Case 1

A.M. No. MTJ-91-565 October 5, 2005

Patricio T. Junio, Complainant,
vs.
Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr., MTC, Alaminos, Pangasinan, Respondent.
FACTS:
Judge Pedro C. Rivera, Jr. pleading for judicial clemency relative to our Resolution dated August 30,
1993 dismissing him from the service for kissing his boarders daughter while he was drunk during his
birthday party, which act constitutes gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the Judiciary.
After more than 11 years or on November 17, 2004, respondent Judge sent a letter to this Court,
stating that he did not file a motion for reconsideration of our Resolution because he "accepted the
verdict, in all humility." But he pleaded that based on humanitarian considerations and in the spirit of
forgiveness, we grant him his monetary benefits corresponding to his long years of service in the
government; and allow him to work in any government agency or government-owned or controlled
corporations as a consultant. He further stated that he was acquitted in the criminal case for acts of
lasciviousness filed against him; that he served the government for more than thirty-five (35) years,
four (4) years of which was in the Judiciary; and that this is his first administrative offense.
On June 17, 2005, respondent Judge again wrote this Court reiterating his plea for judicial clemency
"in the light of my present personal circumstances." He stated that he is undergoing intensive medical
treatment for cataract, prostatic enlargement, postural vertigo, hypertension and arthritis; that he is
"under heavy financial crisis;" and that his ardent wish is "to reap the fruits" of his long years of
service to the government.
Issue: Whether or not a judge dismissed from service may be granted a judicial clemency considering
his length of service and his financial, and physical conditions?
Ruling: Yes, Judicial clemency must be granted.
Membership in the judiciary circumscribes ones personal conduct and imposes upon him certain
restrictions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted
position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be
free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His conduct must be able to withstand the
most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system. We certainly do not require
judges to measure up to the standards of conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to
be like Caesars wife in all their actions. Hence, their faithful adherence to the Code of Judicial
Conduct is strictly demanded. A lackadaisical attitude towards these judicial standards is
impermissible.

In respondents case, we note certain significant factors that spur us to consider his present plea for
judicial clemency and reexamine with compassion the penalty imposed on him. Respondent Judge
has rendered more than thirty five (35) years of government service. This is his first and only
administrative offense. He demonstrated sincere repentance. He was dismissed from the service
more than ten (10) years ago and "has come to terms with reality and learned (his) lesson." His
regressing physical condition caused by various illnesses and old age necessitate financial support.

CASE NUMBER 2
ADVANCE TEXTILE MILLS INC, PETITIONERS
VS WILLY TAN, doing business under the name WCT Manufacturing, Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Advance Textile Mills, Inc., allegedly sold textile materials to Willy Tan of WCT
Manufacturing. After few attempts at collecting the unpaid balance of P1,751,892.67, on November
11, 1993, petitioner sent respondents a final demand and letter giving him ten days to settle his debt
on pain of legal action. Respondent still failed to pay. Thereafter, petitioner instituted an action for
collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent denied
purchasing fabric materials on credit from the petitioner and alleged that all he purchases were paid
in cash basis. He likewise denied receiving any demand letter from the petitioner.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled on March 6, 1995. On motion of respondents counsel, the trial
court granted the motion to cancel and reset the pre-trial conference on April 5, 1995. Both on said
date respondent and counsel failed to appear, so the trial court, upon petitioners motion, declared
respondent in default and thereafter allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte.
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Respondent appealed the decision in Court of
Appeals and ruled that default was null and void, for failure of the trial court to serve respondent with
the notice of pre-trial and ordered the lower court a quo for further proceedings. Then petitioner raised
the case to Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a separate notice resetting pre-trial date is required before the party litigant
can be declared in default for his failure to attend the reset pre-trial?
RULING: Yes, the party and his counsel must be served with separate notices of pre-trial conference.
The proceedings before the lower court happened in the years 1994 to 1995, and that governed by
the old Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the old rules, particularly Rule 20, Section 1; a notice of pretrial must be served on the party affected, separately from his counsel, otherwise the proceedings will
be null and void. The general rule that notice to counsel is notice to parties has been held insufficient
and inadequate for purposes of pre-trial, such that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party
through or care of his counsel or counsels address with the express imposition upon counsel of the
obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and assuring
that the party either appear thereat or deliver to counsel a written authority to represent the party with
power to compromise the case, with the warning that a party who fails to do as may be non-suited or

declared in default. Before a party is non-suited or is declared as in default, it must be shown that
said party and his counsel were duly served with separate notices of the pre-trial conference.

CASE NUMBER 3

CASE NUMBER 4

CASE NUMBER 5
ALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005

Facts: Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries
in the birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr, to wit: (1) the surname Herrera as appended to
the name of the said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba
Herrera Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to all childs mother, Armi A. Alba He
averred that such challenged entries are false.
Private respondent contended that he married only once, as evidenced by certification from NSO and
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong.
The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance the hearing was set. On the
scheduled hearing the counsel from the OSG appeared but filed no opposition, Armi was not present.
The court a quo rendered a decision ordering the correction of the entries in the Certification of Live
Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.
Armi filed a petition for the annulment of the judgment, contending that she came to know of the
decision of the RTC where the school where her son was enrolled, was furnished by private
respondent with a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioners surname from Herrera to
Alba. Armi contended that she and private respondent cohabited and after their separation, he
continued to give support to their son.
Private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation with Armi.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child shall use the surname of their mother.

Held: Under Art. 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA No. 9255, w/c took effect on March 19,
2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother , unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in w/c case they may bear the fathers surname. In Wang vs. Cebu Civil Registrar it was held
that an illegitimate child whose filiations is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and
his mothers surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is
only when said child is recognized that he may use his fathers surname, reflecting his status us an
acknowledged illegitimate held.

CASE NUMBER 6
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INC., ET AL. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 157611. August 9, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit corporation that operates
and maintains a country club and various sports and recreational facilities for the exclusive use of its
members. Sometime in 1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI, requested its Internal Auditor,
to conduct a study on the profitability of ACCIs Food and Beverage Department (F & B Department).
Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993, F & B Department had been incurring
substantial losses. Realizing that it was no longer profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B
Department, the management decided to cease from operating the department and to open the same
to a contractor, such as a concessionaire, which would be willing to operate its own food and
beverage business within the club. Thus, ACCI sent its F & B Department employees individual
letters informing them that their services were being terminated and that they would be paid
separation pay. The Union in turn, with the authority of individual respondents, filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not the clubs right to terminate its employees for an authorized cause, particularly
to secure its continued viability and existence is valid.

Held: When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and open the same to a
concessionaire, it did not reduce the number of personnel assigned thereat. It terminated the
employment of all personnel assigned at the department.
Petitioners failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due to substantial losses
notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual respondents were dismissed on the ground of closure
or cessation of an undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is
allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The closure of operation of an establishment or

undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses includes both the complete
cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of a companys activities.

CASE NUMBER 7
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES
GR. No. 154259

February 28, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of
Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages through
the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages,
P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorneys fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October
13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and
invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotels former managers birthday was being
celebrated. He consented and carried the latters present. At the party, when he was helping himself
at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud
voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied
the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he
claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant
wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay
Bisayas claim that she invited him to the party.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lims conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for
damages caused to plaintiff.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through
Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be
his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that
when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering
the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is
apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention
on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have
made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as
requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not
guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

CASE NUMBER 8
SPOUSES QUE VS CA
G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Arrieta filed a complaint against the spouses Que and Adela Urian for the annulment of a
quit claim over a lot she inherited from her grandfather. After petitioners received the complaint
together with the summonses, they hired the services of Atty. Ranot. However, Atty. Ranot failed to
file petitioners Answer. Therefore, respondent moved to declare petitioners in default. Only Urian
appeared during the hearing of respondents motion and he also manifested that Atty. Ranot was still
preparing the Answer. Respondent presented her evidence ex parte, and the case was submitted for
judgment. The quit claim was declared null and void. The petitioners moved for reconsideration or a
new trial on the ground that there was mistake and fraud as they were allegedly under the impression
that their lawyer had prepared and filed the necessary pleading. The trial court dismissed their motion
and so did the Court of Appeals when they appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners petition.

Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only when a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Because they were allegedly under the
impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed the necessary pleading, petitioners, in their petition
for relief from judgment in the trial court, alleged that judgment was entered against them through
mistake or fraud. However, that is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under Section 1, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court. Mistake, under Section 1 of Rule 38, refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which
relates to the case. Fraud, on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, the kind which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court. Obviously,
petitioners mistaken assumption that Atty. Ranot had attended to his professional duties is neither
mistake nor fraud.
Moreover, under Section 1, negligence must be excusable and generally imputable to the
party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and
allow a party to disown his counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and
subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should

do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the
courts ruling.
In this case, the Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels negligence and
allowed a litigant another chance to present his case based on the following instances: (1) where the
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when the
application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where
the interests of justice so require. However, none of these exceptions are present in the case at bar.
Therefore, petition must be dismissed for lack of merit.

CASE NUMBER 9
NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and
ANDRES GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134787

November 15, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother
and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in
1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition"
covering properties they inherited from their parents.

Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against
petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court has no application

Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.Thus,
the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance
of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions
involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a

compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of
the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint
otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying
the necessary averments of a defective complaint.

CASE NUMBER 10
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380

October 5, 2005

Facts:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left
for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son
that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as
our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our
holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had

acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained
a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the afore cited
evidence in his favor.

CASE NUMBER 11
CASE NUMBER 10
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO
G.R. No. 168445

November 11, 2005

Facts:
Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency, Inc.,
which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant and Jose Gasacao were
charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested while his nephew remained
at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal
recruitment. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao appealed to the
Supreme Court claiming that he cant be held liable for illegal recruitment because he was just a mere
employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that he was not aware of the law against
prohibition on bonds and deposits under section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. 8042.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal
recruitment.

Ruling:
There is no merit in appellants contention that he was just a mere employee of the manning
agency because he was the companys crewing manager. As testified by the witnesses, the accused
appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from receiving job applications, interviewing
the applicants, and informing them of the agencys requirement of payment of performance or cash
bond prior to the deployment. The Supreme Court held further that appellants defense of ignorance is
not commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil Code which states that ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith. The defense of goodwill is neither unavailable because
the appellant failed to deploy the complainants without valid reasons.

CASE NUMBER 12
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of
the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1
of the Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to
the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can
go forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation
has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates
to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the
States power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such
power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

CASE NUMBER 13
NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005 (EN BANC)

Facts:
The petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. In
the course of the proceedings both parties filed various motions with the RTC. Among there were :
(1)motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development in default and (2)motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land
Bank of the Philippines. The trial court granted the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in
default but denied as against the heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons
was improper; the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied; and the
motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied. On
February 12, 1998 the trial court dismissed the petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners allegedly received the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day or on
March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration.

On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4, 1998, the CA denied the notice of
appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3,
1998.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that the petitioners Notice of Appeal was filed out of time?

RULING: The SC ruled in favor of the petitioners. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow
a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth,
this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts
to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule
45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from
July 22, 1998, the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration. To recapitulate, a
party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if
either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on
July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July
22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.

CASE NUMBER 14
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311

March 31, 2005

Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He
averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mothers
middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Ruling:

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for
all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA
8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

CASE NUMBER 15
VILLALON vs. VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206

November 18, 2005

Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to
respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was
docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.On September 25, 1996,
respondent filed an answerdenying petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage
to petitioner has been fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in
their relationship and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards.
Petitioners success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father, and
provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities
was beyond reproach.

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr.
Dayan described the said disorder as a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and
occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness,
thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted
with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus
engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova Complex exhibits habitual
adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision which was denied in an
order dated October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity of
the husband.

Ruling:
No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the
fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in
marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The
same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological
disorder rooted in petitioners personal history. The petition has no merit.

CASE NUMBER 16
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO
vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES
G.R. No. 132537

October 14, 2005

Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia
Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines.
Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under the
management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the property.

Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owners copy of
the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of
which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Mariettas name was sold at a public auction
wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Mariettas husband, Hinahon together with their children,
filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the ground that
said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and is thus exempt from

execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the house and lot was
constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972

Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall
be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the house and lot was
constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not deemed constituted
as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in
1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property
was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within the exception
provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home.

CASE NUMBER 17
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 123450

August 31, 2005

Facts:
Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on December 29, 1989. A year later,
they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his marriage to
Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that Ma. Theresa had
already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such marriage of Ma. Theresa to
Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma. Theresas marriage was
bigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It declared the child as being
illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision but on appeal, reversed its ruling
and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage.

Issues:
a)

Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate.

b)

Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardos legitimacy.

Ruling:
Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy would come
from the validity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriage for that bigamous marriage is
void from the very beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had
never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the so-called marriage with the latter
was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose
Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the
legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he
cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo.The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the
Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.

As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardos legitimacy. He has no standing in law to
dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his
heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since
the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

CASE NUMBER 18
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI CORAZON ANGELES MAGLAYA
G.R. No. 153798

September 2, 2005

Facts:
Francisco M. Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four
parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Aleli claims that she is
the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen
S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent. For this
matter, respondent prays that she be made administratrix of Franciscos estate. Petitioner Belen

opposed respondents claim, alleging that the respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for,
although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was
not signed by him. Belen petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the
legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract
between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Aleli could validly claim that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco
Angeles.

Ruling:
No, respondents legitimacy was impugned, and for failing to establish the presumption of her
legitimacy, she could not validly claim that she is the legitimate child of the deceased. The
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing
proof of the factual basis- that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or
birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. In the case at bar, respondent failed to prove
such legal marriage of her parents, for she failed to show any marriage certificate or marriage
contract. She failed to present any priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority to the witness
box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between her parents. Clearly, therefore,
respondent could not be vested with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained,
should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova.

Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established by
any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed
parents. But respondent failed to prove her legitimacy even in this aspect. Respondent presented, in
support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated November 23, 1939 issued by
the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila. But such birth certificate was not signed by her putative
father. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity
and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother
alone if the father refuses.

CASE NUMBER 19
PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994

Facts:

June 28, 2005

Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son,
Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.

The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear
despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as
she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified
that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the
custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling
reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into account
all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise, This Court has held that when the parents
separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213
takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art 363. In all question on the care,
custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such
measure.

CASE NUMBER 20
RE: HABITUAL TARDINESS OF MRS. CALINGAO

CASE NUMBER 21
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST SHERIFF BISNAR

CASE NUMBER 22
ARANDILLA JR. VS. MAGUINDANAO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE

CASE NUMBER 23
EFFECT OF REPEALING LAW ON LAW FIRST REPEALED
GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 165835

June 22, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife or retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, with
application for injunctive relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the
motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the
Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.
The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias
allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic then filed the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a
petition for forfeiture of those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias. The case was
docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of forfeiture involving the
same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(forfeiture II). Thus the two cases were
consolidated for convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent to the filing
of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA 7080(plunder) and the case raffled
to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same properties identified
in both Forfeiture I and II.
Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the
plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the second division of SB pursuan to
R 8249. On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture
case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case
of plunder.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings pursuant to RA 1379.
Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and civil in nature. It is a divestiture of property without
compensation in consequence of an offense.
CASE NUMBER 24
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 146486
March 4, 2005
Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The Ombudsman

is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is
impeachable.
On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against Rayvi
Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and
(3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas
employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding investigation was
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was referred by the Ombudsman to a
constituted Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the investigation be converted into
one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Office of
the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy
Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. On 18 December
2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the
Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Ombudsmans Deputies are impeachable.
b) Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively liable.
Ruling:
Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-000616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 is reinstated and the Office of the
Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. The Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that The
President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from Office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators in
Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Leading legal
luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is
impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of
the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is
impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not
passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis
of the question presented.
Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the private
respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer
cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment
presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his
removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the
courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private
respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have been

placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.

CASE NUMBER 25
AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 134284
December 1, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro
Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to
Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and
the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the Special
Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the
vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latters approval b) the construction of the building shall
start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979. Before such completion, neither the
deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if the purchase price shall have been fully
paid and c) there shall be no resale of the property.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.

Ruling:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any
allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of restrictions may
only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that is, for the payment of
damages.

CASE NUMBER 26
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 137567
Facts:

June 20, 2000

Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and
having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner
and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint,
petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for
the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.
Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its
requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof
of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no
such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore
he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.

CASE NUMBER 27
BESO vs. DAGUMAN
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211

January 28, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent Judge.
After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to check
with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found out that the
marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against herein respondent
Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.
Ruling:
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the court
jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the
marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.

CASE NUMBER 28
MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509

July 31, 2000

Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella- Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint a n information for bigamy was files against
respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case as a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of the marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of respondent
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed with the Criminal Case. A
pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused.

CASE NUMBER 29
LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 114776

February 2, 2000

Facts:
Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore Airlines Limited on 1979. However
because of the recession that hit the Airline Industry sometime in 1982, Defendant Company initiated
cost-cutting measures such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the plaintiff. Subsequently,
plaintiff filed a case of illegal dismissal against defendant. Laureano then cited Singapore Laws to his
case since he was employed in the Singapore Airlines Ltd.
Issue:
a) Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be applied in this case.
b) Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on the part of Singapore Airlines Ltd.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be proved as fact in order to employ them. The
plaintiff was not able to prove the applicability of the laws of Singapore that he cited to his case.
Under the principle of processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved as facts it will be
presumed as the same as ours. Hence, Philippine Laws should apply. Further, under Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, the petitioners action for damages due to illegal dismissal has
already prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more than four (4) years after the
effective date has prescribed.

CASE NUMBER 30
TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127406

November 27, 2000

Facts:
In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want to declare
their marriage null and void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Edgardo Reyes
married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a judge, then a church wedding followed. In 1991,
Edgardo reyes filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage with Ofelia be
declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license when they got married. He
also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of nullity of the marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only when his civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly
Ruling:
The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of
Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there
was no need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before
such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private respondent being void for
lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private respondents
second marriage to Ofelia Ty is valid.
Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting.