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New Ways of Studying Emotions in Organizations
A Qualitative Study of Emotional Intelligence and Its Underlying Processes and

Outcomes in Management Studies
Dirk Lindebaum
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CHAPTER 5
A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND
ITS UNDERLYING PROCESSES
AND OUTCOMES IN
MANAGEMENT STUDIES
Dirk Lindebaum
ABSTRACT
The processes that underlie ability emotional intelligence (EI) are barely
understood, despite decades of management research. Furthermore, the
outcomes of these processes have been narrowly and prescriptively
defined. To address this deficiency, I conducted a phenomenological
study (n = 26). Findings from a public sector sample suggest that the
underlying emotional processes of meaningful life events are
at least
for now
better defined through the construct of emotion regulation.
While it is part of the ability EI model, the emotional processing that
occurs prior to emotion regulation being initiated is likely to be less consistent with current EI theory. Likewise, these processes lead to outcomes considerably more nuanced than currently appreciated in the EI
literature. Consequently, what started as a gap-filling approach to
New Ways of Studying Emotions in Organizations

Research on Emotion in Organizations, Volume 11, 109 137
Copyright r 2015 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 1746-9791/doi:10.1108/S1746-979120150000011006
109
110
DIRK LINDEBAUM
research eventually turned into a problematization of what scholars seem

to know about EI. I outline the theoretical and practical implications of
this study for management, and offer suggestions for future research.
Keywords: Emotional intelligence; emotion regulation; phenomenology; processes
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to elicit the processes that underlie ability emotional intelligence (EI), and to examine their associated perceived individual
outcomes. EI has been defined as ability to perceive accurately, appraise,
and express emotion; the ability to access and/or generate feelings when
they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion and emotional
knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1997,
p. 10). Despite decades of (largely) quantitative management research, evidence that EI is a valid construct is mixed. Among the key issues are questions about its incremental validity over and above general mental ability
and personality (Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough, 2009; OBoyle,
Humphrey, Pollack, Hawver, & Story, 2011), as well as problems concerning the factor structure and reliabilities of the dominant EI measure
(i.e., the MSCEIT or Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence-Test,
see these studies for empirical divergence: Fllesdal & Hagtvet, 2013;
Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003).
One contributing factor to these mixed findings may be an incomplete
understanding of the processes that underlie EI. For instance, Fiori (2009,
p. 24) argues that the analysis of processes underlying EI may reveal that
individuals differ in how they engage in mechanisms responsible for emotionally intelligent performance. Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2004) also
recognize that understanding the processes underlying EI (p. 211) is not
well understood. Others bemoan the predominantly descriptive nature of
EI (Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004). To date, available descriptors of
EI make reference to (i) the maximum capacity to process emotional data,
(ii) the configuration of mental processes and a tapping into intra-psychic
experiences, and (iii) the assimilation of emotional experiences into mental
life (e.g., Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade,
2008). However, these descriptors are somewhat vague, since they do not
account for generative processes that explain how and why they work. For
instance, when it is stated that EI pertains to tapping into intra-psychic
A Qualitative Study of Emotional Intelligence
111
experiences, does this imply a tapping at conscious or subconscious levels?

In addition, with regard to configuring mental processes, it is not clear
what factors might initiate them, how the process can be defined, and what
consequences might be experienced.
In consequence, the first theoretical contribution of this study is to elicit
the processes underlying EI by examining the lived experiences of individuals through a phenomenological study. Phenomenology seeks to render
explicit the often implicit meaning and structure of human experience
(Sanders, 1982). The choice of qualitative inquiry is appropriate in this
study, since it offers the possibility to explore emotional processes at work
in ways that quantitative studies cannot (Maitlis & Ozcelik, 2004). Also, it
is useful to help explain quantitative results requiring further analysis
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011), which the mixed quantitative findings on
EI discussed earlier suggest. A better theoretical understanding of these
processes is of fundamental importance for management studies, for this
enhanced understanding can help better delineate the theoretical parameters of EI theory, as well as its empirical testing.
The second theoretical contribution concerns a broader appreciation of
outcomes resulting from these processes. Beyond existing concerns about
the descriptive nature of EI, I suggest that EI is also prescriptive in nature
(cf. also Lindebaum, 2009; Lindebaum & Jordan, 2014). That is, abilities
associated with EI have been hitherto exclusively likened to positive and
linear outcomes for individuals, for instance, in terms of job performance
or health outcomes (Joseph & Newman, 2010; Martins, Ramalho, &
Morin, 2010). These findings converge insofar as they reflect linear and
positive correlations between EI and outcome variables. In this prescriptive
respect, it is noteworthy that the definition of EI as stated earlier is often
accompanied by the annex that it promotes emotional and intellectual
growth (see e.g., Mayer & Salovey, 1997). However, there is a nascent
theoretical debate that being emotionally intelligent may also lead to negative outcomes (such as deviance, see Winkel, Wyland, Shaffer, & Clason,
2011), or in the form of curvilinear effects (e.g., Jordan, Dasborough,
Daus, & Ashkanasy, 2010). This resonates with Lincolns view (2009),
when she points to the pitfalls of the research that is being done here,
that is, experimental-heritage, conventional paper-and-pencil tests based
on a somewhat scientific (and often researcher-determined) definition of
EI (p. 785).
Combining these two contributions, this phenomenological study seeks
to extend and elaborate theory in terms of how individual differ in processing emotional information, and how this initiates varying emotional
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processes over time, which, in turn, can lead to a multiplicity of outcomes. Given the general lack of qualitative EI research, these findings
have considerable potential to shed light on the why EI tends to increase
over time
as expounded by the lived experiences of individuals
as
opposed to merely noting that it increases (Kafetsios, 2004). The practical
implications of this enhanced understanding for management can be significant. Especially in terms of EI interventions (see, e.g., Clarke, 2006;
Thory, 2013), this better understanding of processes enhances the prospects that interventions can succeed, which is of critical importance visa`-vis the financial resources that organizations invest in EI interventions
(Kunnanatt, 2004).
The article is structured in the following manner. First, I outline the EI
construct in detail. Second, I report findings from a phenomenological
study designed to address the two research questions posed in this study.
Finally, I elaborate upon the theoretical and practical ramifications of this
study for management. Importantly, my original intention was to fill an
important gap in the body knowledge on EI. However, and consistent with
inductive research sometimes yielding surprising findings (Eisenhardt,
1989), the ultimate framing of this studys contribution is more akin to
what scholars refer to as the problematization of knowledge (i.e., how can
we think differently about we already know, see Alvesson & Sandberg,
2011). Findings suggest the need to probably think differently about EI in
terms of processes and its outcomes, while they point to emotion regulation
as an alternative construct that
for the time being
potentially better
captures the emotional processes that inform the lived experiences of individuals. Indeed, emotion regulation is part of the ability EI model. However,
the emotional processing that occurs prior to emotion regulation being
initiated is likely to be less consistent with the hierarchical and sequential
logic of the ability EI model.
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
There are two reasons for selecting ability EI as a theoretical framework.
First, there is evidence to suggest that emotional abilities increase with age
when they are assessed with performance tests (Kafetsios, 2004), which are
said to enable the objective determination of right or wrong answers
(Mayer et al., 2004). A positive correlation between EI and age is often
lacking when self-report measures of EI are employed (Hemmati, Mills, &
113
Kroner, 2004). Second, self-report measures of EI are typically encapsulated within personality theory (Petrides, Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007) and,
therefore, represent an individuals preferred way of behavior as opposed
to mental performance on emotion-related abilities (Mayer et al., 1999,
p. 270). Given this studys interest in the underlying emotional processes
that lead to increased EI, it shall be understood that the ability version of
EI is a preferable theoretical foundation of this study as opposed to the socalled mixed models or Trait EI models, which rely on self-report measures
(see Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000 for a comprehensive review of major
models).
Advocates of the EI construct frequently point to studies highlighting
the intimate nexus between emotion and cognition to suggest that EI may
aid individuals in pursuing adaptive goals and behaviors (e.g., Mayer &
Salovey, 1995). For instance, Baron (2008) notes that emotions and cognition are entwined by means of processes through which information is
entered into memory, processed, and retrieved for later use (p. 328). As
Mayer and Salovey (1997) note, using the emotions as one basis for thinking, and thinking with emotions themselves, may be related to important
social competencies and adaptive behavior (p. 22).
The ability model of EI is hierarchically and sequentially organized.
That is, the complexity of emotional abilities increases from lower to higher
tiers, and comprises four abilities. Further to this, each branch has associated with its stages or levels of ability, which are mastered by individuals
sequentially. As noted by Mayer et al. (1999), at the lowest level, individuals first perceive and express emotions (e.g., in faces). Second, they
assimilate basic emotional experiences into their mental life, evaluating
emotions against each other, and against various sensations and thoughts
and permitting emotions to direct attention. Third, individuals seek to
understand and reason with and about emotions and determine how these
emotions change over time, for each emotion follows a specific rule
(Caruso & Salovey, 2004). That is to say, anger arises in response to injustice, fear often turns into relief and so forth (Solomon, 1993). Fourth, at
the highest level, the management of emotions concerns knowing how to
calm down after anger or assuaging the anxiety of another person. The
aforementioned four aspects are said to be interrelated. For instance,
awareness of emotions is indispensable for their regulation (e.g., empathy
may be conducive to managing emotion in others). In congruence with this,
studies suggest that all four aspects are positively interrelated (Gannon &
Ranzijn, 2005). The four-branch EI ability model has been operationalized
with the MSCEIT (see Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). While advocates
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report acceptable psychometrics properties of this measure, such as reliabilities and factor structure (Mayer et al., 2003), other studies suggest findings
to the contrary, especially in terms of factor structure (Fllesdal &
Hagtvet, 2013; Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & Stough, 2005).
Since how individuals reason about and with emotions is central to the
EI construct, it is relevant to refer to the work of Feldman Barrett,
Mesquita, Ochsner, and Gross (2007). They argue that a direct examination
of an individuals mental representation is best achieved by investigating
the verbal responses concerning their own behavior. Extending this view,
they also argue that an adequate description of what people feel is
required so that scientists know what to explain in the first place (p. 374).
This is consistent with Lincoln (2009), who calls for a removal of
researcher-defined representations of what constitute emotionally intelligent behavior. The arguments concerning the processes that underlie EI
and what outcomes they may yield inform the two research questions
(RQs) of this study. Specifically, through the study of lived experiences:
RQ1. What processes can be identified that underlie EI and help differentiate how individuals engage in mechanisms responsible for a variety
of outcomes?
RQ2. What do these outcomes look like?
METHOD
I am concerned here with the phenomenological accounts provided by participants. This allows to embrace the complexity of the human individual
and their actions (Ardley, 2011, p. 637), as well as prioritizing the individuals own interpretation of a situation. Phenomenological approaches
focus on the participants own interpretation of their lived experience
(Sanders, 1982). Here, it is assumed that the emotional processes under
investigation are individually constructed through active sense-making.
This sense-making process mainly unfolds in the interaction with others
(Johnson & Cassell, 2001). The role of the researcher is of fundamentally
interpretive nature (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992). Encouraging individuals
to share their emotional experiences was key, especially in terms of emotionally challenging life situations. Balancing job performance and ones
well-being served as a starting point to elicit these challenging life situations, for individuals often struggle to maintain a healthy balance between
115
these factors (Gooty, Gavin, Ashkanasy, & Thomas, 2014).

Correspondingly, I asked participants whether success at work or their
well-being is more important to them, followed by promptings as to
whether they can recall concrete situations at work. Another key question
sought to elicit more generally whether participants could recall a life event
that they found emotionally very challenging, to the extent that their behavior changed as a result (i.e., exploring maximum challenges in processing
emotional information consistent with EI theory). Note that while some
participants were grateful, others were adamant that they were not grateful
at all for the emotional challenges they faced.
From the above follows that this study (and qualitative research more
generally) typically excludes a concern for validity, reliability, objectivity,
generalizability, and verification (Amis & Silk, 2008). Instead, and consistent with writings of other qualitative researchers (Lincoln & Guba, 1985),
I focused upon (i) credibility (instead of internal validity), (ii) transferability (instead of external validity), (iii) dependability (instead of reliability),
and (iv) confirmability (instead of objectivity) of findings. Thus, I concur
with Cassell, Bishop, Symon, Johnson, and Buehring (2009), who do not
subscribe to the view that there is a fixed point from which qualitative
research can be considered good or bad in an externally-legitimated
way. Rather, individuals will construct their own sense of what is good,
which will privilege their own understanding and sensemaking processes
(p. 517). However, being rigorous in the collection and analysis of data
has been a central concern not in the sense of the creation of distance
and non-involvement (Etherington, 2004), but rather as a systematic reading and re-reading of the interview scripts, coupled with a persistent oscillating between theory and data to ensure intimate communication between
the two.
Approach to Data Collection and Analysis

I conducted 26 interviews with participants from a local authority (n = 12)
and University administration (n = 14) in the United Kingdom between
April and July 2010. Underlying this choice is a consideration for purposive
sampling, as it is essentially strategic and implies an effort to establish a
good correspondence between research question and sampling (Bryman,
2004). Both organizations underwent considerable restructuring and reorganization at that time, which can evoke anxiety and fear for individuals
(Huy, 1999). It shall be understood that the data emerging from the
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interviews do not always correspond with my theoretically informed questions. That is, since the data creation process is governed by the accounts
that participants provide, the interviews contained considerably more depth
and width than could be mapped neatly onto the interview guide (which is
available upon request).
I negotiated access with key managers from the local authority and university departments. Managers passed on an Informed Consent Sheet to
staff, with an emphasis that participation in this study is entirely voluntarily. In doing so, participants were assured of the strict confidentiality and
anonymity inherent in the interview process, and that numbers would be
used to communicate the identity of participants.
The sample consisted of 15 female and 11 male employees. Duration of
interviews ranged between 40 and 60 minutes. The sample size was influenced by the fact that, after the 23rd interview, participants did not produce any significant new data, concepts, or themes (relative to the themes
outlined later). This corresponds to what Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe
as theory saturation. All participants agreed to their interview being audiorecorded, and a professional service provider transcripted all interviews in
full. To disguise participants identities, I use pseudo names when reporting
the data.
During the data analysis, the interviews were subjected to four iterations
of scrutiny. First, I listened to interviews to obtain a sense of the whole and
to double-check transcription accuracy, while also noting emphasis in voice
or speech pauses as well as non-verbal cues, such as finger-tipping on the
table. The second iteration of data analysis aimed to separate the interview
material according to relevance to the research questions. I then partially
followed the widely used recommendations for phenomenological data analysis by Hycner (1985).1 This enables the creation of stronger findings since
a clear methodological process is used (Gephart, 2004, p. 458). Having
engaged in bracketing to note down conscious presuppositions (see also
Wright, Murray, & Geale, 2007),2 I perused the interviews again (i.e., the
3rd iteration) to delineate general units of meaning (e.g., words, phrases, or
non-verbal cues that reveal unique and coherent meaning). At this stage, I
also produced a hand-written summary (between 1 and 2 pages) of each
interview. I then read the scripts again in order to delineate more closely
units of meaning as they relate to the research questions. Hycner (1985)
argues that this enables the clustering of relevant units (i.e., do units of relevant meanings cluster together naturally?). It was at this stage that I realized the original intention of a gap-filling approach was not
suitable anymore, and that framing the contribution in terms of
117
problematization is necessary. In the 4th iteration, I could determine

themes from the specific units of meaning. Guided by the research questions, three themes emerged from the data analysis. These themes (which
reflect clusters of relevant units of meaning) are labeled (i) factors initiating
emotional processes, (ii) characteristics of processes (in terms format, independence of emotional processes, mechanisms, and contents), and (iii)
work and health-related outcomes of these processes. Following this, I
involved a second experienced researcher in phenomenological data analysis in order to assess the plausibility of the themes I identified. Importantly,
the joint deliberation of the themes contents did not focus upon calculating
the inter-rater reliabilities of both researchers scores (but rather upon credibility of findings as highlighted earlier). Overall, this consultation
prompted some minor changes in the description of themes. Lastly, in qualitative analysis data are often first dissected to create new meaning structure that correspond to the questions posed, while new connections
between the new structure of the data are allowed to emerge (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). As the analysis suggests, several new connections
became apparent.
DATA ANALYSIS
Factors Initiating Emotional Processes
While filtering iteratively the data in quest of emotional processes, it
became evident that without an appreciation of factors initiating emotional
processes, any subsequent processural understanding is likely to remain
incomplete. Two factors stood out in this respect, namely, (i) courage and
(ii) honesty about individuals own emotions and thoughts, as outlined
below.
Courage
In terms of a presence of courage, several participants shared similar
experiences. For instance, Sally spoke of her experience in dealing with a
colleague at work from a different department, with whom she had to produce a policy document. Following some misunderstandings about her
intentions of changes to the document, she noted:
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I said: Well I think we should meet for a coffee and talk it through. And that was extremely difficult because Im absolutely adverse to confrontation. I really didnt find that
comfortable at all. But it was really interesting that we sat down. It was very difficult
at first.
Confronting unpleasant situations emerged also in Davids account. He

shared an example with regard to the link between courage, the expression
of work-related frustration, and stress relief. The situation in question pertained to a workshop led by senior management, which he saw as a cause
of that work-related frustration on the restructuring of the organization.
He said (in front of 20 colleagues):
Youve been talking about this for a long time and youre achieving nothing
Why dont you just get on with it, if youre going to do it, do it I could see the
room fall silent. One of my colleagues said, Youre like Wolfe Smith out of Citizen
Smith, an old television program, power to the people I dont normally get on my
soapbox and argue, but its a great stress buster.
The above quote indicates that speaking truthfully (which requires courage) in such a situation was seen by David as source of stress relief.
However, there were several accounts that suggested, just as some participants displayed the courage to confront uncomfortable situations, others
struggled with it. One informative account stems from Martin:
When I was younger my father died which in itself is obviously life changing As a
person I felt it was a time when your emotions were most on public display and
I reacted to that by completely shutting off any emotional response when I
was in public Looking back on it all that happened was that the grief was just buried
until later and came out over a number of years. And these insights you only have with
age and experience, but it would be nice to talk to that young man and explain what he
was going through and how things would change and what was the best.
Despite him being now an adult, this reflection still did not come easily
to him, as underlined by the swallowing speech pause before the last word
in the above excerpt, which in itself was uttered in a quivering voice. It
appears that Martin decided to suppress the emotion-eliciting event for a
long time.
Honesty
This theme emerged from several accounts, in which life-changing experiences (e.g., divorces, grievance cases at work, and stress at work) initiated a
greater honesty about the participants own emotions.3 Like courage, it
should be borne in mind that this sense of honesty is intimately linked to
119
the outcomes individuals experience, as highlighted later. For instance,

Andrew appreciated that
following his divorce and a grievance case at
work that the important
thing is recognizing, has something, has anything changed I think maybe whats
changed from all those circumstances is the sense of being more honest.
A similar storyline surfaced in Waynes account, who told of his hospitalization some time ago, which was for him a life-threatening experience. It
turned out, however, that it was a condition that could be cured with minor
surgery. Yet, his angst made him become like a child crying every time
somebody came to see him at his hospital bed. While previously he
thought of himself as strong, this situation made him realize that he was
not as strong as [he] thought [he] were, and that he stopped pretending
that he is very strong, which brought the honest person out of him.
Intriguingly, like several other participants in this study, he felt grateful for
that life-changing experience, to the extent that he felt grateful for it. In all
cases, reflections on the pain-instilling experiences over time were essential
in leading to that sense of honesty with which they can now deal with, or
relate to, emotional experiences in more adaptive ways.
Processes in Terms of Format, Independence of Emotional Abilities,

Mechanism, and Content
Clearly distinguishable themes emerged from the data in terms of format
(i.e., curvilinear vs. linear effects), independence of emotional abilities
(i.e., do individual experiences reflect the sequential logic of the ability EI
model?), mechanisms (e.g., cognitive transformation of emotion elicitors),
and contents (i.e., conscious vs. subconscious). Note that these themes,
despite the need to distinguish them, are nevertheless often related, as highlighted below.
Format
The lived experiences of several participants were often inconsistent with
the linear logic of EI, which almost exclusively assumes positive and linear
relationships between EI and important life outcomes. That is, it became
evident that sometimes processing emotional information was engaged in
too much, or participants could not stop thinking about particular events,
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DIRK LINDEBAUM
which was perceived as an annoyance. In terms of excessive thinking, for

instance, Terry said that he probably worries too much about things over
which [he has] got no control. In a similar vein, on being asked whether
she has a tendency to worry or ruminate, Marie stated:
I think I do that too much. I think about things a lot Im probably a bit
paranoid I over-analyze things all the time. I wake up in the night thinking about
things, write them down. Its everything in my life, thats not just work.
Sally made similar suggestions. When asked whether she has a propensity to ruminate, she responded that she tick(s) that box every time and
that she chew(s) over things a lot. An inability to stop thinking thoughts
that are emotionally draining emerged from the account of Leanne.
Following an outline of numerous events that she currently has to organize
or attend to, I raised the question whether the planning worries or agitates
her, or whether it is a positive agitation. Her response was she has a nervous energy probably that [she] get(s) a bit hyper, but also that she cant
switch off sometimes.
By contrast, when asked whether he has a tendency to worry excessively,
Murray was quick to respond that worry, no its not in [his] genes, a
statement that was accompanied by what might be described as hysterical
laughter. A very similar storyline was shared by David, who noted that he
can only worry about things when they arise, not when they are imagined
future situations, adding that if you go over it in your mind all the time
you can plan and that is a good thing but to over-plan was not regarded
as helpful.
Independence of Emotional Processes
The label of this theme reflects sequential issues (relative to the hierarchically and sequentially organized ability EI model outlined earlier) that emanated from several participants accounts. For instance, Damian elaborated
on an important experience he had at university, when he failed an accountancy exam (i.e., he felt completely at a loss, as if it was some sort of
grief). Being forced to sit in the exam again, he noticed that this completely changed him emotionally, insofar as he understood better that he is
going to fail things, that it is bound to happen at some point, and that
you should prepare for failure since it is not the end of the world.
The consequence of better understanding the causes and consequences of
emotions made him more resilient (note, this pertains to the third branch
of the ability EI model). However, elsewhere Damian was candid that he
wouldnt use [emotions] at all really in fear of coming across as being
121
angry or upset when influencing others (i.e., managing of emotions in

others, fourth branch). Interestingly, when asked whether he puts his heart
and mind into performing well at work, he thought that its important to
engage both the heart and mind because sometimes you can be
too logical and factual about things whereas a certain amount of how
things feel should be allowed to influence how [he] act(s). Thus, the case
of Damian underscores that he does not use emotions at the intra versus
interpersonal level to the same degree. It is not clear whether this reflects a
lack of ability per se, but his determined response in terms of not using
emotions to influence others suggests a discontinuity as far as the sequential logic of the ability EI model is concerned. The case of Sally offers
further support that individuals can perceive their emotional abilities as
varying in proficiency. When asked how she believes her health affects her
performance at work (and vice versa), she suggested that:
You could almost force yourself into that situation [i.e., feeling more positive and energetic] and think, Oh gosh Ive got a lot to do, but you know what Im going to get
this this and this, and you can bring yourself to a positive mental attitude if you like.
What surfaces in her account is that she, with some effort, can induce a
positive mental attitude if she feel(s) a bit sick, that she has to be more
driven, and that she has to force (her)self on occasion to get the job done.
This corresponds with the second branch of the model (i.e., using emotions
to facilitate thinking). However, as the interview progressed, she admitted
that she (doesnt) think (shes) mastered putting herself emotionally in the
shoes of another person (i.e., first branch of model). She continued:
Sometimes Im surprised at how people are feeling. I misjudge things. In a meeting Ill
think that persons really got it and after the meeting that person will be Oh my goodness that was awful, and Ive been quite surprised Ive got a lot more to learn.
More insights on whether participants excelled at emotional abilities

along the logic of the ability model resulted from Lindsay. Like other participants, I asked her whether she is able to put herself emotionally in the
shoes of another person (i.e., first branch of EI model). She replied that she
does that quite well, since she experienced repeated struggle with the performance management side of her job, when she asks herself how would I
feel? However, she noted that, while she mostly feels alright in terms of
her empathetic skills, she is not one of these ones that reads it, processes
it, and modifies behavior straight away. Like other accounts before, hers
suggests a discontinuity among the EI branches that have been hitherto
assumed to be hierarchical and sequential.
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Mechanisms
Participant accounts falling within this theme serve very closely to answer
RQ1 (i.e., what processes can be identified that underlie EI and help differentiate how individuals engage in mechanisms responsible for a variety of
outcomes?) Recall that current descriptors of EI tend to be rather vague,
referring to tapping into intra-psychic experiences or configuration of mental processes. As such, this theme is concerned with a more tangible
description of mechanisms that steer the processes underlying EI. Two subthemes emerged as I deepened the analysis: (i) cognitive transformation of
the emotion elicitor and (ii) changes in attention focus.
In terms of participants narratives indicating a cognitive transformation
of the emotion elicitors, the data analysis revealed a high frequency of its
occurrence. To begin with, Nina shared the view that work isnt everything to [her] at all when asked whether success at work or happiness is
more important to her, adding later that she has stopped taking work as
serious following the death of a very close friend (i.e., it changed her outlook on life to appreciate family and friends more). In a similar vein,
Wayne alluded to a significant change in his outlook on life following a
previous hospital admission, during which he sensed a real death anxiety.
That experience transformed problems into situations for him in terms
of living with other peoples problems, since not everybody is the same as
[him]. In addition, David engaged in cognitively transformed situations to
the effect that:
Life cant always be great and neither should it always be bad it does move around
and I think that people can have far too greater expectations or become very disappointed or disillusioned and depressed if its bad.
With regard to changes in attention focus, one informative account was

provided by Chris. Increasingly disliking his job at the local authority, he
alluded that he always wanted to pursue a career as a musician.
Specifically:
Sadly, I always had the music that was an escape and with that music is a dream
of having success with what you do because you feel its good. So I think that was
always not like a backup but a buffer or maybe its like a dream. That was your
dream [and] youre thinking: Okay, this will only last for so long because we are doing
this with the music.
His reference to escape underlines that he distracted his attention

focus to pursuits considered more life-enhancing than the constant fear of
losing his job as a result of multiple rounds of restructuring. He even
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admitted that he would never reach that light (i.e., being a professional
musician), yet he was adamant that he was always trying to head towards
it. In a related fashion, Bill talked about how he became less emotional
having taken on previously the emotional burdens of colleagues who
worked with him in an organization with a bullying culture. He indicated
that he has is a nurtured a little bit the ability to detach [him]self from
both staff, both people and both the emotional journey that people go on
at work, to the point he pretends that he is not interested in conversations
at work during which he would feel like the sponge for everyone elses
issues and problems. Wayne, by contrast, did not attempt to distract himself, but rather consciously concentrated on the pleasure and life-enhancing
events in life (following his hospital admission). In his words:
I said: You have life, enjoy it, otherwise youll lose it the joy of being there, so work
with the greatest mood I always did it but this actually gave more boost, go for it
tomorrow you may, you know, you just walk and somebody may run over you by car
and you are finished.
Again, even though his lived experienced is contained within this theme,
it is worth repeating that the act of concentrating on life-enhancing events
has important consequences both for himself and his social environment.
Contents
In terms of contents of processes, only few participants made reference to
the distinction between conscious and sub-or unconscious (i.e., automated)
processes being at play as a result of life-changing (and emotional) experiences.4 Foremost among participants who were aware of the above distinction was Andrew. Reflecting on his (painful) experience of getting
divorced from his wife (i.e., the emotionally most difficult thing), he
noted that he is now a lot more aware of what catches you out when it
comes to situations that are emotionally meaningful to him. While at the
time of the relationship breakdown he could not identify what caused it,
he added:
I like to think that Ive learned from that in terms of the way I deal with the current
situation Im in, because no relationships actually perfect you need to make those
allowances and need to do that in a conscious way to the point where you become
unconsciously competent and youve got a consciously competent stage about it and
then hopefully you become unconsciously competent because you do it as a matter of
automatic reaction.
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His lived experiences of getting divorced prompted him to try to be consciously aware of what might surprise him emotionally. Once he had internalized the conscious practice, he felt that this practice increasingly
rendered the process unconscious (or a matter of automatic reactions). In a
similar vein, the narrative of Paula also referred to how she reacted to
work events that for her turned out to be unpleasantly painful at first.
As hinted earlier, she suffered under the new leadership of her department,
which placed higher performance expectations upon her. Feeling upset and
angry about the conduct of a performance appraisal meeting with department leader (and an external consultant), she indicated:
I was upset and I was a little bit angry probably as well as a result of that
[i.e., appraisal meeting]. I think I distanced myself, not consciously but subconsciously.
I distanced myself a little bit and I stopped caring as much to a point. And I just
thought: Well I can only do what I can do and if thats not good enough for you
then Im just going to get on with it, get my head down do my job and Ill see.
In retrospect, she noticed that the distancing did not occur in a conscious
fashion, but rather occurred subconsciously. The interesting insight from her
narrative and others is how that distancing affected both her performance
and well-being at work. In the next theme, I will outline personally experienced outcomes from the variety of emotional processes detailed above.
Work and Health-Related Outcomes of Emotional Processes

Consistent with the aforementioned analytical approach to first dissect the
data, while subsequently allowing for new connections to emerge, this
theme offers many interfaces with the preceding themes, especially the process subthemes (i) format and (iii) mechanisms. Below I touch upon these
two processural subthemes to highlight how and why they relate to the outcomes that individuals experience.
Starting with the focus on format of processes, engaging too much in
processing emotional information mirrors the characteristics of curvilinear
effect (i.e., too much of anything can be bad). For instance, Marie was
once emotionally very attached to her former employer, being very
loyal, hard working, and loving it. In the course of a restructuring, she
was offered a new job. However, the demands of that new job meant that
she was too stressed and felt quite physically ill. After some time, she
felt that her loyalty was not reciprocated, prompting her to feel mistreated. She felt heartbroken to the extent that she told them that she
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cannot work for [them] anymore. She quit the job, but swore to herself
that she will never give that [i.e., degree of loyalty and dedication] again.
Her case underlines that an inability to regulate how much emotional loyalty is exerted has detrimental consequences for her well-being. Negative
outcomes for ones well-being as a result of processing emotional information too much also emerged in the account of Bill. Being empathetic and
having a tendency to speak his mind in support of colleagues who were
harshly treated, he became somewhat of a spokesperson for his colleagues
at his former job, which was conspicuous by a bullying culture and lack of
direction. Yet, he noticed that being too receptive to other peoples problems did not do his mental health very much good. Eventually, he quit
his job to retain his sanity. However, since he developed the ability to
detach himself from work, he is now a better manager. Similarly, excessive worry was perceived by Terry as a hindrance to career progression.
I take less risks than some other people I think I do worry too much about what
might go wrong and spend too much time worrying about that and I think that stops
me from taking some of the risks that some people take, perhaps worrying over
nothing I may have been more successful at work if I took a few more chances.
Therefore, processing emotional information excessively (i.e., worrying

too much) had the perceived consequence of impaired career progression in
the case of Bill. Other participants (like Kim) indicated what an absence of
excessive worrying might entail, candidly noting that she is quite carefree. Kim added:
The job that Im doing is important to get everything processed and do all that side
of things, but I wouldnt take it to heart or anything like: Oh, I didnt get this work
done so this is going to be terrible.
Thus, Kim was clear that she would not allow her work to affect [her]
personally. Her view proffers an intriguing contrast in terms of outcomes
that participants perceived and experienced as a result of excessive processing of emotional information (or lack thereof). Further insights surfaced
when I examined the consequences of applying the specific mechanisms of
emotional processing mentioned earlier. To begin with, Emma told of her
experiences as an HR manager, in which role she repeatedly had to make
staff redundant. Applying cognitive reframing of the situation as a protective mechanism, she believed that
compartmentalizing what you do and realizing that: This is the job, this is what
youve got to do, and this is not me personally doing this to somebody [i.e., make staff
redundant].
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Using this protective mechanism was essential to her, since she has had
very unpleasant experiences where people have subsequently committed
suicide. As another example, Andrew admitted that he had spells
in life when [he has] had anxiety and small bouts of depression.
However, he did not experience this for a long time, noting that now he is
quite good at managing [his] own emotional wellbeing. His insight stands
in direct relation to his efforts to cognitively reframe meaningful life events,
so as to lessen the emotional impact of them.
As an example of attentional deployment, the case of Paula illustrates
that, by distracting her attention away from the situation that caused her
stress (i.e., not to care so much and looking at it from an
outside rather than personal perspective), she realized that she started
ticking those boxes at work in terms of her performance. In her words,
she was able to function better as a result of distancing herself from
work.5 A similar yet distinct story was shared by Sandra. As the most
emotional experience she had in her life, the case of her fathers illness
some time ago highlighted that her ability to detach herself from the
situation emotionally (i.e., distracting attention focus) had consequences
that she perceived as favorable for her (and other family members). In
her words:
I didnt show a lot of emotion because I was conscious that my dad was very worried
about his own health and he didnt need me to be showing that I was worried and upset
as well. So I detached myself from it and tried to occupy myself and not sit dwelling
about it because it wouldnt do me any good and would only make me more
worried I think thats just how I deal with it. Brave face, itll be OK and try and
look for the positive and whats going to happen If I dwelt, I dont think Id come
out of my shell, I think Id go into a corner and not come out.
Her narrative is instrumental in showing that detaching from the situation caused her pain and fear (i.e., distraction in attention focus), but had
both intra and interpersonal consequences that were perceived as desirable.
While all these examples indicate that by either cognitively transforming
the emotion elicitor or shifting ones attention, a (perceived) desirable outcome can be obtained, it should also be understood that an inability to
handle these mechanisms implies that individuals can suffer negative outcomes. For instance, some noted that their inability to switch off sometimes causes them to wake up at night (e.g., Sally, Leanne, and Marie), or
that role-prescriptions of being a HR manager can be stressful, especially
when one has to convey negative performance feedback or, worse still, to
lay off staff (Sharon).
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DISCUSSION
This study aimed to elicit the processes that underlie EI and to examine the
perceived outcomes at the individual level that these processes can lead to.
The motivation behind this endeavor resided in the fact that advocates of
EI themselves admit that little is known about the processes associated
with EI. In addition, it has been suggested that the outcomes of high EI
have been too narrowly and prescriptively defined, especially in terms of
pro-social and health indicators, as well as performance at work
(e.g., Mayer et al., 2008). As indicated earlier, the widely-accepted definition of EI is frequently followed by the annex to promote emotional and
intellectual growth. However, Suddaby (2010) cautions that, when constructs are defined, researchers often conflate the processes underlying a
particular phenomenon and its outcomes. If these are not clearly distinguished, our own value judgments predetermine the nature of the outcome
(Lindebaum & Jordan, 2014). Of note, while my initial motivation for this
study partly reflected a gap-filling intention with regard to the first aim,
the overall data analysis suggests that a problematizing framing of the contribution was necessary eventually. This is consistent with inductive
research sometimes yielding unexpected findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). This,
in turn, is mirrored in several significant theoretical and practical contributions for the management community.
Theoretical Contributions
The empirical analysis revealed rich insights into the emotional processes
that form part of the lived experiences of participants. The first significant
insight stemmed from identifying factors that are seemingly required to
initiate a deeper processing of emotional information. In other words, how
can one speak of an individuals ability to process emotional information
at maximum capacity in the absence of courage and honesty about oneself
in the first place? As the data show, a willingness on the part of participants
to closely look at that which gave them considerable emotional pain (such
as being averse to confrontation (Sally), or suffering from stress (David)),
was essential for initiating subsequent processural reflections. These subsequent reflections were akin to meaningful learning experiences that rendered some participants more resilient and more confident about
themselves in terms of confronting (as opposed to avoiding) painful
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situations in life. Consequently, the argument that EI will lead to emotional and intellectual growth can probably only be sustained if the factors
of process initiation are fully appreciated. This is consistent with recent studies emphasizing the need to appreciate the role of antecedent variables
and how they affect the outcomes of EI (Leonard & Harvey, 2007).
The second theoretical contribution relates to current assumptions about
the underlying processes of EI, which are potentially in need for reconsideration. This contribution has several manifestations. First, the linear
assumptions linking EI and various outcomes oftentimes do not manifest
themselves in the data. In fact, the data suggest more often than not that
individuals engaged excessively in processing emotion information (most
notably in worrying, rumination, or an inability to switch off).6 This is
consistent with prior speculations about the presence of curvilinear effects
in EI research (Jordan et al., 2010). In fact, findings speak neatly to recent
debates in management research on the too-much-of-a-good-thing effect
(TMGT effect, see Pierce & Aguinis, 2013, p. 313), whereby variables oftentimes accepted as having desirable outcomes for individuals (in this case,
EI) actually have undesirable ones for individuals due to patterns of curvilinearity. Second, the phenomenological accounts of several participants
question the sequential and hierarchical logic of the four-branch EI model.
For instance, the case of Damian underlines the complex distribution of
mastery across all four branches of the EI model (but see also Sally and
Lindsays accounts). Specifically, whereas he perceived skill at understanding emotions (e.g., with the consequences of becoming more resilient), he
was candid that he would not use emotions in trying to influence colleagues
at work (i.e., managing others emotions) in fear of being regarded as angry
or upset. Intriguingly, he puts his mind and heart into performing well at
work, by which he meant that a certain amount of how he feels about specific situations at work (i.e., using emotions to facilitate thought) should be
allowed to influence how he acts. In consequence, these accounts cast some
preliminary doubt upon whether the sequential and hierarchical logic of EI
accurately represent the actual thought-processes and mastery of abilities in
the general population. It is not hard to discern that, based upon the varied
accounts provided, that considerable fluctuation may exist across individuals in their mastery of emotional abilities, something that quantitative
studies would find hard to detect. This fluctuation may also help explain
the less-than-consistent factor structure of the MSCEIT. If the participants
above were to complete the MSCEIT, following their accounts they would
be likely to do better on some branches compared to others. In consequence, the consistency of the factor structure is likely to be adversely
129
affected. If future research provides further evidence to this effect (i.e.,

varied mastery across all branches), then this is likely to reinforce calls for
further improvement of this psychometric instrument (see also Fllesdal &
Hagtvet, 2013).
Third, in terms of mechanisms that characterize how participants process emotional information in emotionally challenging situations, the participants accounts suggest two prominent ones, namely, the (i) cognitive
transformation of emotion elicitors and (ii) changes in attention focus.
However, these mechanisms do not correspond very closely with the vague
descriptors of EI as far as its underlying processes are concerned. The quest
for alternative constructs with better conceptual clarity and fit with the
data revealed emotion regulation as a viable option (Gross, 1998).
Particularly its emergence in management studies (e.g., Lawrence, Troth,
Jordan, & Collins, 2011) prompted me to revisit how the mechanisms of
emotion regulation are defined. While emotion regulation is defined as the
processes by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when
they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions
(Gross, 1998, p. 275), two specific antecedent-focused emotion regulation
mechanisms are of relevant here: (i) cognitive change and (ii) attentional
deployment (Gross, 1998). Systematically contrasting the accounts provided by participants with the literature on cognitive change suggests that,
of all its sub-categories, cognitive re-appraisal is most closely and frequently reflected in the accounts of participants (see e.g., accounts by Nina,
Wayne, and David). Cognitive re-appraisal is defined as cognitively transforming the situation so as to alter its emotional impact (Gross, 1998,
p. 284). Applied to the accounts of participants, it can be seen how they
employed re-appraisals in emotionally complex and challenging life situations, often with the aim to prevent negative effects for their health. This is
consistent with recent longitudinal experimental studies showing that reappraisal training leads to lower scores of self-reported negative affect and
stress in the daily lives of individuals (Denny & Ochsner, 2014). Attentional
deployment, by contrast, refers to processes of distraction, concentration,
and rumination. However, the data analysis suggests that distraction and
concentration are more prevalent mechanisms of attentional deployment.
Distraction has been characterized as focusing attention on nonemotional
aspects of the situation or moving attention away from the immediate
situation altogether, or changing internal focus (Gross, 1998, p. 284).
The latter can refer to individuals disengaging from unattainable goals by
shifting their attention to more manageable goals (McIntsoh, 1996). Verbal
accounts that fall into this category can be found in several accounts (see
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e.g., case of Chris, Paula and Bill). In terms of concentration (e.g., whether
on work or art), its key characteristic is the capacity to absorb cognitive
resources (Gross, 1998, p. 284). It, too, can be applied to diverting attention to specific emotion elicitors (Gross, 1998). Grandey (2000) provides an
example of this from a previous research project, such that sometimes I
have to change my mood and boost my energy to teach I have to focus
on being positive and maintaining that (p. 99). This specific example connects plausibly with the account of Wayne (i.e., focusing on having a life
and enjoying it following hospital experience), or Sally (focusing on tasks
she wished to complete at work (i.e., focusing on this and this) in order
to induce a positive mental attitude to do better at work).
In sum, it would appear that, when faced with emotionally challenging
situations, the emotional processes that emerged in the data are seem better
aligned with the well-defined processes in the emotion regulation literature.
Consequently, this raises questions about the current utility of ability EI as
a scientific construct
at least for now. Needless to say, emotion regulation is one dimension and the apex of the four-branch EI model. Therefore,
these findings should not be interpreted to connote that EI and emotion
regulation exist independent of each other, since other abilities feed into
the ability to regulate ones emotions. However, as the data analysis has
shown, how the ability to perceive, use, and understand emotions feed into
the ability to regulate emotions is probably less consistent with current theorizing on EI. As discussed, currently these processes that seemingly underlie EI are not well understood and vaguely defined. Therefore, in the
absence of a proper understanding of how other abilities feed into the ability to regulate emotions, future research could shift attention to emotion
regulation as a construct that is both conceptually and operationally welldefined (Lawrence et al., 2011). This could be a temporary state of affairs
until further replication studies have been conducted, and any adjustment
to EI theory and measurement have been completed. Given the close link
between better understanding the underlying processes of EI and how this
can inform intervention at work, the domain of management is ideally suited to host these further empirical efforts.
The fourth theoretical contribution is related to the outcomes that individuals experience in response to their ability to process emotional information. Taking again the linear assumptions and curvilinear effects as a
starting point for a discussion on perceived individual outcomes, the data
offered several compelling insights. Foremost is that an inability to stop
processing emotional information (e.g., to stop worrying, to explore ways
to reduce emotional loyalty to workplace, or limit ones empathy for
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others) beyond a certain point often resulted in negative health outcomes

(cf. cases of Marie and Bill) or impaired career progression (cf. case of
Terry). This is inconsistent with the depiction of EI as having largely linear
relationships with outcome variables, and is also at variance with the view
that being high in EI (based upon ones ability to process emotional information) always leads to emotional and intellectual growth. Instead, the
ability to regulate ones emotion (e.g., to stop caring so much emotionally
about ones work) had the surprising effect of helping Paula to do better in
terms of both her health and career progression (see also narrative of
Andrew). These findings identify a need to be more sensitive in our theorizing on emotional processes and their outcomes to how emotion regulation abilities (or lack thereof) influence the presence of curvilinear effects
and their manifestation in terms of individual health and various outcomes
at work (e.g., performance). Put differently, optimal functioning in terms
of ones mental health and performance in the workplace may be matter of
not too much EI.
Practical Implications
Management interventions aimed at improving employee well-being or performance, for instance, can harness these findings to make better and
informed decisions on what the interventions content should be. Since the
processes underlying EI have not been more precisely defined hitherto, it is
plausible to suggest that some EI intervention at work lacked the precision
to impart what EI might be. With the processes better defined, and an
appreciation of a wider range of outcomes, management practitioners can
now more clearly inform their interventions (Lindebaum, in press). This is
likely to render these interventions more successful, as recent examples on
training individuals in re-appraisal underline (Denny & Ochsner, 2014).
Limitations and Future Research

Qualitative research has been criticized for its lack of generalizability
(Kincheloe & Tobin, 2009). The phenomenological data analysis appreciates this limitation to generalize, but importantly makes no such claims of
generalizability or context-free results (Ardley, 2011). Furthermore, I only
included participants from two public sector organizations in the UK in
this study. Thus, findings may not be representative of how participants in
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private sector (or even other public sector) organizations would have
responded to the interview questions. Another potential limitation of the
in-depth interview is that of interviewer bias (Antonakis et al., 2004).
However, the involvement of a second experienced researcher served to
mitigate the effects of potential researcher bias, in addition to close adherence to recommendations for phenomenological research (Hycner, 1985).
In terms of future research, several promising avenues emerged. First,
the quest for a better understanding of the role of conscious and subconscious (Fiori, 2009) processes in enabling individuals to both be well and
do well at work could be one such avenue. As the analysis suggests, some
participants were conscious of the need to cognitively transform emotion
elicitors. Doing so over time gradually become more unconscious and automated. In consequence, future research could examine the antecedents of
conscious processes (and/or factors that impede them), and what processes
are at play as these become more unconscious overtime. Overall, this
should enable management researchers to better understanding the transition between conscious and subconscious processes, and the outcomes these
might produce. Second, whether or not one is willing, for instance, to use
emotion to influence others may not be an issue of ability but of emotional
display rules at work, according to which individuals feel compelled to act
(Geddes & Callister, 2007). Therefore, future research could explore the
role of display rules in inhibiting the use of emotional abilities.
CONCLUSION
The data presented suggest that the vaguely defined processes typically
associated with EI could be replaced with more clearly defined constructs
(and their underlying processes) from the emotion regulation literature,
since participants accounts could often be mapped onto these constructs
at least for as long as refinement of the EI construct is under way. Of
course, emotion regulation is one dimension and the apex of the fourbranch EI model. As such, other abilities feed into the ability to regulate
ones emotions. However, as the data analysis has shown, how this occurs
is probably less consistent with current theorizing on EI. Of note, there is
already a tendency to report only the empirical data on this fourth branch
and how it relates to a variety of outcome variables (cf. Kluemper,
DeGroot, & Choi, 2013). Therefore, this study joins a body of literature
that is somewhat skeptical about ability EI as conceptualized and
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operationalized in the form of the four-branch ability model of EI

(Antonakis & Dietz, 2011; Fllesdal & Hagtvet, 2013). Of course, I am not
suggesting that we abandon the study of EI as a human ability altogether,
but the data identify several concerns that prompt a rethinking of the construct as well as further psychometric refinement. In sum, for EI to be
investigated with renewed vigor and potential, this data analysis suggests a
need to go back to the drawing board in order to rethink what is meant by
being able to process emotional information at maximum capacity, what
qualifiers need to be recognized, and how to conceptually and operationally
re-define the construct. If this is realized, then scholars and practitioners in
the realm of management and beyond are likely to have a construct at
hand that assist individuals in better harnessing emotional processes to
both be and do well at work.
NOTES
1. Strictly adhering to these recommendations does not correspond with the
more advantageous approach to gain an in-depth understanding of the data as presented here. This is consistent with Sanders (1982), who notes that a precise
methodology does not exist for phenomenological researchers (p. 353). For
instance, I considered writing summaries of each interview toward the end of the
analytical process (as suggested by Hycner, 1985) as too late giving that these summaries are essential in familiarizing oneself the data. Also, seeking respondents
feedback was not possible due to on-going re-structuring of the organizations. This
meant that, at the time the data were analyzed, many participants would not work
in that organization/or department any more. To mitigate this step, and to further
ensure the faithfulness to the phenomenon itself (Knaack, 1984), I frequently paraphrased the participants views in order to receive confirmation (or disconfirmation)
that I understood their accounts according to their perceptions. In fact, I have
sometimes purposely paraphrased incorrectly in order to elicit corrective action on
the part of participants (see Sandberg, 2000, for a similar approach to enhance the
credibility of findings).
2. One key presupposition has been the advocacy of EI on my part for many
years, albeit with a somewhat more differentiate perspective on EI compared to
other contributors of the field. This point serves to mitigate any objections that the
analysis has merely yielded confirmatory findings.
3. I recognize that greater honesty can be both a factor which initiates emotional processes and outcome of meaningful life experiences. However, I treat it
here as the former, since subsequent important life events can be approached with a
different mental attitude, which, as Wayne suggests later, implied stopping to pretend being strong when one is not.
4. Gross (1998) also suggests that emotion regulation processes can be automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious, and may have their effects at one or
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more points in the emotion generative process (p. 275). This has relevance in conjunction with some participants accounts, in which it is hinted at the perceived role
of conscious or sub/unconscious processes.
5. This quote shows that individuals can even oscillate between cognitive transformation (i.e., not caring ) and changes in attention focus (i.e., outside vs. personal perspective) within a matter of a two sentences.
6. Rumination concerns also directing attention, but attention is channeled
toward feelings and their outcomes (Gross, 1998). This focusing is often directed
toward the negative emotion features of depression (see Gross, 1998, for more information). As the narratives have shown, the outcomes of excessive rumination have
often been described as detrimental (e.g., waking up at night because one cannot
switch off).
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