Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972

NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Victor Arichea for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G.
Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:p
Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
finds the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario
Satimbre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band
and sentences Bonifacio Malanaas an accessory after the fact to suffer
imprisonment of from six (6) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to six (6)
years, prision correccional, as maximum and to indemnify the offended
party, Ignacio Peaflor in the sum of P80.00 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency but not to exceed one-third (1/3)of the principal
penalty and the accused Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre to
suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day, prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day,reclusion temporal, as maximum, both to indemnify the spouses
Ignacio Peaflor and Casimira Lagman in the sum of Two Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and all three to pay the proportionate part of the
costs.
The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, from which We quote:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs.

Casimira Lagman Peaflor , 47-year old wife of Ignacio Peaflor , the
owner of a store located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after
answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the dog nearby
indicating the presence of strangers around the vicinity. Acting on instinct,
she woke up husband Ignacio Peaflor who, after getting his flashlight and
.38 caliber revolver, went down the store to take a look. As he approached
the door of the store, it suddenly gave way having been forcibly pushed
and opened by 4 men, one of them holding and pointing a machinegun.
Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peaflor fired his revolver but missed.
Upon receiving from someone a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell
down but he pretended to be dead. He was hogtied by the men. The fact,
however, was that he did not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men then
went up the house. One of the robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peaflor
for money saying that they are people from the mountain. Mrs. Casimira L.
Peaflor , realizing the danger, took from under the mat the bag containing
P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth P350.00 and delivered them to the
robber. Thereupon, that robber opened and ransacked the wardrobe.
Then they tied the hands of Mrs. Casimira L. Peaflor and those of her
two sons. After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered them with
blankets and left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken
by the robbers. The spouses thereafter called for help and Councilor
Almario, a neighbor, came and untied Ignacio Peaflor . The robbery was
reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa and to the Philippine
Constabulary.
Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises upon
receiving the report of Councilor Almario and found owner Ignacio
Peaflor with a wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The wardrobe was
ransacked and things scattered around. It appears that the robbers bore a
hole on the sidewall of the ground floor of the store and passed through it
to gain entrance. According to Chief of Police Delfin Lapid, "they removed
the adobe stone and that is the place where they passed through" (tsn. 24,
I). In that same morning, policeman Melquiades Samaniego reported
seeing suspicious characters passing through a nearby field and when the
field was inspected, the authorities were able to locate a greasegun with 5
bullets and a pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I, testimony of Chief of Police)...
It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal complaint for robbery in band
was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Hermosa, Bataan. Named as
defendants in the complaint, as subsequently amended, were Nicanor Napolis,
Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe,
Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre,
Paul Doe, et al. Napolis, Malana, Anila and Casimiro having waived their right to a
preliminary investigation, the case, insofar as they are concerned, was forwarded to the
Court of First Instance of Bataan, where the corresponding information was filed. As

subsequently amended, by the inclusion, as defendants therein, of Antonio Bededia

alias Toning, Domingo Flores alias Eko, Ben de la Cruz, Jose Escabel alias Pepe,
Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is alleged in said information: .
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, in
the Municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused Bonifacio
Malana, Nicanor Napolis, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori, Jose
Escabel, Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, Alias
Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso, Domingo Flores,
Alias Eko and Paul Doe, by conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, with the intent to gain and armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3)
caliber .45 pistols and two (2) revolvers, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, entered the dwelling of the spouses IGNACIO
PEAFLOR and CASIMIRA L. PEAFLOR by boring a hole under the
sidewall of the ground floor of the house and once inside, attack, assault
and hit Ignacio Peaflor with the handle of the Grease Gun causing him to
fall on the ground and rendering him unconscious, tied his hands and feet
and then leave him; that the same accused approached Casimira L.
Peaflor , threatened her at gun point and demanded money; that the
same accused while inside the said house searched and ransacked the
place and take and carry away the following cash money and articles
belonging to said spouses Ignacio Peaflor and Casimira L. Peaflor , to
wit: P2,000.00 in cash, Philippine Currency, One (1) ring (Brillante) valued
at P350.00, One (1) licensed Commando Colt Revolver, Serial No.
532132 and One (1) Flashlight, valued at P7.00, to the damage and
prejudice of said spouses in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN PESOS, (P2,557.00) Philippine Currency.".
At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and
Flores, 1 the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of the offended
parties, Ignacio Peaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman Peaflor , Provincial Fiscal
Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea, Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina,
Delfin Lapid, the Chief of Police of Hermosa, Bataan, and Lt. Luis Sacramento of the
Constabulary and the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of defendants Napolis, Satimbre
and Malana, respectively, admitting their participation in the commission of the crime
charged.
Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor testified mainly on the robbery involved in the charge, whereas
Fiscal Kahayon narrated the circumstances under which the affidavit Exhibit A was
subscribed and sworn to before him by appellant Napolis; Police Chief Lapid and Lt.
Sacramento dwelt on the investigations conducted by them and the circumstances
under which said defendants made their aforementioned affidavits; and Clerk of Court
Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina explained how Exhibits B and
C were subscribed and sworn to before them by defendants Satimbre and Malana,
respectively.

Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi. Testifying in his own defense,
he would have Us believe that on October 1, 1956, he was in his house in Olongapo,
Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr. Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony and that of his wife Engracia
Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to be innocent of the crime charged and said that, although
reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon, upon the advice of his wife
Engracia Mendoza who sought to corroborate him and Mayor Guillermo Arcenas
of Hermosa, in order that he may not be implicated in a robbery that took place in
Balanga, Bataan, and that he could be sent back to his hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan dismissed the
case as against defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario
Satimbre, as above indicated. Said defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
however, dismissed Malana's appeal, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from
said decision of the Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court has erred
.
I. In affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of the crime
charged based upon a lurking error of identity.
II. In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an extra-judicial
confession extracted through duress.
III. In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon the evidence on
record adduced during the trial.
IV. In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision of law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant has not been sufficiently
identified as one of those who perpetrated the crime charged. In support of this
contention, it is argued that the identification made by Mrs. Peaflor was due to a
picture of appellant taken by Lt. Sacramento from the files of the police in Olongapo,
Zambales, and then shown to her, before he (appellant) was apprehended and then
brought to her presence for identification. It is thus implied that Mrs. Peaflor identified
him in consequence of the suggestion resulting from the picture she had seen before he
was taken to her for said purpose. The defense further alleges that she could not have
recognized appellant herein, in the evening of the occurrence, because the same was
dark, and the flashlight used by the malefactors was then focused downward.
Appellant's pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The record shows that the
authorities were notified immediately after the occurrence; that, soon after, peace

officers Police Chief Lapid and PC Lt. Sacramento repaired to the house of Mr.
and Mrs. Peaflor and investigated them; that based upon the description given by Mrs.
Peaflor , one individual was apprehended and then presented to Mrs. Peaflor , who
said that he was not one of the thieves; that another person subsequently arrested and
taken to Mrs. Peaflor was, similarly, exonerated by her; that in the course of the
investigation conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt. Sacramento later brought
Mrs. Peaflor to the offices of the police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures
of police characters on file therein; that among those pictures, she noticed that of
appellant herein, who, she believed, was one of the culprits; and that appellant was,
therefore, arrested and brought to Mrs. Peaflor , who positively identified him as one of
the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs. Peaflor , through the
aforementioned picture of appellant, that he was one of the thieves. It was she who told
Lt. Sacramento that said picture was that of one of the thieves. Besides, the fact that
Mrs. Peaflor readily exonerated the first two suspects, arrested by the authorities,
shows that appellant herein would not have been identified by her if she were not
reasonably certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize appellant herein because it was
he who demanded money from her and to whom she delivered P2,000 in cash and two
(2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and ransacked her wardrobe; and it
was he who tied her hands and those of her two sons. These series of acts, performed
in her presence, consumed sufficient time from 10 to 20 minutes to allow her
eyesight to be adjusted to existing conditions, and, hence, to recognize some of the
robbers. The night was dark; but, there were two flashlights switched on, namely, that of
her husband, and the one used by the thieves. Although the latter was, at times,
focused downward, it had to be aimed, sometimes, in another direction, particularly
when the money and rings were delivered to appellant herein, and when he opened and
ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peaflor . Lastly, her testimony was confirmed by other
circumstances presently to be mentioned, in connection with the consideration of the
other alleged errors pointed out by appellant herein.
The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong premise that appellant's
conviction was based upon his extra-judicial confession and that the same had been
made under duress.
Said extra-judicial confession was merely one of the factors considered by His Honor,
the trial Judge, and the Court of Appeals in concluding that the evidence for the defense
cannot be relied upon and that the witnesses for the prosecution had told the truth.
Besides, appellant's confession was not tainted with duress. In this connection, the
Court of Appeals had the following to say: .
Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peaflor 's
identification, we have the extra-judicial confession of appellant Nicanor
Napolis, marked Exh. A, subscribed and sworn to by said accused on

October 26, 1956, 25 days after the occurrence, before Provincial Fiscal
Eleno L. Kahayon, the 64-year old prosecutor who, since July 18, 1946,
was the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to the present. His testimony shows
that he read the confession, Exh. A, to said accused in the Tagalog
dialect; asked him whether he understood it to which appellant Napolis
answered "yes"; inquired whether he was coerced to which he replied
"No"; and then, required him to raise his hand in affirmation which he did
(tsn. 14-15, I). Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the confession in his
(Fiscal's) presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon further testified
that he saw no signs of physical violence on the person of the appellant
who appeared normal in his appearance (tsn. 15, I). In this confession,
Exh. A, appellant Napolis related that it was co-accused Antonio Bededia
(still-at-large) who pointed the greasegun to husband Ignacio Peaflor and
who hit him (Peaflor ) on the head and that it was co-accused Ben de la
Cruz (whose case was dismissed) who wrested Peaflor 's revolver. For
his part, appellant Napolis admitted that it was he who talked to Mrs.
Casimira L. Peaflor and it was he who got the money bag. The loot,
according to him, was split from which he received a share of P237.00
(Answer to Q. A, Exh. A). Among others, he mentioned appellant
Bonifacio Malana as the owner of the greasegun and the one who got
Peaflor 's revolver from the hands of co-accused Ben de la Cruz. ... .
It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from a decision of the Court of
Appeals, the findings of fact made in said decision are final, except .
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee. 2
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory that the evidence for the
prosecution is contradictory and, hence, unworthy of credence. Counsel for the defense
alleges that, whereas Ignacio Peaflor said that the thieves had entered his house by
forcing its door open, Mrs. Peaflor testified that their entry was effected through an
excavation by the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed that the malefactors
had removed a piece of wood and an adobe stone to get into said house. No such
contradictions, however, exist. The house of Mr. and Mrs. Peaflor consisted of two (2)
parts, one of which was a store and the other the dwelling proper, adjoining the store,
which had a door leading thereto (to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peaflor testified that the
culprits had entered the store by removing an adobe stone from a wall thereof, and this
was corroborated by the chief of police, although he added that the malefactors had,

also, removed a piece of wood from said wall. Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mr.
Peaflor referred to a door, inside the store, leading to the dwelling proper, as
distinguished from the store.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the findings of fact made by the Court
of Appeals are supported by those of His Honor, the trial Judge, who had observed the
behaviour of the witnesses during the trial, it is clear to Us that the first three (3)
assignments of error are untenable.
The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime committed and
the proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of
robbery committed by armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been
made by breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and,
accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in
accordance with said legal provision.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used violence
against Ignacio Peaflor , and intimidation against his wife, thereby infringing Article 294
of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said article,
which prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299,
although, factually, the crime committed is more serious than that covered by the latter
provision. This Court had previously ruled .
... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is
characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling
qualification," so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of
the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is
characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently
graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because
where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is
greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the
individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.)
And this view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty
to be applied under article 294 is lighter than that which would result from
the application of article 299. ... . 3
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view.
Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house
and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon
persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal. 4 Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous decision, 5 if, aside
from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing any

of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art.
294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof -- shall
be much lighter. 6 To our mind, this result and the process of reasoning that has brought
it about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies
the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with
the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is
evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but,precisely,
for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above
cited reduction of the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of
violence or intimidation which made it amore serious one. It is, to our mind, more
plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the
conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements
of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition
-- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its
maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period -- from nineteen (19)
years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. In short, the
doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos 7 and applied in U.S. v. Manansala, 8 U.S. v.
Turla, 9 People v. Baluyot, 10 Manahan v. People, 11 and People v. Sebastian, 12 is
hereby abandoned and appellant herein should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor to nineteen (19)
years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal.
Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed
in all other respects, with costs against herein appellant, Nicanor Napolis. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-32202-04 July 25, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ONTING BIRUAR, EUGENE RUSLIN, ABRAHAM LIM alias Titing Lim, ANGEL DY
alias Baba Isa, CEFERINO CATURAN alias Fred, EDGARDO SEERES alias
Broke, ROMUALDO RABOY alias Romy, and SATURNINO GALLIANO, defendants,
ABRAHAM LIM alias Titing Lim, CEFERINO CATURAN alias Fred, ROMUALDO
RABOY alias Romy, and SATURNINO GALLIANO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for defendants-appellants.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

REVIEW of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao finding the accused
Abraham Lim, alias Titing Lim, Angel Dy, alias Baba Isa, Ceferino Caturan, alias Fred,
Edgardo Seeres alias Broke, Romualdo Raboy, aliasRomy, and Saturnino Galliano
guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and
Physical Injuries, and sentencing each of them, in (1) Crim. Case No. 9987, for Robbery
in Band, to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR
(4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to
indemnify, jointly and severally, Gorgonio Mosende in the amount of P720.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs; (2) Crim. Case No.
9988, for Arson, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
of the law, to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased George Kalitas the
amount of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs; (3) Crim. Case No. 9989, for Robbery with Homicide and Physical
Injuries, to suffer the death penalty, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the deceased George Kalitas in the amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The inculpatory facts are as follows: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of July 2,
1966, while Gorgonio Mosende and his wife, Fausta, were preparing to go to sleep in
their house in Sitio Suapit, Barrio Limot, Mati, Davao, several persons arrived and
called: "Good evening, tiyo. " Thinking that they were relatives of his wife, Mosende
invited the callers to come up. Two men, armed with .45 cal. pistols, later ientified as the
accused Romualdo Raboy and Edgardo Seeres came up and demanded: "hain na ang
iyong armas "where is your firearm? Mosende denied having a firearm, but his wife was
so frightened that she told the armed menn: "Do not kill my husband, if you want the
arm, the shotgun is here," and raised the mosquito net covering their sleeping mat and
pointed to the shotgun. The accused Edgardo Seeres took the gun and asked the

couple for money. Fausta, in fear, opened their aparador which the accused Edgardo
Seeres then ransacked, taking therefrom P170.00 in coins and paper bills. The two
accused then left, taking with them the shotgun of Mosende valued at P550.00. Not long
thereafter, Mosende heard gunshots coming from the direction of the house of George
Kalitas, about 25 meters away. Mosende and his wife went down their house and
sought cover behind a coconut tree. A few minutes later, Mosende saw a blaze start
from the house of George Kalitas which spread rapidly until the entire house was
engulfed in flames and completely burned down. 1
All the inmates of the house of George Kalitas were fast asleep when the firing started
and were awakened by the gunfire. George Kalitas, a 70-year old paraplegic, was
sleeping inside their bedroom with his wife, Sylvia Mingming, his grandchildren Jessie
Renopal and "Bebot", and their maid's son, Fortunato "Ato" Malapong. 2Narciso Bauyot,
a nephew of George Kalitas, slept in the dining room, while the maid Babbadon Odal
slept in the kitchen. 3
Upon hearing the fusillade, Babbadon Odal rushed to the master's bedroom to get her
son, "Ato." But, as she was about to raise the mosquito net covering her son, she was
hit by a bullet on the left wrist and immediately lost consciousness, regaining the same
only at the Mati Baptist Hospital, where she was brought for treatment of her injury. 4
Jessie Renopal, the 11-year old granddaughter of George Kalitas, was also grazed by a
bullet in the head when she stood up upon hearing the volley. 5 She felt pain, but she
did not lose consciousness, thus enabling her to see five robbers enter the house while
two others remained by the door. 6
Narciso Bauyot who was sleeping in the dining room, ran to the kitchen upon hearing
the gunfire and hid in anaparador. But, when the toilet of the main house of George
Kalitas was set on fire, he left his hiding place and went out of the house, passing
through a small window in the kitchen. He landed safely on the ground only to fall into
the hands of the accused Romualdo Raboy who pointed a gun at his abdomen telling
him: "you surrender, if you will not surrender, I will kill you." The accused Edgardo
Seeres also told Narciso to surrender and raise his hands, which Narciso did. Seeres
then continued firing at the house of George Kalitas. Another armed man, later
Identified as the accused Saturnino Galliano, also approached Narciso and threatened
to pour a can of kerosene on him. But, Narciso pleaded: "Don't pour it on me because I
might be burned," and was spared. The accused Saturnino Galliano, instead, poured
the can of kerosene on the walls of the kitchen of the house and ignited it with some
dried fronds. 7
The robbers then started to break open the main door of the house with an axe. 8 After
the robbers had broken the door and gained access to the sala, George Kalitas fired at
them with his "Stevens" 12-gauge shotgun, 9 hitting one of them.10 George Kalitas had
crawled with his wife and grandchildren after Jessie Renopal and Babbadon Odal were
hit by bullets. 11 The armed men fired back, hitting George Kalitas, who dropped his
shotgun. His grandson, Bebot, picked up the shotgun, but, when the robbers shouted:

"surrender, surrender, throw that gun to us; throw the gun below, by the stairs," he
panicked and threw the shotgun to them. 12
Immediately, thereafter, four (4) armed men, later Identified as the accused Angel Dy,
Romualdo Raboy, Saturnino Galliano, and Abraham Lim rushed them. Angel Dy held
Mrs. Kalitas by the neck and kicked the wounded George Kalitas, while the others went
inside the bedroom of George Kalitas and forcibly opened a trunk placed under the bed
which contained the amount of P40,000.00, in cash, at the last counting two months
before the incident. They also took some old coins which Mrs. Kalitas had kept in a
container inside the trunk. Saturnino Galliano and Angel Dy also got the money of
Jessie Renopal. 13
After getting the money, the robbers left. 14 The inmates of the house also went out
because of the fire and brought the wounded to the hospital. But, George Kalitas died
before they could reach the hospital in Mati. 15
Meanwhile, the fire continued to spread until the main house of George Kalitas and his
bodega, including their contents, and a truck parked in between the buildings, all valued
at P34,545.00. were completely destroyed. 16
The crime was reported to the police authorities immediately thereafter and Sgt. Jose
Biones of the 433rd PC Company stationed at Mati, Davao, conducted an investigation.
He learned that a light green Buick Electra 225 Sedan, 1964 model, with Plate No. H6357-Manila-'65, had refueled at a Caltex gasoline station in the poblacion of Mati and
then proceeded towards Barrio Limot at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 2,
1966, and was seen again parked at some distance from the house of George Kalitas.
PC Sgt. Blones also went to the still smouldering house of George Kalitas and
recovered twenty-nine (29) spent cartridges of various calibers and a mutilatedqqq slug,
which he turned over to the PC Company investigator. An alarm was, likewise, flashed
to intercept the Buick car and apprehend its occupants. 17
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1966, Pat. Bonifacio Dao of the Davao
City Police Department, received a telephone call from the Sasa Police Precinct that the
wanted car was spotted going towards Davao City. Pat. Dao and two (2) companions
boarded a jeep to intercept the car, and at Bajada, near the EMCOR, they saw the car
stop and a man with a sack alighted therefrom. They gave chase, but the car sped
away. They then tried to run after the man with the sack, but the man threw the sack
away and disappeared in the tall cogon grasses. They recovered the abandoned sack
and found it to contain a pistolized carbine, a .45 cal. pistol, with several rounds of
ammunition, a barong tagalog, four (4) flashlights, and a pair of gloves. The next day,
July 4, 1966, a police team saw the wanted car parked in the corner of Monteverde and
Guerrero Streets, in front of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor, in Davao City. They found
the accused Angel Dy inside the car who, when asked who the owner of the car was,
pointed to Onting Biruar at the Kingston Hotel. The policemen went to the hotel and
found Onting Biruar together with Romualdo Raboy and Edgardo Seeres whom they
brought to the police headquarters for investigation. Upon questioning, Angel Dy

informed the police investigators that the car was driven by Abraham Lim on the night of
July 2, 1966, and led a police posse to Barrios Obrero and Piapi, both in Davao City, in
an effort to catch the said Abraham Lim. But, they failed to find him. Instead, they found
the accused Ceferino Caturan in Barrio Piapi, who was nursing a bullet wound on his
left upper leg. From Piapi, Angel Dy brought the police team to a house in Toril, Davao
City, where they finally found Abraham Lim in the company of Eugene Ruslin. The
policemen found a .45 cal. pistol, with seven rounds of ammunition under the pillow
used by Abraham Lim. 18
Later, the police team arrested the accused Saturnino Galliano who was implicated in
the crime. 19
The Buick sedan was turned over to the PC detachment and PC Sgt. Diomedes Cagas,
upon inspection of the said car, recovered a .45 cal. pistol, with seven rounds of
ammunition, hidden under the floor mat, near the gas pedal of the said car. 20
As a consequence, Onting Biruar, Abraham Lim alias Titing Lim, Angel Dy alias Fred,
Edgardo Seeres aliasBroke, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, Eugene Ruslin, and
Saturnino Galliano were charged with Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with
Homicide and Physical Injuries before the Court of First Instance of Davao, in three (3)
separate informations docketed therein as Crim. Case Nos. 9987, 9988, and 9989,
respectively.
All the accused denied the commission of the crimes charged and, except for the
accused Abraham Lim, interposed the defense of alibi. The trial court summarized the
evidence of the defendants, which they claim to be substantially correct, as follows:
1. TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED ONTING BIRUAR
Defendant Onting Biruar testified that on June 28, 1966 he came to Davao
City to renew the coastwise license of motor boat; that he rode on his
Buick (Electra) car; that he registered in a room at Kingston Hotel, Davao
City and did not go out until the following day; that on June 29, and 30,
1966, he went to the Customs office to renew his license, but he failed to
obtain his purpose; that on July 1, 1966 Abraham Lim came to his hotel to
borrow his car for the purpose of bringing his wife to a hospital to deliver;
that he consented and gave his car; that as the car was not returned he
became apprehensive and he began looking for it; that on the same day,
he met Romualdo Raboy y aliasRomy and Edgardo Seeres alias Broke
and one Sammy, driver of the Provincial Governor of Cotabato and asked
them to help him find his car to which they acceded; that from that day
they began the search and continued until the next day but in vain; that on
July 3, he (Onting Biruar) was apprehended by the D.C.P.D. Commando
Unit in his hotel on a charge that his car was used in the commission of
the crimes charged herein at Limot, Mati. Later, he corrected a mistake
that it was on July 4 when he was arrested and not July 3. It was

explained to him that his involvement with other accused lies solely in his
being the owner of the car subject of the present inquiry; that he admitted
that he was taken at the P.C. barracks where he was investigated by Sgt.
Abalayan.
2. TESTIMONY OF BERNARDINO SAMSON:
Bernardino Samson, driver of the Provincial Governor of Cotabato
corroborated the statement of Onting Biruar referring to his having joined
the party to search for Onting's car.
3. TESTIMONY OF ABRAHAM LIM:
Accused Abraham Lim testified that he came from Cotabato City and
arrived at Davao City in the afternoon of June 29, 1966 in response to a
telegram that he received from accused, Angel Dy alias Baba Isa; that he
took a Minrapo bus and he met his wife in the house of his uncle, Candido
Ramos at Piapi, Davao City; that he brought her to San Pedro Hospital on
the following day (June 30) where she delivered; that on July 1st morning
at about 7:00 he was able to borrow the car of defendant, Onting Biruar
after assuring the latter that he would use it only for service of his wife who
delivered in the hospital; that from that time the car was under his
exclusive control until July 2, 1966. On July 4, 1966 he was arrested by
the Davao City Commando Unit at Toril, Davao City together with Eugene
Ruslin, one of the accused herein.
Abraham Lim admitted that he used the said car in going to Limot, Mati,
Davao Oriental without the knowledge and permission of the owner; that
on July 2, 1966, he left Davao City in company with Ceferino Caturan,
Cesar Go and another unidentified man and arrived at Mati at about ten
o'clock at night; that he proceeded to the house of George Kalitas with his
men, but as no one was familiar with the road and the place, he needed a
guide; that he passed at the house of Saturnino Galliano which was about
5 kilometers from the house of Kalitas and invited him to be his guide; that
the latter accepted although that was the first time that Lim met him in
Betty's store; that the purpose of accused Abraham Lim in going to Kalitas
house is to collect accounts, an alleged indebtedness of George Kalitas in
the amount of P15,000.00 which was advanced by him for the purchase of
coprax; that on demand, Kalitas refused to pay; that Lim pressed him
more and asked him to pay in kind particularly pointing to the coprax store
in Kalitas bodega; that this must have irked Kalitas and he commanded
his nephew, Narciso Bauyot to get his carbine from his bed, but he was
calmed down and promised to pay him on the first week of July; that as he
insisted on his demand, Kalitas drew his pistol which was timely grabbed
by him and at the same time he drew his own 22 caliber magnum pistol
and pointed at the back of Kalitas head and dragged him towards the main

door; that upon reaching the stairs they were fired upon by some people
whom Lim suspected to be the neighbors of Kalitas; that the old man was
hit in the upper part of his body and he (Lim) saw blood streaming down
from his wound; that although wounded and under his (Lim) control,
Kalitas shouted at his men to surrender which was heeded; that Aguedo,
Mosende and four other neighbors came and surrendered their firearm to
Lim which consists of one carbine and 5 pistols and were ientified by Lim.
Aguedo surrendered his 45 cal. pistol, Mosende his 45 cal. pistol;
confiscated from George Kalitas, is a nickel plated pistol marked Exh. "B",
one carbine from Narciso Bauyot and another 45 caliber pistol (Exh. "C")
from Mosende, one barong-tagalog, Exh. "BB" which is his own (Lim)
dress; that after the surrender of these firearm they went back to Davao
City; that he saw Saturnino Galliano grab the carbine from Narciso Bauyot
which he fired at the latter in order to scare the men of Kalitas, but his
intention was only to shoot Narciso's shirt; that Galliano was with him and
Kalitas when they were seeking shelter in the pile of lumber near the
kitchen of Kalitas' house while there was shooting directed at them,
Accused Lim also admitted that he was investigated by the Davao City
Police Commando and subsequently by the P.C. (Exhs. "O", "O-1" to "O4"); that he signed both affidavits taken by these investigators only under
compulsion of force and duress; that he was kicked by his probers on his
knees and pellets were inserted between his fingers and pressed so
strong that it caused him pain, in order to make him confess.
Lim also admitted that he was convicted by final judgment rendered by the
City Court of Davao City for illegal possession of firearm filed against him
in Crim. Case No. 2490-C; that he was arrested at Toril, Davao City on
July 4, 1966; that he explained that his appearance there was due to his
purpose to see his friend, Joselito Ambrosio from whom he would borrow
money to defray the hospital expenses of his wife, but he failed; that
before the incident in question, he (Lim) was engaged in the business of
buying and selling coprax corn, rice and other agricultural products
covering the coastal towns of Cotabato and the eastern old province of
Davao; that he did not have license in his name, but he borrowed the
license of his cousin, Felipe Uy; that pursuance to the operation of his
business he came to know the deceased, George Kalitas since 1965; that
they have a deal-Kalitas would be his agent to buy coprax and grains in
his neighborhood; that on August 1965 he happened to meet Kalitas in a
bus while on his way to Mati, that being an old man he could trust him;
that he advanced to him P15,000.00 as capital for their business; that this
money was given to Kalitas in his house at Limot in the presence of
Saturnino Galliano and Kalitas' family; that Kalitas signed a receipt for said
amount but he lost it during that scuffle incident in Kalitas' house including
a notebook containing an entry of their business transaction; that Kalitas

delivered to him a truckload of coprax worth P5,000.00; that he does not

know how much additional cash advances he gave Kalitas; that he was
investigated by the municipal judge of Mati on July 12, 1966; that during
the investigation he did not tell the truth that he was kicked and maltreated
by the Davao City Police and by the P.C. agents for fear of revenge.
4. TESTIMONY OF ANGEL DY:
Accused Angel Dy testified that he left Dadiangas, Cotabato on June 29,
1966 at about 7:00 AM together with the wife of accused Abraham Lim
and a maid; that upon arrival in Davao City in the afternoon they
proceeded to Piapi in the house of an uncle of Abraham Lim; that he met
the latter in the CBC terminal on June 30, 1966 at about five o'clock in the
afternoon; that on July 1, 1966 they went out to see accused Onting
Biruar, to borrow his car for the purpose of bringing Lim's wife to the
hospital; that Lim's wife was brought to the hospital only on July 2 in the
afternoon on Onting's car escorted by him and Abraham Lim and a
housemaid and Caturan (t.s.n., 674-675 Barlaan); that on July 1 they
spotted the car of Onting parked in a gasoline station; that accused
Abraham Lim borrowed it and had full control thereof from that day; that
from that time he was taking care of the car, that while he was watching it
in the premises of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Parlor the Davao City Police
Commando came and seized the car, telling him (Dy) it was used in
committing the crime of robbery and homicide in Mati, that he told them he
did not go to Mati, however, he was brought to Agdao where he was
maltreated, then he was transferred in the office of the Police Detective
Division boxed and manhandled by the police; that on July 4, 1966 he
guided the police to locate the accused, Abraham Lim at Toril, Davao City;
that Abraham was found there and was arrested together with Eugene
Ruslin; that they were brought to the P.C. barracks and were jailed there;
that he did not sign any state judgment; that he admitted he is also known
as Baba Isa and he is the uncle of Abraham Lim; that he rode in Onting's
car together with Abraham and hi4 wife on July 1, 1966 in going to Talomo
and back to Piapi.
On cross examination this witness (Dy) incurred in self-contradiction. He
declared that he went to meet accused Abraham Lim in the CBC terminal
after lunch on June 29, 1966 and testifying further he said that he arrived
in Davao City from Cotabato at about 4:00 same day; that on July 1 at
8:00 A.M. Lim brought his wife to a clinic at San Pedro Street riding in
Onting's car; that he slept in the hospital until July 4, 1966; that on that day
from the hospital he brought the car to the premises of the Cosmopolitan
Funeral Parlor where it was taken by the police.
5. TESTIMONY OF ROMUALDO RABOY:

Accused Raboy alias Romy testified that on June 22, 1966 he came for
the first time from Cotabato City to take vacation in Davao City; that he
was accompanied by his cousin, Nelly Agravante; that he lodged in her
house at Talomo, Davao City, from June 22 to July 2, 1966; that he stayed
in said house without going to any other place outside Davao City; that on
July 2, 1966 he took permission from his cousin to go to CBC terminal to
make arrangement for him to take the last trip to Cotabato; that on his way
at Acacia at about 7:30 A.M. he saw accused, Onting Biruar in Kingston
Hotel, Onting whistled and called him and asked him to help him find his
car to which he agreed; that he desisted from continuing his plan to go to
Cotabato; that they searched the car during the whole day of July 2, but in
vain; that he slept with Onting Biruar in Kingston Hotel; that on the
following day (July 3) they failed again to see the car; that on July 4, 1966
they were arrested in Kingston Hotel by the D.C.P.D. Commando, he,
Onting Biruar and Edgardo Seeres that he was brought to the office of
the Police Detective Division; that he denied that he was in the house of
the latter George Kalitas on July 2 and 3, 1966; that he does not know, nor
met Silvia Kalitas; neither Narciso Bauyot, nor Gorgonio Mosende.
On cross examination he declared that his nickname is Romy, that he did
not know Abraham Lim, Ceferino Caturan, Angel Dy and Eugene Ruslin;
that he first met accused Onting Biruar for the first time at P.C. barracks at
Davao City before he was brought to Mati by the P.C. that he did not
register his name in Kingston Hotel; that he was arrested in said hotel
together with Onting Biruar and Edgar do Seeres that from the Detective
Division he was transferred to the PC barracks; that he was not
investigated there; that the car finally arrived at 5:30 on July 3 according to
what Onting Biruar informed him.
6. TESTIMONY OF NELLY AGRAVANTE:
Nelly Agravante, cousin of accused Romualdo Raboy has corqqq
roboratedqqq the statement of the latter covering that portion, from the
time he arrived in Davao City on June 22, 1966 until he took permission
from her to go back to Cotabato on July 2, 1966.
7. TESTIMONY OF SATURNINO GALLIANO:
Saturnino Galliano testified that he is 37 years old; that he is a resident of
Waywayan, Mati, Davao Oriental; that since 1960 he cultivated a farm
about four hectares with two cousins; that he was arrested on July 5,
1966, in the same place by the Mati Police; that he does not know the
defendants Onting Biruar, Edgardo Seeres, Romualdo Raboy, Ceferino
Caturan, Eugene Ruslin and Abraham Lim; that he met them only on July
12, 1966 at Mati when they were investigated; that he denied having
robbed, the houses of Gorgonio Mosende and the late George Kalitas on

July 2 late at night and in early morning of July 3, 1966; that he denied
having poured petroleum and set on fire the house of the latter; that he
just met for the first time Silvia Kalitas, Narciso Bauyot, Mosende and
others on July 12, 1966 in the Municipal Court of Mati; that it is not true
that he participated in the commission of robbery, killing and arson as
charged in the information; that he resembled the accused Ceferino
Caturan.
8. TESTIMON OF CEFERINO CATURAN:
Ceferino Caturan declared that on the second week of June he was
brought to Davao City by his employer, co-accused Abraham Lim to assist
the latter's wife to deliver in the hospital- that they came in Davao City in a
PU car together with the wife of Abraham Lim, a maid and himself; that
upon arrival they proceeded to the house of his uncle at Piapi, Davao City;
that for about six months he was employed as a checker of Lim in his
motor launch; that before the incident in question his master, Abraham
Lim was engaged in the business of buying and selling coprax corn and
rice; that Lim returned to Cotabato and came back on June 29, 1966 and
rejoined his wife at Piapi; that on June 30, he brought Lim's wife to the
hospital: that they rode on a hired taxi because he was not able to borrow
Onting Biruar's car; that Lim's wife delivered on June 30, 1966 at night;
that on the following morning he, Abraham Lim and Angel Dy took their
breakfast in a restaurant; that on the afternoon of July 2, 1966 at about
one o'clock he was brought by Abraham Lim to Mati; that they have
started from a restaurant with three (3) companions; that along the way
they picked up six other persons at Bajada; that he cannot see any of
them in the Courtroom; that at the start he did not know the purpose of
Lim in going to Mati, now he knows that it is to rob a certain house in Mati;
that upon reaching Mati they refueled in a gasoline station and went to eat
in a restaurant; that they met one Angelo Montero there who invited Lim to
go inside; that after eating they left with Montero guiding them until they
reached a certain place where the car could no longer proceed due to bad
road; that he received instruction to guard the car; that all the riders left
and went towards certain direction, that after some time he heard
successive shots coming from some distance; that at about two o'clock the
following morning (July 3) two of his companions returned; that one of
them is wounded; that one of them shot him hitting his thigh; that half-hour
later the bigger group with Abraham Lim arrived; that they started for Mati
and from there they proceeded to Davao City passing at Kingking bridge
where two or five of their companions got off the car; that they arrived at
Davao City on July 3, 1966 at about 3:00 p.m.; that on July 4, 1966 he
was apprehended by the Commando Police and brought to the P.C.
barracks, Davao City where his affidavit (Exh. 'HH') was taken by Sgt.
Almazar; that he did not sign it after it was typewritten but only on the
following day after his wound was operated in the Davao General

Hospital; that while he was confined in said hospital, Fiscal Angel Matondo
arrived, but before he came he has already signed it; that he was weak
and not feeling well when he signed his affidavit before it was explained to
him.
On cross examination he declared that one of those 6 men who joined
them in the car brought a sack wrapped in Manila paper; that Abraham
Lim is the one who drove the car going to Mati; that he did not talk with
him during the trip in going to and on return.
This witness (Caturan) was confronted with his answer to question 17 of
his affidavit (Exh. "HH")wherein he stated that he saw six of his
companions being armed with pistol of different calibers and one carrying
carbine and Abraham Lim carried his own 45 caliber pistol. Caturan
explained that it is true that he saw his companions carry firearms, but it
was during that time when they returned to the car from the place where
they went. (t.s.n., p. 735, Barlaan)
This statement refers to that incident when the car stopped to a certain
place when it could no longer proceed due to bad road, where all the
riders except Caturan went off the car and came back later after 4 or 5
hours covering a period from July 2 at about 10:00 at night to 2 or 3
o'clock early morning of July 3, 1966.
9. TESTIMONY OF EDGARDO SERERES:
Defendant Edgardo Seeres testified that he came from Cotabato City
and arrived at Davao City on June 28, 1966 riding on a CBC bus; that he
had no companion; that his purpose in coming to Davao City is to deliver
shrimps for sale in a place near the public market at Bankerohan; that
upon arriving he proceeded to his aunt's house at Washington Street and
stayed there continuously for 5 or 6 days; that he knew accused Onting
Biruar, but not Romualdo Raboy, Eugene Ruslin, Ceferino Caturan; Angel
Dy and Saturnino Galliano; that on his way to CBC station on July 2, 1966,
Onting Biruar saw him passing his hotel and called him; that he asked him
to help in looking for his car which was borrowed by someone and was not
returned; that he agreed; that they have started the search but they could
not find it on that day; that from that time he lodged in Kingston Hotel with
Onting and Romualdo Raboy; that on July 4, 1966 in the morning he was
apprehended by the Davao City Police together with Onting Biruar and
Romualdo Raboy; that he did not know the cause of his arrest; that they
were brought to Agdao, then transferred to the office of the detective
division and finally to the P.C. barracks; that he was investigated there;
that he was maltreated by the P.C. soldiers at the time he signed his
affidavit; that he just met Ceferino Caturan; Angel Dy and Abraham Lim
there; that he met Galliano at Mati; that he was detained together with

others at the P.C. barracks at Mati on July 6, 7 and 8, 1966; that he did
not go to Limot, Mati on July 2 or July 3, 1966; that he always was in
Davao City during those days; that he denied statements of Narciso
Bauyot; that he was seen in the house of Kalitas on the night of July 2,
1966, that he denied the statement of Mosende that he was one of the two
men who robbed his house on the same day; that the first occasion he
met Romualdo Raboy was in P.C. barracks, so also Ceferino Caturan,
Angel Dy and Eugene Ruslin; that he is known as Broke; that he knows
Onting Biruar for he used to deliver crabs to him; that he does not know
Fiscal Matondo; that his affidavit taken by the P.C. (Exh. 'N') has been
extracted by force and duress.
The trial court, however, rejected the denials and excuses of the defendants and found
that an of them, except Onting Biruar, the owner of the Buick car used in the
commission of the crimes, and Eugene Ruslin, who was found sleeping with Abraham
Lim in Toril, Davao City, when the said Lim was arrested by a police team, did, in fact,
actively participate in the commission of the crimes complained of, and that their claims
that they were elsewhere when the crimes were committed are unavailing against their
positive Identification by the witnesses for the prosecution who testified in a natural and
straightforward manner and had no motive or reason to pervert or suppress the truth or
testify falsely against them.
We have examined the record of the cases with great care and found no convincing
reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that the accused were the perpetrators of
the offenses charged. The claim of Abraham Lim that he went to the house of George
Kalitas to collect what the latter allegedly owned him is improbable and not worthy of
belief. The following observations of the trial judge is more logical and consistent with
human conduct:
(3) Referring to improbabilities and inconsistencies of the defendants'
statements, Abraham Lim declared that his purpose in going to the late
Kalitas' house that night in question was to collect accounts from the
deceased. if this is true, why did he bring along no less than four armed
men with him and made demand at about midnight in the dwelling of
Kalitas? He admitted in cross examination that by chance he met Kalitas
in a bus while he was on his way for Mati in 1965; that being an old man
he could trust Kalitas and he advanced to him P15,600.00 as capital for
their business.
If he could trust the late Kalitas with such big amount, why did he make
that demand in the presence of armed men who made use of force and
terror to attain their aim?
Again he related that on demanding payment of the debts, Kalitas was
irked and he drew his pistol and aimed at Abraham Lim but the latter in
turn grabbed it and drew his own 22 caliber magnum pistol and grazed it

at the back of Kalitas head and then dragged him outside. In the ensuing
scuffle he lost the receipt of the said loan of P15,600.00 and also a
notebook containing an entry of their transaction.
This is another brand of Lim's statements which is not only improbable
and unnatural but is outright incredible. Kalitas was an old, sickly man who
was alone facing a menacing group of armed men who shot their way to
his bedroom. Would he, in his senses dare to provoke them in that
manner?
At least two inmates of the house declared that he was already shot
during the first burst of gunfire coming from outside the house and before
the defendants came up. This seem to be true because he was carried by
two of them towards the main door and Lim admitted that they dragged
him outside. How could Kalitas drew his pistol when he was severely
wounded and could not even talk.
Abraham Lim continued his story by stating that when Kalitas was brought
outside, he was shot at the upper part of his body by others whom he
suspected to be Kalitas' neighbors and yet he was able to shout at his
men calling them to surrender and in fact, Mosende, Aguedo and four
others surrendered to Abraham their respective firearms consisting of one
carbine and five pistols which he Identified in the courtroom. If his story is
true, then no other logical conclusion can be drawn therefrom except that
Abraham Lim and his men went to Kalitas' house on that night in question
to fight, plunder and subdue Kalitas and his neighbors and in fact,
according to him, they succeeded in forcing them to surrender thru Kalitas
not only their persons but also their arms, but the Court would prefer to
believe that a sham story of this nature is rather false, exaggerated and
unbelievable because if Kalitas was really shot at a vital part of his body
he could not have talked and moved, how then could he shout? Granting
arguendo that Kalitas shouted at his men to surrender, the latter following
the natural instinct of self-preservation would flee from the scene of the
crime and would not give up their arms and persons to such ruthless and
dangerous foe under that horrible circumstances of firing, killing and
burning of a house. There is no evidence that they were cornered or
trapped in such a tight situation that no other remedy could be availed of
except to surrender . . . If Lim's story is to be accepted the Court cannot
find good reasons to justify him to capture Kalitas and his neighbors if his
purpose is only to collect debts.
Besides, the attack on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution is based upon
trial matters. Thus, counsel for the accused claims that the testimony of the prosecution
witness Alfredo Matiga is not credible since the said witness even failed to recall, during
his cross-examination, the number of the house where he was living and his birthdate. It
should be noted, however, that the said witness testified to only one detail, and that is,

the fact that he saw the Buick car of Onting Biruar refueling at a gasoline station in the
poblacion of Mati on the night of July 2, 1966, which fact is admitted by the accused
Abraham Lim and Ceferino Caturan.
The testimony of Narciso Bauyot is also assailed on the ground that he signed his
sworn statement before the Municipal Judge during the preliminary investigation without
reading its contents, or without having then read and explained to his. The conviction of
the accused, however, was not based upon the sworn statement of the witness, but, on
the collective testimony of Narciso Bauyot and the other prosecution witnesses who
were subjected to a rigid cross-examination by the defense counsel during the trial of
the case. Besides, counsel failed to point out how the failure of this witness to
understand the substance of his affidavit could have cast serious doubt on the guilt of
the defendants,
The testimony of Gorgonio Mosende regarding the robbery in his house is also
impugned as improbable because the said Mosende had testified that the accused
Romualdo Raboy and Edgardo Seeres had announced their presence to Mosende
before coming to the house, which they need not have done in order to rob the couple.
While it may be true that the accused had made known their presence to Mosende and
that the latter had invited them to come up his house, Mosende did so because he
thought that the callers were relatives of his wife. It may have been unwise for Mosende
to do so, but that does not render his story improbable considering that the incident
happened in the rural areas where the people are generally more hospitable. Besides,
Mosende is a poor man and he had no reason to expect that he would be robbed. At
any rate, the accused failed to impeach the testimony of the said Gorgonio Mosende.
Defense counsel also claims that no robbery was committed in the house of George
Kalitas since there is no positive evidence presented to show the existence of the
money allegedly taken from George Kalitas as well as the act of taking the same. To
support his contention that no money was taken from George Kalitas, counsel quoted a
portion of the testimony of Silvia Mingming Kalitas, the wife of George Kalitas, which
shows that the trunk where the money was kept was burned without its being opened.
Counsel further stated that the accused were apprehended within 48 hours after the
commission of the crime and yet the money stolen or a part thereof was not traced to,
nor recovered from the accused, much less presented in court.
The contention is devoid of merit. It had been positively established that the late George
Kalitas had kept money in a trunk placed under his bed which the accused took on the
night in question. Martillana Kalitas categorically stated in court that her father, George
Kalitas, had money, amounting to P65,000.00, which he kept in a trunk placed under his
bed, because he had no trust in banks. 21 Jessie Renopal testified that the accused
broke open the said trunk with an axe on the night of July 2, 1966 and took the money
placed inside. 22 Her testimony is corroborated by Silvia Mingming Kalitas, the wife of
George Kalitas. Silvia Mingming Kalitas declared, however, that the money kept by her
husband amounted to only P40,560.00 at the last counting. 23

The testimony of Silvia Mingming Kalitas which was quoted by counsel for the accused,
does not support his contention that no money was taken from George Kalitas on the
night in question. The testimony, adverted to, reads, as follows:
COURT:
Q Now, the Court wants to know whether that trunk which
you have mentioned from which they got the P40,560.00
cash was taken before or after the house was set on fire.
Which is which?
A The fire was beginning, when it was advancing, that the
time when the robbers came up.
Q Was that trunk from which the money was taken burned?
A It was burned; nothing is left, including the clothes.
Q Before it was burned, was it already opened?
A Before it was burned, it was not yet opened. It was they
themselves who opened it. 24
It is clear therefrom that the accused opened the trunk and took the money placed
inside before it was burned.
The argument of counsel that the amount stolen, or a portion thereof, should have been
presented in evidence in order to make the transportation credible, is untenable. Where
the property stolen was not recovered, it would be impossible to present it in evidence.
Besides, there is no law nor jurisprudence which requires the presentation of the thing
stolen in order to prove that it had been taken away. It appears of record that there were
other persons who participated in the commission of the offenses, but have not been
charged. Ceferino Caturan stated that there were 9 of them inside the car when they
went to the house of George, Kalitas on the night in question, and Abraham Lim testified
that one of his companions in going to the house of George Kalitas on the said night
was one Cesar Go. 25 However, only 8 persons have been Identified and charged and
Cesar Go is not one of them. The money could be with him. Moreover, the accused
were not apprehended immediately after the commission of the crimes, but a day later,
or on July 4, 1966. The accused could have disposed of the money before their arrest.
The failure of the prosecution to present in evidence the money stolen does not give
rise to a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
It is also contended by the accused that only one offense was committed since the
robbery in the houses of Gorgonio Mosende and George Kalitas is one continuing
offense, committed at the same time and on one occasion, and arising out of one
criminal resolution, and the burning of the house of George Kalitas was the means to

commit the crime of robbery. Counsel cites the case of People vs. De Leon 26 in support
of his contention.
The contention is without merit. In the case cited by counsel the defendant entered the
yard of a house where he found two fighting cocks belonging to different persons and
took them. In this case, however, the accused, after committing the crime of robbery in
band in the house of Gorgonio Mosende, went to the neighboring house of George
Kalitas where they committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with Homicide and
Physical Injuries. Obviously, the rule enunciated in the cited case cannot be made
applicable since the herein accused performed different acts with distinct purposes
which resulted in juridically independent crimes. The Court also rejected the applicability
of the cited case of People vs. De Leon in the case of People vs. Enguerro, 27 and found
the accused therein guilty of three (3) separate crimes of Robbery in Band, where the
said accused, after committing a robbery in band in a store, went to another house
where they committed a second robbery, and after committing it proceeded to another
house where they committed a third robbery, and in the same barrio during the period
from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of the same day.
The burning of the house of George Kalitas was not the means in committing the
robbery. The evidence shows that the accused gained entry into the house of George
Kalitas by breaking down the door with an axe and not by burning the same. 28
Finally, the accused Abraham Lim pleads that he had been denied the right to be
present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings against
him, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment. He claims that
the trial court proceeded with the trial of the cases despite his absence therefrom
although he was charged with a capital offense.
The contention is devoid of merit. The provisions of the Rules of Court 29 Securing to an
accused person the right to be present in all criminal prosecutions against him must be
understood as securing to him merely the right to be present during every stage of his
own trial and not at the trial of another. Since the accused Abraham Lim was present
during his arraignment and jumped bail after giving his testimony in court and was
absent only when his co-accused were presenting their evidence, none of which are
prejudicial to the interest of the accused Abraham Lim his attorney was present during
this time, and also present when the sentence was read to him, there was no
infringement of the said defendant's right to be present at every stage of the
proceedings against him.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the defendants Abraham Lim alias Titing
Lim, Ceferino Caturanalias Fred, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, and Saturnino Galliano
guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and
Physical Injuries.
The trial court found that the commission of the offenses charged was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, use of motor vehicle, use of

unlicensed firearm, and with the aid of armed men to ensure or afford impunity. The use
of unlicensed firearm, however, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
in Crim. Case Nos. 9988 (Arson) and 9989 (Robbery with Homicide and Physical
Injuries) since the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm is
solely applicable to robbery in band under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code. 30
This, notwithstanding, the death penalty imposed upon the accused Abraham
Lim alias Titing Lim, Ceferino Caturan alias Fred, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, and
Saturnino Galliano in Crim. Case No. 9989, for Robbery with Homicide and Physical
Injuries, is within the range of the penalty provided for by law. However, for lack of the
necessary affirmatory votes, the penalty imposed upon them by the trial court is hereby
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
We also find that the trial court had inadvertently ordered the defendants to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased George Kalitas the amount of
P20,000.00 for the money stolen from him and not recovered in Crime Case No. 9988,
and the amount of P12,000.00 for the death of the said deceased in Crim. Case No.
9989. Crim. Case No. 9988, however, is a prosecution for Arson, for the illegal burning
of the property of George Kalitas valued at P34,545.00, while Crim. Case No. 9989 is
one for Robbery with Homicide and Physical injuries where the evidenced showed that
the amount of P40,000.00 was taken from the house of George Kalitas. The Solicitor
General recommends that the defendants be ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late
George Kalitas the amount of P34,545.00 in Crim. Case No. 9988, and the amounts of
P12,000.00, for the death of the said deceased and P40,000.00, for the money stolen
from him.
We further note that the penalty imposed upon the defendants in Crim. Case No. 9987
is less than what the law prescribes for the offense committed. In said case, the
defendants were found guilty of Robbery in Band, attended, among others, by the
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. However, Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that
if the robbery mentioned in pars. 3, 4 and 5 is committed by a band, the offenders shall
be punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties, and Article 296 of same
Code, as amended, also states that when any of the arms used in the commission of
the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon the malefactors
shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided for by law. Hence, the
penalty to be imposed upon the defendants should be the maximum of the maximum
period of the penalty, even without the concurrence of any other aggravating
circumstance, 31 or an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the modification that the defendants Abraham Lim alias Titing Lim, Ceferino
Caturan alias Fred, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, and Saturnine Galliano are

sentenced: (1) to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum in Crim. Case No. 9987; (2) to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
Crim. Case No. 9989; and (3) to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased George Kalitas the amount of P34,545.00 in Crim. Case No. 9988, and the
amount of P40,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 9989, for the money stolen from the said
deceased. The indemnity for the death of George Kalitas is hereby increased to
P30,000.00. 32 With costs against the accused Abraham Lain alias Titing Lim, Ceferino
Caturan alias Fred, Romualdo Raboy alias Romy, and Saturnino Galliano in this
instance.
Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez,
Jr. De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs in th result.
Teehankee, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

Appellant Lim was tried properly because his absence at the trial was unjustified (Sec.
19, Art. II, Constitution). The minimum of the penalty in Case No. 9987 should be taken
from prision mayor minimum.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
Appellant Lim was tried properly because his absence at the trial was unjustified (Sec.
19, Art. II, Constitution). The minimum of the penalty in Case No. 9987 should be taken
from prision mayor minimum.
Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32794 July 15, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUANITO CALIXTRO y BERNARDO, APOLINARIO MARTINEZ y SEBOLLEO
PETRONILO MERCADO y SANTOS, ALBERTO KATIGBAK y DIMAANO and JUAN
MERCADO y LORSANO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Conrado D. Manzano for defendant-appellant Juanita Calixtro y Bernardo.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a case of robbery in band with homicide. Strangely enough the two persons who
were killed were not robbery victims, innocent bystanders or mere strangers; they were
members of the band. The amount stolen was the paltry sum of P150.00.
In Criminal Case No. CCC-VIII-29(70)-Batangas, of the defunct Circuit Criminal Court,
of the Eighth Judicial District, accused JUANITO CALIXTRO y BERNARDO,
APOLINARIO MARTINEZ y SEBOLLEO, JUAN MERCADO y LORSANO, ALBERTO
KATIGBAK y DIMAANO and PETRONILO MERCADO y SANTOS were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the following charge:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1970, in the afternoon in the
Municipality of San Luis, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together
with their other companions namely, Pio Cuevas and Alberto Obrador who
had since died because of the resistance put up initially by one Julian
Agojo, a security guard of the Rural Bank of San Luis, Batangas, all armed
with assorted unlicensed firearms, conspiring and confederating together,
acting in common accord and mutually aiding one another, with intent of
gain and against the consent of the owner thereof, by means of violence
against and intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, at gunpoint, take, rob and carry away cash money in the
total amount of P150.00 belonging to the said rural bank, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the aforementioned amount of P150.00;
that on the same occasion and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the said

accused, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit with
the said firearms the said Pio Cuevas and Julian Agojo, thereby inflicting
upon the former several gunshot wounds causing hemorrhage which
directly caused his death and upon the latter injuries in the different parts
of his body, requiring medical attendance and preventing him from
performing his customary work for a period of more than nine (9) days, but
less than thirty (30) days.
That the aggravating circumstance of the use of a motor vehicle in the
commission of the crime was further present.
After trial the court a quo rendered the following judgment:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, the court finds
defendants Juanito Calixtro y Bernardo, Apolinario Martinez y Sebolleo,
Petronilo Mercado y Santos, Alberto Katigbak y Dimaano and Juan
Mercado y Lorsano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as Principals in the
crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide, aggravated by the
circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, craft, disguise, and use of
unlicensed firearms. In the absence of any other modifying circumstances,
the court sentences each of the said defendants to Death, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of deceased victim Pio Cuevas in the sum of
P12,000.00, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased victim
Alberto Obrador in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The case is now before Us on automatic review because of the imposition of the death
penalty.
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 16, 1970, a jeep with
seven men on board stopped in front of the Rural Bank of San Luis,
located at San Luis, Batangas. Six men alighted therefrom while one man
was left behind the steering wheel of the parked jeep (pp. 91-92, T.s.n.,
April 30, 1970; pp. 8, 16, T.s.n., April 14, 1970). Of the six who alighted,
three proceeded to the bank and the rest took positions in front of the
bank (pp. 93-94, T.s.n. April 23, 1970; pp. 15-16, T.S.n., April 14, 1970).
The men who stood in front of the bank were Alberto Katigbak, Petronilo
Mercado and Apolinario Martinez (pp. 102-103, T.s.n., April 14,1970).
Of the three men who proceeded to the bank, the first to enter the bank
was Pio Cuevas, then Chief of Police of San Antonio, Quezon. He wore a
PC uniform and was armed with a carbine (pp. 6, 12, 14, T.s.n., April 23,
1970). He was followed by Juanito Calixtro and Juan Mercado who were
both in civilian attire and were armed with short firearms (pp. 6, 12, 14-15,

T.s.n., April 14, 1970; pp. 88-89, T.s.n., April 20, 1970; pp. 104-105,
T.s.n., April 23, 1970). As Cuevas entered, he told the security guard of
the bank, Julian Agojo, that the Lieutenant, at the same time pointing to
Calixtro, was going to apply for a loan. Agojo then instructed them to
proceed to the manager of the bank. Calixtro proceeded directly to the
cashier's table. Cuevas, however, instead of following Calixtro,
immediately grabbed the service carbine of Agojo which rested on the wan
near the door and poked the same at the latter shouting in a loud voice in
the vernacular, 'dapa kayo, holdup ito, mamamatay kayo.' (pp. 9-11,
T.s.n., April 4, 1970; pp. 89, 91-92, T.s.n., April 20, 1970; pp. 96-98,
T.s.n., April 23, 1970; p. 11, T.s.n., April 24, 1970). At this juncture,
Dionisio Aquino, bank manager who saw what had transpired, ran inside
the bank vault to hide (pp. 86-92, T. t.s.n., April 20, 1970). So did Modesta
Punzalan, bank cashier (p. 12, T.s.n., April 24, 1970). Meanwhile Juan
Mercado poked a gun at one of the clients of the bank (p. 12, T.s.n., April
14, 1970). As Agojo grappled with Cuevas for the possession of the
carbine, some shots which were not fired by Cuevas or Agojo were heard
from outside and inside the bank (pp. 11-12, T.s.n., April 14, 1970; p. 98,
T.s.n., April 20, 1970; p. 100, T.s.n., April 23, 1970; p. 13, T.s.n., April 24,
1970). At this juncture, Atty. Antonio de Sagun, bank counsel, who
witnessed what transpired ran behind the vault door to hide (p. 11, T.s.n.,
April 4, 1970). After the firing, both Aquino and De Sagun peeped from
where they were hiding and saw Calixtro take money from the cashier's
table. They also saw Cuevas and Agojo still grappling for the possession
of the carbine (p. 13, T.s.n., April 14, 1970; pp. 100-101, T.s.n., April 20,
1970). The money taken from the cashier's table amounted to P150.00 (p.
101, T.s.n., April 20, 1970; pp, 16-19, T.s.n., April 24, 1970). While Agojo
was grappling with Cuevas, the former was wounded on the chin, left
elbow, both palms and on his right breast (p. 106, T.s.n., April 23, 1970).
As Agojo continued to struggle with Cuevas for the carbine, Cuevas
shouted to his companions for help and another burst of shots were fired.
This time Alberto Katigbak, Apolinario Martinez and Petronilo Mercado
who were deployed outside the bank were seen firing towards the
direction of the bank while Jaunito Calixtro and Juan Mercado were
shooting at Agojo as he grappled with Cuevas. Cuevas, apparently hit,
jerked, loosened his hold on the carbine, enabling Agojo to wrest it from
Cuevas (pp. 101-105, T.s.n., April 23, 1970). Cuevas, at that time, was
near the door, facing the interior of the bank with his back towards the
street and was moving backwards towards the latter. Thereupon, Cuevas
ran out towards the jeep in a staggering manner, his back smeared with
blood (p. 17, T.s.n., April 14, 1970; pp. 106-107, T.s.n., April 23, 1970). As
Agojo tried to Chase Cuevas, the latter's companions namely, Katigbak,
Martinez and Petronilo Mercado fired at Agojo. The latter fell flat on the
ground and in a supine position, exchanged shots with the fleeing robbers
(pp. 19-20, T.s.n., April 14, 1970; p. 108, T.s.n., April 23, 1970; pp. 158159, T.s.n., April 14,1970). Cuevas and his companions then boarded

their jeep which sped northward (p. 20, T.s.n., April 14, 1970; p. 107,
T.s.n., April 20, 1970; p. 106, T.s.n., April 23, 1970). Thereafter, Dionisio
Aquino, Antonio de Sagun, Mario Kaibigan, Julian Agojo and Alfredo
Rojas boarded a volkswagen car and gave chase (pp. 21-22, T.s.n., April
14, 1970; pp. 110-111, T.S.n., April 20, 1970; pp. 108-109, T.s.n., April 23,
1970). The jeep which Cuevas and his companions rode was finally
sighted at Lemery, Batangas, near the BTCO station. On reaching a dead
end street, it stopped. Its occupants, alighting scampered in different
directions leaving behind, Obrador, who fell dead from the vehicle. On the
other hand, the trailing volkswagen also stopped. Agojo fired his carbine in
the air to attract attention and to call policemen to come to their aid (pp.
25-26, T.s.n., April 14, 1970; pp. 110-114, T.s.n., April 20, 1970; pp. 109110, T.s.n., April 23, 1970). Policemen from Lemery, Batangas and PC
men arrived. Cuevas and his five other companions were later,
apprehended (p. 27, T.s.n., April 14, 1970; pp. 113-114, T.s.n., April
20,1970). Juan Mercado was nabbed in a pig sty near the public market of
Lemery, Batangas. He readily admitted that he was the driver of the group
who held up a bank (p. 4, T.s.n., May 29, 1970). Petronilo Mercado and
Martinez were arrested in the house of one Manuel Mitra in Lemery,
Batangas. Petronilo Mercado, who then carried a .45 caliber pistol,
surrendered the firearm to Mitra who in turn delivered it to Mayor Mariano
Venturanza of Lemery, Batangas (pp. 4-6, T.s.n., May 27,1970; pp. 5-6,
T.s.n., June 18,1970; pp. 10-11, T.s.n., Sept. 1, 1970). Calixtro was
apprehended at the backyard of the house of Mitra (p. 4, 47, T.s.n., May
27, 1970). Katigbak was caught in the house of an auto-mechanic in the
vicinity (p. 5, T.s.n., May 27, 1970). Cuevas and Juan Mercado were
brought by Leoncio Razon, Acting Chief of Police of Lemery, Batangas, to
the Lemery Emergency Hospital for treatment (pp. 84, 91, T.s.n., April
24,1970). Martinez, Calixtro, Petronilo Mercado and Katigbak were
brought to the municipal jail and were investigated (p. 5, T.s.n., May 27,
1970).
As Cuevas was breathing irregularly and bleeding profusely from his
wound (pp. 84-89, T.s.n., April 24, 1970; pp. 11-13, T.s.n., May 12, 1970),
Chief of Police Razon, in the presence of Dr. Jose Abjelina, Chief of the
Lemery Emergency Hospital, took the antemortem statement of Cuevas
who thumbmarked it. Dr. Abjelina signed the document as a witness (pp.
85-88, T.S.n., April 24, 1970; p. 14, t.s.n., May 12, 1970). Verbatim, the
antemortem statement is as follows:
T Ano ang iyong pangalan?
S Pio Cuevas.
T Bakit ka narito sa Lemery Emergency Hospital?

S Ako po ay nabaril.
T Sino ang bumaril sa iyo?
S Mga kasama ko po.
T Sino ang pangalan nila?
S Hindi ko alam ang pangalan nila. Sila ay taga Lipa City.
T Bakit kayo magkasama-sama?
S Kami po ay nagkatagpo-tagpo sa Calamba.
T Ano ang pakiramdam mo sa tama ng baril sa iyo?
S Masama ang lasa ko.
T Ilan kayong magkakasama dito?
S Anim (6) po.
T Bakit naman kayo naparito?.,
T Sinabi po sa akin na sila ay maglooban sa banko. (Exhibit
"M", p. 93, Record)
The antemortem statement was recorded in the police blotter of Lemery, Batangas (pp.
90-91, T.s.n., April 24, 1970). After Cuevas was given first aid at the Lemery Emergency
Hospital, he was taken to the Batangas Provincial Hospital (p. 4, t.s.n., April 30. 1970).
Meanwhile, Jose de Ramon, Chief of Police of San Luis, Batangas who was notified of
the bank robbery, conducted, that same afternoon, an ocular investigation of the bank
premises. He retrieved five (5) empty carbine shells, one (1) empty .45 caliber shell one
(1) empty .38 caliber shell one (1) empty .22 caliber shell and one (1) deformed slug
(pp. 29-33, t.s.n., June 2, 1970). He also recovered a Pershing cap near the guard's
table (p. 40, T.s.n., Ibid.). He turned over these items to Lt. Edgardo Toco of the
Philippine Constabulary detachment at Majayjay, Lemery, Batangas; who was also
conducting an investigation of the same incident (pp. 35-36, T.s.n., Ibid). All the empty
bullet shells were found by De Ramon outside the bank building. No shell was found
inside the premises of the bank. The said five empty carbine shells were found 5 meters
away from the bank door (pp. 56-57, T.s.n., Ibid.). The carbine taken by Agojo from
Cuevas was given to De Ramon who in turn gave it to Lt. Toco (pp. 8-9, T.s.n., May
27,1970; p. 68, T.s.n., June 2,1970). Razon on the other hand, gave Lt. Toco the PC
uniform taken from Cuevas (p. 21, T.s.n.. May 27, 1970) and the wallet of Calixtro which
contained the latter's residence certificate, firearm license, Id card and driver's license

(pp. 24, 30, T.s.n., Ibid.). Lt. Toco did not conduct a paraffin test because he had to
attend to the investigation of the incident first and no one among the appellants
admitted having fired a gun (pp. 86-87, T.s.n., May 28, 1970). The walls and ceiling of
the bank, a glass window and desk top inside the bank, were punctured with bullet
holes (p. 6, T.s.n., May 27, 1970; p. 55, T.s.n., June 20,1970; Exhibits B1-B3, C1-C3,
D1-D2, El, F1, H, pp. 41-47, Record).
A medico-legal certificate prepared by Dr. Lauro Arreglado, Jr., of the Batangas
Provincial Hospital, who conducted an examination on Cuevas, disclosed the following
findings:
l. Wound, gunshot, thru and thru with POX 0.6 x 0.4 cms. with abrasions
superiorly just below the angle of the right scapula and slightly lateral to
the mid-scapular line penetrating right chest cavity directed anteriorly to
the left slightly downward traversing the mediastenum and left chest cavity
lacerating left dome of diaphragm with POX 1 cm. x 1-1/4 cm. at the level
of the 7th interspace along anterior ancillary line fracturing 7th rib left side
with severe hemothorax bilateral. Presence of sutured wound 2 cms. long
with 3 stitches extending medially and slightly downwards from POX.
2. Wound lacerated 1-1/2 inches L-shaped left part aurecular area.
3. Abrasions dorsum right hand.
Note: Patient died of severe hemorrhage at 7:00 a.m. February 18, 1970, in this
hospital' (pp. 4-11, T.s.n., April 24, 1970; Exhibit "D", P. 130, Record).
The death certificate showed that Cuevas died at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of
February 18, 1970, of severe hemorrhage due to gunshot wound, chest, traversing
pleural cavities (Exh. " P", p. 129, Record).
On February 16, 1970, Dr. Antonio G. Mangubat, Municipal Health Officer of San Luis,
Batangas, treated Julian Agojo. A medical certificate issued by such doctor on the same
date showed the following findings:
Found the following lesion on February 16, 1970 at 7:00 P.M.
1. Lacerated wound 1/2 inch, subcutaeneous lower jaw.
2. Abrasion, multiple left elbow.
3. Abrasion, left thumb, inner portion palm.
4. Contusion, right hand.
5. Abrasion, right chest above and below the right nipple.

Healing time 79 days barring complication' (Exhibit "Q", 150, Record)

Two wounds found on Agojo would heal in 7 to 9 days, barring complication, even
without medical treatment (p. 5, T.s.n., May 12, 1970). Wounds 1 and 3 were caused by
a blunt instrument while wounds 2, 4 and 5 were caused by friction against a rough
surface (pp. 4-5, T.s.n., Ibid.')" (Brief, pp. 5-15.)
Juanito Calixtro is represented in this appeal by his counsel de parte, Atty. Conrado D.
Manzano. Appellants Apolinario Martinez, Petronilo Mercado, Juan Mercado and
Alberto Katigbak are represented by their counsel de oficio, Atty. Dominador P. Padilla.
Appellant Calixtro makes the following assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT JUANITO CALIXTRO'S CLAIM THAT HE WENT WITH
DECEASED PIO CUEVAS ONLY TO COLLECT THE AMOUNT WHICH
THE LATTER OWED THE DREAMER'S CLUB IN CALAMBA, LAGUNA.
II. THE TRIAL-COURT ERRED IN PRACTICALLY HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JUANITO CALIXTRO CARRIED AND FIRED
INSIDE A BANK A GUN AND THE ONE WHO TOOK THE MONEY
FROM THE DRAWER OF THE BANK'S CASHIER MRS. MODESTA
PUNZALAN AND THAT THE BANK WAS ROBBED IN THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P150.00).
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DECEASED PIO
CUEVAS WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY ONE OF HIS COMPANIONS.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DECEASED PIO
CUEVAS EXECUTED A DYING DECLARATION (ANTEMORTEM
STATEMENT) EXHIBIT "M" AND IN GIVING IT MUCH WEIGHT AND
VALUE AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT- APPELLANT
JUANITO CALIXTRO RESPONSIBLE FOR ROBBERY AND FOR THE
DEATH OF PIO CUEVAS AND INJURIES SUSTAINED BY JULIAN
AGOJO AND THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS ROBBERY IN BAND
WITH HOMICIDE AND LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT JUANITO CALIXTRO FOR LACK OF SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING DEFENDANTAPPELLANT JUANITO CALIXTRO TO DEATH." (Brief, pp. 1-3.)

The other appellants assign the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
PRINCIPAL PROSECUTION WITNESSES, MORE PARTICULARLY,
ANTONIO DE SAGUN, JULIAN AGOJO, DIONISIO AQUINO, AND
MODESTA PUNZALAN.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DECEASED
PIO CUEVAS WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY JULIAN AGOJO.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PIO
CUEVAS' ALLEGED ANTE-MORTEM STATEMENT, EXH. "M".
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ALL THE ACCUSED
CRIMINALLY AND CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF ALBERTO
OBRADOR.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME
CHARGED WAS COMMITTED BY A BAND.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ACCUSED
ARE GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY IN BAND WITH HOMICIDE,
AS DEFINED AND PUNISHED UNDER PAR. 1, ART. 294, REVISED
PENAL CODE.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME
CHARGED WAS COMMITTED BY ALL THE ACCUSED IN
CONSPIRACY WITH ONE ANOTHER.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESSES.
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED,
AT LEAST ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, pp. 12.)
Each of the appellants admitted riding on the same jeep which stopped in front of the
Rural Bank of San Luis in the afternoon of February 16, 1970. However, none of them
admitted participation in a conspiracy to rob the bank.
Juanito Calixtro was 29 years old when he testified on June 19, 1970. He was the
manager of a night club. On February 15, 1970, Pio Cuevas who was known as "Chief"
tabled a hostess but could not pay his bill at morning's end of the following day. Cuevas
promised to return to settle his bill and in fact did so. But he did not bring cash. Instead
he asked Calixtro to go with him to the cattle market in Batangas. Calixtro rode in a jeep
with Cuevas but the driver was another person. On the way to Batangas, the group met

Apolinario Martinez who invited them to eat breakfast. Cuevas and the driver accepted
the invitation but Calixtro declined and remained seated in the jeep. Later, in Lipa, three
more persons boarded the jeep. They were Juan Mercado, Petronilo Mercado and
Alberto Katigbak. From Lipa the group went to the bank in San Luis. Cuevas alighted
from the jeep, put on a uniform and then told Calixtro, "let us go down manager, you
better come with me, I am going to borrow money from this place and pay you my
account, so that you can go back to Calamba." (T.S.N., June 19, 1970, p. 10.) Inside the
bank he saw Cuevas and a security guard wresting for the possession of the former's
gun. Shots rang out and the group fled. Cuevas had been shot and also Obrador, the
driver of the jeep.
Apolinario Martinez was 33 years old when he testified on June 24, 1970. He said that
he was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, but he had known Pio Cuevas for about
seven months because his brother Atty. Pedro Martinez, Jr. was the lawyer for Cuevas
in a case for murder. On February 16, 1970, he was in Calamba, Laguna, to collect P
2,200.00 from a debtor, Brigido Gonzales. He was unable to see Gonzales so he
decided to go to San Juan, Batangas, to visit his children by his previous wife. While he
was waiting for transportation Cuevas arrived in a jeep with two persons. He ate
breakfast with Cuevas who told him that he had to pay Calixtro's bill so they would first
go to Batangas to borrow money and later they would proceed to Lucena to meet Atty.
Martinez who was sickly and persuade him to withdraw as counsel for Cuevas. When
they reached Lipa, Petronilo Mercado joined the group and a little later also Juan
Mercado. In Taal still another person joined the group. He was Alberto Katigbak. The
rest of his testimony is mostly about the incident at the Rural Bank of San Luis.
Petronilo Mercado was 31 years old when he testified on June 23, and 24, 1970. He
said that at about 1:00 p.m. on February 16, 1970, he was in front of his house in Lipa
waiting for a bus bound for Lemery. His ultimate destination was San Luis to take up
something with his compadre Totoy Diokno. While waiting for a bus Obrador, the driver
of a jeep, passed by and asked, "Pete, where are you bound for?" When he said, "San
Luis" he was asked to join the group and he did. In front of the Sea Breeze in Butong,
Cuevas called Alberto Katigbak who also boarded the jeep. The jeep proceeded to San
Luis and stopped in front of the bank. (There followed the robbery.)
Juan Mercado was 35 years old when he testified on July 3, 1970. On February 16,
1970, at about 11:00 a.m. he had just alighted from a jeep in Lipa City when Pio
Cuevas, Chief of Police of San Antonio, Quezon, arrived in a jeep. He was asked to
drive the jeep because according to Cuevas he had a sleepless night. Cuevas told him
the destination was San Luis to follow-up a case involving a jeep. He acceded to
Cuevas' request. Also aboard the jeep were Alberto Obrador, Petronilo Mercado,
Apolinario Martinez and one who was addressed manager of a nightclub. When they
reached Butong [Taal] Alberto Katigbak boarded the jeep. They proceeded on their way
and upon reading a junction he was ordered to turn around. When the jeep stopped
Cuevas and Juanito Calixtro alighted. Later Calixtro came running and said that Cuevas
and a rural bank guard were quarreling. Suddenly he heard gun fire. He looked towards
the bank and saw Cuevas with his hands raised. The guard aimed a gun at Cuevas and

fired. He drove the jeep towards the bank to pick-up Cuevas and they proceeded to
Lemery.
Alberto Katigbak was 34 years old when he testified on July 24, 1970. On February 16,
1970, he was at the Sea Breeze Resort in Butong, Taal. At about 1:00 p.m. he decided
to go home and while waiting for a tricycle he was offered a lift by Pio Cuevas to go to
Taal. He boarded the jeep which went to the poblacion of San Luis. There Cuevas and
Calixtro entered the rural bank. (There follows a narration of the incident.)
It can be seen from the foregoing that all of the appellants claim ignorance of any plan
to rob the Rural Bank of San Luis, deny participation in the robbery and assert that each
of them was a mere accidental by-stander. The version of the appellants is simply too
crude to be convincing.
We have a situation where several persons bound for various places located in different
directions all happened to ride the same vehicle and then found themselves at a
common destination the Rural Bank of San Luis. To top it all, the jeep must have
been jam-packed for it carried seven men who were all adults.
From the totality of the evidence there is no doubt that each of the appellants conspired
and participated in the perpetration of the crime charged. The evidence for the
prosecution describing minutely the different steps in the commission of the crime from
the entry of Cuevas, Calixtro and Juan Mercado into the bank, the shout, the grappling
for the guard's gun, the hasty departure, the pursuit and the apprehension of the
appellants in Lemery all point to a common plan, a unity of purpose and a concerted
action.
Several details remain to be considered.
1. Did Pio Cuevas execute a dying declaration? The appellants claim that Cuevas'
declaration cannot be considered as an ante-mortem statement for a number of
reasons.
It is said that the declaration was not authenticated by the signature of Cuevas.
However, the record shows that Cuevas affixed his thumbmark thereto. In fact, an antemortem statement needs no signature or thumbmark.
It is said that the wound sustained by Cuevas was so serious as to cause him to lose
consciousness immediately and render him incapable of giving any statement. In fact,
Cuevas and his cohorts were able to flee from San Luis to Lemery where they were
apprehended. Acting Chief of Police Leoncio Razon of Lemery, Batangas, who brought
Cuevas and Juan Mercado to the Lemery Emergency Hospital and took the declaration
testified that Cuevas answered in a clear manner. This was corroborated by Dr. Jose
Abjelina of the said hospital who signed the declaration as a witness. In fact also,
Cuevas died on February 18, 1970, or two days after he was shot (Exh. P, certificate of
death.)

Dr. Lauro Arreglado, Jr. who said that in 5 or 10 minutes from the infliction of the injury
Cuevas could no longer talk intelligently and coherently was merely giving an opinion.
Dr. Arreglado was a resident physician at the Batangas Provincial Hospital where
Cuevas was transferred and later died. He was not present when Cuevas gave the
statement and his opinion cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Chief of Police
Razon and Dr. Abjelina.
It is said that the statement was not made under a consciousness of impending death.
Suffice it to say, it is not necessary for the declarant to state expressly that he expected
to die. It is sufficient if the factual circumstances point to such belief on the part of the
person making the declaration. In the case at bar, Cuevas sustained a serious injury
which turned out to be fatal; when the declaration was made he was breathing
irregularly and bleeding profusely; and he said, "Masama ang lasa ko."
Finally, it is said that Inocencia and Flora Cuevas, widow and daughter, respectively, of
Pio testified that he confided to them it was a guard who shot him. Their testimony
cannot prevail over that of disinterested witnesses. For what it may be worth, their
testimony shows that contrary to the claim of the appellants, Cuevas was able to talk
before he died on February 18,1970.
2. Who killed Cuevas? The trial court found that Cuevas was shot and killed by one of
his companions. The appellants claim that it was Julian Agojo, the bank guard, who shot
Cuevas.
The conclusion of the court a quo is supported by the evidence on record. It was
Cuevas himself in his ante-mortem statement who pointed to the appellants as the
culprits.
T. Ano ang iyong pangalan?
S. Pio Cuevas.
T. Bakit ka narito sa Lemery Emergency Hospital?
S. Ako po ay nabaril.
T. Sino ang bumaril sa iyo?
S. Mga kasama ko po.
T. Sino ang pangalan nila?
S. Hindi ko alam ang pangalan nila. Sila ay taga Lipa City.
T. Bakit kayo magkasama-sama?

S. Kami po ay nagkatagpo-tagpo sa Calamba.

T. Ano ang pakiramdam mo sa tama ng baril sa iyo?
S. Masama ang lasa ko.
T. Ilan kayong magkakasama dito?
S. Anim (6) po.
T. Bakit naman kayo naparito?
S. Sinabi po sa akin na sila ay maglooban sa banko.
It should be stated that when Cuevas said that he did not know the names of his
companions, he meant to say he did not know who of them shot him. From the
testimony of the appellants it is clear that except for Petronilo Mercado who was offered
a ride by Obrador, each of them had previously known Cuevas.
That Julian Agojo did not shoot Cuevas is shown by his testimony that Calixtro and
Juan Mercado were firing at him as he grappled with Cuevas. He also Identified
Petronilo Mercado, Katigbak and Martinez who were outside but firing in the direction of
the bank. Thus Agojo testified:
FISCAL ENDAYA:
Q What was this unusual incident that you made mention
that happened in the San Luis Rural Bank on February 16,
1970?
A The bank was robbed, sir.
Q How did you know that the bank was robbed?
A When it was about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that
date, a jeep stopped in front of the bank with men on board
the jeep.
Q What happened when you saw the said jeep stopped or
parked in front of the bank?
A When the jeep had stopped in front of the bank, I saw six
(6) men alighted from the same, sir, and there was another
one left behind the wheel of the jeep.

Q Can you mention to this Honorable Court who were those

men that alighted from the jeep that parked?
A Yes, sir.
Q If they are in Court can you point to them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where are they?
A One of them is there. (Witness pointing to a person and
Identified him as Katigbak) Martinez. (Witness pointing to the
man beside Katigbak and Identified him as Martinez) That is
the other, (Witness pointing to the third man seated who
when asked his name Identified himself as -)
COURT:
Will you step down the witness stand and point to those
persons.
(Witness went down the witness stand and pointed to a
person and that person pointed to Identified himself as
Alberto Katigbak. Witness pointed to another person and the
person pointed to when asked his name Identified himself as
Apolinario Martinez. Witness pointed to another person and
the person pointed to when asked his name Identified
himself as Juan Mercado. Witness pointed to another person
who when asked his name Identified himself as Juan
Mercado. Witness pointed to another person who when
asked his name Identified himself as Petronilo Mercado.
Witness pointed to another person who when asked his
name Identified himself as Juanito Calixtro)
FISCAL ENDAYA:
Q You stated that they all alighted from that jeep parked in
front of the San Luis Rural Bank in that afternoon, had there
been someone left in said jeep when these persons
alighted?
A There are still two not here, sir.
Q When these six men alighted from the jeep what
happened?

A Three of them after alighting proceeded to the bank and

the last three followed the three ahead of them and stayed in
front of the bank.
Q In what particular place of the bank where you then when
you saw these six men alight from the said jeep?
A I was at the door of the bank, sir.
Q Were you inside the bank or outside the bank?
A I was still inside the bank, sir.
Q How were you able to see these six (6) men alight from
the jeep inside the bank?
A The door of the bank is made of glass and the persons
outside can be seen through that glass, sir.
Q Who among these six men did enter the said bank?
ATTY. CAEDO:
No basis, Your Honor.
FISCAL ENDAYA:
This is just but a follow up question.
COURT:
May answer.
WITNESS:
A The first one who entered the bank was the one in PC
uniform and followed by a stout person whom they called
lieutenant, sir, and the third to enter the bank was a thin one.
FISCAL ENDAYA:
Q The man whom you said to be in PC uniform is he here in
court?
A He is not here, sir.

Q Will you please Identify who the two companions of the

man in PC uniform who entered the bank?
A That one is the one referred to as the lieutenant, sir,
Juanito Calixtro, sir. (Witness pointing to accused Juanita
Calixtro) And that one, Juan Mercado. (Witness pointing to
accused Juan Mercado)
Q Who among the three who entered the bank was able to
enter first?
A The one in PC uniform sir.
Q Then followed by whom?
A Followed by Juanita Calixtro, sir. And the last to enter was
Juan Mercado.
Q What happened when these three whom you mentioned
had entered the bank?
A I accosted the one in PC uniform after the three had
gained entrance, sir and I asked them as to what they want.
Q Who among the three did you ask what they wanted?
A The one in PC uniform sir.
Q What was the answer, if any?
A And his reply to me was the lieutenant was going to file a
loan and he even pointed to me the lieutenant.
Q What did you notice in his person when you were talking
to this man in PC uniform?
The one in PC uniform was carrying his carbine, sir.
Q What was the answer if any?
A The lieutenant was going to file a loan.
Q What was your answer then?
A I instructed them to proceed to the desk of the manager
and talk with him, sir.

Q After having answered him what happened next?

A The one referred to as the lieutenant proceeded on his
way to the table of the cashier and I also instructed the one
in PC uniform to follow him but instead of following him he
grabbed the carbine which was resting then on the wall
beside the table of the security guard, sir.
Q How far was this carbine you were referring to from you
when it was grabbed by the man in PC uniform?
A More or less a distance of half a meter, sir.
Q What did You do when the said carbine was grabbed by
the man you mentioned?
A After he had taken hold of the carbine he poked the same
at me and uttered the following statements 'hold up ito, dapa
kayo, papatayin namin kayo.'
FISCAL ENDAYA:
Q In what manner were the said words spoken
A It was said in a very loud voice, sir.
Q When those words were spoken what was he doing no,
was this said gun of yours being held?
COURT:
He said he pointed the gun at him while making the
utterance.
FISCAL ENDAYA:
Q What did you do next?
A I pretended to lie flat on the ground but instead of doing so
I grabbed the carbine and I did what I know, sir.
(Witness standing with his left hand extended fully with
closed fist)
FISCAL ENDAYA:

Your Honor please, for purposes of demonstration may the

witness be allowed to take hold of a real carbine to see what
really did happen, Your Honor.
COURT:
Go ahead. Let us clarify this.
Q Did you actually hit the floor of the bank or you only made
that move as a subterfuge to draw attention away from
Cuevas?
A I just pretended that I will lie down on the ground, Your
Honor. I made a move as if I was going to life flat on the
ground but instead I grabbed the carbine, which Cuevas was
holding then, with my left hand.
FISCAL ENDAYA:
Q At the time that you pretended to be ducking how many
guns or carbine was or were in the possession of the man in
PC uniform?
A Two, sir.
Q At that moment, that Cuevas or the said man in PC
uniform was talking to you where was the third man?
A He was at the living room of the bank where the receiving
room was then, sir. He was at the receiving room of the
bank.
Q In relation to your place where was the distance where he
was?
A More or less a distance of three meters, sir.
Q How about Calixtro?
A Calixtro was near the table of our cashier, sir.
Q When you were able to grab the carbine held by the man
in PC uniform what happened next?
A There was firing from inside and outside of the bank, sir.

Q While there was gunshot heard by you, do you remember

if anything was uttered by the man in PC uniform?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he utter?
A He was asking for help from his companions, sir.
Q At that precise moment when he called for help what was
happening?
A There were more shots fired after his calling for help from
his companions, sir, at us.
Q Did you notice anything in the person of Cuevas when
there were volley of shots?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was it?
A After he had asked for help from his companions and
when more shots were being fired I saw him jerked and that
was the time when I was lucky enough to wrest from him the
second carbine and then when he was running away I saw
the back part of his clothes wet with blood, sir.
Q Can you Identify or still remember the three men who
were left outside the bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what--In relation to the main entrance of the bank where
were these three men situated?
ATTY. DE JESUS:
When?
FISCAL ENDAYA:
Upon alighting from their jeep.
WITNESS:

A In front of the bank, sir. They deploy themselves in front of

the bank.
FISCAL ENDAYA:
Q Were you able to Identify them while they were outside the
bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point to this Honorable Court who were
these men if they are here?
A Yes, sir, they are here.
Q Please point to them?
A That one in blue.
Q What is his name?
A Alberto Katigbak, sir. (Witness pointing to accused Alberto
Katigbak) Apolinario Martinez. (Witness pointing to accused
Apolinario Martinez) and the last Petronilo Mercado.
(Witness pointing to the accused Petronilo Mercado)
Q What were they doing when they were outside the bank?
A They were firing towards the bank, sir.
Q While they were firing where was Cuevas, the man in PC
uniform?
A At that precise moment, we were grappling, sir." (T.S.N.,
April 23. 1970, pp. 91-103.)
3. Who killed Obrador? The trial court inferentially held that Obrador was killed by one
or some of the appellants when it sentenced them "to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of the deceased victim Alberto Obrador in the sum of P12,000.00." But the
appellants have a point when they claim that they should not be held liable for the death
of Obrador. The information does not charge them for the death of Obrador nor were
they tried thereon.
Parenthetically, there is much ado on the question of who killed Cuevas and Obrador
because if they were killed by security guard Julian Agojo, the appellants can at best be
guilty of robbery in band only, a crime which does not carry the death penalty.

4. Did the appellants commit robbery in band with homicide considering that Cuevas
was one of them and not a robbery victim, an innocent bystander or a stranger? The
answer is Yes because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says so.
In People vs. Mangulabnan, 99 Phil. 992 (1956), this Court held:
Article 294, No. 1., of the Revised Penal Code, which defines the special,
single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide ..., but this English
version of the Code is a poor translation of the prevailing Spanish text of
said paragraph, which reads as follows:
l. Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con
ocasion del robo resultare homicidio.'
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of
robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal
Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of
the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has
also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30,
1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to
be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889- see Cuello
Calon's Codigo Penal, p. 501-502)." (At pp. 998-999.)
In the light of the foregoing, the trial court correctly held that the appellants committed
robbery in band with homicide aggravated by craft and the use of a motor vehicle which
is punishable by death. However, We cannot impose the death penalty for lack of the
necessary number of votes. We have to reduce the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is modified in that the appellants shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and they shall jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of Pio Cuevas only the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-41008 June 18, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs.
ARTURO PECATO, ET AL., accused. FELIX PECATO AND ERENEO
PERUDA, accused-appellants.

SARMIENTO, J:
Before us on automatic review is a decision 1 of the then Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Norte, 15th Judicial District, Branch II, Surigao City, in Criminal Case No.
185, finding the accused Felix Pecato and Ereneo Peruda guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons as defined
and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing them to suffer
the supreme penalty of death by electrocution together with all the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of Felix Larong in the sum of twelve thousand
pesos, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
In an Information 2 dated February 16, 1972, the lst Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Surigao del Norte accused Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato, Victoriano Leyros, and Ereneo
Peruda of the crime of robbery with homicide committed as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the lst day of November, 1971 in the municipality of
Gigaquit, province of Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, Arturo Pecato,
Felix Pecato, Victoriano Leyros and Ereneo Peruda, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, and armed with the following
deadly weapons to wit: One revolver Cal. 22; two sharp pointed
instruments; two shotguns, with intent of gain and by means of violence
and intimidation on persons that is shooting Felix Larong and manhandling
Uldarica Larong, his daughter, the latter sustained injuries in the different
parts of her body, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
take, from Felix Larong and Luciana Larong, husband and wife
respectively, the amount of Three Hundred Fifty (P350.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, belonging to Felix Larong, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the amount aforestated.
That on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal
and carry the amount of Three Hundred and Fifty (P350.00) Pesos, the herein accused
in pursuance of their conspiracy, with intent to kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength,
disregard of rank on account of age; in band, nighttime and treachery, attack, assault

and shoot Felix Larong, with the use of firearms, thereby inflicting upon the latter, the
following injuries, to wit:
1. Shotgun wounds
a exists (sic) irregular in shape 1.5 left iliac region.
2.1. umbilicus
b entrance circular in shape located at the spinal
column between the iliac crests.
Internal examination:
a Penetrated wounds small intestine,
large intestine, mesenteries.
b severed spinal column
c extracted pellets.
1.2. from the abdominal wall
2.1. from the spinal column.
and as a consequence thereof cause the death of Felix Larong thereby
causing moral damages to the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to Art. 294 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code with the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstance of insult or disregard of rank, in band, use of superior
strength and night time.
xxx xxx xxx
Of the four accused, only three, Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato, and Ereneo Peruda, were
arrested. Victoriano Leyros went into hiding, evaded arrest, and has remained at large.
Upon their arraignment on February 18, 1974 3 the three accused, Arturo Pecato, Felix
Pecato, and Ereneo Peruda, pleaded not guilty. Whereupon, the trial court proceeded
with the trial of the case. However, before the actual trial in the court below, specifically
on June 23, 1974, the accused Arturo Pecato died, hence, "his criminal responsibility in
the case whatever he may have, was extinguished." 4 However, the case proceeded
and was decided against Felix Pecato and Ereneo Peruda.

The dispositive portion of the 109-page decision dated February 4, 1975, now under
review, states:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court
hereby finds the accused FELIX PECATO and ERENEO PERUDA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Violence Against or
Intimidation of Persons, defined and penalized under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
disregard of rank, in band and abuse of superior strength and nighttime,
with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and invoking the
provisions of Article 294 of the same Code with respect to the aspect that
the crime was committed in band, the Court hereby sentences the said
two accused to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by electrocution
together with all the accessories prescribed by law.
The same accused are hereby ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Felix Larong in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.
The home-made shotgun, Exhibit "D," being one of the instruments of the
crime, the same is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the Government.
Let this case, insofar as the accused Victoriano Leyros who is at large be
archived without prejudice to its reinstatement as soon as said accused
shall have been apprehended and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 5
xxx xxx xxx
The records of the case establish the following facts:
At about nine o'clock in the evening of November 1, 1971, 6 in Lahi, Gigaquit, Surigao
del Norte, while Felix Larong, about 70 years old, 7 and his family, consisting of his wife
Luciana Larong, about 85 years of age, 8 and his 31-year old unmarried
daughter, 9 Uldarica Larong, were preparing to sleep, 10 several men called from
outside their small house, a one-room affair, 4 1/2 by 5 meters (3 by 2 fathoms) in
dimensions. 11 The said men after bidding the house occupants "good evening,"
requested that they be allowed to enter the Larongs' house.12 Hearing these, Felix
Larong opened the door of their house 13 and thereupon, four men, each carrying a
gun, entered. 14
Having thus gained entrance to and once inside the house, the four heavily armed men
again greeted the house occupants 15 and with the use of flashlights they carried,

illuminated the inside of the house. 16 This they did notwithstanding the presence of a
lighted kerosene lamp inside the house. 17 The intruders then ordered the Larongs to
he face down on the floor 18 and demanded money from Felix Larong.19 When the old
man replied that he had no money, he was ordered to produce his pistol to which he
answered that he had none. 20 At this point, Felix Larong was asked by one of the
intruders whether he recognized them. 21 When he answered in the positive since he
said they were still his relatives, and even while he was lying face down on the floor,
one of the men, Arturo Pecato, shot him. 22 He died as a result of the shotgun wounds
he sustained.
After shooting Felix Larong, the intruders next turned their attention on Uldarica Larong
and demanded money from her. 23 When she refused, she was manhandled and hit with
gun butt on different parts of her body. 24 One even struck the side of her
face. 25 Luciana Larong, seeing what the malefactors were doing to her daughter,
ordered the latter to give them money. 26 Uldarica Larong first gave the men P300.00,
but when they still demanded for more, she gave an additional P50.00. 27 After a while,
the intruders left.
Fearful that the robbers-killers would come back, Uldarica Larong and Luciana Larong
went out of their house and hid themselves among the bushes nearby. 28 True enough,
the robbers later returned but finding no one around, they did not tarry long. 29 After
staying for only about an hour, they left. 30
On the following morning, November 2, 1971, the robbery killing was reported to the
Police Department of Gigaquit . 31 The Chief of Police upon learning of the incident
dispatched several policemen to the scene of the crime to conduct an
investigation. 32 The policemen on reaching Lahi went to the house of the Larongs and
there asked Luciana Larong and her daughter Uldarica Larong who perpetrated the
crime. The two women positively Identified and pointed to Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato,
Victoriano Leyros, and Ereneo Peruda as the criminals who robbed them and killed
Felix Larong. 33
Based on the Identification made by the two Larong women, the policemen arrested on
that same day Arturo Pecato and Felix Pecato at their separate residences which were
also located at Lahi. 34 Ereneto Peruda was apprehended the following day, November
3, 1971, in the Poblacion of Gigaquit. 35 Victoriano Leyros was nowhere to be found and
thus was never arrested. 36
At the trial of the case, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely:
Dominador Paray, one of the policemen who conducted the investigation on November
2, 1971; Judge Capistrano C. Navallo, the municipal judge of Gigaquit who conducted
the preliminary examination of the accused; Nicasio Erazo, the Chief of Police of
Gigaquit at the time the crime was committed; Dr. Bernardo Moran, who interpreted and
explained the medical findings contained in the autopsy report on the victim Felix
Larong submitted by Dr. Celso Valmores; 37 and Uldarica Larong. Incidentally, the
widow of the victim, Mrs. Luciana Vda. de Larong, was not presented at the trial.

However, her deposition dated January 16, 1973, which was taken with the express
permission of the trial court, 38 was presented in evidence by the prosecution as Exhibit
"C". 39
The defense on its part presented as witnesses Felicidario Bayla, Daniel Latorre,
Encarnacion Peruda, Vicenta Pelajes Pecato, Francisco Gonzales, and the two
remaining accused themselves, Felix Pecato and Ereneo Peruda.
Against the positive Identification made by prosecution witnesses Uldarica Larong and
the widow, the accused interposed alibi for their defense.
Accused Felix Pecato claimed that he did not commit the crime as he was at his house
on that night of November 1, 1971 and never at any instance went out. 40 He stated that
on the date of the incident he was sick, suffering from fever and chilling, 41 and was very
weak. 42 He swore that with him that night of November 1, 1971 were his wife, their
child, and his mother , 43 who massaged him, 44 and spent the night with him and his
family. 45
This alibi of appellant Felix Pecato was corroborated by his mother, Vicente Pelajes
Pecato, who testified that she spent the night of November 1, 1971 in the house of her
son, Felix Pecato. 46 She asserted that she was there to take care of her sick son and
even massaged him. 47 She further testified that her son Felix never left the house that
night48 as he was then very weak and still recuperating from fever and chills. 49
Appellant Ereneo Peruda, on the other hand, averred that he spent the whole night of
November 1, 1971 at home with his family and several other guests. 50 He recounted
that early on that night there was a small feast held in their house as it was then his
younger sister's birthday. 51 According to him, he retired to sleep at about eleven o'clock
that night52 and even shared his bed with one of their guests who stayed and spent the
night at their house. 53 From that time and until eight o'clock in the morning of the next
day, November 2, 1971, when he woke up, he never went out of his house. 54
The narration made by the appellant Ereneo Peruda as to his whereabouts on the night
of November 1, 1971 was supported by the testimonies of two of the defense witnesses,
Felicidario Bayla and Daniel Latorre. Bayla testified that he met accused Ereneo Peruda
late in the afternoon of that All Saints' Day after a cockfight, 55 and together they
proceeded to the latter's house as there was a small party being held then at that
place. 56 He further said that he stayed at the Peruda's place for three more hours after
his arrival at about seven o'clock in the evening 57 and Ereneo never left the house all
the while that he was there. 58
Daniel Latorre testified that he also met the accused after the cockfight held that
afternoon of November 1, 1971.59 Afterwards, Daniel Latorre declared that along with
several others, he went to the house of Ereneo Peruda as there was a small feast
there. 60 He narrated how he was with Ereneo Peruda the whole night of November 1,
1971. He added that he even spent that night in the Perudas' place and slept side by

side with the accused, sharing a bed. 61 He stated hat he never noticed the accused
leave the house at any single moment the whole night of November 1, 1971. 62
Encarnacion Peruda, an older sister of accused Ereneo Peruda's father 63 and a witness
for the defense, stated that she immediately went to the house of the Larongs on
November 2, 1971 after hearing of the death of Felix Larong. 64According to her, upon
reaching the place, she inquired from Uldarica Larong what happened and who did
it. 65 Uldarica Larong allegedly told her (witness) that they, the Larongs, were not able to
recognize the malefactors as their faces were covered or masked and they were
wearing hats. 66
Francisco Gonzales, the Municipal Mayor of Gigaquit at the time the crime was
committed, 67 was presented by the accused obviously to support their accusation that
they were subjected to physical maltreatment by the policemen of Gigaquit while they
were under detention. However, this witness only testified that he was approached by
the mother of Arturo and Felix Pecato for help regarding her sons who were then
already under police custody as she was afraid that they might be mauled by the
policemen. 68 Responding to the entreaty, the mayor-witness said that he summoned
the Chief of Police and ordered the latter to see to it that the detainees were taken good
care of. 69
The crux of this review is the determination as to which prevails between the positive
Identification of the two appellants and their alibi. As already mentioned, the trial court
found that herein two accused, Felix Pecato and Ereneo Peruda, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons, as defined and penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentenced them to death. After a thorough review of all the evidence on record, we are
constrained to affirm, as we hereby affirm, the judgment of the trial court.
While indeed, "(T)he prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and the weakness of the defense does not relieve it
of its duty ...," 70 in the case at bar, we are fully satisfied that the prosecution has
established a clear and positive Identification of the accused. Luciana Larong and
Uldarica Larong, the two prosecution witnesses who were themselves victims of the
crime complaint of and subject of this criminal case, and who Identified the two accused
as among the perpetrators of the crime, never in the main, wavered in their testimonies.
From as early as right after the incident, during the police investigation. in the lengthy
and thorough preliminary investigation conducted by Municipal Judge Capistrano C.
Navallo, and at the trial of the case, these two witnesses-victims readily, positively, and
unequivocally Identified Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato, Victoriano Leyros, and Ereneo
Peruda as the four persons who entered their home, robbed them of P350.00, killed
Felix Larong, and manhandled and pistol-whipped Uldarica Larong on that fateful night
of November 1, 1971. They recognized these malefactors as there was a lighted
kerosene lamp inside their house that night. The two women were certain of the Identity
of the four men because the latter were not wearing masks, hats, or anything to hide
their Identities. 71 Moreover, these witnesses and the appellants are close relatives. 72

On the other hand, the defense tried to attribute the inculpatory testimonies and hostility
of the Larongs against the appellants to the "bad blood" that allegedly exists between
them. This "bad blood," which is now being foisted by the defense as the motive of the
Larongs in falsely accusing the appellants and testifying against them, purportedly
arose when one of the accused, Arturo Pecato, now deceased, brother of appellant
Felix Pecato and a friend of appellant Ereneo Peruda, testified in a stabbing incident
against Jose Escudo, a grandson of the victim Felix Larong. 73 Appellant Ereneo
Peruda, on the other hand, claimed that his father was, at one time, hacked by Jose
Escudo. 74
The proffered motive has not been proven satisfactorily. Indeed, considering that the
two witnesses-victims, are closely related by blood to the appellants, it would take much
more than just "bad blood," engendered in the way revealed by the defense, to
constrain close blood relatives to impute falsely the commission of a capital offense to
other relatives which would mean the imposition of the extreme penalty of death. The
Filipino psyche abhors such an irreverent and false imputation, This abomination is
especially true among rural and simple folks like the Larongs. It is more likely that the
Larongs had been impelled to testify against their relatives as a concomitant of their
quest for justice. We agree with the trial court that the so-called "bad blood" that
allegedly exists between the accused and the Larongs appears as mere illusions,
concocted by them in a desperate but vain effort to be extricated from the crushing
wheels of justice. Even defense witness Vicenta Pelajes Pecato in her testimony
admitted that if there was indeed an ill-will between them and the Larongs, the victim,
Felix Larong, endeavored to patch things up by admonishing his grandson, who was
allegedly the source of the rift. 75 Thus it is shown that the claim of the defense on this
score is, at best, flimsy.
It is a rule well-settled in this jurisdiction that alibi cannot prevail over the positive
Identification by the prosecution's witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime especially when there was no physical impossibility for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 76 The rule holds more true where the
accused is positively Identified by one who has no reason to charge falsely the accused
with an offense that is punishable with death. 77
The alibi presented by accused Felix Pecato is even more dubious and weak because it
was attempted to be established mainly by the appellant himself and his mother,
Vicente Pelajes Pecato, and not by third persons "who would, in the natural order of
things, be best to support the tendered alibi. 78 In People v. Romero, 79 we ruled that the
testimony of a mother corroborating her son's alibi scarcely merits any probative
value. It is undeniably tainted with bias for it springs from the natural desire of a mother
to exculpate her son from criminal liability. 80 Further, "alibi" is at best a weak defense
and easy of fabrication especially between parents and children, relatives, and even
those not so related. 81
More importantly, however, from the testimonies of the witnesses, both for the
prosecution as well as for the defense, it has been proven that the two appellants, Felix

Pecato and Ereneo Peruda, reside in places very near the scene of the crime. 82 In fact,
it would only take them less than a two- hour trek from either place to the house of the
victims. 83 Thus, there was no physical impossibility for the appellants to be at the scene
of the crime on the night of November 1, 1971. But above all, the defense was not able
to rebut the positive Identification by Luciana Larong and Uldarica Larong of the two
appellants as among the four heavily armed men who shot and killed Felix Larong,
robbed them of P350.00, and mauled Uldarica, inflicting physical injuries in the different
parts of her body.
The crime committed by the accused is Robbery with Homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Felix Larong was shot to
death during the robbery. We have repeatedly held that: (A)s long as homicide resulted
during or because of, the robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident robbery with
homicide is committed,- it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as
to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime that has to be taken into consideration 84Further, whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part
as principals in the commission of the crime are also guilty as principals in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the
homicide unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 85 In
this instance, the evidence on record is bereft of any showing that any of the accused
tried to prevent the killing of Felix Larong. What is shown instead is that they merely
stood watching and did nothing when one of their companions shot the
victim. 86 Additionally, the term "homicide" in robbery with homicide should be
understood as a genericterm and includes murder. 87
To determine the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court on the accused for
the crime they committed, the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime
must be considered. While the Information alleges the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, insult or disregard of rank, in band, abuse of superior
strength, and nighttime, the decision under review found the attendance of treachery,
disregard of rank, in band, abuse of superior strength, and nighttime.
The trial court is correct in ruling that there was treachery in the commission of the
crime. Felix Larong was shot to death while he was lying face down on the
floor, 88 without any warning and thus was not able to defend himself at all.
The aggravating circumstances of in band, abuse of superior strength, and nighttime
were likewise present in the commission of the crime. The robbers, numbering four
were all armed. 89 Felix Larong, who was already 70 years old on November 1, 1971,
was shot and killed by one of the robbers all of whom were younger and physically
stronger. The robbers likewise especially sought nocturnally in committing the crime.
This is shown by their act of providing themselves with flashlights 90 which they used in
illuminating the interior of the Larong's home after they had gained entrance therein.

Additionally, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is also present in this case

inasmuch as the crime took place and was committed by the accused in the house of
the victims. We have held that dwelling is an aggravating circumstance in the crime of
robbery with homicide 91 as the authors thereof could have very well committed the
crime without the need of violating the domicile of the victims. 92
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank cannot, however, be appreciated in
this case. Disregard of rank finds no application in robbery with homicide, a crime
primarily against property and not against persons. 93
The crime of robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This
case being attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of treachery, in band,
abuse of superior strength, nocturnally, and dwelling, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, and observing the provisions of Article 63, second
paragraph, of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty that must be imposed on the two
appellants, Felix Pecato and Ereneo Peruda, should be, as correctly meted out by the
trial court, death. However, pursuant to Section 19(l), Article III, Bill of Rights, of the
1987 Constitution, the death penalty has already been abolished. Thus, the penalty
imposable on the accused is only reclusion perpetua.
Parenthetically, the observation by the People in its Brief for the Appellee, 94 that the
trial court should not have mentioned Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code in its
decision, is well taken. As early as in the case of People vs. Apduhan 95 this Court had
the occasion to state that the special aggravating circumstance of "use of unlicensed
firearm" mentioned in Article 296, Revised Penal Code, is applicable only to cases of
robbery committed by a band therein defined, which fall within the scope of and are
punishable under Article 295 in relation to subdivisions (3), (4), and (5) of Article 294.96
WHEREFORE, with the above MODIFICATIONS and the increase of the indemnity that
must be paid to the heirs of the late Felix Larong to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), 97 the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against
the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35281 September 10, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESSIE TAPALES y VARGAS and PEDRO CORANEZ y TATUALLA, defendantsappellants.
Vicente A. Torres for appellants.
Solicitor General E. P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General C. T. Limcaoco and
Solicitor P. O. Guerrero for appellee.

PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila,
dated April 21, 1972, finding accused-appellants, Jessie Tapales y Vargas and Pedro
Coranez y Tatualla, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, with the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty offset by the aggravating stances of multiple Rape, use of
motor vehicle and nighttime, and sentencing both said accused to the extreme penalty
of death.
The Information filed against the accused charged them with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and Rape as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1971, at nighttime y sought to better
accomplish their ends, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with another,
whose Identity and whereabouts are still unknown and helping one
another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation to
wit: by boarding the taxi being then occupied by Eugenie Calaykay
y Baldonado and Diana Ang y Navales while mud vehicle was at a
ship position at Jones Bridge, in said City and pointing a knife at
Diana Ang y Navales and a gun at Eugenio Calaykay y Baldonado,
take, steal and carry away against their will and consent, one (1)
men's wrist watch, "Rado" brand gold plated and one (1) brown
wallet with cash money of undetermined amount belonging to said
Eugenie Calaykay y Baldonado, and Mexican money worth P2.00
and one (1) Parker ball pen valued at P10.00 or a total value of
P12.00 belonging to said Diana Ang y Navales to the damage and
prejudice of said owners in the aforesaid respective amounts that
by reason of and on the occasion of the said robbery, the said
accused, in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault

and use personal violence upon the person of Eugenio Calaykay y

Baldonado by then and there shooting him twice with the gun and
stabbing him with the balisong knife on the chest, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wounds which were the direct cause of his death
thereafter; that by reason of and on the occasion also of the said
robbery, the said accused, in furtherance of their conspiracy, did
then and there , unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, to wit.- by threatening to stab and kill the
said Diana Ang y Navales with said balisong knife and firearm,
which they were holding then at the time, succeed in having sexual
intercourse with her, one after the other all -against her win and
consent.
Contrary to law and with the generic aggravating circumstances of
the use of motor vehicle and employment of craft in the commission
of said offense.
Upon arraignment, appellants, through their counsel de officio, manifested their desire
to enter a plea of guilty. The trial Court duly informed them of the gravity of the offense
and the imposable penalty therefor of life imprisonment or death. When asked by the
Court whether they understood the full consequences of a plea of guilty, both answered
affirmatively. They admitted to the Court that they robbed Eugenie Calaykay and Diana
Ang and that they killed the former when he shouted, "hold-up". However, both of them
denied having raped Diana Ang contending that she had consented to have carnal
knowledge with them. The Court below, citing the case ofPeople vs. Mongado, 1 where
Rape was considered a generic aggravating circumstance to the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, considered appellants to have entered an unconditional plea of guilty to the
offense of Robbery with Homicide, 2and proceeded to receive evidence to ascertain not
only the existence of rape but also of attendant modifying circumstances that could
affect criminal liability.
Diana Ang narrated the incident as follows: On October 27, 1971 at around 11:00
o'clock in the evening, Diana Ang, 20 years old, married but estranged from her
husband, Valentin Katigdas, was in the company of her boyfriend of six months,
Eugenio Calaykay, 32 years old, single, at the Jai Alai Bamboo Room, Taft Avenue,
Manila. After some betting, Eugenio invited Diana for a snack at the International House
at Ongpin, Binondo. They left the Jai Alai at around 11:45 P.M. They then hailed a
taxicab parked in front of the Keg Room of Jai Alai. Both sat at the rear of the taxi,
Diana sitting at the left side and Eugenio sitting at the right side. When they were at the
middle of Jones Bridge, the driver stopped and said "Pare, just a while, the right door of
the taxi is open. " He opened and closed the right front door four times. At this juncture,
two men alighted from a taxicab immediately behind. One armed with a knife, Identified
by Diana as Pedro Coranez approached the taxi from the left and the other, armed with
a gun, Identified by Diana as Jessie Tapales, approached the taxicab from the right. As
they entered the taxicab they said "This is a holdup, we only need money." Inside the
taxicab, Jessie Tapales divested Eugenio of his "Rado" wrist watch, while Pedro

Coranez ransacked Diana's bag and took her "Parker" ball pen worth P10.00 and
Mexican money worth P2.00. While Diana and Eugenio were being robbed, the taxicab
driver continued driving down to the foot of Jones badge where he made a "U" turn,
proceeded up the bridge, made a right turn on Bonifacio Drive, went straight ahead until
they reached the Fire Department at Intramuros. At this point, Eugenie shouted, "holdup, hold- up". Instantly, Eugenio was stabbed by Coranez and shot by Tapales A
commotion ensued inside the taxicab prompting the driver to tell Eugenia "pare, tumalon
ka na lamang. " Diana then grappled with Coranez for the possession of the knife while
Eugenia already wounded, squeezed himself out of the right window. Eugenie fell in the
middle of Del Pan bridge. With Diana still inside the taxicab, Tapales ordered the driver
to proceed to Quezon City. Tapales then pulled down Diana's pants and panty, mashed
her breast and inserted his fingers into her private parts. While Tapales was abusing
Diana, Coranez was also her, his right hand around Diana's shoulders and his left hand
poking a knife at her left side. Scared and tremble Diana pleaded that she be spared as
she was pregnant but said pleas were in vain. On the way to Quezon City, Diana
noticed that they took the Tondo, Balintawak and Highway route. Tapales introduced
himself as "Fernando" and Coranez as "Johnny". Before reaching Quezon City,
Coranez suggested to Tapales" that they proceed to the place of Tapales "kapatid" at
Kamuning which, however, was objected to by Tapales. Tapales opted to look for a
vacant lot in Quezon City. When they found one, they ordered the driver to stop. Diana
was ordered to alight, followed by Coranez. After apparently taking instructions from
Tapales, the driver left the place. About six meters from where they alighted, Coranez
forced Diana to lie on the wet cogon grass. Tapales then placed his jacket on the grass
where Diana was made to lie down. There and then Coranez and Tapales took turns in
raping her. Although Diana admitted that Tapales and Coranez did not make use of
their weapons when they reached the vacant lot, she claimed that she submitted to their
bestial acts as she was too weak and terribly scared to resist the appellants. After that,
Diana asked appellants to get another taxicab but Tapales told her that the taxi they
took would return, as in fact, it did. The three of them boarded the taxi and they cruised
around the other street. Diana was finally dropped off behind the Carbungco restaurant.
Before alighting from the taxi, appellants gave Diana 118.00 and threatened to kill her if
she reported the matter to the police. Despite the threats, Diana told the people around
of her dreadful experience. One took pity on her and took her to a policeman in a
restaurant near the Center Theatre. The policeman instructed them to proceed to
Precinct 8 where she reported the incident to Pat. Libao. An Advance Information or
Alarm Report 3 was forthrightly issued. While in the precinct, Diana saw the shoes of
Eugenie. Later, Diana was taken by the police to the morgue where she Identified the
dead body of Eugenie. The next morning Diana was physically examined by one Dr.
Lucero at Precinct 2. 4
After some sleuthing, the police apprehended appellants, but the two taxicab drivers
remained at large. Appellants admitted culpability in their sworn statements. 5
In open Court, Jessie Tapales declared that he was invited by Pedro Coranez to commit
Robbery and admitted the commission of that crime as well as Homicide and
Rape. 6 For his part, Pedro Coranez while admitting the commission of Robbery with

Homicide, denied having raped Diana Ang content ding that it was she who suggested
that they look for a vacant lot. Pedro Coranez even testified that he was constrianed to
have carnal knowledge with Diana Ang despite the fact that the place was a with human
excreta. On cross examination, Pedro Coranez admitted that he and Jessie Tapales
conspired with two taxi drivers known as Pintong (driver of the taxi taken by the victims),
and Bruno Borja (driver of the taxi used by appellants in following the taxi of the victims)
in the commission of robbery. 7
The trial Court gave full credence to the spontaneous and straight- forward testimony of
Diana Ang, and held:
The Court cannot subscribe to the claim of the accused that Diana
Ang voluntarily agreed to have carnal knowledge with them and
was even the one who invited them. It is indeed highly
inconceivable how Diana Ang, who was already robbed and who,
by reason or on the occasion of the robbery her boyfriend died
would still have the sexual urge. ...
On April 21, 1972, the trial Court handed down its Decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, both accused are hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of robbery with
homicide and there being proved the aggravating circumstances of
multiple rapes, the use of motor vehicle and nighttime offset only by
the mitigating circumstance of their plea of guilty, the court
sentences each one of them to DEATH; to jointly and severally the
heirs of the victim Eugenie Calaykay the sum of P12,000.00 for the
death of the latter, the sum of P10,000.00 for moral damages; the
sum of P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; and to return to the
heirs of victim Calaykay the Rado watch and the black wallet with
cash taken from Calaykay.
The Court further orders the said accused to jointly and y in the
victim Diana Ang, the sum of P12,000.00 for moral damages, the
sum of P10,000.00 for exemplary damages and to return to her the
cash and article taken from her or to jointly and severally indemnify
her in the amount of P12.00 value therefor if they fail to do so and
to pay the costs.
Hence, this mandatory review.
Appellants, through counsel de officio ascribe the following errors to the trial Court, to
wit:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING RAPE AS AN

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS CASE;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING NIGHTTIME AS
AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS CASE;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANTS
TO DEATH.
We find the errors assigned bereft of merit.
1. This Court has consistently held that the legal definition of the crime committed
herein is Robbery with Homicide, with Rape being considered an aggravating
circumstance.
It is the uniform jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that where the
crime charged is robbery with homicide and rape, the legal
definition of the crane is robbery with homicide punishable under
paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Penal Code; and the rape
committed on the occasion of that crime is considered an
aggravating circumstance (People vs. Ganal,, 85 Phil. 743, 751;
People vs. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136, 142; and People vs. Tarrayo, 27
SCRA 953 (1969). See also: People vs. Carillo, 85 Phil. 611, 635).
Instead of ignominy, therefore, it is the rape itself that aggravates
(People vs. Mongado, 28 SCRA 642,651-652, (1969).
The defense argues, however, that the foregoing doctrine should be re-examined and
abandoned considering that there is no law that makes Rape an aggravating
circumstance nor one that classifies it as a generic aggravating circumstance. 8
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
Penalties.Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or
on occasion of the robbery, the crane of homicide shall have been
committed.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the special complex crime contemplated in the foregoing provision does not
include Rape. However, there can be no question, and this appellant admits in Ms Brief,
that Rape committed on the occasion of Robbery with Homicide increases the moral evil
of the crime. Moreover, it is incorrect to state that there is no law which considers Rape

as an aggravating circumstance simply because it is not specifically enumerated in

Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code as an aggravating circumstance. As enunciated in
the case of People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil. 623,(1949),
...Rapes, wanton robbery for personal gain, and other forms of
cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be regarded as
aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately
augmenting unnecessary wrongs to the main criminal objective,
under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code. ...
Said paragraphs read thus:
Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are
aggravating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about
which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
xxx xxx xxx
21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be
deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for
its commission.
This Court's consistent ruling, therefore, which holds that when Rape and Homicide coexist in the commission of Robbery, it is paragraph 1 of Article 294 which applies, the
Rape to be considered as an aggravating circumstance (People vs. Ganal, et al., 85
Phil. 743 (1950); People vs. Carillo, 85 Phil. 611 (1950); People vs. Bacsa, 104 Phil.
136 (1958); People vs. Tarrayo, 27 SCRA 953 (1969); People Mongado, 28 SCRA 643
(1969), should be upheld, for a settled judicial construction put upon a statute has
almost the same authority as the statute itself, and this Court win not disregard or
overrule it except for the most cogent reasons. 9
Alternatively, appellants contend that even if the ruling that Rape is an aggravating
circumstance in Robbery with Homicide be upheld, the crime of Rape herein should be
considered, by time and distance, as a separate and distinct offense from that of
Robbery with Homicide because while the Robbery was committed at Jones Bridge, the
Homicide in Intramuros, both in Manila, the Rape was committed in Quezon city. 10
While there may have been an appreciable interval of time between the robbery and the
killing, on the one hand, and the rape, on the other, there can be no question but that
there was a direct relation, an intimate connection between them such that it can be

stated, without fear of contradiction, that it was by reason or on occasion of the robbery
that Homicide and Rape were committed. 11
2. Appellants contention that the trial Court erred in considering nighttime as an
aggravating circumstance is neither well taken. The crime was committed between the
hours of 11:45 P.M., and 1:00 A.M. As early as 6:00 P.M. of October 27, 1971, both
accused had already planned the robbery. It is evident that they purposely sought
nighttime and took advantage of it to facilitate the commission of the offense and to
avoid discovery. 12 In fact, when the victim Eugenio Calaykay shouted "hold-up, holdup," no one responded to his can because of the lateness of the night. When he forced
himself out of the taxi and fell on Del Pan Bridge, no one saw or noticed it. Again,
because of the wee hours of the morning, appellants were able to cruise around
leisurely from Manila to Quezon City looking for a vacant lot. In the meantime, both
appellants, taking advantage of the darkness of night inside the taxi-cab, were able, with
impunity, to take liberties with the person of Diana Ang.
In itself nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance, and becomes one only where it is
specially sought by the offender or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the
commission of the crime or to avoid discovery and thus minimize the risk of capture. 13
3. Considering, therefore, that the commission of Robbery with Homicide was attended
by the circumstances of multiple rape , use of motor vehicle, and nighttime, in
aggravation, which overwhelmingly offset the lone circumstance of plea of guilty, in
litigation the accused-appellants, by the law, must be meted out the extreme penalty of
death. 14
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgement automatically elevated to this Court for
review, the same is hereby affirmed.
Costs against accused-appellants, Jessie Tapales y Vargas and Pedro Coranez y
Tatualla.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro
and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Santos, JJ., are on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 80042 March 28, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO QUIONES, RONILO CANABA, AMADO CONDA, JR., ZALDY CIVICO and
ALFREDO ABAN,accused-appellants.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

CRUZ, J.:
On June 30, 1986, the bodies of three men were found in a wooded area in
barangay Tuaco, Basud, Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of
decomposition and bore various contusions, stab and bullet wounds, and other
injuries indicating foul play. The victims were later positively identified as
Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana.

In due time, an information for robbery with multiple homicide was filed against
Adolfo Quiones, Alfredo Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr.,
Santiago Solarte, Armando Buitre and one John Doe. 1
On their arraignment on November 13, 1986, Quiones, Canaba, Aban, Civico and
Conda pleaded not guilty. On November 20, 1986, Conda, Canaba, and Quiones
withdrew their plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. 2 On April 1, 1986,
Conda was allowed to withdraw his former plea of guilty and substitute the same
With not guilty. 3 Solarte escaped and is presently at large while Buitre was killed
in an encounter with the Manila police. 4
Judge Luis D. Dictado of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte
directed the prosecution to present evidence also against Quiones and Canaba
despite their plea of guilty, which they maintained even after being informed of its
possible consequences, including the death penalty. After trial, judgment was
rendered convicting all the accused (except Solarte, who had not yet been
arrested, and Buitre). 5
The evidence for the prosecution established that the three victims were riding in
a dark blue Mitsubishi car at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 27 or 28,
1986, when they were intercepted along the Maharlika Highway in the abovenamed barangay by the accused, who had placed sacks on the road to block the
way. The three were taken to the nearby woods where they were

killed. 6 According to his brother, Napoleon, Alexander Sy was at that time

carrying P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections of his business, a
necklace with pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring, and a
licensed .22 caliber handgun. 7 All this, together with the other articles belonging
to the victims, were taken by the accused, who also used the car in fleeing to
Sapang Palay, where it was recovered without the stereo and the spare tire. 8
The first to be picked up for questioning was Conda, who implicated the other
accused and led a police team to the house of Sonny Tabalan, where Solarte was
hiding, Inexplicably, Conda and Solarte both escaped. However, the police found
in Tabalan's house one live grenade, one .38 caliber pistol, a defective air rifle
with magazine, and a wooden rifle which he said had been brought there by
Solarte and Quiones. In separate extra-judicial statements, 9 both Quiones and
Canaba identified these weapons as the ones used in the commission of the
crime. 10
Testifying for the prosecution, Francisco Bariuan declared that on July 7, 1986,
Solarte came to his house and asked him to pawn a watch for P300.00. Solarte
returned the following day with Canaba and Conda. They were carrying guns and
a grenade. Solarte informed him that they were the ones who, together with
Buitre, Quiones and Aban, had killed Sy and his companions. He and Solarte left
later to hire jeep and Canaba and Conda stayed behind, warning him that they
would blow up his house if he squealed on them. 11
But the case for the prosecution really depended on the statements of the
accused themselves, principally Quiones and Canaba. Both were informed of
their constitutional rights before their investigation and were actually assisted by
Atty. Santiago Ceneta when they gave their separate confessions. 12 Both
confessed to the crime charged and narrated in detail their participation in its
commission.
Quiones later testified that he had been subjected to torture to force him to
admit the killing and robbery, 13 but as the trial judge noted, no proof of such
coercion was ever presented in court. Moreover, the witness' narration of the
commission of the offense substantially jibed with the testimony of the other
accused, thus negating the suspicion that it had been merely concocted.
Understandably, Quiones sought to minimize his participation in this crime by
claiming that he stayed in the car when the three victims were forcibly taken to
the woods where they were robbed and slain. 14 This is another indication that the
had not been manhandled into signing the confession.
lt is important to note that when asked at the trial if he was affirming his extrajudicial statement, he categorically said he was, 15 thus in effect reiterating his
detailed account of the conduct of the several accused, including their escape to
Manila in the stolen car and their distribution of the loot among themselves. This
was now a judicial confession. Interestingly, Quiones also admitted to two other

hold-ups and his membership in another gang of robbers headed by one Kapitan
Mitra, an unnecessary embellishment that lent further credence to his
confession. 16
Canaba's own statement corroborated Quiones' confession and provided more
elaboration. Like Quiones, he admitted that they had placed sacks on the load
and forced the three victims to go with them to the parke where they were
unclothed and killed, two by Buitre and the third by Solarte. Quiones remained
in the car. Afterwards, the accused distributed the cash among themselves, each
receiving P10,000.00, with Solarte and Buitre getting the weapons also. Using
Sy's car, they proceeded to Sapang Palay after leaving the weapons with Sonny
Tabalan in his house in Tigbinan. 17
Conda also gave an extra-judicial confession, but this was not made with the
assistance of counsel and so must be rejected. It is totally worthless and
inadmissible against him. Such a confession is anathema in a free society. It was
not recognized even during the era of martial law under the 1973 Constitution as
interpreted by the Court in People v. Galit. 18 And it is also scorned under the
present Constitution, which is more deeply committed to the protection of the
rights of the accused.
Civico also gave an extra-judicial confession, likewise without the assistance of
counsel. 19 But testifying on his behalf, he purged it of invalidity when he freely
affirmed it on the stand in the presence of the judge himself and with the
assistance of defense counsel. 20 By so testifying, he in effect reiterated but
validly this time his earlier narration, replete with all the damming details, of
the commission of the crime.
The Court is satisfied that the evidence against the accused is sufficient to justify
their conviction. The declarations of the prosecution witnesses and more so of
defendants Quiones and Canaba, both of whom had pleaded guilty are telling
enough to toll their guilt. The seized weapons and the other exhibits offer strong
corroboration that has not been refuted. The state of the cadavers of the
swollen scrotums and the protruding tongues tell a tale of their own of the
defendants' perverted ruthlessness.
By contrast, the defense was practically one of mere denial. Even the claimed
maltreatment of Quiones has not been established.
It is clear from the evidence on record that there was a conspiracy among the
perpetrators of the crime to rob and slay. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. This need not be established by direct evidence but may be
proven through the series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of
the common unlawful purpose. 21

Proof of conspiracy in the case at bar was supplied, paradoxically enough, mainly
by defendants Quiones and Canaba themselves. From the time they blocked the
road to waylay their prey to the killing and robbing in the woods, to the
distribution of the loot and their escape in the stolen car, all the accused were
acting in concert and in accordance with their common plan.
It is argued that Civico and Aban were not part of the conspiracy and that
Quiones himself categorically said so in answer to a question from the
prosecution. Interpreting this merely as a gesture of loyalty or perhaps goodwill
or charity toward his fellow criminals, we dismiss it as a falsity. On the other
hand, Civico himself admitted his own participation in the offense, and in his
sworn confession (which he affirmed in court) also implicated Aban. And there is
also Bariuan's testimony that Aban was one of the armed group, including the
other accused, that went to his house on July 8, 1986, and talked of their
commission of the crime. These declarations are enough to place the two
defendants within the conspiracy together with the other defendants.
In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and every one of the conspirators
is guilty with the others in equal degree. Hence, every member of the group that
perpetrated the killing and robbery of the three victims must suffer the same
penalty prescribed by law even if they had different modes of participation in the
commission of the crime. 22
The trial judge found all the accused guilty as charged and sentenced each of
them to serve the triplepenalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of P380,000.00 to the heirs of Alexander
Sy, P50,000.00 to the heirs of Augusta Gabo, and P50,000.00 to the heirs of Frisco
Marcellana. The firearms were also confiscated in favor of the State.
The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with
multiple homicide and so were also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The
reason is that there is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the
Revised Penal Code. The charge should have been for robbery with homicide
only regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the commission of the
robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial
and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code. As
held in People v. Cabuena: 23
But it was error to sentence the appellants to three life
imprisonments each as if 3 separate crimes had been committed.
The complex crime of robbery with homicide is not to be multiplied
with the number of persons killed. As was said by this Court
in People vs. Madrid (88 Phil. 1), "the general concept of this crime
does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim making
the slaying of human being in excess of that number punishable as
separate individual offense or offenses. All the homicides or murders

are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with

homicide so long as the killings were perpetrated by reason or on
the occasion of the robbery.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of robbery with homicide
is reclusion perpetua, to be imposed only once even if multiple killings
accompanied the robbery. Furthermore, the discussion by the trial court of the
attendant circumstances was unnecessary because Article 63 of the Code
provides that when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied without regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the crime.
The civil indemnity for each of the three victims is reduced to P30,000.00, to be
paid to their respective heirs. The heirs of Alexander Sy are also awarded the
additional sum P330,000.00, representing the value of the articles taken from him
by the accused.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of all the accused-appellants is AFFIRMED, but
each of them is sentenced to only one term of reclusion perpetua for the crime of
robbery with homicide. The monetary awards are also modified in accordance
with the preceding paragraph. It is so ordered.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41265 February 27, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO PATOLA and EUNILLO SANGAYON, accused whose death sentence is
under review.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Juan Luces Luna (counsel de oficio) for accused.

AQUINO, C.J:

This is a review of the death penalty imposed upon Feliciano Patola and Eunillo
Sangayon by the Court of First Instance of Davao, Tagum Branch 8. They were
convicted of robbery with rape with the use of deadly weapons and ordered to pay
Roman Cohado P4,500 as value of the stolen goods,
Patola was ordered to pay Mila Amoguis, his rape victim, P10,000 as moral damages
while Sangayon was ordered to pay the same amount to his rape victim Elena Odal.
Patola appealed from the said decision.
Accused Sangayon executed an extrajudicial confession (Exh. B). The prosecution's
evidence shows that at about eight o'clock in the evening of September 7, 1973 in the
store of Roman Conado located at Barrio Switch, Maco, Davao del Norte, Mila Amoguis
and Elena Odal, salesgirls, were piling up the goods as it was closing time. Feliciano
Patola, Eunillo Sangayon, 22, and two unidentified persons were still in the store
drinking beer.
Unexpectedly, Sangayon closed the door of the store, Patola, with a gun in his hand,
approached Mila and told her not to shout if she did not want to die. Patola and
Sangayon herded Mila, Elena, the Cohado couple and their son William to an adjoining
room and told them to lie down on the floor face down. They were hogtied with nylon
ropes. Their mouths were stuffed with pieces of cloth torn from the curtains.
Patola, Sangayon and their two companions ransacked the store and took away P1,700
in cash, appliances, a wrist watch and other things with a total value of P4,500. (The
fact of the robbery is shown in the five photographs of the rooms in Cohado's house
taken the next day, Exhibits F to I.)
Then, Sangayon untied the feet of Elena and brought her to a room and abused her.
After Sangayon was through, his companion entered the room and in turn abused
Elena. The second robber brought Elena to the sala, hogtied her again and covered her
with a blanket. Mila was untied by Patola and brought to another room where he
ravished her.
The next day the rural physician examined Mila. There were contusions in her labia
majora and labia minora. Her fourchette was bleeding. Her hymen was ruptured. There
were fresh lacerations at the three o'clock and seven o'clock positions. Sperm cells
were found in her vagina. The physician concluded that she had been deflowered. Her
virginity was recently lost (Exh. D).
The same physician found that the labia minora of Elena had a contusion. Her
fourchette was lacerated. Her hymen was ruptured at the three o'clock and nine o'clock
positions. There were sperm cells in the vagina. As in Mila's case, the physician
concluded that she had been deflowered and her virginity was recently lost (Exh. E).

Patola and Sangayon were arrested six days after the commission of the robbery. They
were Identified by Mila, Elena and Zosima Conado. The revolvers used in the robbery
with rape were seized from them (Exh. L and M with bullets, Exh. N and 0).
Patola, Sangayon, Jesus Montecino and Alfredo Dalogdog were charged with robbery
with rape. They waived the preliminary investigation. They pleaded not guilty at their
arraignment. Upon motion of the fiscal, the case against Dalogdog was dismissed.
Montecino was acquitted by the trial court.
Patola's defense was that at the time the robbery with rape was committed he was in
Barrio Tuganay, Carmen, Davao del Norte. Sangayon's alibi was that he was in
Panabo, Davao. The trial court reasoned out that the distances of Panabo and Carmen
to Maco, the scene of the crime, did not preclude the accused from committing the
offense. It concluded that in any event the positive identification made by the rape
victims and the store-owner, Zosima Conado, should prevail over the alibis of the
accused.
Even if Sangayon's confession is not given any weight under section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution, the oral evidence against him is sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Mila remembered that Patola was wearing a pink shirt with long sleeves (10 tsn July 3,
1974). Elena declared that she struggled when Sangayon was trying to have sexual
congress with her. She saw his face (18-19 tsn August 29,1974). Zosima Conado
recognized Patola and Sangayon by their faces (32 tsn August 29, 1974). The store
was lighted by a flourescent lamp (9 tsn July 3, 1974).
Counsel de oficio contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in disregarding the
alibi of the accused, in convicting them of rape in the absence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused had carnal intercourse with Mila and Elena against
their will and in relying on Sangayon's confession and on Dalogdog's testimony.
These contentions are devoid of merit. As this is a case involving credibility of the
witnesses, the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight. Even if Dalogdog's
testimony is disregarded because he was not present during the robbery, the
testimonies of the offended parties are adequate to prove the special complex crime
charged.
The trial court found that nocturnity, dwelling and abuse of superiority were aggravating.
It imposed the death penalty because it applied article 335 of the Revised Penal Cade
on rape rather than its article 294[2] on robbery with rape.
The accused were charged with a crime against property, not a crime against chastity.
There was no complaint of the offended parties in this case. Robbery with rape is
punishable with reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua before article 294[2]

was amended by Presidential Decree No. 767 which took effect on August 15, 1975 and
which raised the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death when the rape is qualified.
There used to be a controversy as to whether robbery with qualified rape should be
penalized under article 294[2] or under article 335 which imposes a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
That controversy was set at rest in People vs. Cabural, L34105, February 4, 1983, 120
SCRA 528 and People vs. Porcare, L-37235, February 5, 1983, 120 SCRA 546, where
it was held that robbery with qualified rape should be punished under article
294[2]. (See People vs. Mendez, L-35491, May 27, 1983, 122 SCRA 415). It should be
stressed that in the case the accused were not charged with qualified rape alone, a
crime against chastity, but with robbery with rape, a crime against property.
The trial court applied in this case article 335. It regarded article 294[2] as having been
"amended" by article 335.That is why it imposed the death penalty. If article 294121,
before it was amended, is to be applied, the penalty is only reclusion perpetua. At any
rate, for lack of the necessary ten votes, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed with the modification that the
penalty imposed on the accused is reclusion perpetua. The indemnity for the qualified
rape should be raised to P20,000 in both cases. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas,
Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54567 March 22, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMETERIO DINOLA, accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

CORTES, J.:
Upon complaint by Marilyn Caldosa, the appellant-accused Emeterio Dinola was
charged before the Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Palo, Leyte with the
crime of robbery with rape under the following information:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 21st day of October, 1977 in the Municipality of
Alangalang, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly
weapon, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge with one Marilyn Caldosa,
and that on the occasion thereof, the said accused, by the use of force
upon the same Marilyn Caldosa, and with intent to gain, did then and there
wilfully and feloniously take and carry away the wrist watch of Marilyn
Caldosa, to her damage and prejudice in the amount of P300.00, the
money value of the watch.
Contrary to law. [Rollo, p. 8.]
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded "not guilty" [Rollo, p. 10]. After trial, the court a
quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with rape and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the victim in the amount of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00)
and to pay the costs [Rollo, pp. 11-12].
From the judgment of conviction, the accused filed the present appeal assigning the
following as errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE IMPROBABILITIES IN
THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT MARILYN CALDOSA.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING THE BURDEN UPON THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE AND IN NOT ANALYZING THE STATE'S
EVIDENCE TO ARRIVE AT A CONCLUSION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [Rollo,
p. 65.]
The evidence for the prosecution consisted primarily of a medico-legal certificate and
the testimonies of complainant Marilyn Caldosa and Dr. Sherlito Siao, the doctor who
conducted the physical examination on Caldosa after the incident allegedly occurred.

The medicolegal certificate of the complainant stated the following findings:

Findings:
No external sign of physical injuries
INTERNAL EXAM:
Introitus:
Admits 2 examining fingers with slight pain.
There is an incomplete laceration of the hymen at 6 o'clock position
There is a contusion 0.5 cm. at the 1 o'clock position of the hymen
Cervix: Negative Sperm Exam: Negative for
spermatozoa
Uterus: Not Enlarged
Discharges: None
xxx xxx xxx
[Exh. "A"; Rollo, p. 5.]
Dr. Sherlito Siao, a resident physician of the Daniel T. Romualdez Memorial Hospital
testified to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]hat on October 21, 1977, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he
conducted a physical examination of Marilyn Caldosa in connection with
an alleged rape case; that his findings were reduced to writing Exhibit "A"
which witness identified; that there were no signs of external physical
injuries; that there was incomplete laceration [of the hymen] which did not
extend to the base and it is possible that there was sexual contact; that
there was injury to the hymen caused by a blunt instrument, perhaps a
male organ, and could have been caused by forcible insertion; that no
spermatozoa was found as there was perhaps no ejaculation, recent
washing or there was no penetration of the male organ, and that the victim
was possibly raped.
xxx xxx xxx

[Trial Court Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 23.]

The testimony of complainant Marilyn Caldosa was summarized by the trial court as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . That she knows the accused, . . . and that she has known him for
more than a year as the accused resides in front of their house and had
previously worked for them and they would oftentimes converse as they
are friends; that on October 21, 1977, at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning,
she was at home sleeping [alone] in the house of her aunt, Gertrudes Vda.
de Barraza, who was then in Tacloban . . .; that she was awakened by a
voice saying: "Do not make a noise or I will kill you. If you will not accede
to a carnal knowledge I will count from one to three and I will kill you."; that
she noticed a small bolo pointed towards her breast and she [was]
frightened . . .; that the person then placed himself on top of her and
placed his penis inside her vagina by push and pull; that the first push was
not successful and the person tried many times to put his penis inside
[her] vagina until he was able to do so and [she] felt pain; that while the
person was on top of her, she did not resist as he was (sic) big while she
is small and she cannot overcome him; that after having carnal knowledge
[with] her, the person lighted a candle and when he saw her "Citizen"
watch valued at P300.00 he grabbed it from her; that after the candle was
lighted, she saw that the person was "Eme" whose full name is Emeterio
Dinola . . .; that the accused left after grabbing her watch while she stayed
in bed as she was afraid and at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning she
went to the bathroom and washed her vagina as she felt dirty; that at
about 5:00 or 6:00 o'clock in the morning, she went to the house of the
son of her aunt in Barrio Binongtuan and they went to the Provincial
Hospital in Tacloban City to have her painful vagina treated, arriving there
at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning; that she was not treated that morning
as the doctor on duty was not there and they were requested to return in
the afternoon; that they were given a prescription for the medicine which
the son of her aunt bought while she went to school; that she went back to
the hospital in the afternoon and she was physically examined by Dr.
Sherlito Siao.
xxx xxx xxx
[Trial Court Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 23-25.]
The accused denied the complainant's allegations and offered the following counterstatement of facts:
xxx xxx xxx

. . . That on October 21, 1977, at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he

was at home in their farm at Barrio Caiguihan, Alangalang, Leyte, about 1
kilometer from the Poblacion of Alangalang; that the house belongs to his
father Inocentes Dinola and living with them were his step-mother and a
half-brother; that he does not know Marilyn Caldosa and her statement
that he raped her and stole her watch is not true as he knows nothing
about it; that it is not true that he lives infront (sic) of the house of the
victim in the poblacion as he lives in the farm; that he does not know
Gertrudes Vda. de Barraza; that he was fetched from the house of
Filemon Ramos at Calle Retana, Alangalang, Leyte on October 21, 1977
by Patrolman Augusto Salvatierra who told him that the Chief of Police
wanted to see him; that he went with Patrolman Salvatierra to the
Municipal Building but the Station Commander was not there; that it was
only "Cocoy" Caples who was there and who immediately maltreated him;
that he was never informed why he was summoned; that he was boxed,
kicked, and maltreated in many other ways by "Cocoy" Caples, including
being thrust at or jabbed with a pistol; that "Cocoy" Caples boxed his ears
with his (Caples) palms and blood came out and he lost consciousness;
that he was maltreated in the office of the Chief of Police; that while he
was in the Municipal Building on October 21 1977, he did not meet Marilyn
Caldosa and he did not see her the next day; that on October 22, 1977 he
was inside the jail and during the whole time that he was in jail in
Alangalang he never saw Marilyn Caldosa; that the charge against him is
a mere fabrication.
xxx xxx xxx
[Trial Court Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 28-19.]
The testimony of the accused was corroborated by the only other defense witness
Diosdado Dinola, the accused's half brother.
As in most rape cases where the complainant is the main prosecution witness, the issue
boils down to her credibility.
The accused assails the credibility of complainant Marilyn Caldosa by pointing to the
following factors which, according to the accused, negate the complainant's allegation of
the use of force on her: (1) there were no external signs of injuries on her body; (2) the
complainant did not make any resistance as in fact her hands were just on her sides
during the time the forced intercourse allegedly occurred; and (3) she did not say
anything to stop her assailant from consummating the act.
In the medico-legal certificate prepared by Dr. Sherlito T. Siao, it was stated that Marilyn
Caldosa sustained "[n]o external sign of physical injuries" [Exh. "A"; Rollo, p. 5]. This
statement was confirmed by the doctor when he took the witness stand [TSN, August 1,
1978, p. 3]. But from this medical finding alone, it can not be concluded that there is no

truth in the complainant's allegation of rape. The Court has already ruled that the
absence of external signs of physical injuries on the complainant does not necessarily
negate the commission of the crime of rape [People v. Malabad, G.R. No. 63219,
November 28, 1984, 133 SCRA 392; People v. Monteverde, G.R. No. 60962, July 11,
1986, 142 SCRA 668; People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 74653, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA
568].
But the accused, in order to impugn further the credibility of the complainant, relies on
the latter's admission that during the time the accused was on top of her, her hands
were on her sides and that she did not say anything to stop the accused.
It is true that when asked if the complainant resisted the accused while he was on top of
her, she said that she did not [TSN August 1, 1978, p. 10]. She also admitted that
during all the time that the accused was on top of her, her hands were just on her sides
[TSN, September 20, 1978, p. 19]. However, it must be remembered that according to
the complainant, when she was roused from sleep by the accused, the latter held a bolo
to her chest and threatened to kill her if she made any noise [TSN, August 31, 1978, p.
9]. Moreover, when asked to explain why she offered no resistance, she consistently
stated both on direct and cross-examination the following: "I cannot resist him because
he is bigger and I am small" [TSN, August 1, 1978, p. 10; "I did not anymore [resist]
because he was (sic) big and I was (sic) small" [TSN, September 20, 1978, p. 19].
The Court has already ruled that rape may be committed even if no force was used,
intimidation being sufficient. Intimidation includes the moral kind such as fear caused by
threatening the girl with a knife [People v. Garcines, G.R. No. L-32321, June 28, 1974,
57 SCRA 653]. The Court has likewise held that the admission of the victim that her
hands were on her sides while the accused was on top of her does not mean that she
consented to the act [People v. Modelo, G.R. No. L-29144, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA
639]. The complainant in this case, is a seventeen (17) year old lass while the accused
is a thirty four (34) year old laborer. In complainant's words: "he is bigger and I am
small." Considering, the size, age and strength of the accused, coupled by his use of a
bolo to threaten the complainant, the Court rules that the complainant's failure to resist
the accused does not detract from the fact that the latter employed intimidation in order
to have sexual intercourse with the latter. The law does not impose a burden on the
rape victim to prove resistance. What needs only to be proved by the prosecution is the
use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim.
The accused next takes issue with the statement of the complainant that after he
allegedly raped her, he lighted a candle, enabling the complainant to see his face and
recognize him. The accused finds it incredible for a perpetrator of a crime to give the
victim the chance to identify him. Thus, it is concluded by the accused that the
complainant has fabricated a tall tale of rape involving the two of them.
But in this day and age, it is not uncommon for criminals to be careless about or to even
intentionally reveal their identities to their victims. The failure by a criminal to conceal his
identity would not make the commission of the crime any less credible. Bragadoccio

among criminals is not uncommon. Very often too, they are secure in the thought that
they have instilled sufficient fear in their victims that the latter will not give them away to
the authorities.
The complainant in this case was able to identify her assailant with certainty. When
asked on the witness stand who had assaulted her, she replied that it was the accused,
Emeterio Dinola [TSN, August 31, 1978, p. 7]. On being told to identify her rapist and
with the permission of the trial court, she stepped down from the witness stand and
tapped the accused on the shoulder [Id.] The trial court found the complainant to be a
credible witness, and with good reason. A careful reading of the record of the case
shows the complainant's testimony regarding the circumstances of the rape and the
identity of the rapist to be direct, lucid forthright and, being totally untainted by
contradictions in any of the material points, deserves credence.
Lending further credence to the testimony of the complainant is the oft-repeated
observation of the Court that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit
that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that is the truth. It is her
natural instinct to protect her honor [People v. Itano, 109 Phil. 912 (1960); People v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 62387, June 19,,1985, 137 SCRA 99; People v. Ramilo, G.R. No.
52230, December 15, 1986, 146 SCRA 258; People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. L-40988,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 153]. As the trial Court noted:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [A]t the time of the incident the complaining witness was only 17 years
old, single, and a college student. She was then at the stage of life when
an individual prepares for the future. This Court cannot conceive that such
a person would seemingly jeopardize her future by the filing of the instant
case with its resultant adverse social effects unless the charges were true.
She would not willingly go through the rigors of a public trial wherein she
would have to relate, in detail, the atrocity committed upon her person
unless she was sure that it was the accused who committed such an
atrocity.
Further, aside from the allegation that the instant case is a mere
fabrication, no evidence has been adduced by the defense as to why the
complaining witness would fabricate a case against the accused. [Trial
Court Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 32.]
Finally, the Court finds significance in the fact that the complainant sought medical
examination immediately after the incident [TSN, August 31, 1978, p. 12]. This fact,
taken together with the other circumstances of the case, indicates that the fresh
laceration found by the doctor on her hymen [Exh. "A"; Rollo, p. 5] was inflicted against
her will.

In fine, the Court, after a thorough examination of the entire record of the case, finds no
substantial reason to depart from the established rule that the Supreme Court regards
with respect and will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses, unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which if
considered, might affect the result of the case [People v. Sinaon, G.R. No. L-15631,
May 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 260; People v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, January 27, 1989;
People v. Pedrosa, G.R. No. 56457, January 27, 1989].
Having sustained the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the complainant, the
defense put up by the accused, alibi, must necessarily fall. The Court has consistently
held that the alibi of the accused that he was not at the rape scene cannot stand against
the positive identification made by the complainant [People v. Soriano, G.R. No. L32244, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 740; People v. Deus, G.R. No. 63729, May 31, 1985,
136 SCRA 660; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA
569]. Alibi is inherently a weak defense [People v. Datahan, G.R. Nos. 77107-08,
January 21, 1988, 157 SCRA 215] especially, where as in this case, the same was
corroborated only by a relative of the accused [People v. Manuel, G.R. No. L-44461,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 248; People v. Macabenta, G.R. No. 72476, February 14,
1989].
The accused, in this case, was not satisfied in abusing the complainant. After satisfying
his criminal lust and upon seeing the watch on the girl's wrist, he again threatened to kill
the complainant if she did not hand over the watch. The complainant refused to give it
but he forcibly grabbed it from her. [Sworn Statement of Marilyn Caldosa dated October
22, 1977, p. 1; Rollo, p. 3]. The accused was charged and convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape.
However, it does not appear from the record of the case that when the accused entered
the house of the complainant, he already had the intention to rob the complainant. In
fact, the complainant testified that after she was raped by the accused, the latter lit a
candle, saw the watch on her wrist, threatened to kill her if she did not give it to him and
forcibly took it from her [TSN, August 31, 1977, pp. 10-11]. Hence, the taking of the
watch by the accused was more of an afterthought, even accidental. If the intention of
the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the
robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed [See People v. Canastre, 82 Phil.
480 (1948)]. However, if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after
committing rape also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the
criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby MODIFIES the judgment of the court a quo by
finding the accused guilty of two independent crimes of rape and robbery. The accused
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of not less than two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, to not more than eight (8) years
of prision mayor [Art. 294, par. 5, RPC in relation to Act No. 4103, as amended] for the
crime of robbery and to restore to the victim the watch which was taken or to pay its
value in the amount of three hundred pesos (P300.00). As for the crime of rape, since it

was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the accused must suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua [Art. 335, Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. III, Sec. 9 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution] and indemnify the victim the amount of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) [People v. Viray, G.R. No L-41085, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA 135].
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 92049 March 22, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN MORENO y ULTRA, and PAULINO DELORIA, accused,
REYNALDO MANIQUEZ, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for accused-appellant.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Accused Juan Moreno, Paulino Deloria and lone appellant Reynaldo Maniquez were
charged with the Crime of "Robbery with rape" in an information quoted as follows:
That on or about May 31, 1985, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
with intent of gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation and
by means of force upon things, to wit: by forcibly destroying with the use of
cutter and screw driver the window of the ground floor of House No. 1291
Paz St., Paco, this City, an inhabited house being used as a dwelling
place of RAJ MOHNANI and his family, and entering the said window, an
opening not intended for entrance or egress, did then and there wilfully,

unlawfully and feloniously break into and enter inside the said house and
once inside, poked their respective bladed/pointed weapons to said Raj
Mohnani and his wife, Sundri Mohnani, telling to call their maids, and
ordering them including their three (3) children to lie face down, took, stole
and carried away the following, to wit:
One (1) SONY TV 21" colored valued at P10,000.00
One (1) Betamax valued at 11,000.00
One (1) ROLEX wristwatch gold 10,000.00
One (1) PEGOT wristwatch blue w/ gold 10,000.00
One (1) Citizen quartz w. watch, gold 2,000.00
One (1) Computer Sharp Model 1500 10,000.00
One (1) Seiko wristwatch, silver 1,200.00
One (1) Citizen quarts, gold 1,500.00
One (1) Casio wristwatch 500.00
One (1) Cartier black 500.00
Six (6) assorted wristwatches 3,000.00
One (1) gold ring with initial "R" 5,000.00
Two (2) Gold bracelets 15,000.00
One (1) pair of gold earrings 2,000.00
Three (3) wallets with cash money 3,000.00
and US $134.00
Two (2) pairs of Bally shoes 5,000.00
One (1) bicycle 850.00
One (1) bottle Black Label whisky 500.00
One (1) Dunhill cig. lighter 7,000.00
One (1) Win electro lighter 500.00
One (1) Sony TV 16"
One (1) Headphone radio
Four (4) betamax tapes
One (1) Bally shoes
One (1) bag of assorted slippers
One (1) Yasaki rubber shoes
One (1) ROTA AIRE SUNBEAM
all valued at P98,550.00, Philippine Currency and US$134.00 or its
equivalent to P2,412.00, or all valued at P100,962.00 more or less,
belonging to said RAJ MOHNANI against his will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of
P100,962.00, more or less, Philippine Currency; that on this occasion, the
robbery was immediately accompanied by rape, the said accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, to wit: by using and poking their respective
bladed weapons on the person of Marry Ann Galedo y Caledo and
Narcisa Sumayo y de Alagdon, succeed in having sexual intercourse with
them against their will and consent.

Contrary to law. 1
Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, all three accused jumped bail. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Maniquez
was, however, reapprehended. The other tow, Juan Moreno and Paulino Deloria, could
not be found, although Juan Moreno has been reported dead. On the other hand, the
victims of the alleged rape, Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo, left their employer's
house shortly after the alleged robbery and rape for an unknown province, and thus
neither of them could testify at the trial.
On September 11, 1987, after trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment of
conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment against all the
Accused, as follows:
1. The Court finds the Accused Juan Moreno y Ultra, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, for the crime of robbery as defined in and
penalized by Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years ofprision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties of the law;
2. The Court finds the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez y de la Merced and
Paulino Deloria y Ramilla, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, for
the crime of robbery with rape and hereby sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties of
the law and hereby orders the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez to pay Mary
Ann Galedo and the Accused Paulino Deloria to pay Narcisa Sumayo, the
amount of P10,000.00, Philippine Currency, by way of damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
3. Ordering all the Accused to return to the Spouses Mohnani Raj and
Sundri Mohnani all the goods and appliances stolen by them as listed in
the aforementioned Information and if they failed and/or refused to do so,
to pay, jointly and severally, to said Spouses the value of said goods, in
the amount of P98,550.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
Since the decision involved the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the records of the case
were transmitted to this Court for review. Notice was sent to counsel of the accused to
file Appellants' brief but such notice was returned unclaimed. However, Reynaldo

Maniquez, who was detained at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, signified his
intention to plead his case, at the same time requesting this Court to appoint a
counsel de oficio since his previous counsel had allegedly abandoned him. His request
was granted, and counsel de oficio filed his brief, raising only one assignment of error:
that "the lower court gravely erred when it convicted the appellant with the crime of rape
on the basis of the affidavit of the alleged offended party, without hearing her testimony
in open court." 3
Accused-appellant is contesting, not his conviction for robbery, but only his conviction
for rape of Mary Ann Galedo, who was not presented as a witness during the trial.
The following facts as found by the trial court are undisputed:
As can be synthesized from the evidence in the record, it appears that
between 4:00 and 4:30 o'clock in the early morning of May 31, 1985, the
Spouses Mohnani Raj and Sundri Mohnani, both Indian nationals, but
residing in the Philippines, were sleeping in their house at No. 1291 Paz
Street, Paco, Manila, with their three (3) children. The couple had two
maids, namely, Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo, who were
sleeping in another room near the sala of the house.
The three (3) Accused agreed to rob the house of Mohnani Raj and Sundri
Mohnani. At first, the Accused Juan Moreno had, in mind, robbing a house
in Makati but when he saw that there were policemen in the vicinity, the
house of the Indian couple became their prime target. Seemingly, aside
from the three Accused, they had another confederate, a jeepney driver,
who agreed to use his jeepney on which to load the loot taken by the
Accused from the house of the couple. When the Accused reached the
vicinity of the house of the couple, the jeepney was parked nearby about
four (4) meters away from the house of the couple.
The Accused Juan Moreno entered the house first by cutting the iron grills
of the window of the house. In the meanwhile, the Accused Paulino
Deloria patrolled the street nearby for any persons or tanod in the vicinity.
The Accused Reynaldo Maniquez, on the other hand, acted as the lookout. After a while, Juan Moreno emerged from the house, with a pair of
scissors. The Accused Juan Moreno handed over to the Accused
Reynaldo Maniquez the pair of scissors and ordered the latter to look for
Paulino Deloria.
Thereafter, the trio entered the house together, using a flashlight.
It was at that point in time that the son of the couple, Pran, was going out
of the bedroom of the couple to urinate. The spouses were awakened
when the three Accused Juan Moreno, Reynaldo Maniquez and Paulino
Deloria entered their bedroom. The Accused Paulino Deloria, who was

armed with a gun covered with a towel, switched on the lights inside the
bedroom of the couple and stood by the door. The Accused Reynaldo
Maniquez, on the other hand, sat on the stomach of Mohnani Raj, at the
same time, warning the latter not to shout, while poking the pair of
scissors on him. The Accused Juan Moreno posted himself beside where
Sundri Mohnani Raj was lying down, while poking his knife at her.
The Accused Juan Moreno told Sundri Mohnani to remove all her
belongings and her handbag and warned her not to shout. The said
Accused was able to take from her a watch, two (2) Indian bangles, two
(2) rings and P1,000.00 cash. The Accused Paulino Deloria also told
Sundri Mohnani to remove her watch and other personal belongings and
asked her if she had money. Sundri Mohnani gave the said Accused her
money. The Accused Reynaldo Maniquez asked Sundri Mohnani for the
wallet and the latter told the Accused that the wallet was on top of the
airconditioning unit. The Accused Paulino Deloria asked her where her
maids were and Sundri Mohnani told the Accused where their maids were
sleeping. Sundri Mohnani, thereupon, accompanied Paulino Deloria and
Reynaldo Maniquez to the room of their maids, near the sala. When
Sundri Mohnani and the two (2) Accused entered the room of the maids,
Sundri Mohnani instructed her maids not to shout and to go to the room of
the Spouses.
However, the Accused Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez told the
maids to go with them stead. Reynaldo Maniquez brought Mary Ann
Galedo to the bathroom of the house while Paulino Deloria brought
Narcisa Sumayo to the sala.
Sundri Mohnani was afraid to go out of the bedroom. However, she
peeped through the door of the bedroom which was then open. Although
she could see the bathroom, the door to the bathroom was closed. She
could not, moreover, see the sala from where she was.
After about five (5) minutes, Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez and
the two (2) maids returned to the room of the couple. Sundri Mohnani saw
that the zipper of the pants of Reynaldo Maniquez was still open. Narcisa
Sumayo was crying while Mary Ann Galedo was lying in bed, quiet. The
two (2) maids were told to lie down. Sundri Mohnani asked Narcisa
Sumayo why she was crying, but the latter did not respond. The Accused
Paulino Deloria told Narcisa Sumayo to stop crying. After two or three
minutes, Reynaldo Maniquez closed the zipper of his pants and went out
of the bedroom and took the wallet of Mohnani Raj on his way out.
Thereupon, the Accused left the room and ransacked the house. The
Accused Juan Moreno took the television and Betamax set from the room

of the couple while the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez took a Betamax and
the wallet of Sundri Mohnani Raj.
The three Accused forthwith carted from the house the belongings and
things they took from the house. They waited for the jeepney to arrive.
After a while, the jeepney parked nearby came along. The three Accused
thereupon loaded their loot inside the jeepney. Juan Moreno rode in the
jeepney while the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez walked home.
After the Accused left the residence of the couple, Sundri Mohnani locked
their door while Mohnani Raj shouted "Nakaw, nakaw". When the couple
went out of their room, they saw their door to the house opened and the
iron bars on the window were destroyed.
The couple called up the police who later responded and arrived in their
house. There were also about twenty or so people who offered succor to
the couple. The police officers were told of the circumstances of the
robbery-rape perpetrated by the Accused.
The couple were able to recover, from across the street from their house,
some of their belongings stolen by the Accused, namely, one (1) rota air,
one (1) Sony television, head phone, four (4) Betamax tapes, one (1) pair
Bally shoes and one (1) pair of rubber shoes. One bag of assorted
slippers was found near the gate of their house.
Mohnani Raj, his brother-in-law and his son later proceeded to the police
station at about 5:45 o'clock that morning to make a formal report of the
robbery. The police investigators were furnished with a list of the
belongings stolen by the Accused. Forthwith, Pat. Rodolfo Soriano, of the
Theft & Robbery Unit of the Crimes Against Property Section of the
Western Police District prepared and signed, on May 31, 1985, an Alarm
Report, based on the investigation of the police officers wherein is listed
the properties stolen by the Accused, and the values thereof, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is alleged in said Report that after the accused ransacked the house of
the couple and took their appliances and belongings, the two maids were
dragged to the sala and bedroom and were sexually abused, and that the
two (2) maids will be furnished with the request for a medico legal
examination of said maids (Exhibit "J-1").
xxx xxx xxx
Further investigation of the case was turned over to Pat. Cecilio
Banzagales, Jr. the next day, June 1, 1985. On June 12, 1985, the police

investigators received information that the Accused Juan Moreno could be

found at Union Street, Paco, Manila. The police thereupon arrested the
Accused Juan Moreno. At 12:00 noon of the same day, the Accused
Reynaldo Maniquez was apprehended by the police officers. The said
Accused informed the police officers of the whereabouts of the Accused
Paulino Deloria at Taguig, Metro Manila. The latter Accused was arrested
at about 3:00 o'clock that day in said place. 4
On June 14, 1985, at 8:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Mary Ann Galedo and
Narcisa Sumayo had themselves examined by Dr. Marcial Ceido of the
Medico Legal Section of the Western Police District. On his physical
examination of Mary Ann Galedo, the doctor made the following findings:
1. Breasts are fairly developed, conical in shape, pendulous
and soft and with dark brown prominent nipples and arcelae;
2. Abdomen is flat, soft and with striae of pregnancy;
3. Multiple old healed lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock
positions extending to the base, while hymen as a whole is
thick;
4. Introitus vagina admits two (2) examining fingers with
moderate resistance;
5. Vaginal wall is lax and with flattering of rugosities; and
6. Last menstrual period June 11, 1985 for 4 days.
OPINION:
The above findings is consistent with a woman who has
already given birth.
Exhibit "M".
which findings are "consistent with a woman who has already given birth
(Exhibit "M"). On his examination of Narcisa Sumayo, the doctor made the
following findings:
1. Breasts are fully developed, firm, hemispherical in shape
and with small brownish nipples and areolae;
2. Abdomen is flat, firm and without striae of pregnancy;
3. Hymen is relatively thick, circular in shape and intact;

4. Introitus vagina admits one (1) examining finger with

moderate resistance and would not admit the tip of two (2)
examining fingers;
5. Vaginal wall is firm and with prominent rugosities; and
6. Last menstrual period May 25, 1985 for 4 days.
OPINION:
The above findings is consistent with a woman who is a
virgin.
Exhibit "M".
which findings are consistent with a woman who is a virgin (Exhibit
"M"). 5
The trial court in convicting appellant and accused Deloria of the crime of rape stated as
follows:
. . . While concededly, there is no direct evidence to prove the crime of
rape considering that Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo, after they
executed their respective statements before the police investigators, left
for their respective provinces and that their whereabouts were unknown to
the Prosecution, nevertheless, there is sufficient, ample and convincing
circumstantial evidence in the record proving the guilt of the Accused
beyond peradventure of doubt for the crime of rape.
The testimony of Sundri Mohnani is vital. Thus, she positively and
spontaneously testified that he saw the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez bring
Mary Ann Galedo from her room to the bathroom. The two of them, the
Accused Reynaldo Maniquez and Mary Ann Galedo staying inside the
bathroom for about five (5) minutes. After the lapse of said time, Mary Ann
Galedo and the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez went out of the bathroom.
Mary Ann Galedo proceeded to the bathroom of the couple. Sundri
Mohnani saw the zipper to the pants of the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez
still open. It was only after two (2) minutes that the Accused Reynaldo
Maniquez bothered to close the zipper of his pants.
The Accused Paulino Deloria and Narcisa Sumayo likewise stayed in the
sala of the house for about said period of time of five (5) minutes after said
Accused brought her from her room. When Narcisa Sumayo returned to
the bedroom of the couple, she was crying profusely, most possibly
because of the emotional shock and traumatic experience she went
through in the sala. Mary Ann Galedo, on the other hand, sat on the bed

quiet. Because of her persistent cries, Narcisa Sumayo had to be ordered

by the Accused Paulino Deloria to stop crying.
While it may be true that when Sundri Mohnani asked Narcisa Sumayo
why she was crying, the latter did not respond, and that Mary Ann Galedo
was lying in bed, quiet, however, the failure of Narcisa Sumayo to respond
and the silence of Mary Ann Galedo is understandable. It is to be noted
that the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez and Paulino Deloria were still inside
the bedroom standing guard and holding their weapons. The two Accused
had threatened the two maids that they would be killed. There was thus
the ever-present possibility that if the two maids talked about what
happened to them, the two Accused might kill them.
When the police investigators responded to the calls for succor from the
couple and proceeded to the house of the latter immediately after they
received said calls that early morning, the police officers were forthwith
informed of the sexual abuse the two maids suffered at the hands of the
two Accused and this is reflected in the Alarm Report prepared by Pat.
Rodolfo C. Soriano Exhibit "J-1", on May 31, 1985, . . . :
xxx xxx xxx
The testimony of Sundri Mohnani was partially corroborated by no less
than the Accused Reynaldo Maniquez himself when he affirmed and
confirmed on the witness stand the allegation of Sundri Mohnani that the
Accused brought Mary Ann Galedo to the bathroom and stayed with her
inside the bathroom, although the Accused averred that they did so only
for less than two (2) minutes. 6
Although Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo were not presented by
the Prosecution as its witnesses, however, when the Prosecution offered
the aforementioned written statements of the two (2) maids, the counsel of
the accused did not object to the admission of said evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the Accused thereby waived their right to cross-examine
the said affiants and such statements are admissible in evidence and the
Accused became bound to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting
from said evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the contents of the Alarm Report, Exhibit (sic) "J" and "J-1"
anent the rapes of the two maids, prepared by the police in the

performance of his duties as such police officer and investigator are prima
facie of the facts contained therein:
Sec. 38. Entries in official records. Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty especially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Section 38, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
Considered from another angle, the Alarm Report, Exhibit "J" was
prepared on the very day when the two maids were raped. The
informations about the rapes of the maids were relayed to the police
officers shortly after the rapes were committed and the same reported to
the police investigators. Patently, therefore, the declarations of the two
maids who forthwith informed the police officers of the rapes are
admissible in evidence as part of the "res gestae" and as an exception to
the hearsay rule:7
In effect, there are two issues raised in this appeal:
(1) Whether the affidavit executed by Mary Ann Galedo narrating the
circumstances of her rape was properly considered as evidence without
her testimony in open court, and
(2) Whether, without such affidavit, there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged rape was
committed by the accused-appellant, Reynaldo Maniquez.
Counsel for appellant claims that in the absence of Galedo's testimony in court, her
affidavit is hearsay evidence and was thus inadmissible for the purpose of proving the
allegation of rape.
Admittedly, Galedo's affidavit would be hearsay evidence if she did not testify as to its
contents at the trial. The accused was not given the opportunity to face and crossexamine her on her accusations, a right guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
However, there are exceptions to the rule on inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, and
one of these is when it is part of the res gestae. Section 42 of Rule 130, Rules of Court,
provides:
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as a part of the res gestae. . . . .

This exception is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy because
made instinctively, "while the declarant's mental powers for deliberation are controlled
and stilled by the shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances
at the time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by
retrospective mental action". 8 Said natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived
to be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness stand. 9
Immediately after the three accused left the house where the crime was committed, and
the threatening presence of the accused was gone, both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa
Sumayo told their employers, the Mohnani spouses, that they were raped. The latter
later testified in court as to these statements. These were thus part of the res
gestae since they were spontaneously made after their harrowing experience, as soon
as the victims had the opportunity to make them without fear for or threat to their lives.
More important even is the straightforward and clear testimony of Sundri Mohnani, wife
of Raj Mohnani, their employer. She testified in court that she saw appellant enter their
bathroom with Galedo. She saw him close the door and later come out after about five
minutes, with the zipper of his pants still unzipped. She saw him zip it up some minutes
later. This testimony was partly corroborated by appellant himself who admitted on the
witness stand that he went inside the bathroom with Galedo, but denied having raped
her.
Aside from the testimony of the victim herself, it is not often that direct evidence of rape
is available. The act of rape itself is rarely witnessed by a third party. More often than
not, only circumstantial evidence can be given. And such evidence can be the basis of
conviction, provided certain requisites are present. Section 4 of Rule 133, Rules of
Court, provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although the medical examination of Galedo was inconclusive as to whether she was
raped, there are several other circumstances tending to prove that she was, namely: the
act of appellant in taking her to the bathroom, closing the door and leaving it only after
about five minutes; the fact that his fly was open when he left the bathroom; and the
spontaneous statement of Galedo to her employers that she was raped. These facts
were all part of the testimonies of witnesses who were given credence by the trial court
and must thus be considered as proven. We find no reason to question the latter's
judgment as to the truth of these testimonies. Finally, taking all these facts together, We

are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of having raped Mary
Ann Galedo.
With respect to Paulino Deloria who was also found guilty by the trial court of the crime
of Robbery with rape against Narcisa Sumayo, the circumstantial evidence presented
against him consists of Sumayo's statement to Raj Mohnani that Deloria raped her, and
the testimony of Sundri Mohnani to the effect that Deloria took Sumayo to thesala.
Although Sundri did not see what happened in the sala as it was out of everybody's
sight, she stated that when Deloria and Sumayo came back after about five minutes,
Sumayo was crying profusely. Raj Mohnani also testified that Sumayo was crying for
some time and could not stop until she was threatened by Deloria. It is true that the
medical examination of Sumayo showed that her hymen was intact. However, this fact
alone does not necessarily signify that Sumayo was still a virgin, and does not preclude
the fact that she may have had sexual intercourse. A well-known authority on Legal
Medicine has this to say on the subject:
Although unruptured hymen is commonly mentioned as a distinguishing
feature of virginity, it is not always a sure indication of preservation of
virginity. A woman might have had previous sexual intercourse and yet the
hymen remains unruptured, while others might have experienced sexual
relations, but with laceration of the hymen. 10
This Court has previously held that an intact hymen does not preclude rape.
The ruling of the court below as regard Pastores must be affirmed. It must
be remembered that the fact that a woman's hymen has no sign of
laceration does not preclude a finding of rape. For the rupture of the
hymen or laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is not
indispensable to a conviction for rape; it is enough that there is proof of
entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. 11
Thus, despite the fact that the medical examination of Sumayo showed that the hymen
was still intact, it is not inconsistent with a finding that Deloria raped her. Why did he
bring her to a place where no one could see what he intended to do? Why did Sumayo
cry so violently that she could not stop until her tormentor Deloria threatened her and
ordered her to stop crying? Why did she tell her employer as soon as the three accused
left, that she was raped? We are convinced that there is only one answer to these
queries: because she was indeed violated by Deloria.
With respect to the charge of robbery, appellant does not question his conviction by the
lower court. The records show strong and ample evidence more than sufficient to
support the conviction of all three accused of the crime of robbery. They all conspired to
rob the victim's house; they cut the iron grills of the window for the purpose of gaining
entry into the house; Moreno was armed with a .38 paltik gun and appellant with a pair
of scissors; they hogtied and intimidated Raj and Sundri Mohnani; and they carted away
in a waiting jeep everything they could get from the Mohnani household from big

appliances like 21" TV set, to several kinds of watches and jewelry, to shoes and
slippers. Appellant, who was the only one of the three accused who testified in court,
practically admitted all these facts, although he tried to minimize his share of the loot.
Therefore, accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the rape, is guilty of robbery only
under Article 294, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to appellant Reynaldo
Maniquez, who is herein found to have raped Mary Ann Galedo, he should be guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with rape, under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, as correctly found by the lower court. However, the trial court in fixing the
penalty imposed on the accused failed to take into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nocturnity and the use of a motor vehicle. The aggravating
circumstance of dwelling is considered because the crime was committed in the place of
abode of the victims. It is obvious that the accused used the cover of the night to
facilitate the commission of the crime, and intentionally contracted for and used a motor
vehicle to insure the success of their criminal plot.
But since it was only accused Reynaldo Maniquez who appealed the lower court's
decisions, the corresponding increase in the penalty brought about by the appreciation
of the mentioned aggravating circumstances will not affect the sentences imposed upon
the two other accused Deloria and Moreno who did not appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court finding the accused-appellant
Reynaldo Maniquez guilty of the crime of robbery with rape, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties of the
law, is hereby AFFIRMED. We furthermore order the accused-appellant Reynaldo
Maniquez to pay Mary Ann Galedo, the sum of P30,000.00 by way of damages without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION

[G. R. No. 118133. February 28, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO BALACANAO y

QUINES, ROBERTO SALVADOR y AGCAOILI, MARTIN SORIANO, y
NARAG, ERIBERTO BATUELO y BALACANAO, ELPIDIO GANGAN, y
BALISI, ABRAHAM CAMAYANG y PAGULAYAN, TACIO ACORDA y
BISALDE, RUBEN ACORDA y LAYUGAN, LORENZO CARONAN y CANAPI,
ELVIS BANGAYAN, GIL TAMBIAO, VILLAMOR AGANA, JESSIE ACORDA,
HERMINIO ACORDA y MABUTI and DAMASO CABANA, accused.

ROBERTO SALVADOR y AGCAOILI, MARTIN SORIANO y NARAG, ERIBERTO

BATUELO y BALACANAO, ELPIDIO GANGAN y BALlSI, ABRAHAM
CAMAYANG y PAGULAYAN, TACIO ACORDA y BISALDE, and RUBEN
ACORDA y LAYUGAN, accused-appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On June 24, 1990, fifteen (15) armed men stormed the house of the spouses
Manuel and Estelita Calata in barrio Casingsingan Norte, Amulung, Cagayan.
Two days after the incident or on June 26, 1990, Estelita executed a sworn
statement charging Eriberto Batuelo, Elpidio Gangan, Roberto Salvador, Martin Soriano
and Roberto Balacanao of robbery with rape, along with five other persons.
The following day, June 27, 1990, Manuel also executed a sworn statement
particularly identifying Soriano as one of the reprobates.
Thereafter or on July 2, 1990, a criminal complaint for robbery with multiple
rapes[1] was filed by Police Investigator Cuntapay against Balacanao, Batuelo, Gangan,
Salvador, Soriano and five John Does.
After a preliminary examination conducted by Judge Rafael P. Carag of the Fifth
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Iguig, Cagayan, an appropriate information was
recommended to be filed on August 22, 1990.
The station commander of the Amulung Police Station later received an anonymous
letter[2] dated 10-22-90 divulging that a certain Damaso Cabana was one of the
architects of the June 24, 1990 incident.
Cabana was thus taken into police custody on November 5, 1990 following which
he executed a sworn statement[3] dated November 6, 1990 admitting his participation in
the incident and identifying his associates as Jessie Acorda, Minio Acorda, Ruben
Acorda, Tacio Acorda, Villamor Agana, Amoy Balacanao, Elvis Bangayan, Abraham
Camayang, Ensu Caronan, Gil Tambiao, and four (4) other unnamed persons who
turned out later to be Batuelo, Gangan, Salvador and Soriano. A reinvestigation of the
case was thus conducted.
After the reinvestigation, Cabana and the fourteen he implicated were charged, by
Information[4] dated August 29, 1991, before the Regional Trial Court Branch 1 of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan for Robbery with Rape allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about June 24, 1990, in the municipality of Amulung, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with guns, conspiring together and helping one another with intent to gain and by the
use of force, violence and intimidation of persons entered the house of the
complainant[s], Mr. and Mrs. Manuel A. Calata, and once inside the house did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away against the will of
the owner, the following items:

One (1) Karaoke sing-along valued at P4,500.00

One (1) Wall clock valued at 300.00
Assorted jewelries all valued at 3,000.00
Assorted merchandize all valued at 2,500.00
One (1) Samurai valued at 550.00
Cash money in the amount of 300.00
PNB and LAND BANK Bank Books, a
wallet containing pertinent papers, assorted
keys and other items
TOTAL VALUE P11,150.00
all valued at P 11,150.00 and all belonging to the complainant[s] Mr. and Mrs. Manuel
A. Calata, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid owner[s] Mr. and Mrs. Manuel
A. Calata in the aforesaid amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
(P11,150.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency; that on the same occasion of the robbery,
the above-named accused likewise armed with their aforesaid firearms, with lewd
designs and by the use of force, violence against and intimidation of persons did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse one after the other
with the offended party, Estrella (sic) Calata against her will.
Contrary to law.
Five of those charged, namely: Jessie Acorda, Herminio Acorda, Villamor Agana,
Elvis Bangayan and Gil Tambiao, eluded arrest.
Balacanao, Caronan, Batuelo, Camayang, Gangan, Salvador, Soriano and Tacio
Acorda pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
On motion of the prosecution, Damaso Cabana was discharged to become a state
witness.
From its evidence, the prosecution established the following version:
Between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. of June 24, 1990, Abraham Camayang, leader of a
group of notorious characters from Solana, Cagayan (Solana group), and his henchman
Villamor Agana went to the house of state witness Cabana in Casingsingan Norte,
Solana, Cagayan and invited Cabana to join them for an unspecified purpose.
Acceding, Cabana joined the two who were later joined by seven Solana group

members, namely: Gil Tambiao, Elvis Bangayan, Lorenzo Caronan, Jessie Acorda,
Herminio Acorda, Tacio Acorda and Ruben Acorda.
The Solana group, along with Cabana, then repaired to the house of the spouses
Calata where another group of notorious characters from Amulung, Cagayan (Amulung
group) composed of its leader Roberto Balacanao, Elpidio Gangan, Martin Soriano,
Eriberto Batuelo and Roberto Salvador were already waiting in the vicinity.
Solana group leader Camayang thereupon gave directions to the two groups, he
posting Cabana, Hermino Acorda and Tacio Acorda as look outs along the road south
of the Calata house. Camayang, with four others, then entered the backdoor into the
kitchen of the Calata house, catching by surprise Estelita and her minor children 11
years old Claudette and Carlos who screamed. Estelitas husband Manuel, who was in
the sala, immediately dashed into the kitchen where he was met by Balacanao who
pushed him back into the sala and made him lie face down. His hands were at once tied
behind his back.
The second wave of malefactors soon entered the same backdoor of the Calata
house, after which Camayang and Batuelo held Estelita and her two young children at
bay. They then demanded money from the Calatas. In particular, Soriano made it
appear that they are subversives who needed money for the treatment of their comrade
who was injured in an encounter.
In the meantime, the Calatas neighbors Concepcion Lumboy, Celso Gorospe and
Renato Corpuz passed by chance by the Calata house. Attracted by the noise and
commotion inside the house, they proceeded thereto and once inside, they were
pounced upon and shoved into the sala where they were ordered to lie flat in a prone
position. Their hands were tied too behind their backs.
Caronan, to further instill terror, ordered one of his men to get a can of gasoline and
when a can of gasoline was brought, he told his cohorts to pour gasoline on the victims
and burn them.
As the crime wore on, Camayang dragged Estelita and her daughter Claudette into
a room beside the sala, the entrance of which room was covered only by a curtain.
Once inside the room, Camayang tore off the clothes of Estelita and Claudette. As
Claudette was crying, Camayang and his companions spared her and the naked girl
immediately ran to her bound father in the sala. Estelita was then raped by Camayang,
followed by Tacio Acorda, then by Caronan, and finally by Balacanao.
The bound hands of Manuel and his three neighbors were later untied by the
malefactors and they were ordered to remove their clothes. Caronan thereupon ordered
Celso Gorospe to dance naked amidst the rhythmic clappings and jeers of the
malefactors. The four were later ordered to put on their clothes but they were again tied
and ordered to lie flat on the floor.
Herminio Acorda later shouted get out now, people are coming, prompting the
malefactors to hurriedly flee with their loot consisting of cash, pieces of jewelry,
assorted goods, appliances, a samurai sword, bank books, a wallet, keys, a wall clock
and other items all valued at about P11,150.00. Thus, when the people referred to by

Herminio Acorda - a group of thirty men from the adjacent barangay of Calintaan
headed by their barangay captain Cesar Lacuesta - arrived at the Calata house, the
malefactors were gone.
On June 26, 1990, upon instruction of the police, Estelita submitted herself to a
medical examination. Dr. Dulce Baculi, the Municipal Health Officer of Amulung, came
out with her findings embodied in her Certification (Exhibit E)[5] which reads:
I. External Examination:
a. 1. Contusion at left jaw.
2. Slight swelling of upper lip.
b. No other external physical injuries noted on the victim.
II. Internal Examination:
a. Vulva on internal examination shows slight tenderness and smeared with blood.
Note: Victim is having her menstrual period.
For the defense, all the accused, disclaiming being acquainted with state witness
Damaso Cabana on or before the incident, proffered alibi.
After trial, the trial court found the accused Balacanao, Caronan, Batuelo,
Camayang, Gangan, Salvador, Soriano, Ruben L. Acorda and Tacio B. Acorda guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Rape, by Decision of May 3, 1994 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Roberto Balacanao y Quines, Roberto
Salvador y Agcaoili, Martin Soriano y Narag, Eriberto Batuelo y Balacanao, Elpidio
Gangan y Balisi, Abraham Camayang y Pagulayan, Lorenzo Caronan y Canapi, Tacio
Acorda y Bisalde and Ruben Acorda y Layugan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of Robbery with Rape aggravated by abuse of superior
strength and ignominy and hereby imposes upon each and everyone of them the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and
to pay in solidum Manuel and Estelita Calata the stolen properties in the amount of
P11,150.00 and moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 and cost.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis supplied)
The Decision has, with respect to Balacanao who did not appeal, become final and
executory.
Caronan and Camayang jointly filed a notice of appeal on May 12,
1994. Caronan, however, later filed an undated letter, which this Court treated as a
Motion, praying for the withdrawal[6] of his appeal in view of the extension to him of

executive clemency. This Court granted said Motion and accordingly dismissed the
case against Caronan by a Resolution of April 7, 1999.[7]
Salvador, Gangan, Soriano, Batuelo and Ruben Acorda (Salvador et al.) also jointly
filed a notice of appeal while Tacio Acorda and Camayang separately filed theirs.
Accused-appellant Tacio Acorda assigned as lone error of the trial court its finding
that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant Camayang challenges the trial court for having erred:
I. IN BASING ITS DECISION OF CONVICTION OF APPELLANT
(CAMAYANG) SOLELY ON THE CONFESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF
DAMASO CABANS [sic] PARTICULARY IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF
ACCUSED ABRAHAM CAMAYANG AS ONE OF THE CULPRITS;
II. IN NOT BELIEVING THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ABRAHAM AS CORROBORATED BY WITNESSES;
Ill. IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION INSTEAD OF WEIGHING THE EVIDENCES ADDUCED
DURING THE TRIAL, THERE BEING ABSENT THE INTENT OF ACCUSED
ABRAHAM CAMAYANGS PARTICIPATION (sic) IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE; and
IV. IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ABRAHAM CAMAYANG WHO
AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED WAS NOT
AT THE SCENE [OF THE CRIME AND WAS] MERELY IMPLICATED BY
[CABANA DUE TO] INTIMIDATION AND COERCION DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
And as to accused-appellants Salvador, et al., they fault the trial court in:
I. . . . FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ROBERTO A. SALVADOR,
ELPIDIO GANGAN, MARTIN N. SORIANO, ERIBERTO B. BATUELO AND
RUBEN L. ACORDA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE.
II. . . . ORDERING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROBERTO A. SALVADOR,
ELPIDIO GANGAN, MARTIN N. SORIANO, ERIBERTO B. BATUELO AND
RUBEN L. ACORDA TO PAY IN SOLIDUMTHE SPOUSES MANUEL AND
ESTELITA CALATA, THE AMOUNT OF P11,150.00 REPRESENTING THE
AMOUNT OF THE STOLEN PROPERTY AND MORAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF P500,000.00 AND COST.
Accused-appellants respective appeals lack merit.
Robbery with rape is a special complex crime[8] punished under the second
paragraph of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons- Penalties.- Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
xxx
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when
the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by
reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in
subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted: Provided, however, That when the
robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death; (As amended by P.D.
No. 767, August 15, 1975)
xxx
That the crime was committed is undisputed. The issue in the main is the identity of
the malefactors.
Accused-appellants contend that the prosecution failed to establish their identity as
participants in the crime, hence, it was error for the trial court not to have appreciated
their alibi.
Accused-appellants contention does not persuade.
From the following extracts of the testimony of state witness Cabana, and his
identification[9] in court of accused-appellants, there can be no mistaking their
participation in the crime:
(Atty. Maramag)
Q: When this case was filed before the Honorable Court you were one of the
original accused in this case, is it not?
(Cabana)
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell the Court why you were one of the accused in this case?
A: I was one of the accused because I was then in their company at that time
[June 24, 1990].
Q: You said you were one in their company kindly mention your companions at
that time?
A: Villamor Agana, Abraham Camayang, Elvis Bangayan, Gil Tambiao,
Lorenzo Caronan, Ruben Acorda, Tacio Acorda, Jessie Acorda, Minio
Acorda, Amoy Balacanao, Pidio Gangan, Martin Soriano, Eriberto
Batuelo, Berto Salvador and I am the 15th.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx

Q: At or about between the hour of 5:30 to 6:00 oclock in the evening of June
24, 1990 where were you?
A: I was in our house in Casingsingan, sir.
Q: What were you doing at that time in your house?
A: At that time I am (sic) going purposely to fetch water but here comes (sic) the
arrival of Villamor Agana and Abraham Camayang.
Q: Why did these two Abraham Camayang and Villamor Agana come to you?
A: At that time this Villamor Agana told me to come [sic] with them because we
are going somewhere else.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
(Court)
Q: When Villamor Agana and Abraham Camayang went to you and you went
with them you mean to say that it was only the three of you who proceeded
from your house up to the place where you were going?
xxx
A: When we started from our house we were only three but at the downgrade
portion of our house located at the southern part the other companions
were already there and we went together, sir.
Q: How many of them were already there at the southern portion of your
house?
A: They are seven in all, sir.
Q: Name them.
A: Gil Tambiao, Elvis Bangayan, Lorenzo Caronan, Jessie Acorda, Minio
Acorda, Tacio Acorda, Ruben Acorda.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
(Court)
Q: According to you [you] were ten in all who left your premises going towards
the house of Mr. Calata were you able to reach the house of Mr. Calata?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The Court understands that only the ten of you reached Calatas house?
A: Upon reaching near the house of Mr. Calata, the five others were already at
the eastern portion of the house of Mr. Calata then they joined us.
xxx
(Atty. Maramag)

Q: Will you please name those five who were on the eastern portion of the
house of Mr. Calata?
A: Amoy Balacanao, Elpidio Gangan and the other three I only came to know
their names while we were already at the PNP station at Amulung but I
already knew their faces at that time.
Q: You now name the three others whom you came later to know their names?
A: Martin Soriano, Eriberto (sic) Salvador, Berto Batuelo.[13] (Emphasis
supplied)
Estelita and Manuel positively identified too accused-appellants and described
their respective acts. Estelita thus testified in court:
(Fiscal Saquing)
Q: Who were these ten persons who entered your house if you know?
(Estelita)
A: I know them, sir. They were: Abraham Camayang, Ruben Acorda,
Anastacio Acorda, Ensu Caronan, Amoy Balacanao, Pedro [sic]
Batuelo, Gangan, Agana.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
(Court)
Q: You name those who allegedly entered your house one by one.
A: Abraham Camayang, Ensu Caronan, Ruben Acorda, Atanacio Acorda,
Damaso Cabana, Agana, Martin Soriano, Pedro (sic) Batuelo, Amoy
Balacanao, Roberto [sic] Gangan, sir.[15](Emphasis supplied)
xxx
(Fiscal Saquing)
Q: Who ransact (sic) your cabinets?
A: The accused, Tacio Acorda, Ruben Acorda, Ensu Caronan, Batuelo,
Gangan, Amoy Balacanao, sir.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
And she also positively identified accused Balacanao and Caronan and accusedappellants Camayang and Tacio Acorda as the four men who sexually abused her. [17]
Manuels identification of accused-appellants as participants is shown in his
following testimony:
(Court)
Q: When you said in answer to the question of Atty. Reyes that it was Damaso
Cabana and his group that went up your house and molest[ed] your wife,

who were the members of this group that you are referring [to] if you know
[their names]?
(Manuel)
A: Abraham Camayang, Roberto Balacanao, Lorenzo Caronan, Ruben
Acorda, and Tacio Acorda, and members from Amulung are Martin
Soriano, Eriberto Batuelo and Roberto Salvador.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
(Atty. Maramag)
Q: And this person who poked his gun at your face is Roberto Balacanao alias
Amoy Balacanao?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At the time when this Amoy Balacanao poked his gun and ordered you dapa,
dapa, where was your wife and two children at that time?
A: They were still at the kitchen and I saw Abraham Camayang h[o]ld the
hands of my wife and so with my two children, and also in (sic) the
person[s] of Roberto Salvador and Martin Soriano at the same time
demanding money.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
Q: How about when you were ordered by Amoy Balacanao to lay face
downward on the floor, what did you do?
A: I was brought to the sala and made me laid [sic] face downward by this
certain fellow in [sic] the name of Lorenzo Caronan.[20] (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx
(Atty. Cipriano)
Q: Who among them asked for money?
A: The companions of Abraham Camayang, sir.
Q: Do you know their names?
A: Martin Soriano and Ruben Acorda, sir.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
(Atty. Cipriano)
Q: Could you tell us what did this Eriberto Batuelo, what was the participation?
A: He held one of my children and demanded money at that time, sir.
Q: What is the name of your child?

A: Claudette, sir.
Q: How about this Elpidio Gangan?
A: The same, they are at the back of my wife and my two children,
sir.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
And Manuel and Estelita identified in court five of the seven accused-appellants,
with Estelita positively identifying accused-appellants Soriano, Gangan and
Batuelo[23] while Manuel identified accused-appellants Camayang, Salvador and
Soriano.[24]
In another vein, accused-appellants assail the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly drawing attention to Cabanas statement that there were five who
sexually abused Estelita which contradicts the latters testimony that there were four,
thus rendering his testimony unworthy of belief.[25] Accused-appellant Tacio Acorda
adds that Cabana was just used by Police Investigator Rodrigo Cuntapay to entangle
him in this case.
Accused-appellants also capitalize on the failure of Estelita to correctly identify her
sexual abusers during the preliminary investigation.[26]
Accused-appellants assault at the credibility of the prosecution witnesses fails.
Cabanas failure to point out the exact number of Estelitas sexual tormentors is of no
consequence, accused-appellants themselves having noted[27] that the testimony of
Cabana as regards this point is hearsay and inadmissible.
With respect to the claim that Cabana was merely used by Police Investigator
Cuntapay to implicate accused-appellant Tacio Acorda in the crime, the same finds no
support from the records and cannot accordingly defeat the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed.[28]
As for the questioned identification by Estelita during the preliminary investigation of
her sexual abusers, this did not escape the attention of the trial court when it noted as
follows:[29]
Estelita testified that the men whom she identified in court were the real rapists. She
explained that she committed the error during the previous identification (preliminary
investigation) due to nervousness and confusion on the names of the rapists in their
number and in the order or sequence of the sexual assaults upon her. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
xxx
But Estelitas explanation behind her error in the identification of her rapists during
the preliminary investigation merited the understanding and credence by the trial court
in this wise:

Estelita suffered what very few women in this world had gone through. She underwent a
most traumatic and nerve-shocking ordeal - a hideous, ghastly and outrageous blow
upon her feminine possession. To expect her tonarrate in court and in public her most
horrible and excruciating experience in
a perfect sequence of events and accurate identification of the reprobates whom, in the
first place, she did not personally know, is to beunreasonable....[30] (Underscoring
supplied).
xxx
Indeed, Estelitas confusion should not militate against her given the number of
malefactors and the ordeal she went through. What counts is that she was firm at the
witness stand that her rapists, and the order in which they raped her, were what she
mentioned thereat. Thus, on direct examination, she declared:
(Fiscal Saquing)
Q: After pulling you and stripping you off [sic] your dress, what did Abraham
Camayang do next?
(Estelita)
A: He pulled me down inside our room and tore my dress and pulled me down
on the floor and raped me, sir.
xxx
Q: After Abraham Camayang raped you, what happened next?
A: This Atanacio Acorda raped me again, he poked a gun and pulled me down
and because I am afraid to die I just submitted myself, sir.
Q: When Atanacio Acorda finished raping you, what transpired next if there
was?
A: Another came sir, and this Ensu Caronan again raped me.
xxx
Q: After this Ensu Caronan finished raping you what happened if there was?
A: This Amoy Balacanao raped me, again, sir.
x x x.
And on cross-examination

[31]

she declared:

(Atty. Cipriano)
Q: When you testified here in Court you said that it was Abraham Camayang
who first raped you but during the preliminary investigation you testified that
it
was
Roberto
Salvador
who
first
raped
you.
Now, which is correct, your statement during the preliminary investigation or
your statement now?

A: My testimony now before this Court, sir.

Q: You also testified during the preliminary investigation that [the] second
person who raped you was Martin Soriano but in your testimony now the
second person was [sic] Atanacio Acorda, which is correct?
A: Atanacio Acorda, sir.
Q: Your statement now before the Court?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You were then lying when you gave your statement during the preliminary
investigation?
A: I was confused only in their names but the truth is what I am testifying now.
Q: You have also statement during the preliminary investigation that it was
Elpidio Gangan who was the third person who raped you but before this
Court you said it was Ensu Caronan?
A: Ensu Caronan, sir.
Q: Not Elpidio Gangan?
A: Yes, sir. (Underscoring supplied)
Why would Estelita, a married woman and mother of four, [32] raped successively by
four men on one occasion, devise a sick narrative and expose herself to the unbearable
stigma and humiliation attendant to a trial for rape if she were not determined to punish
her malefactors?
In any event, Estelitas incorrect identification during the preliminary investigation of
her sexual abusers is inconsequential with respect to the criminal liability of accusedappellants. For at the trial court and during the preliminary investigation, she identified
Balacanao as one of those who sexually abused her. As conspiracy was proven and
rape was committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of the robbery, all the
conspirators-participants are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape.[33]
As for the brushing aside of accused-appellants alibis since they failed to prove that
it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime[34] on the date and
time it occurred, the trial court did not err thereby.
Thus, accused-appellant Tacio Acorda merely claimed that he was at the time
in Barangay Santiago, Municipality of Iguig the same province of Cagayan.
Accused-appellants Gangan, Salvador and Sorianos evidence claimed that they
were all in the same municipality of Amulung at about the time the crime was
perpetrated. But accused-appellant Gangans alibi is uncorroborated. And so is
accused-appellant Salvadors that he was at the house of Arsenio Agcaoili in Anquiray,
Amulung.[35] In fact, accused-appellant Salvadors testimony on other points is mired in
inconsistencies. Thus he first testified that he slept at the house of Agcaoli in Anquiray
because he (Salvador) had visitors at home that night.[36] He later retracted and said
they were visitors of his brother.[37] And while he initially stated that his brother told him

not to go or leave their house because they had visitors, he later said that it was
presumably the same brother who told him to leave.[38] As for accused-appellant
Soriano, he gave inconsistent statements with regard the date he was allegedly
assigned to act as guard at the dancehall in Pacac Grande, Amulung, he initially stating
that it was on June 25, 1990, but he later claiming that it was on June 24, 1990.
In accused-appellant Camayangs case, while he and accused Caronan testified that
they were at Pudtol, Kalinga-Apayao at about the time the offense was committed, at
work in the construction of presumably the same hospital, they surprisingly failed to
state that they saw each other on that day.
As for the other arguments of accused-appellants, they are bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant Camayangs claim that the trial court laid undue stress on the
sworn statement of Cabana[39] and that his guilt cannot be predicated thereon is belied
by the trial courts disquisition which shows that Cabanas sworn statement was only one
of the documentary bases for its decision.
The argument that Cabanas testimony was given under the compulsion of
irresistible force and insuperable fear[40] is purely speculative.
As for the argument that since Cabana is an unschooled farmer, the question-andanswer method of eliciting testimony cannot become the basis for accused-appellant
Camayangs conviction[41] deserves scant consideration.
Accused-appellant Tacio Acordas contention that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt because his name was never mentioned by the spouses Calata
during the preliminary investigation[42] fails. He was identified by Cabana during the
reinvestigation. More importantly, he was positively identified by Cabana and the
spouses Calata during the trial.
The lack of merit of the appeal notwithstanding, it being settled that an appeal
throws the entire criminal case open for review, it becomes the duty of appellate courts
to correct errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are
made the subject of assignment of errors or not.[43]
In the present case, the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating
circumstances of abuse of superior strength and ignominy is erroneous. The 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that every complaint or information
should state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. [44] This
provision may be given retroactive effect in light of the well-settled rule that statutes
regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, [hence] [p]rocedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[45] The aggravating circumstance
that advantage be taken of superior strength and ignominy not having been alleged in
the information in this case, the same could not be appreciated.
With respect to the award of P11,150.00 to the spouses Calata as actual damages
for the claimed stolen personal properties: Ordinary witnesses such as private
complainants cannot establish the value of jewelry. [46] Neither can the same be taken

judicial notice of.[47] The valuations made by Manuel and Estelita cannot thus become
the basis for reparation in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence.
Neither can reparation for the Karaoke sing-along appliance be ordered, absent
proof as to its description, kind/model and competent evidence of its value. [48] The same
holds true with respect to the assorted merchandise, the samurai, the wallet, the PNB
and Land Bank bankbooks and assorted keys. The wall clock having been admittedly
recovered,[49] only the amount of P10,000.00 cash stolen[50] established by the
prosecution which, though not the amount alleged in the information, was not objected
to and rebutted by the defense,[51] should be awarded.
It was also error for the trial court to award P500,000.00 as moral damages without
citing the basis therefor. Estelita is thus entitled to only an award of P50,000.00 for each
count of rape as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for each count as moral
damages.[52] Furthermore, an award to Manuel of P50,000.00 as moral damages is in
order.
WHEREFORE, the May 3, 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan,
Branch 1 at Tuguegarao, finding accused-appellants Roberto A. Salvador, Elpidio B.
Gangan, Martin N. Soriano, Eriberto B. Batuelo, Abraham P. Camayang, Ruben L.
Acorda and Tacio B. Acorda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of Robbery with Rape and sentencing them to each suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. They are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P10,000.00 to private complainants Manuel Calata and Estelita Calata as
actual damages; the amount of P50,000.00 to Estelita Calata for each count of rape as
civil indemnity, and another P50,000.00 for each count as moral damages; and the
amount of P50,000.00 to Manuel Calata as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 86163

April 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and
SIMPLICIO CANASARES, BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City, *dated 29 August 1988, in Criminal Case No. 20092,
finding him and his co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed
Canasares, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery with Serious
Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention" and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information filed against them reads:
The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO
CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose
maternal surnames, dated and places of birth cannot be ascertained of the crime
of ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION (Art, 294, paragraph 3, in conjunction with Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, conspiring and confederating
among themselves, working together and helping one another, armed with guns
and handgrenade and with the use of violence or intimidation employed on the
person of Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco and Rodita Hablero did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry away, with intent
of gain, cash in the amount of P20,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches, one (1)
Lady's Seiko quartz wrist watch and one (1) Lady's Citizen wrist watch and
assorted jewelries, all valued at P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason
of said robbery, Mary Choco suffered serious physical injuries under paragraph 2
of Article 263, Bienvenido Salvilla likewise suffered serious physical injuries and
Reynaldo Canasares also suffered physical injuries; that the said accused also
illegally detained, at the compound of the New Iloilo Lumber Company, Iznart
Street, Iloilo City, Severino Choco, owner/proprietor of said Lumber Company,
Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, who is a minor, being 15 years of age, and Rodita
Hablero, who is a salesgirl at said Company; that likewise on the occasion of the
robbery, the accused also asked and were given a ransom money of P50,000.00;
that the said crime was attended by aggravating circumstances of band, and
illegal possession of firearms and explosives; that the amount of P20,000.00, the
ransom money of P50,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches, two (2) lady's wrist
watches, one (1) .38 caliber revolver and one (1) live grenade were recovered
from the accused; to the damage and prejudice of the New Iloilo Lumber
Company in the amount of P120,000.00.
The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:

On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber
Yard at about noon time. The plan was hatched about two days before. The accused
were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they entered the
establishment, they met Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out
for her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go
back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino
Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter being a minor 15 years of age,
and told the former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his
daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00,
according to the defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with
the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no
heed. Instead, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino
after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept
there as hostages.
At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four
accused also took turns eating while the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told
Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be released.
Severino answered that he could not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks
were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the
lumber yard. Major Melquiades B. Sequio Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City,
negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and appealed to them to surrender
with the assurance that no harm would befall them as he would accompany them
personally to the police station. The accused refused to surrender or to release the
hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and joined the negotiations. In
her dialogue with the accused, which lasted for about four hours, Appellant demanded
P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them P50,000.00 instead,
explaining the difficulty of raising more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed
to receive the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco in going
out of the office. When they were out of the door, one of the accused whose face was
covered by a handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram
unlocked the padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which the latter, in
turn, gave to one of the accused. Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to
the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal
to the accused to surrender peacefully but they refused.1wphi1 UItimatums were given
but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military authorities decided to
launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie
and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary
suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg
had to be amputated. The medical certificate described her condition as "in a state of

hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several
major operations during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30,
1986."
For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon time of 12 April 1986 he
and his co-accused entered the lumber yard and demanded money from the owner
Severino Choco He demanded P100,000.00 but was given only P5,000.00, which he
placed on the counter of the office of the lumber yard. He admitted that he and his coaccused kept Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office. He maintained,
however, that he stopped his co-accused from getting the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino and, like the P5,000.00 were all left on the counter, and were never touched
by them. He claimed further that they had never fired on the military because they
intended to surrender. Appellant's version also was that during the gunfire, Severino's
daughter stood up and went outside; he wanted to stop her but he himself was hit by a
bullet and could not prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to them to
surrender but that they gave themselves up only much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced each of
the accused "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law and to pay the costs."
Appellant Salvilla's present appeal is predicated on the following Assignments of Error:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was consummated and
in not holding that the same was merely attempted.
2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender."
Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.
The defense contends that "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as
distinguished from an attempt requires asportation or carrying away, in addition to the
taking, In other words, the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the
giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away or asportation And without asportation the
crime committed is only attempted" (Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla, Records, p.
317).
There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal
property belonging to another. This is known as the element of asportation the essence
of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity
and consent and without the animus revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p.
97, citing 5 C.J. 607). In fact, if there is no actual taking, there can be no robbery.
Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an essential part of the crime of
robbery.

Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this
is because neither he nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by
Severino nor the latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of which is that
none of those items were recovered from their persons.
Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard
employee, testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a
paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused Simplicio
Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00
from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she
(the Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the amount to
one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1,
1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch
were within the dominion and control of the Appellant and his co-accused and
completed the taking.
The State established a "taking" sufficient to support a conviction of robbery even
though the perpetrators were interrupted by police and so did not pick up the
money offered by the victim, where the defendant and an accomplice, armed with
a knife and a club respectively, had demanded the money from the female clerk
of a convenience store, and the clerk had complied with their instructions and
placed money from the register in a paper bag and then placed the bag on the
counter in front of the two men; these actions brought the money within the
dominion and control of defendant and completed the taking. (Johnson vs. State,
432 So 2d 758).
"Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner and absolute control
of the property by the taker, even for an instant, constitutes asportation (Adams
vs. Commonwealth, 154 SW 381; State vs. Murray, 280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs.
Commonwealth, 105 SE 2d 149) [Emphasis supplied].
It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose
of the personalities taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime, From the
moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no
opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete (Reyes, Revised
Penal Code Annotated, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).
The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property,
even if for a short time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the
hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property away,
out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have
made his escape with it" (People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220
SW 2d 644; People vs. Beal, 39 P 2d 504; People vs. Clark, 160 P 2d 553).
Contrary to Appellant's submission, therefore, a conviction for consummated and not
merely attempted Robbery is in order.

It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen the taking because the
place was dark since the doors were closed and there were no windows. It will be
recalled, however, that Rodita was one of the hostages herself and could observe the
unfolding of events. Her failure to mention the taking in her sworn statement would not
militate against her credibility, it being settled that an affidavit is almost always
incomplete and inaccurate and does not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries
or suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G.R. No. L-63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570;
People vs. Tan, et al., 89 Phil. 337 [1951]).
The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino would not lessen her credibility.
The defense has not proven that she was actuated by any improper motive in testifying
against the accused.
In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers around the credibility of witnesses in
respect of which the findings of the Trial Court are entitled to great weight as it was in a
superior position to assess the same in the course of the trial (see People vs. Ornoza
G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Anent the second assignment of error, the "surrender" of the Appellant and his coaccused cannot be considered in their favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a
surrender must have the following requisites: (a) that the offender had not been actually
arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his
agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary (People vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L-62043,
13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).
The "surrender" by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements.
They were, indeed, asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but they
refused until only much later when they could no longer do otherwise by force of
circumstances when they knew they were completely surrounded and there was no
chance of escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be mitigating as when
he gave up only after he was surrounded by the constabulary and police forces (People
vs. Sigayan et al., G.R. Nos. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People vs.
Mationg G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not
spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. And while it is
claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not despite several
opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs.
Dimdiman 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we find the guilt of the
accused-appellant, Bienvenido Salvilla, established beyond reasonable doubt.
Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary to turn now to the nature of the
linked offenses involved and the penalty imposed by the Trial Court.

Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the Information with "Robbery with
Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal Detention ("Art. 295, par. 3, in conjunction
with Art. 267, RPC )and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We agree with the Trial Court
that a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code has been committed
such that the penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267,
Revised Penal Code), or "reclusion perpetua to death," is to be imposed instead of the
penalty prescribed for Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which
is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other." The term "necessary means" does not connote indispensable
means for if it did then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be
an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase
"necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure
the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p.
624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the
crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as it was selected by
Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design
to stage a robbery.
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66,
29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 325) where the accused were convicted of Robbery but
acquitted in the case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was held that "the
detention is absorbed in the crime of robbery." For one, in Astor, there were two (2)
separate Informations filed, one for Robbery and another for Serious Illegal Detention.
In the present case, only one Information was filed charging the complex offense. For
another, in Astor, the robbery had already been consummated and the detention was
merely to forestall the capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case, where
the detention was availed of as a means of insuring the consummation of the robbery.
Further, inAstor, the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery so that it
was held therein:
. . . were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival of the police at
the scene of the crime, they would have not anymore detained the people inside
since they have already completed their job. Obviously, appellants were left with
no choice but to resort to detention of these people as security, until
arrangements for their safe passage were made. This is not the crime of illegal
detention punishable under the penal laws but an act of restraint in order to delay
the pursuit of the criminals by peace officers (People v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265; People
v. Uday 55 Phil. 167, cited in the Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed.,
p. 1337). Where the victims in a robbery case were detained in the course of
robbery, the detention is absorbed by the crime of robbery (P. v. Baysa, 92 Phil.
1008, id.). In the case at bar, the detention was only incidental to the main crime
of robbery, and although in the course thereof women and children were also
held, that threats to kill were made, the act should not be considered as a
separate offense. Appellants should only be held guilty of robbery.

In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the robbery but
was a necessary means to commit the same.1wphi1 After the amount of P20,000.00
was handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused to leave. The
victims were then taken as hostages and the demand to produce an additional
P100,000.00 was made as a prerequisite for their release. The detention was not
because the accused were trapped by the police nor were the victims held as security
against the latter. The detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the
malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a means of extortion for an additional amount.
The police and other authorities arrived only much later after several hours of detention
had already passed. And, despite appeals to appellant and his co-accused to surrender,
they adamantly refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be
turned over to them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being handed to
them, as inadequate.
The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265
[1907] where the restraint was for no other purpose than to prevent the victims from
reporting the crime to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil. 1085 [1953]
where the victims were taken to a place one kilometer away and shot in order to
liquidate the witnesses to the robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 [1953];
People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all of which cases were cited in Astor and
where the victims were only incidentally detained so that the detention was deemed
absorbed in robbery.
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of the offense of Serious Illegal
Detention are present in this case. The victims were illegally deprived of their liberty.
Two females (Mary and Minnie) and a minor (Minnie), a specified circumstance in
Article 267 (3), were among those detained. The continuing detention was also for the
purpose of extorting ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.) not
only from the detained persons themselves but even from the authorities who arrived to
rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to the robbery
but a necessary means employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial Court
is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19491

August 30, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, ET AL., defendants,
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Alberto M. Meer for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the judgment rendered on August 30, 1961 by the Court
of First Instance of Bohol (Judge Hipolito Alo presiding) convicting Apolonio Apduhan,
Jr. of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to death and "to idemnify the heirs of
the deceased Geronimo Miano in the amount of P6,000.00, to indemnify the heirs of the
other deceased Norberto Aton in the same amount of P6,000.00 ..."
On August 2, 1961 the accused Apduhan, then represented by Atty. David Ocangas,
together with his co-accused Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson, both represented by
Atty. David Tirol, pleaded not guilty to a second amended information which recites:.
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior,
Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
in the Municipality of Mabini, Province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named
accused and five (5) other persons whose true names are not yet known (they
are presently known only with their aliases of Bernabe Miano, Rudy, Angel-Angi,
Romeo and Tony) and who are still at large (they will be charged in separate
information or informations as soon as they are arrested and preliminary
proceedings in Crim. Case No. 176 completed before the Justice of the Peace
Court), all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other
deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent
of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, by means of
violence, the dwelling house of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano,
which was also the dwelling house of their children, the spouses Geronimo
Miano and Herminigilda de Miano; and, once inside the said dwelling house, the
above-named accused with their five (5) other companions, did attack, hack and
shoot Geronimo Miano and another person by the name of Norberto Aton, who
happened to be also in the said dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon the said
two (2) persons physical injuries which caused their death; and thereafter the
same accused and their five (5) other companions, did take and carry way from
said dwelling house cash money amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos
(P322.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to Honorato Miano and Geronimo

Miano, to the damage and prejudice of the said Honorato Miano and the heirs of
the deceased Geronimo Miano in the sum of Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos
(P322.00) with respect to the amount robbed, and also to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of deceased Geronimo Miano and Norberto Aton by reason
of the death of these two persons.
Act committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal
Code with the special aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by
a band with the use of unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and
other aggravating circumstances, as follows:
1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended parties without
any provocation from the latter;
2. That nighttime was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime;
and.
3. That advantage was taken of superior strength, accused and their
companions, who were fully armed, being numerically superior to the offended
parties who were unarmed and defenseless.
When the case was called for trial on August 9, 1961, Atty. Tirol informed the court a
quo that he was appearing also for Apduhan, but only as counsel de oficio. In view of
this manifestation, the trial court appointed Atty. Tirol as counsel de oficio for the said
accused. Forthwith, Atty. Tirol manifested that Apduhan would change his former plea
of not guilty to a plea of guilty. The record discloses that after the trial, judge had
repeatedly apprised Apduhan of the severity of the offense for which he was indicted
and the strong possibility that the capital penalty might be imposed upon him despite a
plea of guilty, Apduhan persisted in his intention to plead guilty with the request,
however, that the death penalty be not imposed. Then after hearing the arguments of
Provincial Fiscal Jesus N. Borromeo and Atty. Tirol on the effect of articles 295 and 296
of the Revised Penal Code on the case at bar, the trial judge advised the herein
accused anew that he could be sentenced to death notwithstanding his projected plea
of guilty, but the latter reiterated his desire to confess his guilt on the specific condition
that he be sentenced to life imprisonment. Eventually, however, Apduhan desisted from
pleading guilty and let his previous plea stand on record after further warnings that he
faced the grave danger of being sentenced to death in view of the circumstances of his
case. But the aforesaid desistance was merely momentary as it did not end the
accused's equivocation on the matter of his plea. After a five-minute recess requested
by Atty. Tirol in order to confer with the accused, the former informed the court a quo
that his client would insist on entering a plea of guilty. The following appears on record:
Atty. D. TIROL:
Your Honor, please, I had a conference with the accused and I apprised him with
the situation of the case and after hearing our apprisal he manifested that he will

insist on his entering a plea of guilty, Your Honor. I made it clear to him that we
are not forcing him to enter the plea of guilty.
COURT (To accused Apolonio Apduhan, Jr.)
Q. Is it true that you are withdrawing your plea of not guilty?
A. I will just enter the plea of guilty.
Q. Have you been forced to enter the plea of guilty by your lawyer?.
A. No, Sir.
Q. And why do you said "I will JUST enter the plea of not guilty"?
A. I have proposed to enter the plea of guilty even before.
Q. Now the Court warns you again. Are you conscious of the fact that
notwithstanding your plea of guilty the Court may impose upon you the penalty of
death?
A. I will just enter the plea of guilty, at the discretion of the Court.
Q. Even with all those dangers mentioned by the Court to you? .
A. Yes, Sir. (t.s.n. pp. 23-25).
Subsequently the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel de oficio resumed their oral
arguments regarding the effect on the instant case of articles 295 and 296, particularly
the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance under the latter
article. Also discuss were the existence and effect of the alleged mitigating and
aggravating circumstances. All of these points will be later analyzed.
When the lower court subsequently reviewed the proceedings, it found that the
accused's plea of guilty was ambiguous. Hence, on August 30, 1961, the case was
reopened with respect to Apduhan, and on said date the latter entered a categorical
plea of guilty, as evidenced by the record:
COURT (To Accused Apduhan, Jr.):
The Court reopened this case because after a review of the proceedings it found that
your plea was not definite. In answer to a question of the Court you simply said "I will
just enter the plea of guilty". The Court wants to know whether you enter the plea of
guilty of the crime charged in the second amended information.
ACCUSED APDUHAN:.

I enter the plea of guilty.

COURT (To same accused Apduhan):
Q. Therefore, you admit that you have committed the crime charged in the
second information?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. Is it necessary for you that the second amended information be read again?
A. No more; it is not necessary.
Q. Do you want that the second amended information be read to you again?
A. No more, Your Honor. (t.s.n. pp. 50-51).
On the same day, the court a quo rendered its decision, the pertinent dispositive portion
of which reads:.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment finding accused
Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior guilty of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide, punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 296 of the game Code, as amended, and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of death.
Considering that Apduhan had voluntarily confessed his guilt in open court, then the
only aspect of the case properly subject to review is the correctness of the penalty
imposed by the court a quo. In this respect, the appreciation of the use of unlicensed
firearm as a special aggravating circumstance (art. 296) in fixing the appropriate penalty
for robbery with homicide (Art, 294 [1]) committed by a band with the use of unlicensed
firearms, and the interplay and counter-balancing of the attendant mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, would determine the severity of the penalty imposable.
The disposition of the question at hand necessitates a discussion of the interrelation
among articles 294, 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code. For this purpose the said
articles are hereunder quoted:
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties.
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua, when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any
of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of article 263 shall have
been inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the
article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been
inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in
the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly
unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of the
execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not
responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by
subdivisions 3 and 4 of said article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period in other cases. (As amended by Rep. Act 18.).
ART 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and
by a band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. If the offenses
mentioned in subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall
have been committed in an uninhabited place or by a band, or by attacking a
moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passengers'
compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the passengers thereof by
surprise in the respective conveyances, or on a street, road highway, or alley,
and the intimidation is made with the use of a firearm, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties. (As amended by Rep.
Acts Nos. 12 and 373.) (Emphasis supplied) .
ART. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof.
When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a
robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the
arms used in the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm the penalty
to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the
corresponding penalty provided by law,without prejudice to the criminal liability
for illegal possession of such unlicensed firearm.
Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the
band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the
band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same. (As amended
by Rep. Act No. 12). (Emphasis supplied).

The afore-quoted art. 294 enumerates five classes of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons and prescribes the corresponding penalties.
The case at bar falls under art. 294(1) which defines robbery with homicide and
fixes the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 295 provides, inter alia, that when the offenses described in subdivisions 3, 4
and 5 of art. 294 are committed by a band, the proper penalties must be imposed in the
maximum periods. The circumstance of band is therefore qualifying only in robbery
punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, art. 295 is inapplicable
to robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and lesiones graves resulting in
insanity, imbecility, impotency or blindness. If the foregoing classes of robbery which
are described in art. 294(1) and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be
punishable under art. 295, but then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under Art.
14 of the Code.1 Hence, with the present wording of art. 2952 there is no crime as
"robbery with homicide in band." If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the
indictable offense would still be denominated as "robbery with homicide" under art.
294(1), but the element of band, as stated above, would be appreciated as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance.
Article 296, as quoted above, defines "band", creates the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, and provides the criminal liability incurred by
the members of the band. The ascertainment of the definite function and range of
applicability of this article in relation to articles 294 and 295 is essential in the
disposition of the case at bar.
In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appears to have accorded validity to the
Provincial Fiscal's contention that in robbery with homicide committed by a band, the
use of unlicensed firearm must be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance
pursuant to art. 296. Thus convinced, the trial judge stressed in his decision that "under
the express mandate of the law, we cannot escape the arduous task of imposing the
death penalty." Subscribing to the said position, the Solicitor General adds that the
"penalty for robbery under the circumstances mentioned in Articles 294, paragraph 1,
and 296 of the Code is the maximum of reclusion perpetua to death, or the supreme
penalty of death. This is mandatory." .
On the other hand, Atty. Alberto M. Meer, the accused's counsel de oficio in the present
review, contends that the use of unlicensed firearm, if ever appreciated in the case at
bar, must be considered a generic aggravating factor which "may be off-set by the
existence of mitigating circumstances so that the penalty to be imposed should be the
penalty of reclusion perpetua." .
Both the foregoing contentions are untenable.
After a perceptive analysis of the provisions of art. 296, we reach the considered
opinion that the said article is exclusively linked and singularly applicable to the
immediately antecedent provision of art. 295 on robbery in band, as the latter article, in

turn, is explicitly limited in scope to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently,

although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance under art.
296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in relation to
robbery with homicide, described and penalized under paragraph 1 of art. 294.
As previously stated, art. 295 provides that if any of the classes of robbery described in
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294 is committed by a band, the offender shall be
punished by the maximum period of the proper penalty. Correspondingly, the
immediately following provisions of art. 296 define the term "band", prescribe the
collective liability of the members of the band, and state that "when any of the arms
used in the commission of the offense be in unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be
imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty
provided by law." Viewed from the contextual relation of articles 295 and 296, the word
"offense" mentioned in the above-quoted portion of the latter article logically means the
crime of robbery committed by a band, as the phrase "all the malefactors" indubitably
refers to the members of the band and the phrase "the corresponding penalty provided
by law" relates to the offenses of robbery described in the last three subdivisions of art.
294 which are all encompassed within the ambit of art. 295. Evidently, therefore, art.
296 in its entirety is designed to amplify and modify the provision on robbery in band
which is nowhere to be found but in art. 295 in relation to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art.
294. Verily, in order that the aforesaid special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm may be appreciated to justify the imposition of the maximum period
of the proper penalty it is a condition sine qua non that the offense charged be robbery
committed by a band within the contemplation of art. 295. To reiterate, since art. 295,
does not apply to subdivision 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the special aggravating factor in
question, which is solely applicable to robbery in band under art. 295, cannot be
considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with homicide under art. 294(1),
even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms.
The legislative intent of making art. 296 corollary to art. 295 with respect to robbery in
band was unmistakably articulated by Congressman Albano in his sponsorship speech
on H. B. No. 124 (subsequently enacted as Rep. Act No. 12, amending, among others,
articles 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code). Said Congressman Albano: "Article
296 as a corollary of Article 295 would change the definition heretofore known of the
term "band" under the law. The purpose of this amendment is to inject therein the
element of aggravation, when any member of the band carries an unlicensed firearm . ."
4.
The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, however, was
initially applicable to all the subdivisions of art. 294 since the said Rep. Act No. 12 also
amended art. 295 to include within its scope all the classes of robbery described in art.
294. With the then enlarged coverage of art. 295, art. 296, being corollary to the former,
was perforce made applicable to robbery with homicide (art. 294[1]). Thus, in People vs.
Bersamin, 5 this Court, in passing, opined: "The use of unlicensed firearm is a special
aggravating circumstanceapplicable only in cases of robbery in band (Art. 296, Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 12)." .

In the said case, this Court declared in effect that in robo con homicidio the use of
unlicensed firearm is not a special aggravating circumstance when the said offense is
not committed by a band. Inferentially, had the robbery with homicide in Bersamin been
perpetrated by a band, the use of unlicensed firearm would have been appreciated. This
implied pronouncement would have been justified under art. 296 in relation to art. 295,
as amended by Rep. Act 12. But the aforesaid inference lost all legal moorings in 1949
with the enactment of Rep. Act 373 which excluded subdivisions 1 and 2 of art. 294
from the coverage of art. 295. Since art. 296, as repeatedly emphasized above, is
corollary to art. 295, the diminution of the latter's scope correspondingly reduced the
former's extent of applicability. In other words, the passage of the foregoing amendment
did not only jettison the first two subdivisions of art. 294 from the periphery of art. 295
but also removed the said subdivisions (which pertain, inter alia, to the offense of
robbery with homicide) from the effective range of art. 296.
Notwithstanding that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
cannot be appreciated in the instant case, we are constrained, in the final analysis, to
observe that the imposition of the death penalty on the accused Apduhan would appear
to be a logical legal consequence, because as against the attendant mitigating
circumstances the aggravating circumstances numerically and qualitatively
preponderate.
After Apduhan had pleaded guilty, the defense counsel offered for consideration three
mitigating circumstances, namely, plea of guilty, intoxication, and lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong. Subsequently, however, the defense withdrew the last
mentioned mitigating circumstance after the prosecution had withdrawn the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The following manifestations appear on
record: .
"FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"In fairness to the accused, because the crime charged is robbery in band (the
case at bar is actually robbery with homicide), it is natural that in robbery in band
there is already abuse of superior strength, so we will just withdraw that superior
strength.
"COURT (To Atty. D. Tirol): .
"What do you say now? .
"ATTY. D. TIROL: .
"Such being the case, we will not insist on presenting evidence in support of our
contention that the accused did not intend to commit so grave a wrong.
"COURT: .

"Moreover by the mere use of firearm the accused cannot claim that he did not
intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. So now you withdraw your
petition that you be allowed to present evidence to that effect? .
"ATTY. D. TIROL: .
"Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 47-48).
Thus, only two alleged mitigating circumstances remain for consideration.
Anent the plea of guilty, we believe that under art. 13 (7) its appreciation in the
case at bar is beyond controversion.
However, apropos the alternative circumstance of intoxication, we find no
evidence on record to support the defense's claim that it should be considered as
a mitigating factor. This absence of proof can be attributed to the defense's
erroneous belief that it was not anymore its burden to establish the state of
intoxication of the accused when he committed the offense charged since
anyway the prosecution had already admitted the attendance of the said
mitigating circumstance on the ground that the State did not have strong
evidence to overthrow the accused's claim of non-habituality to drinking. The
record discloses the following pertinent discussion: .
"COURT (To Fiscal Borromeo):.
"Do you agree, Mr. Fiscal, that the non-habitual intoxication of the accused be
also taken into account in his favor as a mitigating circumstance? "FISCAL
BORROMEO: .
"We have no evidence exactly to know at this time that the accused was
intoxicated, but his affidavit states that before the commission of the crime they
took young coconuts and there is no mention about the taking of any liquor, so
that, as it is now, we are constrained to object.
"COURT (To the Fiscal): .
"But do you have evidence to counteract that allegation? .
"FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"We do not have any evidence to counteract that.
"COURT (To the Fiscal): .
"But do you not admit the attendance of that circumstance? .

"FISCAL BORROMEO: With that manifestation we submit because actually we

do not have evidence to counteract that he was a habitual drinker. "COURT (To
the Fiscal): .
"But do you prefer to admit that mitigating circumstance or you need that
evidence be presented to that effect? "FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"Inasmuch as we do not have strong evidence to contradict that circumstance in
fairness to the accused, we would rather submit.
"COURT (To the Fiscal): .
"The attendance of the mitigating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication? .
"FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 7-9) (Emphasis supplied) .
From the above proceedings in the trial court, it would appear that what the prosecution
actually intended to admit was the non-habituality of the accused to drinking liquor, not
as a matter of fact, but due to the State's inability to disprove the same. The prosecution
apparently did not concede the actual intoxication of the accused. We are of the firm
conviction that, under the environmental circumstances, the defense was not relieved of
its burden to prove the accused's actual state of intoxication. Otherwise, to appreciate
the attendance of a mitigating factor on the mere allegation of the accused, coupled with
the dubious acquiescence of the prosecution, would open wide the avenue for
unscrupulous and deceitful collusion between defense and prosecution in order to
unduly and unjustly minimize the penalty imposable upon the accused.
The last paragraph of art. 15 of the Code provides:.
"The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the
same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the
intoxication is habitual or intentional it shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. (Emphasis supplied).
Under the foregoing provision, intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or
intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. However, to be
mitigating the accused's state of intoxication must be proved. 6 Once intoxication is
established by satisfactory evidence, 7 then in the absence of proof to the contrary" it is
presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional. 8 .
In People vs. Noble 9 the defendant testified that before the murder he took a bottle of
wine and drank little by little until he got drunk. The policeman who arrested the
accused testified that the latter smelled wine and vomited. The Court held that the

evidence presented was not satisfactory to warrant a mitigation of the penalty.

Intoxication was likewise not competently proved in a case 10 where the only evidence
was that the defendant had a gallon of tuba with him at the time he committed the
crime.
In the case at bar the accused merely alleged that when he committed the offense
charged he was intoxicated although he was "not used to be drunk," 11This self-serving
statement stands uncorroborated. Obviously, it is devoid of any probative value.
To recapitulate, the accused has in his favor only one mitigating circumstance: plea of
guilty. As aforementioned, the defense withdrew its claim of "lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong" and failed to substantiate its contention that intoxication should be
considered mitigating.
While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an
admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances therein recited. 12 The four aggravating circumstances are (1) band; (2)
dwelling; (3) nighttime; and (4) abuse of superior strength. The circumstance of abuse
of superiority was, however, withdrawn by the prosecution on the ground that since the
offense of robbery with homicide was committed by a band, the element of cuadrilla
necessarily absorbs the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. We believe that
said withdrawal was ill-advised since the circumstances of band and abuse of
superiority are separate and distinct legal concepts. The element of band is appreciated
when the offense is committed by more than three armed malefactors regardless of the
comparative strength of the victim or victims. Hence, the indispensable components of
cuadrilla are (1) at least four malefactors and (2) all of the four malefactors are armed.
On the other hand, the gravamen of abuse of superiority is the taking advantage by the
culprits of their collective strength to overpower their relatively weaker victim or victims.
Hence, in the latter aggravating factor, what is taken into account is not the number of
aggressors nor the fact that they are armed, but their relative physical might vis-a-vis
the offended party.
Granting, however, that the said withdrawal was valid, there still remain three
aggravating circumstances which render inutile the solitary extenuating circumstance of
plea of guilty. The prosecution does not need to prove the said three circumstances (all
alleged in the second amended information) since the accused by his plea of guilty, has
supplied the requisite proof. 13 Hence, we will not belabor our discussion of the
attendance aggravating circumstances.
The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of
persons, 14 like the offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this
class of robbery could be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity
of the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be committed in no other
place than in the house of another, such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house.
15 This Court in People vs. Pinca, 16 citing People vs. Valdez, 17 ruled that the
"circumstances (of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime

committed, because, the crime being robbery with violence or intimidation against
persons (specifically, robbery with homicide) the authors thereof could have committed
it without the necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim." Cuello Calon
opines that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity
in the accused and produces greater alarm. 18.
Nocturnity is aggravating when it is purposely and deliberately sought by the accused to
facilitate the commission of the crime 19 or to prevent their being recognized or to
insure unmolested escape. 20 Nocturnidad must concur with the intent and design of
the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the darkness of night. 21
In the case at bar, the affidavit (exh. I-1) of the accused Apduhan shows that he and his
co-malefactors took advantage of the nighttime in the perpetration of the offense as they
waited until it was dark before they came out of their hiding place to consummate their
criminal designs.
In his decision, the trial judge recommends to, the President of the Republic the
commutation of the death sentence which he imposed on the accused to life
imprisonment. The Solicitor General supports this recommendation for executive
clemency.
We find no compelling reason to justify such recommendation. Contrary to the trial
judge's observation, the accused's plea of guilty was far from "spontaneous" and
"insistent". It will be recalled that his initial plea was one of not guilty. Later, he changed
his plea but with the persistent condition that he be sentenced to life imprisonment, not
death. It was only after much equivocation that he finally decided to "just" plead guilty.
Because his plea was still ambiguous, the court a quo had to reopen the case to
ascertain its real nature. Conceding, however, that his plea was "spontaneous" and
"insistent," such manifestation of sincere repentance cannot serve to obliterate the
attendant aggravating circumstances which patently reveal the accused's criminal
perversity.
It appears from a cursory reading of the decision under review that the trial judge also
anchored his recommendation on the ground that there is "the possibility that the
firearm was used in order to counteract the resistance of the deceased." This is no
justification at all for executive clemency. Firstly, the above observation is a mere
conjecture - in the language of the presiding judge, a "possibility." Secondly, even
granting that the said observation relates to the actual happening, to employ a firearm in
subduing the lawful resistance of innocent persons is a criminal act by any standard.
Even as we purge the decision under review of its errors, we must hasten to commend
the trial judge, the Hon. Hipolito Alo, for his earnest and patient efforts to forestall the
entry of an improvident plea of guilty by the accused Apduhan, notwithstanding that the
latter was already represented by a counsel de oficio and hence presumed to have
been advised properly. Judge Alo made sure that the accused clearly and fully
understood the seriousness of the offense charged and the severity of the penalty
attached to it. When the accused proposed to confess his guilt, Judge Alo repeatedly

warned him that the death penalty might be imposed despite his plea of guilty. As
aforementioned, when it appeared that Apduhan's plea of guilty was ambiguous, Judge
Alo reopened the case to determine with definitiveness the nature of his plea.
The virtue of Judge Alo's efforts in ascertaining whether Apduhan pleaded guilty with full
knowledge of the significance and consequences of his act, recommends itself to all trial
judges who must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the
meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
As a final commentary on the criminal conduct of the accused herein, it must be
emphasized that the instant review was delayed for several years because he escaped
from the New Bilibid Prisons on June 17, 1963, less than six months after he was
committed to the said penitentiary. He was recommitted on July 10, 1964 with a new
mittimus from the Court of First Instance of Leyte for robbery in band in criminal case
10099, for which he was sentenced to serve a prison term of from 8 years and 1 day to
12 years and 1 day commencing on October 31, 1963. 22 His recommitment was
reported to this Court only on July 5, 1966.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, for failure to secure the required number of
votes, the penalty of death cannot be legally imposed. The penalty next lower in degree
- reclusion perpetua - should consequently be imposed on the accused.
ACCORDINGLY, with the modification that the death sentence imposed upon Apolonio
Apduhan, Jr. by the court a quo is reduced to reclusion perpetua, the judgment a quo is
affirmed in all other respects, without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28547 February 22, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN
GORRICETA, accused. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, and FRANCO
BRILLANTES, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo
R. Rosete and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
Sixto P. Dimaisip for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, which convicted them of robbery with
homicide, sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay
solidarily the sum of six thousand pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the sum
of five hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of fighting cocks (Criminal Case
No. 11082).
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around eleven o'clock in the evening of
January 9, 1966, Gorriceta, who had just come from Fort San Pedro in Iloilo City, was
driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in
front of the Elizalde Building on J. M. Basa Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla
and Franco Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck. Jaranilla requested
to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He
told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta) was on his way home.
Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla
ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place. So, Jaranilla, Brillantes and
Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao.
Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to
seventy meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted from
the vehicle. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the
direction of the plaza. After an interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared.
Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck.
Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta
drove the truck to Jaro (another district of the city) on the same route that they had
taken in going to Mandurriao.
It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front
seat of the track. Gorriceta the driver, was on the extreme left. Next to him on his right
was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.
While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under
construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and
Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after
Patrolman Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that

the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan
approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of
the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman.
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a
sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta. He immediately
started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the
city. Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan.
Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta's house. Gorriceta parked the
truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned Gorriceta not to tell anybody about the
incident. Gorriceta went up to his room. After a while, he heard policemen shouting his
name and asking him to come down. Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was
only at about eight o'clock in the morning of the following day that he decided to come
down. His uncle had counselled him to surrender to the police. The policemen took
Gorriceta to their headquarters. He recounted the incident to a police investigator.
Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon
on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before midnight of January 9, 1966, he
conducted a friend in his car to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial
hospital at Mandurriao. As he neared his residence, he saw three men emerging from
the canal on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house. He noticed a red Ford pickup truck
parked about fifty yards from the place where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter,
he espied the three men carrying roosters. He immediately repaired to the police station
at Mandurriao. He reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro what he had just
witnessed. The two policemen requested him to take them in his car to the place where
he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon arrival thereat, the men and the truck
were not there anymore.
Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. On reaching
the detour road leading to the airport, the policemen left the car and crossed the runway
which was a shortcut. Their objective was to intercept the truck. Trespeces turned his
car around in order to return to Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He
stopped and again turned his car in the direction where shots had emanated. A few
moments later, Patrolman Castro came into view. He was running. He asked Trespeces
for help because Jabatan, his comrade, was wounded. Patrolman Castro and
Trespeces lifted Jabatan into the car and brought him to the hospital. Trespeces learned
later that Jabatan was dead.
Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police
department, conducted an autopsy on the remains of Patrolman Jabatan. He found:
(1) Contusion on left eyebrow.
(2) Bullet wound one centimeter in diameter, penetrating left anterior
axilla, directed diagonally downward to the right, perforating the left upper

lobe of the lungs through and through, bitting the left pulmonary artery and
was recovered at the right thoracic cavity; both thoracic cavity was full of
blood.
Cause of death: Shock, hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.
Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock in
the morning of January 10, 1966. He discovered that the door of one of his cock pens or
chicken coops (Exhs. A and A-1) was broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on
the ground. Upon investigation he found that six of his fighting cocks were missing.
Each coop contained six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and wood with nipa
roofing. Each coop had a door which was locked by means of nails. The coops were
located at the side of his house, about two meters therefrom.
Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of
detectives came to his house together with the police photographer who took pictures of
the chicken coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two days
later, he was summoned to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster which
was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily identified it as one of the six
roosters which was stolen from his chicken coop (Exh. B).
Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with the
aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, nocturnity, band, contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state
witness. Hence, the case was dismissed as to him.
On February 2, 1967, after the prosecution had rested its case and before the defense
had commenced the presentation of its evidence, Jaranilla escaped from the provincial
jail. The record does not show that he has been apprehended.
The judgment of conviction was promulgated as to defendants Suyo and Brillantes on
October 19, 1967 when it was read to them in court. They signed at the bottom of the
last page of the decision.
There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as already stated,
escaped from jail (See Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
However, the notice of appeal filed by defendants' counsel de oficio erroneously
included Jaranilla. Inasmuch as the judgment has not been promulgated as to
Jaranilla, he could not have appealed. His appeal through counsel cannot be
entertained. Only the appeals of defendants Suyo and Brillantes will be considered.
In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court
assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was robbery and that Patrolman
Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview of
article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

In this appeal the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not finding that
Gorriceta was the one who shot the policeman and that Jaranilla was driving the Ford
truck because Gorriceta was allegedly drunk. Through their counsel de oficio, they
further contend that the taking of roosters was theft and, alternatively, that, if it was
robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the robbery was already
consummated when Jabatan was killed.
After evaluating the testimonies of Gorriceta and Brillantes as to who was driving the
truck and who shot policeman, this Court finds that the trial court did not err in giving
credence to Gorriceta's declaration that he was driving the truck at the time that
Jaranilla shot Jabatan.
The improbability of appellants' theory is manifest. The truck belonged to Gorriceta's
sister. He was responsible for its preservation. He had the obligation to return it to his
sister in the same condition when he borrowed it. He was driving it when he saw
Brillantes, Jaranilla and Suyo and when he allegedly invited them for a paseo. There is
no indubitable proof that Jaranilla knows how to drive a truck.
The theory of the defense may be viewed from another angle. If, according to the
appellants, Gorriceta asked Jaranilla to drive the truck because he (Gorriceta) was
drunk then that circumstance would be inconsistent with their theory that Gorriceta shot
Jabatan. Being supposedly intoxicated, Gorriceta would have been dozing when
Jabatan signalled the driver to stop the truck and he could not have thought of killing
Jabatan in his inebriated state. He would not have been able to shoot accurately at
Jabatan. But the fact is that the first shot hit Jabatan. So, the one who shot him must
have been a sober person like Jaranilla.
Moreover, as Jaranilla and his two comrades were interested in concealing the fighting
cocks, it was Jaranilla, not Gorriceta, who would have the motive for shooting Jabatan.
Consequently, the theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan and that Jaranilla was driving the
truck appears to be plausible.
Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence that in taking the
six roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of Baylon's house violence against or
intimidation of persons was employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot be invoked.
Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code which
penalizes robbery in an inhabited house (casa habitada), public building or edifice
devoted to worship. The coop was not inside Baylon's house. Nor was it a dependency
thereof within the meaning of article 301 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having shown the inapplicability of Articles 294 and 299, the next inquiry is whether the
taking of the six roosters is covered by article 302 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads:

ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.Any robbery

committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the
first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that any
of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for
entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys,
picklocks or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or
receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open
elsewhere.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English
translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original reads:
ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular.El robo
cometido en un lugar no habitado o en un edificio que no sea de los
comprendidos en el parrafo primero del articulo 299, ... . (Tomo 26, Leyes
Publicas 479).
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term
which may be confounded with the expression "uninhabited place" in articles 295 and
300 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is
different from the term lugar no habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is
the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is
that the malefactor should enter the building or dependency, where the object to be
taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should
enter the building (casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not
enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things. (See Albert,
Revised Penal Code, 1932 edition, p. 688).
Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at Rizal
Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches therefrom, the crime was theft and not

robbery because he did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the store.
(People vs. Adorno, CA 40 O. G. 567, per Montemayor, J., who later became a member
of this Court). *
In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be
considered a building within the meaning of article 302. Not being a building, it cannot
be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means of
any of the five circumstances enumerated in article 302.
The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed as
embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299 (meaning not an "inhabited house
or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for
storage and safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car used for
the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The unnailing of a strip of cloth
nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car, was held to
constitute breaking by force within the meaning of article 512, now article 302. (U.S. vs.
Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).
The ruling in the Magsino case is in conflict with the rulings of the Supreme Court of
Spain that a railroad employee who, by force, opens a sealed or locked receptacle
deposited in a freight car, does not commit robbery. He is guilty of theft because
a railroad car is neither a house nor a building within the meaning of article 302 which
corresponds to article 525 of the 1870 Spanish Penal Code. Article 302 refers to houses
or buildings which, while not actually inhabited, are habitable. Thus, a pig sty is not a
building within the meaning of article 302. The stealing of hogs from a pig sty is theft
and not robbery, although the culprit breaks into it. Article 302 refers to habitable
buildings. (Guevara, Revised Penal Code, 1939 Edition, pages 555-6, citing II Hidalgo
Codigo Penal 636-7, 642, which in turn cites the decisions of the Spanish Supreme
Court dated March 2, 1886 and April 25, 1887). **
As may be seen from the photographs (Exhs. A and A-1) Baylon's coop, which is known
in the dialect as tangkal orkulungan, is about five yards long, one yard wide and one
yard high. It has wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the
shoulder of a person of average height like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or
cages. A compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard. A person cannot be
accommodated inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person
should go inside that compartment. The taking was effected by forcibly opening the
cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft
and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single criminal
impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters.
The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of
two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes
of theft (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, citing decision of Supreme Court of Spain

dated July 13, 1894 and 36 C. J. 799; People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320; People vs.
Villanueva, 49 O.G. 5448, L-10239, August 7, 1953).
Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances facilitated
the commission of the theft. The accused intentionally sought the cover of night and
used a motor vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious enterprise (People
vs. Tan, 89 Phil. 647, 660; People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372).
Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the information. They admitted their
previous convictions for theft (130, 132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised Penal
Code).
The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3], Revised Penal Code).
That penalty should be imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating
circumstances are present (Art. 64[3], Revised Penal Code).
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They
are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103).
With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the
evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the malefactor who shot that
unfortunate peace officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur of
the moment. The treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately
adopted by the offender (U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738;
People vs. Abalos, 84 Phil. 771).
The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time of
the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing should be characterized as a
direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code)
complexed with homicide. The two offenses resulted from a single act. (Art. 48, Revised
Penal Code; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Lojo, Jr., 52 Phil. 390).
The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of
appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They conspired to steal the
fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the
theft. They went to the scene of the crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's
residence, each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by
Gorriceta.
The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the
roosters. It is not an indispenable element of theft that the thief carry, more or less far
away, the thing taken by him from its owner (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; Duran
vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 476; U.S vs. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754).

It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who would forestall
the theft or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the fruits of the crime, was part of their
plan. There is no evidence to link appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of
Jabatan, except the circumstance that they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the
latter shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified that Suyo did not do anything when
Jabatan approached the right side of the truck and came in close proximity to Jaranilla
who was on the extreme right. Brillantes pulled his revolver which he did not fire (47, 5355 tsn). Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a person a
co-principal thereof.
Jaranilla heard Gorriceta's testimony that he (Jaranilla) shot Jabatan. Instead of taking
the witness stand to refute the testimony of Gorriceta, Jaranilla escaped from jail. That
circumstance is an admission of guilt.
The instant case is different from People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568 where the victim
was killed on the occasion when the accused took his chickens under the house. It is
distinguishable from the People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372 and People vs.
Salamudin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670 (both cited by the Solicitor General) where the robbery
was clearly proven and the homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery.
As already noted, theft, not robbery, was committed in this case.
The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten,
47 Phil. 493 where the homicide committed by a member of the band was not a part of
the common plan to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing
was liable for robbery with homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.
There is a hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as to the participation of Suyo and
Brillantes in the killing of Jabatan by Jaranilla. As already stated, no robbery with
homicide was committed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that those two appellants
have any responsibility for Jabatan's death. Their complicity in the homicide committed
by Jaranilla has not been established.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellants Ricardo Suyo and
Franco Brillantes of robbery with homicide is reversed. They are acquitted of homicide
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a)
each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional as maximum and
(b) ordered to indemnify solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum of five
hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.
As to the liability of Elias Jaranilla for theft and homicide, with direct assault upon an
agent of authority, trial court should render a new judgment consistent with this opinion
(See Sec. 19, Art. IV, Constitution).

So ordered.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
public of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO,
alias "Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castaeda for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the
felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and
found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5,
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with
kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL
SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom,
to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as
may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. 1

On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial which ultimately
resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of
robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree
No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of
robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance with
P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the
offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00
as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages. 3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in
convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly
charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and
cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. 4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counterstatement of facts in the People's brief 5 which adopted the established findings of the
court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of the
proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial divergence in the version
proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January
13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta
Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of
her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo
Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was
then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived
at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go
to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo
will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she
got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the
wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it
stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside
the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat
and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a
gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced,
"ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money
inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag
contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro
agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in
Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta.
Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed.
Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown,
perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo,
Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for
P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand.
Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his
mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro,
according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of
the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally
able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because,
according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured
when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM
(Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to
encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct.
18, 1989, pp. 10-13) 6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of
complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North
Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car
down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway. 7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San
Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter

ate at a restaurant and divided their loot. 8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial
of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire
need of money for the medication of his ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories
have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court
cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for
ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those
instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds
true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a
correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to
determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was
committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or
whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and
murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a
person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the
motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the
previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be
direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,
nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant,
other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the
blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we
were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well
and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam,
(sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had
kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for
this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident
in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as
early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has
been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused,

even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing
them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they
committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does
not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the
complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional
testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag
containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when
the checks was (sic) being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that
you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all
you already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she
signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa (sic)
Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle
Verde when she is (sic) already given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to
my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other place
along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So
when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we
will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the
nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the
complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when
complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what
she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily
surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was
summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed

is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the
trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished
by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the
allegation in the information that the victim was carried away and extorted
for more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was carried on
from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise
admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more
money that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not
having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes
committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the
highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua. 18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing
clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently
necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of
Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on
which matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet been
made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a
modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that
the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term
in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds
sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our
discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of
brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary
robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the American
occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and
since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving
bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of

bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a
band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art.
306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It
would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member
or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any
other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the
organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a
band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of
committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by
a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was
committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is
required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could
not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same,
there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the
circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular
clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless
elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the
nation andstunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged
from perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on
the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the

economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.

(Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person
chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the
"innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which
single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social
progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an
obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, "
such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage
contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on
the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of
the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the
offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the
liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there
be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the
Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains
under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under
the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only
against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective
victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same
as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the
same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that
matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime
of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree
just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been
stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily
puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential
issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of
property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule
of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to
the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into
its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the
milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be
farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive
criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we
apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the

desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For,
if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun
point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the
vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of
the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and
traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we
apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in
the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was
casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of
the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines
"highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of
robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute
highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined
in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts
evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their
respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated
against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against
appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate,
the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be
imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the
crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom,
since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter
offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the
elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation
of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar.
Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is
charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the
offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against
appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly
but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of
complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with
intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge

of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any of the
elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra
and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in
relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay
the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as
actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110037. May 21, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. EDUARDO PULUSAN y

ANICETA, ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y MACALINO, ROLANDO TAYAG and
JOHN DOE Alias Ramon/Efren, accused.
EDUARDO PULUSAN y ANICETA and ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y
MACALINO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Four men held a robbery of a passenger jeepney along Bulacan-Pampanga
highway, divesting all passenger of their valuables. Four of the jeepney's passengers
were killed by the robbers and the only female passenger raped repeatedly. Three
victims, however, lived to tell the story - the jeepney driver, a fifty-year old and the
ravaged girl .
The Solicitor General summarized the prosecution evidence as follows:
On January 20, 1986 at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Constancio Gomez
was then plying his route from Balagtas, Bulacan along the MacArthur Highway
going towards Malolos, Bulacan on board a passenger jeepney with six (6)
passenger (pp. 5-6, TSN, June 10, 1986). They included Marilyn Martinez a

seventeen (17) year old student and Cresenciano Pagtalunan (p. 2, TSN, March
10, 1987; pp. 2-3, TSN, June 10, 1986). The four (4) other male passenger
were later identified to be Rodolfo Cruz, Magno Surio, Constancio Dionisio and
Armando Cundangan (pp. 2-3, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986; pp. 5-14, TSN, Aug. 5,
1987; pp. 3-5, TSN, April 8, 1987; Exhibits "Z", "AA', "BB", "CC").
Upon reaching Bry. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, a group of four (4) male
passengers boarded the jeepney (pp. 5-6, TSN, June 10, 1986). Two of them
sat at the rearmost portion of the jeepney fronting each other; the third sat
behind the driver's seat while the fourth man sat in the middle of the other
passengers (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 3-4, TSN, July 22, 1986; pp. 3-5,
TSN, March 10, 1987). Sudenly, the man who was later identified to be
appellant Eduardo Pulusan, who sat behind the driver, poked a knife at
Constancio Gomez and announced: "Hold-up ito, huwag kayong kikilos (pp. 5-6,
TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6, 9, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp 4-6, TSN, June 10,
1986; pp. 5-6, 9, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 4-6, TSN, March 18,
1987). Thereafter, appellant Pulusan's three (3) companions followed suit,
poked their knife and "sumpak" (homemade shotgun) at the passengers and
divested them of their valuables (p. 6, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 3-5, TSN, July
22, 1986; pp. 5-9, March 10, 1997). Gomez was divested of his P100 cash
money, a lighter valued at P50.00 and a fancy ring of unknown value (pp.7-8,
TSN, June 10, 1986). Cresenciano Pagtalunan, one of the passengers was
similarly divested of P110.00 in cash and a diver's watch worh P1,000.00 (TSN,
pp.3-4, July 22, 1986). Marilyn Martinez, another passenger was divested of a
wristwatch worth P350.00 together with her books, notebooks and handbag (pp.
5-7, TSN, March 10, 1987). Rodolfo Cruz was likewise divested of a watch
valued at P700.00, a wedding ring worth P500.00 and P750.00 in cash (pp.3-8,
TSN, Jan. 27, 1987). Magno Surio's watch worthP400.00, camera with flash
bulb and batteries inside and cash of more than P2,000.00 were also taken
during the incident (pp. 3-7, 9-10, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987; Exhs. "A", "B", "C" to "C3"). Thereafter, appellant Pulusan took over the wheels from driver Gomez and
drove towards Pampanga. He later stopped at Quezon Road, Bgy. San Pablo,
San Simon, Pampanga (pp. 7 - 8, TSN, June 10, 1987). He parked the jeepney
in a "talahiban" where there were no people around except for the occupants of
the passenger jeepney (pp. 7 - 8, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 7 - 8, TSN, March
10, 1987). Afterwards, appellant Rolando Rodriguez (Rodriguez) dragged
Marilyn Martinez to the "talahiban" a few meters away from the parked jeepney
where his three (3) companions, including appellant Pulusan, were left guarding
Gomez and his other passengers (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 10-11, TSN
March 10, 1987; pp. 1-13, TSN, March 18, 1987). Once at the "talahiban,"
appellant Rodriguez, then armed with a kitchen knife, through force and
intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Marilyn Martinez who
was then still virgin (Exhibit "W"; pp. 10-13, TSN, March 10,
1987). Subsequently, appellant Pulusan followed appellant Rodriguez and
Marilyn Martinez at the "talahiban and likewise sexually abused her (pp. 14-15,
TSN, March 10, 1987; Exh. "W"). Later, appellants two other companions
similarly took turns in having carnal knowledge of Marilyn Martinez at the

"talahiban" (pp. 15-16, TSN, March 10, 1987). After the fourth man had
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her , he held Marilyn Martinez's wrist
and they both proceeded towards the jeepney (pp. 16-17, TSN, March 10,
1987).
Meanwhile, at the place where the jeepney was parked Gomez and one of his
passengers who were then inside the vehicle were called outside by one of
appellant's companions and asked Gomez " pare, gusto mo bang mamatay?"
(p. 10, TSN, June 10, 1986). Gomez pleaded with them that he be spared
because his wife recently gave birth and he was the only breadwinner for his
family (ibid). Thereafter, he was boxed at the right jaw and told to board the
jeepney while said man, together with appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez,
clubbed and stabbed the passenger who was called with him (pp. 10-11, TSN,
June 10, 1986). Subsequently, the four called three other passengers inside the
jeepney one by one. When the three (3) passengers managed to run towards
the "talahiban" but his captors pursued and eventually killed him (pp. 10-11,
TSN, June 10, 1986). Subsequently, Cresenciono Pagtaluan was hit with pipe
and clubbed by appellant and their companions but one of them uttered: Pare,
huwag na yan, matanda na yan, hindi na papalag" (pp. 12-13, TSN, ibid' p. 7,
TSN, July 22, 1986).Thereafter, Gomez was ordered to start the jeepney while
a shotgun was aimed at his temple and threatened not to report the incident
(ibid.) Eventually, their captors boarded Marilyn Martinez in the jeepney and
threatened her not to report the incident and sent them home. Appellants and
his companions then dispersed to different directions (pp. 12-13, TSN, June 10,
1986).
Accordingly, Gomez and his two surviving passengers Marilyn Martinez and
Cresenciano Pagtalunan, left their four (4) co-passengers who had been killed
by their captors and proceeded to the Municipal Building of Apalit, Pampanga to
report the incident to the Apalit police (p. 14, TSN, June 20, 1986; pp. 8-9, TSN,
July 22, 1986; p. 19, TSN, March 10, 1987).Accompanied by the Apalit police
(p. 14, TSN, June 20, 1986; pp. 8-9, TSN, July 22, 1986; p. 19, TSN, March 10,
1987). Gomez and Crescenciano Pagtalunan, were immediately interviewed by
Pat. Maniago, Investigator of the San Simon (pp. 2-3, TSN, Dec. 16,
1986). Later, Pagtalunan stayed at the municipal building of San Simon where
he remained for more than a day (p. 10, TSN where he remained for more than
a day (p. 10, TSN, July 22, 1986). Thereafter, the joint team of the San Simon
and Apalit police, including Pat. Maniago, Pfc. Nicolas Yambao and Umali was
accompanied by Gomez to the crime scene at Quezon Road, Bgy. San Pablo,
San Simon where the bodies of his four (4) male passengers were found and
which were later brought to the Funeraria Punzalan for autopsy (p. 14, June 10,
1996; pp. 3-5, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). Pat. Emerito Maniago prepared a sketch of
the crime scene (Exh. "S", p. 4, TSsN, Dec 2, 1986). Eventually, Pat. Maniago,
Pfc, Nicolas Yambao and Lino Umali returned to the station and interviews
Gomez and Pagtalunan about the description of the suspects and conducted
follow-up investigation of the case (pp. 3-4, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; Exh. "P", "P-1";
pp. 3-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986; pp. 2-9, TSN, Jan. 6, 1987). They also proceeded

to Malolos, Bulacan to coordinate with the Malolos INP for the identification of
the victims' cadavers (pp. 3-4, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). Thereafter, Pat. Maniago
prepared an "Initial Investigation Report" addressed to Corporal Santiago
Rodriguez, Station Commander of the San Simon Police Station at San Simon,
Pampanga concerning the "Robbery In Band, Rape, Multiple Homicide and
Illegal Possession of Firearms/Deadly Weapons" committed on or about 9:30 to
10:30 P.M. of January 20, 1986 at Quezon Road, San Pablo Propio, San
Simon, Pampanga (Exh. "P", "P-1"; pp. 2-5, TSN, Dec 16, 1986; pp. 2-16, TSN,
Jan. 6, 1987; pp. 2-3, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986).
On January 21, 1986, Cpl. Santiago Rodriguez was informed of the aforesaid
incident (pp. 2-3, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). He then instructed his men to continue
investigation on the case considering that preliminary investigation threon had
been made by Pat. Maniago (pp. 3-4, TSN, ibid.; pp. 3-6, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986).
On the same day, Marilyn Martinez, one of the surviving victims, was brought by
her relatives to the Cemtral Luzon General Hospital in San Fernando,
Pampanga where she underwent physical examination by Dr. Evelyn
Macabulos, resident of the Hospital's Obstetrics and Gynecology Department
(pp. 19-20, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 6-15, TSN, May 27, 1987; Exh. "W",
"W1"). Dr. Macabulos found that the patient was conscious, coherent , slightly
incooperative, distraught, untidy with soiled clothes and underwear" and that her
blood pressure was 130/80 while her pulse rate was 105 per minute (pp 7-9,
TSN, May 27, 1987). She noted that "her eyes were swollen but without
contusions; her heart was slightly tachycardic, regular rate rhythm with no
murmur (pp. 9-10, TSN, ibid) She also observed that she had clear breath
sounds; her breast are conical, well-developed, symmetrical with light brown
nipple and areola, no contusions noted" (ibid.). She also noted that he trunk has
linear hematoma at the back which looked like finger marks while in her
extremities, there were 2 x 1.5 cm. Round hematoma at posterior upper part of
the left thigh (pp. 9-10, TSN, ibid). Dr. Macabulos further osserved that in her
external genitalia there was "scanty pubic hair, well coaptated but moderately
swollen labia minora, labia mahora also confested (sic)". She noted that the
hymen had fresh lacerations at 12 o'clock, 6 o'clock, 5 and 7 o'clock; scantly
bleeding from the laceration; there was a .3 x .3 cm. Hematoma (sic) at 12
o'clock; the patient cried and was hysterical in the examination of her genitalia
and complained of pain when application was inserted for smear; the patient's
panty was stained with blood and when smear for spermatozoa was done, none
was found (pp. 10-11, TSN, May 27, 1987; Exh. "w"). Later that day, Marilyn
was confined at the Rosary Hospital in Bulacan for 2 1/2 days so that she can
recover her strength (p. 11, TSN, March 25, 1987).
Meanwhile, the widows of the passengers who were killed during the January
20, 1986 incident at Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga, including Susana
Bautista Vda. De Surio, Lucila Cruz and Corazon Dionisio, were informed that
their respective husbands were among the four (4) passengers of jeepney who
were killed in San Simon, Pampanga and were invited to go to the funeral parlor
in Pampanga to make the necessary identification of the cadavers (pp. 305,

TSN, April 8, 1987; pp. 3-4, TSN, January 27, 1987; pp. 3-5, TSN, Feb. 17,
1987). Lucila Cruz confirmed her husband's death when she went to San
Simon, Pampanga on January 23, 1986 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. (pp. 3-4, TSN,
January 23, 1987; Exh. "Z", pp. 8-9, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987). The death of her
husband Constancio Dionisio was confirmed by his widow Corazon when she
went to the funeral parlor in San Simon on January 25, 1986 (pp. 3-5, TSN,
April 8, 1987). The death of Magno Surio was also confirmed by his widow
Susana Bautista Surio when she went to the funeral parlor in San Simon
accompanied by a policeman from malolos (pp.3-5, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987; Exh.
"AA"; pp. 10-11, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987).
Dr. Maria Teresa F. Santos, Rural Health Physician of San Simon, Pampanga,
who conducted autopsy of the four (4) cadavers recovered at Bgy. San Pablo,
San Simon, Pampanga, issued Certificates of Death of Rodolfo C. Cruz, Magno
Surio, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan (pp. 3-4, TSN, Aug. 5,
1987; Exhs. "Z", "AA", "BB" and "CC"). The cause of death of Rodolfo C. Cruz
was "Cardio-respiratory arrest, shock hemorrhage, multiple stab wounds" (Exh.
"ZZ, pp. 8-9, TSN. Aug. 5, 1987). The cause of death of Magno dela Cruz y
Surio is the same as that of Rodolfo C. Cruz (Exh. "AA", pp. 10-11 TSN, Aug. 5,
1987). The stated cause of death of Constancio Dionisio and Armando
Cundangan was also the same as those indicated in the certificates of death of
the other victims (Exhs. "BB", "CC"; pp. 12-14, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987).
Meanwhile, in the early morning of January 23, 1986, Cpl. Rodriguez received a
tip from a civilian informer that the description of one of the four (4) suspects
given by Marilyn Martinez tallied with that of appellant Eduardo Pulusan who
previously had a record in their file (pp. 6-8, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986; pp. 4-6, TSN,
Sept. 7, 1987).
In the afternoon of January 23, 1986, Cpl. Rodriguez, Pat. Maniago and several
policemen of San Simon, Pampanga, together with the Pampanga P.C.
Command, including Sgt. Mario Dulin, proceeded to the residence of appellant
Pulusan at Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon., Pampanga (pp. 10-11, TSN, Nov. 25,
1986). When their group reached San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga, they
found Honwario Pulusan, appellant Eduardo Pulusan's brother there (pp. 10-11,
Nov. 25, 1986; p. 6, TSN, Sept. 9, 1987). After interviewing him, the team
learned from Honwario that appellant Pulusan was with Rolando Rodriguez,
Rolando Tayag and one Efren alias Ramon at Bgy. Moras dela Paz, Sto
Tomas, Pampanga, where Rolando Rodriguez resided (pp.2-5, TSN, Nov. 18,
1986; pp. 10-11, TSN, Jan. 6, 1987; pp. 5-7, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). Immediately
thereafter, the joint San Simon police and Pampanga PC Team coordinated
with the Station Commander of Sto. Tomas and proceeded to Moras dela Paz
together with Honwario Pulusan (pp. 3-5, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). Upon reaching
Bgy. Moras dela Paz, the team parked their vehicle a few meters away from the
residence of appellant Rolando Rodriguez (pp. 5-6, TSN, Oct. 7, 1997). As the
members of the joint PC and police team approached the residence of appellant
Rodriguez about 20 or 30 meters therefrom, they noticed four (4) persons,
including appellants Rodriguez and Pulusan, jumping and scampering away

from the house (pp. 7-8, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 7-8, TSN, Nov. 18,
1986). Honwario Pulusan pointed to the police team appellants Rodriguez and
Pulusan and also and "Kuya, sumuko na kayo" (p. 8, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). The
joint police and PC team pursued them and eventually apprehended appellants
Rodriguez and Pulusan (pp. 7-8, TSN, September 9, 1987; pp. 4-6, TSN, Nov.
11, 1986).
Thereafter, Pat. Maniago, Sgt. Dulin and the Barangay Captain, returned to the
house of appellant Rodriguez, conducted a search thereon in the presence of
one Gloria Bautista, siste-in-law of Rolando and eventually confiscated several
items, to wit: "one (1) camera, nikon type with cover (Exh. "A"); one (1) pair of
men's shoes, colored brown (Exh. "E"); one pair Grosby men's shoes (while)
(Exh. "G"); one (1) pair ladies shoes colored black (Melvin Trade Mark (Exh.
"H"); one (1) KNIFE 12 inches long (Exh. "J"); one (1) knife 10 inches long (Exh.
"K"); one (1) sunglass (Unisex) (Exh. "I"); one (1) ladies wrist watch (Urika)
(Exh. "M"); four (4) pcs. of batteries (Exh. "C" to "C-3"); two (2) pieces of steel
pipes which turned out to be an improvised 12 gauge shotgun "paltik-sumpak"
(Exh. "L", "L-1"); one (1) pants Haruta (Exh. "F"); one (1) jacket colored green
(Exh "D"); one (1) camera flasher (Exh. "B"); two (2) pieces (live) 12 gauge
shotgun ammos (Exh. "N"); and one (1) piece empty shell for 12 gauge
shotgun" (Exh. "N") (pp. 8-10, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 8-9, TSN, Sept 9, 1987;
pp. 3-9, TSN, Dec. 9, 1986; pp. 6-10, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). Afterwards, Sgt.
Dulin prepared an inventory of the recovered items (Exh. "R", "R-1", "R-2"; pp.
8-11, Sept. 9, 1987). Subsequently, appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez,
together with recovered items, were brought to the Station of the Pampanga
P.C. Command at St. Nino, San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation
(p.15, TSN, Sept. 9, 1987). A "Progress Report" relative to the arrest of
appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez and the recovery of the items from their
possession was also made by Cpl. Rodriguez (Exh. "Q", "A-1").
In the afternoon of January 23, 1986, the joint police and PC team informed the
three (3) surviving victims Gomez, Pagtalunan and Martinez that the suspects
had been arrested and invited them and the wives of the victims who were
killed, including Lucila Cruz, Susanaa Surio and Mrs. Cundangan, to go to the
PC Headquaters in the morning of January 24, 1986 (pp. 15-16, TSN, Sept. 9,
1987; pp. 10-11 TSN, Nov. 11, 1986; pp. 23-24, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986; pp. 4-11 ,
TSN, Nov. 11, 1986).
In the early morning of January 24, 1986, Gomez, Marilyn Martinez and
Pagtalunan, together with the wives of those who were killed, proceeded to the
PC Headquarters in San Fernando Pampanga (pp. 15-16, TSN, June 10, 1986;
pp. 5-6, TSN, July 29, 1986). Three persons, including appellants Pulusan and
Rodriguez, were presented to Gomez, Martinez and Pagtalunan and they were
asked if they knew them (pp. 2-3, TSN, Oct. 14, 1986) Pagtalunan pinpointed
only two of them, appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez as the persons who held
them up in Malolos on January 20, 1986 (ibid.; pp. 15-17, TSN, July 22,
1986). Gomez and Martinez also positively identified appellants to be among
the four (4) persons who committed the robbery, killing and rape in the evening

of January 20, 1986 (pp. 10-11, kTSN, Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 20-21, TSN, March 19,
1987; Exh. "O", "O-1" to "O-3"). Pictures of the identification of appellants
Pulusan and Rodriguez by the three (3) surviving victims were taken by a
commercial photographer under the supervision of the police authorities (pp.
16-17, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6, TSN, July 29, 1986; pp. 10-11, TSN, July
22, 1986; Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-2" and "O-3").
Susana Bautista Surio, widow of the victim Magno Surio, in her "Sworn
Statement: identified the camera, flash and batteries, among the items
confiscated by the police at the house of appellant Rodriguez, to be the property
of her husband who used them in his work as commercial photographer (pp. 411, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987; Exh. "U", "U-1"; Exhs. "A", "B", "C" to "C-3").
An information charging Pulusan and Rodriguez with the crime of highway robbery
attended with multiple homicide and multiple rape was filed in the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan in Malolos.[1] The information was later amended to include Rolando Tayag
and one John Doe alias Ramon or Efren. The amended information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of January, 1986, along the Mac Arthur highway in
the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Eduardo Pulusan y
Anicete and Rolando Rodriguez y Macalino, Rolando Tayag and one John doe
alias Ramon/Efren, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, armed with an improvised firearm and bladed instruments, with intent
of gain and by means of violence against and intimidation persons (sic), did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away with
them the following articles from the driver and the passengers of a passenger
jeepney bound for the said municipality, to wit:
From Constancio Gomez, driver:
Cash ------------------------------------------------------------------- P100.00
Lighter (Zippo brand) ----------------------------------------------- 100.00
2 fancy rings ---------------------------------------------------------- 60.00
From Cresenciano Pagtalumam, passenger:
Cash --------------------------------------------------------------------- P 110.00
Wrist watch ------------------------------------------------------------ 1,500.00
From Magno Surio, passenger:
Wrist watch, Seiko brand -------------------------------------------- P 800.00
Camera, Nikon brand ------------------------------------------------ 8,000.00

From Armando Cundangan, passenger:

Wrist watch, Seiko brand ------------------------------------------- P 700.00
Cash ------------------------------------------------------------------- 80.00
From Rodolfo Cruz, passenger:
Cash ---------------------------------------------------------------- P 700.00
Wrist watch, Seiko brand ----------------------------------------- 700.00
From Constancion Dionisio, passenger:
Cash ----------------------------------------------------------------- P 200.00
From Constancio Dionisio, passenger:
Cash --------------------------------------------------------------- P 200.00
From Marilyn Martinez, passenger:
Wrist watch Urika brand ---------------------------------- ----- P 350.00
To the damage and prejudice of the above-enumerated persons in the
amounts above-mentioned; and that by reason or on the occasion of the said
highway robbery and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the said Eduardo
Pulusan y Aniceta, Rolando Rodriguez y Macalinao and Rolando Tayag and
one John Doe alias Ramon/Efren, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of said Marilyn Martinez one after the
other, and with intent to kill, abuse of superior strength, cruelty, treachery and
evidence premeditation, further assault, attack strike and hack/stab with the
weapons they were then provided the said Magno Surio, Armando Cundagan,
Rodolfo Cruz and Constancio Dionisio, inflicting on the said persons serious
physical injuries which directly caused their instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.[2]
Rolando Tayag and John Does alias Ramon or Efren remain at large. Pulusan and
Rodriguez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
In his defense, Rodriguez testified that he was a nephew of co-accused Eduardo
Pulusan. He denied knowledge of the crime charged against him. He asserts that he
had not committed any crime, and that in fact, he was able to get an NBI clearance as a
requirement for his work as a driver in Iraq.[3]

As a kabo ng jueteng, he would collect bets three times a day, the last jueteng draw
being at 9:30 in the evening. He would thus be home only between 11:30 and twelve
midnight, as on the night of January 20, 1986. Rodriguez presented in court to
corroborate his alibi fellow kabo Oscar Nocum, a jueteng collector named Sara Lee, and
a jueteng bettor Marilou Garcia.
Oscar Nocum testified that Rodriguez was with him from about 9:30 in the evening
of January 20, 1986, which was the time of the last jueteng draw, until midnight:[4]
Sara lee, who lived nine houses from Rodriguez, testified that on the night of
January 20, 1986 she saw Rodriguez at around eight o'clock to remit her
collection. Rodriguez then came back to her house between 10:30 and eleven o'clock
because she had invited him to her daughter's birthday celebration and because they
expected to hear from him the results of the jueteng draw.[5]
Marilou Garcia, also a neighbor of Rodriguez who lived six houses away, testified
that she placed a bet with Rodriguez at his house at around eight o'clock to 8:45 in the
evening of January 20, 1986, afterwhich Rodriguez left. She next saw him later that
evening at around 10:30 to eleven o'clock when he passed by Garcia's house where a
bingo game was in progress.[6]
When arrested at his house in Moras, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga, Rodriguez was with
his two children, his uncle Eduardo Pulusan and jueteng collectors, one of which was
Rolando Tayag, one of those charged with Pulusan and Rodriguez in the amended
information. Pulusan was in Rodriguez's house to invite the latter to their town fiesta. [7]
Eduardo Pulusan testifying in his defense asserted that on January 20, 1986, he
was repairing his house in preparation for the coming fiesta. His helper then was a
certain Tony. The following day, he also stayed at home because he helped his father in
their fishpond. He did not leave his house until around 1:30 p.m. on January 23, 1986
when he went to the house of his nephew, Rolando Rodriguez, to invite him to the
fiesta. Pulusan presented in court his mother, Agapita, and Antonio Libid, the carpenter
who allegedly repaired his house, to corroborate his alibi. Both testified that Pulusan did
not leave the house on the night of January 20, 1986. [8]
He professed innocence because he had never been implicated in a crime, not
even vagrancy. He denied the testimony of prosecution witness Sgt. Dulin that he once
had a rape case against him.[9]
On June 5, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Bulucan, Branch 12 at Malolos,
rendered a Decision in Criminal Case No. 9217-M as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused
EDUARDO PULUSAN y ANICETA and ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y MACALINO
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds them guilty of the offense of Robbery
with Homicide penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code,
and hereby sentences each of them to suffer and undergo imprisonment for life
or RECLUSION PERPETUA, with cost against said accused.
Both accused Pulusan and Roriguez are hereby ordered, jointly and severally,
to indemnify the heirs of the late Rodolfo Cruz, Magno Surio, Constancio

Dinisio and Armando Cundangan the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS

(P30,000.00) for each dead victim as civil indemnification for their death.
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are also hereby ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, as indemnification to the rape victim Marilyn Martinez, the
amount of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby further ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay moral damages to the respective heirs of the deceased Magno
Surio, Rodolfo Cruz, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan, the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby further ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay moral damages to the respective heirs of the deceased Magno
Surio, Rodolfo Cruz, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan, the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) to each victim and to
rape victim Marilyn Martinez the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby furthermore ordered, jointly
and severally, to reimburse the heirs of the dead victims for the funeral
expenses by them as follows:
TWENTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P21,830.00) for deceased Rodolfo Cruz;
TEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS
(P10,170.00) for deceased Magno Surio;
ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00) for deceased
Constancio Dionisio.
Finally, both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby ordered, jointly and
severally, to return to the victims or their heirs the items they have taken during
the robbery or to reimburse the value thereof as follows:
Constancio Gomez - a lighter worth P50.00 and cash of P100.00;
Cresenciano Pagtalunan - a driver's watch Worth P1,100.00 and cash
of P110.00.
Marilyn Martinez - a wrist watch worth P350.00;
Rodolfo Cruz - a watch worth P700.00, a wedding ring worth P500 and cash
of P750.00.
As regards accused ROLANDO TAYAG and a John Doe alias 'Ramon/Efren', let the
record of this case be committed to the Archives to await their arrest and for this
purpose, let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused Rolando Tayag.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Pulusan contends before this Court that the trial court erred in giving credence to
his identification by prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime; in
giving evidentiary weight to the "incredible, unreliable and inconsistent if not conflicting
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;" in failing to give "exculpatory weight" to his
alibi which was supported by witnesses, and in convicting him even if his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.[11]
Rodriguez asserts that the trial court erred in convicting him and imposing on him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and in giving credence to the evidence presented by
the prosecution.[12]
The arguments of Pulusan and Rodriguez are anchored mainly on the issue of
credibility.
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrates, can
weigh such testimony in the light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at
the trial and is hereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the
true and the false.[13] Thus, the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any
clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the
case.[14] There is no showing in the instant case of an oversight, misundertanding or
misapplication of facts on the part of the trial court that may warrant reversal of that
court" findings and conclusions.
Pulusan avers that the prosecution witnesses' identification of him as one of the
robbers was not enough to hurdle the test of certainty. [15] Pulusan quotes the following
portions of the testimony of Constancio Gomez:[16]
Q Mr. Witness before the wheel of your jeep was taken from you and (you were) told
to sit at the back, you did not recognize the faces of those persons?
A No, sir.
Q Because you did not give a glance at their faces, correct?
A When something was poked at me, I have not yet recognized them. But when I
was sitted (sic) at the back, once in awhile I glanced at them, sir.
Q Mr. Witness when one of the persons you mentioned who boarded your jeep at
Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan poked a knife at your back and announced a hold-up,
you became greatly afraid Mr. Witness, correct?
A Of course, sir.
Q You were even terrified of being killed harmed by such happening, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you were very much afraid of these four men who announced the hold-up,
correct?
A Yes, sir, of course, I am afraid.
xxxxxxxxx
Q In fact Mr. Witness when these persons announced the hold-up, specifically when
one of them was poking a knife at your back and you were terribly afraid of these
four persons, you were afraid much more to look at their faces, correct?
A Yes, sir, I am not looking at their faces because something was poked at me.
Q Now even if you were ordered to go inside the jeepney, together with the
passengers and even after one of the four men took the wheels of the jeep, you
were still very afraid to look at them, correct?
A Even if I am so afraid, sir, once in a while I glanced at them and tried to recognize
them.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that when you were ordered to go inside the jeep to sit
with your passengers, they ordered the light of the jeep to be put off?
A When that was said, we were already far and all the valuables were already taken
from us, sir.
Q The light were (sic) ordered to go inside the jeep to sit with your passengers, they
ordered the light of the jeep to be put off?
A They were the ones who put off the light, sir.
Q When you said that you take a look at their faces, it means to say that you take
only a passing glance at their faces, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you were just taking a passing glance of the faces of those four men, you
did not actually describe (sic) their faces, is that correct?
A Some of them I can describe but the others I cannot, sir.
Q When you arrived at the place where the jeep stopped, is it not a fact that the place
was dark?
A Darked (sir), sir.
Q While you were there, you were not able to recognize the faces of the four men,
correct?
A No more because it was dark, sir.[17] (Underlining supplied)
The quoted portion, rather than support Pulusans contention, show that Gomez,
although gripped by fear, was able to look at and see the malefactors. While it may be
true that Gomez had only occasional glances at the men, this does not mean that he
could not have been able to recognize them. The most natural reaction of victims of

violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe
the manner in which the crime was being committed.[18]
We also consider the following testimony of Cresenciano Pagtalunan, thus:
Q When these four passengers boarded the jeepney, was the jeepney inside lighted
or not?
A The jeepney was lighted, sir.
Q Did you look at the faces of these four persons who boarded the jeepney?
A I came to know their faces when they passed by me and announced that it was a
hold-up, I happened to look at them, sir.
Q In fact you looked at their faces and you have only a glimpse of their faces,
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you have glimpses of these four persons who boarded at Malolos or only one
of them?
A I saw their faces because there was still light inside the jeep, sir.[19]
This testimony was corroborated by Marilyn Martinez who affirmed that when the
four men boarded the jeep, the light inside the jeep was still on. She was able to
recognize the men because they entered the jeep one by one. Moreover, Marilyn
testified that even though the light inside the jeep was off, because they travelled quite a
long distance, lights from the vehicles following them provided enough
illumination.[20] When they arrived at the isolated talahiban in Sto. Tomas, one of the
robbers switched on the headlights of the jeep. After the repeated rape of Marilyn, the
light inside the jeep was already on.[21] Furthermore, appellant Rodriguez, who was the
first to rape Marilyn, dragged her to the talahiban by passing in from to the jeep with its
headlights on. She was looking at him, pleading for mercy.[22]
This Court has time and again held that the relative weight and significance of
evidence on visibility depend largely on the attending circumstances and the discretion
of the trial court. The Court has considered as sufficient for identification illumination
from a kerosene lamp[23] from a flashlight,[24] in the same way that the Court considered
as enough lighting for identification purposes the medium light inside a jeepney which
was passing through a dark place.[25] In the instant case, the factor of visibility was in
favor of the eyewitnesses. Such identification by all of the three prosecution
eyewitnesses, not only by one, could not have been coincidental or contrived.
In an attempt to discredit the eyewitnesses and their testimonies, Pulusan points out
these conflicting testimonies: (1) Gomez and Marilyn testified he poked a knife at
Gomez while Pagtalunan said that he was holding a sumpak; (2) Gomez testified that it
was Pulusan who brought Marilyn to the talahiban while according to Marilyn, it was
Rodriguez who brought her first to that place; (3) Gomez testified that they went to the
PC headquarters the day following January 20, 1986 while Pagtalunan testified that
they did so four days later; and (4) Gomez contradicted his testimony on direct

examination that the crime transpired on January 20, 1986 by his testimony on crossexamination that the incident happened on February 20, 1986.
We find these alleged contradictions too trivial to affect the prosecutions case. Far
from eroding the effectiveness of the testimonies of these eyewitnesses, such trivial
differences are in fact indicative of veracity.[26] Witnesses testifying on the same event
do not have to be consistent in every detail considering the inevitability of differences in
their recollection, viewpoint or impression.Total recall or perfect symmetry is not
required as long as the witnesses concur on material points.[27]
The prosecution, contrary to appellants contention has also proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the four men, Pulusan and Rodriguez included, conspired in the
commission of the crime. In conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit
a crime is not necessary. It may be deducted from the mode and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such points to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.[28]
Pulusan and Rodriguez boarded the jeep together with two companions at the same
time in Barangay Tikay. When Pulusan announced the hold-up, Rodriguez and their
companions simultaneously brandished knives and the sumpak and divested the
passengers of their money and valuables. When the jeepney reached an isolated place,
the men took turns in raping Marilyn, inflicting physical harm on four male passengers
who all succumbed to repeated clubbing and stabbing. After the carnage, the four
malefactors walked towards the same northerly direction.Apparent then is the unity of
purpose and design in the execution of the unlawful act.[29] And where the conspiracy is
shown, the precise extent of participation of each accused in the crime is secondary and
the act of one may be imputed to all the conspirators.[30]
Pulusan and Rodriguezs respective alibis cannot prosper. Apart from the fact that
they situated themselves in places not too far from the crime scene, there was no proof
that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the locus criminis during its
commission.[31] Most of all, their respective alibis collapse in the face of the positive
identification of them as the perpetrators of the crime.[32]
The crime of charged in the information was highway robbery attended with multiple
homicide with multiple rape. Highway robbery or brigandage is defined in Sec. (2) of
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974, as:
(t)he seizure of any person of ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the
taking away of property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of
person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any
Philippine Highway.
As manifest in its preamble, the object of the decree is to deter and punish lawless
elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby disturbing the
peace and tranquility of the nation and stunning the economic and social progress of the

people. A conviction for highway robbery requires proof that the accused were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. There is no such proof
in this case. Neither is there proof that the four men previously attempted to commit
similar robberies indiscriminately.[33]
The trial court thus correctly found Pulusan and Rodriguez guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide aggravated by rape under Article 294(1) of Revised Penal
Code. In the interpretation of an information, controlling is not the designation but the
description of the offense charged. Under the allegations in the information, Pulusan
and Rodriguez are liable under the aforesaid article of the penal code. [34]
We must state that regardless of the number of homicides committed on the
occasion of a robbery, the crime of still robbery with homicide. In this special complex
crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty
prescribed in Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code.[35] There is no crime of robbery with
multiple homicide under the said Code.[36]The same crime is committed even if rape and
physical injuries are also committed on the occasion of said crime. Moreover, whenever
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is proven to have been committed,
all those who took part in the robbery are liable as principals therein although they did
not actually take part in the homicide.[37]
Rape had not been proven to be original intention of the appellants, the crime
having been committed simply because there was a female passenger in the
jeep. Hence, rape can only be considered as an aggravating circumstance and not a
principal offense.[38]
Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with homicide is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the attendance of rape as a generic
aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty of death should be imposed. However,
by reason of Section 19(1), Art. III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which proscribes
the imposition of the death penalty and considering further that at the time the crime
was committed, Republic Act No. 7659 entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on
Certain Heinous Crimes reimposing the death penalty had not yet been enacted, the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Because reclusion perpetua is a single
indivisible penalty for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the same
shall be imposed regardless of the attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.[39]
The Court gives credence to the findings of the trial court as to the items to be
returned or equivalent amount to be reimbursed to the victims of robbery, as well as the
actual damages claimed and proven by the windows of the slain, victims.
However, the civil indemnity for the heirs of the deceased victims should be
increased to P50,000.00 in conformity with jurisprudence.[40]
As to the moral damages awarded to Marilyn Martinez, the same should be
increased pursuant to this Court's ruling that the offended party in the crime of rape is
entitled to moral damages in the amount of at least P50,000.00; but in casses where
multiple rapes are committed against one victim, as in this case where the victim
suffered four rapes by four men, the victim should be awarded no less than the amount
of P200,000.00 as moral damages.[41]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 5, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12 convicting appellants Eduardo Pulusan and Rolando
Rodriguez of the crime of robbery with homicide is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modifications that the heirs of the four (4) slain victims shall each be entitled to an
indemnity of P50,000.00 and the rape victim, Marilyn Martinez, shall be awarded moral
damages in the amount of P200,000.00. Appellants shall be liable jointly and severally
for the monetary awards.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), and Romero, JJ., concur
Purisima, J., on leave