Dasein is the subject of investigation, but should not be equated

with humans; rather it is ways of being (understood to be general,

not particular, but still concrete rather than abstract). On some
interpretations, language, sciences and cultures may also qualify as
Dasein. (e.g. John Haugeland who equates Dasein with
disclosedness) Perhaps corporations could also count as Dasein on
this interpretation. Even if not correct, this view of Dasein makes it
easier to ignore some features that for Heidegger are accidental:
-The idea of one is a subject who has subjective experiences (that
are private in some sense)
-The idea that what Heidegger describes, in claiming to go 'back to
the phenomena', is perceptual or more precisely visual in nature
-The idea that having a body is essential to Dasein (but this may
turn out to be a mistake on Heidegger's part)
If one is tempted to jump to the conclusion that with Heidegger
everything becomes radically constructed, note his distinction
between facticity and factuality: the latter is properties such as
homo sapiens (biological creature) whereas the former is a way of
being human beings (social actors). This is similar to a distinction
between a dog and a pet, sustenance and a meal, a mate and a
lover. By acknowledging that an investigation can be interested in
factuality, that in some sense aspire to non-interpretation (although,
necessarily, any way that Dasein can express/communicate this is
interpretable), Heidegger introduces a deep divide between the
social and the natural sciences.
To distinguish the inquiry into a particular being and the general
structures that are the conditions of intelligibility for all beings,
Heidegger introduces the existentiell (particular, one role, the
singular human being pondering its own being in facing up against
the wrath of God) and existential (the thinker delineating the
general structures that are common to all man, at the level of
factuality).
The last distinction Heidegger makes is between ontological and
ontical. An ontical investigation is about beings, understood as
objects/'a what'. Human beings are special (ontically distinct) in that
their being is existence, i.e. their being is ontological. Ontological is
about ways of being. One can only have an understanding of one's
own being in an ontological sense; to have that is to have an
understanding of one's own way of being. More commonsensically it
is an answer to the question 'who am I?' I cannot have an
ontological understanding of another particular person's way of
being; my way of being is not their's. This does not mean that I
cannot understand other people, it only means that I understand
other people ontically.

Remember that a language can be understood as a way of being; to

see how an individual's understanding of oneself differs from an
individual's understanding of others, consider a two-person
language. In this language, the conditions of intelligibility are set by
these two persons jointly, and in this sense each person has equal
'access to' or 'understanding of' this way of being. This is because
the limits of intelligibility of a language are set by at least two
people sharing it (if we believe Wittgenstein's private language
argument). The language could evolve by one person coming up
with new features and the other person latching on to these; the
evolution would be a constant metamorphosis through symbiosis.
Contrast the two-person language with the case of two completely
similar people. Here, even though one person might change and
their ways of being start diverging, there are still two persons and
two ways of being, each intelligible to each person in their own way.
The significance things take on, and the commitments each person
has, can only be understood from that own person's point of view,
even though the person may see similarities.
The way Heidegger alleviates worries that we are impossible to
understand each other is by saying that our understanding of
ourselves is inherently public. What makes my way of being distinct
for me is its 'mineness'. Mineness is a public stand on what it means
to be human (remember that this is never given beforehand) that is
shown by way of comportment. We all carry with ourselves an
ontology (understanding of being) and a definition of humanity.
There are 3 general structures for how one's being (mineness) is
expressed in relation to the public understanding of human nature
defined by its culture: authentic, inauthentic and undifferentiated.
Heidegger claims that, in launching this investigation, Dasein
already in some sense has an understanding of being. This is what
he calls the pre-ontological understanding of being. It is ontological
rather than ontical because we are dealing with Dasein (which, for
example, is a who rather than a what). The sense we have of
ourselves is revealed by the instances where we interpret ourselves;
we don't take ourselves as beings with a previously given definition
of what our being is about. But perhaps it is simply a mystery,
something that can only be lived and never understood, let alone
articulated.
It is not clear from Heidegger's argument that Dasein must have a
general ontological understanding of being; nor is it clear that
Dasein must be able to make this explicit. Last, it is not clear that
Dasein's understanding of its own being would have to imply an
understanding of all modes of being. Maybe we can understand
what it is to be human but not what it is to be equipment, a work of
art or a mere entity.