Information Warfare in Greece and Rome: Cryptography

and Steganography
Evan Dembskey
Tshwane University of Technology, South Africa
evan.dembskey@gmail.com
Abstract: The ancient Greeks and Romans were fully aware of the necessity of obtaining, protecting and
communicating military intelligence. The timely delivery of information often turned the tide of battle to advantage,
and the lack of it to disadvantage and even disaster. The ancient Greek and Roman literature is replete with
examples of intelligence gathering, analysis and communication. Intelligence failures are not ignored, but
recorded and discussed. In this paper we examine the ancient primary sources to understand what role
cryptography and steganography played in Ancient Greece and Rome. A brief discussion of ancient Greek and
Roman intelligence techniques and some modern examples (drawn from secondary literature) of intelligence
failures are included in the discussion. This serves to demonstrate that the ancient Greeks and Romans were
sophisticated in their use of technology, and faced many of the same problems we face today. The question in
this ongoing research project is then asked, is it possible to draw lessons that are applicable to modern
intelligence and information warfare activities? It is concluded that of the incidents and technologies analysed, the
failures are the result of non-technological factors, and that we can profit from a more detailed study of ancient
primary sources.
Keywords: Ancient Greece, Rome, cryptography, steganography, information warfare, intelligence

1. Introduction
The acquisition and use of information is an essential part of warfare and economic activity
(Goldsworthy, 1996) in all societies throughout time. For as long as men have held sway over other
men, leaders have needed to gain information from beyond their field of vision and to send
instructions beyond the range of their voices (Woolliscroft, 2001). The timely delivery of information
has often turned the tide of battle to advantage, and the lack of it to disadvantage. A well-placed
Trojan scout could have avoided the breach that ended that war. Better information may have
produced a favourable outcome for Julius Caesar in Britain in 55 and 54 B.C. The defeat of Publius
Quinctilius Varus in the Teutoburg Forest was no doubt due to a failure of intelligence on the Romans
part. The problem of failures of intelligence is still with us, such as the Battle of Wanat in Afghanistan
in 2008 and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallabs bomb attempt on Flight 253 in 2009.
Using Sheldons (2005) suggestion that the modern intelligence cycle of direction, collection,
analysis and dissemination is used as a framework for discussion, we begin the task of understanding
intelligence failures by examining ancient methods of cryptography and steganography. This research
concentrates on dissemination or transmission techniques, particularly cryptography and
steganography; the areas of direction, collection and analysis are briefly mentioned for the sake of
completeness, but not examined in any great depth, as this paper cannot encompass all areas of the
problem.
From a modern perspective, the study of cryptography and steganography falls more properly under
COMSEC (communications security) in command, control and communication systems.
The research method employed is essentially a literature study. The ancient texts are read in
translation, using the respected Loeb editions where possible. In some cases no complete translation
is available, and translations within secondary sources are resorted to. A limitation when studying
current literature is in the lack of access to primary sources and reliance secondary sources such as
popular press, books and articles. However, given the nature of the primary sources, this is
understandable.

2. Direction
Firstly the need for intelligence must be recognised. There is evidence for the recognition of the value
of intelligence in both Greece and Rome. Indeed, the need to understand an enemys movements
would be self-evident even to the most inexperienced commander
Spying is well-documented in the primary sources. Sextus Julius Frontinus (1969) has the following to
say on the subject, in his Stratagemata.

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Evan Dembskey
During the war with Etruria, when shrewd methods of reconnoitring were still unknown to
Roman leaders, Quintus Fabius Maximus commanded his brother, Fabius Caeso, who
spoke the Etruscan language fluently, to put on an Etruscan dress and to penetrate into
the Ciminian Forest, where our soldiers had never before ventured.
Frontinus is explicit in his recognition of evolving methods of spying. He mentions another case in
which a spy named Hamilcar Rhodinus successfully spies on Alexander III by pretending friendship. If
Frontinus report is true, then Alexanders behaviour is puzzling, as there was an understanding of the
dangers he and his generals must have possessed and the fact that Alexander is known to have
restricted who could and could not attend military conferences.
The betrayal of the Spartan king Leonidas at Thermopylae took the form of intelligence being given to
the Persians, and surely this would have been a lesson for the following generations. Thermopylae
was a narrow pass in Locris, at its narrowest it was only wide enough for a single cart. Leonidas was
to defend the pass against the Persian emperor Xerxes. After two days of intense fighting the
Persians made no headway and suffered terrible losses. A local man, Ephialtes, betrayed the Greeks
and told Xerxes about a track that went through the hills and could be used to attack from behind. It
was by using this track that the Persians defeated Leonidas. This demonstrates several important
factors. Firstly, there is a need to gather intelligence. Had Leonidas known about the track he would
no doubt have had it guarded properly. Secondly, never doubt the value of local knowledge. Thirdly,
there is a need not only to gather intelligence, but to protect it from the enemy.

3. Collection
The ability to deduce future actions from enemy behaviour is an ability that relies on a combination of
knowledge, understanding of human behaviour and understanding of the enemy. This is
accomplished using techniques ranging from scouting, spying, questioning locals and prisoners-ofwar, bribery, to taking advantage of deserters and other unplanned for occurrences.
There is some evidence that the Greeks had codified intelligence collection, and employed novel
methods. Gerolymatos (1986) argues plausibly there was an understanding of the difference between
tactical and strategic intelligence. It is likely that the Romans had similar institutions.
The electronic and information technology revolutions have opened new avenues for intelligence
collection, but in turn act as a force multiplier for terrorists. It must also be recognised that much of
this new technology can be circumvented by simply not committing information to digital storage.

4. Analysis
Quite often in the ancient world intelligence didnt need extensive analysis, but it did need to come to
the attention of someone who could recognize its importance and could do something with it.
Herodotus tells the story of how Demaratus warned his Spartan countrymen when Xerxes planned to
invade Greece.
Demaratus framed the following contrivance. He took a pair of tablets, and clearing the
wax away from them, wrote what the king was purposing to do upon the wood whereof
the tablets where made; having done this, he spread the wax once more over the writing,
and so sent it
The blank wax-covered wood initially perplexed the Spartans. Understandably, they would have
expected some message to be written on the tablet. Gorgo, the wife of king Leonidas of, discovered
the stratagem, making her the worlds first known female cryptographer. Had she not discovered the
message, it would have been all but useless.
Varus failure in Teutoburg, Caesars failure in the landing in England, the failure at Wanat
Afghanistan and the Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab failure all have the same common characteristics
a failure of analysis. In all these cases the intelligence was available but not acted on. Much of the
analysis of ancient intelligence seems to have been performed by single people or small groups, more
or less on the spot. However, if those people, like Caesar, ignored or did not have the capacity to
analyse information, the chances of disaster increased to a point where it was inevitable.

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5. Dissemination
Information must be transmitted to those that can best make use of it. While in transmission,
information is vulnerable to interception. Like us, the Ancient Greeks and Roman developed systems
to either hide the presence of information, or render is useless if intercepted.
One method may have included entity and message origin authentication with cryptography, much
like modern public key cryptographic systems. The belief that a skytale is a cryptographic device is so
universally held that it hardly seems open to question. This belief rests only on the authority of authors
of later antiquity, primarily Plutarch and Aulus Gellius. Gellius describes the skytale as a staff about
which a leather thong is wrapped, and that the letters of the message where written across the
connected edges of the joints, so that when the thing was removed from the skytale the letters
become imperfect and broken.
Plutarch reports five instances of the use of the skytale between 404 and 395 B.C. Plutarch believed
that the skytale was a cryptograph, and thus probably believed that these five messages were
encoded. Perhaps they were, but a closer examination shows there is little reason to think so.
Plutarch is the only ancient author to tell us that a skytale was used in four of these five occasions.
For the fifth, Polyaenus is the only other author to report that it was. Xenophon contradicts Plutarch on
three of these occasions. (Eadie & Ober, 1985).
Xenophon preserves what appears to be the text of a messenger sent by a Spartan commander to
Sparta, possibly the only genuine example of such a missive we have. In 410 B.C. the Spartan navy
was defeated off Cyzicus and the Spartan navarch Mindarus was killed in the battle. His epistoleus,
Hippocrates, sent a message to Sparta: The ships are gone. Mindarus is dead; the men are starving;
we know not what to do. The message was intercepted and taken to Athens. The Athenians
appeared to have no difficulty reading the message, and so we must conclude that either the
message was not encoded, or the encoding posed no barrier to the Athenians. Xenophon does not
find it particularly remarkable that a letter from a Spartan vice-admiral is read by Athenians without
difficulty.
In the other two passages where Xenophon mentions the skytale, the intended recipients were an ally
and a Theban. Unless all of Spartas allies and the less than friendly Thebans had their own halves of
Spartan skytale, it seems unlikely the Spartans were using the skytale as anything more than
messages or message devices (Eadie & Ober, 1985). In the final analysis, there seems to be little
evidence that the skytale was used as a cryptographic device. What its exact purpose was we can
only guess, as its function seemed to vary over time.
In Book Six of the Iliad, Proetus, believing that Bellerophon tried to ravish his wife, sends Bellerophon
to the king of Lydia with a letter of introduction written on a folded tablet, and containing much ill
against the bearer. When the king deciphered the message he ordered Bellerophon to undertake a
number of suicide missions, all of which he survived, winning half of the kings kingdom and the kings
daughter in marriage. Homers language is not precise enough to judge what the markings on the
tablet actually were. It is likely that they were nothing more than ordinary letters; Bellerophon may
have been illiterate. Actual substitution of symbols for letters seems too sophisticated for the era of
the Trojan War. But the mystery Homer throws around the tablet does suggest that some form of
rudimentary concealment was used though the device may have been in common use. Certainly the
king had no difficulty in finding the message. The folded tablet may very well be the oldest evidence
for the use of steganography.
Writing itself can be considered as a type of cryptography in a largely illiterate society. The level of
literacy is also a factor. If a persons skill at reading is low, possibly confined to reading simple orders
or equipment inventories, and he or she struggles to read more complex texts, it will be far more
difficult for that person to decipher ciphertext, even if a simple cipher is used. Even though the Caesar
Cipher is considered weak by todays standards, it is possible that it was strong enough for practical
use 2000 years ago.
In the Gallic Wars, Julius Caesar (1917) describes using Greek letters to hide his Latin communiqus.
The use of a foreign language is still a problem today, and necessitates the hiring and training of
translators. It is possible that the delay caused by the necessity of translation be significant.

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Using Greek as a cipher may have been sufficient, as it is unlikely that the Gauls knew much, if any,
Greek. Dio Cassius goes on to describe the Caesar Cipher. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, states (Jul
56.6, 1914) that in some of his private correspondence Caesar employed a substitution cipher. In
Aug. 88 Suetonius describes a similar, but slightly simpler, cipher employed by Augustus, where he
would substitute B for A, C for B and so on. Aulus Gellius, in Book XVII.IX of his Attic Nights,
mentions Caesars use of a cipher, and implies that the key was not always the same. He also notes
that sometimes Caesar used more complex ciphers, but unfortunately does not mention what they
are. The truth is that Caesar probably did not create the system known today as the Caesar Cipher,
unless he did so in ignorance and independence of the developments of the Greeks in that area.
However, it is likely that he did make use of the system, and thanks to the writings of Suetonius,
Gellius and Probus it has become synonymous with Caesar.
A more sophisticated approach is to hide the message in plain sight. An example of this might be to
subtly mark particular letters on a message written on papyrus, so that only close observation will
reveal the marks. Today, security through obscurity, or hiding the existence of a message, is
generally considered to be inferior to other forms of information protection, like cryptography. It is the
authors opinion that this is an ill-considered attitude to adopt when considering Rome and Greece.
Cryptography only becomes a superior strategy when the science of mathematics had advanced far
enough that one-way functions and other advanced techniques were discovered and understood.
However, even today, such a message may be overlooked.
There are interesting stories of unusual transport layers in the ancient literature. When the tyrant of
Miletus, Histaiaeus wanted to encourage his cousin, the current ruler of Miletus, Aristagoras to revolt
against the Persian king, he hit upon the following stratagem to secretly convey his message.
Histaiaeus shaved the head of his messenger and wrote the message on his scalp and waited for his
hair to grow back. The messenger was then sent to Aristogoras. Upon arriving at the destination, the
slave shaved his head and the message was revealed. Elsewhere (I.123, 1920), Herodotus tells us of
messages hidden in the belly of a freshly killed rabbit. The Median noble Harpagus wanted to avenge
himself on the king of the Medes, who years before had tricked him into eating his own son. Harpagus
hid a message in the belly of a hare and sent it with a messenger disguised as a hunter to Cyrus, king
of Persia. The messenger instructed Cyrus to open the hare himself. When he read the message
Cyrus realised that Harpagus would help him from the inside in a revolt against the Medes. Cyrus
took the opportunity and led the Persians to victory. Aulus Gellius mentions another use of this
method in XVII.IX of his Attic Nights. These innovative mechanisms have been duplicated today, if
somewhat less bloodily, in the form of messages embedded in publically accessible sound and image
files on the Internet, or files carried by unwitting people.
In the twentieth century the demands of two world wars have escalated the development of battlefield
systems of communication with dramatic effect, emphasising their importance to victory.
Nevertheless, military thinking has changed little since Onasander wrote his essay on generalship
(Peddie, 1994). Even as late as 1942 orders were passed with signal flags, heliographs, lamps, handsignals and bugle-calls. This latter instance, particularly, was a method practised first by the Greeks
then by the Romans, starting more than two-and-a-half thousand years ago, and probably earlier.
Asclepidotus wisely recognises the limitations of signals and offers advice to overcome the most
common difficulties. His approach is pragmatic rather than academic and probably reflects the
approach taken by most commanders of the day. He also gives us a flavour of commands given by
voice, bugle and signal in the following passage.
The commands must be short and unambiguous. This would be attained if the particular
command should precede the general, since the general are ambiguous. For example,
we would not say Face right!, but Right face!, so that in their eagerness some may not
make the turn to the right and others to the left when the order to turn has been given
first, but that all may do the same thing together; nor do we say Face about right! but
Right about face! nor Counter march, Laconian!, but Laconian, counter march!
and
By far the most frequently mentioned signal transmitters in the ancient sources are simple fire
beacons (Woolliscroft 2001). Though still limited to line of sight, they have the advantage that they
can be seen of longer distances than can other methods of visual signalling. Their use seems to be
very ancient; Homer first mentioned them (see below). Unfortunately, due to their nature it is difficult,
to find any material remains.

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In The Iliad (XVIII, 1987) Homer mentions the use of beacons as warning devices. He also mentions
that there is smoke during the day. Aeschylus mentions another use of a beacon in Agamemnon. In
the opening passages, a beacon brings news of victory from Troy. To quote Aeschylus (2009):
Watchman: Now I watch for a new star, the promised beacon fire, the signal bringing
news from Troy of Victory
Herodotus (1920) also mentions a beacon chain which the Persian general Mardonius had intended
to use to transmit news of the fall of Athens to King Xerxes at Sardis during the Persian Wars in 480
B.C.
In The Peloponnesian War Thucydides (1919) mentions the use of beacons no less than four times.
In II: 94 he clearly demonstrates the danger that beacons could cause if misinterpreted. This is always
a danger, as beacons are usually simple binary signals, either on or off, and may out of necessity be
used to warn of an unexpected occurrence. Thucydides also writes about the use of beacons as
devices of treachery in IV: 111.
Vegetius (1990) mentions the use of both beacons for night use and smoke signals for day use. A
benefit of smoke signals he does not mention is that they are not necessarily limited to line of sight.
In Volume IV, Book X of his Histories, Polybius discusses fire-signalling (IV.10.43, 1920). He has high
praise for the usefulness of fire as a signalling device and gives reasons for the importance and
usefulness of fire-signalling. Polybius recognised the main problem with fire-signals, that of both
sender and receiver having to use pre-arranged signals. According to Polybius, fire-signals were
nothing more that beacons. If a situation occurs where some intelligence has to be communicated but
no code was decided upon, then that intelligence cannot be transmitted by code.
Caesar himself provides additional examples of the use of beacons, in both The Gallic Wars (1917)
and The Civil Wars (1914). One example demonstrates the use of fire, and the other smoke. Both
examples show that the use of this kind of signal was considered commonplace.
There are a few intriguing hints that beacons were used to signal more complex messages than those
mentioned above. Unfortunately the sources do not mention the exact methods used. In Thucydides:
After ravaging the land until noon, the Peloponnesians sailed off again, but at around
dusk, they were told by fire signal that a 60-strong squadron of Athenian ships was
approaching from Leucas.
A simple analysis of Thucydides account reveals that four pieces of information were supposedly
sent by beacon, namely 1) the strength of the squadron, 2) the type of squadron (navy), 3) the
nationality of the squadron and 4) the origin of the navy. No doubt it is easy to create a signal to
indicate that an Athenian navy is approaching, but to signal the exact numbers and origin is a more
difficult task. If Thucydides account is accurate, the Spartans must have had signals to indicate
numbers, and signals to either indicate each possible origin of an Athenian navy or some sort of
system to send the origin letter by letter, something like the Polybius Square. Based on an idea
developed by the philosopher Democritus, it used two or more torches to spell out every letter in the
Greek alphabet (Wrixon, 2000). To use this system Polybius suggests using a dioptran, essentially a
hollow tube that allows the user to focus more readily on a specific area. Polybius does recognise the
difficulty in using this system, but says, essentially, that practice makes perfect. Polybius gives credit
to Tacticus Aeneas for his idea.
rd
Simpler a perhaps more effective system is reported by the 3 -century A.D. writer, Julius Africanus,
who reports that it was used by the Roman army of his day (Sheldon, 2005). The system uses three
torches, designated right, centre and left. Each torch encodes a third of the alphabet, or eight letters.
The system uses varying numbers of flashes of the individual lights rather than combinations of
different lights to transmit letters. Thus one flash on the left signals alpha, two flashes beta and so
on. The biggest problem with using multiple torches or beacons to encode signals is that each
individual fire must be some distance from the others so that they can be resolved.

One major problem of beacon use was that the signal can be jammed. Fire signals are very difficult
to block unless they are small and the blocker is close to them, but lighting multiple beacons, or

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lighting beacons at unexpected and random times might render the enemys use of beacons useless.
In The Peloponnesian War (1919) Thucydides provides a beautiful example of this.
Polybius (1922) tells of a strategy suggested by Aeneas Tacticus, but does not seem to think much of
it, as it fell far short of our requirements. Though clever, Aeneas device seems too clumsy to be
used reliably. The device requires the use of two earthenware vessels of identical width and depth.
Each vessel would have a cork a little narrower than its mouth, with a hole in the middle. A rod is
passed through each hole. The rods are graduated in equal sections, each clearly marked off from the
rest. In each section the most evident and ordinary events that occur in war are written. Holes are
then bored into each vessel of the same size before filling them with water. To use the device, a torch
is raised by the sender and water is allowed to escape. When the rode has sunk to a level where the
message to be sent is on the level of the mouth of the vessel the torch is lowered. The receiver, upon
seeing the torch raised, also allows water to begin escaping, which he then stops when the torch is
lowered. All things being equal, the same graduation should be at the mouth of both vessels.
Philon, in Mechanica VII (8.55-57) provides a description of a virtually identical system (Woolliscroft
2001). Philon recommends a large vessel (150 litres) which would help alleviate timing problems
associated with using synchronised water clocks. Philon also seems to recognise the limits of the
number of messages that can be sent, and alludes to the possibility of combining signals to create
new meanings.
Polybius (1922) stated that the water clock system was an improvement on beacons, but still suffered
from the same problems usually experienced when using codes. Not all contingencies are possible to
predict, and even if they were there would be too many to fit on a rod. Polybius offers a better system,
devised by Cleoxenus and Democleitus and apparently perfected by him. It is essentially a
substitution cipher transmitted using torches. Today it is known as the Polybius Square or Polybius
Checkerboard.
Using water clocks in this manner is problematic. Firstly, the clocks had to be made as closely as
possible to the same size. Any significant difference in size would result in one of the clocks
discharging its water at a faster rate than the other. For the same reason the hole though which the
water is released must also be the same size in both clocks. This may not have been possible to do
so long ago. This problem could be alleviated by making the clock much larger, and the circles
larger, so that there is a greater margin for error. Transportation and resetting would be problematic.
All things considered, beacons had a number of strengths that helped tip the balance in favour of
using them. They are more immune to the vagaries of climate than other visual signalling methods,
which is why they were also employed as lighthouses in the ancient world (Woolliscroft, 2001). The
signal is simple but powerful and this less likely to become obscured or distorted by poor reception
conditions. A bright light can also be seen for a surprising distance on misty nights. Smoke can even
be seen during the day in misty conditions, and as the air is usually still in misty conditions the smoke
will not readily disperse.
All these methods catalogue the efforts of men to communicate or frustrate an enemys ability to
communicate. Though the technology is different, the techniques and thinking are remarkably similar
to our own. Though no evidence in the literature has been found, light signalling would be ideal for
use in Afghanistan and Iraq.

6. Conclusion
The evidence for the existence of the elements of information warfare, in the form of COMSEC and
the recognition and use of information in the ancient world, while not overwhelming, conclusively
shows that it was understood and practiced by the Greeks and Romans.
It may be that as soon as a culture has reached a certain level, probably measured by its literacy,
cryptography appears spontaneously as its parents, language and writing probably did also. The
multiple Human needs and desires that demand privacy between two or more people in the in the
midst of war or social life must inevitably lead to cryptology wherever men thrive and wherever they
write (Kahn, 1996).

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It can be argued that the methods the Greeks and Romans employed are very much the same as
those employed today, when the relative computational capabilities of the societies are factored out.
There is evidence of lively and imaginative thought on the matter. It is very unlikely that all the
methods and techniques of steganography and cryptography were known and written about, and no
doubt little of what was written about has survived.
To conclude, it is possible to draw lessons from the ancient literature, as their military concerns were
very much the same as modern concerns. Modern intelligence and IW professionals should study the
ancient primary sources as this provides the philosophical underpinnings for their profession.
Historians and scholars of warfare will also profit, as such a study demonstrates that such activities
are not going to disappear, and need to be understood from a wider perspective.

References
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Caesar. (1914) Civil Wars, The. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
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Cassius. (1916) Roman History. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Eadie J.W. & Ober, J. (ed.) (1985) Craft of the Ancient Historian, The, Lanham: University Press of America, Inc.
Frontinus (1969) Stratagems. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Gellius, A. (1999) Attic Nights I. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Gerolymatos, A. (1986) Espionage and Treason, J.C. Gieben, Amsterdam.
Goldsworthy, A. (1996) Roman Army at War, The. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Herodotus. (1920) Persian Wars. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Homer. (1987) Iliad. Penguin Books, London.
Kahn, D. (1996) Codebreakers, The, Scribner, New York.
Peddie, J. (1994) Roman War Machine, The. Alan Sutton Publishing Limited, Gloucestershire.
Plutarch. (1916) Lives. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Polybius. (1922) Histories. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Sheldon, R. (2005) Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome. Frank Cass, Oxon.
Suetonius. (1914) Lives of the Caesars. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Tacticus. (1923) On the Defence of Fortified Positions. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
The 9/11 Commission Report (2004).
Thucydides. (1919) History of the Peloponnesian War. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Vegetius. (1990) Epitoma Rei Militaris. Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York.
Woolliscroft, D. (2001) Roman Military Signalling. Tempus Publishing Ltd, Gloucestershire.
Wrixon, F. (2000) Codes, Ciphers and other Cryptic and Clandestine Communications, Black Dog and Leventhal
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Xenophon (1901) Anabasis, Macmillan and Co., New York.

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Biographies of contributing authors (in alphabetical

order)
Sabah Al-Fedaghi holds an MS and a PhD in computer science from Northwestern University, Evanston,
Illinois, and a BS in computer science from Arizona State University, Tempe, USA. He has published papers
in journals and contributed to conferences. He is an associate professor in the Computer Engineering
Department, Kuwait University. He previously headed the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department
(19911994) and the Computer Engineering Department (20002007).
Fathy Amer is the professor of Electronics in the department of Communications and Electronics, Helwan
University, Cairo, Egypt. Previously, He was an associate professor at faculty of training at El ahsaa, Saudia
Arabia from 1995 to 2004. His research interests include Microelectronics and Testing and Information
Hiding.
Shubhangi Sunil Bhatambrekar is the Head of the Computer Science Department. He holds M.Sc, M.
Phil.(Phy), MCA, DCL. With 17 years of experience, he was Chairperson of the Board of Studies in
Computer Science and a Member Academic Council at University of Pune (2000-2005). He is a Member
Board of Studies Computer Management at University of Pune and a Member of the Board of Studies in
Computer Science at Bharati , University. He is a Senior Life Member of the Computer Society of India and a
member for India of the IFIP (TC3-Education Group) 2003-06.
Alexander Bligh PhD is Schusterman visiting professor of political science at the University of Notre
Dame, Indiana, US, and professor of political science at Ariel University Center, Israel. His is also teaching at
Bar Ilan University Department of Political Science. He was formerly deputy advisor (1987-1990) and advisor
(1990-1992) to the Prime Minister of Israel on Arab affairs; expert on counter-terrorism. He has published
numerous books and articles on these topics as well as the politics of the Middle East. Bligh has rich
experience in leading war and simulation games.
Sviatoslav (Svet) Braynov is Associate Professor in the Computer Science Department at the University of
Illinois at Springfield in the USA. He has published more than 50 papers in refereed conferences and
journals, chaired and co-chaired several conferences and workshops, and delivered multiple invited
presentations and tutorials. His research interests include computer security, game theory, electronic
commerce, and artificial intelligence.
Aristeidis Chatzipoulidis received his main degree from Alexander Technological Educational Institute in
Marketing and his master degree from Strathclyde Business School in International Marketing. Currently, he
is a PhD student at the University of Macedonia and his main research focus on governance, risk,
compliance and management disciplines.
Lou Chitkushev is the chairman of Computer Science Department at Boston Universitys Metropolitan
College, director of Information Security and Biometrics Laboratories and the head of the Graduate program
in Telecommunications. He is co-founder and Associate Director of Boston University Center for Reliable
Information Systems and Cyber Security (RISCS) which was established to promote and coordinate
research on reliable and secure computation and information assurance education by developing ideas and
tools to protect critical computational infrastructure. He holds a Ph.D. in Biomedical Engineering from Boston
University, M.S. in Biomedical Engineering from Medical College of Virginia, and an M.S. and B.S in
Electronics and Telecommunications from the University of Belgrade. He has extensive international
industrial and academic consulting experience in areas of telecommunications, data assurance, and
biomedical informatics.
Paul Crocker has a degree in Mathematics and PhD in Applied Mathematics from the University of Leeds,
UK. After working in software development and support in 1996 he joined the Mathematics and Computer
Science Department at the University of Beira Interior, Portugal. His research and teaching interest include
parallel and concurrent Computing, Security and Operating systems. He is a member of the Instituto de
Telecomunicaes research organization.
Evan Dembskey comes from Johannesburg, South Africa, and has studied both ICT and Ancient History to
a masters level. He is currently pursuing a doctorate in computer science. In the future, he hopes to combine
his love of science and history.

ix

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