GARCIA VS BOARD OF INVESTMENTS

FACTS:
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation,
applied for registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a
new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the
province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an
amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the
site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy
of BPCs original and amended application documents. The BoI denied the request on
the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to the release
of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code
protects the confidentiality of these documents absent consent to disclose. The BoI
subsequently approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or
publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the
wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcias Constitutional right to have access to
information on matters of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the
Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an interest in the
establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital
because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe The
Court also ruled that BPCs amended application was in fact a second application that
required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that all applications
and their supporting documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall
not be disclosed to any person, except with the consent of the applicant, the Court
emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure on the orders of a court of
competent jurisdiction. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of
the application, amended application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI
under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, the
Constitution does not open every door to any and all information because the law
may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny. Thus it excluded the
trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial information of the applicant
BPC, and matters affecting national security from its order. The Court did not provide
a test for what information is excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access
public information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold
under its ruling.

Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking
his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose
publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents
make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of
recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?
HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent
upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided
to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated
or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.

Neri v. Senate Committee

Action:
A motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated Mar. 25 2008, granting the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo Neri against the respondent Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and
Commerce, and National Defense and Security (the Committees).
Fact:
Neri appeared before the Committees and testified for about 11 hours on matters
concerning the NBN Project, a project awarded by the DOTC to ZTE.
Neri disclosed that then Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He informed PGMA of the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on PGMA and his discussions relating to the NBN Project, Neri refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege.
Committees persisted in knowing Neris answers to (a) w/n PGMA followed up the
NBN Project, (b) w/n she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) w/n she directed him to
approve it, required him to appear and testify once more on Nov. 20 2007. On that
day, Neri did not appear upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege.
On Nov. 22, the Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain
why he should not be cited in contempt. On Nov. 29, Neris replied that he
manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should
there be new matters to be taken up. He requested that he be furbished in advance
as to what else he needs to clarify.
Issue:
1. w/n there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our
legal system
2. w/n there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the 3
questions are covered by executive privilege
3. w/n Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the 3 questions
are critical to the exercise of their functions
4. w/n Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order
Held:
1. Yes. In Almonte v. Vasquez, the Court affirmed that the presidential
communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. The Court
articulated that there are certain types of information which the government may
withhold from the public, that there is governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters; and that the right to information does not extend to
matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers, by
which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions
in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
2. Yes.

Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to
a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, because the
Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary
Board. Quintessential is defined as the most perfect embodiment of
something, the concentrated essence of substance. Non-delegable means
that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an executive
agreement is in essence an executive power and the final decision in the
exercise of the said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the
President even when it has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board because it is only a form of check and balance.
Committees contend that the application of the doctrine of operational
proximity for the reason that it may be misconstrued to expand the scope of
the presidential communications privilege to communications between those
who are operationally proximate to the President by who may have no
direct communications with her. In the case at bar, the danger is absent
because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly
within the term advisor of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member
of her official family.
Committees contend that the Court erred in upholding the Presidents
invocation, through Exec. Sec., of executive privilege because
o Between Committees specific and demonstrated need and the
Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to
strike the balance in favor of the former
It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive
privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in
confidentiality. The Letter dated Nov. 15 of Exec. Sec. Ermita
specified presidential communications privilege in relation to
diplomatic and economic relation with another sovereign nation
as the bases for the claim.
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction that information on intergovernment exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards
for the sake of national interest.
o In the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the
1987 Constitution on government transparency, accountability, and
disclosure of information
o The constitutional provisions cited by Committees do not espouse an
absolute right to information. It must be emphasized that the assailed
Decision did not enjoin the Committees from inquiring into the NBN
Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are
covered by executive privilege.
3. No. Committees contend the information elicited by the 3 questions are necessary
in the discharge of their legislative function, among them,
To consider the 3 pending Senate BillsThere is simply a generalized
assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to
legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate Bills. And
it is further expressed by the counsel of Committees that even without Neri
answering the 3 questions, the Senate can still come up with legislations.
To curb graft and corruptionThe potential culpability of high government
officials in a given government transaction is not a task for the Senate to
perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine
anyones guilt of a crime or wrongdoing.

4. Yes. Committees contended that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring

invitations or subpoenas to contain the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the
questions relative to and in furtherance thereof is not provided for by the
Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum
An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked
Executive, generates its own abuses. The requirements set forth in Senate v.
Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress power.
Witnesses should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by
the inquiry. It will allow them to prepare the pertinent information and
documents
The language of Sec. 21 Art. 6 of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is
categorical. It should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Onyle
those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered
null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect
the rights of witnesses as expresses in Sec. 21 Art. 6 of the Constitution.

SABIO v. GORDON
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No.
455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines

Overseas

Telecommunications

Corporation

(POTC),

Philippine

Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings

Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task.
Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal.

The Courts high regard to such power is

rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily,
the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being
a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that
the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policymaking and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people
sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional
rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

CASE Name: AKBAYAN vs Aquino

Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.

FACTS
The petitioners NGOs, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers filed a
petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to obtain from respondents the
full text of the Japan Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) and all pertinent attachments and annexes to it, as well as
the Philippine and Japanese offers made in the course of the
negotiations.
January 25, 2005 Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Taada III and Mario
Joya Aguja filed House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry regarding the
bilateral trade being negotiated the Philippine government, particularly the
JPEPA. This became the basis of an inquiry subsequently conducted by the
House Special Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into the
negotiations of the JPEPA. In the inquiry they requested respondent
Undersecretary Tomas Aquino, Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating

Committee to study and negotiate the JPEPA, and to furnish the House
Committee with a copy thereof. Usec. Aquino did not heed their request.
November 2, 2005 Usec. Aquino replied to Congressman Agujas request,
through a letter, that they will be provided a copy of the document once the
negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review of the
proposed agreement has been conducted.
Congressman Herminio G. Teves, in a separate move, requested Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita to do the same. Executive Secretary replied through
a letter that copy of the JPEPA would be forwarded to the Committee as soon
as it is settled and complete.
Aguja also requested the same from NEDA Director-General Romulo Neri and
Tariff Commission Chairman Edgardo Abon. Both of them responded that the
person in best position to answer request would be Usec. Aquino.
August 31, 2005 A third hearing was conducted by the House Committee
resolving to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of the JPEPA but it was
not pursued because then House Speaker Jose de Venecia requested him to
hold in abeyance the subpoena until the President gives her consent to the
disclosure of the documents.
September 9, 2006 PGMA signed JPEPA
JPEPA First bilateral free trade agreement to be entered by the Philippines in
the event that the Senate grants consent to it. It covers topics about:
o trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading,
trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government
procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition
policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and general and final
provisions.
September 11, 2006 it was made accessible to the public
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the JPEPA is a matter of public concern. YES
2. Whether or not executive privilege may be invoked. YES
3. Whether or not the ruling in PMPF vs Manglapus in the case at bar.
YES
4. Whether of not there is sufficient public interest to overcome the
claim of privilege. NO
5. Whether or not the respondents belatedly claim executive privilege.
NO
1. Yes
The courts have the duty to determine on a case by case basis whether
the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
the public. The Court held that, the JPEPA, being an international trade
agreement is covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, therefore,
exempted from the right to information and the policy full public
disclosure.
2. Yes
Neither the right to information nor the policy of full public
disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public

concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature. Whether

a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is made. It bears emphasis, however,
that such privilege is only presumptive. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a
public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information,
strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The respondents claim privilege considering the status (negotiations
ongoing and the text was still subject to change) and nature (diplomatic
negotiations) of the JPEPA during the time that the Committee was
requesting a copy the documents thereof, these are covered by executive
privilege. JPEPA was a diplomatic negotiation in progress.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized by the
Court. Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that information on intergovernment exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards
for the sake of national interest.
In PMPF vs Manglapus, the Court held that: secrecy of negotiations with
foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom
of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.
o The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and
expedition of decision which are inherent in executive action.
Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential
nature.
o Mr. Stimson a Secretary of the State in the US said that: A
complicated negotiation . . . cannot be carried through without
many, many private talks and discussion, man to man; many
tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other
countries come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home
and of their differences with other countries and with other
delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain
circumstances and would not do under other circumstances. . . If
these reports . . . should become public . . . who would ever trust
American Delegations in another conference? (United States
Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284.).
o They adopted the doctrine laid down in US vs. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its
negotiations with foreign countries.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted
their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would
govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan, but also with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
3. YES
(1) National security (PMPF vs Manglapus) vs. economic treaty
(present case)
Faulty assumption that information, to be considered privileged, must
concern national security. The recognition in Senate v. Ermita that
executive privilege has encompassed claims of varying kinds, such that

it may even be more accurate to speak of executive privileges,

cautions against such generalization.
Examples of privileged information are: informers privilege,
presidential communications privilege, deliberative process privilege,
and diplomatic negotiations privilege.
Privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank
exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties
by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the
privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations
privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the
independence in decision-making of the President, particularly
in its capacity as the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. And, as with
the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic
negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information
per se, but because the information is part of a process of
deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest, must be
presumed confidential.
In Fulbright and Jaworski v. Department of Treasury, the US District
court ined close relationship between deliberative process and
diplomatic negotiation privileges, which are:
o Negotiations between two countries to draft a treaty
represent a true example of a deliberative process. Much
give-and-take must occur for the countries to reach an accord.
o The policies behind the deliberative process privilege
support non-disclosure. Much harm could accrue to the
negotiations process if these notes were revealed. Exposure
of the pre-agreement positions of the French negotiators might well
offend foreign governments and would lead to less candor by the U.
S. in recording the events of the negotiations process.
o Finally, releasing these snapshot views of the negotiations would be
comparable to releasing drafts of the treaty, particularly when the
notes state the tentative provisions and language agreed on. As
drafts of regulations typically are protected by the
deliberative process privilege, drafts of treaties should be
accorded the same protection.
In Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), et al. v. Office of
U.S. Trade Representative, the court refrained from applying the
doctrine laid down in Fulbright and ordered the disclosure because the
information being sought was not inter-agency and the court does not
reach the question of deliberative process.
o The US government stated a statutory basis for withholding
information, or the Exemption 5 from Freedom of Information Act,
namely: (1) it must be either inter-agency or intra-agency in
nature, and (2) it must be both pre-decisional and part of the
agency's deliberative or decision-making process.
Philippine courts, however, having no counterpart of the FOIA, when
assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations, are more free
to focus directly on the issue of whether the privilege being claimed is

indeed supported by public policy, without having to consider as the

CIEL court did if these negotiations fulfill a formal requirement of being
inter-agency.
NOTES:
o Fulbright -> The plaintiffs in that case sought access to notes
taken by a member of the U.S. negotiating team during the U.S.French tax treaty negotiations.
o CIEL -> plaintiffs sought information relating to the just-completed
negotiation of a United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement the
same district court.
(2) Petitioners in Manglapus consisted entirely of members of mass
media vs. in the case at bar petitioners include members of the
House of Representatives
Incorrect to claim that the doctrine laid down in Manglapus does not
apply to the present case, where the demand for information has come
from members of Congress, not only from private citizens.
The privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not
ipso facto lose all force and effect simply because the same privilege is
now being claimed under different circumstances.
The Courts statement in Senate v. Ermita that presidential refusals
to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three
distinct kinds of considerations [state secrets privilege, informers
privilege, and a generic privilege for internal deliberations], and may
be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either
judicial or legislative investigations, implies that a privilege, once
recognized, may be invoked under different procedural
settings. In PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court held that it is the
President alone who negotiates treaties, and not even the
Senate or the House of Representatives, unless asked, may
intrude upon that process.
The recognition granted in PMPF v. Manglapus to the privileged
character of diplomatic negotiations cannot be considered irrelevant in
resolving the present case, the contextual differences between the two
cases notwithstanding.
(3) The school of thought that the requirements of foreign policy and
the ideals of transparency were incompatible with each other or
the incompatibility hypothesis, while valid when international
relations were still governed by power, politics and wars, are no
longer so in this age of international cooperation.
The Court notes that the ruling in PMPF v. Manglapus is grounded
more on the nature of treaty negotiations as such than on a
particular socio-political school of thought. If petitioners are
suggesting that the nature of treaty negotiations have so changed that
[a]n ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the
concession which are exacted or offered on both sides no longer lead[s]
to widespread propaganda to block the negotiations, or that parties in
treaty negotiations no longer expect their communications to be
governed by historic confidentiality, the burden is on them to
substantiate the same. This, petitioners failed to discharge.

4. NO
There are at least two kinds of public interest that must be taken into
account. One is the presumed public interest in favor of keeping the
subject information confidential, which is the reason for the privilege
in the first place, and the other is the public interest in favor of
disclosure, the existence of which must be shown by the party asking for
information.
Petitioners go on to assert that the non-involvement of the Filipino people
in the JPEPA negotiation process effectively results in the bargaining away
of their economic and property rights without their knowledge and
participation, in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
o The case for petitioners has, of course, been immensely
weakened by the disclosure of the full text of the JPEPA to
the public since September 11, 2006, even as it is still
being deliberated upon by the Senate and, therefore, not
yet binding on the Philippines. Were the Senate to concur with
the validity of the JPEPA at this moment, there has already been, in
the words of PMPF v. Manglapus, ample opportunity for discussion
before [the treaty] is approved.
The Congress alleged that they could not meaningfully exercise the power
to regulate international trade agreements such as the JPEPA without
being given copies of the initial offers exchanged during the negotiations
thereof. In the same vein, they argue that the President cannot exclude
Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority
the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived
only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the
Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.
And also Art. VII Sec 21 of the Consti.
o In PMPF vs Manglapus echoed by Bayan vs. Executive Secretary,
the Court held that: By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic
nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the
sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the
country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect
of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of
foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is executive altogether.
o As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and
the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts
which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of
his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no
less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself
is powerless to invade it.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast
legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations.
While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such
pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not
to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is
not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority
to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the
President, but only the Senate.

5. NO
That respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their
Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of
privilege should not be credited. Petitioners position presupposes that
an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House
Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have
waived it.
What respondents received from the House Committee and petitionerCongressman Aguja were mere requests for information. Request =
NOT compulsory process, they do not strictly call for an assertion of
executive privilege.

IDEALS vs PSALMS
GR 192088, 9 Oct 2012Petitioners: IDEALS et al Respondents: PSALM et al
FACTS:
PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of the EPIRA law. Said law mandated PSALM to manage
privatization of NPC. When PSALM commenced the privatization an invitation to bid was published
and the highest bidder K-Water was identified. The sale to K-Water was sought to be
enjoined by petitioners who contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when,
in the conduct of the bidding it violated the
peoples right to information without having previously released to the public critical information
about the sale.
ISSUES:
1.Can the bid documents, etc. used in the on-going negotiation for the privatization and sale of
Angat hydro plant be accessed via the right to information?
2.Is the duty to disclose information the same with the duty to permit access to information on
matters of public concern?
HELD:
1.Yes. The court reiterated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
2.No. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution,
the other
aspect of the peoples
right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain access to documents and paper of
the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions
involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of

information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any
matter contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency

Bantay vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus
to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in
the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently
were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic
Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the
Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of
certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this
urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director
of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees.
Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en
banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees
names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure
request. Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away
from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the
April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections
must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec
resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not
their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No.
7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named
therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that
the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the
elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent
party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their
respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of
the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the
public the names of said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation
of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the
Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups,
sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2
petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The
exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is
outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In
certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the
case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ
of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that
nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject
party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of
the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a

justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely
nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even
publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect
their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a
party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to
information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the
citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to
information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The
peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject
to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns
is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in
question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines

(G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962) (14 October 2008)
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP),
represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign
the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the
previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and
jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro
defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities
of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The
BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The
MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as associative,
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its
provisions requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall take effect
upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel
the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the
MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to
information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the

City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their
agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.
Issues and Ruling:
1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require
new legislation and constitutional amendments.
YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary
changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down
as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the Presidents authority to
propose constitutional amendments. Because although the Presidents power to
conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may
validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the
Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a
certainty.
2. W/N there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters
of public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy
of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No.
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify
the exercise of the peoples right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the
peace agenda:
a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is
replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of
the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before
any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory
to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment;
c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).
3. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No.

8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.
NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same
is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the
provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective
until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE
and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
From The President addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the
clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel
nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an
act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only
in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of
the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that
process.
5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.
NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed
the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public
scrutiny.
Carpio-Morales, J.
The peoples right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of
the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the
Constitution.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands.
The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.
An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish
durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status
as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence.

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to selfdetermination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determinationa
peoples pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this
case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession)
arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is
not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such
authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional
act.
Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral
declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were
clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to
that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those
statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly,
unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.

Hazel Ma. C. Antolin v. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A. Gangan, and Violeta

J. Josef
GR No. 1655036

July 5, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Hazel Antolin took the 1997 CPA Board Exams but failed, receiving
failing grades from four out of seven subjects. Convinced that she deserved to pass,
she wrote to respondent Abelardo Domondon, Acting Chairman of the Board of
Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected. Her answer
sheets were shown but these consisted merely of shaded marks. She requested for
copies of the questionnaire, their respective answer keys, and an explanation of the
grading system used in each subject. Respondent denied the request.
Issue:

WON Antolin has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers.

Petitioner:
Primarily, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with damages against the
Board of Accountancy and its members before the Manila RTC, praying that the court
would order the board to furnish her with copies of the examination papers and other
documents and materials. She later amended her petition, pleading a cause of action
for the access of the documents requested for. However, the RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground that the petition had already become moot and academic
since she already passed the 1998 CPA Board Exams. However, an omnibus order of
the trial court reconsidered her case. The CA, however, ruled that (i) the PRC
regulation preventing her from gaining access to said documents were valid
limitations on petitioners right to information and access to government documents;
(ii) that the examination documents were not of public concern; (iii) it was not the
function of the respondents to review and reassess the answers to exam questions of
a failing examinee; (iv) the case was moot and academic as petitioner already passed
the 1998 CPA Board Exams; (v) that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, having not elevated the matter to the PRC before seeking judicial
intervention. Petitioner insists she has the Constitutional right to gain access to said
examination documents, that she did not need to exhaust administrative remedies
since no recourse to the PRC was available as only a pure question of law is involved
in the case and that her petition was not rendered moot and academic when she
passed the 1998 CPA Board Exams.
Respondents:
Respondent primarily denied the request of petitioner on two grounds: first,
the PRC rules only permitted access to the petitioners answer sheet and that
reconsideration of rating shall be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in
grading the answer sheets or malfeasance; secondly, he clarified that the Board was
precluded from releasing the exam papers as such act were considered
unprofessional by the PRC resolution. The Board did not find any mechanical error in
the grading of petitioners test papers. Nonetheless, the petitioner elevated the case
to the RTC wherein respondents argue that petitioner was not entitled for the relief
sought, among others. They also filed to dismiss the petition on damages since (1)
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) the petition stated no cause
of action as there was no ministerial duty to release the information demanded, (3)
and the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is subject to
the limitation set forth by the PRC Resolution No. 338. Also, they added that the
petition had become moot and academic since petitioner already passed the 1998
CPA Board Exams.
Dispositive Portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 11,
2006 and February 16, 2004 Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 76546 and
CA-GR SP No. 76498, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. The November 11,

2002 and January 30, 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Civil
Case No. 98-86881 are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for
further proceedings.
Court:
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 28, Article 2 of the
Constitution provides that the State may adopt policies in the disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest while Section 7, Article 3 provides the right of
the people to information on matters of public interest. It is clear that the peoples
right to information is limited to matters of public concern and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Court, nonetheless, conceded that the
CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in
order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession.
Furthermore, on the issue of mootness, the Court held that the petitioners belated
passing of the Board Exams does not automatically mean that her interest in the
examination papers has become mere superfluity.
Lastly, CA erred in ruling that petitioner should have exhausted administrative
remedies before seeking judicial intervention because issues of law cannot be resolved with
finality by an administrative officer.