Professional Documents
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SPECPRO - Voluntary Dissolution Until Absentees
SPECPRO - Voluntary Dissolution Until Absentees
SPECPRO - Voluntary Dissolution Until Absentees
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and a similar copy shall be posted for three (3)
consecutive weeks in three (3) public places in such municipality or city.
Upon five (5) days notice, given after the date on which the right to file objections as fixed in the
order has expired, the Commission shall proceed to hear the petition and try any issue made by the
objections filed; and if no such objection is sufficient, and the material allegations of the petition are
true, it shall render judgment dissolving the corporation and directing such disposition of its assets
as justice requires, and may appoint a receiver to collect such assets and pay the debts of the
corporation. (Rule 104, RCa)
Sec. 120. Dissolution by shortening corporate term. A voluntary dissolution may be effected by
amending the articles of incorporation to shorten the corporate term pursuant to the provisions of
this Code. A copy of the amended articles of incorporation shall be submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission in accordance with this Code. Upon approval of the amended articles of
incorporation of the expiration of the shortened term, as the case may be, the corporation shall be
deemed dissolved without any further proceedings, subject to the provisions of this Code on
liquidation. (n)
Sec. 121. Involuntary dissolution. A corporation may be dissolved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission upon filing of a verified complaint and after proper notice and hearing on the grounds
provided by existing laws, rules and regulations. (n)
Sec. 122. Corporate liquidation. Every corporation whose charter expires by its own limitation or is
annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other purposes is terminated in
any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the
time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or
against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to
distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established.
At any time during said three (3) years, the corporation is authorized and empowered to convey all of
its property to trustees for the benefit of stockholders, members, creditors, and other persons in
interest. From and after any such conveyance by the corporation of its property in trust for the
benefit of its stockholders, members, creditors and others in interest, all interest which the
corporation had in the property terminates, the legal interest vests in the trustees, and the beneficial
interest in the stockholders, members, creditors or other persons in interest.
Upon the winding up of the corporate affairs, any asset distributable to any creditor or stockholder or
member who is unknown or cannot be found shall be escheated to the city or municipality where
such assets are located.
Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by this Code, no corporation shall
distribute any of its assets or property except upon lawful dissolution and after payment of all its
debts and liabilities. (77a, 89a, 16a)
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10142
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REHABILITATION OR LIQUIDATION OF FINANCIALLY
DISTRESSED ENTERPRISES AND INDIVIDUALS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act
(FRIA) of 2010".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to encourage debtors, both juridical and
natural persons, and their creditors to collectively and realistically resolve and adjust competing
claims and property rights. In furtherance thereof, the State shall ensure a timely, fair, transparent,
effective and efficient rehabilitation or liquidation of debtors. The rehabilitation or liquidation shall be
made with a view to ensure or maintain certainly and predictability in commercial affairs, preserve
and maximize the value of the assets of these debtors, recognize creditor rights and respect priority
of claims, and ensure equitable treatment of creditors who are similarly situated. When rehabilitation
is not feasible, it is in the interest of the State to facilities a speedy and orderly liquidation of these
debtor's assets and the settlement of their obligations.
Section 3. Nature of Proceedings. - The proceedings under this Act shall be in rem. Jurisdiction over
all persons affected by the proceedings shall be considered as acquired upon publication of the
notice of the commencement of the proceedings in any newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines in the manner prescribed by the rules of procedure to be promulgated by the Supreme
Court.
The proceedings shall be conducted in a summary and non-adversarial manner consistent with the
declared policies of this Act and in accordance with the rules of procedure that the Supreme Court
may promulgate.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
(a) Administrative expenses shall refer to those reasonable and necessary expenses:
(1) incurred or arising from the filing of a petition under the provisions of this Act;
Section 42.Creditors' Committee. - After the creditors' meeting called pursuant to Section 63 hereof,
the creditors belonging to a class may formally organize a committee among
themselves. In addition, the creditors may, as a body, agree to form a creditors' committee
composed of a representative from each class of creditors, such as the following:
(a) Secured creditors;
(b) Unsecured creditors;
(c) Trade creditors and suppliers; and
(d) Employees of the debtor.
In the . election of the creditors' representatives, the rehabilitation receiver or his representative shall
attend such meeting and extend the appropriate assistance as may be defined in the procedural
rules.
Section 43.Role of Creditors' Committee. - The creditors' committee when constituted pursuant to
Section 42 of this Act shall assist the rehabilitation receiver in communicating with the creditors and
shall be the primary liaison between the rehabilitation receiver and the creditors. The creditors'
committee cannot exercise or waive any right or give any consent on behalf of any creditor unless
specifically authorized in writing by such creditor. The creditors' committee may be authorized by the
court or by the rehabilitation receiver to perform such other tasks and functions as may be defined
by the procedural rules in order to facilitate the rehabilitation process.
(D) Determination of Claims.
Section 44.Registry of Claims. - Within twenty (20) days from his assumption into office, the
rehabilitation receiver shall establish a preliminary registry of claims. The rehabilitation receiver shall
make the registry available for public inspection and provide
publication notice to the debtor, creditors and stakeholders on where and when they may inspect it.
All claims included in the registry of claims must be duly supported by sufficient evidence.
Section 45.Opposition or Challenge of Claims. Within thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
period stated in the immediately preceding section, the debtor, creditors, stakeholders and other
interested parties may submit a challenge to claim/s to the court, serving a certified copy on the
rehabilitation receiver and the creditor holding the challenged claim/so Upon the expiration of the
thirty (30)-day period, the rehabilitation receiver shall submit to the court the registry of claims which
shall include undisputed claims that have not been subject to challenge.
Section 46.Appeal. - Any decision of the rehabilitation receiver regarding a claim may be appealed
to the court.
(E) Governance.
December 2, 2008
December 2, 2008
RULES OF PROCEDURE ON CORPORATE REHABILITATION (2008)
RULE 1
COVERAGE
Section 1. Scope - These Rules shall apply to petitions for rehabilitation of corporations,
partnerships and associations pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended.
Section 2. Applicability to Rehabilitation Cases Transferred from the Securities and Exchange
Commission. - Cases for rehabilitation transferred from Securities Exchange Commission to the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities
Regulation Code, shall likewise be governed by these Rules.
RULE 2
DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION
Section 1. Definition of Terms. - For purpose of these Rules:
"Administrative Expenses" shall refer to (a) reasonable and necessary expenses that are
incurred in connection with the filing of the petition; (b) expenses incurred in the ordinary
course of business after the issuance of the stay order, excluding interest payable to the
creditors for loans and credit accommodations existing at the time of the issuance of the stay
order, and (c) other expenses that are authorized under this Rules.
"Affidavit of General Financial Condition" shall refer to a verified statement on the general
financial condition of the debtor requiredin Section 2, Rule 4 of these Rules.
"Affiliate" is a corporation that directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, is
controlled by, or is under the common control of another corporation, which thereby becomes
its parent corporation.
"Asset" is anything of value that can be in the form of money, such as cash at the bank or
amounts owed; fixed assets such as property or equipment; or intangibles including
intellectual property, the book value of which is shown in the last three audited financial
statement immediately preceding the filing of the petition, In case the debtor is less than
three years in operation, it is sufficient that the book value is based on the audited financial
statement\s for the years or year immediately preceding the filing of petition, as the case
may be.
"Board of Directors" shall include the executive committee or the management of partnership
or association
February 24 2004
Approved,
2.6.
Guardian - refers to a person lawfully invested with the power, and
charged with the duty, of taking care of one who, for defect of age,
understanding, or self control, is considered incapable in administering his
own affairs. This term also refers to those authorized to exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in default of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian (Title IX, Family Code). Those exercising substitute
parental authority are the following:
2.6.1 The surviving grandparent (Article 214, Family Code);
2.6.2 The oldest brother or sister, over 21 years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified (Article 216(2),
Family Code); and
2.6.3 The child's actual custodian, over 21 years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified (Article 216
(3), Family Code).
Rule 3. Who may file
Under these rules, the father, mother, child if of age, or the guardian, may
file the public document or Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father
(AUSF) in order for the child to use the surname of the father.
Rule 4. Where to file
4.1.
The public document or AUSF executed within the Philippines shall
be filed at the Local Civil Registry Office (LCRO) where the child was born, if
the birth occurred within the Philippines.
4.2.
The public document or AUSF executed outside the Philippines shall
be filed at the LCRO of Manila, if the birth occurred within the Philippines.
4.3.
The public document or AUSF whether executed within or outside the
Philippines shall be filed at the LCRO of Manila, if the birth occurred outside
the Philippines.
Public document
5.3.
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a
public document is executed
by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in
a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten
instrument, the child shall
use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported
by the following
documents:
a. AUSF
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of
Employment records
SSS/GSIS records
Insurance
Certification of membership in any organization
Statement of Assets and Liabilities
Income Tax Return (ITR)
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child
shall use the surname
of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF.
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the
child shall use the
surname of father upon submission of a public document or a private
handwritten
instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3
Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is
required if he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be
contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of
the child in the Certificate
of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the
Register of Births.
8.1.2 If admission of paternity is done at the back of the Certificate of
Live Birth, no annotation
is made in the Certificate of Live Birth. However, annotation shall be
made in the Register
of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255."
8.1.3 If admission of paternity is made in a separate public document,
the proper annotation
shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of
Births. The annotation
shall be as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255."
8.1.4 In case of delayed registration, follow the provisions under 8.1.1
to 8.1.3 and comply with
the requirements under Rule 25 of Administrative Order No. 1 series
of 1993. Proper
annotation with regard to delayed registration shall be made.
8.2
c. AUSF
10.3.
Records the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth in the Register of
Births, and the public document and AUSF in the Register of Legal
Instruments.
10.4.
Annotates the Certificate of Live Birth and the remarks portion of
the Register of Births.
10.5.
Issues certified copies of Certificate of Live Birth or certified
transcription (LCR form 1A) with annotations.
10.6.
Distributes the annotated Certificate of Live Birth, registered public
document or AUSF including any supporting document as follows:
a. First copy to owner of the document;
b. Second copy to the OCRG;
c. Third copy to the LCRO.
Rule 11. Retroactivity Clause
These rules shall have retroactive effect for all births occurring within and
outside the Philippines.
Rule 12. Separability Clause
If any portion or provision of this Implementing Rules and Regulations is
declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions
thereof shall not be effected by such declaration.
Rule 13. Repealing Clause
All circulars, memoranda, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of these rules are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Rule 14. Effectivity
These rules shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.
APPROVED this 14th day of May 2004.
The issues in this case are not novel: whether or not the conveyance made by way of the
sheriffs sale pursuant to the wit of execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 590 is
prohibited under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; and whether or not the family home is
exempt from execution.
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (For recovery of property) in favor of
private respondent, two (2) petitioner's properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of
about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis
Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located
at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February
12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners failure to
redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely
selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as
Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that
petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February
12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject property
covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said property has
been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any
encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act. No. 141. Petitioners
further alleged that they were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on
February 9, 1968, Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance
in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family home which
was extrajudicially constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of
conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over
the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said
property.
Private respondent refuted petitioners contentions alleging that he lawfully acquired the
subject properties described as Lot No. 5545, Cad. 237 which was a private land, by virtue of a
Sheriffs Sale on February 12, 1966. Said sale has become final as no redemption was made
within one year from the registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale. The validity of the sale in
favor of Abdon Gilig was even confirmed by the Court of appeals in a related case (CA No.
499965-R) entitled Arriola v. Gilig, where one Rufino Arriola also claimed ownership over the
subject property.
Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a who
sold the land to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de
Venta. Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for free patent which was
made final only in 1979.
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since petitioners are still in possession of
the subject property, he has been deprived of acts of ownership and possession and therefore,
prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968 until possession has been restored to them.
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint.
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
SO ORDERED.[1]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
11. On November 3, 1985, the plaintiff filed the present action. [2]
Petitioners contend that under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the subject land
which they inherited from their father under free patent cannot be alienated or encumbered in
violation of the law. Citing in particular the cases of Oliveros v. Porciongcola[3] and Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals,[4] the execution or auction sale of the litigated land falls within the prohibited
period and is, likewise, a disavowal of the rationale of the law which is to give the homesteader
or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land which the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.[5]
We are not unmindful of the intent of the law. In fact, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[6] the
Court elucidated, to wit:
from the issuance of the patent. The reckoning point is actually the date of approval of the
application. In Amper v. Presiding Judge,[7] the Court held that:
x x x The date when the prohibition against the alienation of lands acquired by
homesteads or free patents commences is the date of the approval of the application
and the prohibition embraces the entire five-year period from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant. As stated in Beniga v. Bugas, (35 SCRA 111), the
provision would make no sense if the prohibition starting from the date of the
approval of the application would have no termination date.
The specific period of five years within which the alienation or encumbrance of a
homestead is restricted starts to be computed from the date of the issuance of the
patent. But the prohibition of alienation commences from the date the application is
approved which comes earlier. (Underlining ours.)
Following this ruling, we agree with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way
of the sheriffs sale was not violative of the law. The judgment obligation of the petitioners
against Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964. The properties were levied and sold at public
auction with Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder on February 12, 1966. On February 9, 1968, the
final deed of conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon Gilig was issued after the
petitioners failed to redeem the property after the reglementary period. Pablo Taneos application
for free patent was approved only on October 19, 1973.
The sequence of the events leads us to the inescapable conclusion that even before the
application for homestead had been approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the land.
The Deed of conveyance issued on February 9, 1968 finally transferred the property to Abdon
Gilig. As of that date, Pablo Taneo did not actually have anymore rights over the land which he
could have transferred to herein petitioners. The petitioners are not the owners of the land and
cannot claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition does not
apply since it is clear from the records that the judgment debt and the execution sale took
place prior to the approval of the application for free patent. We quote with favor the respondent
courts valid observation on the matter:
x x x the application of Pablo Taneo for a free patent was approved only on 19
October 1973 and Free Patent was issued on 10 December 1980. Under the aforecited
provision, the subject land could not be made liable for the satisfaction of any debt
contracted from the time of the application and during the 5-year period following 10
December 1980, or until 10 December 1985. However, debts contracted prior to the
approval of the application for free patent, that is prior to 18 October 1973, are not
covered by the prohibition. This is because they do not fall within the scope of the
prohibited period. In this case, the judgment debt in favor of defendant-appellee was
rendered on 24 June 1964, the writ of execution issued on 22 November 1965, notice
of levy made on 1 December 1965, the execution sale held on 12 February 1966, and
the certificate of sale registered on 2 March 1966, all before Pablo Taneos application
for free patent was approved on 19 October 1973. The execution, therefore, was not
violative of the law.[8]
Anent the second issue, petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as
family home is exempt from execution. In a last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners
invoke the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code.
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said, however, that the
family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted
over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs.[9] It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicially and
extrajudicially, the former by the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court,
and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring
the establishment of the family home. The operative act then which created the family home
extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by
Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code.[10]
Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer necessary. Article 153 of the
Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied in the family residence. It reads:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the extent
of the value allowed by law.
It is under the foregoing provision which petitioners seek refuge to avert execution of the
family home arguing that as early as 1964, Pablo Taneo had already constituted the house in
question as their family home. However, the retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly
on the provisions on the family home has been clearly laid down by the court as explained in the
case of Manacop v. Court of Appeals[11] to wit:
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been
occupied by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment.
The contention is not well-taken.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it
does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Modequillo vs. Breva, 185
SCRA 766). Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter
2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioners debt was incurred
as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His
property is therefore not exempt from attachment (Annex O, Plaintiffs Position Paper
and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78). (pp. 5-6, Decision; pp. 6465, Rollo) (underscoring ours)
The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of
the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances
where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Article 243 reads:
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment, except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the
declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others
who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. [12]
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question,
erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the
family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo
was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family
home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners alleged family home, as
constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243(2).
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering
that such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that
the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco
Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling house where a
person and his family residesand the land on which it is situated,[13] it is understood that the
house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a
family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to escape
execution of their property but to no avail.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who has been excluded from
the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What we are asked to decide is whether he should be
allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the
absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code.
The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. 1 The latter court
held that the trial judge had not committed any grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in
allowing the private respondent to prove his filiation. Moreover, the proper remedy was an ordinary appeal
and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for a reversal of these rulings on the ground that they
are not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children (her
co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. 2 Claiming
to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial
settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the
petitioners. 3
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and that
at the age of 15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the latter's
urging and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he received support from his father while he
was studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually graduated. He was also assigned by
his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in
Mananom from 1967 to 1973. 4
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission from
Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the
illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. 5 These are "the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The petitioners thereupon moved for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the
applicable provisions of the Civil Code. 6
March 6, 1937
CRUZ, J.:
Questioned in this action is the dismissal of a petition filed by Daya Maria Tol-Noquera for
appointment as administratrix of the property of the absentee Remigio Tol.
In Special Proceedings No. P-056, which was filed in December 1986, Daya Maria Tol alleged that
she was the acknowledged natural child of Remigio Tol, who had been missing since 1984. She
claimed that a certain Diosdado Tol had fraudulently secured a free patent over Remigio's property
and had obtained title thereto in his name. She was seeking the administration of the absentee's
estate in order that she could recover the said property.
The petition was opposed by Diosdado Tol, who argued that Daya Maria Tol was not an
acknowledged natural child of the absentee and that the property sought to be administered was
covered by an original certificate of title issued in his name.
On March 31, 1987, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was a collateral attack
on a Torrens title. The court also declared in effect that it was useless to appoint an administrator in
view of the claim of a third person that he was the owner of the absentee's property.
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, she filed a notice of appeal with this
Court on June 4, 1984. However, inasmuch as only questions of law were involved, we resolved to
require the petitioner to seek review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within 15 days
from notice.
In the petition now before us, it is argued that the original petition in the trial court was not intended
as a collateral attack on a Torrens title; hence, Art. 389 of the Civil Code 1 was not applicable.
The private respondent, on the other hand, contends that since the petitioner claims she is an
illegitimate child of Remigio Tol, she is prohibited under Art. 992 of the Civil Code 2 from inheriting ab
intestato from the relatives of her father.
The private respondent likewise questions the necessity of her appointment for the purpose only of
having the title annulled. He adds that in view of her allegations of fraud, she should have sued for
the annulment of the title within a period of one year, which had already expired. Lastly, the decision
of the trial court had already become final and executory because 76 days had already elapsed from
the date of receipt of the said decision on May 21, 1987, to the date the petition was filed before this
Court on August 5, 1987.
A study of the record reveals that the lower court was rather hasty in dismissing the petition.
As we see it, the petition was not a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The petitioner did say there
was a need to appoint an administrator to prevent the property from being usurped, but this did not
amount to a collateral attack on the title. The alleged fraudulent issuance of title was mentioned as a
justification for her appointment as administrator. But there was nothing in the petition to indicate that