Professional Documents
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Crim Law Last Minute
Crim Law Last Minute
MALA PROHIBITA
The following offenses are mala prohibita: violation of R.A. 8042 (Illegal
Recruitment),[7] Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22),[8] R.A. 9165 (Dangerous Drugs
Law),[9] P.D. 957 (Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums),[10]
P.D. 1602 (Anti-Fencing Law),[11] R.A. 8282 (SSS Law),[12] and P.D. 1866 as
amended by R.A. 8294 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives).
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for
illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.[13]
Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation
of P.D. 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating
circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.[14]
Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or
animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation of such possession. As a consequence, the burden of evidence is shifted
to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.[15]
Having been caught in flagrante delicto (in possession of prohibited drugs), there is
prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on accused-appellants part.[16]
The finding of the illicit drugs and paraphernalia in the house owned by the
appellant raised the presumption of knowledge and, standing alone, was sufficient
to convict.[17]
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited
drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the
confiscated marijuana is not necessary.[18]
CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo,
or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[19]
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to
its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurb or would lead to an injustice.
[20]
Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning
of the language used; and may not be held to include offenses other than those
which are clearly described, notwithstanding that the Court may think that Congress
should have made them more comprehensive. Words and phrases in a statute are
to be construed according to their common meaning and accepted usage.[21]
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be
interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.[22]
The Courts function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and
harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et
concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.[23]
Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the
State.[24]
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos, x x x if the law does not
distinguish, so We must no distinguish.[25]
Conformably with the principle of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the
relationship of the offender, as being just a step-grandfather of the victim, cannot
be deemed embraced by the enumeration (qualified rape).[26]
The particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. [27]
Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term shall further emphasizes
its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced. x x x And where the law does not distinguish the courts
should not distinguish; where the law does not make exception the court should not
except.[28]
GENERALITY
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.[29]
Penal laws are obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. Since
the Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application of
our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
enjoy, it follows that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based
upon an express constitutional grant.[30]
TERRITORIALITY
Piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.[31]
PROSPECTIVITY / EX POST FACTO LAW
Favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda, penal laws which are favorable to
the accused are given retroactive effect[32] except in the case of a habitual criminal
as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.[33]
The following statutes have prospective application: R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law),
[34] Republic Act No. 7890 (Increasing the Penalty for Grave Coercion),[35] R.A.
8353 (The New Rape Law),[36] Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
(Re: Penalty for B.P. 22)[37] and R.A. No. 7691 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts).[38]
The following statutes have retroactive application: R.A. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006),[39] the favorable provisions of R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law),
[40] RA 9346 (Anti-Death Penalty Law),[41] the Constitution[42] and the favorable
provision of R.A. 8294 (Firearms Law).[43]
In People v. Rolando Valdez, G.R. No. 127663, March 11, 1999, the accused used an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of four (4) counts of murder. R.A. 8294 was
applied retroactively in favor of the accused who is not a habitual delinquent insofar
as the use of unlicensed firearm is no longer considered a separate offense.
However, the provision of the R.A. 8294 that the use of unlicensed firearm is
considered as aggravating circumstance was not applied retroactively against the
accused since the same has the effect of increasing the penalty (ex post facto).
EQUAL PROTECTION
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or persons are
different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.[44]
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class.[45]
DUE PROCESS
The due process clause, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, requires that citizens are given
sufficient notice or warning of what is lawful and unlawful conduct under a penal
statute. To enforce this guarantee, courts have developed the void for vagueness
doctrine. The void for vagueness doctrine expresses the rule that for an act to
constitute a crime, the law must expressly and clearly declare such act a crime.[46]
Substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the
governments action. x x x the law is necessary to achieve a compelling
government purpose. x x x police power cannot be exercised whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty and property.[47]
NON-IMPOSITION OF CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies x x x something more inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life.[48]
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution ... to come under the ban, the
punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive wholly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. Mere
severity does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.[49]
BILL OF ATTAINDER
A bill of attainder has been defined as a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial.[50]
EX POST FACT LAWS
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3)
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done
was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[51]
CLASSIFICATIONS OF FELONIES
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Test- Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.[52]
A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo, we held that that there can be no
frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence
implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated
homicide cannot exist.[53]
A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. What qualifies an act as one of reckless or simple negligence
or imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the execution thereof.
Otherwise stated, in criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done without malice but
with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence, and which has harmed society or
an individual.[54]
ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person COMMITTING A FELONY (by means
of DOLO or CULPA) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.[55]
Petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a
bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does
not alter petitioners liability for his death.[56]
Petitioner committed an unlawful act by punching Lucrecio, his uncle who was much
older than him, and even if he did not intend to cause the death of Lucrecio, he
must be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to the abovequoted provision. He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
[57]
Victorianos act of physically maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act.
[58] The accused was held guilty of Parricide.
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical
consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious
than that intended. Hence, an accused who originally intended to conceal and to
bury what he thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as a
principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that the said victim was
actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment and
burial.[59]
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which
he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the
crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his
son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct
consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal
liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.[60]
ABERRATIO ICTUS
ERROR IN PERSONAE
PRAETER INTENTIONEM
mistake in identity
There is a notorious
disparity between the act
and the means employed
by the offender and the
resulting felony, i.e., the
resulting felony could not
be reasonably anticipated
or foreseen by the offender
from the act or means
employed by him.[63]
The following DO NOT INCUR any criminal liability (not committing a felony): (1)
anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, or in defense of relatives or
strangers; (2) any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which
causes damage to another; (3) any person who acts in the fulfillment of duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office; and, (4) any person who acts in obedience to
an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.[64]
Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his
rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances (Art.
247, RPC) is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. This does not mean, however,
that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact
that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the
deceased, he uttered warning words (an waray labot kagawas,) that is not
enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados.
We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under
the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries
through simple imprudence or negligence.[65]
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. The autopsy report indicated
that the cause of the victims death is multiple organ failure. X x x Thus, it can be
concluded that without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted
with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his death.
The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act
caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.[66]
On September 28, 1993 the accused punched Tomelden. The blow caused
Tomeldens nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious. X x x October 2 and 7,
1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness, headache, and
other pains. The attending doctors observed the patient to be in a state of
drowsiness and frequent vomiting. X x x Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of October 10
due, per Dr. Arellano, to cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion
with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident.[67] The lucky punch
was the proximate of Tomeldens death.
The resulting death/injury was not the proximate cause of the defendants act in the
following instances: (1) Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her,
thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias violent
assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her maxillary area, x x x and to have
suffered incomplete abortion. X x x Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital
for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17,
1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the
fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding
and abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated by proof
other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been
the result of other factors.[68] (2) The defendant struck the deceased a blow on the
mouth. Defendant was held liable only for Slight Physical Injuries and not Parricide
since the wife died of diarrhea. (3) On January 23, 2002, accused x x x stabbed Cruz
on the left side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick
broke and was left in Cruzs body. X x x on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the
Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only
brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died the
following day x x x liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted
upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the
stab wound.[69]
IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
Impossible crime applies only to a crime which would be an offense against
PERSONS or PROPERTY were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means. If the act performed constitutes a violation of the Revised Penal Code or
Special Laws, then the offender is liable for the crime committed and not for an
impossible crime.[70]
The accused who unlawfully took a check belonging to Mega Foam without the
latters consent but was not able to appropriate the amount of the check since the
same was dishonored upon presentment was held guilty of an impossible crime.[71]
STAGES OF EXECUTION
ATTEMPTED RAPE
ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS
UNJUST VEXATION
The accused was held guilty of attempted rape since there was no introduction of
the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the
vagina of private complainant.[76]
Removing her pants is not attempted rape but unjust vexation.[77]
In theft and in robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, the offense is
consummated the moment the offender takes, possession of the personal property
with intent to gain. He need not dispose or take away the property in order to
consummate the offense. What is important is whether or not there was asportacion
or unlawful taking. There is no felony of frustrated Theft.[78]
In robbery with force upon things, the offender must ENTER the building in order to
commit the crime.[79] The crime is consummated once the offender takes
possession of the personal properties therein. But if the property taken is a LOCKED
or SEALED FURNITURE or RECEPTACLE he must TAKE AWAY from the
building said locked or sealed furniture or receptacle (to be broken or forced open
outside the place of robbery) in order to consummate the felony.[80]
When the accused uttered the words Pag hindi mo ibinigay ang hinihingi namin sa
iyo ay papatayin ka namin, it clearly appears that appellant and her companions
had the intention of robbing the victim and were bent on resorting to violent means
to attain their devious ends. It could have been the P500.00 which Ubaldo Pimentel
left with the victim the previous night, or some other valuables, or perhaps, even
some merchandise. Since there is no proof or reasonable certainty that anything
was successfully taken from the deceased, the appellant should be convicted only of
attempted robbery with homicide penalized under Article 297 of the Revised Penal
Code.[81]
Estafa is consummated when deceit and damage on the victim are present;
frustrated when the money taken has not be appropriated or spent and there is
deceit; and attempted when there is deceit but no money was taken.
Undoubtedly, petitioners commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but
they failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not
by reason of their own spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension
by the authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to
cause damage and not the damage itself had been shown, the RTC and the CA
correctly convicted petitioners of attempted estafa.[82]
Corruption of public officer is consummated by the mere agreement of the parties.
The offense is attempted corruption of public officer if the public officer to be
corrupted does not agree to the proposal of the offender.
The accused was held guilty of attempted murder since he has intent to kill and the
wounds inflicted upon the victims were not considered fatal.[83]
CONSPIRACY
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.[84]
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the
single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually
take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the
same.[85]
MULTIPLE OFFENDERS
RECIDIVISM
(Art. 14. No. 9)
REITERACION OR
HABITUALITY (Art.
14 No. 10)
QUASIRECIDIVISM
(Art. 169)
HABITUAL
DELINQUENT
Ordinary
aggravating
Ordinary
aggravating
Special
aggravating[86]
Punished with
additional penalty
Previously
convicted by final
judgment of
another crime
embraced in the
same title of the
RPC[87]
Previously punished
for an offense to
which the law
attached an equal or
greater penalty or
for two or more
crimes to which it
attache a lighter
penalty[88]
Commits a felony
before beginning
to serve or while
serving his
sentence.[89]
Pardoned at the
age of 70 if not
habitual
delinquent
(Art. 62 no. 5)
Reiteracion and quasi-recidivism cannot aggravate the felony at the same time
since in reiteracion, the offender has already served his sentence while in quasirecidivism the offender is serving his sentence.
In reiteracion or habituality, it is essential that the offender be previously punished,
that is, he has served the sentence, for an offense in which the law attaches, or
provides for an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second
offense, or for two or more offenses, in which the law attaches a lighter penalty.[91]
If recidivism or reiteracion are both present, the proper aggravating circumstance is
recidivism since reiteracion requires that the previous offenses should not be
embraced in the same title of the Code. [92]
Recidivism and habitual delinquency can aggravate the offense at the same time.
[93] A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist.[94]
A felony can be aggravated by recidivism, quasi-recidivism and habitual
delinquency at the same time.
Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance which imposes the
maximum of the penalty for the new offense. It makes no difference, for the
purpose of the effect of quasi-recidivism under Article 160 of the Revised Penal
Code, whether the crime for which an accused is serving sentence at the time of the
commission of the offense charged, falls under the said Code or under special law.
Quasi-recidivism is punished with more severity than recidivism proper because the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism, as any other aggravating circumstance,
may be offset by a mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime,
whereas, in a case of quasi-recidivism the maximum degree of the penalty
prescribed by law for the crime committed should always be imposed irrespective of
the presence of any mitigating circumstance.[95]
Quasi-recidivism, like recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a
certified copy of the sentence convicting an accused. 35 The fact that appellant was
an inmate of DAPECOL does not prove that final judgment had been rendered
against him.[96]
If the offender is granted absolute pardon by the President, the felony pardoned
shall still be considered in determining the offenders subsequent liability for
recidivism, reiteracion, quasi-recidivism and habitual delinquency.[97]
But if the President, with the concurrence of Congress grants amnesty to the
offender, the offense included in the amnesty will not be considered in determining
his liability for recidivism, reiteracion, quasi-recidivism and habitual delinquency
because IN AMNESTY, THE CRIME IS TOTALLY OBLITERATED.[98]
The crime committed by a child in conflict with law who was placed under
suspended sentence and who was subsequently discharged by the court should not
be taken into consideration in determining his subsequent liability for recidivism,
reiteracion, quasi-recidivism and habitual delinquency because in (automatic)
SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE the court does not pronounce the judgment of
conviction.[99]
If the accused was granted probation and subsequently discharged by the court, the
crime committed should be taken into consideration in determining his subsequent
liability for recidivism because probation does not erase the previous conviction of
the accused.
If the accused was granted probation and subsequently discharged by the court, the
crime committed should not be taken into consideration in determining his
subsequent liability for reiteracion because the latter required that the accused had
previously served his sentence. In probation, the convict does not serve his
sentence.
The convict who is released on parole (after serving the minimum sentence) and
who committed an offense before his final release or discharge is NOT a quasirecidivist since he is not yet serving his sentence at the time of the commission of
the offense.
A habitual delinquent cannot avail of beneficent provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.[100] He cannot also avail of the retroactive effect of a law that is
favorable to him.[101]
CONTINUING CRIMES
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting
of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a
series of acts, there is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be
imposed.[102]
Examples of continuing crimes (1) the taking of six roosters at the same place
and time,[103] (2) squatting,[104] (3) concubinage[105] and (4) robbery committed
against several persons at the gasoline station.[106]
The following are NOT continuing crimes (multiple crimes were committed) (1)
estafa committed against different persons and in different occasions,[107] (2)
Estafa under Art. 315, para 1 (b), RPC,[108] (3) falsification and malversation,[109]
(4) qualified theft committed on different occasions,[110] (5) adultery since every
act of sexual congress is a separate crime,[111] (6) falsification of private
document,[112] and (7) grave threats against several individuals in different
occasions.[113]
Only one crime was committed and only one penalty was imposed in the following:
(1) estafa through multiple falsification of mercantile documents,[114] (2) estafa
through falsification of public documents[115] and (3) violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) were the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens
was done by a single stroke of the pen.[116]
In People v. Alberto Basao, et al., G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012 the accused
were held guilty of one (1) crime of robbery in band although they have two victims.
DELICTO CONTINUADO, or continuous
crime or continued crime
CONTINUING OFFENSE
territory where the offense was in part committed.[118] Estafa is also a transitory
offense.[119]
COMPLEX CRIMES (ART. 48, RPC)
COMPOUND CRIMES
(delito compuesto)
(delito complejo)
Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are
committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary
means for committing the other (or others).[124]
There was only one forcible abduction with rape and that was the one allegedly
committed on the truck or jeep. Any subsequent acts of intercourse in the house
against her will would be only separate acts of rape and can no longer be
considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape.[125]
In People v. Erland Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012 the accused was
held guilty of rape and NOT complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape since
the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances,
the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
Article 48 does not apply to acts penalized under Article 365, RPC[126]
There is no complex crimes where the killing was not shown to have been
committed by a single discharge of firearms. The accused was held liable for the
separate crimes of four murders and two attempted murders not complex crimes of
multiple murder with double frustrated murder.[127]
There is no complex crime where there was more than one gunman involved, and
the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. The accused was held
liable for four counts of murder.[128]
The accused was held liable for 50 counts of violation of B.P. 22. Each act of drawing
and issuing a bouncing check constitutes a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[129]
Each act of carnal knowledge is a separate and distinct crime of rape.[130]
In People v. Ito Pinic, G.R. No. 186395, June 8, 2011, however, the accused took off
his own pants and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain. He withdrew his
penis after about ten (10) seconds but inserted it again after ten (10) seconds. After
five (5) seconds, he withdrew it again but inserted it once more after five (5)
seconds. He also inserted his finger and licked her vagina. X x x although the penis
was thrice inserted in her private organ, the same constituted one (1) count of rape.
Rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the
Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized
by a special law.[131]
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of estafa and falsification will
constitute as one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate
offenses. The complex crime of estafa through falsification of documents is
committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or
goods from another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of
committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to conceal the
misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are committed. In
the instant case, when accused collected payments from the customers, said
collection which was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or
erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were
contrived to conceal some amount of her collection which she did not remit to the
company xxx.[132]
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
The following constitutes special complex crimes: (1) When by reason or on
occasion of ROBBERY the crime of homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, arson or
serious physical injuries are inflicted.[133] (2) When by reason or occasion of RAPE,
the crime of homicide is committed.[134] (3) When the victim in KIDNAPPING AND
SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION is killed or dies as a consequence of detention or
is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.[135] When the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of CARNAPPING or on occasion thereof.[136]
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of
whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.[137]
In People v. Teofilo Buyagan, G.R. No. 187733, February 8, 2012 (J. Brion), People v.
Samuel Algarme, G.R. No. 175978, February 12, 2009 (J. Brion) and in People v. PO1
Felipe dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008 (J. Brion) the accused
were found guilty of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
In People v. Michael Hipona, G.R. No. 185709, February 18, 2010 the accused was
held liable for special complex crime of robbery with homicide (not rape with
homicide and robbery).
In the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[145]
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of
real aggression. For this reason, Dannys observation that one of the men was
pulling an object from his waist is not a convincing proof of unlawful aggression. A
threat, even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person was about to be
attacked, is not sufficient. An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means
enough.[146]
Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the act
of drawing ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun at a target. The former
cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In People v.
Borreros, We ruled that for unlawful aggression to be attendant, there must be a
real danger to life or personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the deceased of allegedly
drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such
act did not put in real peril the life or personal safety of appellant.[147]
The unlawful aggression started when the appellant immediately fired at the victim
as the latter alighted from a tricycle and continued when the appellant fired at the
victim six (6) times.[148]
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger
not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The unlawful aggression
may constitute an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury upon the accused. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and strong,
positively showing the x x x intent to cause injury. x x x the victim was unarmed
when he went to the house of the appellant.[149]
The number of wounds the victim suffered, 26 in all (a number of which were
located in vital parts of the body), belies the appellants claim that he acted in selfdefense. The location and severity of these wounds also negate the claim of selfdefense; these circumstances point to a determined effort to kill, and not simply to
defend.[150]
SELF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OF HONOR
DEFENSE OF
PROPERTY
Unlawful aggression
consists of attempting to
rape a woman or
Unlawful aggression
consists of unlawfully
taking the property of
SELF-DEFENSE
RETALIATION
SELF DEFENSE
IN FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time
because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as
accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.[155]
The aggression is lawful if the aggression consists in the lawful exercise of a right.
An example of a lawful aggression is the force used by an owner or a lawful
possessor of a thing in repelling an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property or the aggression showed by the husband who
surprises his wife caught in the act of sexual intercourse with her paramour.[156]
A person acting under any of the justifying circumstances does not commit a crime,
however, if he acted negligently, he may be held liable for culpa under 365,
RPC[157] or entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete selfdefense or incomplete fulfillment of duty.[158]
In Francisco Sycip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000 the accused
issued post dated checks in favor of the developer as amortization payment for his
townhouse unit. The developer failed to develop and complete the project; hence,
the accused ordered the bank to stop payments. As a result, the checks he issued
bounced and he was accordingly charged for violation of B.P. 22. The Supreme Court
held that the accused is not liable for B.P. 22 because he is exercising his lawful
right to suspend payments.
BATTERRED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence,
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase (minor battering occurs); (2)
the acute battering incident (characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,
sometimes, death); and (3) the tranquil / loving phase (the woman and her batterer
are emotionally dependent on each othershe for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness). This cycle must be repeated.
The justifying circumstance of battered woman syndrome was not applied in the
case of Marivic Genosa because the accused failed to present evidence with regard
to the third phase of the cycle that she felt that she provoked the violent
incidents between her and her spouse; that she believe that she was the only hope
for her husband to reform; that she believe that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being, that she is dependent on him; that she feels
helpless and trapped in their relationship; that both regard death as preferable to
separation.
Self-defense was not also appreciated in the case of Marivic Genosa because the
unlawful aggression has already ceased at the time the accused killed her batterer.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
JUSTIFYING
EXEMPTING
ACCIDENT
INSANE
IMBECILE
FEEBLEMINDED
Has lucid
interval
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
Elements of insuperable cause: 1. That the act is required by law to be done. 2. That
a person fails to perform such act. 3. That his failure to perform such act was due to
some lawful or insuperable cause.[166]
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt
from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus
non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force
contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument
who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat.[167]
DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
x x x surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person x x x in the act or immediately thereafter x x x These rules shall be
applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents, with respect to their
daughters under 18 years of age, and their seducer, while their daughters are
living with their parent.[168]
Art. 247, RPC is an exempting circumstance. Consequently, no punishment is
inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his protection
NOT EXEMPT
A minor below 15 years old, or above 15 but below 18 acting without discernment,
is exempt from criminal liability but not from civil liability. He has to undergo
intervention program.[173]
In Robert Sierra v. People, G.R. No. 182941, July 3, 2009, the Supreme Court
accepted the testimony child as evidence of his age.[174]
Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong.[175] Discernment means the mental capacity of a minor between 15 and 18
years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.[176]
Treatment of children:
1.
Intervention - the child is fifteen (15) years or below or above fifteen (15) but
below eighteen (18) years old, who acted without discernment. The authority which
will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to immediately release the
child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the
childs nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare
and development officer who will determine the appropriate programs in
consultation with the child and to the person having custody over the child.[177]
2.
Diversion - If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below eighteen (18)
and who acted with discernment. If the imposable penalty for the crime charged is
above six (6), diversion may be resorted to only by the courts.[178]
Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application.[179] If the child is above 18 but below 21 at the time of
promulgation, he may still apply for suspension of sentence.[180]
In People v. Hermie Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011, the child in conflict
with the law was found guilty of qualified rape punishable by death. Supreme Court
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is not
applicable in physical injuries, to felonies by negligence, unintentional abortion and
to defamation/slander.[181] The weapon used, the part of the body injured, the
injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted may show that the accused intended
the wrong committed.[182]
PROVOCATION
PROVOCATION
VINDICATION OF GRAVE
OFFENSE
Provocation and obfuscation arising from one and the same cause should be treated
as one mitigating circumstance. Vindication of grave offense cannot co-exist with
passion or obfuscation.[184]
In voluntary surrender, the surrender of the accused to the authorities must be
unconditional, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to
save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture.
[185]
Although Hermogenes went to Barangay Chairman Aloria of Bulihan after the
killings, he did so to seek protection against the retaliation of the victims relatives,
not to admit his participation in the killing of the victims. Even then, Hermogenes
denied any involvement in the killings when the police went to take him from
Chairman Alorias house. As such, Hermogenes did not unconditionally submit
himself to the authorities in order to acknowledge his participation in the killings or
in order to save the authorities the trouble and expense for his arrest.[186]
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense
that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without these elements, and where
the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the
need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot
be characterized as voluntary surrender to serve as a mitigating circumstance.
[187]
In voluntary plea, the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt before a
competent court prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.[188]
Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender as provided for in paragraph 7 of
Article 13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code,
restitution should be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the
accused when the two circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to
instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present even
though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7,
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering that restitution is also tantamount
to an admission of guilt on the part of the accused, it was proper for the
Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor
of petitioner.[189]
In Emilio Cimafranca v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 94408, February 14, 1991,
however. the Supreme Court held that the return of the funds malversed is not a
defense and will not be an exempting circumstance nor a ground for extinguishing
the criminal liability of the accused but it can be a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender. In the instant case, the return of the property
malversed was not mitigating because it took the accused several years before he
returned the government property. In fact, when the engine was returned, it was
already scrap and the revolver was rusty and had to be reblued.
The fact that the accused suffers from a physical defect, a severed left hand, does
not mean that he should automatically be credited with the mitigating
circumstance. In order for this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that
such physical defect limited his means to act, defend himself or communicate with
his fellow beings to such an extent that he did not have complete freedom of action,
consequently resulting in diminution of the element of voluntariness. Such cannot
be appreciated where the accuseds physical condition clearly did not limit his
means of action, defense or communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite
his handicap, the accused nevertheless managed to attack, overcome and fatally
stab his victim.[190]
In Jose Reyes v. People, G.R. Nos. 177105-06, August 12, 2010 the Supreme Court
held that the mitigating circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code is applied only when the offender was over 70 years at the time of the
commission of the offense. The offender who is 63 years old at the time he
committed the offense is not entitled to such mitigating circumstance.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The circumstances in Article 14 nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 20 are considered
aggravating if the same facilitated the commission of the offense or especially
sought of by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or the offender took
advantage thereof for purposes of impunity.[191]
The following are special aggravating circumstances: (1) quasi-recidivism[192] (2)
use of unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder,[193] (3) use of
illegally manufactured explosives in the commission of any crime defined in the
Revised Penal Code or special laws which resulted in the death of a person,[194] (4)
under the influence of dangerous drugs in the commission of crime[195] (5) that
advantage be taken by the offender of his public position[196] and (6) the crime
was committed by an organized or syndicated crime group.[197]
An organized or syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime.[198] By definition, a drug syndicate is any organized
group of two (2) or more persons forming or joining together with the intention of
committing any offense prescribed under RA 9165.[199]
The circumstance that the public officer took advantage of his official position is not
aggravating in violations of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), in
Plunder and Crimes committed by Public Officers under the Revised Penal Code, and
falsification of public documents by a public officials.
The mere fact that the offender is a public officer or employee (even if he has not
taken advantage of his official position) is an aggravating circumstance in violations
of R.A. 9165 (The Dangerous Drugs Law),[200] a SPECIAL aggravating
circumstance in violation of R.A. 7610 (Child Abuse Law),[201] and a QUALIFYING
circumstance in violation of R.A. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003).[202]
Commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties is aggravating when the crime is committed at the police
station where policemen were discharging their public functions.[203]
The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex
may be taken into account only in crimes against persons or honor, when in the
commission of the crime there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age, or
sex.[204]
The aggravating circumstances of rank, age or sex are not appreciated in robbery
with homicide since said aggravating circumstances apply only to crimes against
persons or honor when in the commission of the crime there is some insult or
disrespect shown to rank, age or sex. It is not proper to consider these aggravating
circumstances in crimes against property. Robbery with homicide is primarily a
crime against property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident of the
robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal.[205]
Provocation in dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and
(c) immediate to the commission of the crime.[206]
Also nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is
deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure
escape. There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the
commission of the crime, and that the accused took advantage of it to insure his
immunity from captivity.[207]
Dwelling is NOT absorbed in treachery.[208] Treachery cannot co-exist with passion
and obfuscation.[209]
Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation and and in robbery
with rape. because this class of robbery can be committed without the necessity of
trespassing the sanctity of the offended partys house.[210] It is considered an
aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law
accords to the human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him
wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.[211] Dwelling is also
aggravating in forcible abduction when the offender entered the dwelling of the
victim.[212]
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence is inherent in malversation
(Art. 217), qualified theft (Art. 310), estafa by conversion or misappropriation (Art.
315) and qualified seduction (Art. 337).[213]
The prosecution failed to present evidence to show a relative disparity in age, size,
strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them armed
with a knife, attacked the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them armed
with a knife, is not per se indicative of abuse of superior strength.[214]
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[215] Abuse
In People v. Edgar Evangelio, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011, unlawful entry was
not aggravating since the accused freely entered the victims residence through the
open kitchen door, which is clearly intended for ingress and or egress.
Use of motor vehicle is aggravating if the same was used as a means to commit a
crime,[235] or the same facilitated the commission of the crime or the escape of the
offenders[236]
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES AS
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294)
If HOMICIDE or MURDER is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as SPECIAL [237] aggravating
circumstance.[238]
The use of unlicensed firearm is also aggravating in robbery with HOMICIDE.[239]
The use of unlicensed firearm is NOT aggravating in frustrated murder,[240] direct
assault with attempted homicide,[241] in robbery,[242] in violation of Comelec gunban,[243] in kidnapping for ransom[244] and in rape.[245]
If an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no
separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime
is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an
aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.[246]
In People v. Pedro Cupcupin, G.R. No. 132389. November 19, 2002, the accused
was held liable for two separate offenses of violation of P.D. 1866, as amended and
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law because the unlicensed firearm was
merely found lying around, together with the prohibited drugs, and therefore, was
not being used in the commission of an offense.[247]
Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation
of PD 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating
circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.[248]
Even if the firearm used was properly licensed to the security agency, its
unauthorized use by the appellant aggravated his offense.[249]
A barangay captain is authorized to carry any kind of firearm under Sec. 389 of the
Local Government Code.[250]
The existence of the firearm may be established by testimonial evidence.[251]
When a person commits ANY OF THE CRIMES defined in the RPC or special laws
with the use of unlawfully manufactured explosives, detonation agents or incendiary
devices, which RESULTS IN THE DEATH OF ANY PERSONS, the use of such
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.[252]
USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS AS QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive finding for the
USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime by an offender, and the application of the penalty provided
for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.[253]
Subject to Section 15 (which penalizes the offense of use of dangerous drugs with
six months rehabilitation), any person apprehended or arrested for violating the
provisions of R.A. 9165 shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or
test within 24 hours if the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground
to believe that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of physical signs
and symptoms or other visible outward manifestation, is UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
DANGEROUS DRUGS. X x x[254]
R.A. 9165 AND MINOR OFFENDERS
Section 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. An accused
who is over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
mentioned in Section 11 of this Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at
the time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found
guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of a suspended sentence ,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act,
or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised Penal Code;
or of any special penal laws;
(b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a DOHaccredited physician; and
(c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended.
While under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and
rehabilitative surveillance of the Board , under such conditions that the court
may impose for a period ranging from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months.
Upon recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused under
suspended sentence to a Center, or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician for at
least six (6) months, with after-care and follow-up program for not more than
eighteen (18) months.
Xxx
Section 67. Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of
a First-Time Minor Offender. If the accused first time minor offender under
suspended sentence complies with the applicable rules and regulations of the
Board, including confinement in a Center, the court, upon a favorable
recommendation of the Board for the final discharge of the accused, shall discharge
the accused and dismiss all proceedings.
Xxx
Section 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a FirstTime Minor Offender. x x x
Section 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. If the
accused first-time minor offender violates any of the conditions of his/her
suspended sentence, the applicable rules and regulations of the Board exercising
supervision and rehabilitative surveillance over him, including the rules and
regulations of the Center should confinement be required, the court shall
pronounce judgment of conviction and he/she shall serve sentence as any other
convicted person.
Section 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu
of Imprisonment. Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court may, in its
discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the sentence provided
under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on
probation , or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of
probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the
Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the
Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation, the
Board shall submit a written report to the court recommending termination of
probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the court shall issue
such an order.
Xxx
If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in
the Center by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted
from the sentence to be served.
In Michael Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008 the minor offender was
convicted of violation of Sec. 5, R.A. 9165 was denied probation. The Supreme Court
held that Section 24 of R.A. 9165 is clear that any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation. Under the law, any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968.
NOTE: some provisions of R.A. 9165 concerning minor offenders have been
amended by R.A. 9344 particularly on the age of criminal responsibility, the juvenile
justice and welfare system, suspension of sentence and confinement in agricultural
camps and training facilities.
APPLICATION AND NON-APPLICATION OF RPC PROVISIONS
(SEC. 98, R.A. 9165 IN RELATION TO ART. 10, RPC)
SEC. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. Notwithstanding
any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
(Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in
the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
felony, and that the accuseds drunkenness affected his mental faculties. In this
case, the absence of any independent proof that his alcohol intake affected his
mental faculties militate against Victorianos claim that he was so intoxicated at the
time he committed the crime to mitigate his liability.[257]
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
RELATIONSHIP is absolutory cause in THEFT, ESTAFA or MALICIOUS MISCHIEF when
the same are committed or caused mutually by the: 1. spouses, ascendants and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line. 2. The widowed spouse with
respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same
shall have passed into the possession of another; and 3. Brothers and sisters and
brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. The offenders are only civilly
liability.[258] If the crime committed estafa through falsification of public document,
the relative is exempt from criminal liability for estafa but not for the falsification.
[259]
PARDON and CONSENT of the offended party in adultery or concubinage is
absolutory cause.[260]
PARDON by the offended party and MARRIAGE is absolutory cause in seduction,
abduction and acts of lasciviousness. The marriage of the offender with the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already
imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the
co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned
crimes.[261]
MARRIAGE of the offender and the offended party is absolutory cause in rape.
PARDON is absolutory cause in rape if the offender is the legal husband except if the
marriage is void ab initio.[262]
PARDON by the offended party is not an absolutory cause in BIGAMY.[263]
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE/ DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION
Principals
Accomplices
Accessories
An accomplice HAS
KNOWLEDGE about the
criminal design of the
principal by direct
participation AND HE
COOPERATES in the
execution of the offense by
supplying materials to be
used in the commission of
the offense or by giving
moral aid to the principal
by direct participation in
the execution of the
A co-conspirator is
not liable if he has
not participated in
the commission of
the crime.
crime[265]
The failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to arrest the person of the accused
makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a commission of
another offense of obstruction of justice.[272]
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher
penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.[273]
The accessories EXEMPT from criminal liabilities under Art. 20, RPC may be held
criminally liable for obstruction of justice for concealing or destroying the body of
the crime to prevent its discovery or for harboring/assisting in the escape of their
relative in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
APPLICATION OF PENALTIES
Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty of reclusion perpetua, reclusion
temporal, prison mayor, prision correctional and arresto, the accessory penalties
thereto are also imposed upon the convict.[274]
Indivisible penalties like reclusion perpetua shall be applied by the courts regardless
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.[275]
No matter how many mitigating circumstances are present, the court cannot impose
a penalty next lower to that prescribed by law if there is a special aggravating
circumstance.[276]
ANTI-DEATH PENALTY LAW (R.A. 9346)
Persons convicted of offenses whose sentences is reduced to reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment by reason of R.A. 9346, shall not be eligible for parole . The
law applies retroactively to the offender who is not a habitual delinquent.[277]
In People v. Hermie Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011 , the child in conflict
with the law was found guilty of qualified rape punishable by death. Supreme Court
considered the minority of the accused as privilege mitigating circumstance.
Notwithstanding the Anti-Death Penalty Law (R.A. 9346) and the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the Supreme Court sentenced the accused to
reclusion perpetua. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of determining the
proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the
penalty of DEATH is still the penalty to be reckoned with. The doctrine is
reiterated in People v. Henry Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011.
In People v. Alfredo Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006 , the accused was
convicted by the lower court for Attempted Qualified Rape. Qualified Rape is
punishable by Death. The Supreme Court held that in computing for two degrees
lower, the reckoning point is NOT the penalty of Death since the imposition of death
penalty is prohibited under R.A. 9346, but from reclusion perpetua. Two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua is prison mayor. Thus, the penalty for Attempted
Qualified Rape is prison mayor.
PURPOSES OF PENALTY
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.[278]
CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES
Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties
provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent and duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws,
while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.
[279]
DURATION OF PENALTY
Although reclusion perpetua has a duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, it is
still indivisible.[280]
APPLICATION OF PENALTY
If the penalty provided by law for the offense is reclusion perpetua to death, and
there is no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance that attended its
commission, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.[281] It is wrong for
the trial court to impose a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.[282]
Simple rape is punished with reclusion perpetua. Where the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.[283]
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18
years of age acting with discernment, the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law is imposed (PRIVILEGE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY). Based on
Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion
perpetua to death.[284]
Two mitigating, no aggravating, one degree lower.[285]
The penalty is two (2) reclusion perpetua for two (2) counts of rape.[286]
In Danilo Evangelista v. Hon. Pedro Sistoza, et al., G.R. No. 143881, August 9, 2001
the accused was sentenced to prison mayor for robbery and prision correctional for
illegal possession of firearm. Sentence cannot be served simultaneously. In the
service of two prison terms, the second sentence did not commence to run until the
expiration of the first.
The accused who is sentenced to suffer imprisonment is credited for the period of
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.[287]
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4103)
RPC or special laws that carries the
penal nomenclature of the RPC
SPECIAL LAWS
DISQUALIFIED
QUALIFIED
Recidivists are entitled to indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103). Habitual
delinquents are disqualified.[292]
Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the
Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.[293]
The accused was convicted of attempted rape. The penalty for attempted rape is
prison mayor (two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua). The indeterminate
sentence is six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum.[294]
The accused was convicted of violation of R.A. 3019, special law. The imposable
penalty is six years and one month to 15 years. The indeterminate sentence is
anywhere between 6 yrs and one month to 15 yrs.[295]
Sec. 11, R.A. 9165 is punishable by imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 20
years. It is wrong for the trial to impose a straight penalty.[296] The indeterminate
sentence is anywhere 12 years and one day to 20 years.
Straight penalty is proper where the penalty imposed is less than one year.[297]
The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua[298] or arresto menor.[299]
One degree lower of prison mayor is prision correctional.[300]
One degree lower of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum.[301]
One degree lower of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods is
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.
[302]
One degree lower of prision mayor minimum is prision correctional maximum.[303]
THREE-FOLD RULE
The maximum duration of the convicts sentence shall not be more than threefold
the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon
him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total
of those imposed equals the said maximum period. Such maximum period shall in
no case exceed forty years.[304]
People v. Bernard Mirto, G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011
In People v. Bernard Mirto, G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011 the accused is
convicted of four (4) counts of Qualified Theft and accordingly sentenced to serve
the penalties of four (4) of reclusion perpetua. Applying Art. 70 of the RPC, accused
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 40 years.
In Samuel Barredo v. Hon. Vicente Vinarao, G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007 the
accused has to serve the penalties imposed on him successively in the order of their
severity.22 Hence, he has to first serve the more severe penalty, i.e., that imposed in
the carnapping case (imprisonment for 17 years and 4 months as minimum to 30
years as maximum). Only after he has served this will he commence serving the
less severe penalty imposed in the illegal possession of firearms case
(imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as
maximum).
In People v. Eulalio Buhos, et al., G.R. No. L-40995 June 25, 1980 the Accused were
convicted of one (1) complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and sixteen (16)
separate crimes of rape with the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and use of a motor vehicle without any mitigating circumstance. The
accused were convicted of seventeen (17) death penalties.
In People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971 the accused were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) death sentences. The Supreme Court
held that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in
connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the
penalty.[305]
In the service of their respective sentences, the petitioners shall be entitled to the
benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.[306]
SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT
There is NO subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay civil indemnity arising from
the crime[307] or when the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision
correccional.[308]
The law on subsidiary imprisonment is applicable to BP 22 cases pursuant to Art. 10,
RPC.[309]
PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968, as amended)
First-time minor offender convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law may
be placed on probation even if the sentence provided under R.A. 9165 is HIGHER
than that provided under existing law on probation provided he is not convicted for
drug trafficking or pushing.[310]
Those convicted of drug trafficking or pushing under R.A.9165, regardless of the
penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation.[311]
The minor convicted for violation of law (except the Dangerous Drugs Law) may
apply for probation at ANY TIME, provided he is QUALIFIED (sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of less than six years) under the Probation Law.[312]
PAROLE UNDER
ISL (RA 4103, as
amended)
SUSPENSION OF
SENTENCE
A CHILD IN CONFLICT
WITH THE LAW UNDER
R.A. 9344
Instead of pronouncing
judgment of conviction, the
court placed the child
under suspended sentence
without need of application
(Sec. 38)
Period of suspension of
sentence is until the child
is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not more
than one year; in all other
cases, said period shall not
exceed six years.
If the sentence is fine only
and the offender is made
to serve subsidiary
imprisonment in case of
insolvency, the period of
probation shall not be less
than nor more than twice
the total number of days of
subsidiary imprisonment.
If he violates any
conditions of his parole, the
Board may issue an order
for his re-arrest and he
shall serve the remaining
unexpired portion of the
maximum sentence for
which he was originally
committed to prison unless
the Board grants a new
parole to said prisoner
The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day
on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their agents, as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the
bigamous marriage.[326]
Section 410 (c) of the Local Government Code provides: While the dispute is under
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and
cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing the complaint
with the punong barangay. The prescriptive period shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complainant or the certificate of repudiation or of the
certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided,
however, that such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of
the complaint with the punong barangay.
Section 28, R.A. 9344 provides: The period of prescription of the offense shall be
suspended during the effectivity of the diversion program, but not exceeding a
period of two (2) years.
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal extinguishes not only
his criminal liability for the crime but also his civil liability solely arising from or
based on said crime. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. An action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing
a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended.[327]
Parole refers to the conditional release of an offender from a correctional institution
after he serves the minimum term of his prison sentence. The grant thereof does
not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender. Parole is not one of the modes of
totally extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
[328]
The mere payment of an obligation before the institution of a criminal complaint for
estafa does not, on its own, constitute novation that may prevent criminal liability.
[329]
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES UNDER RPC
The filing of the complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of the
60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical
injuries.[330]
These trips abroad did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91.
These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the
Philippines.[331]
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER SPECIAL LAW
ACT NO. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as
amended, is the law applicable on the prescription of crimes punishable under
special laws and NOT Arts. 90 to 93, RPC.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription, that is, the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused
interrupts the period of prescription.[332]
The prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from
the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans made an exhaustive investigation because "it was wellhigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes
committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance
and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the
loans."[333]
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when
the culprit should EVADE THE SERVICE OF HIS SENTENCE (the convict must be
imprisoned and escaped from confinement). The period of prescription is
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some
foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should
commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.[334]
PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY
A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except in
criminal cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, or acts of
lasciviousness, or in rape committed by the legal husband, and the same was
extended by the offended party BEFORE THE INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION IN
COURT.[335]
PARDON BY THE PRESIDENT vis. AMNESTY
Pardon by President
Amnesty
accessory
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE
The crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION can be committed through imprudence.[343]
Vagrancy is not a legal ground to detain a person since the same has been
decriminalized.[344]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure
for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.[345]
Sundays, Saturdays and holidays are excluded in the computation of the periods
enumerated under Art. 125, RPC (Arbitrary Detention).[346]
The crimes of maliciously obtaining search warrant and abuse in the service
search warrant are without prejudice to the liability of the offender for the
commission of any other offense.[347]
ANTI-TORTURE ACT OF 2009 (R.A. 9745)
Torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or
felony committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission
thereof. In which case, torture shall be treated as a separate and independent
criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OTHER
CRIMINAL LIABILITY provided for by domestic and international laws.[348]
The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the
immediate senior public official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies
shall be held liable as a principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment for any act or omission, or negligence
committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or allowed, whether
directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she has
knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that
acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall
be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates
or by others within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did
not take preventive or corrective action either before, during or immediately after
its commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent or investigate allegations
of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but failed
to prevent or investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to
negligence shall also be liable as principals.[349]
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code insofar as they are applicable shall be
suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of any crime punishable under
Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty
and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the acts constituting
torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as
defined herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.[350]
Committed by an outsider[353]
If the delivery of the prisoner was committed through bribery, the briber commits
two separate offenses of corruption of public officer and delivering prisoners from
jail; the jailer in custody of the prisoner, if he is a public officer, is liable for infidelity
of the custody of prisoners and bribery, the prisoner by final judgment commits
evasion of service of sentence if he is already convicted by final judgment.
If the crime committed by the prisoner for which he is confined or serving sentence
is treason, murder, or parricide, the offender who helped in the escape of the
prisoner is liable as accessory under Article 19 par. 3, RPC.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department
has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period,
upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President
has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.[355]
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
FORGERY
FALSIFICATION
FALSE
CERTIFICATES
Committed by giving to a treasury or
bank note or any instrument payable to
bearer or to order the appearance of a
true and genuine document; or by
erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or
altering by any means the figures,
letters, words or signs contained therein
Committed by
counterfeiting or
imitating any
handwriting,
signature or rubric,
etc (refer to Art 171)
The documents
falsified are medical
certificates,
certificate of merit
or service, etc.
USURPATION OF OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS
for three (3) separate crimes of sale of dangerous drugs, illegal possession of drugs
and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia.
A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any
dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test is criminally liable for illegal use of
dangerous drugs.[368]
If the offender uses a dangerous drug, the crime committed is only one crime of use
of dangerous drugs and not two separate crimes of use, and, possession of
dangerous drugs.
If the offender is using a dangerous drug and he is also found to have in his
possession such quantity of any dangerous drug which is not only for use, the
offender commits the crime of possession of dangerous drugs and not the crime of
use of dangerous drugs.[369]
The non-compliance of Section 21 no. 1 of R.A. 9165 does not render the arrest of
the accused illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible as long as (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds, and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.[370] In other
words, even if the apprehending police officers failed to comply with section 21 of
the Dangerous Drugs Law the accused may, nonetheless be convicted if the
prosecution is able to prove that the dangerous drug presented in court is the very
same dangerous drug that was taken or confiscated from the accused. This is done
by proving the chain of custody. In Ruel Ampatuan v. People, G.R. No. 183676, June
22, 2011 the Supreme Court enunciated the links that must be established in the
chain of custody as follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
The police officer who arrested a person without lawful ground, planted evidence,
and demanded money for the release of the person arrested, and the arrested
person complied by giving money, is liable for unlawful arrest and robbery under
RPC and for planting evidence under R.A. 9165. Unlawful arrest cannot be complex
with planting with evidence because the latter offense is punished under R.A. 9165.
Section 98 of RA 9165 expressly provides for the non-applicability of RPC, except
with respect to minor offenders. (The crime also constitutes a complex crime of
incriminating innocent person through unlawful arrest but the same carries a lower
penalty as compared to the crime of planting evidence.)
In People v. Rolando Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011, the Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction of the accused for attempted sale of dangerous drugs since
the prosecution was able to identify the buyer and seller as well as the object and
consideration in the illegal transaction. The accused intended to sell shabu and
commenced by overt acts the commission of the intended crime by showing the
substance to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police
officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested the accused and
his live-in partner. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. The
penalty, however, is the same as that of a consummated sale.
In conspiracy (as a mode of committing the offense), it is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the
crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the
mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it,
without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of
conviction.[371]
R.A. 9165
OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE
R.A. 3019
RPC
Drug protector or
coddler is punished
under Sec. 4, R.A.
9165
Sec. 3 provides: In
addition to acts or
omissions of public
officers already
penalized by
existing laws x x x
Not punishable
as Accessory
under Art. 19,
RPC since Sec. 98
of R.A. 9165
expressly
provides for the
non-applicability
of RPC to 9165
The offender is
liable for violation
of R.A. 3019 for
allowing himself to
be persuaded,
induced or
influenced to
violate a law in
connection with
The offender is
also liable for
bribery if he
received bribe
money
in evidence violates
Sec. 27, R.A. 9165
INDIRECT BRIBERY
Bribery is qualified when committed by any public officer entrusted with law
enforcement and who refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime.
The public officer may be held liable for direct/ qualified bribery and prevaricacion
under Art. 208, RPC at the same time.[374]
A police officer or prosecutor who received bribe money from the accused in
consideration of the unsuccessful prosecution or dismissal of drug cases and the
accused was in fact acquitted is liable for Qualified Bribery and for Bungling in the
Prosecution of Drug Cases under Sec. 92, R.A. 9165.
DIRECT BRIBERY
INDIRECT
BRIBERY
R.A. 3019
in consideration of
any offer, promise or
gift
[375]
The public officer, directly or indirectly
requests or receives any gift from any
person in consideration of helping said
person secure any government license
or permit[376]
ESTAFA
Committed by an accountable
public officer involving public funds
or property under his custody
Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the
act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular
public purpose to another public purpose.[382]
The act of the jail warden of allowing a detainee to stay in the latters house at night
and to return to the municipal jail during the day constitutes a crime of infidelity of
custody to prisoners.[383] Art. 88, RPC provides: The penalty of arresto menor
shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the defendant himself under
the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in its
decision, taking into consideration the health of the offender and other reasons
which may seem satisfactory to it.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. 3019)
The public officer who commits any of acts punishable under R.A. 3019 may also be
held criminally liable for violation of the Revised Penal Code or any Special Laws for
the same delictual act.[384]
The act of the Mayor, Municipal Engineer, and member of the PNP of destroying the
subject fences without giving any notice to the private complainant does not
amount to manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith. The same could not be
considered evident bad faith as the prosecution evidence failed to show that the
destruction was for a dishonest purpose, ill will or self interest.[385]
The mayor was held liable for violation of Section 3 (b) for demanding and receiving
"grease money" as a condition for the release of the final payment to the private
complainant.[386]
The elements of violation of Section 3(g), R.A. No. 3019 are: (1) that the accused is
a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.[387]
The elements of the violation of Sec. 3 (h) of R.A. 3019 are as follows: 1) The
accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from
having such interest by the Constitution or by law. Edgar Teves, then mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. He is prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.[388]
PLUNDER
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two
(2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d),
e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of
which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken
greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this
term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
In People v. Cecilia Lagman, G.R. No. 197807, April 16, 2012 the accused was held
liable only for Slight Physical Injuries as there no evidence as to the duration of the
injuries sustained by the victim.
In People v. Rodrigo Salcedo, G.R. No. 178272, March 14, 2011 the accused was
held liable for the complex crime of Murder with unintentional abortion for stabbing
a pregnant woman, killing the woman and the unborn child in the process.
Force in rape cases is defined as "power, violence or constraint exerted upon or
against a person." It is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in
accomplishing it be so great or of such a character as could not be resisted. It is
only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which the accused had in mind.[398]
Physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim and the latter submits herself out of fear.[399]
In rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence or intimidation.[400]
A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape
inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the
accused of the crime. Be that as it may, in People v. Ortoa, where the medico-legal
findings showed that the victim is still in a state of virginity when she was
examined, we held that: The lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual
intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. Even the
fact that the hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out the possibility of
rape. x x x Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without
rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape.[401]
In the context that is used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. 23 Thus, even granting that AAAs
lacerations were not caused by Colorado, the latter could still be declared guilty of
rape, after it was established that he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the
victim.[402]
In People v. Armando Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011 the accused inserted
his finger into the genitalia of his 10 year-old victim, thereafter he inserted therein
his organ. The accused was convicted for two (2) separate crimes of statutory rape
and for rape by sexual assault.
The accused was held liable for acts of lasciviousness and not rape by sexual
assault since there was no actual insertion of the tongue.[403]
In People v. Joseph Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13, 2004, the victim
Appellant ejaculated twice during the time that he consummated the rape.
Appellant did not withdraw his penis to insert it again into the vagina or to touch
the labia majora or the labia minora when he ejaculated the second time. It is not
the number of times that appellant ejaculated but the penetration or touching
that determines the consummation of the sexual act. 36 Thus, appellant committed
only one count of rape.
In People v. Ito Pinic, G.R. No. 186395, June 8, 2011, however, the accused
undressed his victim and removed her panty. Thereafter, he took off his own pants
and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain. He withdrew his penis after
about ten (10) seconds but inserted it again after ten (10) seconds. After five (5)
seconds, he withdrew it again but inserted it once more after five (5) seconds. He
also inserted his finger and licked her vagina. After consummating the act, appellant
sent her home and warned her not to tell anyone of the incident. X x x although the
penis was thrice inserted in her private organ, the same constituted one (1) count of
rape.
Rape is qualified if the victim is below seven (7) years old, or, when the victim is a
minor and the offender is a parent,[404] ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse[405] of the parent of the victim.
The granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victims grandfather, is a
relative of the victim in the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by Article
266-B, paragraph 5(1).[406]
In rape with homicide, the original intention of the offender is to commit rape and it
is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the woman
victim of the rape. In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term
homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight
physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. 47 Hence, even if
any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance only.[407]
If the original intention of the offender is to rape a woman and the taking of the
latters personal property is a mere afterthought, the offender is liable for two
separate crimes of rape and robber. In Robbery with rape, the original intention of
the offender is to rob.[408]
A person is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was
suffering from a "borderline mental deficiency" (IQ between 70 to 89). The
traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental
retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0-19, and a maximum intellectual factor
in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old child; (b) imbecile by an
IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of
the average seven-year old child; (c) moron or feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to
not, of the child which includes psychological and physical abuse, cruelty, emotional
maltreatment or any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. In the first information,
petitioner is charged with child abuse by uttering debasing, demeaning and
degrading words to the minor. In the second, he is charged with child abuse by
inflicting physical injuries that debase, demean and degrade the dignity of the
children as human beings.[414]
taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be
inferred that the latters purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of
their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder,
hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a
component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact,
as we held in the aforecited case of Masilang, et. al., although the accused had
planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first killed him and it was only
later that they demanded and obtained the money, such demand for ransom did not
convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or deprivation of liberty was
involved, hence the crime committed was only murder.[417]
In People v. Felipe Mirandilla, G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011 the Supreme Court held
that regardless of the number of rapes committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is
because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact
R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659
depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim
was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape. However, for the crime of kidnapping with
rape, as in this case, the offender should not have taken the victim with lewd
designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In
People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the
woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only
necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct
and separate count of rape.
In Judith Jatulan v. People, G.R. No. 171653, April 24, 2007, the Supreme Court held
that ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the
redemption of a captured person that would release him from captivity. No specific
form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as
long as the ransom was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims
freedom. Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the
perpetrator is of no moment.
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION if the kidnapping is less than three days and without
the attending circumstances enumerated in Art. 267, RPC.
The act of putting ones foot inside the door constitutes entry for purposes of
trespass to dwelling.[418]
In Joseph Anthony Alejandro, et al. v. Atty. Jose Bernas, et al., G.R. No. 179243,
September 7, 2011 the accused were held guilty of unjust vexation for padlocking
the rented Unit and cutting off its electric, water and telephone facilities. The
accused were not held liable for grave coercion it was never alleged that the acts
were effected by violence, threat or intimidation. The mere presence of the security
guards is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners. There is intimidation
when one of the parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
R.A. 7610
RPC
corporations, he
shall also suffer the
penalty of
temporary absolute
disqualification.
Art. 341. White
slave trade. The
penalty of prision
mayor in its medium
and maximum
period shall be
imposed upon any
person who, in any
manner, or under
any pretext, shall
engage in the
business or shall
profit by prostitution
or shall enlist the
services of any
other for the
purpose of
prostitution
In Teodolo Villanueva, Jr. G.R. No. 187152, July 22, 2009 the accused was held liable
for robbery with homicide, not robbery with murder but the Supreme Court
considered treachery as generic aggravating circumstance.[424]
In People v. Nonoy Ebet, G.R. No. 181635, November 15, 2010 the Supreme Court
held that when homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery,
all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that
there was an endeavor to prevent the killing / rape.[425]
In People v. Ngano Sugan, et al., G.R. No. 192789, March 23, 2011 the Supreme
Court held that the proper designation of the offense is robbery with homicide with
the aggravating circumstance of band, NOT robbery with homicide committed by a
band.
In People v. Edgar Evangelio, et al., G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011 band and
dwelling were considered generic aggravating circumstances in robbery with rape.
People v. Alberto Basao, et al., G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012 the accused were
held guilty of robbery in band. At least five (5) people, including accused-appellants,
carrying guns and a hand grenade, barged into the home of, and forcibly took
pieces of jewelry and other personal properties of their victims. They were also held
guilty of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention for abducting their one
of their victims, detaining him for seven (7) days and demanding ransom for his
release.
In People v. Rogelio Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002 the accused was
held liable for two (2) separate crimes of rape and theft, and not special complex
crime of robbery with rape since the taking of personal property was not the original
evil plan of the accused. It was an afterthought following the rape.
ROBBERY UNDER RPC
particular person
In Philippine highway
Punished as accessory
formed
THEFT
ESTAFA
In People v. Bernard Mirto, G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011 the accused was held
guilty of qualified theft for misappropriating the checks given by the customers to
the corporation as payment for the goods received..As Branch Manager of UCC who
was authorized to receive payments from UCC customers, the accused gravely
abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by the management of UCC.
In People v. Remedios Tanchanco, G.R. No. 177761, April 18, 2012 the accused,
employed as a legal secretary and liaison officer of a law office, was held guilty of
qualified theft for misappropriating the money intended for payment of capital gains
and transfer taxes and for the processing of title. Theft becomes qualified when it is
committed with grave abuse of confidence.
People v. Olivia Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011 the accused, a bank
teller, was held guilty of qualified theft.
In Rommel Briones v. People, G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009 (J. Brion) the accused
was held guilty of theft, and not robbery in grabbing the security guards firearm
and running away with it.
In People v. Cesar Conception, G.R. No. 200922, July 18, 2012, the accused was held
guilty of theft, and not for robbery with homicide, for snatching the bag from the
victim. The accused was absolved from criminal liability for the death of his
companion since he did not perform or execute any act that caused the latters
death.
In People v. Abelardo Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001 the accused, a bank
cashier, was held guilty of a complex crime of qualified theft through falsification of
commercial document for taking P36,480.30 by forging the signatures of officers
authorized to sign the check and thereafter appropriating the amount of the check.
The fact that accused-appellant as assistant cashier of Metrobank had custody of
the aforesaid checks and had access not only in the preparation but also in the
release of Metrobank cashiers checks suffices to designate the crime as qualified
theft as he gravely abused the confidence reposed in him by the bank as assistant
cashier.
Carmina Brokmann v. People, G.R. No. 199150, February 6, 2012 (J. Brion) the
Supreme Court held that estafa is either by (a) abuse of confidence or (b) means of
deceit. In estafa by abuse of confidence, deceit is not an element of the offense.
In Andre Daigle v. People, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012 the accused was held
guilty of estafa under par. 1 (b) for appropriating the property held in trust and for a
particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending machines and spare parts
for the corporation. The "failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held
in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation."
Elsa Magtira v. People, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012 (J. Brion) the accused was
held guilty of estatfa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) elements for
misappropriating the money held in trust under the paluwagan agreement.[428]
In Dulce Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 172820, June 23, 2010 (J. Brion) the accused
was held guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) for appropriating the
diamond ring held in trust for sale on commission basis.
In People v. Melissa Chua, G.R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012 the Supreme Court
held that the accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and estafa under Art.
315 par. 2 (a) at the same time. Unlike in illegal recruitment where profit is
immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires a clear showing that the offended party
parted with his money or property upon the offenders false pretenses, and suffered
damage thereby.[429]
In estafa through falsification of public document, mere payment of an obligation
before the institution of a criminal complaint does not, on its own, constitute
novation that may prevent criminal liability.[430]
In Lea Sagan v. Juliano, G.R. No. 134120, January 17, 2005, the Supreme Court held
that damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense of Estafa under para.
2 (d) and must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. The
false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with,
the issuance of the bad check. The drawer of the dishonored check is given three
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the check,
otherwise, a prima facie presumption of deceit arises. Thus, if the complainant knew
that the drawers account was already closed at the time of the issuance of the
check and that the parties treated the check as mere evidence of indebtedness, the
drawer cannot be held liable for estafa since there is no deceit involved. He may,
nonetheless, liable for violation of B.P. 22
In estafa under Art. 315 par. 2 (d), the receipt by the drawer of the notice of
dishonor is not an element of the offense. The presumption only dispenses with the
presentation of evidence of deceit if such notification is received and the drawer of
the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3)
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor of the check. The presumption indulged
in by law does not preclude the presentation of other evidence to prove deceit.[431]
presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612 that: Mere
possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.[435]
The offender may punished either as accessory to theft or robbery under Art. 19,
RPC or for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.[436]
BOUNCING CHECK LAW (B.P. 22)
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was
aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored
it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. [437]
Not only must there be a written notice of dishonor or demand letters actually
received by the drawer of a dishonored check, but there must also be proof of
receipt thereof that is properly authenticated, and not mere registered receipt
and/or return receipt.[438]
In Susan Go and People v. Fernando Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005, the
Supreme Court held that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence,
it may not be applied retroactively in favor of the accused who is not a habitual
delinquent under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. The circular applies only to
those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already
terminated by final judgment.
To establish the existence of the second element, the State should present the
giving of a written notice of the dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the
dishonored check.[439]
As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, the clear tenor and intention of
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in B.P. 22. Where the circumstances of the case, for instance, clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the more appropriate penalty. This
rule of preference does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of
B.P. 22.[440]
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972 (R.A. 6539)
If a person is entrusted with a car for test driving but failed to show up after the
test-drive, he is liable for carnapping and not for estafa since he must be deemed to
have unlawfully "taken" the car soon after the test-driving after he failed to return
the vehicle.[441]
If the motor vehicle stolen or robbed consists of roadrollers, trolleys, streetsweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on
public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers
and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes, the
crime is QUALIFIED THEFT under Art. 310, RPC and not carnapping.[442]
In the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."[443]
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof," then it must be deemed
to fall under the clause (of Section 14) "when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person."[444]
In People v. Elgin Latayada, G.R. No. 146865, February 18, 2004 the accused was
held guilty of homicide and not carnapping with homicide since the accuseds
original design was not carnapping. The elements of elements of complex crime of
carnapping with homicide are: that 1) appellant took the motorcycle; 2) his original
criminal design was carnapping; 3) he killed Payla; and 4) the killing was
perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof." X x x the prosecutions evidence does not prove that accused took the
motorcycle.
In People v. Ricardo Cayanan, et al., G.R. Nos. 73257-58, June 16, 1995 the accused
were held guilty of qualified carnapping (the victim was killed) with the generic
aggravating circumstances of band and use of motor vehicle.
In People v. Marlon dela Cruz, G.R. No. 174658, February 24, 2009 the Supreme
Court held that Carnapping refers specifically to the taking of a motor vehicle. It
does not cover the taking of cash or personal property which is not a motor vehicle.
As the Court of Appeals noted, x x x Two (2) articles were taken from TEOFILLO, SR.,
his tricycle and some cash. The taking of the tricycle constitutes a violation of the
anti-carnapping law, RA 6539, while the taking of the cash from TEOFILO, SR. by
hitting him with a stone and stabbing him in the chest constitutes the crime of
robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Elmer Diamante, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 180992, September 4, 2009 the
accused were held guilty for carnapping by means of violence and intimidation and
for robbery for taking the victims car, cash and valuables at a gun-point.
In People v. Venancio Roxas, G.R. No. 172604, August 17, 2010 the accused was
held guilty of carnapping for taking the car of the victim at gunpoint, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with frustrated Murder for depriving the victim of her
liberty and for mortally wounding her with intent to kill, and theft for taking the
victims cash and valuables while the latter was asleep.
ANTI-ARSON LAW (P.D. 1613)
There are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: DESTRUCTIVE ARSON under Art.
320, RPC and ARSON under P.D. 1613.[445] Said classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the
SIMPLE ARSON
In People v. Julie Gil, G.R. No. 172468, October 15, 2008 the accused was held guilty
of destructive arson for setting fire on a residential house and adjacent houses
located in Sampaloc, Manila.
In Climaco Amora, G.R. No. 154466, January 28, 2008 the accused was held guilty of
destructive arson since crime was committed in a place where bakeries, barber
shops, tailoring shops and other commercial and residential buildings were situated
(in an urban and populated area).
In Joel Gonzales, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 159950, February 12, 2007 the accused was
held guilty of simple arson under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613 since
the arson was committed in an inhabited house or dwelling.
In People v. Dante Buebos, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008 the accused was held
liable for arson and not for destructive arson since the information failed to allege
whether or not the burnt house is inhabited or situated in a populated or congested
area. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated
by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned" was not
appreciated since it appears that the accused was acting more on impulse, heat of
anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent
to his wounded ego.
Conspiracy to Commit Arson is punishable.[447]
In People v. Ferdinand Baluntong, G.R. No. 96602, November 19, 1991 the Supreme
Court citing People v. Malngan, ruled that in cases where both burning and death
occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether
arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the
building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the
crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other
hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or
edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular
person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a
means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed homicide/murder and arson.As it was not shown that the main motive
was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide
being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.
In People v. Carlito de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009, the accused
were held guilty of arson with the special aggravating circumstance that the crime
was committed by a syndicate (carried out by a group of three or more persons).
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Adultery - is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse
with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void.
A married woman who contracted a subsequent bigamous marriage and engage in
sexual relation with her second husband after the marriage is liable for two separate
crimes of bigamy and adultery. There two are separate offenses. The first is crime
against civil status while the second is a crime against chastity.
Concubinage - is committed by a husband who shall keep a mistress in the
conjugal dwelling, or shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife , or shall cohabit with her in
any other place. The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
"Cohabit" means dwelling together as husband and wife, or in sexual intercourse,
and comprises a continued period of time. Hence the offense is not the single act of
adultery; it is cohabiting in a state of adultery; and it may be a week, a month, a
year, or longer, but still it is one offense only.[448]
A married man who contracted a subsequent bigamous marriage and thereafter
cohabit with her second wife after the marriage is liable for two separate crimes of
bigamy and concubunage. There two are separate offenses. The first is crime
against civil status while the second is a crime against chastity.[449]
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
Committed by any person in public authority, priest, homeservant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in
any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or
custody of the woman seduced, who has carnal knowledge
with a virgin over twelve years and under eighteen years of
age
committed by any
person who, by
means of deceit ,
has carnal knowledge
a woman who is
single or a widow of
Among the persons who can commit qualified seduction is a "domestic". And a
"domestic," for purposes of said legal provision, has been interpreted judicially as
persons usually living under the same roof.[450]
In People v. Fernando Teodosio, G.R. No. 97496, June 3, 1991 the accused was held
liable for seduction for persuading the minor to give up her virginity on the false
promise of marriage (by means of deceit).
When force or intimidation is employed or when the offended party is less than 12
years old, the crime is rape and not seduction.
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
If the primary purpose of the offender in abducting a woman is to rape her, the
crime is rape (the forcible abduction is absorbed in rape).[452]
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
CONSENTED ABDUCTION
In People v. Lito Egan, G.R. No. 139338, May 28, 2002 the accused was held guilty
of forcible abduction. The attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness committed are
absorbed in forcible abduction.
The accused who forcibly abducted a woman and raped her thirteen (13) times is
liable for one (1) complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and twelve (12)
separate crimes of rape.[454]
In People v. Ireneo Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011 the accused was held
guilty of acts of lasciviousness for touching the breasts and licking the vagina of
her eight-year old. But if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip
of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime
of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
ANTI-PHOTO AND VIDEO VOYERISM (R.A. 9995)
It is prohibited and unlawful for any person: (a) To take photo or video coverage of a
person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar activity or to
capture an image of the private area of a person/s such as the naked or
undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks or female breast without the
consent of the person/s involved and under circumstances in which the person/s
has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) To copy or reproduce, or to cause
to be copied or reproduced, such photo or video or recording of sexual act or any
similar activity with or without consideration; (c) To sell or distribute, or cause to be
sold or distributed, such photo or video or recording of sexual act, whether it be the
original copy or reproduction thereof; or (d) To publish or broadcast, or cause to be
published or broadcast, whether in print or broadcast media, or show or exhibit the
photo or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or any similar activity
through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and other similar means or device.
The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that
consent to record or take photo or video coverage of the same was given by such
person/s.
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED AGAINST
THE P[ROVISION OF LAWS
PERFORMANCE OF ILLEGAL
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
on the part of the accused, and the direct link between material damage and failure
in precaution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. We are morally
convinced that all three were established in this case in accordance with the
required level of evidence in criminal cases.[472]
The Supreme Court held in People v. Patrolman Domingo Belbes, G.R. No. 124670,
June 21, 2000 that the act of the accused of shooting at the victim not reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide because the shooting was intentional. Illustrations
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to
a friend, who was killed by the accidental discharge brought about by negligent
handling; or (2) discharging a firearm from the window of ones house and killing a
neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the balcony front; or (3) where the
defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his .45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the
bout continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and
hit a bystander who died soon thereafter. In this case, appellant intended to fire AT
the victim, and in fact hit ONLY the victim.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do
no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.[473]
There can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as
reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime
of frustrated homicide cannot exist.[474]
To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence on the part of petitioners. There may be negligence attending the
disbursement of public funds in favor of the family of deceased indigents, such
negligence is equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.[475]
[1] For the Bar Examination in Criminal Law based on the 2013 Supreme Court Bar
Syllabus
[2]Assistant Chief of the Inquest Division, Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila; Bar
Reviewer in Criminal Law at the Chan Robles Professional Review, The University of
Manila and Adamson University; Ll.B., San Beda College, Manila (2002), LL.M.,
University of Sto. Tomas, Manila (2008)
[3] Artemio Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
[4]People v. Lo Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991
[5] People v. Cora Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004
[6] Romarico Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 183891, August 3, 2010
[7] People v. Beth Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008
[8] Rafael Lanaria v. People, G.R. No. 160127, November 11, 2008
[9] People v. Jacquiline Pambid, G.R. No. 192237, January 26, 2011
[10] Victoria Cabral v. Jacinto Uy, G.R. No. 174584, January 20, 2010
[11] Mel Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012.
[12] Romarico Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 183891, August 3, 2010
[13] Elenita Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011
[14] People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003, People v. Albert de Leon,
G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009 and People v. Diosdado Camat, G.R. No. 188612,
July 30, 2012
[15] People v. Arnold Castro, G.R. No. 194836, June 15, 2011. See also People v.
Willy Yang, G.R. No. 148077, February 16, 2004.
[16] People v. Jacquiline Pambid, G.R. No. 192237, January 26, 2011
[17] People v. Dexter Torres, G.R. No. 170837, September 12, 2006
[18] People v. Belen Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010
[19] Michael Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
[20] Socorro Ramirez v. CA et al., G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
[21] Luis Marcos Laurel v. Zeus Abrogar, et al., G.R. No. 155076, February 27, 2006
[22] People v. Roman Derilo, et al., G.R. No. 117818, April 18, 1997
[23] Urbano Moreno v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006
[24] Amada Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, Vicente
Cenzon v. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos, et al., G.R. No. 164337, June 27, 2006, Danilo
Evangelista v. Hon. Pedro Sistoza, G.R. No. 143881, August 9, 2001, Judge Adoracion
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February 28, 2001
[25] Rodolfo Llamas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991
[26] People v. Pedro Itnong, G.R. No. 145034-35, February 5, 2004
[27] Edgardo Gaanan v. IAC and People, G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986
[28] Pablo Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108747, April 6, 1995
[29] Suzette Nicolas v. Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009
[30] People v. Romeo Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000 (J. GonzagaReyes, concurring)
[31] People v. Roger Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001
[32] People v. Francisco Talaro, et al., G.R. No. 175781, March 20, 2012 and People v.
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[33] Violeta Villa v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 125834, December 6, 1999
[34] People v. Roman Derilo, et al., G.R. No. 117818, April 18, 1997
[35] People v. Marilyn Villamar, G.R. No. 121175, November 4, 1998
[36] People v. Sixto Padua, G.R. No. 192821, March 21, 2011