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Call On COMELEC, Voters, Poll Watchers: Gear For Poll Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation On May 9
Call On COMELEC, Voters, Poll Watchers: Gear For Poll Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation On May 9
Call On COMELEC, Voters, Poll Watchers: Gear For Poll Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation On May 9
ReleasedApril29,2016
AUTOMATEDELECTIONSYSTEMWATCH(AESWatch)
CALLONCOMELEC,VOTERS,
POLLWATCHERS:GEARFORPOLL
DISASTERPREPAREDNESSAND
MITIGATIONONMAY9
Toensuretransparent,honestandpeacefulelectionsWillthemachinescountyourvotesright?
____________________
Mitigatingmeasures:
*AlltimeandmotionPrecinctelectionresults(ERs)
nottotals
anddefinitely
notdatacomingfrom
thecentralserverandtransparencyserver
receivedbytheC/MBOCsSHOULDbepublished
asthey
are
andshownonapublicorComelecwebsitethatisaccessibletoeveryonefurthermore,thewebsite
mustbemaintainedfor2yearsasthelawrequires
**Everyvoterhastherighttocopyinwritinghis/herballotIDandprecinctnumberthatappearinthe
screen,documentdescriptionofthevoterreceiptifthereceiptiswrong,thevoterhastherightto
correctitinwritingandlodgeaprotestwiththeBEIinwriting(onthelogbook)accordingly,theBEIs
shouldbewarnednottopreventthevoterfromexercisingsuchrightbyarbitrarilydeclaringsuchact
asunlawful
***COMELECmustrescindComelecResolution10083immediatelyasitopensupwideconditions
fordatamanipulationthroughSDcardswitchingandtampering.
_______________
Thehotlycontested,emotionallychargedelectioncampaignwillfinallyconclude10daysfromnow
whenthewholenationgoestothepollsonMay9.Whethertheelectionswillbringthecountry
politicalstabilityorinstabilitywilldependheavilyonwhethertheautomatedelectionsystemwill
workwithallthetrustworthiness,accuracy,andreliabilitythatamodernelectiontechnologyrequires.
ThecurrentCOMELECnowunderadifferentsetofMalacaangappointedcommissionersand
chairmanbutworkingwiththesameinsiderpolloperatorsandelectionsystemsupplierhasboastedit
hasimplementedmoresafeguardsthanthepreviousComelecdministrations.Partiallytrue,thanksto
thepressurebyelectionwatchdogsandthepublic.Butwhatlurksbehindthisseemingandpartial
compliancewiththelawistoopenupbiggerrisksthat,absentremediesandcontingencies,pose
greaterdangertothesecurityandaccuracyofthecountingofthevotes.Asofthisdate,themachines
havenotbeencertifiedbythirdpartyagencytorunassecurelyandaccuratelyastheyshould.
FortheITandmanagementsystemexperts,aswellassocialscientists,professionalsandinterfaith,
NGOleaderswhohavelongbeenengagedinensuringhonestandpeacefulelectionsabigdisaster
loomsintheMay9electionsifComelecinsistsonSPEEDANDEASEOFBEIover
TRANSPARENCYandACCURACYofDATA.
Wecallonthecountrys55millionregisteredvotersandtherestofthenationtonotallowtheir
guardsdown,towatchtheirvotemorevigilantlyandmethodically,andtoprepareforanelection
disasterthatmayyetunfoldsothatourvotesaresecuredandareproperlycountedenablingusto
exerciseoursovereignvoiceinchoosingthenextadministration.
WHYDANGER
First,neverbeforehastheautomatedelectionsystembeenmostvulnerabletomanipulationandfraud
asaresultofthehackingoftheComelecwebsiteonMarch27thatcompromisednotonlytheelection
databutalsotheprivateinformationof55millionvoters.WehaveseennumerouscasesintheUnited
Statesandothercountrieswherestolenelectiondatabaseledtothemanipulationofvotes,changeof
voterregistration,andthelossofpublictrustintheirelectionsystems.IftheComelecwebsitecanbe
hackedforlackofsecurity,reportedlywithinsidersconspiracy,howcanyounowtrustthewhole
systemsandinfrastructuresthatwillbeusedbyComeleconelectiondayandthereafter?
Secondly,thepresentComelecisrepeatingpreviouscommissionersnoncompliancewiththe
minimumsystemrequirementsofelectionautomationsince2010.Inwhatsmacksofanabuseof
discretionandauthority,theComelecenbancquietlyissuedResolution10083lastMarch15
mandatingallBEIstoimportallSDcardstransmittedornottransmittedERsfromthe92,509
precinctVoteCountingMachines(VCMs)tothecity/municipalitycanvassingcenters.Underthe
law,Comelecmustensurethe100%transmissionofERsfromtheprecincttocomplywithanother
provisionthatONLYTRANSMITTEDERsshallbethebasisfortheproclamationofwinning
candidates.Sucharbitrarychangeofruleswillopenwideelectioninterventionandmanipulationsuch
astheswitchingofmicroSDcardswithfakeorpreviouslyfabricatedones.Wastheresolutionissued
becauseofanticipatedwidespreadtransmissionglitchesonMay9aswhathappenedin2010(where
10%ofERswerenottransmittedandin2013withthetransmissionfailureof25%ERs)?Isthe
Comelecfoolingusagain?
TheComelechasbeenhypingthatitis100%readyfortheelection.
Butdothecommissionerssay
theyrereadybecausetheyhavecompliedwithalltheminimumsystemrequirementstomake
theelectionscredible?
Letuslookagain:
1)Forthethirdtime,allERswillnotbeauthenticatedbydigitalsignaturesoftheBEIsinrepeated
violationofSection30ofRA9369(orautomatedelectionlaw)whichmandatesthatONLYERs
THATAREDIGITALLYSIGNEDANDELECTRONICALLYTRANSMITTEDshallbeconsidered
asOFFICIALELECTIONRESULTS.Withthisviolation,howcanyoutrusttheelectionoutcomeas
credible?
2)Welikewiseraisethefollowingquestions:HastheAESsystembeenclearedandcertified100%
readybytheTechnicalEvaluationCommittee(TEC)againasrequiredbylaw?Thesourcecode
reviewhasnotbeenfullysatisfactorilyconcluded.Willthevoterreceiptaccuratelyreflecttheballot
castunlikewhathappenedinmanycountriesintheongoingOverseasAbsenteeVoting(OAV
Whathappensifnamesofcandidatesdonotappearinthemachinegeneratedresultsorifnamesof
votersinthecertifiedlistaremissing?
Likewise,neverseenbeforearenumerousglitchesinvolvingtheongoingOAVvotinginmany
countrieswhichportendofthingstocomeonMay9.MigranteInternationalhasreportedVCM
malfunctioningintheUS,Canada,Italy,andRomeresultinginvoterdisenfranchisementdelayed
ballotdeliveryalsointheUSnamesofmorethan100registeredvotersfoundmissinginthemaster
listofvotersinJapanreportsofincompletevotesinthereceiptsforsenatorialraceinItalyinHong
Kong,somevotesfoundmissinginvoterreceiptswithonevicepresidentialcandidatecomplaining
thathisvoteswerenotreflectedinvoterreceipts.
WHYDISASTER
COMELECinsiststoonlypartiallyenabletheautomatedsystemsafeguardstoensureandgivemore
premiumtospeedandeaseofvotingovertransparency,securityandaccuracyofelectionresults.
Voterverificationisimplementedbutvotersreceiptsifnotsecuredcanbeeasilyreplacedwithbogus
piecesofpaperwithnosecuritymarksknowntothevotersandthepublic(precinctlocation,machine
source,etc.).
PostingoftheelectionresultsontheComelecpublicwebsitebutifthedataisonlyasummaryofvotes
orifitcomesfromthetransparencyserverorcentralserver,thiswouldbedisastroustotransparency
andaccuracybecausethereisdefinitelynoassurancethatthedataintheCentralServerwouldbethe
sameasthoseintheC/MBOC,ashappenedinthe2010and2013elections
ComelecissuedResolution10083whichnowmakesthePollAutomationLawinutilewheresections22
and25ofRA9369statethatonlyelectronicallytransmittedresultsaretheofficialresultstobasethe
proclamationofwinners.
ToaddressthesethreatstotheMay9election,westronglyurgetheComelec,amongothers:
1)ThatalltimeandmotionPrecinctelectionresults(ERs)nottotalsanddefinitelynotdatacoming
fromthecentralserverandtransparencyserverreceivedbytheC/MBOCsbepublished
astheyare
andshownonapublicorComelecwebsitethatisaccessibletoeveryonefurthermore,thewebsite
mustbemaintainedfor2yearsasthelawrequires
2)Thatallvotersbeallowedtocopyinwritinghis/herballotIDandprecinctnumberthatappearin
thescreen,and,ifthereceiptiswrongforthevotertocorrectitinwritingaccordingly,theBEIs
shouldbewarnednottopreventthevoterfromexercisingsuchwritebyarbitrarilydeclaringit
unlawful
3)TorescindComelecResolution10083immediatelyasitopensupwideconditionsfordata
manipulationthroughSDswitchinganddatatampering.
ThesearenosuresolutionsagainstfraudonMay9.Aftertwoautomatedelections,shrewdveteran
electioncheatshavemasteredelectroniccheating.Thecontroversial603010preprogramming
votepatternuncoveredbyCenPEGinMay2010remainsunresolvedtodaywithit,thecredibilityof
theelectionresults.TherecenthackingofthevoterregistrationsystemandtheComelecdatabasehave
exposedtheFilipinovoterspersonaldatatorisk.TheillpreparednessoftheComelecinfestedwith
thenomoreorlackoftimementalitymadeworsebyitsobsessiontospeedandeaseinmanaging
electionsoverensuringtransparency,securityandaccuracyofelectiondata,becomesmoreworrisome
aselectiondaydrawsnear.Resolution10083,forone,isreckless,kneejerkreactiontoavoidamore
disastrousrepeatofthe23%failedtransmissionin2013.Themodetodaythereforeistogearfor
disastermitigationoraNoElorpostponeelectionscenariowhichComelechaddangledbeforein
MarchaftertheSupremeCourtruleditshouldimplementthevoterreceiptrequirementofthelaw.
WeanticipatetheComelecmaynotheedourdemandsandtoinstituteappropriatecontingency
measuresunlessasinthevoterreceiptissueanothercaseisbroughttotheSupremeCourt.Given
thethreatsanddeficienciesoftheautomationsystemandthecompromisingstanceoftheComelecin
electionmanagement,alltheseleavethevotersalongwiththepollwatchersaswellascandidates
andpoliticalpartieswithnochoicebuttoguardthevotesandtoremainvigilantandtakeappropriate
actionsagainstelectronicfraud,transmissionglitches,machineerrors,andthepossibilityofinsider
hackingwheretheelectionresultswillnotreflectthetruewillandintentoftheelectorate.xxx
Announcement:
AESWatch
PollMonitoringCenterisbeingsetupattheMagsaysayCenter,Pamantasanng
LungsodngMaynila,IntramurosManilatoreceive,monitor,relayneededinformationandprovide
assistancetopollwatchersonmonitoring&reportingthebehaviorofthecountingmachines.
FortrainingsandbriefingsonPOLLWatching,monitoringandrespondingtoHOWTHEVote
CountingMachines(VCMs)formerlyknownasPCOS(PrecinctCountOpticalScanners)actuallyand
securelybehaveonElectionDay.ENSUREyourvotesarecountedright!
Contact:
+6329299526(Landline)
Mobilenos:09272092500
09985344650
09175198547
09272818288
ImmediateFlashDate:May26:
FTSorFinalTestingandSealingnationwideforall92,509VCMsinthesamenumberofCPs
(Clusteredprecincts).CopytheIDnumberoftheVCMandmakesurethatthehashcodeassignedto
VCMwhichisanimageofthesupposedsourcecodeputinescrowbytheComelecwiththeCentral
Bankisreflectedinthevotersreceipttobereceivedaftercastingtheballotintothemachine.
The
HASHCODEoftheVCM(VoteCountingMachine)putinescrowwiththeCentralBankbythe
Comelec:
A14791C42FDA957C47DBE3EAS2FB2AA3
9DBFDAAFF683687A80B69F61A113EOF7
DuringtheFTS,ensurethatTRANSMISSIONisconsummated,theSDcardimplantedintheMachine
isnotremovedarbitrarilyandwithoutproperdocumentationofSDcardnumberanddate/timeof
removaltobecomparedwiththeauditlogtobemadeavailabletopollwatchersofpoliticalparties
for
checkingandaudit.Report,recordandcomplainalldiscrepanciesandabnormalbehaviorofthe
machinesandoperatorsinwritingtotheBEIs,themedia,AESWatchandallwatchdogsinthe
vicinity.