sociedad y puede retirarse voluntariamente de ella'.
Consequently, 'ninguno puede ser obligado a entrar contra su voluntad en una
asociacin porque su

68['Then let us establish as a principle that the supreme

authority bring to bear its orgins in the free consent of
peoples, which we may call a pact, or social alliance.'] Camilo
Henri quez, 'Nociones fundamentales sobre los derechos de
los Pueblos,' Aurora de Chile, vol. 1 no. i (February 1812).
69Diogo Antonio Feij, 'Discurso as Cortes de Lisboa,' from
Dirio das Cortes, 23 Aprii 1822, p. 9 5 1 , in Dingo Antonio Feij (Sao Paulo,
1999), p. 5 1 .

Independence; toma na extensa escala dos Estados soberanos o lugar que Ihc compete
pela suficiencia de seus recursos, civilizapao e naturais riquezas, que lhe aseguram o
exercicio pleno c inteiro de sua independencia, Eminente Soberana de Dominio, sem
sujeipo ou sacrificio da mais pequea parte desta mesma Independencia, ou soberana
outra apo, Governa e Potencia estranila qualquer.' See M. Medianera Padoin, Fakralis/ao
Caucho, Front eira Platina, Direito e Re vola (do (Sao Paulo, 2001), p. 91 if.