Idek Its Cards

Open Borders Generally Doesnt Solve
Open Borders Fail

Opening the border for inclusion only masks other forms
of exclusion- making immigrants even more hesitant to
cross the border
Motomura 07
(Hiroshi, Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, 2007, Americans in Waiting:
The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States, pg 13)
This entire inquiry reflects my hope that national citizenship in the United States can be a
viable context for a sense of belonging and for participation in civic, political, social, and
economic life that is inclusive and respectful of all individuals. There are certainly other
models of belonging, including transnational models that reflect a sense of belonging to
more than one nation, and postnational models that think beyond national citizenship
entirely. But the apparent inclusiveness of these other approaches to belonging can mask
other modes of exclusion. If national citizenship matters less, ties of religion, race, class,
and other groupings that are less cosmopolitan or democratic than national citizenship
will matter even more than they do already. The result may be a world without national
walls but also a world of a thousand petty fortresses, as political philosopher Michael
Walzer once put it.10 Making national citizenship into an inclusive vehicle is not easy. It
requires a welcome of immigrantscrystallized in the idea of Americans in waitingthat
has faded from law and policy in the United States. Although this idea has weakened and is
in danger of weakening further, it should be restored to prominent influence because it

captures this basic truth: a sensible we/they line must reflect the understanding that many
of them will become part of us. This understanding was the conceptual engine for
integrating generations of immigrantsmostly those from Europe. With much of this
understanding gone, we should not be surprised if more recent waves of immigrants,
especially immigrants of color, seem more reluctant to cross the we/they line into American
society. Recovering the lost story of immigrants as Americans in waiting is thus crucial
not only to giving immigrants their due, but also to recovering the vision of our national
future that is reflected in the phrase a nation of immigrants that America is made up
of immigrants, but still one nation.
Open Borders do not solve for either economic equality,

worker oppression or Democratic representation
Johnson 2007 Dean of UC Davis School of Law(Kevin R., 2007Opening the
Floodgates; Why America Needs to Rethink Its Borders and Immigration Laws)
An open-borders solution is, of course, not the silver bullet that would instantly cure all of
the nations woes. Far from it. Inequalities in the modern U.S. capitalist system will persist .
The receding of the immigration laws will allow greater labor mobility and free the labor
market to operate more efficiently in response to market forces than the current system of
immigration controls does. Efficient markets, however, rarely operate without
perpetuating or increasing economic inequality. Other tools would be needed to address the
endemic problems of economic inequality in American social life. Several proposals in this
book, however, are designed to help ameliorate the problems of economic inequality
exacerbated by open borders. Wealth redistribution policies that transfer benefits from
those economic actors who gain from easy labor mobility to the poorest citizens of the
United States constitute one possibility. Those, such as lower-skilled workers, who
benefit littleor perhaps lose groundbecause of the immigration of workers should
receive transfer payments or tax reductions funded by taxes paid by the beneficiaries of
free labor migration, primarily businesses and employers. In addition, the federal
government, which collects the lions share of
A Call for Truly Comprehensive
Immigration Reform | 43 tax revenues paid by noncitizens, should provide adequate
resources to state and local governments that today provide services, such as emergency
services and a public education, to immigrants. To a limited extent, states have
aggressivelyat times successfullypressed the federal government on an ad hoc basis
for financial assistance to defray the costs of immigration and immigrants. To help cover
those costs, resources could be redirected by the federal government to states with large
immigrant populations. This would reduce the fiscal pressures at the state and local
levels, which often fuel resentment and anti-immigration sentiment. Last but not least,
the federal government must do much more to ensure that wage and labor protections are
enforced for all workers in the United States. Currently, the law completely fails to
regulate the secondary labor market, in which immigrants are exploited and lack wage
and labor protections. The existence of the unregulated secondary market undercuts the
efforts of labor in the primary market, in which employers tend to comply with the law, to
improve its treatment by employers. On a related note, open borders as advocated in this
book would do nothing to solve the dilemmas of democracy American style. That project, of
course, deserves the nations attention. As the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004
show, much work remains to be done in the United States to ensure that all U.S. citizens
enjoy a truly democratic election process that does not disenfranchise a large percentage of
the greater community. With millions of noncitizen residents barred from voting, the
United States already has serious problems with ensuring true democracy for all
residents. A similar problem continues to afflict many minority citizens. One possibility
to improve the responsiveness of government to immigrants, which is beyond the scope
of this book and would surely provoke controversy, might be to extend the franchise to
noncitizen residents of the United States.86 The United States finds itself at a historical
crossroads. Immigration is on the front pages of newspapers across the country.
Restrictionist messages fill talk show radio and the national news. Immigration deserves
the nations attention. But it warrants sober analysis, not sound bites designed to rile base
instincts and insult and alienate members of the national community. A real effort must be
made to address the most fundamental problem with U.S. immigration law: that our laws
are dramatically out of synch with the social, economic, and political reality of
immigration in the modern world.
Bad to Abandon Borders

Erasing borders leads to unlimited and endless violence of
a world police state in order to erase the ontological
necessity of pluralism that makes resistance ineinvtbale.
The political gesutre of the Kritik is a way to erase the
other and bring about the kingdom of satan.
Prozorov, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies,
University of Helsinki, Finland, in 8
[Sergei, De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political
Thought of Late Modernity in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed.
Noel Parker, pg. 34-6]
For Schmitt, the
immanentist orientation of modern political theology, through the effacement

of sovereign transcendence, inevitably renders it anti-political by virtue of its negation of
any outside to the immanent order of being (cf. Ewald 1992; Ojakangas 2004). This negation of the outside may
be conceptualized at two levels. In terms of political ontology, immanentism necessarily disavows its own origins, which must
logically be decisionist and exceptional, i.e., exterior to the plane of immanence of the internal organization of order. Every order is
constituted by a founding rupture that dispenses with the previously existing order and inaugurates the new order, without itself being
part of either. In the ontological sense, the outside of order, disavowed in immanentist thought, is that
marginal excess that constitutes the form of order by escaping from it, that supple- ment
which simultaneously sustains and undermines the existence of order, the sovereign decision
that institutes order, while remaining unsubsumed under its principles (see Schmitt 1985; Derrida
1992). The dis- avowal of the sovereign foundation is thus the negation of the boundary that ultimately separates order from itself, and
thus, in the well-known Derridean argument, prevents its closure and consolidation into a self-
propelling machine. On the ontic level, the negation of the outside takes place through the
effacement of the fundamental spatio-temporal pluralism of political orders in the project of
world unity, for which there are no longer friends and enemies, both of whom are
legitimate equals to the self in the pluralistic domain of the international. What remains is
only the self-immanent self that is to be elevated to the universal status and the obscene
excess of the foe, whose resistance to forcible incorporation into world unity serves as a
justification for its annihilation. The logic of world unity is marked by a persistent attempt
at the erasure of all dividing lines between individuals and political communities and, thus,
the merger of the self and the other in the final reign of benign universality. There is no
longer a place (literally as well as figuratively) for the exclusion of the other, simply because there is
no longer any otherness in the system which operates with the all-inclusive category of
humanity (Schmitt 1976; Kervegan 1999). For Schmitt, the horrifying consequence of world unity would
be the elimination of all pluralism and, hence, the impossibility of difference, otherness, and,
in concretely spatial terms, the outside. A unified world is a world, which is impossible to leave in any other manner
than by discon- tinuing ones own existence. Freedom is freedom of movement, nothing else. What
would be terrifying is a world in which there no longer existed an exterior but only a
homeland, no longer space for measuring and test- ing ones strength freely? (Schmitt 1988, 243).
The problem with world unity, however, is more than the sacrifice of pluralism. The world, in which there is only a
homeland, is, in Schmitts diagnosis, a dystopic world police power, to which the romantic
connotations of homeland barely apply: The day world politics comes to the earth, it will
be trans- formed in a world police power (Schmitt, cited in Petito 2004, 6). For Schmitt, pluralistic
antagonism between states in an international society is infinitely preferable to the
technological nihilism of world domination, which mindlessly pushes for ever-greater
integration, oblivious to the fact that world unity can serve the most obscene of purposes:
after all, the Kingdom of Satan is also a unity (Schmitt, cited in Ojakangas 2004, 80). In a spiritual world
ruled by the law of pluralism, a
piece of concrete order is more valuable than any empty

generalizations of a false totality. For it is an actual order, not a constructed and imaginary
abstraction . . . It would be a false pluralism, which played world-comprehending totalities
off against the concrete actuality of such plural orders (Schmitt 1999, 206). The effacement of the outside
only serves to endow a necessarily par- ticularistic unity with a universality that elevates it above its numerous equals in the pluralistic
ontology of the international, and consequently opens a path for global police domination by what, by logical necessity,
remains merely one political force in the world. The borderless world, tele- ologically presupposed in
much contemporary political discourse, is, in a Schmittian analysis, a world of infinite self-certitude and
arrogance, unbounded violence of the subjection of particular political entities to the
pseudo-universal ideal and unlimited world police power over a world that remains
ontologically pluralistic and, thus, will inevitably resist its subjection.
Difference is inevitablea borderless world is an

impossible attempt to deny the foundations of politics
themselves
Prozorov, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies,
University of Helsinki, Finland, in 8
[Sergei, De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political
Thought of Late Modernity in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed.
Noel Parker, pg. 38-9]
What then becomes of boundaries in an anti-immanentist turn in political ontology? Should we simply reaffirm the ontological
necessity of boundaries and their irreducible presence even in the immanentist designs for the unity of the world? Indeed, the
argument that boundaries are ontological preconditions rather than merely ontic
phenomena points to the impossibility not merely of dispensing with boundaries in practice,
but also of transcending them in thought. As I have argued, it is only by a prior reification of the
boundary that disavows its spectral parergonal ontology, and endows it with empirical
presence that the discourse of denigration of boundaries becomes possible in the first place .
A crucial distinction must be drawn, though, between the ontological function of boundaries and the empirical positivities of bounded
entities. While the existence of some or other boundaries must be viewed as an ontological necessity, it does not follow from
this that particular orders, bounded in historically specific ways, are in any way necessary.
There can be no natural boundaries, just as it is impossible to legitimize the location of a
boundary with reference to the limits of ethnic or political identity that it bounds, if only
because this very identity is a contingent effect of the boundary itself. To argue for the
ontological primacy of boundaries is therefore to reject the ontologization of identities that
they delimit, i.e., to assert that a boundary is not a ground. It is precisely this ontological stance that
permits the ontic discernment of the diverse potentialities at the margin, analyzed in this volume
the reaf- firmation of the parergonal status of the boundary necessarily focuses our attention on concrete practices of (re)constituting
marginal entities as positive effects of delimitation. In other words, anti-immanentist discourse must not merely displace the utopian
pathos of overcoming boundaries in global, self-immanent unity, but also problematize and disturb the existence of such unities within
the pluralistic international order. From this perspective, a critique of the state may well be derived from the critique of globalism
rather than function as its opposite. Our critique of immanentist tendencies in political thought, which
is necessarily a critique of any postmodern delusion of a borderless world, must therefore

not be equated with a shallow conser- vatism of the defense of the status quo or a nostalgia
for the Westphalian nation-state. Just as Schmitts (1976, 2003) argument about the
impossibility of the negation of the political did not entail for him the impossibility of the
demise of the nation-state, we must not equate the ontological status of the borderline with
the historical immutability of the modern embodiment of the boundary in the nation-state
border. New forms of delimiting difference may well be invented, just as new forms of
antagonism are certain to appear. Thus, boundaries are neither natural givens nor superficial
social constructs, but rather markers of the fundamental ontological division of the world,
its difference from itself that precludes its closure into self-immanence.
An outright rejection of borders fails. Reframing our

concepts of borders in terms of effects is crucial to
cultivate a politics attentive to lived experience
Agnew 8
(John, Department of Geography, UCLA, Borders on the mind: re-framing border
thinking Ethics & Global Politics Vol. 1, No. 4, 2008)
Fourthly, and finally, policing
borders still has a powerful normative justification in the defense

of that territorial sovereignty which serves to underpin both liberal and democratic claims
to (Lockean) popular rule. Now such claims may frequently be empirically fictive, particularly in the case of imperial and
large nation-states, but the logic of the argument is that, absent effective worldwide government, the highest
authority available is that of existing states .68 How such states police their borders, of course, should be subject
to transparent and open regulation. But why it is popularly legitimate to engage in policing functions in the way they are carried out
cannot simply be put down to mass docility in the face of an omnipotent (because it is omniscient) state apparatus. National
populations do worry about their borders because their democracy (or other, familiar, politics)
depends on it. The border is a continuing marker of a national (or supranational) political order
even as people, in Europe at least, can now cross it for lunch.69 The problem here is that democratic theory
and practice is not yet up to dealing with the complexities of a world in which territories and
flows must necessarily co-exist. If one can argue, as does Arash Abizadeh, that the demos of democratic theory is in
principle unbounded, this still begs the question of who is foreigner and who is citizen in a world that is still practically divided
by borders.70 As Sofia Nasstrom puts the problem succinctly: it is one thing to argue that globalization has
opened the door to a problem within modern political thought, quite another to argue that
globalization is the origin of this problem.71 Until political community is redefined in some way as not being
coextensive with nation-state, we will be stuck with much of business as usual. Currently then, given the strong
arguments about what borders do and the problems that they also entail, a more
productive ethic than thinking either just with or just against them would be to re-frame
the discussion in terms of the impacts that borders have; what they do both for and to
people. From this perspective, we can both recognize the necessary roles of borders and the
barriers to improved welfare that they create. In the first place, however, this requires re-framing thinking
about borders away from the emphasis on national citizenship towards a model of what Dora Kostakopoulou calls civic
registration.72 Under this model, the only condition for residence would be demonstrated willingness to live according to
democratic rule plus some set requirements for residency and the absence of a serious criminal record. Such a citizenship model
requires a reconceptualization of territorial space as a dwelling space for residents and, thus, a move away from the nationalist
narratives which cultivate the belief that territory is a form of property to be owned by a particular national group, either because the
latter has established a first occupancy claim or because it regards this territory as a formative part of its identity.73 In a world in
which wars and systematic violations of human rights push millions to seek asylum across borders every year, this rethinking is
imperative.74 In the second place, and by way of example, from this viewpoint it is reasonable to prefer global redistributive
justice to open borders. To put it bluntly, it is better to shift resources to people rather than permitting
people to shift themselves towards resources.75 Currently much migration from country-to-country is the result
of the desire to improve economic well-being and enhance the life-chances of offspring. Yet, people often prefer to stay
put, for familial, social, and political reasons, if they can. There seems no good basis, therefore,
to eulogize and institutionalize movement as inherently preferable to staying put. If adequate
mechanisms were developed to stimulate development in situ, many people who currently move would not. Not only people in
destination countries associate their identities with territory. Using the standard of a decent life, therefore, can
lead beyond the present impasse between the two dominant views of borders towards a
perspective that re-frames borders as having both negative and positive effects and that
focuses on how people can both benefit from borders and avoid their most harmful effects.
In political vision as in everyday practice, therefore, borders remain as ambiguously relevant as ever, even as we work to enhance
their positive and limit their negative effects.
Borders are key to social solidarity that solves poverty,

equality, and are key to macroeconomic regulation
Agnew 2008 (John, Agnew is currently Distinguished Professor of Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA). From 1975 until 1995 he was a professor at Syracuse University in New York. Dr. Agnew teaches courses on political
geography, the history of geography, European cities, and the Mediterranean World., Borders on the mind: re-framing border
thinking, Ethics and Global Politics, pg 5, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/258.pdf)
A second theme in how borders serve political identity is a broadly social democratic emphasis
on how social solidarity within national borders furthers goals such as diminished poverty,
increased equality of opportunity, and given the absence of effective global-level institutions,
macroeconomic regulation and stabilization. To Paul Hirst, for example, as sources of power are increasingly
pluralistic, the state becomes even more important in providing a locus for political
solidarity.28 In particular, he writes, Macroeconomic policy continues to be crucial in promoting
prosperity, at the international level by ensuring stability, and at the national and regional
levels by balancing co-operation and competition. Governments are not just municipalities
in a global market-place
Borders are necessary as they fulfill our ethical and

identity of humans as means to independence, limits of
violence, and the ability for stability
Vaughan-Williams 8 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, ph.d Assistant Professor of
International Security , 2008, Borders, Territory, Law, University of Exeter, International
Political Sociology (2008) 2, 322338, Accessed: 7/27/13,)
there
have been some notable attempts at acknowledging and offering theoretically reflective
accounts of the concept of the border of the state . Jackson, for example, has built upon the work of Hedley
Bull and emphasized the normative role that state borders play in international life: the
sanctity and stability of inherited boundaries is a fundamental building block of
international society and a principle behind which the vast majority of sovereign states
rally (Jackson 2000:333). On his view, borders between states not only delimit the spheres of national
interests, security, and law but also shape rights and duties such as those relating to nonintervention (Jackson 2000:319). As such, borders are said to perform a key normative role by distinguishing between insider
Nevertheless, when taken collectively, these complaints perhaps overstate the case and over the past 5 years or so in particular
groups (members of international institutions such as the UN) and outsider groups (those who enjoy no legal existence as independent
states) (Jackson 2000:333). A similar line of argument is pursued by Williams who also draws on
Bull to argue that borders between states perform an important ethical function in world
politics (Williams 2002:739). For Williams, state borders are ubiquitous and embedded in IR because
they are a necessary facet of human existence: The durability and depth of sedimentation of
territorial borders as fences suggest that division, and division on a territorial basis, speaks
to a deep-seated need of human identity and also in human ethics (Williams 2003:39; emphasis added).
On this view, borders between states are said to act as fences between neighbours in such a
way that tolerates diversity instead of stifling difference (Williams 2003:39). Without borders,
Williams claims, the international juridicalpolitical system would not be able to ensure state
independence, limits on violence, sanctity of agreement or the stability of possession (Williams
2002:739740). Hence, he argues, to remove, or even to re-conceptualize, territorial borders would
mean the end of IR requiring a shift in the conduct of politics on the planet that is
unimaginable (Williams 2003:27). However, Williams argument might be challenged on two grounds: first, that borders
between states are not necessarily limits on but rather markers and even upholders of
violence in political life; and, second, in any case, as we have already seen in the case of legal arguments deployed by the
UN in defence of the Human Rights of detainees in Guantanamo, planetary shifts in the conduct of politics occasioned by (or
reflected in) the disaggregation of territorial limits and limits of law appear to be already well under way.
Modern borders are engines of connectivity that allow for

engagement with the other
Rumford 11, Chris Rumford, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal
Holloway, University of London, Seeing like a border Political Geography 30 (2011)

pages 61-69
Borders are no longer seen only as lines on a map but as spaces in their own right (as in the idea
of borderlands) and as processes; in short, there has been a shift from borders to bordering (or
rebordering, on some accounts). The argument advanced here is that the changes to borders are in fact more far-reaching than
can be captured by either the idea that borders are everywhere or a security-driven rebordering
thesis. I propose that to understand borders fully scholars need to see like a border. Three
key dimensions of borders/bordering are generating a distinct research agenda and associated literature. First, borders
can be engines of connectivity. Rather than curtailing mobility, borders can actively
facilitate it; many key borders are at airports, maritime ports, and railway terminals.
Borders can connect as well as divide, not just proximate entities, but globally. This means that
more conventional views of interactions across borders (e.g. Minghi, 1991) are in need of revision. It also means that border scholars
must take issue with the idea, expressed by Hkli and Kaplan (2002, p. 7), that cross-border interactions are more
likely to occur when the other side is easily accessible, in contrast to when people live
farther away from the border. For van Schendel (2005) borderlanders are able to jump scales (local, national,
regional, global) and therefore do not experience the national border only as an immediate limit. People can construct the scale of the
border for themselves; as a local phenomenon, a nation-state edge, or as a transnational staging post: the border can be
reconfigured as a portal.
Construction of borders involve citizens and give people

autonomy
Rumford 11, Chris Rumford, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal
Holloway, University of London, Seeing like a border Political Geography 30 (2011)

pages 61-69
Second, bordering is not always the business of the state. Ordinary people (citizens and also
non-citizens) are increasingly involved in the business of bordering, an activity I have
previously termed borderwork (Rumford, 2008). Citizens, entrepreneurs, and NGOs are active in constructing,
shifting, or even erasing borders. The borders in question are not necessarily those (at the edges) of the nation-state; they can be found
at a range of sites throughout society: in towns and cities, and in local neighborhoods. Examples (in the UK) include: the local
currency schemes in several English towns (Stroud, Lewes, Totnes) designed to prevent the leeching of money from the local
economy; securing Protected Designation of Origin status (from the EU) for local produce such as Melton Mowbray pork pies and
Stilton cheese (Cooper & Rumford, in press) which creates bounded regions for branded products. What is distinctive about these
activities is that they result from initiatives by entrepreneurs, citizens/ residents, and grass roots activists. They are not top-down,
state-led processes of bordering. This activity does not necessarily result in borders that enhance
national security but it provides borderworkers with new political and/or economic
opportunities: the uses of borders are many and various. Third, borders provide
opportunities for claims-making. This has long been recognized to be the case in respect of the nation-state, where
national borders are not always imposed by the center. For example Sahlins (1989, p. 9)work on the
SpaineFrance border in the Pyrenees shows that local society brought the nation into the village. But borderwork also
has a post-national dimension and is consistent with what Isin and Nielsen (2008) term an act of
citizenship: they are part of the process by which citizens are distinguished from others:
strangers, outsiders, non-status people and the rest (Nyers, 2008, p. 168). Moreover, acts of citizenship and
borderwork alike are not restricted to those who are already citizens; they are means by which non-status persons can constitute
themselves as being political (Nyers, 2008, p. 162). Borderwork can also be associated with a range of claims-making activity, not
only claims to national belonging or citizenship, but also demands for transnationalmobility, assertions of human rights, and
demonstrations of political actorhood, all of which can comprise acts of citizenship. This leads to the possibility of
viewing bordering not only in terms of securitization but also in terms of opportunities for
humanitarian assistance targeted at those (refugees, migrants) who may coalesce at the
borders.
Even if Borders split up the world artificially they are key

to preserving our ontological connection to the world and
pre-requisite for political agency
Parker and Addler-Nissen 12, Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 2012
[Noel and Rebecca, Picking and Choosing the Sovereign Border: A Theory of Changing State Bordering Practices,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.660582]
We can rst observe that borders help full epistemological conditions. Borders produce
particular conditions for understanding reality. We who are inside the border are also
expected to possess greater knowledge of insiders than of outsiders, which in turn reduces
uncertainties regarding our common knowledge on the inside. The border is frequently a
bulwark sustaining commonly agreed measures of reality (such as national-currency measures for ination
or relative welfare). The border slices the world up into different pieces of reality that we cannot
know equally well. That increases as well the plausibility of any assertion regarding the
circumstances, gains or losses within our border. Hence, other things being equal, borders
help promote the idea that there are fewer uncertainties in communications between
insiders by comparison with communications with those on the outside. This leads to an
assumption that we will be able to agree on the terms used to evaluate changes and
preferences even the order of priorities, which is a pre-condition of political decisions. Put in
a nutshell, the border provides conditions for greater certainty and agreement for those within it. Thompson also makes explicit an
ontological claim for the border/boundary which is implicit in post-structuralisms
prioritisation of differences as against commonalities: namely, that ...borders exist
before entities ... that is to say, borders are ontologically prior to specic entities.
Borders help constitute the way we conceive the world . This can be demonstrated, inter alia, on the basis of
the epistemological claims above. For those epistemological consequences of boundaries provide key
ontological pre-conditions for the continuity of the given social particular as an integrated
entity; and hence also for its identity .14 The fact of the border helps produce shared understandings of the identities
of particulars, both internal and external to the particular itself. This includes understandings of internal variations and sub-categories
(constituencies, classes ... ) between insiders/members of the given social particular. The self-identities of members and subcategories are grounded in, and thus far validated, by seeing those particulars in relation to each other.15 Likewise, the
boundary sustains any determination of the collectivity (the nation, or whatever it may be) whose
interests may be the basis for decisions and actions on its behalf. This , as Rokkan noted,16 is
especially signicant in democratic collectivities, where a large self-aware demos is
postulated as the ground for decisions that need to accord in some way with the preference
of an indeterminable category, the ordinary mass of the people. The above ontological effects
of borders yield yet further consequences. For borders provide pre-conditions for
determinations of the situation of insiders relative to outsiders: claims regarding presumed
and/or potential different conditions (be it better or worse) for insiders than for outsiders.17 The
same could be said of any impression of greater/lesser (or potentially greater/lesser) welfare than
outsiders. Only with these kinds of claims and impressions in place, can an additional,
politically important category of knowledge have meaning: assertions about potential
improvements or deteriorations in conditions for the inside.18 If the existence of the subjects who
experience comparative well-being were not given, we would not nd meaning in headlines such as Danish schools worst on PISA
tests.19 A fortiori threats which it may be necessary to protect again
Cosmopolitan attempts to transcend national borders reproduce violent identities.

Ronald NIEZEN Anthro @ McGill 7 Postcolonialism and the Utopian Imagination
Israel Affairs 13 (4) p. informa
The idea of a diasporic or self-exiled intelligentsia possessing the only legitimate way to
transcend the imperialist power interests in social knowledge is not an attractive solution
to many of those who see themselves as oppressed colonial subjects. To them, knowledge
must have more than the blunt edges of detached humanist contemplation; it must be a
source of self-discovery and liberation. Said himself was not immune to the attractions of
nationalist identification and commitment. It is possible to see the tension between the
ideal discomforts of exile and the politically tangible consolations of nationalism
manifested in Said's own engagement in the struggle for Palestinian freedom, in which he
emphasized only the self-affirmation that emerges from oppression, while overlooking
the violent realities of their political struggle - all the while extolling the virtues of
cosmopolitan self-criticism. There is a sense in which he was profoundly oblivious to the
dangers that follow from subjection. Although rejecting nationalism, Said failed to
consistently recognize that one of the worst possible consequences of political oppression
is the political disfigurement of the oppressed, bringing out in them malignant forms of
collective self-discovery and counter-hatred. The irony of a cosmopolitan humanism that
develops its own versions of cultural essentialism and self-stereotyping has become a
wider feature of the postcolonial critique of Western cultural imperialism. In this
literature, nationalist contentions follow almost naturally from the emphasis on cultural
incommensurability. If the research agendas of Western scholarly traditions are
inevitably associated with power and interests in dominated societies, it follows (or at
least has followed for some of Said's postcolonial acolytes) that the only legitimate form
of cultural description is cultural self-affirmation. Insofar as postcolonial theory
advocates cultural research, it pursues a methodology intended to be empowering, rooted
in cultural sensitivity and affirmation, survival struggles, the maintenance of difference,
using research practices that are sympathetic, that recover, redefine and recreate the
realities of distinct peoples, free from the positional superiority of Western knowledge
and the legacies of cultural imperialism.4 But if this approach is made exclusive, if any
uninvited, uncomfortable assertion, observation or judgement is to be excoriated from the
scholarly agendas of the Occident (or its sympathizers), then all that remains is the kind
of research that has always been implicated in the foundation myths of nations, which
have long included themes of liberation from oppression, uncovering a peoples'
innermost being, defining one's own citizenship, becoming self-determining in a distilled
and pure sense, tinged with political love. And if, as is now widely recognized,
nationalism begins with ethnography and history, then imagine how much more likely it
is that uncritical auto-ethnography and auto-history will contribute to bounded,
xenophobic forms of collective imagination. More ominously, the sense of collective
discovery is also often part of an essentialism of the oppressive 'other', including those
within one's own self-defined ranks who are seen as refusers or apostates of the national
faith. Postcolonialism, in other words, has difficulty reconciling its sweeping critique of
Western cultural imperialism with its encouragement of the tendency towards collective
self-affirmation that follows from counter-imperialist rediscovery.
Borders Prevent War

Borders are inevitable and it is easier to prevent crossborder aggression than an insurgency
Alexander B. Downes, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Duke
University,SAIS REVIEW, 2006, pp. 57-8 More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a
Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars

Despite international attempts to encourage power-sharing and federalism as a means to preserve a united Iraq, a partition of
the country into three statesa Kurdish state in the northeast, a Shi'ite state in the south, and a Sunni state in the northwest
is probably unavoidable for the same reasons it is unavoidable in Kosovo. The history of violence and repression has made it
hard for Iraq's ethnic groups to trust each other. The Kurds suffered such brutality that they insist on maintaining their own
armed forces and prefer an independent Kurdish state to remaining part of a united Iraq. The Sunni Arabsthe dominant and
privileged group under Saddam Hussein's regimehave suffered a major status reversal and are now marginalized. The
Sunni-based insurgency that has raged since Saddam's downfall in 2003 signals not only many Sunnis' attachment to and
reverence for Saddam, but also their mistrust and suspicion of Iraq's Shi'ites and Kurds. The 2005 constitution was negotiated
mostly without Sunni input and over their vehement objections. Unsurprisingly, Sunnis voted overwhelmingly against the
document. Last-minute promises by Shi'a and Kurdish leaders that would allow the constitution to be renegotiated following
new parliamentary elections are small consolation to Sunnis, who will always compose a small minority of the country's
elected representatives and thus will wield little power. The constitution's federal provisions represent Shi'ite leaders'
recognition that the Kurds insist on near total autonomyand thus that the Shi'ites should form their own federal bloc as well.
Given the powerful centrifugal forces at play, this process will lead to the eventual partition of Iraq. This result is not
surprising. The basic logic for why Iraq would fall apart was laid out nearly 10 years ago in an article by Daniel Byman. In
this article, Byman argued that the legacy of bitterness and mistrust engendered by Saddam's use of massive violence against
the Kurdish and Shi'ite communities would make it nearly impossible for those groups ever to trust the Sunnis again, or to
entrust their security to institutions they did not control. Byman cites Michael Ignatieff's argument that "Genocide and
nationalism have an entwined history. It was genocide that convinced the Jews . . . that they were a people who would never
be safe until they had a nation-state of their own. As with the Jews, so with the Kurds . . . for a people who have known
genocide, there is only one thing that will do: a nation-state of their own." These two communities are regionally concentrated
in areas they view as homelands, increasing their ability and willingness to fight for secession and making partition relatively
feasible to implement. Given each group's inability to rely on the others' benign intentions, the fact that each group is armed,
and the likelihood that central power-sharing institutions will generate deadlock rather than consensus, it is likely that
federalism will promote separation rather than unity and lead to partition. Byman's conclusion in 1997 still rings true: "Iraq . . .
is a state that deserves to collapse and be partitioned." The Kurds, of course, will be delighted at the prospect of achieving
statehood, and the Shi'ites will accept the break-up of Iraq, as they will obtain the largest piece of territory as well as copious
reserves of oil. The Sunnisthe group that stands to lose the most territory and natural resourcesare also the group with the
least capability to reverse partition. The insurgency is based in the areas that would become part of a Sunni state; thus it would
lose steam once foreign occupation forces depart. Once new borders and states are created, the problem would become one of
deterring and preventing cross-border aggression. This would be easier than quelling a domestic insurgency with strong social
support and a task that Kurdish and Shi'ite forcesaided by smaller external forcesshould be able to perform.
Eliminating borders makes peace impossible

University, SAIS REVIEW, 2006, p. 49 More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a

The conventional wisdom among scholars and policymakers opposes solving ethnic
conflicts by drawing new borders and creating new states. This view, however, is flawed
because the process of fighting civil wars imbues the belligerents with a deep sense of
mistrust that makes sharing power after the conflict difficult. This is especially true in
ethnic civil wars, in which negotiated power-sharing agreements run a high risk of failing
and leading to renewed warfare. In light of these problems, this article argues that
partition should be considered as an option for ending severe ethnic conflicts. The article
shows how failure to adopt partition in Kosovo has left that province in a semi-permanent
state of limbo that only increases the majority Albanian population's desire for
independence. The only route to long-term stability in the regionand an exit for
international forcesis through partition. Moreover, the article suggests that the United
States should recognize and prepare for the coming partition of Iraq rather than pursuing
the futile endeavor of implementing power-sharing among Iraq's Shi'ites, Kurds, and
Sunnis.
PARTITION PROVIDES MORE SECURITY THAN DISOLVING BORDERS


In this article, I argue that partitiondefined as separation of contending ethnic groups
and the creation of independent statesshould be considered as an alternative to powersharing and regional autonomy as a means to end civil wars. Partition does not require
groups to disarm and make themselves vulnerable to devastating betrayal. Nor do
formerly warring groups have to cooperate and share power in joint institutions. Partition
also satisfies nationalist desires for statehood and fills the need for security. In cases of
severe ethnic conflict, when perceptions of the adversary's malign intentions are so
entrenched as to impede any agreement based on a single-state solution, partition is the
preferred solution.
Partition is better than power sharing


The poor record of negotiated settlements in ethnic civil wars that leave borders intact,
whether or not they are facilitated by third-party intervention, suggests that a new
approach might be necessary: one based on partition rather than power-sharing. In this
model, third parties would intervene not to turn back the clock to the pre-war situation,
but to inflict a decisive defeat on one side or the other. This would reduce the likelihood
that the defeated party would think it could gain anything by resorting to war in the
future. In those cases where a third party intervenes on behalf of ethnic rebels, military
victory will result in partition. Partition can only lead to peace, however, if it is
accompanied by ethnic separation. Interveners should work to make sure that the states
are as ethnically homogeneous as possible so as to reduce the likelihood of future
cleansing, rebellions by the remnant minority for union with its brethren in the other
state, or war to rescue "trapped" minorities. Finally, both sides should be militarily
capable of defending themselves, and the borders between them should be made as
defensible as possible to discourage aggression, either by following natural terrain
features or by building demilitarized zones or other barriers
BORDERS NECESSARY TO PREVENT ETHNIC CLEANSING
University.SAIS REVIEW, 2006, p. 49-50 More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as
a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars

Recently, however, scholars have begun to challenge this single-state-solution orthodoxy,
arguing instead that dividing states and creating new borders may be a way to promote
peace after ethnic civil wars. One view, [represented by Chaim Kaufmann, stresses that
ethnic civil wars cannot end until contending groups are separated into homogeneous
ethnic enclaves. When groups are intermingled, each side has an incentive to attack and
cleanse the other. Once separation is achieved, these incentives disappear. With the
necessary condition for peace in place, political arrangements become secondary. Unless
ethnic separation occurs, Kaufmann argues, all other solutions are fruitless because ethnic
intermingling is what fuels conflict.
Borders Good -- Freedom

Borders create competition between governments that is
key to maintaining individual liberty
Morriss 2004 [Andrew, Chairholder in Law and Professor of Business at the
University of Alabama, Borders and Liberty, Foundation for Economic
Education, The Freedman, Vol 54 No 7, http://www.fee.org/publications/thefreeman/article.asp?aid=4646]
Borders play a critical role in our lives. Some of the borders that matter to us are ones we
establish ourselves: this is my house and property; that is your house and property. By
choosing what is mine and using the legal system to mark it off from what is yours, I
create a border. While not quite as invulnerable as suggested by the maxim A mans
home is his castle, my property gives me a firm border against you. Borders come from
property rights and are essential to a free society . At the macro level we have political
bordersunrelated to property rights, more permeable than personal-level borders, but
just as important to ensuring liberty. When I drive from my home to my office, I cross the
borders of multiple political subdivisions of the state of Ohio, moving from Columbia
Township to Cleveland, from Lorain County to Cuyahoga County. Those borders are
invisible but important. Cleveland confiscates 2 percent of my salary because my work
lies within its borders (Ohio cities can levy local income taxes). Columbia Township
taxes my home. Columbia does not tax my income, and so income I earn at home is
worth 2 percent more to me than wages at work. Cleveland cannot tax my home, freeing
me from the concern that people I cannot vote for could tax property as well as income. (Of
course I also worry about people I can vote for taxing my income and assets, but at least
there is a theoretical possibility of throwing the rascals out when I vote.) These borders
are all permeable: I do not need to show identification to pass across any of them and do
not need to justify my purpose in moving among the various cities and towns along my
drive to and from work. Other macro-level borders are less permeable. When I walk
across the U.S.-Mexican border near my parents home in Yuma, Arizona, in one
direction I must satisfy Mexican authorities that my purpose is legitimate. In the other, I
must satisfy U.S. authorities that my return is legitimate. In both directions, people with
guns are standing by, ready to keep me out should I fail to satisfy them about the
legitimacy of my purpose. Only the Americans with guns seem worried about who is
entering the United States. They look at my identification, ask what I was doing in
Mexico, and, sometimes, have dogs sniff my vehicle and belongings. In many respects,
these macro-level borders are wonderful things. Lorain and Cuyahoga counties in Ohio
must compete for my familys residence. Choosing to live where we do is related to the
taxes charged by the communities where we might have lived. Investors make similar
choices. The choices by families about where to live and invest their money influence
communities public policies. Choosing bad policies produces an exodus; choosing good
policies leads to immigration of both capital and people. For example, Cleveland is trying
to reverse its post-World War II decline in population by offering to exempt new
construction from real-estate taxes for 15 years. Such competition isnt perfect, of course,
and only operates on the margin. Desirable locations such as New York City will be able
to impose higher taxes than less-desirable locations such as Cleveland. Nonetheless, the
competition offered on local taxation policy and other regulatory issues is important in
restraining governments from infringing liberty. Macro borders with competition enhance
liberty. At the state and local level the only way politicians can prevent such competition is
by eliminating borders. In Cleveland, regional leaders are pushing consolidation of
local governments into one big entity as the solution to the exodus of population and
investment to lower-tax jurisdictions. Fortunately, politicians self-interest also cuts
against consolidation since it would mean fewer positions for them.
The Mexican border is specifically key to individual liberty

Morriss 2004 [Andrew, Chairholder in Law and Professor of Business at the
University of Alabama, Borders and Liberty, Foundation for Economic
Education, The Freedman, Vol 54 No 7, http://www.fee.org/publications/thefreeman/article.asp?aid=4646]
National borders are also important sources of liberty. The Mexican border, for example,
offers a choice between a drug-regulatory regime that requires a doctors prescription for
most pharmaceuticals and one that does not. The streams of visitors to towns such as
Algodones, Baja California, are not merely seeking lower prices. Some are seeking
medicines unapproved in the United States; others are looking for medications for which
they have no U.S. prescription, whether for recreational (such as Viagra) or medical
(antibiotics) use. Mexico does not offer the pro-plaintiff tort doctrines of U.S. productliability law, has lower barriers to entry for pharmacists, and a wide-open market for
pharmaceuticals that includes openly advertised price competition. U.S. residents near the
Mexican border thus have a choice of regulatory regimes for their medicine that those of
us who live farther away do not. Border-region residents can buy medicines either with
the U.S. bundle of qualities, restrictions, and rights, or the Mexican bundle. From the
level of traffic of elderly visitors Ive seen at the border crossing, it appears the Mexican
bundle is more attractive for many. Borders are thus friends of liberty in two important
ways. First, without borders we would not have the competition among jurisdictions that
restricts attempts to abridge liberty. The impact of borders goes beyond those who live
near them. Pharmacists try to prevent the free sale of prescription drugs, but they would
be much more successful if Mexico did not offer an alternative for at least some
consumers. It is the margin that matters, and so free availability of pharmaceuticals in
Mexico benefits even those of us who live in Ohio. Jurisdictions thus compete to attract
people and capital. This competition motivates governments to act to preserve liberty .
Famously, for example, states compete for corporations, with Delaware the current
market leader. Delaware corporate law offers companies the combination of a mostly
voluntary set of default rules and an expert decision-making body (the Court of
Chancery). As a result, many corporations, large and small, choose to incorporate in
Delaware, making it their legal residence. (Their actual headquarters need not be
physically located there.) Corporations get a body of liberty-enhancing rules; Delaware
gets tax revenue and employment in the corporate services and legal fields. That states
position is no accident. At the beginning of the twentieth century, New Jersey was the
market leader in corporate law. When New Jerseys legislature made ill-advised changes
to its corporations statute that reduced shareholder value, Delaware seized the
opportunity and offered essentially the older version of New Jerseys law. Within a few
years, the vast majority of New Jersey corporations became Delaware corporations. The
second way that borders further liberty is that they allow diversity in law and other
community norms, letting each individual find the setting that most resembles the type of
society he or she desires. Everyone in Ohio need not agree on how to organize town
activities: I can live in a township with few taxes and few services, and my more leftwing colleagues at the university who prefer a more interventionist society can live in
Cleveland Heights, a suburb with an aggressive central-planning mentality and high
taxes.
Borders are critical to freedom

Andrew Morriss, alen J. Roush Professor of Business Law and Regulation at Case
Western Reserve University, BORDERS & LIBERTY, July 2004,
http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=4646
Borders play a critical role in our lives. Some of the borders that matter to us are ones we
establish ourselves: this is my house and property; that is your house and property. By
choosing what is mine and using the legal system to mark it off from what is yours, I
create a border. While not quite as invulnerable as suggested by the maxim A mans
home is his castle, my property gives me a firm border against you. Borders come from
property rights and are essential to a free society.
Borders allow people to live in societies they wish to live

in
The second way that borders further liberty is that they allow diversity in law and other
community norms, letting each individual find the setting that most resembles the type of
society he or she desires. Everyone in Ohio need not agree on how to organize town
activities: I can live in a township with few taxes and few services, and my more leftwing colleagues at the university who prefer a more interventionist society can live in
Cleveland Heights, a suburb with an aggressive central-planning mentality and high
taxes.
Borders motivate states to preserve liberty

National borders are also important sources of liberty. The Mexican border, for example,
offers a choice between a drug-regulatory regime that requires a doctors prescription for
most pharmaceuticals and one that does not. The streams of visitors to towns such as
Algodones, Baja California, are not merely seeking lower prices. Some are seeking
medicines unapproved in the United States; others are looking for medications for which
they have no U.S. prescription, whether for recreational (such as Viagra) or medical
(antibiotics) use. Mexico does not offer the pro-plaintiff tort doctrines of U.S. productliability law, has lower barriers to entry for pharmacists, and a wide-open market for
pharmaceuticals that includes openly advertised price competition. U.S. residents near the
Mexican border thus have a choice of regulatory regimes for their medicine that those of
us who live farther away do not. Border-region residents can buy medicines either with
the U.S. bundle of qualities, restrictions, and rights, or the Mexican bundle. From the
level of traffic of elderly visitors Ive seen at the border crossing, it appears the Mexican
bundle is more attractive for many. orders are thus friends of liberty in two important
ways. First, without borders we would not have the competition among jurisdictions that
restricts attempts to abridge liberty. The impact of borders goes beyond those who live
near them. Pharmacists try to prevent the free sale of prescription drugs, but they would
be much more successful if Mexico did not offer an alternative for at least some
consumers. It is the margin that matters, and so free availability of pharmaceuticals in
Mexico benefits even those of us who live in Ohio. Jurisdictions thus compete to attract
people and capital. This competition motivates governments to act to preserve liberty.
Famously, for example, states compete for corporations, with Delaware the current market leader. Delaware corporate law offers companies the combination of a mostly voluntary
set of default rules and an expert decision-making body (the Court of Chancery). As a result, many corporations, large and small, choose to incorporate in Delaware, making it their
legal residence. (Their actual headquarters need not be physically located there.) Corporations get a body of liberty-enhancing rules; Delaware gets tax revenue and employment in
the corporate services and legal fields.
Borders preserve liberty more than a world without it

Even though borders can be an excuse for reducing liberty, a world with lots of borders is
nonetheless a far friendlier world for liberty than one with fewer borders. They promote
competition for people and money, which tends to restrain the state from grabbing either.
Borders offer chances to arbitrage regulatory restrictions, making them less effective.
Without borders these constraints on the growth of the state would vanish.
War Advantage Answers

Borders in Latin America may contribute to rivalry, but do
not cause conflict Studies prove
Trinkunas 12
[Harold, Naval Postgraduate School, Maiah Jaskoski- Naval Postgraduate School, Borders and Borderlands in the Americas- PASCC
Report Number 2012 009]
Border policies are rooted in a deep history of partial, problematic state building in the
region. Historically, Latin American states have engaged in rivalry rather than war. Rivalry
benefits these states because it enables the development of nationalism and nationality. Rivalry
promotes state coherence and acts as an attractor for weak central governments , using
nationalism to retain some loyalty and some authority over populations in their borderlands.8 Though rivalry impedes
interstate cooperation to resolve border issues in some key cases in the Americas (Peru, Bolivia,
and Chile; Venezuela and Colombia), it does not rise to such a level that it generates the cycle of
international conflict, defense preparedness, taxation, and popular mobilization. This means that Central and South America
did not experience the type of state building that led to the development of hard fiscal/military/industrial states in Europe in the 18th
and 19th centuries.9 This historically limited state capacity across much of the region to address border security issues unilaterally, but
rivalry also limited the possibility for cooperation across borders to address security and other dimensions of borderlands. This
project found no cases in the Americas in which borders were seriously at risk of provoking
international war, even in the cases that were most ideologically polarized, as was the case on the
Colombian-Venezuelan and Colombian-Ecuadorean borders. While we still see the militarization of borders as
vehicles for signaling during international disputes, we found that leaders in the
contemporary Americas were constrained by domestic stakeholders and economic
considerations. In fact, much of the violence identified in borderlands has occurred in precisely
those spaces where international relations are smoothest, especially due to strong economic
relations: in Central America, regional economic integration and cross-border flows are growing even as states struggle to
maintain border security.10 The peaceful settlement of international disputes and uti posidetis (the legal
concept that borders are based on those inherited from the colonial period) has become the norm across the region.
In some cases, there is an increased tendency to legalize territorial claims, settling border disputes in international tribunals and
through judicial arbitration. This means that states do not necessarily view their borders as matters of
existential import, but at most as subjects that may be negotiated .11
Identity Advantage Answers/Turn

Turn rejection of fences-as-borders is unethical
separation of communities is a necessary precondition for
human identity
Williams, professor of IR at the University of Durham, 3
[John, 7-1-3, Geopolitics, Territorial Borders, International Ethics and Geography: Do
Good Fences Still Make Good Neighbours?, p. 37-40, Academic Search Complete,]
Defending the Ethics of Territorial Borders- The foregoing discussion leads us to two
issues to discuss in relation to developing a partial and limited defence of the ethics of
territorial borders. The ontological strength of territorial borders leads to questions about
the ethical component of the depth of practice that supports this. Here, the article wishes
to point to evidence that borders of some sort, including territorial borders, are deeply
rooted in ethics. The second ethical issue that arises relates to the defence of a neoclassical constructivist mode of enquiry into international relations. This is an ethically
consequentialist account that looks at the desirable elements of practice that flow from
the more fundamental ethical role of borders. Turning to the first of these tasks, it is
implausible to assert that institutions as enduring as territorial borders-as-fences
inextricably linked to the sovereign state have endured for so long and are so entrenched
unless borders are in some way representative of a need for division in
human ethical life. There is evidence in both the material already surveyed and
from elsewhere in normative and ethical accounts of division, distinction and

differentiation to support the idea that the ontological strength of territorial borders in
international relations can be connected to a deep-rooted need for division in human ethical
life. In relation to the material at the heart of this paper, territorial borders are
synonymous with division. 'Boundaries, by definition, constitute lines of separation or
contact.... The point of contact or separation usually creates an "us" and an "Other"
identity.' 62 In their idealised essentialism they divide tones of sovereign control: they
divide inside from outside: they divide foreign from domestic: they divide our identities as
citizens; they divide national communities: they divide those to whom we owe primary
allegiance from those who come second (if anywhere) in moral calculation: they divide us
from them. The endurance of borders and boundaries in human society, whether they be
territorial borders or otherwise, implies that borders and the need to create an 'us' and an
'other' are very powerfully entrenched in human relations and our ability to identify and
understand ourselves. The critique of reified sovereign territoriality in
political geography does not lead to the abandonment of territorial
borders. Instead they are reinterpreted as features of hegemony, for Agnew and
Corbridge, of power for Tuathail and of identity for Newman, requiring the reterritorialisation, rather than the de-territorialisation, of social life under conditions of
globalisation. The anthropological work of Dorman and Wilson points to the need for
boundary distinctions between social groups and the vital role that
these play in the maintenance and development of identity ." Frances
Harbour's survey of universal ethical propositions, also drawing on anthropological work,
suggests a necessary division in human ethical life. By extension, the power-riddled,

historically conditioned, accident prone and even arbitrary, careless or plain misguided
creation of territorial borders does have deep roots. Borders, including territorial borders,
may be inescapable in international politics not just for reasons of power, but for reasons of
right, too. Recalling Hutching's injunction not to separate these into essentially
incommensurable categories of thought we can argue that the weight of evidence
about the ubiquity of borders points to their being a necessary part
of human life, and a basic category of ethical thought about that life. Philosophical
weight can also be brought to bear in defence of a view of borders and boundaries as
being pan of the human condition through the work of Hannah Arendt. She famously
argued that 'we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the
same as anyone else who lived, lives or will live..." The unique, distinctive individual
finds their self-understanding through interaction with fellow human beings with whom
they share community and in spaces where they can meet as equals. This equality
importantly includes an equality of community membership granting them a set of shared

ideas, experiences and values, rather than some sort of de-contextualised equality such as
that experienced behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance." Arendt's account emphasises the
requirement for communities to retain their distinctiveness from
one another , including through the use of borders and boundaries. [Human] dignity
needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle , in a new law
on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its
power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial
entities.' In simple terms, borders can be seen as either being prior to and creative of
difference, or that difference is prior to and creative of borders. This stark juxtaposition of
opposites is resolved in favour of the latter option by the arguments that borders are social
phenomena and that the human condition is characterised by an essential diversity of
human beings and the necessary relationship between distinctive individuals and their
communities. The durability and depth of sedimentation of territorial borders as fences
suggest that division, and division on a territorial basis, speaks to a deep-seated need of
human identity and also in human ethics. We need to have reasons for granting a
privileged position to some that is not available to others, perhaps in the form of
recognising rights and duties of special beneficence, and accepting that proximity, both
geographical and emotional, and location upon one side of the line on the map or the
other, does make a difference.' Territorial division in the form of states is an important,
but certainly not the only, aspect of this. The endurance of the territorial
border-as-fence as the primary mechanism for division in international
politics cannot , though, be treated as prima facie ethically irrelevant or
straightforwardly contingent. However, its position as a social phenomenon also means
that the creation and re-creation of the border-as-fence has to be held up to constant
ethical questioning and critique. The arguments of tradition, culture and precedent as to
who is to count and who is not, who is to be a citizen and who is not, what the role of
territory ought to be and how it should be delimited cannot be taken for granted." As the
normative theorists insist, a part of ethical analysis and enquiry is to constantly question
dominant ethical arguments. This may be crucial in exploring the current location of
territorial borders and the enunciation of the role that they play, but such a critique may
not be able to land an ethical knock-out blow upon a feature of human ethical thought and
life that seems to be highly durable. Location and role may change, but that borders will
have locations and play roles, and that these should he critically explored, may be a
fixture. A cosmopolitan international ethic thus needs to engage with the desirability of
division as well as to promote inclusiveness. There is a need for cosmopolitan ethics to go
further than identifying the consequences of territorial borders that are the frequent target
of normative critique. Repression, religious intolerance, discrimination, ethnic cleansing
and so on have become inextricably associated with the territorial state. The consequences
of the existence of territorial borders can indeed be extreme and morally repugnant.
However, whether such effects are an inevitable and essential result of
the existence of territorial borders seems far less certain . We may
argue that the role of territorial borders to divide in international
politics is potentially ethically justifiable. Such justification needs to be rooted
in elements of existing practice and values that are generally regarded as legitimate and
serving important purposes in shaping the way the world ought to be. If we accept the
view of normative theory outlined earlier then we can see that the social creation and
recreation of ethics includes, via mechanisms like territorial borders, a view of division
and distinction that is ethically valued. An appreciation of the constructed and dynamic
nature of territorial borders holds out the prospect of being able to detach these aspects
from the more violent practices that have also accumulated around territorial borders.
This, of course, is easier said than done.
Diversity threatens the survival of the national American

identity
Beirich and Potok 9
(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law
Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on
the Rise Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1)
But the most important factor driving the rise of these groups is that, although the United
States has always been a multiracial country, many whites view it as having been created by
and for Christian whites. Beginning in 1965, when racial immigration quotas were
abolished, large numbers of immigrantsparticularly Latinosentered the country at the
same time that birth rates for native-born whites were falling precipitously. As darker
skinned immigrants arrived in places that had only rarely seen such newcomers, many
whites reacted with fear and anger. This has been greatly exacerbated by the U.S. Census
Bureau's prediction that whites will lose their absolute majority in the United States in
2042; the news in 2000 that California had lost its white majority had already fueled these
fears. As other states follow suit in coming years, more whites may well resort to
extremism. For white supremacists, this coming date spells impending doom, a fact that
many white supremacist ideologues have harped upon relentlessly. Jared Taylor, editor of
the racist American Renaissance magazine, offers what is probably the most cogent
critique of mainstream, politically correct viewsa critique that seems to have found
great sympathy. Some think that it's virtuous of the United States, after having been
founded and built by Europeans, according to European institutions, to reinvent itself or
transform itself into a non-white country with a Third World population, Taylor told an
interviewer for The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Immigration
(Swain, 2002). I think that's a kind of cultural and racial suicideWere all now more or
less obliged to say, Oh! Diversity is a wonderful thing for the country, whereas,
practically every example of tension, bloodletting, civil unrest around the world is due
precisely to the kind of thing were importingdiversity (Swain, 2002). These factors
have created a situation ripe for organizers of the radical right. Already, in the wake of
Obama's elections, groups ranging from the white nationalist Stormfront to the neoConfederate League of the South, were claiming to have experienced dramatically
increased interest (Scheer, 2008).
Culture Advantage Answers

Reject their generic link claims - borders produce cultural
connections as much as they exclude.
Parker 12
[Noel, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, Nick Vaughan-Williams, Department
of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, Geopolitics, 17:4, 727-733, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2012.706111]
On the other hand, bordering practices and the various forms of contestation and resistance they often give rise to are
not treated simply as normatively bad phenomena. Rumford, for example, highlights the ways in which
borders are also sites of cultural encounter rather than simply a mechanism of division
and exclusion. Indeed, even in some of the worlds most persistently troubled border-zones,
such as the India-Pakistan region, the border can be said to act as an interlinking and
cooperative space (Bouzas, this issue). On this view, as Salter might say about Bouzas material, borders then knit
the world together even though the colonial sutures remain living after-traces of past
violence. Methodologically, the empirical thrust of CBS research is conversant with anthropological approaches to the
phenomenology of the border and indeed several of the pieces included here reflect extensive ethnographic fieldwork for example
Bouzas interviews with migrants in the border villages near Kargil, Pakistan and Gieliss time spent with Dutch migrants in
Kranenburg.
Race Advantage Answers

Critical geography cannot effectively combat race
whiteness is too inscribed in the study
Price 2010 [Patricia L. Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida
International
University, At the crossroads: critical race theory and critical geographies of race in
Progress in Human Geography 34(2) page 156 ]
Critical geographic studies of whiteness are not, however, without their own critics. Alastair Bonnett (1996), for instance, makes the
(problematic) assertion that the tendency to focus on blackness or whiteness is a particularly American obsession that does not
reflect the subtler reality of race in other places. Yet there is very little intentionally comparative critical geographic research on race,
such that Bonnetts claim is difficult to substantiate empirically. What is perhaps more troubling and easier to
document is the remarkably persistent whiteness of geographys practitioners. According

to some, the popularity of white studies in geography may in fact simply reflect the
whiteness of geographers, and as such constitute a zone of racial solipsism, or worse, a
comfort zone rather than a space of truly critical engagement with racism (let alone antiracism; Pulido, 2002; Mahtani, 2006). The prominence of white studies in geographic
studies of race may in fact not simply reflect but also unwittingly act to reinforce white
dominance in geography (Nash, 2003).
Backlash DA
1NCBacklash
Immigration legislation fuels armed, right-wing extremist
groups.
Miller 09 (Greg, reporter for the Washington Post and former reporter for the LA Times
and winner of the Overseas Press Award, Los Angeles Times, Right-wing extremists
seen as a threat, April 16, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/16/nation/narightwing-extremists16)
The department routinely issues intelligence warnings to state and local authorities, a role it was assigned
in response to criticism that the federal government had failed to do so in the months preceding the Sept.
the report said

extremist organizations were "harnessing this historical
election as a recruitment tool." It cited two cases before the election where potential
threats against Obama were disrupted by law enforcement. The assessment also listed
economic factors -- including increases in real estate
foreclosures and unemployment -- as creating a "fertile
recruiting environment" for right-wing groups. And it describes
evidence compiled by local law enforcement agencies that extremist groups are
stockpiling weapons out of concern that Congress and the Obama administration might
enact legislation requiring the registration of all firearms. The report also said a push for new
immigration legislation that would grant residency or
citizenship to people who entered the country illegally could
fuel anger among groups fearing competition for jobs.
11 terrorist attacks. Describing right-wing groups' animosity toward Obama,
Preserving nationalism is key to prevent imminent race

wars
Beirich and Potok 9
Unlike the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazi organizations, the ideology of most nativist
extremist groups is not explicitly racist. But there are exceptions. Nine of the groups
identified by the SPLC as nativist extremist are also listed as racist hate groups. That is
because they disparage all Latinos on a racial basis, regardless of immigration status, or
because they plainly endorse white nationalism, sometimes predicting impending race war.
While only a few nativist extremist groups deal in such unvarnished white supremacist
ideology, most of them are playing a role similar to that of traditional hate groups in the
raging national immigration debate: they are interjecting racist conspiracy theories,
disseminating false and defamatory statistics about criminal immigrants and the problems
they create, blaming and targeting Latino immigrants as individuals, and promoting direct
intimidation, mean-spirited harassment and even murder. Their rhetoric is shot through
with paranoid conspiracy theories of invasions, and is frequently warlike. An army of
illegal aliens, including criminals, drug smugglers, and terrorists, is invading our
country, the Indiana Federation for Immigration Reform and Enforcement declared.
America is being destroyed by a modern version of Genghis Khan's army, according to

the Emigration Party of Nevada, whose leader, Donald Pauly, has called for the Department
of Homeland Security to station sniper teams on the border and also suggested that all
Mexican women should be forced to undergo sterilization after having their first child
(Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007).
Causes Backlash
Radical anti-immigration groups have soared in number
and have been driven by non-white immigration.
Potok 10 (Mark, senior fellow of Southern Poverty Law Center and EIC of Intelligence Report, Southern
Poverty Law Centers Intelligence Report, Rage on the Right: The Year in Hate and Extremism, Spring
2010 Issue Number: 137, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-allissues/2010/spring/rage-on-the-right)
broad-based populist anger at

political, demographic and economic changes in America
ignited an explosion of new extremist groups and activism across the
nation. Hate groups stayed at record levels almost 1,000 despite the total
collapse of the second largest neo-Nazi group in America. Furious anti-immigrant
vigilante groups soared by nearly 80%, adding some 136 new
groups during 2009. And, most remarkably of all, so-called "Patriot" groups militias and
The radical right caught fire last year, as
other organizations that see the federal government as part of a plot to impose one-world government
The anger
seething across the American political landscape over racial
changes in the population, soaring public debt and the terrible economy, the bailouts of
on liberty-loving Americans came roaring back after years out of the limelight.
bankers and other elites, and an array of initiatives by the relatively liberal Obama Administration that are
seen as "socialist" or even "fascist" goes beyond the radical right. The "tea
parties" and similar groups that have sprung up in recent months cannot fairly be considered extremist
groups, but they are shot through with rich veins of radical ideas, conspiracy theories and racism.
We
are in the midst of one of the most significant right-wing

populist rebellions in United States history, Chip Berlet, a veteran analyst
of the American radical right, wrote earlier this year. "We see around us a series of
overlapping social and political movements populated by
people [who are] angry, resentful, and full of anxiety. They are raging
against the machinery of the federal bureaucracy and liberal government programs and policies including
health care, reform of immigration and labor laws, abortion, and gay marriage." Sixty-one percent of
Americans believe the country is in decline, according to a recent NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll. Just a
quarter think the government can be trusted. And the anti-tax tea party movement is viewed in much
The signs
of growing radicalization are everywhere. Armed men have
come to Obama speeches bearing signs suggesting that the "tree of liberty" needs to be
"watered" with "the blood of tyrants." The Conservative Political Action
Conference held this February was co-sponsored by groups like
the John Birch Society, which believes President Eisenhower was a
Communist agent, and Oath Keepers, a Patriot outfit formed last year that
suggests, in thinly veiled language, that the government has secret plans
to declare martial law and intern patriotic Americans in
concentration camps. Politicians pandering to the antigovernment right in 37 states have
more positive terms than either the Democratic or Republican parties, the poll found.
introduced "Tenth Amendment Resolutions," based on the constitutional provision keeping all powers not
And, at the "A Well

Regulated Militia" website, a recent discussion of how to build
"clandestine safe houses" to stay clear of the federal
government included a conversation about how mass murderers like Timothy McVeigh and
Olympics bomber Eric Rudolph were supposedly betrayed at such houses.The number of hate
explicitly given to the federal government with the states.
groups in America has been going up for years, rising 54% between 2000
and 2008 and driven largely by an angry backlash against non-white
immigration and, starting in the last year of that period, the economic meltdown and the climb to
power of an African American president. According to the latest annual count by the Southern Poverty
Law Center (SPLC), these groups rose again slightly in 2009 from 926 in 2008 to 932 last year despite
the demise of a key neo-Nazi group. The American National Socialist Workers Party, which had 35 chapters
in 28 states, imploded shortly after the October 2008 arrest of founder Bill White for making threats
against his enemies. At the same time, the number of what the SPLC designates as "nativist extremist"
groups organizations that go beyond mere advocacy of restrictive immigration policy to actually
confront or harass suspected immigrants jumped from 173 groups in 2008 to 309 last year. Virtually all
of these vigilante groups have appeared since the spring of 2005.
Endorsing multiculturalism and assimilation of local

cultures will result in white backlash and racial violence
Beirich and Potok 9
None of the factors discussed here are likely to wane in the coming years. Immigrants
legal or otherwisewill very probably continue to flow into the United States, and whites
will eventually lose their majority. Another challenge relates , of course, to economic
globalization, particularly the transfer of many industrial jobs abroad and the spread of
neo-liberal approaches to economic problems. Globalization has contributed to the loss of
some national sovereignty, with its attendant spread of multiculturalism and
multiracialism, and pressures on local cultures to assimilate into a kind of Western world
culture. A backlash from some whites is to be expected , with its chances enhanced by the
election of Barack Obama. These factors are now compounded by the large numbers of
Americans who increasingly find they are facing hard economic times . It is not clear
precisely how such economic developments will affect the growth of the radical right,
although it seems certain that any correlation is not a simple onepeople who lose their
jobs do not rush out to join radical groups without further ado. What seems more likely is
that difficult economic times, particularly when they affect people not accustomed to
seeing their prospects shrinking, give the radical right an opening. It is at such moments
that the sometimes convoluted explanations of the world offered by radical ideologues
get more of a hearing than they otherwise would have. And to some, the only possible
defense against this homogenizing juggernaut is what is seen as the organic nationa
nation that is based on race, a community of blood.
Invasion of immigrant workers on domestic workers

creates controversy, there will be no harmony
Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and
Chicana/o Studies, Opening the Floodgates, New York University Publication)
There is some evidence that low-wage immigrant workers in the United States, who
immigrate to this country in substantial numbers, have palpable effects on the wage
scale of the lowest-paid workers in the United States. Because these immigrants are
willing to work for lower wages than are domestic workers, employers may offer to
pay less. Unskilled U.S. citizens in urban, high-immigration areas are the most directly
affected. One much-cited 2005 study by the Harvard economists George Borjas and
Lawrence Katz attributed wage reductions for low-skilled workers to undocumented
immigration from Mexico.42 Other empirical studies, however, undermine this claim.43 In
fact, growing wage disparities may be attributable to factors other than undocumented
immigration, such as globalization and decreasing unionization of workers in the United
States.44 Even if the overall effects of immigration on unskilled citizens are relatively
small, the impacts on discrete parts of the labor force are tangible and help generate
tension between citizens and immigrants.45 Unquestionably, immigration has
transformedand continues to transform certain labor markets. Over the past
few decades, jobs in the poultry and beef industries in the Midwest and the Southeast and
the janitorial industry in Los Angeles have increasingly been filled by immigrants. In
some circumstances, jobs that were held predominantly by African Americans have come
to be taken for the most part by Latina/o immigrants.46 These shifts have sparked
tension and controversy.
Opening the border failscauses backlash

Impediments to a regional arrangement do, of course, exist. The political unpopularity
of immigration in the United States is one. Demographic differences are another. Racial,
socioeconomic, and cultural differences among the populations of the NAFTA partners
arguably exceed those of the original EU members. In addition, the staying power of
anti-Mexican sentiment in the United States should not be underestimated. It has a
lengthy history and is enduring. Fear of a mass migration of poor culturally
and racially different people will likely generate considerable controversy for the
foreseeable future and even greater fears about the national identity than currently
exist.
Economic issues and increasing immigration is likely to

lead to violence
Beirich and Potok 9
A perfect storm is brewing. An economic meltdown, high rates of non-white immigration,
rapid demographic change and now the election of America's first African American
president are fueling widespread rage on America's radical right (and, to a lesser extent, in
parts of the political mainstream). These developments are likely to lead to growth in the
number of hate groups, higher levels of hate-motivated violence, and continuing domestic
terrorism, presenting significant challenges for law enforcement professionals in the near
future. And if antigovernment sentiment continues to grow in the wake of these political
trends, law enforcement officials may well find themselves personally targeted, so a full
understanding of these movements, from both the perspective of protecting the public and
officer safety, is imperative. Some leaders of the organized radical right, reacting to the
campaign and ultimate election of Barack Obama, have openly suggested that more
violence is on the way. Thom Robb, an Arkansas Klan leader, described in November 2008
the race war he sees developing between our people, who I see as the rightful owners and
leaders of this great country, and their people, the blacks (Robb, 2008). This rage has
already resulted in two alleged violent plots, including one in which a pair of neo-Nazi
skinheads in Tennessee were arrested just 2 weeks before the 2008 elections. They were
accused of planning to murder black school children, shoot and behead other African
Americans, and assassinate Obama, then still only a candidate.
Multiculturalism threatens Americans both economically

and culturally insecurity results in the formation of hate
groups
Beirich and Potok 9
A remarkable thing occurred while America's Patriot movement rose and fell. Even as
this very public phenomenon captured the attention of law enforcement, citizens and the
press alike, hate groupsKlan, neo-Nazi and other organizations whose primary ideology
is based on racial or other forms of explicit group hatredrose steadily . White nationalists,
now describing themselves as separatists rather than supremacists, offered a racial
analysis of the world that won increasing acceptance among extremists . By 2007, the latest
figure available, the SPLC was tracking 888 hate groups, the largest number since the
organization began monitoring extremism in the early 1980s.2 The number of hate groups
has ballooned since 2000, when 602 groups were counted, a rise of more than 45%. It is now
the hate movement, which stands to be boosted by the added fuel of the economic malaise
and the election of the first black president, which presents the most direct challenge for
law enforcement. Worryingly, the movement's increasingly revolutionary nature and
extreme antigovernment positionsafter Obama's election, for example, David Duke
said in a radio interview, that government is not our governmentmean that certain
sectors of the radical right have now adopted the most dangerous aspects of the Patriot
movement.3 This was emphasized by the two alleged plots by white supremacists to
assassinate Obama that were busted up during the months running up to the November
election, one in Denver, CO, and the other by skinheads from Tennessee and Arkansas.
Current trends favour further growth in the number of hate groups. These trends [which]
include the power of new communications technologies, the use of white power music to
recruit youth, the falling proportion of whites in the U.S. population and rising Latino
immigration. Hate groups see the government as not merely failing to address these
problems, but as actually being secretly run by Jews and other nefarious types who are
bent on encouraging these developments. At the same time, sharp economic pressures
have borne down on young white workers, the middle class, farmers and workers in heavy
industrypressures that are now increasing. Finally, globalization and other rapid social
and economic changesaccompanied by the rise of a new, multicultural orthodoxyhave
ignited an angry reaction among many who feel that they are losing their identity.
Backlash Causes War

Both physical and psychological hate violence will only
escalate
Beirich and Potok 9
Even as anti-immigrant vitriol and propaganda has increased in recent years, hate violence
has risen against perceived illegal aliens. Between 2003 and 2007, the latest year for which
FBI national hate crime statistics are available, anti-Latino hate crimes rose a total 40%.
Those numbers likely understate the problem, because undocumented immigrants,

fearing deportation, are highly unlikely to report attacks to the authorities (Potok, 2008a).
The SPLC also documented several particularly egregious examples of physical and
psychological violence directed at Latinos between 2004 and 2007 (Mock, 2007). The
perpetrators ranged from racist skinheads to rogue border patrol agents to otherwise
everyday citizens who took it upon themselves to repel an invader, terrorize a criminal
alien, or exterminate a cockroach. In one particularly notorious case that occurred in
January 2007, four heavily armed men wearing military-style berets and camouflage
fatigues ambushed a pickup truck carrying 12 undocumented immigrants in a farm field
near Eloy, AZ. The assailants shot and killed the driver and wounded one of the passengers.
Survivors described the shooters as three white men and one Latino who spoke little
Spanish. The ambush stood out because it lacked any characteristics of typical borderland
violence committed by bandits or rival smugglers. No one was robbed in the Eloy
ambush, no drugs were found in the truck and no one was kidnapped (rival immigrant
smugglers, or coyotes, frequently steal one another's human cargo). Also, the fact that
three of the men were white was exceedingly unusual rare for coyotes or border bandits.
The incident remains under investigation. Symbolic of the increasingly violent rhetoric
coming from nativist extremists, some applauded the attack. For example, Jeff Schwilk, the
founder of the San Diego Minutemen, openly celebrated the murders. In America, we call
incidents like that cleansing the gene pool, Schwilk declared in an email (Buchanan and
Holthouse, 2007). Public forums hosted by various nativist extremist groups were rife
with support for the killers. I really hope it IS pissed off Americans who are taking
justice into their own hands, doing what the Border Patrol and the National Guard ARE
NOT ALLOWED to do, a member of the California-based hate group Save Our State
wrote on the group's forum in early 2007. Go vigilantes! Where can I send a check?
(Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007).
Backlash Turns Solvency

Protective measures are taken by nativist movements to
ensure border security
Beirich and Potok 9
Many whites have come to see the federal government, along with the nation's business
elites, as specifically responsible for the failure to curb non-white immigration. On the
radical right, the government often is seen as plotting to destroy the white race. Now, the
white supremacist movement has been joined in its anger over America's immigration
policy by a new nativist movement that seemingly came out of nowhere in the last few
years. Starting with a meeting held in 2001 in Sierra Vista, AZ, which brought together
several anti-immigrant hate groups to laud a border rancher known for detaining suspected
immigrants at gunpoint, the organized anti-immigrant movement has exploded (Southern
Poverty Law Center, 2001a). By 2007, the SPLC had identified 144 nativist extremist
groups active across 39 states (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2007). Most of these
organizationsnearly 100 of themhad appeared since April 2006. The groups
identified as nativist extremist target people, rather than policy. That is, they do not limit
themselves to advocating, even in forceful terms, for stricter border security, tighter
population control, or tougher enforcement of laws against hiring illegal immigrants.
Instead, they go after the immigrants themselves, using tactics including armed vigilante
border patrols; conspicuous surveillance of apartments and houses occupied by Mexicans
and Central Americans; publicizing photos and home addresses of suspected illegal aliens
and harassment and intimidation of Latino immigrants at day-labour sites and migrantworker camps. Because their tactics frequently cross the line into illegal harassment and
even violence, these groups sometimes represent another challenge for law enforcement.
Though most heavily concentrated in Arizona, California and Texas, nativist extremist
groups are active in all regions of the United States. Many of the groups in non-border
states are local chapters of either the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps or the Minuteman
Project, which comprised 57 of the 144 nativist extremist groups listed by the SPLC.
These separate, competing nationwide organizations both emerged from the original
month-long Minuteman civilian border patrol operation held in Cochise County, AZ, in
April 2005. Minuteman chapters raise money for their parent organizations and muster
volunteers for vigilante border actions. Many also hold protest actions or conduct
surveillance ops at day-labor sites in their home cities. In states where it's allowed by law,
their members openly carry firearms. The Minuteman Civil Defense Corps and
Minuteman Project have also spawned a slew of imitators and splinter groups that have
no official affiliation with either national Minuteman organization. These rogue outfits
include the Antelope Valley Minutemen, whose leader, Frank Jorge, has written on his
website: We have a right, and an obligation, to defend our country, our homes, and our
families not only from this invasion, but also from the very Government that is
precipitating this treasonous act (Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007).
No Solvencytearing down the border would cause antiimmigration groups to just recreate borders
ADL 2006 (May 23, Anti-Defamation League Extremists Declare 'Open
Season' on Immigrants: Hispanics Target of Incitement and Violence,
http://www.adl.org/main_Extremism/immigration_extremists.htm?
Multi_page_sections=sHeading_1)
Anti-immigration border vigilante groups have also organized anti-immigrant events
around the country this spring. The largest border vigilante group, the Minuteman Project,
held a reprise in April of their 2005 vigilante border patrols along the Arizona- Mexico
border, and followed up with a caravan that staged anti-immigration events across the
country. One Minuteman event in Birmingham, Alabama, was organized by Mike
Vanderboegh, a former militia leader. At the rally, an attendee distributed copies of Olaf
Childress's racist and anti-Semitic newspaper, First Freedom. Other anti-immigration
groups held rallies from Arizona to Minnesota. Anti-immigration groups have also turned
to publicity stunts. The Minutemen, for example, declared on May 9 that they would start
building their own "border security fence" on private property along the border with
Mexico, unless the federal government itself deployed the military or erected such
fencing. The Minutemen claimed that they had received nearly $200,000 in donations to
build such a fence. Other border vigilante groups have already begun or announced
similar projects.
Anti Immigration Groups Rising

Right-wing, anti-immigration groups are risinglaundry
list.
Miller 09
(Greg, reporter for the Washington Post and former reporter for the LA Times and winner of
the Overseas Press Award, Los Angeles Times, Right-wing extremists seen as a threat, April 16, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/16/nation/na-rightwing-extremists16)
The economic downturn and the election of the nation's first

black president are contributing to a resurgence of right-wing
extremist groups, which had been on the wane since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995,
according to a U.S. intelligence assessment distributed to state and local authorities last week. The
report, produced by the Department of Homeland Security, has triggered a backlash among conservatives
because it also raised the specter that disgruntled veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan might "boost the capabilities of extremists . . . to carry out violence." The assessment noted
that domestic security officials had seen no evidence that such groups were planning attacks in the U.S.
But it is the first high-level U.S. intelligence report to call attention to an array of recent domestic
Among other factors cited

in the report were increased prospects for gun control and
immigration legislation under President Obama, as well as resentment
over the rising economic influence of countries such as China,
India and Russia. But the assessment focuses most of its attention on animosity toward
developments as potential harbingers of terrorist violence.
Obama and anxiety over the recession. "The economic downturn and the election of the first African
American president present unique drivers for right-wing radicalization and recruitment," the report warns
the document describes an economic

and political climate that has "similarities to the 1990s, when right-wing
extremism experienced a resurgence fueled largely by an economic recession, criticism about the
in the first of a series of findings. Overall,
outsourcing of jobs, and the perceived threat to U.S. power and sovereignty by other foreign powers."
The unclassified report was not released publicly but was distributed among law enforcement agencies
across the country before it surfaced online this week.
Terrorism DA
1NCTerrorism
Allowing our borders to be opened will lead to loss of all
American freedoms and nuclear terrorism
Schlafly 1 (Phyllis, J.D., Oct, The Phyllis Schlafly Report, The Threat of Terrorism Is
From Illegal Aliens, http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2001/oct01/psroct01.shtml) TYBG
At the same time, Americans have some soul-searching to do about our security. Why were
our FBI and CIA caught so completely by surprise? Why have they been spending their
resources chasing after a few people who were no harm to society, such as one loner on a
mountaintop at Ruby Ridge and a pathetic religious group in Waco, while the plotting
foreign terrorists crossed our borders and lived in our country illegally, took their flight
training in Florida, and repeatedly boarded our planes? The terrorists are foreigners, most
or all of whom should not have been allowed to live in our country. As FBI Director Robert
Mueller admitted, at least some of the hijackers were "out of status," i.e., they had no
proper immigration documents. It should be repeated over and over again: The terrorism
threat is from illegal aliens who are allowed to live in our midst -- and this is a failure of our
immigration laws and our immigration officials. The criminals who were convicted of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, of the murders in front of the CIA headquarters in
1993, and who were involved in a 1998 plot to bomb New York's subway system were
Middle East aliens who should not have been in the United States. They were either granted
a visa that should never have been issued or had overstayed a visa and should have been
expelled. The 1996 Khobar Towers bombings, the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen were all carried out
by radical Middle East groups. Since easy access into the United States has been repeatedly
exploited by aliens bent on terrorism, it should have been no surprise that it was used by the
World Trade Center/Pentagon hijackers. The policy of opening our borders to
anyone who wants to sneak into our country illegally -- or to remain
illegally after entering legally -- must be exposed and terminated.
This is the most important security precaution our government
must take. The flood of illegal aliens coming across our southern border from Mexico
is well known. The opportunity for illegals to come across our vast northern border is not
as well known, but offers easy opportunities for illegals bent on criminal acts. Canada has
a no-questions-asked immigration policy, and many border crossings between the United
States and Canada are unmanned. The third wide-open door for illegals is the issuing of
visas by 3,700 U.S. consular officers around the world. Our State Department has a
laissez faire policy on issuing visas and approves 80% of the 8 million visa applications
every year. The State Department manual used by consular officials states that "mere
membership" in a recognized terrorist group, or even "advocacy of terrorism," does not
automatically disqualify a person from entering the United States. Congress passed a law
ordering the immigration service to track foreign visitors and students and match their
entry into this country with the expiration date of their visas. Congress also ordered the
immigration service to create a database of foreign students that would be accessible to
law enforcement. These requirements are not due to go into effect until 2003! Visa
visitors -- whether tourist, student or worker -- should be tracked on a federal database
that flags the names when their exit dates come around. It is inexcusable that visa
applicants aren't screened more carefully, and that aliens aren't expelled when their visa
expires. Immigration officials don't even know how many people are in the United States
on visas or how many are so-called "overstays," but it's clearly a substantial factor in
illegal immigration. Many new airport security measures are now making airline travel
longer and more difficult. The question should be asked how any of these measures, if
they had been in place, would have prevented the 9/11 hijackings. We want security
measures that will put criminals at risk, not harass law-abiding citizens. The chance of U.S.
citizens hijacking a plane on a suicide mission is infinitely smaller than the chance of foreign
enemies doing the same. Why are all passengers interrogated about their luggage rather
than about their citizenship? It's time to rethink the rule that an airplane be a gun-free
zone. If the foreign masterminds behind this attack had thought that the crew or
passengers were armed, they might not have invested so much in this type of terrorism.
The courageous actions of passengers against the hijackers on the flight that crashed in
Pennsylvania apparently prevented the plane from reaching its target where many more
people would have been killed. Self-help is essential in an emergency when no law
enforcement officials are available. While we worry about hijacked planes
today, we may soon worry about hijacked foreign missile silos.
Terrorists who would commit the unspeakable crimes of 9/11 would not hesitate to use
nuclear weapons.
Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war draws in Russia

and China
Ayson 2010(Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for
Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, July, After a
Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
Volume 33, Issue 7, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the
country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the
nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism
should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A
contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive
nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons
in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring
would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war
would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the
major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear
weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear
exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two
nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear
exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist
attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events
leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states
that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume
the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small
nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the
superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and
early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t
may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible
situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state
nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it
might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the
picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state
sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be
involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten
them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example,
how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material
used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some
reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of
that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given
the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear
explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it
detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from
its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important
some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of
nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to
believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would
shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United
Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington
would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its
program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China
be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act
of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons
relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded
between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to
assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if
the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia
and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as
unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well
apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period
of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and
Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a
possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a
terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted
(and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the
noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack,
the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its
nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful
planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or
China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly
nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions
might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet
with a devastating response.
Open Borders Causes Nuclear Terrorism

Opening the US Borders increases Terrorism
Murdock, Fellow at Stanford Universitys Hoover Institution on War, 2013
( Deroy, 6/1/13 The Union Leader, U.S. Mexican border welcomes terrorists,
http://www.unionleader.com/article/20130502/OPINION02/130509896 , 7/12/13, TZ)
There are at least 7,518 reasons to get the U.S.-Mexican border under control. That equals
the number of aliens apprehended in fiscal year 2011 from the four nations that federal
officials label "state sponsors of terrorism" plus 10 "countries of interest." Since January
2010, those flying into the United States via these 14 nations face enhanced screening. As
the Transportation Security Administration announced at the time: "Effective aviation
security must begin beyond our borders." U.S. national security merits at least that much
vigilance on our borders. The roaring immigration-reform debate largely addresses
Hispanic aliens who illegally cross the border. Far more worrisome, however, are the
thousands who break into the United States from countries "where we have concerns,
particularly about al-Qaida affiliates," a top State Department official told CNN. These
include Cubans, Iranians, Sudanese and Syrians, whose governments are federally
designated "state sponsors of terrorism." As Customs and Border Protection's "2011
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics" reports, 198 Sudanese were nabbed while penetrating
the USA. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2011, such arrests totaled 1,207. (These figures
cover all U.S. borders, although 96.3 percent of detainees crossed from Mexico.) Like
other immigrants, most Sudanese seek better lives here. But some may be vectors for the
same militant Islam that tore Sudan in two - literally. In FY 2011, 108 Syrians were
stopped; over the previous 10 years, 1,353 were. Syria supports Hezbollah, and Bashar alAssad's unstable regime reportedly has attacked its domestic opponents with chemical
weapons. Among Iranians, 276 were caught in FY 2011, while 2,310 were captured over
the previous 10 years. Iran also backs Hezbollah, hates "The Great Satan" - its name for
the United States - and craves atomic weapons. The other 10 "countries of interest" are
Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen and: . Afghanistan, the Taliban's stronghold and
current theater of America's longest war. (Afghans halted in FY 2011: 106; prior 10 years:
681.) . Nigeria. The land of underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab suffers under
Sharia law in its northern provinces. (Respective data: 591 and 4,525.) . Pakistan,
hideaway of the Pakistani Taliban and the late Osama bin Laden (525 and 10,682). . Saudi
Arabia, generous benefactor of radical imams and militant mosques worldwide; birthplace
of 15 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers (123 and 986). . Somalia. Home of Indian Ocean pirates
and al-Qaida's al-Shabaab franchise. In October 1993, Islamic terrorists there shot down
two Black Hawk helicopters, killed 18 U.S. soldiers and dragged several of their bodies
through Mogadishu's streets (323 and 1,524). The House Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Oversight last November published "A Line in the Sand: Countering
Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border." This study offers chilling portraits
of some who consider the southern border America's welcome ma t. . On Jan. 11, 2011, U.S.
agents discovered Said Jaziri in a car trunk trying to enter near San Diego. Jaziri traveled
from his native Tunisia to Tijuana, he said, and paid smugglers $5,000 to sneak him across
the border. France previously convicted and deported him for assaulting a Muslim whom he
considered insufficiently devout. In 2006, Jaziri advocated killing Danish cartoonist Kurt
Westergaard for creating what Jaziri called sacrilegious drawings of the Prophet
Mohammed. . Somalia's Ahmed Muhammed Dhakane told authorities in 2011 that he
earned up to $75,000 per day smuggling East Africans into America. His clients included
three al-Shabaab terrorists. As the House paper states: "Dhakane cautioned that each of
these individuals is ready to die for their cause. ..." . On June 4, 2010, Anthony Joseph
Tracy was convicted of conspiring to slip aliens into America. Tracy told federal
investigators that Cuban diplomats used his travel agency in Kenya to transfer 272
Somalis to Havana. They proceeded to Belize, through Mexico, and then trespassed into
the USA. Tracy claims he refused to assist al-Shabaab. But officials discovered an email
in which he casually wrote: "...i helped a lot of Somalis and most are good but there are
some who are bad and i leave them to ALLAH..." Remember: These anecdotes and
statistics involve individuals whom authorities intercepted. No details exist about aliens
who successfully infiltrated America.
Allowing illegal aliens in our country makes the U.S. a

police state and risks a second 9/11
Schlafly 1 (Phyllis, J.D., Oct, The Phyllis Schlafly Report, The Threat of Terrorism Is
From Illegal Aliens, http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2001/oct01/psroct01.shtml) TYBG
It's important for Americans to understand that the 9/11 hijackings are a problem of the
U.S. government allowing illegal aliens to roam freely in our country and of promiscuously
issuing visas without proper certifications. It's also a problem of our government failing to
enforce current immigration and visa laws, and failing to deport illegal aliens including
those who overstay their visas. At least 16 of the 19 hijackers fit in one or more of these
categories. For more than two weeks prior to 9/11, the FBI had been trying to find one of
the hijackers whom the CIA had spotted meeting with a suspect in the bombing of the
USS Cole. But all the FBI had to go on was his visa application, which listed his address
as "Marriott, New York City" (where there are ten Marriott hotels and he never went to
any of them). The U.S. law that requires an alien's border crossing document to include a
machine-readable biometric identifier (such as a fingerprint or handprint), and requires
that the identifier match the appropriate biometric characteristic of the alien, has never
gone into effect. We are not going to tolerate a system that treats U.S. citizens and aliens
the same. All aliens are not terrorists, but nearly all terrorists are aliens. We do not want to
live in a police state, where every American is treated like a terrorist, drug trafficker, money
launderer, illegal alien, or common criminal. Larry Ellison, the head of Oracle Corp., the
leading database software company, has offered to donate the tools for creating machinereadable ID cards that contain digitized thumbprints and photographs. Ellison's proposal
would open up vast new markets for Oracle to promote privacy-invading database
software, at the expense of law-abiding citizens. We should have a computerized
database of all aliens entering the United States, whether they are tourists, students, or
workers, and a tracking system that flags the file when a visa time expires. Aliens should
be required to carry smart ID cards that contain biometric identifiers, the terms of their
visas, and a record of their border crossings and travels within our country, similar to the
rubber stamps used in all passports. Airports should be equipped with the machines to
swipe the smart card every time an alien boards a plane. Dumb questions like "Has your
luggage been under your control since you packed it?" should be replaced with useful
questions like "Are you a U.S. citizen?". The National Commission on Terrorism
reported last year: "The United States is, de facto, a country of open borders." It will do a
lot more for the safety of Americans to close those open borders than imposing oppressive
regulations on the travel of law-abiding citizens. We should expel all illegal aliens,
especially from the Middle East, and place a moratorium on legal immigration and the
issuing of visas, until the terrorism threat is resolved.
Immigration from mexico would cause terrorism, criminal

activity, human trafficking, and increased gang violence
Taylor 10 (Dr. Jameson, policy researcher at Mississippi Center for public policy,
Illegal Immigration: Drugs, Gangs and Crime
http://www.jwpcivitasinstitute.org/media/publication-archive/perspective/illegalimmigration-drugs-gangs-and-crime) TYBG
Paramilitary groups trading fire with U.S. agents. Kidnappings and murders of U.S.
citizens. Members of al-Qaida, Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations infiltrating the
border on a routine basis. We are not talking about Iraq but Texas. One of the clearest
indicators the United States has lost control of its southwest border is the ease with which
thousands of tons of drugs and millions of illegal aliens are crossing the U.S. border on
an annual basis. This open borders policy has opened the door to more than just cheap
labor. The presence of millions of undocumented persons in our country has provided a
perfect cover for various forms of criminal activity, ranging from drug trafficking to
prostitution to identity theft. Federal investigators believe that as much as 2.2 million
kilograms of cocaine and 11.6 kilograms of marijuana were smuggled into the United States
via the Mexican border in 2005.1 With the decline of the Medellin and Cali cartels of
Columbia, two Mexican drug cartels the Sinaloa cartel and the Gulf cartel are battling
over the billion-dollar drug trade between Mexico and the United States. These cartels
also have ties to U.S. gangs that serve as distribution networks in the interior United
States. A 2006 study by the House Committee on Homeland Security warns that the
Mexican cartels have essentially wrested control of the border from both the U.S. and
Mexican governments: The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration reports that the
Mexican drug syndicates operating today along our Nations Southwest border are far more
sophisticated and dangerous than any of the other organized criminal groups in Americas
law enforcement history. Indeed, these powerful drug cartels, and the human smuggling
networks and gangs they leverage, have immense control over the routes into the United
States and continue to pose formidable challenges to our efforts to secure the Southwest
border. The cartels operate along the border with military grade weapons, technology
and intelligence and their own respective paramilitary enforcers. This new breed of
cartel is not only more violent, powerful and well financed, it is also deeply engaged in
intelligence collection on both sides of the border.2 Here in North Carolina, the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reports a significant increase in drugtrafficking activity. Explains the DEA: The majority of the increased drug-trafficking
activity is due to an unprecedented influx of foreign nationals into the state in particular
Spanish-speaking, specifically Mexican, nationals. A 2003 report by the National Drug
Intelligence Center corroborates the DEAs findings: Mexican criminal groups in

southwestern states and Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico
routinely use Mexican illegal immigrants in North Carolina as couriers to transport
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine and, to a lesser extent, heroin into and through the
state. These criminal groups exploit a growing Mexican population in North Carolina to
facilitate their illicit activities. Law enforcement authorities in North Carolina, principally
in the western and southern areas of the state, indicate that Mexican criminal groups are
also increasing their involvement in retail drug distribution.3 Needless to say, the
majority of illegal immigrants are not directly involved in the drug trade. Nevertheless,
the DEA has determined that their presence allows Mexican traffickers to effectively
conceal their activities within immigrant communities. 4 Johnston County Sheriff Steve
Bizzell (R) estimates that 80 percent to 85 percent of the drug trade in his county is
conducted by Hispanics.5 In 2002, the Wake County Sheriffs Office similarly reported
that although Hispanics comprised only 5.4 percent of the population, they accounted for
46 percent of drug-trafficking arrests.6 As indicated above, transnational gangs, such as
Surenos-13 and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), are responsible for much of the low-level
drug trade in North Carolina. Over the past several years, North Carolina has experienced
a disturbing surge in gang activity. Between 1999 and 2004, Wake County saw a 5,743.3
percent increase in gang membership. During the same period, the city of Durham saw a
333.3 percent increase.7 A 2005 report by the Governors Crime Commission estimated
that 22.2 percent of all gang members in North Carolina are Hispanic (with ethnicity
unknown for another 19.4 percent).8 By contrast, Hispanics accounted for only 7 percent
of total state population in 2004. Nationally, Hispanics are thought to comprise 49 percent
of total gang membership. A majority of these gang members are illegal immigrants . Notes
Duplin County Sheriff Blake Wallace (D), There is an increasing gang activity problem,
particularly with MS-13 and studies have shown that the majority of those gang members
are illegal aliens.9 Among these studies is a report published by the Governors Crime
Commission which posits that 66 percent of Hispanic/Latino gang members are illegal
aliens.10 In the case of MS-13, one of the most violent and powerful gangs in North
Carolina, federal authorities estimate that approximately 90 percent of U.S. MS-13
members are foreign-born illegal aliens and depend upon the Texas-Mexico border
smuggling corridor to support their criminal operations.11 As Forsyth County District
Attorney Tom Keith (R) puts it, You cannot say drugs without saying gangs without
saying illegal aliens.12 In addition to the drug trade, the Mexican cartels are becoming
increasingly involved in human trafficking (i.e., prostitution) and human smuggling .
According to Dr. Deborah Schurman-Kauflin of the Violent Crimes Institute, Mexico is
the number one source for young female sex slaves in North America. Each year thousands
of women and children with 12-year-olds in top demand are smuggled across the
border and sent to brothels across the United States. Such brothels, notes SchurmanKauflin, can take the form of homes, apartments, spas, massage parlors, and hotels
even middle class neighborhoods can be at risk.13
War DA
1NCConflict
Borders are necessary to prevent conflictpower sharing
leads to more war
Downes, 06 (Alexander. Professor of political science and international affairs at the
George Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil
Wars." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61. ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013.)
The conventional wisdom among scholars and policymakers opposes solving ethnic conflicts by
drawing new borders and creating new states. This view, however, is flawed because the process of
fighting civil wars imbues the belligerents with a deep sense of mistrust that makes sharing
power after the conflict difficult. This is especially true in ethnic civil wars, in which negotiated
power-sharing agreements run a high risk of failing and leading to renewed warfare. In
light of these problems, this article argues that partition should be considered as an option
for ending severe ethnic conflicts. The article shows how failure to adopt partition in Kosovo has left
that province in a semi-permanent state of limbo that only increases the majority Albanian population's
desire for independence. The only route to long-term stability in the region-and an exit for
international forces-is through partition. Moreover, the article suggests that the United States should
recognize and prepare for the coming partition of Iraq rather than pursuing the futile endeavor of
implementing power-sharing among Iraq's Shi'ites, Kurds, and Sunnis. The conventional wisdom
regarding borders in political science and the policy community is that we already have
plenty and do not need any more. Scholars and policymakers alike tend to oppose the creation of new
states, especially as a means to end civil conflict. They argue that secession and partition generate more
problems than they solve and lead to new conflicts. The preferred solutions to these conflicts take
the existing borders as given and concentrate on fostering negotiated settlements that
arrange power internally through such mechanisms as power-sharing, regional autonomy,
or federalism. As Ted Robert Gurr has written, "threats to divide a country should be managed by the
devolution of state power and . . . communal fighting about access to the state's power and resources should
be restrained by recognizing group rights and sharing power."1 Other researchers agree, maintaining that
the key factor in sustaining negotiated settlements to ethnic conflicts is the degree to which the agreement
institutionalizes power-sharing or regional autonomy.2
Recently, however, scholars have begun to challenge this single-state-solution orthodoxy,
arguing instead that dividing states and creating new borders may be a way to promote
peace after ethnic civil wars. One view, represented by Chaim Kaufmann, stresses that ethnic civil wars
cannot end until contending groups are separated into homogeneous ethnic enclaves. When groups are
intermingled, each side has an incentive to attack and cleanse the other. Once separation is
achieved, these incentives disappear. With the necessary condition for peace in place,
political arrangements become secondary. Unless ethnic separation occurs, Kaufmann
argues, all other solutions are fruitless because ethnic intermingling is what fuels conflict.
Borders Prevent War

Separation of ethnic groups reduces conflict
George Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil
Wars." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61. ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013. JMR)
In this article, I argue that partition-defined as separation of contending ethnic groups and
the creation of independent states-should be considered as an alternative to power-sharing
and regional autonomy as a means to end civil wars. Partition does not require groups to
disarm and make themselves vulnerable to devastating betrayal . Nor do formerly warring
groups have to cooperate and share power in joint institutions. Partition also satisfies
nationalist desires for statehood and fills the need for security . In cases of severe ethnic
conflict, when perceptions of the adversary's malign intentions are so entrenched as to

impede any agreement based on a single-state solution, partition is the preferred solution.
In the remainder of this paper, I will elaborate further on this argument and apply it to the
case of Kosovo, demonstrating why autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia is impossible.
Following an evaluation of the various options being considered for Kosovo's
independence, I will argue for a partition of Kosovo along the Ibar River accompanied by
the return of the Serbian population to Serbia. Finally, I argue that like it or not, partition
is probably in Iraq's future.
Third party intervention and negotiated settlements wont

solveborders are necessary
George Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to
Ethnic Civil Wars." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61.
ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013. JMR)
Scholars have offered two solutions to the dilemmas and dangers of negotiated settlements.
First, some argue that the more institutionalized the agreement is, the more it will allay the
former belligerents' security fears and increase their ability to safeguard their interests .
These optimists maintain that negotiated settlements, by creating institutions to share
power in the central government or devolve power to sub-state regions, increase the
likelihood of success by allowing groups to govern themselves and prevent others from
implementing measures harmful to their interests. Examples of power-sharing institutions
in the central government include reserving executive posts and government ministries
for members of different groups, joint decision-making, proportional representation, and
a minority veto. Institutions that devolve power include regional autonomy agreements or
federalism. By working together in common institutions, groups may moderate their
views of their former adversary's intentions and even come to trust each other.10 Second,
intervention by a third party is thought to be an effective way to reduce security fears and
facilitate agreement implementation. If the key problems are that both sides fear betrayal
and there is no mechanism to enforce the agreement, interposing a third party into the
situation can resolve these issues by increasing the likelihood that the parties will keep
their promises and mitigating the costs to the other if one of them does not. Providing
troops on the ground during the early phases of implementation is critical for stability,
security, and protection when groups are disarming and institutions are taking shape.11
Unfortunately, neither power-sharing institutions nor third-party intervention provide
more than a temporary band-aid for the critical underlying problems, which are
uncertainty about the adversary's intentions and inability to commit to the agreement. For
several reasons, negotiated settlements are likely to fail even when they include provisions
for institutions and third-party enforcement. Because an intervener's presence is likely to
be temporary, former belligerents are reluctant to disarm and integrate their military
forces with those of their past enemy. Once the third party leaves, the parties again have
to rely on each other's promises to abide by the agreement. Fear of future betrayal-fed by
experiences of past malign intentions-prompts groups to keep their guns, which increases
the likelihood of a return to war. In high-conflict or post-conflict environments, elections
tend to resemble ethnic censuses. Out-group conflict increases in-group solidarity, and
those who advocate compromise with former enemies are easily branded as traitors
betraying the group's interests. In the aftermath of civil wars, people tend to support
nationalist parties and politicians who promise to protect the group's interests. Post-war
elections are likely to bring hard-line leaders to power who are reluctant to trust the other
side and make the compromises necessary to implement the agreement. As a result,
political institutions that require trust and accommodation are likely to be gridlocked .
When these institutions break down, third parties may step in to govern in their stead, but
this is only a stop-gap solution because it renders these institutions even less likely to
work when the outside party leaves. Furthermore, if the war was characterized by ethnic
cleansing, agreements that call for expelled minorities to return to their former homes
may lead to further violence. The now-dominant majority group may destroy or inhabit
the homes of those who were expelled. Minorities often face hostility, discrimination, and
difficulty finding employment. When the third party leaves and no longer can provide
protection, they may be forced out again. Finally, recent research on cease-fires in
interstate wars has found a striking correlation between third-party intervention and
increased risk of another war in the future. The logic is that "agreements that specify
terms that do not correspond well with the expected military outcome of renewed
fighting" are more likely to fail than those in which the terms reflect the outcome on the
battlefield or the consequences that renewed fighting would bring. Third-party
intervention often short-circuits a war before a clear battlefield outcome has emerged, and
thus "considerable uncertainty remains regarding the consequences of continuing the
war."12 This uncertainty undermines agreements because one or both sides may believe
that it could achieve a better outcome by fighting. Third-party intervention also increases
the likelihood of a mismatch between the agreement's terms and the probable outcome of
the war. This is because outside parties tend to intervene to prevent one side from
decisively defeating another and to restore the status quo ante. Agreements like these are
particularly unlikely to last when the third party withdraws because the side that was
winning in the previous round of fighting believes that it can achieve a better outcome by
returning to war. Once the agreement's enforcer departs, the stronger side has an incentive
to attack to revise the terms of settlement. Similarly, single-state-solutions imposed by
third-party intervention when one or more of the parties prefers independence run an
increased risk of failure because they go against the preferences of the groups involved.
Borders can only lead to peacethey take away incentive

for war
The poor record of negotiated settlements in ethnic civil wars that leave borders intact,
whether or not they are facilitated by third-party intervention, suggests that a new
approach might be necessary: one based on partition rather than power-sharing. In this
model, third parties would intervene not to turn back the clock to the pre-war situation,
but to inflict a decisive defeat on one side or the other. This would reduce the likelihood that
the defeated party would think it could gain anything by resorting to war in the future . In
those cases where a third party intervenes on behalf of ethnic rebels, military victory will
result in partition. Partition can only lead to peace, however, if it is accompanied by ethnic
separation. Interveners should work to make sure that the states are as ethnically
homogeneous as possible so as to reduce the likelihood of future cleansing, rebellions by the
remnant minority for union with its brethren in the other state, or war to rescue "trapped"
minorities. Finally, both sides should be militarily capable of defending themselves, and the
borders between them should be made as defensible as possible to discourage aggression,
either by following natural terrain features or by building demilitarized zones or other
barriers.
Opening the border also brings in spillover violence that

originates in Mexico
Washington Post 11 (Clint McDonald, March 31, Dangers on the US-Mexico Border, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-0331/opinions/35207272_1_border-patrol-agents-border-security-spillover-violence, accessed 7-12-13, AR)
There is a storm brewing along our border with Mexico, and our nation is relegating responsibility for quelling that storm to some of
our poorest communities. In a visit to El Paso last week, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano claimed that there has been no
spillover violence from Mexico into the United States. Regardless of the veracity, her point is irrelevant. It is not spillover
violence but spillover effects of hostilities in Mexico that pose the real threat to the United
States. Spillover effects are the direct results of Mexican violence that influence U.S. citizens
living in communities along the border. For example, Mexican gangs fighting to control territory
around the frontier village of El Porvenir, in Chihuahua, have threatened for almost a year to kill its residents.
To escape the violence, nearly the entire village eventually relocated to Texas border communities
without, of course, being screened or processed. The results include schoolchildren fearing for
their safety as their Mexican schoolmates talk of violence and murder, school buses tailed
by armed private security guards and criminals relocating to the United States with their
families and conducting their operations from this country. The single greatest spillover
effect: U.S. citizens living in fear. While border security is undeniably a federal responsibility, spillover effects are
principally dealt with by local jurisdictions and along the U.S.-Mexico border, this is mostly sheriffs offices operating in large,
sparsely populated county areas supported by small tax bases. Border counties are among the poorest in the United States and can
barely afford to hire and equip sufficient, qualified law enforcement personnel to meet citizens needs.
Integration will result in increased tensions and inevitable

conflictKosovo proves
The case of Kosovo is even more interesting. The United States and its NATO allies
intervened in 1999 to stop Slobodan Milosevic's expulsion of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians,
but never supported the Albanians' claim to sovereignty over Kosovo. UN Resolution
1244 called for Kosovo to remain an autonomous province within Serbia and Montenegro.
The United Nations has maintained this fiction while governing Kosovo since the war,
engaging in so-called "kick-the-can diplomacy," putting off the difficult decisions to the
future.13 Rather than calming the situation, this delaying tactic has raised the ire of the
Kosovar Albanians, who see their treasured goal of independence slipping away . "We are
here, suffocated with UNMIK [the UN Mission in Kosovo] over our heads, and Serbia over
our necks," protested one Albanian. "UNMIK is now six years here without a deadline.
We want a deadline. To become independent from a stronger place you need action, not
process."14 Veton Surroi, the Albanian publisher who now serves in Kosovo's parliament
agrees: "The focus has been on buying time, and that's the only focus there has been."15
Even UNMIK officials concur with this assessment: "One of the profound problems
bedeviling the international community," one bureaucrat noted, "is that it has not yet
defined the goal of what we're working toward here."16 In short, the UN strategy of
keeping Kosovo in a "deep winter," its refusal to endorse the objective of independence
for Kosovo, and the delay in opening negotiations on the future of the province have
caused the Albanians to become increasingly frustrated and led to outbursts of anti-Serb
violence, such as the riots of March 2004 that killed 19 people.17 Kosovo is plagued by
the problems that typically undermine single state solutions after ethnic wars. Given the
province's uncertain political future, both Albanians and Serbs have incentives to remain
armed. In June 2003, the United Nations Development Program estimated that there were
approximately 333,000 to 460,000 privately held small arms in Kosovo, of which only
20,000 were legally owned.18 UN-sponsored gun collection drives bring in few weapons;
one three-month campaign that ended on Oct. 1, 2003, netted just 155 guns.19
Trepidation over Kosovo's future status makes both ethnic communities reluctant to part
with their weapons. According to a report by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
"Faced with an uncertain future and constant wondering about whether conflict will ensue
once again, people may want to keep weapons to provide protection and security if the
situation once again becomes precarious."20 Comments by both Serbs and Albanians
confirm this motivation. According to an Albanian tour guide in Drenica, for example,
"Nobody knows if another war is going to happen or not. If they don't give us independence,
that might mean that the Serbian forces will be allowed to come back-and most people here
don't want to be caught empty-handed when that happens." Serbs, for their part, believe
that self-help is the only way to safeguard themselves from vengeful Albanians. As one
Serb from Gracanica commented, "We believe that none of the security forces operating in
Kosovo at the moment are able to fully protect the Serbs, so we have to look out for
ourselves."21
Lack of borders results in the marginalization of minority

groupsIraq proves
Despite international attempts to encourage power-sharing and federalism as a means to
preserve a united Iraq, a partition of the country into three states-a Kurdish state in the
northeast, a Shi'ite state in the south, and a Sunni state in the northwest-is probably
unavoidable for the same reasons it is unavoidable in Kosovo. The history of violence and
repression has made it hard for Iraq's ethnic groups to trust each other. The Kurds suffered
such brutality that they insist on maintaining their own armed forces and prefer an
independent Kurdish state to remaining part of a united Iraq. The Sunni Arabs-the
dominant and privileged group under Saddam Hussein's regime-have suffered a major
status reversal and are now marginalized. The Sunni-based insurgency that has raged
since Saddam's downfall in 2003 signals not only many Sunnis' attachment to and
reverence for Saddam, but also their mistrust and suspicion of Iraq's Shi'ites and Kurds.
The 2005 constitution was negotiated mostly without Sunni input and over their vehement
objections. Unsurprisingly, Sunnis voted overwhelmingly against the document. Lastminute promises by Shi'a and Kurdish leaders that would allow the constitution to be
renegotiated following new parliamentary elections are small consolation to Sunnis, who
will always compose a small minority of the country's elected representatives and thus will
wield little power. The constitution's federal provisions represent Shi'ite leaders'
recognition that the Kurds insist on near total autonomy-and thus that the Shi'ites should
form their own federal bloc as well. Given the powerful centrifugal forces at play, this
process will lead to the eventual partition of Iraq. Rather than continue to promote powersharing institutions that are ineffective or insist on the maintenance of a single Iraqi state in
the face of mounting evidence that three states are going to emerge, the United States and
other international actors should begin preparing the ground for partition. Three issues
will be of primary importance. First, the United States needs to work with Iraq's
neighbors to ensure they will not interfere or seek to exert undue influence over the
successor states. The United States should work to reconcile Turkey to a Kurdish state,
extract promises from Iraqi Kurds not to foment or encourage Kurdish nationalism in
other countries, and warn Iran that it must allow Iraq's Shi'ites to determine their own
future. The next task will be determining the new borders of the three states. It is beyond
the scope of this essay to propose what those borders should be. However, the Shi'ite state
probably would comprise the nine southern provinces plus the southern part of Diyala
province. The Sunnis likely would receive Anbar, Salahuddin, Ninevah province west of
the Tigris, and the western parts of Ta'mim and Diyala. Kurdistan would probably consist
of Dohuk, Erbil, Suleimaniyah, Ninevah east of the Tigris (including Mosul), and the
eastern third of Ta'mim (including Kirkuk). Finally, there is the question of Baghdad,
home to large numbers of all three groups. Options for Baghdad include making it an
international zone or an area of joint control among the groups, or giving each state
sovereignty over the areas where its people live. These tasks will not be easy, but they
acknowledge the reality that, as Peter Galbraith has put it, "The fundamental problem of
Iraq is an absence of Iraqis."31 The Kurds unanimously prefer independence, the Sunni
Arabs fear oppression in a state dominated by their former victims, and the Shi'itesalthough preferring a single Iraq that they would control-will accept a truncated state rich
in natural resources and free of a Sunni insurgency. Civil wars generate intense mistrust,
fear, and hatred that make the future maintenance of multiethnic societies via negotiated
settlements and power-sharing institutions difficult. Iraq, like Bosnia and Kosovo, is no
exception. After six years in Kosovo, the United States and the United Nations finally have
realized that partition cannot be avoided. One hopes it will not take that long for a similar
realization to dawn on them in Iraq.
Other DA Links
Politics
Despite some sympathy, border enforcement remains
extremely popular to all parties
Conservatives generally find themselves deeply split on the issue of immigration. Some
staunch members of the Republican Party, including President George W. Bush,
generally favor liberal admission policies, or at least more liberal policies than the ones
currently in place. Economic conservatives see gains from immigration and inexpensive
labor. In stark contrast, another wing of the Republican Party is deeply concerned
with the alleged cultural impacts of immigration. This faction aggressively plays on
populist fear about cultural changes blamed on immigrants and demands restrictionist
policies and tougher border enforcement. Today, this arm of the Republican Party,
represented most prominently by Congressman Tom Tancredo and the conservative icon
Pat Buchanan, often exercises great influence over the direction of immigration law
and policy by tapping into broad-based fears of economically and otherwise insecure
U.S. citizens. Poor, working, and middle-income people worry about the changes
wrought by immigration and are not likely to sympathize with the desire of big
business for cheap labor. On the other hand, Democrats also find themselves divided
on immigration. Economically, they are concerned with immigrations downward
pressure on the wage scale and its impact on a long-time base of Democratic
support, labor unions. Although change has come in recent years, organized labor,
often supportive of the basic Democratic agenda, has historically supported
restrictionist immigration laws and policies. Many liberals, however, desire the
humane treatment of immigrants and often push for pro-immigration and proimmigrant laws and policies. There, however, is some common ground. Many
Democrats and Republicans often agree that increased border
enforcement is necessary. Like tough-on-crime stances, this has proved time
and time again to be a politically popular position. This is even true for those
sympathetic to 138 | The Economic Benefits of Liberal Migration of Labor Across
Borders the plight of immigrants. In addition, influenced by public fears of being
overrun by floods of immigrants, politicians of both parties often support limits on
legal immigration and heavy border enforcement.
State Spending
Opening the borders would drown states in fiscal debt
Immigration has had especially significant fiscal impacts on states in which large
numbers of immigrants live. The state and local governments in high-immigration
states must bear substantial costs. Consumption of emergency health services alone
can have substantial impacts on state and local governments.73 The state of Arizona, for
example, pays more than $90 million each year to provide emergency services
to undocumented immigrants. The state is required to provides such services by
federal law but receives only about $650,000 from the federal government to
help cover the services , a fraction of its their costs.74 A public education, which
is generally paid for by state and local governments, is also costly, even if it turns out to
be a good economic investment for the nation. The costs of providing law enforcement
protections to immigrants also can be formidable.
Job Loss
Increase of migrants leads to less jobs.
Sanchez 09 (Rob, Timeout! The case for a moratorium on legal immigration, The
Social Contract Press, Volume:20, MCJC)
One of the most obvious ways to stop job erosion in the U.S. is to stop illegal immigration
and to put severe limits on employment based visas. Beware of politicians that ask us to
accept the Faustian bargain of Comprehensive Immigration Reform. Their claim is
fallacious that CIR will solve the illegal immigration problem, but only if we expand guest
worker visa programs. The following statement by Sen. McCain is not unique as many
variations of it have been repeated throughout the years by political elitists who care
more about increasing the supply of cheap labor than preserving the viability of the
American middle class:
I believe we can pursue the security programs and at the same time set up a system where
people can come here and work on a temporary basis. I think we can set up a program
where amnesty is extended to a certain number of people who are eligible and at the same
time make sure that we have some control over people who come in and out of this
country.
Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), news conference, 2003
We must be careful not to be fooled by the Mortons Fork (false choice) offered by McCain
and other promoters of CIR, who ask us to accept more immigration by increasing the
number of employment based worker visas and by giving amnesty to illegal aliens in
trade for a promise of more border enforcement. Its not a fair deal because American
workers lose jobs any time there are increases in immigration it really doesnt matter if
the increase is due to legal or illegal immigration. The only thing that matters is how much
our total population is allowed to grow by flooding the labor market with more
immigrants. Increased immigration means the supply of workers goes up, demand goes
down, labor arbitration forces wages to go down, and job opportunities for Americans
dwindle. Its a lose-lose deal for American wage earners.
There are two very obvious means to improve the employment situation in the United
States: first we must stop illegal immigration, and second most of our employment based
visa programs should either be severely restricted or abolished. Until both of these happen
all proposals for Comprehensive Immigration Reform should be rejected especially if
they allow any type of amnesty or the expansion of guest worker visa programs. If
unemployment ever reaches zero, and we are sure our borders are secure, then it might
make sense to have a public dialogue about the merits of liberalizing the immigration
system.
K Args
CapRoot Cause
Capitalism is the root problem of economic inequality, not
immigration
An inextricably related economic fear is that easy migration increases 144 | The
Economic Benefits of Liberal Migration of Labor Across Borders wealth inequality.
This line of reasoning, which finds some support empirically, sees cheap labor allowing
business to reap greater profits, accumulate more wealth, and gain at the expense of
labor. As the old adage goes, the rich get richer, the poor get poorer. This, however,
may well be an enduring characteristic of capitalism and a market economy,
rather than the result of immigration and liberal admissions policies. Even if such
fears were real, it may not be possible through border enforcement measures to halt
highly motivated immigrants from entering the United States. Other policies are
necessary to address wealth distribution concerns.

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Open Borders Generally Doesnt Solve

Open Borders Fail

in danger of weakening further, it should be restored to prominent influence because it

Open Borders do not solve for either economic equality,

Bad to Abandon Borders

immanentist orientation of modern political theology, through the effacement

ruled by the law of pluralism, a

piece of concrete order is more valuable than any empty

Difference is inevitablea borderless world is an

is necessarily a critique of any postmodern delusion of a borderless world, must therefore

An outright rejection of borders fails. Reframing our

borders still has a powerful normative justification in the defense

Borders are key to social solidarity that solves poverty,

Borders are necessary as they fulfill our ethical and

Modern borders are engines of connectivity that allow for

Holloway, University of London, Seeing like a border Political Geography 30 (2011)

Construction of borders involve citizens and give people

Holloway, University of London, Seeing like a border Political Geography 30 (2011)

Even if Borders split up the world artificially they are key

Cosmopolitan attempts to transcend national borders reproduce violent identities.

Borders Prevent War

Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars

Eliminating borders makes peace impossible

University, SAIS REVIEW, 2006, p. 49 More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a

PARTITION PROVIDES MORE SECURITY THAN DISOLVING BORDERS

University, SAIS REVIEW, 2006, p. 40 More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a

Partition is better than power sharing

Alexander B. Downes, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Duke

Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars

a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars

Borders Good -- Freedom

The Mexican border is specifically key to individual liberty

Borders are critical to freedom

Borders allow people to live in societies they wish to live

Borders motivate states to preserve liberty

Borders preserve liberty more than a world without it

War Advantage Answers

existential import, but at most as subjects that may be negotiated .11

Identity Advantage Answers/Turn

from elsewhere in normative and ethical accounts of division, distinction and

Harbour's survey of universal ethical propositions, also drawing on anthropological work,

suggests a necessary division in human ethical life. By extension, the power-riddled,

importantly includes an equality of community membership granting them a set of shared

This, of course, is easier said than done.

Diversity threatens the survival of the national American

Culture Advantage Answers

Race Advantage Answers

document is the remarkably persistent whiteness of geographys practitioners. According

the report said

Preserving nationalism is key to prevent imminent race

America is being destroyed by a modern version of Genghis Khan's army, according to

broad-based populist anger at

are in the midst of one of the most significant right-wing

And, at the "A Well

Endorsing multiculturalism and assimilation of local

Invasion of immigrant workers on domestic workers

Opening the border failscauses backlash

Economic issues and increasing immigration is likely to

Multiculturalism threatens Americans both economically

Backlash Causes War

Those numbers likely understate the problem, because undocumented immigrants,

Backlash Turns Solvency

Anti Immigration Groups Rising