1

II. SPECIFIC RULES:

A. Insanity, Imbecility and those over 9 and under 15 years of age
The law provides that a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art. 100 of
the Revised Penal Code). But there is no law which holds the father either primarily or subsidiarily
liable for the civil liability incured by the son who is a minor of 8 years. Under Art. 101 of the Penal
Code, the father is civilly liable for the acts committed by his son if the latter is an imbecile, or
insane, or under 9 years of age or over 9 but under 15, who has acted without
discernment. Under Art. 102, only in keepers and tavern-keepers are held subsidiarily liable and
under Art. 103 of the same Penal Code, the subsidiary liability established in Art. 102 shall apply
only to "employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge of their
duties."
-

Salen vs. Barce (G.R. No. L-14414, April 27, 1960)

B. State of Necessity
C. Irresistible Force, Uncontrollable Fear of Greater or Equal Injury, RPC Art. 101
Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the
following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed
by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having
such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond
with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil
law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall
be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when
the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence
or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those
doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.
D. Innkeepers and Similar Persons, RPC, Art. 102
Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments. - In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any
other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in

2
all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation
shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that
such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him,
of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

E.

Subsidiary Liability of Other Persons, RPC Art. 103

Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged
in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.

(1) Carpio vs. Doroja, 180 SCRA 1

(2) Clemente vs. Foreign Missions, 30 OG 1594
(3) Steinmetz vs. Valdez, 72 Phil 92
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV, Zamboanga City) and EDWIN
RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
Facts: Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo
Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the
latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal certificate and
sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months.
The Court held the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyond reasonable
doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating this
mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month
and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise
ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio . Thereafter, the accused filed an
application for probation.
A writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was,
however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs return.
Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the
owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the
decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and
the nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for
reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to
raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision
which has become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same
criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given, or in a separate civil action.
Ruling: The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the
Revised
Penal
Code,
which
reads
thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees
in
the
discharge
of
their
duties.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in
the criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of
industry, (2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he
is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the
employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these
requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all
these
requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in
court, because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability
under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon
his employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability
imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case.
Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court's decision.
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for

3
subsidiary writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become
final and executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his
subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such
being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was
given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon
the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been
heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the
employee's insolvency.
Clemente vs. Foreign Mission Sisters, CA.
**Employer need not be engaged in Business Industry***
In one case, plaintiffs son was struck by a car owned by defendant whose driver was convicted of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence and served his sentence. Defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint against him on the ground that he cannot be held subsidiarily liable because
there is no allegation in the complaint that he is engaged in any business or industry. The trial
court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
action is based on quasi-delict and Art. 2176 of the Civil Code provides that: Whoever by an act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. The obligation imposed by the foregoing rule is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom ine si responsible. The fact that defendant
is not engaged in industry cannot constitute a defense becasuse paragraph 5 of Article 2180
clearly provides that employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even through they are not engaged in any business or
industry. This defense is available to the employer only if the action is based on his subsidiary civil
liability for his employees criminally tortious act or omission under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Steinmetz vs. Valdez, 72 Phil. 92.
"Where the defendant is admittedly a private person who has no business or industry, and uses his
automobile for private purposes, he is not also subsidiarily liable to the plaintiff for the damages to
the latter's car caused by the reckless imprudence of his insolvent driver."
[G.R. No. 47655. April 28, 1941.]
H. H. STEINMETZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE VALDEZ, defendant-appellee.
Messrs. Ezpeleta, Quijano J Liwag for appellant.
D. Ignacio B. Alcuaz for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. employer and employee; DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION OF CHAPTER Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. - This admitted that the defendant-appellee is a private person who does not have any
business or industry, and uses his car for private purposes. It is evident, therefore, that does not
fall under the classification made by that article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This proved that
the time of the accident, the respondent was not in his car, and more, exerted all diligence in
selecting his driver.
DECISION
HORRILLENO, M.:
Not arise in this matter but purely a matter of law, it has risen to this Superiority, under a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The undisputed facts that appear in the original ruling are substantially as follows: virtual
library chanrob1es 1AW
At the intersection of the streets of Azcallaga and Lepanto City of Manila, the day April 27,
1938, while the plaintiff-appellant was driving his car along Calle Azcarraga collided with the
vehicle of the defendant-appellee, that at the time he crossed the intersection of the street and
Lepanto. At the time of the collision, the car's appellee was guided by his driver, Basil Bayukan. As
a result of this collision, this chofcr was sued and convicted for the crime of property damage.
Since the mentioned driver could not satisfy the compensation to which he was fined, the applicant
filed the lawsuit, appealed, to try to collect the defendant-appellee such compensation.
In support of its claim, the appellant invokes the provisions of Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, which copied reads: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph
"ART 103. -. Subsidiary of others Liability -. The vicarious liability established in the
preceding article, will also be extended to the masters, teachers, individuals and companies
engaged in any kind of industry for the crimes they had eriados incurred his disciples, journeymen,
apprentices or dependent on the performance of their duties or service. "
The provisions of this article are negative appellant's claim. This admitted that the
defendant-appellee is a private person who does not have any business or industry, and uses his
car for private purposes. It is evident, therefore, that does not fall under the classification made by
that article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This proved that the time of the accident. the
respondent was not in his car, and more, I exerted all diligence in selecting his driver.
The case is therefore identical to that of Rosalio Marquez, etc. against Bernardo Castillo, R.
G. No. 46237, whose decision was promulgated on 27th September 1939. So in this case should
apply the doctrine established at that.

4
We confirm, therefore the original ruling, in all its parts, the costs in both instances by the
appellant. So it is ordered.
Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., Concur.
Moran, M., in accordance with this part.
F.

What is Civil Liability Includes

Chapter Two
WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES

Article 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101,
102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Article 105. Restitution; How made. - The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever
possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who
has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may
be liable to him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person in
the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.
Article 106. Reparation; How made. - The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking
into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to
the injured party, and reparation shall be made accordingly.
Article 107. Indemnification; What is included. - Indemnification for consequential damages shall
include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third
person by reason of the crime.
Article 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for
consequential damages and actions to demand the same; Upon whom it devolves. - The obligation
to make restoration or reparation for damages and indemnification for consequential damages
devolves upon the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of
the person injured.

(2) Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558

Where in the complaint for Grave Coercion against the mayor and policemen, they were
acquitted on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, such
acquittal will not bar a civil case for damages arising from the demolition of petitioner's market
stalls. The acquittal on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt
refers to the element of Grave Coercion and not to the fact of that the stalls were not demolished.
Under the Rules of Court, the extinction of penal action carries with it the extinction of civil only if
there is a declaration that facts from which civil may arise did not exist.
Also, Art. 29 of the Civil Code does not state that civil liability can be recovered only in a
separate civil action. The civil liability can be recovered either in the same or a separate action.
The purpose of recovering in the same action is to dispense with the filing of another civil action
where the same evidence is to be presented, and the unsettling implications of permitting
reinstitution of a separate civil action.
However, a separate civil action is warranted when (1) additional facts are to be
established; (2) there is more evidence to be adduced; (3) there is full termination of the criminal
case and a separate complaint would be more efficacious than a remand. Hence, CA did not err in

5
awarding

damages

despite

the

acquittal.

(3) Jamelo vs. Serafino, 44 SCRA 464

***Conviction of Emloyee in Criminal Case Against Him***
G.R. No. L-26730 April 27, 1972
ANITA JAMELO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FEDERICO SERFINO, defendant,appellee.
Gayanelo, Salhay and Castro for plaintiff-appellant.
Ismael A. Serfino for defendant-appellee.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.
The lower court, after noting that the case was on appeal before it from the Bacolod city court's
order dated March 30, 1966 dismissing plaintiff's complaint, related in its own dismissal order of
August 29, 1966 the factual background of the case thus: "(I)t appears that in the evening of
February 1, 1961, while Antonio Regoles was driving the truck of the defendant Federico Serfino,
through his negligence and carelessness, said truck collided with another truck parked on the right
side of the road near kilometer 5 in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental. As a
consequence of said collision his co-employee Artemio Jamelo suffered injuries and he died. The
mother of the late Artemio Jamelo filed in the Court of First Instance Civil Case No. 6198, entitled
'Anita Jamelo vs. Antonio Regoles' for damages on May 15, 1961. On August 26, 1963 the Court of
First Instance rendered a decision declaring the defendant Antonio Regoles responsible for the
death of Artemio Jamelo, and ordered Antonio Regoles to pay P6,000.00 to the plaintiff Anita
Jamelo and to pay an additional sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages. The Court of Appeals,
affirmed on June 10, 1965, the decision of the Court of First Instance. On October 25, 1965, a writ
of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court. On November 17, 1965 the provincial sheriff of
Negros Occidental returned unsatisfied the writ of execution, stating that the defendant Antonio
Resoles was insolvent. Consequently, the plaintiff Anita Jamelo filed this present action against the
defendant Federico Serfino for subsidiary liability as owner of the truck and employer of the driver
Antonio Regoles, claiming that said defendant Federico Serfino is subsidiarily liable to pay the
amount of P8,000.00 adjudged by the Court of Appeals against the defendant driver Antonio
Regoles
who
was
insolvent." 1
The lower court then recounted that "(T)he defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action, and if there is any action, same has already
prescribed. Defendant brought (out) the fact that there was no criminal complaint filed against the
driver Antonio Regoles. Plaintiff filed only a Civil Case No. 6198 in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental against the driver Antonio Regoles. The present defendant owner of the truck,
Federico Serfino, was not included as one of the party defendants. The plaintiff evidently filed this
present complaint under the provisions of Art. 103 in relation with Art. 102 of the Revised Penal
Code. Defendant contends that, there being no judgment in a criminal case filed against the driver
Antonio Regoles, the defendant in this present case Federico Serfino is not subsidiarily
liable." 2
On the strength of Martinez vs. Barredo 3 ruling that the judgment of conviction, in the absence of
any collusion between the driver-accused and the offended party, binds civilly the employer as the
personsubsidiarily liable under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code such
liability not being a primary liability under the provisions on quasi-delict of the Civil Code but
"a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is

6
a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action" the lower court found
defendant's motion to dismiss to be meritorious.
The lower court held that "subsidiary liability presuposes that there was a criminal action. If no
criminal action was instituted, the employer's liabilitywould not be predicated on Art. 103, (Revised
Penal Code)" and accordingly ordered the dismissal of plaintiff's action, which sought to declare
defendant-employer subsidiarily liable to pay the P8,000.00-damages awarded plaintiff in
her civil judgment against the insolvent driver.
Plaintiff-appellant formulates her issue on the case thus: "(I)s the conviction of the driver Antonio
Regoles of the criminal case filed against him for the death of plaintiff's son, Artemio Jamelo, a
condition precedent in order that an action for subsidiary liability based on Arts. 103 and 102 of the
Revised Penal Code may lie against the defendant Federico Serfino as owner of the truck and
employer of the driver Antonio Regoles?" and submits "that the conviction of the employee of the
crime he was charged while in the performance of his duties is not a legal requirement before an
action for subsidiary liability against his employer under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code could
be predicated."
Plaintiff-appellant's position is untenable. There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of
defendant-employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code 4 where his employee has not
been previously criminally convicted. What apparently unfortunately happened here is that plaintiff
filed an independent civil action for damages solely against the erring driver Antonio Regoles based
on his criminal negligence resulting in the death of plaintiff's son and secured the P8,000.00
damage judgment against himalone, which she could not collect, however, due to his insolvency.
Plaintiff does not state what ever happened to the criminal action against him except to contend in
her brief that in filing such independent civil action, "she loses her right to intervene in the
prosecution of the said criminal case against Antonio Regoles and that its dismissal will not bar the
civil action she had already filed against the said Antonio Regoles." 5 Such civil judgment is
enforceable solely and exclusively against the only defendant therein, the erring driver, Regoles.
But this is an entirely different matter from trying now to enforce said civil judgment in this action
on the groundless basis of an alleged subsidiary liability against defendant-employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. The basis is groundless without the prior criminal conviction of the
driver-employee which is a condition sine qua non for thesubsidiary liability of the employer to
come into being under the cited provision of the Revised Penal Code.
It is clear then that there having been no criminal conviction of the employee wherein his civil
liability was determined and fixed, no subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code can be claimed against defendant-employer.
A direct and separate civil action for damages against defendant-employer for quasi-delict under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, subject however to the defense therein provided of proving due
diligence in the choice and supervision of the employee, would have lain against defendant, if
timely filed. Even if the Court were to hold that the action filed below by plaintiff-appellant could be
considered such a separate and direct action for damages on the basis of quasi-delict against
plaintiff's own disclaimer and insistence that she wants to enforce the nonexistent subsidiary liability of defendant-employer the Court is constrained to sustain the
dismissal order of the lower court, since such an action is now clearly barred by prescription as duly
invoked by defendant-appellee in his dismissal motion.
Actions based upon quasi-delicts prescribe after four years from the commission of the fault or
negligent deed. 6Since the accident causing the death of plaintiff's son occurred on February 1,
1961, the filing of the complaint below only on March 10, 1966 was already barred by the lapse of
more than a year beyond the four-year prescription period.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

7
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

(4) People vs. Torres, 366 SCRA 408

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
GANIBO, accused-appellant.

vs. AMORSOLO

TORRES

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court on automatic review is the joint judgment of conviction rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, dated August 14, 1998, finding accusedappellant Amorsolo Torres guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for the rape and the penalty of
imprisonment of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to six years ofprision correccional as
maximum for the acts of lasciviousness.[1]
The Information for Rape alleged:
That on or about September 1, 1997 at Brgy. Ibabang Atingay, Municipality of Magdalena, Province
of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of the herein complainant, with lewd design and with intent to satisfy his lust and by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with his daughter, GLORILYN TORRES y BUSTILLO, a fourteen-year old girl,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. [2]
The Information for violation of RA 7610 (Child Abuse) reads as follows:
That on or about July 26, 1997 at Bgy. Ibabang Atingay, Magdalena, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit lascivious acts with his own daughter, GLORILYN B.
TORRES, by touching her private parts, against her will. [3]
Upon separate arraignments, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, after
which both cases were tried jointly.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized as follows:
Complainant Glorilyn Torres, then 14 years old at the time of the incidents, lived with her
father, herein accused-appellant, and her brothers and sisters, at Bgy. Ibabang Atingay, Magdalena,
Laguna. Her mother Gloria Torres, who has been separated from accused-appellant since 1994, was
living and working in Marikina.
At around 2:00 a.m. of July 26, 1997, complainant was sleeping in their house when she was
suddenly awakened by her father who was mashing and sucking her breasts. She asked him to
stop but he slapped her and told her to keep quiet because her brothers and sisters might
awake. Complainant cried and pleaded with her father to stop. Accused-appellant touched her
vagina and told her Pasensya ka na, kasalanan ito ng nanay mo, dahil wala siya.Complainant tried
to fight back but accused-appellant, who was holding both her arms, continued to suck her breasts
and at the same time was asking for forgiveness. Afterwards, accused-appellant told her to go back
to sleep and left. Complainant did not report the incident to anyone because the accused-appellant
threatened to maul and leave them.
On September 1, 1997, at around 2:00 a.m., complainant was again awakened by accusedappellant lying beside her. Her sister Morilyn was also inside the room. At first, accused-appellant
was mashing and sucking her breasts. Then he ordered her to take off her panty and when she
refused, he forcibly took it off. She tried to struggle with the accused-appellant but then he held
both her arms, placed his knees between her thighs and succeeded in satisfying his lust on

8
her. Complainant felt excruciating pain in her vagina. After a while, accused-appellant stopped and
said he did not want to continue anymore because she might get pregnant. He put on her panty
and left. The following morning, complainant saw a spot of blood on her panty. As in the previous
incident, accused threatened to leave complainant and her brothers and sisters, and that he will
maul and kill her mother, brothers and sisters if she told anybody about what happened. After this
incident, complainant never talked to accused-appellant.
It was only on October 5, 1997 when complainant was able to report the two incidents to their
barangay chairwoman, Aurora Cube. It appears that on said date, Mercy Torres, a sister-in-law of
accused-appellant, saw Roberto Montemor, a suitor of the complainant, holding complainant by the
shoulder, inside the house of accused-appellant. According to complainant, Roberto was
apologizing to her for asking her to elope with him. Mercy Torres reported the matter to Aurora
Cube who went to the house of accused-appellant to confront complainant. When Aurora told
complainant that accused-appellant might scold her, complainant got frightened and held on to the
arm of Aurora. In between tears, complainant narrated to Aurora how accused-appellant molested
and raped her. The barangay chairwoman gave complainant P200.00 and asked a granddaughter
to accompany complainant to see the latters mother in Marikina.
Thereafter, Aurora Cube proceeded to the police station in Magdalena to report the complaint
for rape. She was given permission by the police to invite accused-appellant for questioning. In the
evening of October 5, 1997, Aurora ordered her barangay tanods to invite accused-appellant to the
barangay hall on the pretext that he is scheduled to be on patrol duty. When accused-appellant
arrived, Aurora asked him what he did to his daughter, but accused-appellant denied having done
anything to complainant. That night he was detained at the barangay hall.
The following day, October 6, 1997, complainant and her mother arrived at the barangay hall.
Complainants mother, Gloria Torres, tearfully confronted accused-appellant and asked if what
complainant said was true. Accused-appellant was adamant in denying the charges against him
and said that he could not do that against his own daughter. Thereafter accused-appellant was
turned over to the Magdalena Police Station where he was detained.Complainant and her mother
executed their respective affidavit-complaints.[4]
The Medico-legal report[5] issued by the examining physician Dra. Maria Cleofe Pita, Municipal
Health Officer of Magdalena, Laguna, shows that complainant suffered a healed laceration at 7
oclock position with retraction of the edges. Dra. Pita testified that based on the lacerations, there
could have been penetration more than once, and that the insertion of an object could have caused
the retraction of the edges and laxity of the muscles.
Accused-appellants defense hinges mainly on alibi and denial. As to the charge of acts of
lasciviousness committed against complainant in the early morning of July 26, 1997, accusedappellant testified that the night before, i.e. on July 25, 1997, he slept in the mountain where he
worked as a power saw operator and came home only at 4:00 in the afternoon of July 26,
1997. Then he left the house at around 5:00 p.m. to attend a wedding at Bgy. Burlungan,
Magdalena, Laguna and was able to go home early the following day. With respect to the complaint
for rape, accused-appellant testified that on September 1, 1997, he arrived home from work at
around 6:00 p.m., and after eating supper, he went to sleep. Complainant, together with her
brothers and sisters, was watching television at a neighbors house and he did not know what time
they came home. Accused-appellant testified that the complaint for rape was filed against him
because he did not allow complainant to live with her grandmother and study in Manila.
The trial court rendered judgment on August 14, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
W H E R E F O R E:
Under Criminal Case No. SC-6691, this Court finds the accused AMORSOLO TORRES y GANIBO
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPAL OF CONSUMMATED RAPE defined and punished
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise
known as the Death Penalty Law and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH and to pay the private offended party GLORILYN TORRES the following sums:
P50,000.00 - as civil indemnity;

9
50,000.00 - as moral damages and
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-6692, this Court finds the accused AMORSOLO TORRES Y GANIBO
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPAL OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS defined and
penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of
Prision Correccional as Maximum and to pay the private offended party Glorilyn Torres the following
amounts:
P5,000.00 - as civil indemnity;
5,000.00 - as moral damages and
5,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of both the instant suits.
The joint decision is before us by virtue of the automatic appeal of the death penalty imposed
in the rape case. It will be noted however that no separate appeal was filed by accused-appellant
from the decision finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness. There is thus a need to address the
issue of whether or not the automatic review of accused-appellants conviction for rape, for which
the death penalty was imposed, includes the appeal of his conviction for the less serious crime of
acts of lasciviousness, but not so punished.
The Judiciary Act of 1948 under Section 17, paragraph 1 thereof, provides that:
Sec. 17. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in (1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the
same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as
that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as
principals, accomplices or accessories whether they have been tried jointly or separately x x x.
In the case of People vs. Panganiban,[6] the Court held that an automatic review of the
death penalty imposed by the trial court is deemed to include an appeal of the less serious crime,
although not so punished by death, where the less serious crime arose out of the same occurrence
or was committed by the accused on the same occasion as that which gave rise to the more
serious offense. However, the case at bar is different as the acts of lasciviousness committed by
herein accused-appellant happened on July 26, 1997 whereas the rape was committed on
September 1, 1997.
What is applicable is the doctrine enunciated in the recent case of People vs. Florencio
Francisco y Alejo,[7] where we ruled that the automatic review of the death penalty in the rape
case did not include the conviction for acts of lasciviousness which should have been the subject of
a separate appeal filed before the Court of Appeals, considering that the acts of lasciviousness
case did not arise out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion
as that of the more serious crime of rape. Thus:
In the instant case, however, it cannot be said that the acts of lasciviousness case arose out of the
same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion as that of the more serious
crime of rape.The two (2) cases involved distinct offenses committed at an interval of two (2)
months in point of time.The evidence reveals that the first crime was committed sometime in April
1997 while the second was perpetrated on 27 June 1997. In both cases, accused-appellant was
animated by a separate criminal intent, although incidentally, both crimes were directed against

10
the same victim. Moreover, the evidence presented by the prosecution in the rape case was not
the same evidence they offered to prove the acts of lasciviousness case.
Inescapably, the penalty of reclusion temporal meted out to accused-appellant in Crim. Case No. Q97-73696 (now G.R. No. 135202) for acts of lasciviousness is within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Upon the other hand, Crim. Case No. Q-97-73695 (now G.R. No.
135201) for rape, the penalty imposed therein being death, perforce falls within the jurisdiction of
this Court on automatic review.
In dismissing the appeal from the conviction for acts of lasciviousness for lack of jurisdiction
and wrong forum, the Court in People vs. Franciscoratiocinated as follows:
While we are not unmindful of the practical advantages of a single consolidated review of these
two (2) criminal cases, we cannot array any legal justification therefor without infringing upon the
jurisdictional boundaries so clearly delineated by our statutes. Hence, we have no other recourse
but to recognize this as a case of split appellate jurisdiction. We cannot infuse new meaning into
the provisions of our statutes apportioning appellate jurisdictions between this Court and the Court
of Appeals because their mandates and terms are specific and unmistakable. Nor can we widen the
scope of our appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the fact that the trial court heard two (2) distinct
and separate cases simultaneously. Such procedure adopted by the trial court cannot and did not
result in the merger of the two (2) offenses. In fact, a cursory reading of the assailed decision of the
court a quo reveals with pristine clarity that each was separately determined by the trial judge, as
each should be separately reviewed on appeal. Appellate competence is circumscribed by statute,
and not flux and ferment to be settled by the exigencies of trial proceedings.
In fine, it is obvious that accused-appellants conviction for acts of lasciviousness should have been
appealed to the Court of Appeals, instead of elevating the case to this Court which has no
jurisdiction over it. Consequently, being with the wrong forum, the appeal in Crim. Case No. Q-9773696 for acts of lasciviousness erroneously brought to us is dismissed and the decision therein of
the court a quo stands. x x x
We therefore dismiss the appeal in Criminal Case No. SC-6692 for acts of lasciviousness for
having been filed in the wrong forum. We shall now proceed to review the conviction in the rape
case, where accused-appellant avers that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting him despite
insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant challenges the credibility of complainants testimony. It is contended that if
it were true that complainant struggled and fought with accused-appellant, and that the latter
slapped and threatened her, it is surprising how complainants sister, Morilyn, who was sleeping
beside accused-appellant, was not awakened by all the commotion. Also, the failure of complainant
to immediately report the incident allegedly renders doubtful her testimony, specially in light of her
narration that she was compelled to disclose the matter to the barangay chairwoman only after
complainants Aunt Mercy threatened to tell accused-appellant that complainant was flirting with
her boyfriend.
It is an elementary rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. And the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to
materially affect the disposition of the case.[8]
In the case at bar, complainant categorically testified that she was raped by her own father,
herein accused-appellant. Her testimony jibes on all material points with her sworn statement
which she executed before the municipal judge. She testified thus:
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q: You said something happened to you on September 1,
1997?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell us what happened to you on said date?

11
A: I was then sleeping and I was awakened and I saw
my father was already beside me.

Q: How did you feel when an object was inserted

inside your vagina?

Q: Can you recall what time you were awakened?

A: It was so painful, sir.

A: About 2:00 oclock in the morning, sir.

Q: When you felt something inside your vagina can

you still recall what your father was doing?

Q: Who were sleeping with you at that time aside

from your father?

A: He was still mashing my breast, sir.

A: My youngest sister Morilyn, sir.

Q: May we know if he was kissing you?

Q: How about Alvin, where was he at that time?

A: No, sir.

A: Alvin was sleeping in the outer portion of our

house near the exit, sir.

Q: Do you recall if he was making some body

movement?

Q: How about Melvin?

A: Yes, sir.

A: My four brothers were sleeping together on that

day, sir.

Q: What kind of movement was he doing at that

time?

Q: What happened when you were awakened on said

date at about 2:00 oclock in the morning?

A: He was making movement on this part (witness

pointing on her right pelvis).

A: My father was mashing my breast, sucking the

same and he ordered me to put off my panty which I
did not like so he was the one who took it off.

Q: Tell us what movement was he doing at that time?

Q: Was he able to remove your panty?

A: Yes, sir.

A: His body was making this movement (witness

demonstrating by using her right hand moving it
upward and downward)
Q: What did you do if any when you felt something
inserted into your vagina?

Q: And what did he do?

A: He forcibly inserted his penis into my vagina
while I was struggling, sir.
Q: Do you know how he was able to insert his penis
into your vagina despite the fact that you were
struggling?
A: He put both his knees on both my thighs and held
both my hands upward, sir.

A: I was pleading to him but he did not listen to my

plea, he still continued what he was doing. (witness
with teary eye)
Q: Tell us the exact words you stated?
A: I said: Tay maawa na kayo sa akin, hindi ba
promise ninyo hindi ninyo ako kakayugin, bakit po
ninyo ito ginagawa sa akin?
Q: Was there any response from your father?

Q: How was he able to insert his penis?

A: Nothing, sir.
A: He forcibly inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Was he successful in inserting his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you know?

Q: What did you do if any when your father did not

respond to your plea?
A: After a lapse of 5 minutes he removed his penis
from my vagina and he said he would not continue
anymore because I might get pregnant.

A: I felt pain, sir.

Q: Are we made to understand that the penis of your

father was in your vagina for about 5 minutes?

Q: But you did not see actually his penis being

inserted into your vagina?

A: Yes, sir.

A: No, sir, it was dark and the light was dim.

Q: What else happened after your father removed his

penis from your vagina?

12
A: He wiped my vagina with a cloth and put on my
panty.

Q: Do you still love him after September 1, 1997?

A: No more, sir.

Q: Do you know the reason why he wiped your

vagina with a piece of cloth?
A: No, sir.

Q: Why?
A: It is because I am wondering why he had done to
me that thing when I am his daughter.

COURT:
Q: Did your vagina get wet?

Q: Did you ask your father the reason why he raped

you?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: No, sir, I did not talk to him since then. [9]

TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q: Do you know the reason why your vagina got wet?

On cross-examination, complainant described in

greater detail how she struggled with accusedappellant while he forced himself on her, viz:

A: Something whitish came out of my vagina, sir.

ATTY. DE RAMOS:

COURT:

Q: What was the first thing that your father did on

September 1, 1997?

Q: How were you able to tell that the color of the

substance is white, when you said it is dark?

A: He mashed my breast, sir.

A: My father turned on the light so I saw it, Your

Honor.

Q: And when he was mashing your breast what did

you do?

TRIAL PROSECUTOR:

A: I
was
struggling (nagpupumiglas). I
was
covering my breast with both hands but he removed
by hands.

Q: Do you know where did that white substance

come from?
A: Yes, sir, from my vagina.
Q: What did you feel if any while the penis of your
father was inside your vagina aside from pain?

Q: Were you crying while struggling?

A: Yes, sir.
COURT:

A: I felt pain on my body and I saw some spot of

blood on my panty when I woke up the following
morning.

Q: Why?

Q: What did you do when you noticed spot of blood

coming from your vagina?

Q: You were afraid of what?

A: I was frightened, Your Honor.

A: I washed my panty, sir.

A: I was afraid that he might again do the thing which

happened on July 26, Your Honor.

Q: Did your father threaten you?

ATTY. DE RAMOS:

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you cry for help at that time?

Q: Tell us how your father threatened you?

A: No, sir.

A: He threatened that he would go away and I would

lose a father and he would maul and kill my mother,
brothers and sister.

Q: Why did you not cry for help or shout?

Q: After September 1, 1997, do you still respect your

father?

Q: Despite the fact that you do not want the things

that happened on July 26 to happen again?

A: A little sir. I did not show him that I hated him so

much.

A: He was covering my mouth, sir.

A: Because he was already threatening me, sir.

13
Q: According to you when he inserted his penis into
your vagina he was holding your hands, is that
correct?

Q: You also stated that your father when he was able

to insert his penis into your vagina he placed both his
knees on your thighs?

A; Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why did you not shout at the time he was holding

your hands?

Q: And you also stated that your father was able to

insert his penis into your vagina?

A: Because he said he would maul me.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You also stated that while your father was pushing

his body up and down he was holding your breast, is
that correct?

Q: Tell the Court how he was able to insert his penis

when his knees were placed on your thighs?

A: Yes, sir.

A: There were occasions when he removed his knees

on my thighs and whenever my feet were moving he
again placed his knees on my thighs.

Q: With both his hands?

Q: You said you were struggling at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell the Court how did your father hold your
breast while he was pushing his body up and down?
A; He put his elbow on this portion of my arms
(witness pointing to the crook of the right elbow) and
he mashed my breast with his hands.
Q: You also stated that your father was covering your
mouth at the same time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at the same time he was mashing your
breast?

xxxxxxxxx
Q: And because you felt so much pain when he
entered his penis into your vagina you did not shout?
A: It is because he was already threatening me
that he would kill my mother and I was afraid,
sir.
Q: You mean to tell the Court, while your father
was inserting his penis into your vagina he was
threatening you that he will kill your mother?
A: Yes, sir.[10]

A: It was when I was crying aloud, he removed his

hand from mashing my breast and then he covered
my mouth with his hand.

Accused-appellant was convicted for the crime of rape after the trial court found that the
entire testimony of Glorilyn Torres was candid, spontaneous and consistent which has never been
shaken even under rigid cross-examination. A witness who testified in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a
credible witness.[11] We find no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of and deviate from the
finding of the lower court. Hence, the same should be accorded great weight and deemed
conclusive and binding on this Court.
The attempt of accused-appellant to impute ill-motive on complainant for fabricating the
charge of rape against him cannot succeed. Not a few persons accused of rape have attributed the
charges brought against them to resentment or revenge, but such alleged motives have not
prevented the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who remained
steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examination. [12] Given the naivet of complainant who was
only 14 years old at the time of the incident, we are hard put to believe that she could have
concocted a tale of pure fantasy, if only to get back at her father for not allowing her to live and
study in Manila. Well-settled is the doctrine that no young and decent lass will publicly cry rape,
particularly against her alleged father, if such were not the truth, or if justice was not her sole
objective. The revelation of a young girl that she was sexually abused cannot be easily dismissed
as a mere concoction, considering her willingness to undergo a public trial and relate the details of
her defilement. Normally, no woman would be willing to undergo the arduous stages and
embarrassing consequences of a rape trial, if not to condemn an injustice and obtain retribution. [13]

14
In this case, the information alleged that accused-appellant, through the use of force and
intimidation, had carnal knowledge of complainant. This Court has consistently held that rape is
committed when intimidation is used on the victim, which includes moral intimidation or coercion.
[14]
In this case, complainant was also threatened by accused-appellant with physical harm if she
dared to report the matter to anyone. It is not uncommon for a girl of tender age to be intimidated
into silence by the mildest threat on her life. Thus, our consistent doctrine is that delay in reporting
a rape, if sufficiently explained, does not affect the credibility of a witness. [15]
We have repeatedly adhered to the oft-repeated rule that lust is no respecter of time and
place, and that rape can be committed even inside a house where there are other occupants.
[16]
The presence of people in a certain place is no guarantee that rape will not and cannot be
committed.[17] Thus, the fact that complainants sister was in the same room where the incident took
place is not sufficient to cast doubt on the truthfulness of complainants testimony, especially in
light of her clear and convincing narration of the incident.
Finally, we are not persuaded by accused-appellants defense of alibi. For this defense to
prosper, it is necessary to prove the presence of the accused at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense and demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.[18]Accused-appellant claims that he was working in the mountain but he failed
to show that it was physically impossible for him to be in their house on that fateful day. More
importantly, accused-appellants testimony was totally uncorroborated. His alibi cannot stand
against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution pointing to his culpability.
With regard to the civil liability of accused-appellant, we affirm the trial courts award
of P50,000.00 for moral damages. In this jurisdiction, moral damages in rape cases may be
awarded to the victim in such amount as the court deems just, without the need for pleading or
proof of the basis thereof.However, there being only one incident of rape, the award of exemplary
damages should be decreased from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00. Moreover, in line with recent
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 since the
commission of rape was qualified by circumstances under which the death penalty is imposable in
accordance with R.A. 7659.[19]
The information alleged that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with his daughter, then
fourteen years old. The prosecution presented the birth certificate of complainant which shows that
she was born on October 14, 1983. Complainant testified that she was 14 years old when she was
raped by accused-appellant and this was confirmed by her mother, Gloria Torres. Moreover,
accused-appellant admitted that complainant is his daughter, which was corroborated by the
complainant. The concurrence of minority of the complainant and her relationship to the offender,
having been alleged in the information and duly proved with certainty and clearness as the crime
itself during trial, constrains the Court to affirm the conviction of accused-appellant of qualified
rape, justifying the imposition of the death penalty on him. [20]
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional.Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be
accordingly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28
convicting accused-appellant Amorsolo Torres y Ganibo of RAPE and sentencing him to DEATH and
ordering him to pay P50,000.00 in moral damages is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
exemplary damages is decreased to P25,000.00 and the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is hereby
increased to P75,000.00.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President upon finality of this
decision for possible exercise of executive clemency in accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code.
For being in the wrong forum, the appeal to this Court in Criminal Case No. SC-6692 for acts of
lasciviousness is DISMISSED and the conviction of the accused therein by the
court a quo stands. Costs de oficio.

15
SO ORDERED.

(5) People vs. Paraiso, 349 SCRA 335

G.R. No. 127840

November 29, 1999

PEOPLE
OF
vs.
ROLAND PARAISO, defendant-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the Decision dated November 26, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court 1 of Cebu
City, Branch 14 in Criminal Case No. CBU-41141 finding accused Roland Paraiso guilty of the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
An Information 2 was filed charging accused Roland Paraiso and John Doe of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of June, 1995, at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, more or less, in
Barangay Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, confederating and mutually helping
with one another, with intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of Lolita Alipio Tigley, and once inside,
take, steal and carry away one (1) Rolex watch, assorted jewelries, P200.00 cash and a telescope,
all valued at P180,000.00 and o the occasion thereof, with intent to kill, dragged said Lolita Alipio
Tigley inside a room, and thereafter assaulted, attacked and stabbed the latter on the different
parts of the body which caused her death shortly thereafter.
No bail was recommended. Upon arraignment, accused Paraiso, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. 3 Hence, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Sheila Marie Alipio, 18 years old; Ferdinand
Tigley, 17 years old; Epifanio Tigley, Jr., 15 years old; Kim Tigley, 13 years old; cartographer Ligaya
Agbay; Dr. Juan Zaldamaga. Jr.; and Adelaida Alipio.
Prosecution eyewitness Sheila Marie Alipio, then 18 years old, is the niece of the victim. Her father
Medelino is the brother of the victim Lolita. Their house is located some 50 meters way from the
house of the victim. Sheila testified that at around 1:30 in the afternoon of June 11, 1995, she went
to the house of the victim to deliver a one-gallon water container. At the main door of her aunts
house, she saw two (2) men, including accused herein, standing about a meter away from her. She
rang the doorbell and after a while, her aunt opened the door. All of a sudden, one of the two men
pushed her inside the victims house. She stumbled and when she looked back, she saw one of
them pointing a gun, about 8 to 10 inches long, at her aunts right temple. He allegedly wore navy
blue maong pants, a round-neck t-shirt colored sky blue, red rubber shoes and a black cap over his
head; he was fair-complexioned with somewhat sunken cheeks. Sheila later identified this man in
court as the accused-appellant Paraiso. 4
Sheila further testified that the other man was armed with a Batangas fan knife which he poked at
her right side. They were herded upstairs into one of the rooms, together with the victims children,
Epifanio, Jr., Ferdinand and Kim. Paraiso was allegedly holding the victim Lolita and asked for the
key; he likewise ordered the victim to open the cabinet and ransacked and searched the same. He
asked where the money was placed but Lolita took from her pocket the amount of P200.00 which
she handed to Paraiso saying that it was all that she had. Paraiso likewise took jewelries,
wristwatch and video camera. Paraiso and his male companion brought the victim to the bathroom

16
and ransacked the cabinet. Paraiso later ordered his companion to cover Shell. and her cousins
with pillows. Sheila peeped through the pillows and saw Ferdinand being tied up. Her aunt pleaded
with the perpetrators not to harm the children. Later, Sheila saw her aunt being taken to the
childrens room but her aunt came back bloodied and clutching her breast. Lolita collapsed after
looking at each one of them. The accused and his companion were no longer there. 5
Sheila described the man holding the Batangas knife as dark-skinned, with protruding Adams
apple and his face and forearms bore so many scars and sporting a flat top haircut, somewhat
regular nose. 6
Another witness for the prosecution was Epifanio Tigle, Jr., then 15 years old, who is the son of the
victim. In the courtroom, he pointed to accused-appellant Paraiso as one of the two (2) men who
robbed and killed his mother. 7 He testified that on June 27, 1995, he, together with his siblings,
went to the office of the NBI wherein a cartographic sketch was drawn of one of the suspects (since
he was present when his mother was robbed and killed); that he, together with his brothers,
Ferdinand and Kim and his cousin Sheila went to the Chief of Police at the Municipal Building of
Minglanilla on April 19, 1996 to inform him that the suspects in the robbery case in Argao were not
the ones who robbed and killed his mother. 8 He further testified that he, his mother and brothers
were inside their house at their mothers room when Sheila, who was at the main door, was
ordered to enter their house; and that the robbers ordered them to stay inside their mothers
room. 9 Upon demand, his mother gave accused Paraiso only P200.00, which was in her pocket,
because she has not yet received her allotment from her husband. Thereafter, accused Paraiso
asked for the key to the box and took out some jewelries, such as wrist watch and necklace. 10
Ferdinand Tigley, 17 years old, testified to corroborate the testimonies of eyewitnesses Sheila and
Epifanio, Jr., as he was likewise at the house of the victim during the incident. He was hogtied by
the companion of appellant Paraiso with a t-shirt which was taken from the victims cabinet. 11 He
was also presented to prove actual and moral damages. He stated that the robbers took a
wristwatch, necklace, telescope and video camera aside from the P200.00 which the victim handed
to Paraiso; that the total value of the items taken was P179,800.00, as shown in the list marked as
Exhibit F; this list was made by his father who came home for the burial. The burial expenses
likewise amounted to P47,600.00 as evidenced by a list marked as Exhibit G. Ferdinand further
testified that when his mother was killed, he felt anguish and pain. When asked if his worries and
feelings could be translated into cash, he stated that (G)rief and anguish is not a business
proposition to be given monetary value, not even a million will suffice. 12
Kim Tigley, then 13 years old, is the youngest son of the victim. Upon identifying in court appellant
Paraiso as one of the persons who entered their house, he exploded in anger and banged his fist on
the armchair of the witness box. 13 He recalled that after appellant took out the jewelries,
wristwatch, telescope and camera, and while his older brother Ferdinand was hogtied by
appellants companion, his mother pleaded with the robbers to just take all the things they wanted
but not to harm Ferdinand; and that with the gun pointed at his mothers head and the knife poked
at her, the two robbers held his mother and brought her into the other room where she was
killed. 14
Adelaida Alipio, the sister-in-law of the victim, testified that appellant came to the house of the
victim on June 6, 1995 to apply as a driver but the victim allegedly declined because her jeepney
had many defects. 15
Dr. Juan Zaldarriaga was presented by the prosecution to identify the Necropsy Report of the
victim. He testified that the cause of death was Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds of
the chest with the following post mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
Contusion, greenish-purple, 2.0 x 4.0 cms., lateral aspect, middle third, arm, right.
Contuse abrasion, 0.5 x 0.5 cm., sternal region, right side.
Wounds, incised: 2.0 cms., dorsal aspect, hand, left; 4.0 cms., dorso-palmar aspect, between ring
and middle fingers, hand, left.

17
Wounds, stabbed:
(1) Elliptical shaped, edges clean cut, running horizontally, 1.6 cms., with lateral extremity sharp
and medial extremity blunt; located at the anterior aspect, chest, right side, 4.0 cms. from the
anterior median line and level of the 3rd rib; directed backward, downward and medially; involving
the skin and soft tissues, non-perforating, with the depth of 3.0 cms.;
(2) Elliptical shaped, edges clean cut, running downward and medially, 1.8 cms., with the upper
extremity blunt and lower extremity sharp; located at the anterior aspect, chest, left side, 2.5 cms.
from the anterior median line and level of the 3rd intercostal space; directed backward, downward
and laterally; involving the skin and tissues, perforating the heart, with the depth of 8.5 cms.;
(3) Elliptical shaped, edges clean cut, running horizontally, 1.8 cms., with the medial extremity
sharp and lateral extremity blunt; located at the anterior aspect, chest, left side, 9.0 cms. from the
anterior aspect, chest, left side, 9.0 cms. from the anterior median line and level of the 3rd
intercostal space; directed backward, downward and medially; involving the skin and soft tissues,
perforating the lung, left side, with the depth of 13.0 cms.;
(4) Elliptical shaped, edges clean cut, running almost vertically 2.0 cms., with the upper extremity
sharp and lower extremity blunt; located at the postero-lateral aspect, chest, left side, 15.0 cms.
from the posterior median line and level of the 8th intercostal space; directed forward, downward
and medially; involving the skin and soft tissues, perforating the lung, diaphragm, left side and
stomach, with the depth of 14.0 cms.
Hemopercardium, 300 cc.
Hemothorax: left side, 700 cc.; right side, 500 cc.
Lungs, congested and edematous; cut sections show reddish congested cut surfaces.
Brain and other visceral organs, moderately congested.
Stomach, full of clear fluid and partially digested rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds of the chest.
For the defense, the following witnesses were presented: Estacio Sayson, Lilia Abellana, Thelma
Moneva, Rodliza Alforque, Raul Pable, Eric Pasilan, Rosita Paraiso and accused himself. The theory
of the defense is alibi and denial.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment on November 26, 1996, the dispositive portion
which reads:

16

of

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused Roland Paraiso guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal by direct participation of that certain John Doe of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide as now defined and penalized by Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 7659. The felony at bar was attended by three aggravating circumstances, to wit:
that the act was committed in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of her
sex, that the act was committed in the dwelling of the offended party (morada) without the
offended party having given any provocation therefor, and that advantage was taken by the
accused and of his companion of their superior strength without any mitigating or extenuating
circumstance to neutralize or offset any of these aggravating circumstance. He is accordingly
sentenced to the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection as mandated by law.
The accused Roland Paraiso is also sentenced to restore unto the heirs or family of the late Lolita
Tigley the sum of P200.00 in cash and the assorted jewelries, wristwatch and Video camera valued
at P179,800.00, which he and his companion stole from Lolita Tigley that afternoon of June 11,
1995 at her dwelling at Lipata, Minglanilla, Cebu. The accused is also ordered to pay moral
damages in the sum of P200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 to the
heirs of the late Lolita Tigley.

18
Costs shall also be taxed against the accused.
May God have mercy on your poor soul, Roland Paraiso.
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant Paraiso raised the following assignment of errors in his brief:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING AND FAILING TO CONSIDER CERTAIN FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEIGHT AND VALUE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE MATERIALLY
ALTERED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS OF FACT WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FLIMSY AND
UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
THE LOWER (COURT) ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The assigned errors are interrelated and the present case hinges on the credibility of witnesses.
Appellant contends that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because there were
facts and circumstances that the court a quo did not consider in his favor and that the evidence
presented by the prosecution is flimsy and unreliable.
In this connection, it bears emphasis that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the
appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court unless some facts and
circumstances may have been overlooked that may otherwise affect the result of the case. For, it is
the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of the witness because of its
superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witness while testifying. 17 As
this Court has invariably held, the opinion of the trial court as to who of the witnesses should be
believed is entitled to great respect. The oft-repeated rationale born of judicial experience is that
the trial judge who heard the witnesses testify and had the occasion to observe their demeanor on
the stand was in a vantage position to determine who of the witnesses deserve credence. 18 Only
the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful
aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. 19 We have thoroughly
examined the records and found nothing that would justify our overturning the findings of the trial
court.
Appellant interposed the defense of alibi which is the weakest of all defenses. For alibi to prosper
as a defense, one must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed
but must also show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime. 20 The second element was not proved; appellant lived with his in-laws at Pakigne,
Minglanilla, Cebu, whose house is just 3 electric posts or 5 houses away from the victims house.
His father-in-law Eustacio Sayson testified that appellant was at home during the fatal
incident. 21 However, alibi becomes unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the
accused himself and his relatives. 22
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a positive identification of the accused made by the prosecution
eyewitness prevails over such a defense of alibi. 23 In the present case, not one, but four (4)
eyewitnesses identified him as one of the robbers. Appellant was positively identified by four (4)
eyewitnesses, namely: Sheila Marie Alipio, Epifanio Tigley, Jr., Ferdinand Tigley and Kim Tigley who
were all present at the scene of the crime.
Appellant contends that in the natural course of human conduct and events, when a person has
been a victim of a crime, it is to be expected that he would immediately inform the police of the
name or identity of the perpetrator. It is appellants contention that if the prosecution eyewitnesses

19
had actually seen and recognized the malefactors, they would have reported the appellant, who is
one of their neighbors, to the police immediately or within a reasonable time after the incident took
place. However, it took the eyewitnesses ten (10) months to identify the appellant as one of the
malefactors and the prosecution never gave any plausible reason for such delay. Appellant avers
that he has been a neighbor of the victim and her family for about seven (7) years and has been
buying items from the store of the victim, and even attended the wake of the late Lolita Tigley for
two or three times.
The contention is untenable.
The witnesses delayed reporting of what they know about the crime does not render their
testimonies false or incredible, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most
people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case. 24 Failure to immediately reveal the
identities of the perpetrators of a crime does not affect, much less impair, the credibility of
witnesses, more so if such delay has been adequately explained. 25 Delay in reporting the crime is
not sufficient to doubt the truthfulness of the accusation. 26 Moreover, there is no standard
behavior for a person confronted with a shocking incident. One may immediately report the
incident to the proper authorities while another, in fear and/or avoiding involvement in a criminal
investigation, may keep to himself what he had witnessed. 27 Others may come forward to reveal
the identity of the perpetrators of the crime only after a lapse of considerable length of time. 28
In this case, it should be noted that immediately after the incident, or on June 13, 1995, the
victims minor children, Epifanio, Jr., Ferdinand and Kim, and niece, Sheila, were invited to the NBI
office in Cebu City where they gave the description of the man with the knife since the victim died
of stab wounds. On June 27, 1995, they returned to the NBI and another cartographic sketch was
made describing the man with the gun. 29 The cartographer made a sketch closely resembling
appellants features.
Moreover, on April 19, 1996, the children went to the Chief of Police at the Minglanilla Municipal
Hall to inform him that the persons arrested in Argao were not the ones who robbed the
victim. 30 When they saw accused-appellant Paraiso at the police station, the children were
frightened; Kim clasped his fists and trembled as he was so angry with the person who killed his
mother. 31
Appellant likewise argues that the eyewitnesses may have been mistaken in identifying him as one
of the perpetrators. The defense insisted that appellant has a look-alike in the person of Roger
Camus, now deceased, who was a suspect in another criminal case for robbery. However, during
the hearing, Sheila gave a vivid description of the perpetrators. The man holding the Batangas
knife was dark-skinned, with protruding Adams apple and his face and forearms bore so many
scars and sporting a flat top haircut, somewhat regular nose. The defense showed a picture of one
Jeffrey Ramil who had a standing warrant of arrest for robbery in another criminal case but Sheila
vehemently insisted that this was not the person holding the Batangas knife. Likewise, the defense
showed the picture of Roger Camus (Exhibit 3) who was confined at the Cebu Provincial Jail but
escaped on May 28, 1995. Sheila insisted that he was not the man who was holding the
gun. 32 Sheilas declaration was further bolstered by the testimony of Epifanio, Jr., who, after being
informed of the importance of his declaration on the life of appellant Paraiso, stated that while the
cartographic sketch which resembles Paraiso (Exhibit B) and the picture of Camus (Exhibit 3)
both have the character of a sunken face, it is the man in the cartographic sketch marked as
Exhibit B, whom he later identified as appellant Paraiso, to be one of the robbers. 33
The Court takes note of the fact that the perpetrators were in the house of the victim for several
minutes so that there was sufficient time for the children to develop some kind of familiarity with
the faces of the assailants. As we have ruled:
Even the stressful condition of the witness when the crime was committed did not dilute the
accuracy of her testimony. In fact, a violent incident such as the one sued upon may even serve as
a catalyst to ones memory. As was said in People v. Campa, their faces would in the very nature of
things, also have been forcefully impinged upon and etched into the witnesses memories by the
acts of ferocity perpetrated before their eyes. 34

20
Most often, the face and body movements of the malefactors create a lasting impression on the
witness mind which cannot be easily erased from his memory. 35 Besides, children of sound mind
are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older
persons; 36 they make the best witnesses, because of their power of observation and recall as well
as their innocence. 37
Appellant argues that as an indication of his innocence, he was never in hiding nor did he leave the
residence of his father-in-law which is only five (5) houses away from the victims house. However,
there is no law or principle which guarantees that non-flight per se is proof, let alone conclusive
proof, of ones innocence. 38
Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, provides that:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Penalties. Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied
by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. . . ..
The essential elements of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide are: (1) the taking
of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property thus
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and,
(4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein used
in a generic sense, was committed. 39 The evidence for the prosecution showed that appellant and
his companion, with a gun and a knife, took possession of personal properties belonging to the
victim, with intent to gain, and on the occasion thereof, the victim was killed. Accordingly, the trial
court was correct in finding appellant Paraiso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The trial court, in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of death appreciated three (3)
aggravating circumstances namely: a) disregard of the respect due the offended party on account
of her sex; b) dwelling; and c) abuse of superior strength.
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended
party, 40 if the latter has not given provocation 41 or if the victim was killed inside his
house. 42 Here, robbery was committed in the house of the victim without provocation on her part.
In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating because in this
class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of
the offended partys house. 43 Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity
of privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him
wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 44
While abuse of superior strength may be considered when there is an inequality of comparative
force between the victim and the aggressor, there must, nonetheless, be a situation of strength
notoriously selected and made use of by the latter in the commission of the crime. 45 What should
be considered is not that there were three, four or more assailants as against one victim, but
whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the
offense. 46 Abuse of strength is present not only when the offenders enjoy numerical superiority, or
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor but also when the
offender uses a powerful weapon which is out of proportion to the defense available to the
offended party. 47 Here, the victim was totally helpless in the face of two (2) perpetrators who were
armed with a gun and a knife.
However, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due to the victim by reason of
her sex cannot be appreciated. This aggravating circumstance can be considered only in crimes
against persons and honor. 48 The special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide is a crime
against property not against persons. 49 Nonetheless, even if such aggravating circumstance could
be considered in this case, it cannot be appreciated because nothing appears in the record from
which it may be presumed that in the commission of the crime, appellant deliberately intended to

21
offend or insult the age or sex of the offended party. Moreover, such an aggravating circumstance
would be absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. 50
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties. Applying
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty that should be imposed is death which is the
maximum provided for by law in the absence of any mitigating circumstance to offset the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and abuse of superior strength. These aggravating
circumstances need not be alleged in the information since they are mere generic aggravating
circumstances which have the effect of increasing the penalty to the maximum period which is
death. 51
As regards the civil liability of appellant, following current jurisprudence, 52 the amount of
P50,000.00 should be awarded as civil indemnity for the death of the victim Lolita Tigley. No other
proof is necessary other than the fact of the death of the victim and the accuseds responsibility
therefor. 53
The award of moral damages is likewise in order. The children of the victim witnessed the crime
that transpired before their very eyes, which resulted to the death of their mother. As candidly
stated by her eldest son Ferdinand, when his mother was killed, he felt anguish and pain. When
asked if his worries and feelings could be translated into cash, he stated that (G)rief and anguish
is not a business proposition to be given monetary value, not even a million will
suffice. 54 However, we reduce the amount of moral damages from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 as
the purpose of this award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for the
injuries to their feelings. 55
In addition, the presence of one or more aggravating circumstances justifies the award of
exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code 56 after proof that the offended party
is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages. 57 The amount of P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages is reasonable in view of the presence of 2 aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and abuse of superior strength, 58 and hence, the award by the trial court is reduced from
P100,000.00 to P50,000,00.
Finally, we likewise modify the award of actual damages. The prosecution eyewitnesses testified
that the victim took out from her pocket the amount of P200.00 which she gave to appellant
Paraiso; this is the only amount she had since she had not yet received the allotment from her
husband who was working as refrigeration mechanic in Cyprus. 59 Jewelries, Rolex and Rado
watches, camera and telescope in the total amount of P179,800.00 were likewise taken by the
robbers 60 and that expenses for the burial amounted to P47,600.00. 61 However, the list of
properties taken by the robbers was prepared by Epifanio Tigley, Sr., husband of the victim, who
was not presented as a prosecution witness. It was the victims son Ferdinand who testified
thereon. And as we have ruled in the case of People vs. Antonio Marcos, 62 an ordinary witness
cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of
goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. The
value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable
demonstration and in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides the selfserving valuation made by the prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for the stolen jewelry.
There is likewise no evidence to establish the value of the telescope and the video camera since no
description as to its kind or model was given by the prosecution witness. Likewise, the list of burial
expenses was prepared by Linda Alipio (wife of Medelino Alipio who is the brother of the
victim) 63 but she was not also presented as a prosecution witness. In both these lists, it was
Ferdinand, the victims eldest son, who testified thereon, hence, the evidence cannot be
considered for being hearsay. 64 Since actual damages is premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence obtainable, 65 the award of actual damages should be reduced to P200.00, as
this is only the amount which was sufficiently proved by the prosecution witnesses.
Four (4) justices of the Court have continued to maintain their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People vs. Echegaray 66 that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect
that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

22
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 26, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 14 in Criminal Case No. CBU-41141 finding accused-appellant Roland Paraiso guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death; P200.00 as
actual damages; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this
case, be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

(6) People vs. Panado, 348 SCRA 679

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ULDARICO PANADO, RONIE PANADO,
RONEL PANADO, JESSIE OQUENDO (At large), JOHN PAUL ELESERIO (At large), and
JOHN DOE (At large), accused.
ULDARICO PANADO, RONIE PANADO AND RONEL PANADO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FOUND GUILTY by the trial court for the killing of Danilo del Rosario and sentenced each
to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of their victim P50,000.00 for actual and compensatory
damages plus the costs, ULDERICO, RONIE and RONEL, all surnamed PANADO, now come to us
on appeal. Placido Panado, a co-accused, was earlier acquitted by the court a quo.
The Information alleges that in the afternoon of 28 June 1997 the above named accused in
conspiracy with JESSIE OQUENDO, JOHN PAUL ELESERIO and JOHN DOE armed with assorted
weapons, treacherously and with abuse of superior strength, attacked and killed Danilo del Rosario.
On 20 October 1997, after conducting a preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Freddie A. Ofialda dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence against Lorenzo de
Pedro, who was initially included in the charge sheet, but found probable cause to hold for trial
accused Uldarico Panado and his three (3) sons Ronie, Ronel and Placido, together with Jessie
Oquendo, John Paul Eleserio and one John Doe. The trial court however did not acquire jurisdiction
over the last three (3) named accused - Jessie Oquendo, John Paul Eleserio and John Doe - as their
whereabouts remained unknown even as Uldarico and his three (3) sons were arraigned.
Hilda del Rosario, a witness for the prosecution, testified that at around 4:30 in the afternoon
of 28 June 1997 she was in her house in Sitio Batuan, Mandong, Batan, Aklan, together with her
husband Danilo del Rosario, who was drinking liquor in their kitchen with his friend Elmer
Sison. Her 10-year old son Louie Gee was outside playing in the yard. While going about her
household chores four (4) armed persons arrived and forthwith surrounded their house. The
intruders were Uldarico Panado, Placido Panado, Jessie Oquendo and Lorenzo de Pedro, although on
cross-examination Hilda mentioned only the names of Uldarico, Placido and Jessie as she failed to
recognize the fourth.[1] With a bolo in hand, Uldarico walked towards the front door while Ronie
Panado challenged her husband Danilo saying, "Danny go out, we will fight."[2]
Meanwhile, Uldarico approached Danny in a threatening manner. Instinctively, Danny stood up
from his perch and stepped back towards a coconut plantation outside his house. But as he
stepped out of his house he was encircled by Ronie, Ronel and John Paul Eleserio. According to
Hilda, she heard Uldarico prodding his companions to kill Danny who continued to step backwards
blindly until he tripped over a barbed wire that sent him stumbling to the ground. Uldarico then
attacked his fallen quarry with a bolo while Ronel stabbed him with a knife. Ronie joined the fray by
smashing Danilos left ear with a stone and Placido and Jessie made sure that their victim could not
escape. Hilda cried helplessly.[3] When asked if she knew of any reason for the killing of her
husband, she surmised that it could be a long-standing grudge between Danilo and the Panados
which started when the latter accused her husband of conspiring with a certain Atty. Hernando
Cortes to assassinate them.
Dr. Cornelio Cuachon testified that the post-mortem examination conducted on the cadaver of
Danilo del Rosario yielded the following results: (a) a stab wound located at the right side of the
chest and another stab wound at the left chest just below the nipple both of which could have been
caused by a knife or a bolo; (b) a lacerated wound which was probably caused by a blunt object;
(c) an avulsion which could have been caused by either a piece of wood, an iron bar, a fist blow, or
even by a stone; and, (d) the cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to stab wound. [4]
Elmer Sison testified that on the day of the incident while he and Danilo were drinking liquor
at the kitchen (described by the witness as open and not enclosed by a wall) of the latter's house,
he saw Ronie, John Paul, Jessie alias "Toti" and Placido arrive. The four (4) immediately surrounded

23
Danilo's house. Sensing that trouble was brewing, Elmer warned his drinking buddy not to go out
and then hastily left towards the river nearby.[5]
Louie Gee, the 10-year old son of Danilo, identified the accused Uldarico, Ronel, Placido,
Jessie, John Paul and Ronie as the persons who surrounded and killed his father. He particularly
pointed to Ronel as the one who stabbed his father, and Ronie who smashed his father's face with
a stone. He could still recall how he ran in terror towards his grandfathers house when he saw the
accused taking turns in hitting his father. [6]
Nathaniel Montao, testifying for the defense, said that at around 4:00 in the afternoon of the
day of the killing he saw Danilo poking a gun at Lorenzo de Pedro who was already on his
knees. Danilo fired his gun twice at Lorenzo but missed. He further testified that Ulderico, Placido,
Ronie, and Ronel were then at the Poblacion after having been hired to do some carpentry work. [7]
Nathaniel Montaos testimony was corroborated by Juanito Panado, the alleged employer, who
testified that on the fateful day of 28 June 1997 Uldarico, Ronie and Ronel were at his house doing
some repairs. They reported for work at 6:45 in the morning of that day, which
he remembered to be a Saturday since there were no classes. The three (3) workers left at 5:45 in
the afternoon after receiving their weeks wages. He also noted two (2) other workers, Jessie
Oquendo and John Paul Eleserio, who left earlier in the afternoon. [8]
Montao's testimony was further substantiated by Teresita Francisco, a neighbor of Juanito
Panado, who confirmed the presence of Uldarico, Ronie and Ronel in Juanitos house on 28 June
1997. Teresita was certain that the three (3) accused left after 5:00 in the afternoon of that day. As
to Jessie and John Paul, she did not see them in Juanitos house on the day of the incident. [9]
In his defense, Placido Panado swore that on 28 June 1997 he was fetched by his Lola
Francisca (Francisca Cortez) at 9:00 o'clock in the morning to repair the roof of her kitchen. He
started working at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and finished at 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the
same day. When he got home he saw his father Uldarico and his brothers Ronel and Ronie who had
just arrived from a construction project. Placido's testimony was corroborated by his Lola Francisca
who confirmed his presence at her house to repair her roof and that he stayed until 7:00 o'clock in
the evening after taking his supper. [10]
Taking the witness stand, Uldarico testified that at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of the
day of the killing, he, together with his sons Ronie and Ronel, was at the residence of Juanito
Panado renovating the latters house. He recalled that on that day they worked from 7:00
o'clock in the morning to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Although they finished their work at 5:00
o'clock, they stayed a bit longer because it was payday and they still had to discuss with Juanito
certain matters concerning their next work schedule. On their way home, Ronel rode his own
bicycle while he (Uldarico) rode on another bicycle with Ronie as his backrider. Upon reaching their
house in Barangay Mandong, Batan, he was accosted by SPO1 Teresito Chagas who asked him
about a supposed fighting incident in the vicinity. He denied any knowledge of the same. When
asked whether he had anything to do with the death of Danilo del Rosario, he disclaimed any
involvement in the killing. On 29 June 1997 he and his sons were invited to the police precinct
where their fingerprints were taken without any investigation.He testified further that he knew John
Paul, Jessie and even Lorenzo because they would come to visit their barangay every now and
then.
Lorenzo de Pedro also took the witness stand to rebut the testimony of Nathaniel Montao that
he (Lorenzo) was shot twice by Danilo del Rosario. According to Lorenzo, the truth was that on 28
June 1997 at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon he was inside his grandmothers house when he
heard shouts. When he went outside he saw Uldarico, Ronel, Ronie and Placido chasing and later
slaying Danilo del Rosario. On cross-examination, while admitting having heard shouts he
nevertheless denied having heard gunshots on the day of the killing.
As sur-rebuttal witnesses, the defense presented Vito Baldonado and Thelma
Panado. Vito Baldonado narrated that on 28 June 1997, while on his way to a certain
agrarian employee, he saw Danilo del Rosario poking a gun at Lorenzo de Pedro who was kneeling
beside the road.[11] This testimony was echoed by Thelma Panado who disclosed that she also saw
the deceased poking a gun at Lorenzo.[12]
On 26 January 1998 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision finding Uldarico, Ronie and
Ronel guilty of murder and sentencing each to reclusion perpetua. Placido Panado however was
acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence while the case against accused Jessie Oquendo, John Paul
Eleserio and John Doe was archived for failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
[13]

Explaining its Decision the lower court opined that prosecution witnesses Hilda del Rosario, her
10-year old son Louie Gee, and Elmer Sison clearly and positively showed the circumstances
regarding the death of Danilo del Rosario and the persons who inflicted the injuries that caused his
death. The alibi of the accused was rejected in view of the positive identification of the
accused. With respect to the attendant circumstances, the lower court said The information alleged that the accused conspired, confederated with and helped one another, in
killing Danny del Rosario with treachery and abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime to
murder x x x x Treachery is present when two conditions concur: a) the employment of means,
methods or manner of execution which would ensure the offenders safety from any offensive or
retaliatory act on the part of the offended party which means that no opportunity was given to the
latter to do so; and b) that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously chosen x x x x Prosecutions evidence showed that the accused Uldarico Panado, Ronie
Panado, Ronel Panado and their other companions were armed, hence, there was clearly an
inequality of forces between their group and Danny del Rosario who was unarmed and left alone by

24
his drinking companion, Elmer Sison. Decidedly, the accused assumed a situation of superiority of
strength which they took advantage of in the commission of the crime.
As to the allegation of conspiracy, the lower court said x x x the prosecution was able to prove that the accused Uldarico Panado, Ronel Panado, and Ronie
Panado, were of one mind in attacking Danny del Rosario. As seen in the chain of circumstances in
the commission of the crime, from the time they surrounded the house of Danny del Rosario, all
armed, with Ronie Panado shouting Danny, come and we will fight to their surrounding Danny when
he ran to the coconut plantation, then Uldaricos shout to kill Danny when they surrounded him and
ultimately stabbing him when he stepped on the barbed wire and fell helpless on the ground, then
Ronel stabbing him with a knife and Ronie striking him with a stone on his right ear with such force
as to cause a portion of that ear to be detached, there was a clear unity of criminal purpose and
intention to kill Danny del Rosario x x x x.[14]
Accused-appellants now interpose this appeal on these grounds First. The lower court committed grave error in disbelieving the allegation that a shooting
incident involving Danilo del Rosario and Lorenzo de Pedro had preceded the killing. By foisting this
allegation, accused-appellants insinuate that Lorenzo not only had the motive but was in a better
position than accused-appellants to commit the crime imputed to them.
We are not persuaded by the defense. Lorenzo de Pedro himself categorically denied on
rebuttal the claim that the victim had poked a gun at him and even corroborated the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses on the identity of the killers. Besides, he was exonerated by
the prosecution witnesses themselves who, if indeed they had witnessed the actual killing, would
not have hesitated to point to Lorenzo instead of passing on the blame to accused-appellants. [15]
Second. The lower court committed reversible error in finding that the victims widow had no
improper motive to testify against accused-appellants. They argue that Hilda herself revealed that
her family had ill motives against them when she categorically admitted in her testimony that
there was animosity between them and the deceased after the latter was accused of conniving
with Atty. Cortes to kill them.
The contention is devoid of merit. The general rule is that proof of motive is unnecessary to
impute a crime on the accused if the evidence of identification is convincing; a converso, where the
proof concerning the identification of the accused is unclear, then proof of motive is of paramount
necessity.[16] Accused-appellants were not only positively identified by one (1) but four (4)
prosecution witnesses, namely, Hilda del Rosario, her son Louie Gee, their family friend Elmer Sison
and Lorenzo de Pedro. Granting that Hilda was not in good terms with accused-appellants, how can
we now account for the other witnesses, particularly the last two (2) witnesses, whose motives
were never put in issue? In pinpointing accused-appellants as the killers of her husband, the
victims widow was impelled by no other reason than to bring the culprits to justice. Having
witnessed the violent death of her husband, it would be insensitive and callous on her part not to
charge properly her husband killers knowing fully well who they were, and to fabricate instead
charges against innocent persons.
Third. Accused-appellants would make much of the alleged inconsistent and contradictory
statements of the prosecution witnesses with respect to the exact number of the assailants as well
as their identities. According to them, Hilda allegedly identified seven (7) of the attackers while her
son Louie Gee, although substantially corroborating his mothers testimony, identified only six (6) of
them, and even asserted, contrary to his mothers claim, that Lorenzo de Pedro was not at the
scene of the crime. To underscore these alleged contradictions, they point out that Elmer Sison
mentioned only four (4) of the malefactors.
Again, we do not agree. A meticulous reading of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
will reveal no conflicting, contradictory or impossible statements which could erode their
credibility. The three (3) prosecution witnesses saw the killing from different angles or vantage
points and in various stages. Hilda was inside the house with her husband Danilo when she saw the
assailants from the time they arrived and surrounded their house until they ganged up on her
husband and killed him. Louie Gee on the other hand was playing in the yard when the incident
commenced but hid himself and ran to his grandfathers house as the crime unfolded. Elmer Sison
for his part witnessed only the initial stages of the crime but did not see the actual killing as he ran
out of the house when he sensed the impending trouble. Contrary to accused-appellants belief, it
would elicit a suspicion of a rehearsed testimony if the declarations of all the prosecution witnesses
jibed in every detail despite the differences in their locations when the terrifying spectacle
happened.
With respect to Lorenzo de Pedro, it was established at the preliminary investigation that he
was at the scene of the crime not as participant but as a mere passive onlooker. The records do not
disclose that he actively participated in the killing. He narrated that when he noticed the
commotion outside his grandmothers house, he immediately went down and proceeded towards
Danilos house where he saw the accused chasing the victim. Thereafter, he returned to his house
for fear that he might get involved. This explains why he was initially seen by Hilda with the
attackers but was never seen by Louie Gee in the company of his fathers killers.
Finally, Accused-appellants assail the lower courts ruling giving no credence to their defense
of alibi. According to them, the defense witnesses testified in a positive, straightforward and
consistent
manner
even
during
cross-examination. They
insist
that
while
such
defensecan easily be fabricated, it is not always false and without merit, especially when
juxtaposed with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the prosecutions evidence. Accusedappellants further clarified that although non-flight by itself is not conclusive proof of

25
innocence, "the concatenation of the circumstances in this case conduces to the inevitably logical
and favorable consideration pointing to their innocence."A pathetic excuse, to say the least.
The rule is, positive identification which if categorical and consistent and without any showing
of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial
which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. [17] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that
accused-appellants were somewhere else when the crime was committed but it must likewise be
demonstrated that they were so far away that they could not have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [18] The evidence for the
defense showed that the house of Juanito Panado, where accused-appellants were alleged to have
been during the day, was only half a kilometer or at most a kilometer away according to Uldarico
Panado from their house which was near the house of the deceased, and with a bicycle it would
only take them about ten (10) minutes to negotiate.
All told, accused-appellants were not only positively identified in broad daylight as the
perpetrators of the crime, but they also miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility of their
presence at the time of its commission.
As regards damages, there is need to modify the award by the trial court. In fixing the amount
of P50,000.00 for actual or compensatory damages, it appears to have been based on the claim of
the widow that the heirs incurred burial and funeral expenses. But Art. 2199 of the Civil Code
explicitly requires that, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled only to such
pecuniary loss as he has duly proved. In the instant case, aside from the assertion of the widow
that he spent P9,000.00 for the coffin of the deceased, no documentary evidence was presented to
prove that burial or funeral expenses were actually incurred. However, from her own testimony she
claimed that the receipt for the purchase of the coffin was delivered to the Social Security System
(SSS) to support her claim for reimbursement. In fact, according to her, she was expecting to be
reimbursed P12,000.00 for her funeral expenses. The amount should more than make up for
theP9,000.00 she allegedly spent for the coffin of her husband. With regard to her other funeral
expenses, the widow failed to prove them with competent evidence.
Nonetheless, the heirs are entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased Danilo del Rosario. The absence of documentary evidence to support such claim does not
preclude its recovery. The testimony of the victims wife, Hilda del Rosario, as to the earning
capacity of her husband during his lifetime sufficiently cures this deficiency. [19] Danilo del Rosario
was thirty-seven (37) years old at the time of his death. His average income as fishpond caretaker
was P3,000.00 a month. Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table, the loss of
earning capacity must be computed as follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus age of the deceased).
[20]
Since Danilo was 37 years of age at the time of his death, then his life expectancy was 28.66
years. Thus Net Earning = Life x Gross - Reasonable &
Capacity (x) Expectancy Annual Necessary
Income Living Expenses
(x) = 2(80-37) x (P36,000 - P18,000)
3
(x) = 28.66 x P18,000
(x) = P 514,800.00[21]
On the award of moral damages, this Court is convinced that the prosecution has amply
demonstrated that the heirs suffered mental anguish to justify this award. Current jurisprudence
has set moral damages at P50,000.00. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to rethink our policy on
moral damages.
Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the
heirs of the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as borne out by human
nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and
anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or
brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them
forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an
injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering. Verily, Hilda and her son
Louie Gee would forever carry the emotional wounds of the vicious killing of a husband and a
father. With or without proof, this fact can never be denied; since it is undisputed, it must be
considered proved.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants ULDARICO
PANADO, RONIE PANADO AND RONEL PANADO guilty of Murder and sentencing each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONthat they are
likewise ordered jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Danilo del
Rosario P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,P50,000.00 as moral damages and P514,800.00 for the loss
of his earning capacity. Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
(7) People vs. Caniezo, 354 SCRA 335

26
THE

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
SALAZAR, accused-appellant.

vs. JOEL

CANIEZO

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated May 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33, Siniloan, Laguna, finding accused-appellant Joel Caniezo guilty of rape and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the victim, Sheila Aninao, the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 5, 1995 at Barangay Santiago,
Municipality of Sta. Maria, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Sheila Aninao 21 years of age against
her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty [3] to the charge, whereupon trial
ensued.

[5]

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Sheila Aninao, [4] Apolinario Manalo,
Primitiva Aninao,[6] and Maxima Esconde.[7] Their testimonies established the following facts:

At around 4 oclock in the afternoon of November 5, 1995, while Sheila Aninao was sweeping
the front yard of her house at Brgy. Santiago, Sta. Maria, Laguna, accused-appellant Joel Caniezo
arrived and told her that her friend Binay Alvis had something to give her. Binay and accusedappellant lived in the house of a certain Mrs. Tuvera. Binay was the caretaker of Mrs. Tuveras citrus
plantation. Sheilas mother, Primitiva, gave her daughter permission to go with accused-appellant,
whereupon Sheila and accused-appellant left together to go to Mrs. Tuveras house. [8]
When Sheila and accused-appellant arrived in Mrs. Tuveras house, she found no one there, but
accused-appellant prodded Sheila to get inside the house. There, accused-appellant held her by the
right arm and, pointing a bolo to her side, told her not to shout or he would kill her. She shouted for
help, but nobody responded. Sheila struggled out of accused-appellants grasp and was able to run
for about half a kilometer when she tripped and fell down. As a result, accused-appellant caught
her and dragged her towards Mrs. Tuveras citrus plantation about 25 meters from her (Mrs.
Tuveras) house. The citrus plantation, about a kilometer from Mrs. Tuveras nearest neighbor, was
deserted. Accused-appellant boxed her in the stomach, causing her to fall flat on her back. He then
knocked her head on a big rock behind her, causing her to lose consciousness. When she came to,
she found herself naked and felt pain in her vagina, which was bleeding.
Accused-appellant was beside her and warned her not to shout, otherwise he would kill her
and her family. After Sheila got dressed, accused-appellant accompanied her to the house of her
godmother, Maxima Esconde, who was Mrs. Tuveras nearest neighbor. Accused-appellant then
left. At her godmothers house, Sheila related the incident to three of her kinakapatid who took her
to her house and reported the matter to her mother Primitiva.
Primitiva took Sheila to the barangay hall and reported the incident to the barangay captain,
Apolinario Manalo, who ordered the Bantay Bayan to look for accused-appellant. However, he could
not be found.[9] A warrant for his arrest was issued on November 22, 1995 by the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Mabitac, Laguna,[10] but he was not arrested until January 17, 1996 in his house in
Brgy. Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.[11]
Accused-appellant was a farm laborer at Mrs. Tuveras plantation and had been staying at the
latters house for approximately two months before the incident. He was introduced to the victim by

27
his common-law wife, Zenaida Madez, on November 2, 1995, three days prior to the incident,
although Sheila had already known him for two weeks before that. Sheilas mother, Primitiva, knew
accused-appellant as he used to pass by their place and even eat in their house. Sheilas
godmother, Maxima Esconde, also knew him since she used to visit Mrs. Tuvera. [12]
Sheila was examined by Dr. Cynthia Tamares, Rural Health Physician of Sta. Maria, Laguna, on
November 6, 1995. Dr. Tamares issued a medical certificate, dated November 8, 1995 (Exh. A),
showing the following findings:
General Trauma (extragenital): unremarkable
Genital Trauma:
Perineum and vulva: with areas of swelling and congestion
Hymen: swollen and congested; lacerations noted at 3:00 oclock, 6:00 oclock, and 9:00 oclock
positions respectively; hematoma seen at 3:00 oclock position.
Vagina: on insertion of 1 finger at 6:00 oclock position, pressing the posterior fornix, oozing
blood can be seen accompanied by brownish discharge; upon insertion of only 1 finger
tenderness can be [elicited] from the patient as seen in her facial expression.
Psychological evaluation of the patient: patient is conscious, responsive to questions, but there are
moments when depressive mood can be seen in her facial expression. [13]
Based on her finding that there were tears and lacerations in the hymen, while the vagina was
swollen and congested, Dr. Tamares opined that Sheila had been sexually molested. [14]
Accused-appellants defense was alibi. He claimed that on November 5, 1995, he was in his
house at Brgy. Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal. He claimed that he worked nearly the whole day gathering
wood on Lucina Buldas land and making charcoal. In the afternoon, he was joined by his commonlaw-wife Zenaida and their youngest child. They made the wood they had gathered into
charcoal. At about 3:30 p.m., they stopped working as Lucina invited them to the birthday party of
her granddaughter. Except for accused-appellant and Zenaida, only immediate family members
were present at the party. Lucinas son, Ruben, accused-appellant, and Zenaida had a drinking
session which lasted until 7 or 8 oclock in the evening. Accused-appellant and Zenaida then went
home to sleep.[15]
Accused-appellants common-law wife, Zenaida Madez, [16] and Lucina Bulda[17] corroborated his
alibi. Zenaida had been his live-in partner for 11 years. [18] Lucina Bulda had been a close friend of
the couple for a long time, as both Lucina and accused-appellant were from Bicol. In fact, it was at
the request of Lucina that accused-appellant and his family moved near Lucinas property at Tanay,
Rizal to help her in her charcoal business.[19]
Accused-appellant denied ever being at Brgy. Santiago, Sta. Maria, Laguna. He also
maintained that he had never met the victim Sheila nor the latters godmother, Maxima
Esconde. However, he admitted meeting the victims mother, Primitiva, at the house of a Mr. Sta.
Cruz at Brgy. Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, because the latter gave his pigs to accused-appellant to raise
and take care of. Mr. Sta. Cruz, an uncle of Mrs. Tuvera, acted as an agent for Primitiva in the sale
of certain properties. Accused-appellant denied having any misunderstanding with Primitiva or with
her daughter Sheila. He did not know why Sheila should file a complaint for rape against him. [20]
After trial, the trial court rendered its decision on May 25, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOEL CANIEZO y
SALAZAR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE committed against private
complainant Sheila Aninao, hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua; to pay the victim the sum
ofP50,000.00 for moral damages; and to pay the cost.

28
Accused Joel Caniezo y Salazar being a detained prisoner, it is hereby ordered that he be credited
with the full length of his preventive imprisonment if he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoner, otherwise, he shall be credited with
4/5 of the period he had undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE WITHOUT HIS GUILT HAVING BEEN PROVE[N] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [22]
First. Accused-appellant contends that, contrary to Sheilas claim that she had been boxed in
the stomach and her head hit against a rock, Dr. Tamares certified that the physical examination of
the victim showed no injuries in the head and other parts of the body, except her genitalia.
Accused-appellants contention is without merit. A blow on the head may not necessarily
produce a wound.[23] In this case, Sheila stated in her sworn statement that the blow she received
on her head, although it caused her to lose consciousness, was not too strong. [24] In addition, with
respect to the blow on her abdomen, the absence of any external injury does not preclude the use
of force. Indeed, according to medical authorities, when force is applied on the stomach, no marks
may be detected.[25] This explains the absence of bruises on Sheilas stomach. If there were other
bruises on the other parts of Sheilas body, it was also possible that they were not yet visible at the
time of the medical examination, which was conducted approximately 16 hours after the
incident. This is why it is sometimes suggested that a second examination of the victim be made
after an interval of one or two days to detect bruising which may have only been indicated
originally by tenderness on pressure or slight swelling. [26] This was not done in this case.
In any event, the absence of external signs of physical injuries does not prove that rape was
not committed by accused-appellant as proof thereof is not an essential element of rape. [27]
Second. Accused-appellant contends that the claim of Sheila and her mother that they
completely trusted him even if they had known him for only two weeks is contrary to human nature
and is thus doubtful.
We do not agree with accused-appellants contention. Sheila and her mother did not have to
completely trust accused-appellant for Sheila to agree to go with him to Mrs. Tuveras
house. Accused-appellant represented to Sheila and her mother that Binay wanted Sheila to come
to Mrs. Tuveras house as she (Binay) had something to give her. Sheila went with accusedappellant because she believed that Binay was in the house of Mrs. Tuvera. Sheila and her mother
had no reason to suspect that accused-appellant had any evil design on the victim. They knew that
he was a laborer in the plantation of Mrs. Tuvera, whom they knew very well, and that he was living
in the latters house with Binay. Thus, Sheila and her mother trusted accused-appellant to the
extent of believing him when he told them that Binay was calling for Sheila to go to Mrs. Tuveras
house.
Third. Accused-appellant points out the inconsistencies between Sheilas sworn statement and
testimony in open court, to wit:
1. She testified that her head was banged twice against a rock, causing her to lose
consciousness, while in her sworn statement, she claimed that her head was knocked
on a rock only once and not so hard, but still caused her to lose consciousness;
2. She declared in open court that she was boxed on the stomach while in her sworn
statement, she said that she was boxed at the side of her body;
3. She testified that accused-appellant dragged her to the citrus plantation, about 4
meters from Mrs. Tuveras house, but later retracted and said that it was 25 meters.

29
The inconsistencies concern minor matters. It must be remembered that testimonies during
trial are more detailed and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements. The latter are often
inaccurate due, in part, to suggestion or want of specific inquiries. [28] Moreover, victims of rape are
not expected to have an errorless recollection of the incident which is so humiliating and painful
that they might in fact be trying to obliterate it from their memory. [29]What is important is that
Sheila was consistent in saying that she was boxed in the abdomen and that her head was knocked
on a rock, causing her to lose consciousness.
As to Sheilas uncertainty regarding the distance between Mrs. Tuveras house and her citrus
plantation, her testimony only shows that she does not know how to measure distances. This is
clear from the following portion of her testimony:
Q How far is that citrus plantation from the house of the accused?
A More or less 4 meters.
Court.
How far?
Interpreter.
From here up to the stair of the Municipal Building, a distance of about 25 meters more or less.
[30]

It is clear that it was the interpreter who measured the distance of 25 meters based on Sheilas
rough estimate of distances in the municipal building.
In any event, accused-appellant should have confronted Sheila with her prior inconsistent
statements and given her a chance to explain the alleged inconsistencies as required by Rule 132,
13. As accused-appellant did not do so in this case, he should not now be allowed to raise this
matter on appeal.[31]
Fourth. Accused-appellant claims that it is against common experience for witness Maxima
Esconde, Sheilas godmother, to know him when he had stayed at Mrs. Tuveras house for only two
months, and yet not know the name of her neighbor, Mrs. Tuveras previous laborer, who had
stayed at Mrs. Tuveras house for more than a year.
Accused-appellants contention has no merit. Maxima testified that she knew accusedappellant because she used to visit Mrs. Tuvera, who was her neighbor. She said:
Q What is the name of the former laborer of Mrs. Tuvera who went home to Zambales?
A His name is Boy, I do not know his surname.
Q How long did this Boy stay in the property of Mrs. Tuvera before Joel Caniezo arrived?
A He was there a long time already. I cannot remember the date when he came there.
Q Is it more than a year before Joel Caniezo arrived?
A Maybe more than that, sir.[32]
It is clear that Maxima also knew the previous laborer at Mrs. Tuveras farm. The fact that she was
uncertain about the period of the former laborers stay but certain about accused-appellants is
explained by the fact that, first, she was neither a resident in Mrs. Tuveras house nor a laborer in
the citrus plantation. She was merely an occasional visitor. Second, the laborers stay in Mrs.
Tuveras house was longer and earlier than that of the accused-appellant. Third, accused-appellants
stay was shorter, more recent, and more controversial, thus magnifying in her mind every
encounter she had with him.

30
Fifth. The trial court was correct in rejecting accused-appellants denial and alibi. It is well
settled that denial and alibi are the weakest of defenses as they are not only self-serving evidence,
but they are also easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. [33] Where, as in this case, the denial and
alibi are established mainly by the testimonies of accused-appellant himself and his friends, there
is more reason to disregard their probative value, especially considering the victims and the other
witnesses positive identification of accused-appellant as the malefactor. [34]
However, the trial court erred in stating in its decision that the imposable penalty on accusedappellant ranges from reclusion perpetua to death.Under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, this
particular range of penalty may be imposed only when rape is committed with a deadly weapon
and is alleged in the information.[35] As the circumstance of use of deadly weapon was not alleged
in the information, it can only be considered a generic qualifying circumstance. Accordingly, the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. This penalty cannot be modified by the aggravating
circumstance mentioned considering the provision of Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that a single indivisible penalty must be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances which may have attended the commission of the crime.
The trial court also erred in not awarding civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages to the victim, Sheila Aninao. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
rape.[36] Exemplary damages may also be awarded as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as provided by Art. 2230 of the Civil Code.
[37]
Hence, in addition to the moral damages amounting toP50,000.00, the victim should also be
awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount
of P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Siniloan, Laguna, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and is ordered to pay civil indemnity to complainant Sheila Aninao in the amount
of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages amounting to P20,000.00, in addition to the amount
of P50,000.00 for moral damages which he was ordered to pay to complainant by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.

(8) People vs. Galvez, 355 SCRA 246

THE

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
ESTANISLAO, accused-appellant.

vs. MANUEL

GALVEZ y

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated November 18, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City, finding accused-appellant Manuel Galvez y Estanislao guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the legal heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual
damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
The information against accused-appellant Galvez alleged
That on or about the 9th day of May 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a bladed weapon on the back portion of his body one
ROMEN CASTRO y BROQUISA, which injuries eventually caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
As accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, the trial court proceeded with trial on
the merits.[3]

31
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Danilo Julia, Dr. Ludovico Lagat, Arturo
Saligumba, Reynaldo Castro, Loreto Palad, Alvin Adolfo, SPO2 Vivencio Gamboa, and PO3 Feliciano
Almojuela. On the other hand, the defense presented Elmer Aguilar, accused-appellant Galvez,
Edwin Mangalabanan, SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo, Elena Javier, and Epida Galvez as its witnesses.
The prosecution evidence established the following facts:
At around 11:30 in the evening of May 9, 1998, Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad, and Alvin Adolfo
were at a local fair inside the DM Compound in Heroes del 98, Caloocan City. Danilo Julia was
playing bingo, while Loreto Palad, Alvin Adolfo, and the victim Romen Castro [4] were playing a game
where they would throw 25 centavo coins in one of the stalls. Loreto Palad was on the left side
facing the stall, while Romen Castro was on his left side. Danilo Julia was around three meters
away. After a while, five men arrived, including accused-appellant Manuel Galvez. Two of the men
approached Romen Castro, while the other two men served as lookouts. Accused-appellant Manuel
Galvez then went up directly to Romen Castro and stabbed him at the back with a knife. Accusedappellant afterward threw the knife away and then fled with his companions. Loreto Palad saw
Romen Castro fall to the ground, seriously wounded. With the help of Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad took
the victim to the Ospital ng Caloocan, where he was declared dead on arrival. Danilo and Loreto
then informed the relatives of the victim that the latter had died. Danilo Julia did not know Galvezs
companions but he was able to recognize accused-appellant because the place where the stabbing
took place was well-lighted. The other prosecution witness, Alvin Adolfo, was around three arm
lengths away from Castro and Galvez and saw the entire incident. [5]
On the other hand, PO3 Feliciano Almojuela testified that he was on duty on the night of May
9, 1998 when he received a report of the incident. He and another policeman, SPO1 Edgardo
Mendoza, went to the Caloocan City General Hospital to view the body of the victim and later
proceeded to the scene of the crime where they found bloodstains on the cemented pavement
near the gate of the DM Compound. Upon investigation, they learned that the assailant of Romen
Castro was accused-appellant Manuel Galvez. They were not able to arrest Galvez for lack of
knowledge of his whereabouts.[6]
Reynaldo Castro, brother of the victim, testified that the day after his brothers death, two
policemen arrived in his house with accused-appellant Galvez. Reynaldo Castro told them,
however, that accused-appellant Galvez was not the one who stabbed his brother and should be
released. The policemen, therefore, left and allowed Galvez to go. A few minutes after they had
left, the people inside Reynaldo Castros house began talking and told Reynaldo that accusedappellant Galvez was the one who had stabbed Romen Castro. Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad, Armando
Rufo, and Alvin Adolfo, who were then in the house of Reynaldo Castro, pointed to accusedappellant Galvez as Romens assailant. At the instance of Reynaldo, Arturo Saligumba, a barangay
tanod, apprehended Manuel Galvez.
Arturo Saligumba admitted that Reynaldo did not have personal knowledge of Galvezs
culpability but was only told by others about the stabbing.Saligumba explained that it was the
policeman who actually arrested Galvez, and that he only took the latter to the headquarters. [7]
Saligumbas testimony was corroborated by SPO2 Vivencio Gamboa, investigator of the Station
Investigation Division of the Caloocan City police, who testified that Barangay Tanod Saligumba
turned over accused-appellant Galvez to him for investigation. Gamboa was the one who took the
statements of Danilo Julia (Exh. A), Alvin Adolfo (Exh. H), Loreto Palad, Armando Rufo, Arturo
Saligumba (Exh. F), and Maribel Osea, sister of the victim (Exh. G). He also prepared the referral
slip, dated May 10, 1998, for filing of the case for inquest proceedings (Exh. I).
On cross-examination, Gamboa explained that the statements of the witnesses were prepared
only when accused-appellant Galvez was already in the custody of the police authorities. From the
time he was brought to the police station, accused-appellant had been under detention, having
been committed to the Caloocan City Jail during the inquest. Accused-appellant had not been
released because no bail was recommended considering the charge against him. Gamboa stated
that Saligumba did not tell him that Galvez was arrested on mere suspicion. Gamboa narrated that
there were six suspects in the stabbing of Romen Castro, but they could not be found in their
respective residences at the time of the initial investigation. Accused-appellant no longer had the
opportunity to file his counter-affidavit as he was apprehended a day after the incident. During

32
Gamboas cross-examination, the prosecution stipulated that there was no warrant of arrest at the
time Galvez was taken into custody by Saligumba. Gamboa also testified that there had been
efforts to arrest the other suspects who were still at large. On re-direct examination, Gamboa
explained that they inquired about the knife used by the assailant, but it could not be found
because the incident occurred at nighttime. When questioned by the trial court, Gamboa also
stated that he asked accused-appellant Galvez where the knife was, but the latter invoked his right
to remain silent. During his investigation, Gamboa relied on the report of Almojuela and the
affidavits executed by the witnesses.[8]
Dr. Ludovico Lagat, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted an
autopsy on the body of Romen Castro. His report contained the following findings:
Postmortem rigidity, complete.
Pallor, generalized.
Livid, back.
Abrasions: 3.0 x 2.0 cm., forehead; 5.0 x 2.0 cm., left cheek; 3.0 x 3.0 cms., naso-labial area; 3.5 x
2.0 cm., left ante-cubital area; 4.0 x 1.5 cms., right scapular area; 1.0 x 0.3 cm., right lumbar area;
3.0 x 6.0 cms., left knee.
Stab wound: 3.0 cm., clean cut edges; with a sharp and blunt extremity; elliptical; located at the
left lumbar area; 11.0 cm., from the posterior median line; directed forward downward and
medially; involving the skin and underlying soft tissues; into the retroperitoneum; penetrating the
left kidney (thru and thru); then entering the peritoneal cavity; and into the abdominal aorta; with
a depth 10.0 cms.
Retroperitoneal hemorrhage, massive.
Visceral organs, pale.
Stomach, small amount of partially digested food particles. [9]
Dr. Lagat testified that only one stab wound was found on the body of the victim, although the
latter also sustained several abrasions. The stab wound at the back was the fatal wound, as the
kidney and the aorta were both damaged by it. According to Dr. Lagat, the stab wound was
caused by a pointed sharp-bladed instrument, such as a knife. From the direction of the stab
wound, which was from the back going forward, Dr. Lagat concluded that the assailant was at the
back of the victim when the latter was stabbed. On cross-examination, Dr. Lagat stated that any
injury found on the hands, such as the abrasions suffered by the victim in this case, could be
considered defense wounds. Upon inquiry by the trial court, however, he explained further that the
abrasions found on the victim could have been inflicted by the assailant or caused by the impact as
the victim fell to the ground after he had been stabbed. [10]
It was stipulated during Reynaldo Castros testimony that the family of the victim
incurred P30,000.00 as actual damages for Romen Castros wake andfuneral expenses. Reynaldo
likewise testified that Romen Castro was a construction worker earning a daily wage of P150.00 at
the time of his death.[11]
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf, denying the allegations against him. He claimed that
he was at his familys store in Monumento, Caloocan City on the night of May 9, 1998 and went
home at around 11oclock in the evening to 1052 DM Compound, Caloocan City. He said that after
eating supper he went out and had a talk with a neighbor until 12 midnight near their house. Their
house was near the place where the fair was located, around a block away. He heard that a stonethrowing incident occurred that night but only learned that someone had been stabbed the
following day. He said that at around 9 oclock in the morning of that day, two policemen went to his
house and told him that he was suspected of stabbing Romen Castro. They asked him to
accompany them to Reynaldo Castros house. To clear his name, accused-appellant agreed to do so
but, upon arriving thereat, the people in the house told the policemen that he was not the one who
killed Romen Castro because the one who did so was fair-complexioned and short. Although

33
allegedly released, he was later forced by a barangay tanod to board a taxi and go to the police
headquarters in Sangandaan, Caloocan City. There, he was told that he was a suspect in the killing
of Romen Castro. He was not shown a warrant when he was arrested nor was he interviewed by the
policemen at the headquarters.[12]
Elmer Aguilar, another witness for the defense, testified that he was at the fair at around
11:30 in the evening of May 9, 1998 when Romen Castro arrived. According to Aguilar, after Romen
Castros enemies arrived, a commotion ensued, with these people throwing stones and pieces of
wood at the victim and the latter retaliating. Romen Castro tried to run, but his attackers, around
five in all, were able to catch up with him, and he was stabbed by one of them on his left
buttock. After stabbing their victim, the group ran away. Aguilar said that he did not see accusedappellant at the local fair that night and that the latter was not one of those who attacked and
killed Romen Castro.[13]
Corroborating accused-appellants testimony are his neighbor Edwin Mangalabanan, his aunt
Elena Javier, and his mother Epida Galvez. Edwin Mangalabanan claimed that he was in front of his
house and exchanging stories with accused-appellant Manuel Galvez and another companion,
Bensyo, from 11 oclock in the evening to 12 midnight of May 9, 1998. They learned from passersby
that someone was stabbed inside the DM Compound, but they did not know who the victim was.
[14]
Elena Javier recalled that at around 11:15 in the evening of May 9, 1998, she passed by a sarisari store to buy something on her way home from a miting de avance. While walking towards the
store, around 60 to 70 meters from the fair, she heard a person shouting that someone had been
stabbed. At the store, she saw Manuel Galvez buying a cigarette. Accused-appellant was with
someone named Dencio and a person whom Elena Javier did not know. Elena told Galvez not to go
to the fair because something had happened there. She then proceeded home. When she looked
back towards accused-appellants direction, she saw the latter also on his way home. Elena Javier
admitted that accused-appellant was her nephew.[15]
For her part, Epida Galvez, mother of accused-appellant, testified that she hurriedly left
the miting de avance when she learned that some trouble occurred inside the DM Compound. She
and her companion, Rosemarie Torres, had to pass by the fair on their way home. On the way, they
saw someone boarding a tricycle, while another person, who was directing the traffic, was holding
a knife. Epida Galvez identified the person who was directing the traffic as Saligumba, the
barangay tanod. She then saw her son Manuel at the store, smoking a cigarette, and told him to go
home. Accused-appellant was with Edwin Mangalabanan and someone named Dencio. [16]
SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo also testified for the defense. He testified that he and another
policeman conducted a follow-up investigation of the stabbing incident on May 10, 1998. Inside the
DM Compound, bystanders informed him that accused-appellant Galvez had stabbed Romen
Castro. Lizarondo then fetched Galvez from the latters house and told him to go with him to the
house of the victim. Galvez agreed, but when they arrived, the people just looked at Galvez and did
not point to him as the person responsible for the stabbing of Romen Castro. He therefore let
Galvez go. Later that same day, Lizarondo said he saw Galvez in the police station. Lizarondo asked
why Galvez was there, but the relatives of the victim and the other witnesses told him that the
reason they said nothing when he asked them to identify Galvez was because of fear. [17]
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision, dated November 18,
1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE premises considered and the prosecution having established to a moral certainty the
guilty of Accused MANUEL GALVEZ Y ESTANISLAO of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and absent any generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstances hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 plus
actual damages of P30,000.00 as well as moral and exemplary damages of P30,000.00 each and to
pay the costs, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accuseds preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in the service of his sentence in
accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[18]

34
As his lone assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in
convicting him of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his identity beyond
reasonable doubt.[19]
First. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest and alleges that it was based on
hearsay evidence. He maintains that he was arrested not because of the positive identification of
the eyewitnesses but on the basis of the hearsay testimony of Reynaldo Castro.[20]
Accused-appellants arrest was illegal. Arturo Saligumba admitted that he arrested Galvez on
the basis solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw accused-appellant
commit the crime charged against him. [21] Indeed, the prosecution admitted that there was no
warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody.
[22]
Considering that accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor
did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant
committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.
By entering a plea of not guilty and participating actively in the trial, however, accusedappellant Galvez waived his right to raise the issue of the illegality of his arrest. It is now settled
that objection to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.[23] The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the subsequent proceedings void and
deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts point to the culpability of the
accused.[24]
Second. Accused-appellant questions the credibility of eyewitnesses Danilo Julia, Alvin Adolfo,
and Loreto Palad. He contends that they could not have seen the stabbing incident as the
commotion took place only after the victim was stabbed. Accused-appellant makes much of their
testimony that no commotion took place when the victim and the five malefactors arrived at the
fair and that the commotion occurred only after Romen Castro was stabbed.Hence, he argues that
they could not have observed the relative positions of the assailants and the victim since there was
no reason for them to pay attention to these people. He further questions the testimonies of the
eyewitnesses and asserts that Elmer Aguilars testimony that a fight preceded the stabbing incident
is more in accord with the finding of the autopsy that the victim suffered abrasion wounds. [25]
We find no merit in these contentions. Romen Castro was known to Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad,
and Alvin Adolfo since they were all residents of DM Compound in Heroes del 96, Caloocan City,
just like accused-appellant Galvez was. As such, the witnesses did not have to pay any particular
interest to these people. It is but natural for them to recognize people whom they
knew. Furthermore, Danilo Julia[26] and Loreto Palad[27] were only around three meters away from
Romen Castro, while Alvin Adolfo was just three arm lengths away from the victim when the
incident happened.[28] There was no need for any commotion before the eyewitnesses could notice
the movements of the victim and his assailants. Considering their proximity, these eyewitnesses
had every reason to notice the presence of Romen Castro and the arrival of the five men, one of
whom was accused-appellant. Nor was it necessary for them to be alarmed by the five men since
the latter were not doing anything illegal at that time. Only when they approached the victim and
hemmed him in, while accused-appellant stabbed him did the eyewitnesses have reason to focus
their attention on the assailants and notice the details of this startling event.
Where there is favorable lighting and the witnesses do not appear to be biased against the
accused, their positive identification of the perpetrators should be accepted. [29] In the absence of
evidence showing ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the logical conclusion is that
no such improper motive exists and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit. [30]
It may be noted that while Danilo Julia [31] and Loreto Palad[32] testified that Romen Castro had
been stabbed on the right side of his back, the autopsy report stated that the stab wound was
located at the left lumbar area of the victim. [33] This single lapse on a minor detail cannot, however,
undermine the credibility of these prosecution witnesses. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses are not an uncommon event, and acquittals have resulted in cases where
the inconsistencies and self-contradictions dealt with material points as to altogether erode the
witnesses credibility. But when such inconsistencies are minor in character, not only do they not

35
detract from the credibility of the witnesses but they in fact enhance it for they erase any
suggestion of a rehearsed testimony.[34]
In this case, the crime took place at a local fair, which was illuminated by fluorescent lights.
It was not shown that eyewitnesses Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad, and Alvin Adolfo, all of whom
knew accused-appellant Galvez, [36] bore any grudge against the latter. They testified in a clear,
categorical, and consistent manner that they saw accused-appellant stab the victim at the back.
We further note that Alvin Adolfo testified that accused-appellant was at the left back side of
Romen Castro when he stabbed the latter. [37] Their mistake concerning the location of the stab
wound does not mean that they did not actually see the stabbing incident. Such mistake may be
attributed more to the fickleness of human memory than to any attempt of the prosecution
witnesses to perjure themselves.
[35]

Nor can the failure of the prosecution to present the murder weapon undermine the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses. We have held that the failure of the prosecution to present as
evidence the murder weapon is not fatal to its case because the positive identification of the
eyewitnesses is sufficient to prove the culpability of the accused. [38] Considering the foregoing, we
see no reason to disregard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and overturn the findings
of the trial court.
Neither can we give credit to Edwin Aguilars testimony. His testimony that a fight ensued prior
to the stabbing of the victim cannot be given greater weight than the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses merely because of the presence of abrasions on the body of Romen
Castro. While Dr. Lagat said the abrasions could have been caused by the victims assailants, he
also stated that these injuries also could have been due to the victims fall after he had been
stabbed.[39] To be sure, the abrasions found are consistent with the prosecution witnesses testimony
that the victim fell to the ground after being stabbed by accused-appellant Galvez.
Time and again we have held that the determination of the credibility of witnesses is a matter
best to the trial court, since it is in the best position to observe the witnesses demeanor, behavior,
conduct, and attitude. Thus, unless the trial court overlooked facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might change the outcome of the case, its findings command great weight and the
utmost respect.[40] So it is in the case at bar.
Third. Accused-appellant sets great store on the testimony of SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo that the
prosecution witnesses failed to identify accused-appellant as Romen Castros assailant when he was
presented before them in the house of Reynaldo Castro.[41]
Fear for ones life is a valid explanation for the witnesses failure to immediately identify the
perpetrator to the proper authorities. Such failure does not necessarily impair the credibility of the
witnesses.[42] In the case at bar, the eyewitnesses, specifically Danilo Julia, Alvin Adolfo, Armando
Rufo, and Loreto Palad, identified accused-appellant as the person who stabbed Romen Castro as
soon as accused-appellant had left the house. Understandably, these witnesses, who had seen
accused-appellant stab the victim, were afraid of accused-appellant and were hesitant to identify
him face to face. But they lost no time in pointing to accused-appellant as Romen Castros assailant
as soon as accused-appellant had left. This only goes to show that their initial reluctance was due
more to fear than to their inability to identify accused-appellant.
In contrast to the prosecution witnesses positive identification, accused-appellant merely
offers alibi as a defense. Alibi is an inherently weak defense and should be rejected when the
identity of the accused has been sufficiently established by eyewitnesses. [43] For alibi to prosper,
the defendant must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed,
but it must likewise be demonstrated that he could not have been physically present at the place
where the crime was committed or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [44] While
accused-appellant in this case testified that he was at home at around 11:30 in the evening of May
9, 1998, he admitted that his house was just a block away from where the fair was held.
[45]
Considering how near he was to the place where the crime was committed, accused-appellants
alibi cannot be given any value.
The same may be said of the corroborative testimonies of accused-appellants aunt Elena
Javier, his mother Epida Galvez, and his friend Edwin Mangalabanan. Corroborative testimony is not

36
credible if tainted with bias, particularly in cases where the witnesses are so closely related to the
accused as to be interested in his acquittal. [46] We realize that accused-appellants witnesses consist
of his friends and relatives. Considering that they are bound by friendship and family ties to
accused-appellant, it is not inconceivable that they would be inclined to make excuses for him to
help free him from culpability. In any event, Elena Javier [47] and Epida Galvez[48] both testified that
they saw accused-appellant Galvez at the store after the stabbing incident. It is thus possible for
accused-appellant to have committed the crime and go to the store near the place where the fair
was located, to establish an alibi.
Fourth. Accused-appellant likewise insists that neither evident premeditation nor treachery
attended the commission of the crime and that, at most, the crime committed was homicide.
We agree that evident premeditation cannot be taken against accused-appellant as there was
no proof to show (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of
time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the
offender time to reflect on the consequences of his act. [49] Where there is no evidence as to how
and when the plan to kill was decided and what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. [50] Accused-appellant
mistakenly thinks, however, that the trial court appreciated evident premeditation in the
commission of the crime when the fact is that it did not.
We hold, however, that treachery attended the killing of Romen Castro. To prove treachery, the
following must be established: (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (2) that said means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. [51] In this case, the victim, Romen Castro, had his back to his
five assailants and was playing a game at the fair when these men suddenly approached him. Two
of these men stayed within the vicinity to serve as lookouts, while two other assailants went to
each side of the victim to restrain him. Then, accused-appellant went up to the victim, who was
busy playing the game and thus was unaware of the arrival of the five men, and stabbed him at the
back. The attack was thus sudden and unexpected. It was made without warning and without
giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. [52]
The qualifying circumstance of treachery having been proven, the trial court correctly found
accused-appellant guilty of murder. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
aggravating circumstance in this case, accused-appellant was correctly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as indemnity
to the heirs of the victim Romen Castro is in accord with our current rulings. [53] The award of actual
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should likewise be upheld. Although receipts should
ordinarily support claims of actual damages, the defense in this case stipulated that Romen Castros
funeral and burial expenses amounted to P30,000.00. Hence, in view of the defenses admission as
to the claim for actual damages, the award should be sustained. [54]
The award of exemplary damages should, however, be deleted. Exemplary damages are
awarded in criminal offenses when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[55] Since no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime in this
case, no exemplary damages should be awarded to the heirs of the victim. As regards the moral
damages, the same should be increased to P50,000.00 pursuant to recent rulings.[56]
On the other hand, accused-appellant should also be held liable for loss of earning capacity. In
determining the amount of lost income, the following must be taken into account: (1) the number
of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the
heirs of the deceased. The second variable is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the
net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of
such earnings or income less living and other incidental expenses. Net earnings is computed at fifty
percent (50%) of the gross earnings.[57] In this case, we note that Reynaldo Castro, the victims
brother, testified that Romen Castro was 21 years old at the time of his death and was working as a

37
construction worker five days a week earning P150.00 a day.[58] Applying this formula, the victims
lost income should be computed as follows:
2 x [80-21 (age of the victim at time of death)] = 39.33
3
P150 (daily wage) x 261 (number of working days in a year) = P39,150.00
(gross annual salary)
39,150.00 x .50 (allocation for living expenses) = P19,575.00
39.33 x P19,575.00 = P769,884.75 (loss of earning capacity)[59]
Hence, aside from the damages awarded by the trial court, accused-appellant should pay the
legal heirs of the victim the amount of P769,884.75 representing unearned income of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City, finding
accused-appellant Manuel Galvez y Estanislao guilty of murder and sentencing him to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary
damages is deleted, the award of moral damages is increased to P50,000.00, and the further
amount of P769,884.75 is further given to the heirs of the victim, Romen Castro, representing the
latters unearned income, in addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P30,000.00 actual
damages awarded by the RTC.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

(9) People vs. Pajotal, 368 SCRA 674

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DINDO PAJOTAL y FETALCORIN;
RANDY GABAY (at large) and LINDO GABAY (at large), accused.
DINDO PAJOTAL y FETALCORIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is here on automatic review of the decision, [1] dated February 7, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, finding accused-appellant Dindo Pajotal guilty
of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death.
The Information[2] against accused-appellant and two others charged the following:
"That on or about the 21st day of October, 1996, at about 2:45 in the afternoon, at Sitio Mabaho,
Barangay Cabalwa, municipality of Mansasalay, province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Randy Gabay alias Randy
Montessa, Lindo Gabay and Dindo Pajotal, conspiring, and confederating together and helping each
other, with intent to kill and to gain, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rode a
jeep owned and driven by Winefred Espina and by means of force and violence upon their victim,
take and carry away FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and accused,
pursuant to their conspiracy during the commission of the robbery and on the such occasion
thereof and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away with them the said
amount ofP15,000.00, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Winefred Espina with a bladed instrument, inflicting upon the latter [stab] wounds on the
different parts of his body thereby causing direct and immediate death of said Winefred Espina.
"That in the commission of the crime the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation and the aggravating circumstance - of abuse of superior strength were present.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
The facts are as follows:
On October 21, 1996, at around 2:45 p.m., Winefred Espina was driving a passenger jeepney,
accompanied by his nephew, Arnold Bugayon, who was also seated in front beside the former. They
had just come from Bulalacao where they delivered some merchandise. Just before they reached
Sitio Mabaho, Mansalay, Oriental Mindoro, three men stopped them on the road. The three men
boarded the vehicle, with one of them clinging to the left front side near Espina, while the other
man sat beside Bugayon. The third man hung at the rear of the jeepney with his feet standing on

38
the platform or"parilla." Bugayon identified the man who sat to his right side on the front seat as
Dindo Pajotal.[3]
In Sitio Mabaho, one of the three men ordered Espina to stop the vehicle, to which the latter
replied, "Pare walang ganyanan." (Pal, don't do this.)The three men then asked for money, but
Espina refused to give it to them. Accused-appellant thus poked a knife at Bugayon and threatened
to kill him if Espina did not hand over the money. As Bugayon frantically asked his uncle to do as
the men asked, Espina handed his money to the person on his left.Although he got the money, the
man stabbed Espina on the left thigh, apparently to prevent any attempt by Espina to get the
money back. Espina decided to fight back and alighted from the jeepney. [4]
At this point, accused-appellant also alighted from the vehicle and attempted to stab
Bugayon. He missed as Bugayon got out of the vehicle by passing through the driver's
side. Bugayon saw accused-appellant and his companions ganging up on Espina. Accusedappellant stabbed Espina. Bugayon tried to help his uncle, but one of the men, who was also
holding a knife, stopped him and said "O ano, lalaban ka?" (What? Do you want to fight?) Espina
told Bugayon to run away. Upon hearing this, Bugayon, very much afraid, retreated and did what
his uncle told him.[5]
Bugayon asked for help from persons he met, but no one was willing to come to the aid of
Espina. Finally, a passenger bus bound for Roxas passed by, and Bugayon boarded it. He alighted
at the PNP station in Mansalay and reported the incident to the police. [6]
At 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Dr. Domingo Asis, Rural Health Physician of Mansalay, Oriental
Mindoro, conducted an autopsy on the body of Winefred Espina. Dr. Asis' postmortem report (Exh.
C), which revealed that the victim suffered fifteen (15) stab wounds, contained the following
findings:
"(1) Wound, incised, 4.0 cm long, edges clean cut, 1.5 cm gape, 0.5 cm depth, middle
forehead, showing the bone;
"(2) Wound, incised, 4.0 cm long, edges clean cut, 1.0 cm gape, 0.5 cm depth, forehead, right,
above the eyebrow;
"(3) Wound, lacerated, triangular in shape, 1 cm. depth, above the eyebrow left;
"(4) Fracture, depressed, localized, frontal bone, base of the nose;
"(5) Wound, lacerated, 2 cm long, 1 cm depth, with fractured bone, lateral eyebrow, right;
"(6) Wound, lacerated, 1 cm. long, 0.5 cm depth, cheek, right;
"(7) Wound, stabbed, 1.5 cm long, 1.5 cm depth, posterior chest, at the level of the scapula;
"(8) Wound, incised, edges clean cut, 4.0 cm long, 5 cm depth, 1.5 cm gape, lateral distal
third, forearm, left;
"(9) Wound, incised, edges clean cut, 2 cm long, 0.5 cm gape, 0.3 cm depth, radial area, wrist,
left;
"(10) Wound, stabbed, 2.0 cm long. 8 cm depth, at the level of 6th ICS, left of the sternum,
directing posteriorly, penetrating perforating the thoracic cavity;
"(11) Wound, stabbed, opening is D shape, 2 cm long, 8 cm depth, at the level of 4th ICS,
midclavicular line, anterior chest, left directing laterally and posteriorly, penetrating
perforating the cardiac cavity;
"(12) Wound, stabbed, 2 cm long, 1.5 cm depth, right of the sternum, at the level of 2nd ICS,
non-penetrating;
"(13) Wound, lacerated, 4.0 cm long, 2.0 gape, 0.5 cm depth, distal third, dorsal, medial area,
arm, right;
"(14) Wound, lacerated, 4.0 cm long, 2 cm gape, 0.5 depth, distal third, dorsal, lateral area,
arm, right;
"(15) Wound, stabbed, 3 cm long, 1.5 cm gape, 8 cm depth, middle third, anterior, thigh, left
directing upward and posteriorly.[7]
Of the fifteen wounds, the fatal ones were wounds no. 10 and 11. Dr. Asis testified that based
on the location of the wounds, it was possible that the assailant or assailants were in front of or
beside the victim. Dr. Asis stated that it was likewise possible that the wounds have been caused
by only one instrument. He could not, however, state with certainty how many persons attacked
the victim.[8] Dr. Asis issued a death certificate (Exh. D) on October 28, 1996, which stated that
Winefred Espina died on October 21, 1996 from hemorrhagic shock caused by multiple wounds.
Accused-appellant's defense was alibi. He claimed that on October 21, 1996, at about 2:45
p.m., he was in their house located along the shore of Barangay Manaul, Mansalay. With him in the
house were his two brothers, his mother, and his two nephews. At that time, accused-appellant was
busy repairing a fishing device known as "tora tora," which was used by fishermen in catching
bangus fries. Apart from the members of his family, Nemie Espiritu, a barriomate, saw accusedappellant at around 3:00 p.m. of that day. Accused-appellant claimed that he undertook the repair
of the "tora tora"from 7:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. of that day. He insisted that he did not know his coaccused in this case, Randy and Lindo Gabay. He also denied that he knew the victim, Winefred
Espina, or the latter's nephew, Arnold Bugayon.[9]
Accused-appellant further testified that their house at Barangay Manaul, Mansalay was
located along the shore about half a kilometer from the national highway. There were no motor
vehicles which regularly plied the route from the highway to their place. He admitted, however,
that the distance of their house to the highway could be covered in fifteen minutes by foot. [10]
Nemie Espiritu, a barriomate of accused-appellant, claimed that at around 3:00 p.m. of
October 21, 1996, he was looking for fish to serve to his visitors. On his way to the house of a
certain Tammy Seloria, he saw accused-appellant near his house and they nodded at each other. [11]

39
On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(a) The court finds accused Dindo Pajotal y Fetalcorin GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide punishable under Article 294 paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH to be
executed in accordance with existing law. In accordance with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 122
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Mariano S. Familara III is
hereby directed to forward within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after
promulgation of judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration the
complete records of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court for review;
"(b) Accused Dindo Pajotal is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Winefred Espina the
sum ofP50,000.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of life of the victim, the sum
of P26,000.00 as actual damages and P500,000.00 as lost earnings;
"(c) With respect to accused Randy Gabay alias Randy Montesa and Lindo Gabay who are still at
large, let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against them in order that they could be brought to
court for trial."[12]
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant contends that:
"I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
"II. GRANTING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARE (SIC) GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN CONVICTING THEM FOR ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE SINCE THE CRIMES
COMMITTED ARE ONLY THE TWO SEPARATE CRIMES OF SIMPLE ROBBERY AND
HOMICIDE WHICH WILL ENTITLE THEM TO THE IMPOSITION OF A LESSER PENALTY FOR
EACH OF THE TWO FELONIES CORRESPONDINGLY." [13]
We find the appeal to be without merit.
First. Accused-appellant contends that the State failed to prove his guilt by strong and
overwhelming evidence. While admitting that alibi per se is a weak defense, accused-appellant
nevertheless contends that alibi can constitute a valid and plausible defense if, in the commission
of the crime, there are no other witnesses except the parties involved. In this case, accusedappellant insists no other witness was presented to corroborate Arnold Bugayon's testimony. [14]
Accused-appellant's contention is untenable. Accused-appellant does not explain why the
testimony of the lone eyewitness Arnold Bugayon is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Nor does he give specific instances from the records of this case to bolster his
claim of innocence.
Contrary to accused-appellant's claim, the prosecution has proved the guilt of accusedappellant beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that Arnold Bugayon was the only eyewitness does
not diminish the force and weight of his testimony. A doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is
that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused.
[15]
Hence the trial court, which heard Bugayon's testimony and had the opportunity to observe his
demeanor while on the witness stand, said:
"The robbery subject of the instant case occurred in broad daylight. The lone eyewitness to the
crime, Arnold Bugayon, categorically declared that it was accused Dindo Pajotal who clung to the
right side of their passenger jeepney then being utilized as a delivery vehicle just next to him, to
his right side and that while there was an on-going scuffle between his uncle and the two otherconspirators of Pajotal the latter even delivered with his knife a thrusting blow on him. To the mind
of the court, Arnold Bugayon could not have failed to recognize Pajotal as he himself was assaulted
by him. The natural reaction of a person in his predicament is to exert efforts to identify the
culprits. As ruled by the Supreme Court in the cases of People vs. Melendres, 106 SCRA 575 and
People vs. Amiscua, 37 SCRA 813, a truism founded on the ordinary course of things is that victims
of criminal violence often strive hard to recognize and identify their assailants." [16]
We see no reason to disturb the trial court's evaluation and assessment of Bugayon's
credibility, the same not being tainted by any arbitrariness or palpable error. The findings of the
trial court judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal
unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if
properly considered, might affect the result of the case. The trial judge's evaluation of the
witnesses' credibility deserves the utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness. Conclusions and
findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless
for strong and valid reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying on the case.[17]
Arnold Bugayon's testimony is strengthened by the findings of Dr. Domingo Asis, the medicolegal examiner who performed the autopsy on the victim's body. Bugayon testified that after the
victim, Espina, handed the money to the person on his left side, the latter, apparently aroused by
Espina's uncooperative behavior, stabbed Espina on the left thigh. Espina got out of the jeepney to
confront the robbers and a scuffle ensued, with the three men ganging up on Espina. Bugayon's
testimony is consistent with the medical findings of Dr. Asis that the victim suffered fifteen wounds,
among which was a 3 cm. stab wound on the left thigh, directed upward and posteriorly. Bugayon
also testified that the men who were hanging on the jeepney beside him and his uncle were both
carrying balisong knives. When the three men ganged up on Espina, they stabbed him with their

40
knives and hit him with a stone. [18] Again, this testimony coincides with Dr. Asis's findings that
among the wounds suffered by the victim were incisions and lacerations, as well as a fracture of
the frontal bone on the base of the nose. As the trial court observed, the incisions and lacerations
could very well have been caused by the knives wielded by two of the robbers, while the fracture
could have been caused by the stone carried by the third robber. [19]
Despite compelling evidence against him, accused-appellant could only put up alibi in his
defense. He claimed that on the date and at the time of the incident in question, he was in his
house in Barangay Manaul, Mansalay, Oriental Mindoro repairing a fishing implement.
This defense is unavailing. For alibi to offset the evidence of the prosecution demonstrating his
guilt, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
at the time it was committed.[20] Accused-appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene at the time of the commission of the crime.To the contrary, he testified
that their house was just about half a kilometer from the national highway, where the crime took
place. Although there were no motor vehicles which regularly plied the route from the highway to
their place, the distance could be covered in fifteen minutes by foot. Accused-appellant was an
athletic person. He was in fact one of the stars of their local basketball team. [21] It would thus have
been easy for him to make the fifteen-minute walk to the highway, commit the crime with his coaccused, and return to his house thereafter. Defense witness Nemie Espiritu, who lived in the same
sitio, testified that he saw accused-appellant working in his house after 3:00 p.m. He did not
categorically state what time he saw accused-appellant, but only said that it was at 3:00 p.m.,
more or less.[22]
Alibi is an inherently weak defense which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused-appellant by an eyewitness, Arnold
Bugayon, who had no improper motive to testify falsely against him. [23]
For these reasons, we hold that the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime charged has been
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Second. Accused-appellant contends that, even if he is guilty of killing Winefred Espina, the
trial court nonetheless erred in finding him liable for the crime of robbery with homicide because
two separate crimes of simple robbery and homicide were actually committed, and a lesser penalty
for each should have been imposed. Accused-appellant claims that, according to Bugayon's
testimony, the injuries which caused Espina's death were inflicted after the robbery. He thus argues
that the homicide was not committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery within the
contemplation of Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the special complex crime of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons.
This contention has no merit. In order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide, it is enough that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it
is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes,
or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration. [24] In
other words, in the crime of robbery with homicide, it does not matter if the homicide preceded or
occurred after the robbery. For what is essential is that there is a direct relation or intimate
connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the
former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time. [25] The original criminal design of
the culprit must be robbery and the homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of
the robbery, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. [26] Thus, in People v. Guiapar,[27] it was
held that the death of a guard resulting from the injury he sustained during the robbery qualified
the offense to robbery with homicide. As long as homicide resulted during, or because of, the
robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident, robbery with homicide is committed. [28]
In the case at bar, Arnold Bugayon testified that the victim Espina was initially stabbed in the
thigh by one of the robbers because it appeared that he would fight to get back his money. In fact,
after he was stabbed, Espina got off the jeepney to run after the hold-up men to recover his
money. At that point, accused-appellant and his co-accused then stabbed Espina several times and
struck him with a stone. In view of the foregoing circumstances, we agree with the trial court when
it found that the homicide in the case at bar was committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery.
The information in this case alleged that in the commission of the crime, the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. The trial court was correct in not
appreciating evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance since this is inherent in the crime
of robbery.[29] The trial court was likewise correct in not appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. Although the victim was caught by surprise when he received the first stab on his left
thigh, the evidence shows that the victim was not caught completely off guard. For the fact is that
the victim, accused-appellant, and the latter's co-accused engaged in combat for several minutes
before the former received the fatal stab wounds. This negates the existence of the first element of
treachery, i.e., a sudden attack giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The
existence of a struggle before the fatal blows were dealt on the victim shows he was forewarned of
the impending attack and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense. [30] However,
despite the absence of treachery, the factual circumstances of the crime show that the killing of
the victim was qualified by abuse of superior strength, which is expressly alleged in the
Information.Accused-appellant and his co-accused did not only enjoy superiority in number but
they also used knives and a stone while their victim was unarmed.Thus, there was physical

41
disparity between the protagonists and abuse of superior strength was obvious. The force used by
the aggressors was out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim. [31]
Under Art. 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when, by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed. In this case, it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt
that homicide was committed by accused-appellant and his co-accused by reason or on occasion of
the robbery committed against the victim. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, and the crime was
committed with the presence of one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied. Considering the presence in this case of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, the penalty of death imposed by the trial court is proper and should thus be sustained.
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echagaray[32] that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of
death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
The civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court is sustained, the
same being in line with current case law. [33] The award ofP26,000.00 as actual damages is also
sustained as the amount duly proved and supported by receipts presented during the course of the
trial. However, the trial court should have ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P15,000.00, representing the amount the victim was carrying at the time of
the crime and taken by accused-appellant and his co-accused. It was never established by any
admissible evidence that any portion of this amount had been recovered. [34]
But the award for loss of earning capacity should be disallowed. As a rule, documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence, provided that there is testimony either that the victim was selfemployed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or that the
victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.[35] In the case at bar, the testimony of Lea Espina, Winefred Espina's widow, was the
sole basis for the award of damages for loss of earning capacity. As it is not supported by other
documentary evidence, her bare testimony cannot be made the basis for an award of damages for
loss of earning capacity. Nor do the exceptions apply so as to justify an award of damages for loss
of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence. The victim was not employed as
a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage at the time of his death. He was in fact,
as claimed by his widow, earning substantially more than the minimum wage. For these reasons,
damages for loss of earnings cannot be awarded in the absence of evidence sufficiently showing
his income.
The trial court should have awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 pursuant to
Art. 2219 par. (1) in relation to Art. 2006 par. (3) of the Civil Code. This is in consonance with our
recent rulings.[36] We also agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court should have awarded
exemplary damages pursuant to Art. 2230 of the Civil Code. Said article allows the imposition of
exemplary damages when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. As
discussed, abuse of superior strength aggravated the commission of the crime in the case at
bar. Therefore, an award ofP20,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is in order. [37]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the legal heirs of Winefred Espina P41,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of
the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
(10) People vs. Bantiling, 369 SCRA 47
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY BANTILING, accusedappellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be fabricated. Courts, knowing that in
cases of indefensible homicide, the accused can rely on it with facility, are not likely to be deceived
by the fabricated claim of the accused that he acted in self-defense. [1]

42
Before us on appeal is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, of Iloilo City in
Criminal Case No. 37564 convicting accused-appellant Jerry Bantiling for the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. He was indicted and tried under the
following Information:
That on or about Feruary 2, 1992, in the Municipality of Balasan, province of Iloilo, Philipppines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with a .12 gauge homemade
shotgun (pugakhang) and with decided purpose to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit one SEVERINO
DAMASO inflicting upon the victim fatal gunshot wounds which caused his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On being duly arraigned, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
The prosecutions version of how the killing transpired was based mainly on the eyewitness
account of Rolando Damaso, the younger brother of the victim. He testified that on the evening of
February 2, 1992, at about 9:30 PM, he was walking with a certain Milmar Domingo on a road at
Brgy. Tinggi-an. They were going home after a days work at his farm located at Brgy. Quiasan. Their
stroll was interrupted when they heard a sudden explosion.Almost instinctively, he lighted his
flashlight to where the sound came from. He saw accused-appellant shoot the victim with
a pugakhang (shotgun) aimed at the latter. Accused-appellant then ran towards their house,
shouting, Cantoy, it is finished. He was sure that it was his voice since they oftentimes met, both of
them being natives of Brgy. Tinggi-an, Balasan, Iloilo. Cantoy is the elder brother of accusedappellant. According to Rolando, he ran away after witnessing the crime. Fear enveloped him since
he noticed that accused-appellant was with his brothers. He too was afraid that accused-appellant
might also shoot him. It turned out that Milmar Domingo was likewise scurrying next to him. The
two rushed straight to the victims house, where they met his wife (Edna) and children. They related
to her the shocking news. Edna demanded to see the body of her husband. They immediately
proceeded to the scene of the incident. To their astonishment, the body was not there. So they
went to the house of the Barangay Captain Genaro Ceracado and sought his help in finding it. The
official readily obliged and accompanied them to the place. When they arrived, there was already a
police patrol car on the site.This time, they saw the body of the victim inside the fenced yard of
accused-appellant. Rolando entered it together with a policeman and the Barangay Captain. Edna
was fainting so they brought her back to her house. That very evening, pictures of the body were
taken. He identified these pictures.
The testimony of Rolando was corroborated by Edna Damaso, the wife of the deceased. She
narrated how the calmness of her night was disturbed by the tragic news about her
spouse. Between the hours of 9:00 and 10:00 in the evening of February 2, 1992, while resting at
their house at Brgy. Tinggi-an, her brother-in-law, Rolando, together with Milmar Domingo,
unexpectedly pounded on their door. They told her the heartbreaking story that her husband was
shot to death by accused-appellant. Upon her urging, they immediately revisited the place where
the victim was killed. To their stupefaction, the dead body was no longer within the vicinity of the
area. They headed to the house of the Barangay Captain to seek his help. They again went back,
this time with the Captain, to the killing spot. Upon their return, they met several police officers
who informed them that the body of her spouse was found inside the fenced yard of accusedappellant. Unfortunately, she was not able to get even a glimpse of her dear husband since she
was taken back to their home.Edna, in addition, testified on the pecuniary damages they
suffered. She stated that she spent P21,960.00 for the wake and burial of the deceased. His
untimely death brought sadness and grief to an otherwise happy marriage and family. She
estimated that her husband can harvest palay with a net income of P40,000.00 for four hectares in
one year for only one cropping. Lastly, she agreed to pay for the services of their private
prosecutor for the amount ofP23,000.00.
Dr. Brade Galo, a government physician, conducted a general physical examination on the
dead body at Tinggi-an, Balasan, Iloilo on February 3, 1992. His Postmortem Findings disclose that
the victim suffered 11 gunshot wounds located at the left lateral and posterior area of his
body. According to him, all the wounds were directed towards the left lung and below the left lung,
which when hit by a bullet would suffice to cause a persons death. In his opinion, the point of the

43
gun had been fired from the rear of the victim, rear left side of the body. The firearm used in the
shooting, from what he heard, was a .12 gauge shotgun locally known as pugakhang.
A member of the local Philippine National Police force, Norberto Macheco, declared that in the
evening of February 2, 1992, Apolinario Bantiling, the father of accused-appellant surrendered to
him a .12 gauge homemade shotgun and ammunition, but not without first informing him that his
son shot an unidentified man using the firearm. He noticed that Apolinario seemed to be telling the
truth based on his observation that he was not nervous at all and appeared to be his normal self.
The Chief Investigator of the Balasan Police Station, Balasan, Iloilo, SPO3 Melanio Jordan,
stated that in connection with the incident, he conducted an ocular inspection of the crime
scene. He found two sets of blood stains in different locations: one, inside the fenced yard of
accused-appellant at the exact point where the dead body of the victim was lying; and another,
outside the yard, on the barangay road. He then prepared a sketch of the crime scene where the
said bloodstains were denoted by red dots.
In a bid to exonerate himself, accused-appellant claims that he accidentally shot the victim in
self-defense. The defense presented three witnesses, including himself.
It first called to the stand, Constancio Bantiling, who works and stays at the farm of accusedappellant in Brgy. Tinggi-an. On the evening of February 2, 1992, at about 8:00, he and accusedappellant went to the house of the latters parents, Apolinario and Arsenia Bantiling, to eat their
supper. They carried their own flashlights. They stayed in the parents house for approximately an
hour before deciding to leave. While walking back home, they heard the sound of a firearm being
cocked. He directed his flashlight to where the sound came from. He saw a person, with his head
bowed, and whom he did not recognize, holding a firearm. He whispered to accused-appellant to
make a dash after the gun failed to fire. Upon reaching the house of accused-appellant, they sat on
the edge of the fence and tried to observe the person who had the firearm. He then heard the
fence crack. It turned out that the armed person was trying to break in. When he lighted his
flashlight towards the person, he saw him stumble. When the person was about to stand up, he
ordered accused-appellant to run to him and seize the firearm. Accused-appellant immediately did
as he was told. He proceeded to the armed man (who has yet to stand up) and tried to grab from
him the firearm. While the two were grappling for its possession, the gun suddenly
exploded. Accused-appellant fell down. The armed attacker likewise fell with his face down on the
ground. It turned out that the person was hit. He was able to recognize him as the victim.According
to Constancio, he told accused-appellant to go back with him at the house of his parents since the
victim possibly may have some companions, who similarly might attempt to kill them. When they
arrived at the house, accused-appellant placed the firearm on a table and asked his father to
surrender it to the authorities. Constancio further recalled an incident prior to the fateful night of
February 2, 1992, involving the accused and the victim. A few days before, the carabao of the
victim attacked that of the accused, and the two fought. The former suffered injuries. The next day,
the victim confronted accused-appellant and demanded from him money for medicines. Accusedappellant refused insisting that had not your carabao attacked my carabao, your carabao would not
have been wounded. This, he remembered, made the victim lose his cool.
Next to testify for the defense was the accused-appellant himself, Jerry Bantiling, a resident of
Brgy. Tinggi-an, Balasan, Iloilo, a farmer and hog-raiser. His testimony essentially towed the line of
Constancios version of the incident. He stated that on the evening of February 2, 1992, he and
Constancio went to his parents house, about half a kilometer away, to eat their dinner. They stayed
there for at least an hour and by 9:30 in the evening they were on the way home. According to him,
while they were walking on a dike going to his house, they suddenly heard the clicking sound of a
firearm. Both of them directed their flashlight to where the sound came from. They then saw a
person in a crouching position holding a firearm, approximately two and a half (2) feet long.
Constancio asked him to flee after the gun apparently jammed. When they reached his house, they
decided to observe the person who had the firearm by the edge of the fence. He then heard part of
his fence crack. It turned out that the armed person was trying to break in. When he lighted his
flashlight towards the person, he saw him stumble. Constancio next ordered him to seize the
firearm. He ran towards the person and grabbed the firearm with his two hands. In the course of
their struggle, he fell. Almost simultaneously, the gun exploded. After picking himself up, he
focused his flashlight on the person lying on the ground with his face down. He was able to identify
that person as the victim, Severino Damaso. He went straight to the house of his parents. There he
revealed what happened, placed the gun on top of the table, and asked his father to surrender it to

44
the Municipal Hall of Balasan. Accused-appellant, moreover, admitted that there was an incident
which transpired involving their respective carabaos on January 23, 1992.According to him, the
carabao of the victim, which got loose, attacked his carabao leading to a fight between the two. It
appears that the carabao of the victim lost as it suffered more serious injuries. The very next
morning, the victim demanded from him money for medicines for the injured beast. He refused the
demand reasoning that it was the formers carabao which attacked his. This made the victim angry
who warned him, Be careful, you stupid, I will put a lug in your head. At that time, he did not mind
those words, until after two weeks when the shooting happened.
Finally, the defense presented Apolinario Bantiling, the father of accused-appellant. He
testified that on February 2, 1992, at about 7:00 in the evening, his son and Constancio went to
their house to take their supper. The two went home only after approximately one hour. After they
left, he went to bed. He was roused from his sleep by accused-appellant who was carrying with him
a pugakhang. Father, I grabbed this firearm from the possession of Severino Damaso, was what his
son told him. Then, he and his other son, Jimmy, went to the Municipal Building, where they turned
over the firearm to the policeman on guard, a certain Etok. Five minutes later, the Chief of Police
arrived who allegedly harassed him by asking him whether he owns the gun. He replied that it was
grabbed from the victim by his son. The Chief apparently did not buy his story and insisted that he
admit ownership of the weapon. The police gave him a piece of paper and made him sign
it. Thereafter, they locked him in jail and was released only the next morning upon the arrival of
accused-appellant.
In time, the trial court rendered a decision convicting accused-appellant, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jerry Bantiling GUILTY of the crime of Murder as charged
in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, there
being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime.
Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as a
mandatory death indemnity; P21,960.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 by way of lost earnings;
and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
The one live ammo and one long firearm used in the commission of the crime are hereby forfeited
in favor of the government.
The branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to submit the same to the proper Office for proper
disposal.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Aggrieved with the verdict of conviction, accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal. He
has assigned the following errors in his brief:
I. The Trial Court gravely erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the defenses interposed by the
accused-appellant.
II. The trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent
testimony of prosecution witness Rolando Damaso.[4]
The appeal is devoid of merit. We affirm the conviction, subject to modifications, which we will
discuss below.
Of unbroken consistency in this jurisdiction is the rule that when the accused has admitted
that he is the author of the death of the victim and his defense is anchored on self-defense, it is
incumbent upon him to prove this justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. This
circumstance he has to establish by clear and convincing evidence, the onus probandi having
shifted to him.[5] He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution, for even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved
after the accused himself admitted the killing.[6]

45
The trial court, after weighing the evidence presented by both sides, did not find credence in
the version of the accused-appellant that he accidentally shot the victim in self-defense. It found
his account highly improbable and unbelievable.
We agree. In the first place, the physical evidence on record belie the contention of accusedappellant that the shooting was accidental or that the fatal wounds were inflicted in the course of a
struggle to get possession of the gun. From the medical findings of Dr. Galo, it can be derived that
the gun was fired at level position. It was fired from the rear of the victim, rear left side of his
body. Likewise, the investigating police officer who conducted the ocular inspection found two sets
of blood stains in different locations: one, inside the fenced yard of the accused-appellant at the
exact point where the dead body of the victim was lying; and another, outside the yard on the
barangay road. All these should indicate that the deceased was actually waylaid on the road,
before his lifeless body was transported inside the fence.
More importantly, accused-appellants attempt to impress upon us his theory of self-defense
must fail in light of the positive testimony of the eyewitness Rolando Damaso. The witness
categorically narrated how he saw accused-appellant shot the victim from behind on the barangay
road, thus:
ATTY. TEODOSIO: (to witness)

A A homemade shotgun pugakhang.

Q On the evening of Feb. 2/92 at about 9:30 more or

less, where were you?

Q What happened to Severino Damso when you saw

him being shot by Jerry Bantiling?

A We were walking on the road of Bgy. Tinggi-an

proceeding home.

A I saw him falling down.

Q Who was your companion during that date and

time?

Q About how far was Jerry Bantiling from you when

you said you saw him shot Severino Damaso.
A Maybe about 15 meters.

A Milmar Domingo.
Q And from where did you come from?

Q And when you said about 15 meters meaning it

was your estimate of the distance?

A From my farm at Bgy. Quiasan.

A Yes.

Q While you were walking along that road in Bgy.

Tinggi-an during that time, could you tell us if there
was any unusual incident that happened?

Q Now you said that Jerry Bantiling used a

pugakhang or a homemade shotgun, when he shot
Severino Damaso, how did Jerry Bantiling hold that
shotgun when you saw him?

A Yes, there was.

Q Could you tell us what was that incident about?
A While we were walking on the road there was a
sudden explosion.
Q When you heard that explosion, what did you do?
A Because I was surprised I have my flashlight
lighted.
Q And what did you see when your flashlight got
lighted?
A I saw Jerry Bantiling shot Severino Damaso.
Q Do you know what weapon did you see used by
Jerry Bantiling when you said him shot Severino
Damaso.

A He was aiming his shotgun to Severino Damaso

(witness indicating that Jerry Bantiling was holding
his shotgun with his left hand forward).
Q After you saw Jerry Bantiling shot Severino Damaso
when you lighted your flashlight, can you tell us what
did Jerry Bantiling do afterwards?
A He ran towards their house.
Q Now were you able to hear any voice at that time
when he ran towards his house?
A I heard Jerry Bantiling (witness pointing to the
accused Jerry Bantiling) saying Cantoy it is finished.
Q Who is this Cantoy?
A Cantoy is the elder brother of Jerry Bantiling.[7]

46
The trial court, in our opinion, accurately calibrated the import of Rolandos testimony when it
opted to believe him. To begin with, his declarations on the stand were forthright, categorical, and
spontaneous. Testimonies which are unequivocal, forthright and replete with details are seals of
self-authentication on their credibility.[8]
Furthermore, no evil motive has been proven against Rolando, or the other prosecution
witnesses for that matter, which might prompt them to testify falsely against the accusedappellant.[9] When there is no showing that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated
by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is thus
entitled to full faith and credit. [10] On the contrary, the earnest desire to seek justice for a dead
kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is
innocent of the crime.[11] While revenge is a normal reaction of one who has lost a loved one, it
does not follow that the desire to avenge such loss would include implicating even innocent
persons.[12] In other words, it is not lightly to be supposed that a relative of the deceased would
callously violate his conscience to avenge the death of a dear one, by blaming it on persons whom
they believe to be innocent.[13] The fact that Rolando is the victims brother even lends more
credence to his testimony as his natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter
him from indicting persons other than the culprits for otherwise the latter would gain immunity. [14]
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Rolando cited by the accused-appellant are too
inconsequential and trivial to merit our attention.Minor and insignificant inconsistencies tend to
bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of the witness for they show that his testimony was not
contrived or rehearsed.[15] They do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness
rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming. [16] Well to point,
even the most truthful witnesses can sometimes make mistakes, but such minor lapses, do not
necessarily affect their credibility.[17]
To our mind, the aforestated arguments raised by accused-appellant are factual in nature and
boil down to the credibility of the witnesses and their respective testimonies. The time-honored
doctrine is that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand
and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. [18] The issue on which
witness to believe is one that should be best addressed by the lower court for the findings of fact of
a trial judge are accorded great respect and are seldom disturbed on appeal for having the
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, and to determine by their demeanor on the stand
the probative value of their testimonies.[19] Accused-appellant miserably failed to advance any
cogent reason for us to deviate in this case from this established rule.
The invocation by accused-appellant of accident deserves scant consideration. Under
paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person, who while performing a lawful act
with due care, causes an injury by accident without fault or intention of causing it, is exempt from
criminal liability.[20]Having ruled, however, that self-defense was not present, then it cannot be said
that accused-appellant was performing a lawful act.[21]
Be that as it may, all is not lost for accused-appellant. It may be recalled that the lower court
convicted him for the crime of murder, attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. Its sole basis in arriving at such a conclusion was the physical finding that the mortal
wounds were located at the back of the victims body. This singular circumstance led it to rule that
Damaso was killed with treachery, thus:
From this testimony of Dr. Galo regarding the location of the wounds that the point of the gun had
been fired from the rear of the victim or rear left side of the body. The aggravating circumstance of
the treachery can safely be concluded on the part of the assailants (sic).
According to the doctor the gun must have been fired from the rear of the victim, rear left side of
the body. Furthermore, the doctor testified that the assailants (sic) was probably on the left rear
side of the victim and the gun was at level with the victim.
From the pictures presented in court, the victim was lying face down to the ground showing that he
must have been shot at the back. This in turn show treachery on the part of the assailants (sic).[22]

47
That the victim sustained wounds in the back is not sufficient in itself to prove treachery. The
presence of treachery may not be simply assumed from the mere fact that the fatal wounds were
found at the back of the deceased. [23] These wounds might have been the last ones inflicted in
order to finish the victim, or might have been inflicted by accident, or inflicted in a frontal
encounter.[24]
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor against an
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby, ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor, sans the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.
[25]
Where no particulars are known as to the manner the aggression was made or how the act
resulting to the death of the victim, began and developed, it could not be established by mere
suppositions that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery. [26] There must be conclusive
evidence that the person attacked had absolutely no opportunity to defend himself much less
retaliate and that the means of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused.
Thus, treachery cannot be appreciated where the lone eyewitness to the killing was not able to
see how the assault started.[27] The testimony of Rolando Damaso offers no sufficient basis for
reasonably inferring that treachery attended the commission of the crime. Evidence on record does
not adequately show the manner by which the attack was carried out. What Rolando only
witnessed were the events subsequent to the firing of the shot, i.e., the accused-appellant holding
literally a smoking gun aimed at the fallen victim and uttering the words, Cantoy, it is finished. At
that juncture, the killing of the deceased was already complete. Clearly, he was not able to see the
commencement of the assault and there is no way for him to know whether the accused-appellant
was able to deliberately adopt a sudden and unexpected method of attack which deprived the
victim of an opportunity to defend himself.
In light of our finding that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing of the victim
to murder, we modify his criminal liability to the crime of homicide. Accordingly, we lower the
penalty imposed upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attendant to the
act. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is anywhere within the range
of prision mayor, or from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and the maximum
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
There is likewise the need to modify the civil liability of accused-appellant. We deem it
necessary to increase the award of moral damages from twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to
fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, in accordance with existing jurisprudence. [28]
The amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) given to the heirs of the victim as indemnity
for the latters loss of earning capacity should similarly be augmented. The following factors should
be considered in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years
for which the victim would have otherwise lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of
the deceased. Life expectancy is computed using the formula adopted in the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality: 2/3 x (80 - age at death).
[29]
The rate of loss is arrived at by multiplying life expectancy by the net earnings of the
deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income and less living and other incidental expenses. [30] The net earning is ordinarily pegged at
fifty percent of the gross earnings.[31]
Evidence on record reveals that the victim was 50 years old at the time of his death. From the
testimony of his wife, witness Edna Damaso, he was making about P40,000.00 as net income in
one crop year. This was not disputed by the defense. Thus, applying the formula above, the
accused-appellant should pay his heirs P800,000.00, as shown by the following computation:
2/3 x (80 - 50 [age at the time of death]) = 20 (life expectancy)
20 x P40,000.00 (net annual income) = P800,000.00
Loss of earning capacity = P800,000.00.[32]

48
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. The
accused-appellant is found guilty of Homicide and an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years
of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum is imposed upon him. He is likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P21,960.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P800,000.00 for loss of earning capacity.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

..
***Civil liability of the accused found guilty of rape, seduction or abduction pursuant of Art.
345 of the RPC:
With regard to the civil indemnity, the victime of rape with homicide should be awarded the
amount of 100, 000. Prevailing judicial policy has authorized the mandatory award of Php 50, 000
in case of death, and Php 50,000 upon the finding of the fact of rape. Also, under recent case law,
the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of 75, 000.00 if the crime of rape
committed is effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the applicable amenatory laws (RR No. 4111 and RA No. 7659)***
(4) People vs. Ravelo 202 SCRA 655
(5) ***50, 000 has been fixed as the civil indemnity for rape***
Facts: The accused-appellants are members of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) stationed
at a checkpoint near the airport of Tandag. At approximately 6:30 PM of May 21, 1984, accusedappellants allegedly kidnapped by means of force one Reynaldo Gaurano. They then detained
Gaurano at the house of Pedro Ravelo, one of the accused. Thereafter, they assaulted, attacked,
and burned Gaurano, with the intent of killing the latter. Reynaldo Gaurano died on May 22. At
about 1AM of May 22, the accused-appellants also kidnapped by means of force Joey Lugatiman.
The latter was also brought to Ravelo's house where he was tortured. At 5AM, Lugatiman was
transferred to the house of accusedappellant Padilla. There he was tied to the wall with a nylon line
and was told he would be killed at 9AM. Shortly after, accused-appellants had to attend to
Gaurano; Lugatiman was thus left alone. He was able to escape. He reported what happened to
him and to Gaurano to the police authorities. RTC convicted the accused-appellants of murder of
Gaurano and frustrated murder of Lugatiman. In this appeal, counsel for the accused aver that the
lower court erred in finding that accused-appellants are guilty of frustrated murder. Counsel further
contends that there can be no frustrated murder absent any proof of intent to kill, which is an
essential element of the offense of frustrated murder. The trial court merely relied on the
statement of the accused-appellants stating they would kill Lugatiman to establish intent to kill.
Issue: Whether the statement by the accused stating that Lugatiman would be killed is sufficient
proof of intent to convict a person of frustrated murder
Held: No Ratio: In a crime of murder or an attempt of frustration thereof, the offender must have
the intent or the actual design to kill which must be manifested by external acts. A verbal
expression is not sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown
not only by a statement of the aggressor, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of
means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed in a position to defend
himself.

(4) PNB vs. CA et al

G.R. No. 121597
June 29, 2001
FACTS: The spouses Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by a TCT and registered in
their names. Upon the husbands death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent
Allan as special administrator of the deceaseds intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to
obtain a loan accommodation from PNB to be secured by a real estate mortgage over the abovementioned parcel of land, which Allan did for P450,000.00 with interest.
For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage.
During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder. However, the loan having a payable balance, to
claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC, Balayan, Batangas, against both Mrs.
Chua and Allan.

49
The RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of PNBs complaint. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision by dismissing PNBs appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: The WON it was error for the CA to rule that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action
the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the
same.
HELD: petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
No
Petitioner relies on Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612, 615 (1990),holding that in
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the
debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the mortgagor.
However, it must be pointed out that petitioners cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a
mortgage. The case at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a
settlement of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of
the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. As the CA correctly stated, the
Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively. The applicable rule is Section 7 of
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court ( which PNB contends is not.)
In the present case it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been
complied with [see notes]. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately
applicable to the controversy at hand, which in summary [and case law as well] grants to the
mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can
be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the
mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is
barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
Clearly petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditors option ofextrajudicially foreclosing
the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim
against the estate of the deceased. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery
of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property
securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part
of respondents and the deceaseds estate.
NOTES:
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which states that:
Sec. 7. Rule 86. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his
claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the
estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making
the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after
the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding
to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the
preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone and foreclose the
same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be
admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the

50
estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming
the property mortgaged or pledged by paying the debt for which it is hold as security, under the
direction of the court if the court shall adjudge it to be for the interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made.
To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate
mortgage is recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order
authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been
executed by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:
Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber
estate The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in
cases provided by these rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following
regulations:
xxx
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus
sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court,
together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as
if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.
(5) People vs. Bangcado
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing jurisprudence) is
automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the formers death, without
need of
further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of the aforementioned crimes
(murder, homicide, parricide and rape).Moral and exemplary damages may be separately granted
in addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the
complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary
damages can be awarded if the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances
duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the discretion of the courts.

(6) People vs. Manalo

***Moral damages are automatically granted in a rape case without need of further proof.***
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALEX MANALLO, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, J.:
Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their nine-year old [1] daughter Rosaldiza Nabor
tenanted and lived in a coconut plantation located in Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay. Rosaldiza
helped in the household chores by washing the familys dirty laundry every Saturday at the
barangay reservoir. The route to the reservoir was uninhabited. Going there was quite a long
trek. It usually took Rosaldiza fifteen minutes to negotiate the grassy path from the reservoir to
their house.
In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as coconut gatherer. [2] Alex helped the
Nabor couple gather coconut produce once a week.[3] He was paid P150.0 per day for his services.
In the early morning of March 30, 1992, Liliosa left their house for the market. Rosaldiza went
to the reservoir to wash her clothes bringing with her a pail and a basin. She wore a t-shirt and a
pair of short pants. After washing her clothes, Rosaldiza took a quick bath. [4] At around 11:00 a.m.
Rosaldiza , who was drenched all over, left the reservoir and trekked the same route in going home.
On her way, Alex suddenly appeared from the bushes and grabbed Rosaldiza from behind. Alex was

51
completely naked. He covered her mouth and poked a knife on her neck. Rosaldiza dropped the
basin and the pail she was carrying and fought with Alex to extricate herself from his clutches.
However, he was too strong for her. Alex dragged her to a grassy portion, pulled her down and
pinned her to the ground. [5] She cried and shouted for help, at the same time, resisting Alexs
advances. However, when Alex boxed Rosaldiza on her thighs and on her abdomen, she lost
consciousness. When she regained consciousness, Rosaldiza noticed that she was completely
naked. She felt weak and tired. Her private parts and body ached all over. She noticed semen in
her vagina.[6] Fearing for her life and completely devastated, she cried bitterly. Alex dressed up and
warned her not to tell her parents, brothers and sisters of the incident, otherwise, he would kill
them all. Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran home. By then, Liliosa was already in the house.
Rosaldiza related to her mother what had happened to her. [7]Stunned by the revelation of her
daughter, Liliosa accompanied Rosaldiza to the house of the barangay captain, but the latter was
out of the house. The distraught Liliosa and Rosaldiza proceeded to the house of
barangay kagawad Elesio Obal to whom they related that Alex had raped Rosaldiza. Liliosa,
Rosaldiza and Elesio boarded a tricycle and went to the Camilig Police Station [8] where Liliosa and
Rosaldiza had the incident reported in the police blotter. [9] The trio then proceeded to the Rural
Health Unit of Camilig where Dr. Ma. Crispa Loria-Florece, the Municipal Health Officer, conducted a
physical, including pelvic and smear examination of Rosaldiza. Dr. Loria-Florece signed and issued
a medico-legal certificate[10] which reads:
*Physical findings:
-CONTUSSION right cheek
-HEMATOMA Distal 3rd, anterior aspect right thigh
I E findings:
-Hymen with fresh bleeding, lacerations at 3:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock, 6:00 oclock, 8:00 oclock
positions.
-Cervix smooth, small and firm
-Adnexa (-)
-W/bloody & whitish stick mucous per examining
Finger
*Spec. exam: - cervix pinkish w/whitish secretion at post fornix.
*Vaginal smear With motile sperm cells.
According to Dr. Loria-Florece, the contusion and hematoma sustained by the victim in the
right cheek and right thigh could have been caused by fist blow or slapping of the victim. The fresh
bleeding and multiple lacerations of the hymen could have been caused by sexual intercourse or
the entry of a hard object. Rosaldiza was still a virgin when the doctor examined her but lost her
virginity about an hour from her examination on the victim, since fresh hymenal bleeding usually
stops in about one or two hours from laceration.
Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the police station and executed their respective sworn
statements.
On April 27, 1992, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City,
charging Alex with rape, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on the 30th day of March 1992, at more or less 11:00 oclock A.M. at Barangay Salugan,
Camilig, Albay, the accused with lewd design, armed with a knife, by means of violence and
intimidation, poked the victim Rosaldiza Nabor Y Nebres with said knife and when the victim

52
resisted, slapped her rendering her unconscious, and while in that stae (sic) accused have carnal
knowledge with Rosaldiza N. Nabor, to the latters damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex. He filed, on May 8, 1992, a
motion for bail with no specific date and time for the hearing thereof. [12] Upon the filing of said
motion, the Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion and fixing his bail bond at
P50,000.00.[13] On the same day, Alex posted a property bond which was immediately approved by
the court.[14] Alex was forthwith released from detention.
At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not
guilty. Trial was set on June 18, 1992. [15] The prosecution prayed the trial court to cancel the bond of
Alex considering that his petition for bail was granted without due hearing. However, the trial court
held in abeyance resolution of the motion until after the prosecutor shall have presented its
witnesses on June 18, 1992. The trial court stated that the evidence to be adduced by the
prosecution would be its evidence in Alexs petition for bail and trial on the merits.On June 18, 1992,
the trial court issued an order that Alex would remain free on his bond until June 22, 1992, the date
set for the hearing on his petition for bail. However, Alex failed to attend the trial on said date. The
trial court issued and order for his arrest. However, Alex could no longer be found at his address. It
was only six years thereafter, or on January 22, 1998, that he was arrested. [16]
When Alex testified, he denied having sexually assaulted Rosaldiza on March 30, 1992. He
claimed that they had been lovers engaging in sexual intimacies for over a year even before March
30, 1992. He said that whenever they had sexual intercourse, he gave her P100.00 to P150.00. He
claimed that he came to know Rosaldiza in 1989 when he started working for the Nabors, and from
that day on, they hit it off. He was then 26 years old and Rosaldiza barely in her teens. He testified
that Rosaldiza gave him special attention by personally serving him lunch every time he gathered
coconuts and she flirted with him. He, in turn, used to tease her by asking her to become his
second wife.Every time he needed a smoke, Rosaldiza bought cigarettes for him and always kept
the change. He used to give Rosaldiza pocket money for her schooling. Their relationship
blossomed and in 1991 they started having sexual intercourse. Alex claimed that every time he
gathered coconuts in the landholding of the Nabors, he and Rosaldiza invariably had sexual
intercourse either at Honrado's nipa hut or in the grassy wilderness.
Alex recalled that on March 27, 1992, at around 7:00 a.m., he left his house and played
basketball at the nearby basketball court. After an hour, he got thirsty and proceeded to the house
of Laura. Thereat, Laura handed him water. While drinking water, Rosaldiza called him and asked
for P300.00 for a new pair of shoes. He told Rosaldiza that he would give the P300.00 at their usual
tryst after his routine rounds of his coconut plantation. Rosaldiza agreed. She then told Alex that
she would first drop by her house to get some laundry clothes so that her parents may not get
suspicious. The two met at the agreed place. She demanded that Alex give her the P300.00 but
Alex refused. He insisted that they have sexual intercourse first. Rosaldiza agreed. However, after
their sexual act, Alex still refused to give her P300.00, Rosaldiza got furious. She warned Alex that
she would tell her mother about their relationship. Alex pacified Rosaldiza by promising to give her
the money on Monday. He again sweet-talked Rosaldiza by assuring her that in case she got
pregnant, he would leave his wife and they would settle in Manila. After appeasing Rosaldiza, they
respectively went home. When he arrived home, he ate his lunch and subsequently went to sleep.
At about 1:00 p.m. his wife woke him up and told him that four policemen were looking for him. He
asked the policemen of their purpose and he was told that a complaint for rape had been filed
against him. He went with the policemen to the police station where he was placed under arrest.
He also told the court that when his wife Teresita visited him on that day, he admitted to her his
relationship with Rosaldiza. He said that after hearing his confession, his wife Teresita cried and got
angry.[17]
Teresita Manallo testified that when she visited her husband, Alex, in his cell after his
arrest, he confided to her that he had already admitted the charge. She likewise testified that Alex
had instructed her to talk to Liliosa and ask her forgiveness and if possible to settle the matter with
the Nabors. She claimed that on her way out of the municipal jail she chanced upon the Nabors
and relayed to them the instructions of Alex. However, the Nabors rejected the offer of settlement.
Liliosa was resolute in filing a case against Alex.

53
On April 25, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision [18] finding Alex guilty as charged, the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Alex Manallo is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by using force and intimidation as defined and penalized
under Art. 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to pay complainant P75,000.00 as indemnity , P50,000.00
as moral damages and the costs.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Aggrieved by the decision, Alex appealed to this Court contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOT ON THE BASIS OF
THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE BUT RATHER ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE[20]
Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is inherently weak. He
argues that the decision of the trial court dwelt mainly on the rationalization discrediting the
evidence for the defense and that not much was said why it gave credence to the testimony of the
private complainant. He claims that even assuming that his testimony is unbelievable, as the trial
court put it, that alone could not sustain a verdict of conviction. He asserts that the prosecution
must rest on the strength of its own evidence and not relieved of the onus of proving guilt beyond
reasonable doubt by the weakness of the defense.[21]
The contention of appellant does not persuade.
Even a cursory reading of the decision of the trial court will readily show that it convicted
appellant of the crime charged in light of the testimony of Rosaldiza and Dr. Loria-Florece and the
physical evidence adduced by the prosecution:
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence adduced, the court finds that the accused did rape the
complainant Rosaldiza Nabor on March 30, 1992. The court finds the testimony of complainant
Rosaldiza Nabor credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the
ordinary course of things. The conduct of Rosaldiza Nabor and the subsequent events that
transpired immediately after the alleged sexual assault credibly established the truth of her
charge.
After the accused left her, she came home running and shouting for help because she was raped.
Upon arrival at her house she spontaneously told her mother, she was raped by the accused. They
immediately reported to the barangay authorities, then to the police.
The findings of Dr. Florece clearly supports complainants story. She examined the complainant at
12:15 p.m. of March 30, 1992, which was about one hour after the rape. The external physical
examination showed a contusion on her right cheek and a hematoma on her right thigh near the
knee. These injuries is compatible with the complainants testimony that she was slapped in her
face and boxed in her thigh by the accused as a result of which she lost consciousness.
The internal examination showed fresh bleeding hymenal lacerations at 3:00, 5:00, 6:00 and 8:00
oclock positions, meaning these lacerations were sustained about one or two hours before the
examination because hymenal laceration stops bleeding after one or two hours says Dr. Florece.
There were lacerations because complainant was still a virgin according to Dr. Florece. The motile
sperm cells were moving and alive as found by Dr. Florece. These circumstances clearly show that
the rape was committed on March 30, 1992 and that there was no such sexual intercourse on
March 27, 2003. These lacerations also indicate that the penis was forcibly inserted into the vagina.
(People vs. Peero, 276 SCRA 564)
Dr. Florece, found a contusion on the right cheek of complainant, a reddish coloration of the skin,
slightly elevated or inflamed, a hematoma on the right thigh near the knee, there was
accumulation of clotted blood. The contusion on the right cheek and the hematoma on the right
thigh could have been caused by a fistic blow or by slapping. The hymenal fresh bleeding

54
lacerations could have been caused by a penis in a sexual intercourse about an hour and a half
before her examination because hymenal laceration stops in one to two hours. There were
lacerations because the complainant was a virgin. The motile sperm cells found in the cervix were
alive indicating a recent sexual intercourse. All the foregoing facts and circumstances clearly and
indubitably prove that complainant Rosaldiza Nabor was raped by the accused Alex Manallo on
March 30, 1992 at about 11:00 a.m.[22]
The trial court considered appellants flight from the scene of the crime, his having jumped bail
and for eluding arrest for six long years as evidence of his guilt for the crime charged:
. Besides, the flight of the accused in jumping bail and going into hiding for (6) years is evidence of
his guilt. He would not have fled if his story is true. The court noted that during the years that the
accused was in hiding, the complainant was relentless in her efforts to locate the accused so that
he may be arrested. Complainants demeanor in court showed insincerity. [23]
Rosaldiza described how appellant waylaid her, forcibly dragged her to the grassy area,
pinned her to the ground and when she resisted, he hit her with his fist, rendering her unconscious
and when she regained consciousness, she discovered that she had been deflowered by the
appellant, thus:
PROS. DE MESA:
Q Ms. Witness, are you the same Rosaldiza Nabon,
the private complainant in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you on March 30, 1992 particularly in
the morning of 11:00 oclock more or less?
A I was on my way home coming from the water
reservoir of our place where I washed our clothes,
when suddenly a man who came from nowhere
poked a knife on me.

A When this Alex Manallo poked a knife from behind

me I looked back and considering that I was then
carrying a basin on my right hand and a paile (sic) on
my left hand I tried to free myself from his hold,
however he was so strong that I could not free
myself.
Q While you were striving yourself to be free from
the hold of the accused what happened to the basin
with the laundry clothes and the pail, what happened
A It fell down.
Q And then what did you do?

Q You said there suddenly appeared someone from

nowhere who poked a knife on you, who is this
somebody that you mentioned?

A He told me that I should carry again the basin and

the pail which was then I was carrying, after that he
dragged me into the grassy portion.

A Alex Manallo, sir.

Q Did you carry the basin and the pail?

Q Is this Manallo that you mentioned is the same

Alex Manallo, the accused in this case?

A Yes, because I was afraid.

A Yes, sir.
Q This Alex Manallo that you mentioned who
according to you is the same Alex Manallo who is the
accused in this case, is he present in this court?

Q And while carrying the basin and the pail you were
being dragged?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what happened after you were dragged into
the grassy portion, what happened next?

A Yes, sir, he is here.

Q Can you point to him?
A That man, sir (witness pointing to a certain person
inside the court room who upon being asked of his
name, stood up and identified himself as Alex
Manallo).
Q Now, after the accused Manallo the accused in this
case poked a knife on you, what happened next?

A The accused pushed me and delivered fistic blows

to my thigh and then I became weak.
Q Now, after you were slapped and boxed by the
accused which caused you to fall down and become
weak, what happened next?
A He delivered fistic blows on the stomach and at
that time I became unconscious.
Q And did you ever regain your consciousness?

55
A Yes, sir.
Q And after that what happened next?

A He told me that I should not report the incident to

my parents including my brothers and sisters. He
said, I am going to kill you all because I have a 45.

A He was still near my head.

Q And then, after he said that what did you do next?

Q What was he doing?

A I dressed up myself.

A He was dressing himself.

Q And....?

Q And what happened to you, what did you notice, if

any?

A I proceeded
somewhere.

A I was already naked.

Q And then where did you go?

Q And what did you do after you found yourself

already naked?

A To my house.

home

and

he

was

left

behind

Q And you were walking or running?

A I just cried because I was very afraid because he
might kill me.
Q And what did the accused do after you have regain
your consciousness?

A I was running.
Q When you reached home what did you do?
A I shouted for help to my mother, Mama tabangan
mo ako ta pigrape na ako, or if translated in english,
Mother help me because I was raped. [24]

Despite the threats of appellant to kill her and her family, Rosaldiza spontaneously reported to
her mother the bestial assault on her by appellant. As disclosed by the records, Rosaldiza
constantly cried during her testimony. Her tears add poignancy and credibility to the rape charge
with the verity born out of human nature and experience.[25]
On review, the Court find that the testimony of Rosaldiza bears the hallmarks of truth. It is
consistent on material points. The rule is that when a rape victim's testimony is straightforward
and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions
in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit. It is a well-entrenched
jurisprudential rule that the credibility of a rape victim is augmented when she has no motive to
testify against the appellant or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely suggest
that she could have been actuated by such motive.[26]
Rosaldizas testimony is buttressed by the medico-legal findings of Dr. Florece. The fresh
lacerations in Rosaldizas hymen are the telling and irrefutable, the best physical evidence of her
defloration. The presence of motile sperm cells in the victims violated organ affirms her charge
more than words and anger alone could prove. [27] Her contusion on the right cheek and hematoma
on the right thigh are ample proof of struggle and resistance against rape. These physical evidence
showing the use of brutal force on the victim when she was sexually assaulted certainly speaks
louder than words.[28] In countless cases, we have taken judicial notice of the fact that it is highly
inconceivable for a young barrio lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, to fabricate a
charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to public
trial and tarnish her family's honor and reputation unless she was motivated by a potent desire to
seek justice for the wrong committed against her. [29]
The trial court is correct in discounting the sweetheart defense of appellant. He failed to
establish the existence of such relationship. Rosaldiza specifically denied that appellant was ever
her sweetheart. In People vs. Apostol,[30] this court said that sweetheart defense is a much-abused
defense that rashly derides the intelligence of the Court and sorely tests its patience. Being an
affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof. [31] He
failed to discharge this burden. Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his wife, there
was no support to his claim that he and complainant were lovers. His sweetheart defense cannot
be given credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures or
tokens[32] that such romantic relationship really existed. Even if we assumed, for the nonce, that
appellant and Rosaldiza were indeed lovers, this fact would not have precluded rape, as it did not

56
necessarily mean there was consent. A love affair would not have justified what appellant did
subjecting Rosaldiza to his carnal desires against her will. [33] No young filipina of decent refute
would publicly admit she had been raped unless that was the truth. Even in these modern times,
this principle still holds true. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from
a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.
[34]

The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, young
ladies by custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is
observed so that their reputation remains untainted.[35] Even assuming arguendothat the offended
party was a girl of loose morals, as claimed by appellant, it is settled that moral character is
immaterial in the prosecution and conviction for rape for even prostitutes can be rape victims [36].
The case for the prosecution was even fortified by no less than the evidence of the appellant.
His wife Teresita testified that he instructed her to plead for Rosaldizas forgiveness and for the
settlement of the case, and in obedience to said instruction, Teresita did relay Alexs plea for
forgiveness and for an amicable settlement to Liliosa, the mother of the victim but that Liliosa
turned down appellants plea:
ATTY. MUOS :
Q And so when your mother-in-law came back
from the municipal jail telling you that youll be
the one to go there because she cannot stand
her son being beaten by the policeman, what
did you do?
A I went to the municipal jail of Camalig, sir.
Q And what was the time that you went to the
municipal jail of Camalig?
A About 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, sir.
Q And when you arrived at the place, who were
those person you saw in the municipal hall, if
any?
A I proceeded first to Alex Manallo at the
municipal jail of Camalig, sir.
Q And did you ask Alex Manallo anything why
he was arrested?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did he tell you?
A Alex Manallo informed me that he already
admitted the act, and instructed me to ask

forgiveness from the mother for me, or if not to

settle the matter, sir.
Q Is that all you asked of him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask him something more?
A No more, sir. I already went out of the jail.
COURT to witness:
Wait.
Q When you said he admitted doing the act, to
whom?
A He did not name, sir.
Q All right, when your husband told you that
you ask forgiveness from the mother for me,
who is that mother, who is that person referred
to as the mother that you are supposed to ask
forgiveness for your husband?
A The mother of the complainant, sir.
Q And who is the complainant?
A Rosaldiza Nabor, sir.

[37]

In a case of similar factual backdrop, the Court considered a plea for forgiveness and for a
settlement of the case as an implied admission of guilt:
Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was
dissolved by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for
forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his
kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony.
Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly
established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim
to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the accused dared not assign that finding and
conclusion as an error and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then,

57
the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan
to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife,
children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment
against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon (an
offender). In People vs. Calimquim, we stated:
The fact that appellant's mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazon's father is an
indication of guilt. (See People vs. Olmedillo, L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193). [38]
This Court agrees with the trial court that the appellant is guilty of rape under Article 335 of
Revised Penal Code as amended. The use by the appellant of a knife to consummate the crime is a
special aggravating circumstance which warrants the imposition of the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua to death. However, considering that the prosecution failed to prove any other aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Anent the award of damages, the trial court has correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral
damages, an award that rests on the jural foundation that the crime of rape necessarily brings with
it shame, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation. [39]
The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity should be reduced to P50,000.00 in line with this
Courts ruling in People vs. Banela,[40] that if the crime of rape was committed before the
effectivity Republic Act No. 7659[41], the amendatory law restoring death penalty, the civil
indemnity to be awarded to the offended party shall remain to be P50,000.00.
Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P25.000 should be awarded pursuant to our
ruling in People vs. Catubig,[42] that the award for exemplary damages is justified pursuant to Art.
2230 of the New Civil Code. Since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly
weapon was attendant in the commission of the rape, the offended party is entitled to exemplary
damages.
The Court cannot write finis to this case without making of record its concern and displeasure
at the egregious procedural lapse of the trial court in granting bail to appellant. It bears stressing
that he was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Section 5, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 5. Burden of proof in Bail application. At the hearing of an application for admission to bail
filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the
trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination
unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. (7a)[43]
The trial court as mandated, in resolving a motion or petition for bail, to do the following:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;

58
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, the petition should be denied.[44]
In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8, 1992. There was no specific date
and time for the hearing of said motion.And yet, on the same day that the motion was filed, the
trial court granted the said motion and fixed the bail bond for the provisional liberty of the
appellant in the amount of P50,000.00 without any factual basis therefore stated in the order. Even
when the public prosecutor prayed the court on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property
bond of the appellant on the ground that the trial court granted his motion for bail without even
affording the prosecution a chance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence in opposition
thereto, the trial court held in abeyance resolution thereof and even allowed the appellant to
remain free on his bond in the amount of only P50,000.00. Patently, the prosecution was deprived
of its right to due process. In Go vs. Judge Bongolan, et. al.,[45] this Court emphasized that:
A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise
the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community from dangerous
elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the
necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of jurisdiction. [46]
The presiding judge of the trial court thus exposed his gross ignorance of the law. As a
consequence, the appellant jumped bail and managed to elude arrest for six years, to the prejudice
of the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Alex Manallo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty ofRECLUSION
PERPETUA. He is ordered to pay to the victim Rosaldiza Nabor P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000
as moral damages andP25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

(7) People vs. Rubiso

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY RUBISO, alias ALOG, accusedappellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. [1]
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, finding
appellant Jimmy Rubiso @ Alog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Jimmy Rubiso was charged with murder under an Information filed with the said trial court,
which reads:
That on or about November 6, 1992, in the Municipality of Pavia, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a firearm of
unknown caliber, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
SERAFIN W. HUBINES with said firearm the accused was then provided that time inflicting multiple
gunshot wounds on the latter which caused his death immediately thereafter. [2]
The facts as narrated by the Solicitor General in the appellees brief are:
Prosecution eyewitness Alejandro Pulomeda testified that on November 6, 1992, he went to Jaspe
Metal Craft Industries (Jaspe) at Pavia, Iloilo to canvass the price of a rice thresher. He intended to
ask assistance from his friend, Serafin Hubines who was working at Jaspe. Then, he went straight
and saw Hubines busy putting a bolt on a rice thresher. Hubines was in a squatting position. While
he was walking toward Hubines direction, he saw herein appellant also approaching Hubines from
behind. He noticed that appellants left hand was wrapped with a towel. As appellant walked closer
to Hubines, he unwrapped his hand revealing a handgun of unknown caliber, and shot
Hubines. The latter still managed to stand but he was again successively shot by
appellant. Pulomeda was shocked and frozen by what he witnessed. After a few minutes, he
managed to run out of the Jaspes compound and went back home. On the following morning,

59
nonetheless, he went to see the father of Hubines and narrated to him everything he saw (TSN,
December 14, 1993, pp. 3-24).
PO3 Ananias Gallaza is a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at the residence of
Jaspes owner, Andres Jaspe. He was the security guard on duty at Jaspe on that fateful day. He
remembered hearing gunshot while he was in the comfort room at about 12 noon so he
immediately went out. He went straight to the shop and saw Hubines lying on his back,
bloodied. He and the other workers brought Hubines to the hospital (TSN dated April 26, 1993, pp.
5-6, 9, 13-18, 21).
Patrolman Danilo Opong, another policeman detailed at Jaspe, testified that while he was eating
lunch, he heard a series of gunshots coming from the shop where the threshers were being
manufactured. On his way to the shop, he met a certain Romeo Alanto who informed him that
Hubines had been shot by appellant. At the shop, he saw Hubines bathed in his own blood. He
immediately placed appellant under custody and thereafter brought him to the police station in
Pavia (TSN, dated May 4, 1993, pp. 5, 10, 13, 19-25).
Hubines arrived at the hospital clinically dead. He was twice operated but in vain (TSN, dated July
20, 1993, pp. 5, 8-10).
Medico-legal Dr. Tito Doromal testified that he conducted a post-mortem examination on
Hubines. He found six (6) bullet wounds on the body of the victim. One bullet wound in the right
forehead, another bullet on the left side of the neck and four bullet wounds in the thoraco
abdominal region. His findings led him to conclude that two bullet wounds were inflicted by the
assailant while standing behind the victim (TSN, dated July 26, 1994, pp. 2-13). [3]
The defense has a different version.
Appellant has been working as a welder at the Jaspe Light and Steel Industries. On November
6, 1992, while he was welding a tiller, Serafin Hubines, Jr. passed by and kicked it. When he
confronted appellant, the latter asked, Why, do you want to fight? Then Hubines boxed appellant
on his chest. He fell down on a sitting position. At that point, Hubines pulled his gun. Appellant
immediately stood up and held Hubines hands. They grappled for its possession and both fell on
the ground. Then the gun exploded. According to appellant, he was not sure who caused the
shot. He noticed that many people approached them. Appellant lied down on his stomach and
covered his ears.That was the time he heard three or more shots. He stood up and saw Hubines
lying on the ground full of blood. He walked a few steps and met PO3 Danilo Opong. Appellant told
the latter that he was only defending himself. Patrolman Opong then arrested him and brought him
to the Pavia Police Station for investigation. Meanwhile, Romeo Zuspa, a worker in the compound,
took the firearm and gave it to Patrolman Opong who, in turn, surrendered it to his station.
Resty Amado, also a worker in the same compound, corroborated appellants testimony.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellant of the crime charged,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Jimmy Rubiso is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as provided under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua. Said accused is further ordered to pay the father of the deceased the amount
ofP106,288.85 as actual damages and to the legal heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00
for his wrongful death, P30,000.00 as moral damages; P560,000.00 for loss of earning capacity and
costs of the suit.[4]
The accused who is detained, is hereby credited with the number of days he spent under detention,
if he is qualified, otherwise, he shall be credited only with four fifths (4/5) of his preventive
imprisonment.The accused is further ordered to be sent to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, even if he appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED
PROVED THE THREE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE;
II. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF SELFDEFENSE, THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED THE ACCUSED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT
BECAUSE EVIDENCE SHOW (sic) THAT THERE WAS INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE, HENCE ACCUSED IS
ENTITLED TO A LOWER PENALTY OF ONE OR TWO DEGREES AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 69 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE;
III. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE WERE ABSENT, THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED IS MURDER ATTENDED
BY TREACHERY, BECAUSE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THERE WAS NO TREACHERY, AS A MATTER OF
FACT, THE VICTIM CHALLENGED THE ACCUSED TO A FIGHT BEFORE HE WAS KILLED, HENCE IF
ACCUSED INDEED COMMITTED THE ACT, HE SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
In invoking self-defense, appellant is deemed to have admitted having killed the victim and
the burden of evidence is shifted on him to establish convincing evidence that excludes any vestige
of criminal aggression on his part. [5]
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must prove the existence of the following: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed by
the person being attacked to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.[6] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. It contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or

60
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The person
defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with actual use of
weapon.[7] Of all the elements, unlawful aggression, i.e., the sudden unprovoked attack on the
person defending himself, is indispensable. [8]
Appellant insists that when the victim pulled out his gun, both grappled for its
possession. They fell and there were bursts of gunfire. He must have killed the victim but he was
only defending himself.
Assuming that Hubines had a gun and pulled it, however, records show that he did not
manifest any aggressive act which may have imperiled the life and limb of herein appellant. It is
axiomatic that the mere thrusting of ones hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of drawing a
weapon is not unlawful aggression. [9] Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any
particular target is not sufficient to conclude that ones life was in imminent danger. [10] Hence, a
threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not
sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some
external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. [11]
Another factor which militates against appellants claim of self-defense is the nature and
number of wounds suffered by the victim.
Dr. Tito Doromal, who conducted the autopsy examination, found that the victims body
sustained six (6) bullet wounds. One bullet wound was on the right forehead and another on the
left side of the neck. Four (4) bullet wounds were along the thoraco abdominal region.
The location and presence of gunshot wounds on the body of the victim eloquently refute
appellants allegation of self-defense. It is an oft repeated rule that the presence of a large number
of wounds, their location and their seriousness would negate self-defense. Instead, they indicate a
determined effort to kill.[12]
We thus agree with the trial court that appellant, in killing the victim, did not act in selfdefense.
The prosecution was able to establish that appellant suddenly and unexpectedly shot the
victim at the back without any provocation on his part. In fact the trial court found that Bullet
wounds Nos. 3 and 4 on the thoraco abdominal region were inflicted while the assailant was at the
back of the victim. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby
ensuring without risk to the aggressor the commission of the crime. [13]There being treachery,
appellant must be convicted of murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty imposable when the
crime was committed in 1972 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death which has a
duration of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to death. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium
period of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death which is reclusion perpetua. Hence,
the trial court imposed the correct penalty upon appellant.
On the civil aspect of the case, we affirm the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity to the heirs of the victim. By way of exemplary damages based on the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, an amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded to the said
heirs.[14]
As to actual damages, Serafin Hubines, Sr. presented the receipts showing that he
spent P106,288.85 as hospital and medical expenses; P13,000.00 as funeral expenses, or a total
of P119,288.85.[15]
We increase the trial courts award of moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line
with current jurisprudence.[16] The purpose of such award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but
to compensate them for their wounded feelings. [17] As borne out by human nature and experience,
a violent death, such as the one at bar, invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and
anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death not
only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love,
affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been
done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering.[18]
As to the victims earning capacity, the trial court found that his annual gross income at the
time of his death was P76,800.00 computed at the rate of P1,600.00 a week for forty-eight (48)
weeks. From this amount is deducted the necessary and incidental expenses, estimated at 50%,
leaving a balance of P38,400.00.[19] His net annual income would then be multiplied by his life
expectancy, using the following formula: 2/3 x 80-34 (age of the victim at time of
death). Considering that he was 34 years old when he died, his life expectancy would be
31. Multiplying the net balance of his annual income by his life expectancy, the loss of his earning
capacity is P1,190,400.00, thus:
In computing the life expectancy of a person the following formula is used:
Life expectancy 2/3 x [80 - the age of the victim at the time of death or 34] = 30.66 or 31
Loss of earning capacity P38,400.00 [net annual income] x life expectancy = P1,190,400.00[20]
A modification of the trial courts finding that the victims loss of earning capacity amounts
to P560,000.00 on the basis of a life expectancy of 28 years is, therefore, in order.

61
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 39400 finding
appellant JIMMY RUBISO @ Alog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that he is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased (a) P119,288.85 as actual
damages; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P1,190,400.00 representing the loss of his
earnings.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
(10)People vs. Montemayor
***50, 000 has been fixed as the civil indemnity for rape***
(9) People vs. Bantilan
***100, 000 in case of rape with homicide***
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERMIE BANTILAN, accusedappellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision of Branch 32, Regional Trial Court, Surigao
City finding accused-appellant Hermie Bantilan y Taganas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
complex crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
On February 17, 1995, the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Surigao del Norte, an Information charging Bantilan with the crime of rape with
homicide committed as follows:
That on December 27, 1994 at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, in Bunyasan, Malimono, Surigao
del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with full
freedom, intelligence and voluntariness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd design, have sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge with one JITA QUINTO with force and
intimidation and the employment of force caused several injuries on the victim thus resulting in the
death of the victim to the damage and prejudice of the heirs, actual, moral and exemplary
damages in amounts to be proven in court.
ACT CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 335, No. 3, par. 4 of the Revised penal Code. [1]
Upon arraignment on March 29, 1995, accused Bantilan assisted by Atty. Ombra Benaning
from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) pleaded not guilty. Thus, trial ensued.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
In the early morning of December 27, 1994, Nestor Agapay and Bernabe Humanoy went to the
store of Jita Quinto, at Barangay Bunyasan, Malimono, Surigao del Norte. They ordered and drank a
glass of Tanduay Rhum. They were attended to by Rosie Balabala, younger sister of Jita Quinto who
was then washing clothes. The store is located at the ground floor of Quintos residence.
At twelve oclock noon, the two sisters took their lunch. They invited accused and his companions
who were still drinking to join them. Only accused accepted the offer.
After lunch, Jita went to her room at the second floor to rest. Shortly, thereafter Bernabe went
home leaving behind accused Bantilan and Nestor Agapay who were still drinking Tanduay Rhum.
At about two oclock in the afternoon, accused Bantilan ordered another bottle of liquor. Rosie
refused to give him another bottle because he was already drunk. Accused Bantilan suddenly
asked where her sister Jita was. Rosie responded that she was sleeping at her room
upstairs. Accused Bantilan left without being noticed by Rosie and Nestor who were conversing
with each other. Rosie heard some noise upstairs; she just ignored it. A few minutes later, accused
Bantilan appeared and informed Rosie that her sister Jita wanted her upstairs. Rosie immediately

62
went up. She was followed by accused. As she entered her sisters room, she was shocked to see
her sister sprawled on the floor unconscious. The pillows and beddings were in disarray and were
strewn around Jita. Rosie ran towards her sister and shouted for help. Nestor rushed upstairs and
carried Jita. Accused Bantilan, however, did not help them.
Responding neighbors and barangay officials brought Jita to a nearby hospital. Accused Bantilan,
on the other hand, was turned over by the barangay officials to the chief of police of Malimono,
Surigao Del Norte, where he was detained at the municipal jail. The Police authorities took pictures
of the scene of the crime. They found fresh bloodstains (Exh. B) splattered and scattered all
over. What caught their attention most was the victims bloodied panty strewn on the floor.
At the police station, accused Bantilan denied any involvement in the killing of the victim. However,
the investigating officer remembered the bloodied panty and thus, asked accused Bantilan to pull
up his shirt. There were bloodstains at the edges of his shirt and his underwear (brief). He could not
explain why and where he got those bloodstains.
That same afternoon, policemen brought accused Bantilan to the hospital to have the bloodstains
found on his shirt and underwear (brief) examined. When accused Bantilan was asked to remove
his pants, the investigators saw that the lower portion of his sexual organ contained several specks
of fresh bloodstains, the size of a pinhead. What was even more noticeable were the bloodstains
covering most of accuseds brief (front portion) (exh. H). Likewise, he failed to explain why he had
bloodstains on his genital organ.[2]
On the other hand, the version of the defense is as follows:
xxx. At the time of the incident, he was in Surigao City buying a meterstick which he needed as a
carpenter.Thereafter, he went home arriving at their house in Bunyaran, Malimono at around 4
oclock in the afternoon. The barangay captain, however, fetched him and brought him to the police
station. From there, he was taken to the emergency hospital and then brought back to the police
station and placed in jail (TSN, 10 July 1990, pp. 4-5). [3]
On February 10, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, Hermie Bantilan, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as a principal of the complex crime of rape with homicide as defined and
penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the mandatory penalty of DEATH by lethal injection as provided by
law.
The accused is ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim, Jita Quinto, the sum of P14,000.00 as
reimbursement of actual expenses for the burial of the deceased; the sum of P100,000.00 as
indemnity for the rape and death of the said victim; and the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In this appeal, appellant made the following assignment of errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE VICTIM JITA QUINTO WAS RAPED.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[5]
While the appellant concedes to the well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that in rape, it is
sufficient to prove that there is penetration of the mans penis into the victims sexual organ, no
matter how slight, the fact of penetration of appellants penis into the victims vagina was not,
however, established in the case at bar. The testimony of the examining doctor did not
categorically state that the victim was indeed raped. She testified that the abrasions in the vaginal
canal of the victim and the blood oozing from her vagina may have been caused by the insertion of

63
some other objects and not necessarily by the forcible penetration of a mans penis. Thus, a
reasonable doubt exists on the prosecutions theory of rape which should be considered in favor of
the accused. Moreover, appellant avers that the trial court erred in convicting him based on
circumstantial evidence which was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In convicting the appellant for the crime charged, the trial court gave particular emphasis on
the following unrefuted facts established by the evidence, to wit:
The evidence stands undisputed that at about three oclock in the afternoon of December 27, 1994,
the lifeless or unconscious body of Jita Quinto was found in the bedroom of her house in barangay
Bunyasan, Malimono, Surigao del Norte. At a postmortem examination conducted later at the
Malimono District Hospital by Dr. Adoracion Mantilla, her death was ascribed to cardiac arrest
resulting from asphyxia or suffocation as stated in her certificate of death (Exhibit E) and the
medical findings of Dr. Mantilla (Exhibit D).
According to Rosie Balabala, the younger sister of the deceased victim, she found Jita lying on the
floor where she had been sleeping. Present with her were the accused, Hermie Bantilan, and later
Nestor Agapay. The sleeping mat, pillows, mosquito net and blanket of the deceased were in
disarray as shown in the photographs (Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2). The victims bloodied panties
(Exhibit B) were found on top of the mat as appear in the photographs (Exhibit A-3 and A-1-A).
In her testimony, Dr. Adoracion Mantilla declared that upon making an internal examination of Jita
Quinto, she found fresh abrasions in the latters vaginal canal. Blood oozed from her vagina. The
doctor opined that the abrasions were probably caused by a man having sexual intercourse forcibly
with the deceased. For lack of the necessary laboratory equipment, she was unable to conduct an
examination for the presence of spermatozoa.
The doctor further testified that she found marked bluish discolorations on the body, lips and
fingernails of the deceased indicating a lack of oxygen in her blood. The eyes were dilated or open
and bulging and there were various hematoma found around the victims mouth, above her right
nipple, at her extremities and her back, more specifically in the left and right scapular regions. The
aforementioned findings showed that the deceased had to struggle for breath probably because of
some object placed on her face by her assailant.[6]
The trial court also found that the evidence inevitably and inescapably linked the accused to
the offense charged based on the following facts and circumstances:
(1) The accused, Hermie Bantilan, was in the house of the victim, Jita Quinto, at the time
she was criminally assaulted. Earlier, Bantilan had been drinking liquor with two
friends in the store at the ground floor of the victims house;
(2) There was a commotion in the upstairs bedroom where Jita Quinto was resting. About
ten minutes later the accused came out into the store;
(3) Bantilan was the one who informed Rosie Balabala that she was needed by her elder
sister, Jita Quinto, thereby admitting that he had just came from the latter;
(4) There was nobody else with Jita Quinto in her bedroom except the accused;
(5) Upon immediately responding, Rosie Balabala found Jita Quinto lying unconscious or
dead on the floor with her beddings in disarray and her bloody panties on top of the
mat;
(6) While Balabala and Nestor Agapay frantically tried to revive the victim, Hermie
Bantilan just stood nearby doing nothing to help;
(7) Bantilan was brought by barangay Kagawad Severino Sacro escorted by two tanods in
a jeepney from Bunyasan to the Malimono police station in the afternoon of December
27, 1994;

64
(8) When Bantilan was physically examined by Chief of Police Eulogio Ferol, he saw
bloodstains in the briefs and tiny specks of blood at the edge of the shirt of the said
accused;
(9) The foregoing findings of the Chief of police were confirmed and verified by Dr. Ramon
D. Lafuente who found, in addition thereto, numerous specks of newly dried blood on
the sexual organ of Hermie Bantilan; and,
(10) The postmortem examination of Jita Quinto conducted by Dr. Adoracion Mantilla
showed that the deceased sustained fresh abrasions in her vaginal canal and blood
oozed from her vagina. In the doctors opinion these were caused by someone having
had forcible sexual intercourse with her.[7]
The testimony of prosecution witness Rosie Balabala established how the crime was
committed. On direct examination, she testified as follows:
Prosecutor:

Q: Who were drinking?

Q: Do you recall where were you last December 27,

1994 at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon more or
less?

A: Hermie Bantilan, Nestor Agapay, and Bernabie

Humanoy.
Prosecutor:

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where were you at that time?

Q: While you were tending your store and your

customers are Hermie Bantilan, Nestor Agapay, and
Bernabie Humanoy, what happened, if any?

A: I was at the store, Sir.

Q: Where is that store located?

A: After they finished that drinks they ordered for

another drinks, but I did not give them.

A: At the ground floor of her house where I stayed.

Q Do you remember who asked for another drinks?

Q: What barangay is that house located?

A: Hermie Bantilan.

A: At Barangay Buniasan, Malimono, Surigal del

Norte.

Court: (To the witness)

Q: What did they drink?

Q: By the way, who is the owner of that store?

A: Tanduay Rhum.
A: Jita Quinto.
Prosecutor:
Q: Your sister?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Now, when you told him that you will not give him
drink any more, what did he do?

Q: The victim in this case?

A: Then he asked the whereabouts of my ate.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did he tell you?

Q: At that time, what were you doing at the store of

your sister?

A: He said, where is your ate and I told him that she

was upstairs sleeping?

A: I was tending the store.

Q: What did he do after you told him that she was

upstairs sleeping?

Q: While you were tending that store of your sister, at

that time, do you remember of incident that
happened at that time?

A: I noticed that he move away from me.

Court: (to the witness)

A: They were drinking.

Q: When you said, Ate, to whom are you referring to?
Court: (to the witness)
A: Jita Quinto.

65
Prosecutor:

Q: When you went upstairs, where was Hermie

Bantilan?

Q When you said he went away from you, can you

remember what did he do by that time?

A: He was at my back following me.

A: After a while there was a commotion upstairs.

Q: How about Nestor Agapay?

Q When you heard that there was a commotion

upstairs what did you do?

A: He remained at the store.

Q: Did you reach upstairs when the accused told you?

A: After a while he arrived at the store and told me

that my ate wanted me to go upstairs.

A: Yes, Sir.

Q Who told you that?

Q: When you reached upstairs, what happened next?

A: Hermie Bantilan.

A: I saw my sister lying in the floor.

Q: You mean the accused in this case?

Q: Which part of the house upstairs that you saw that

your sister lying in the floor?

A: Yes, sir.
A: In the bedroom.
Court:
Q: How many bedroom of your house?
Q: Who told you that your sister wanted you to go
upstairs?
A: Hermie Bantilan, Sir.

A: Two bedrooms.
Q: When you saw your sister lying on the floor, what
did you notice anything?

Prosecutor:
Q: From the time that you heard the commotion
upstairs to the time that you were told (sic) by your
Ate upstairs, how many minutes have elapsed?

A: I immediately run for her assistance and shouted

for help.
Q: Why did you shout?

A: About 10 minutes.

A: To ask for help.

Q: From the time that you see that the accused went
away from you and at the time he came back and
said that you were wanted by your sister, how long
did it take that period?

Q: To whom did you direct your shout?

A: More than 30 minutes.

Q: When you said that the accused went away from
you, do you remember where was the companion of
Hermie Bantilan?

A: To our neighbors.
Q: When you shouted for help, where was the
accused, Hermie Bantilan?
A: He was there at the house.
Q: What was he doing there in the house?

A: Bernabie Humanoy already went home.

A: He was just standing.
Q: How about the other companion named, Nestor
Agapay?
A: He was there in the ground floor of the store.

Q: How about Nestor Agapay do?

A: When I shouted for help, Nestor Agapay ran
upstairs.

Q: What was he doing there?

Q: What did Nestor Agapay do?
A: We were conversing each other.
Q: When the accused told you to go upstairs because
your Ate wanted you, what did you do?
A: I immediately went upstairs.

A: And Nestor Agapay carried the body of my older

sister.
Q: When you saw your sister for the first time in the
room, did you notice anything inside the room?

66
A: When I entered the room, the pillows were
disarranged, mosquito net was covering her body,
and pillows was at her side and also at the other side.

A: From his facial appearance his face was red, your

honor.
Q: Is that all?

Q: When you first saw your sister, what did you notice
in her face?

A: Yes, your honor.

A: Her face was bluish and eyes wide open (lig-at).

Court:

Q: Did you talk to her at that time?

That is all, doctor.

A: No more.

Prosecutor:

Q: After that, what happened next, after Nestor

Agapay carried the body of your elder sister?

Q: The number two findings, it is stated, presence of

fresh blood in the brief, anterior side. Will you
elaborate on this findings doctor?

A: I went down and shouted for help.

A: That is in front.
Q: When your sister was carried by Nestor Agapay,
where was the accused at that time?
A: He just stayed and after awhile he went down. [8]

Court:
Q: Will you indicate in your person the part, you point
to your body?

Another prosecution witness Dr. Ramon D. Lafuente,

Medical Officer IV of Malimono District Hospital
testified on the condition of the accused, thus:
Q: Were you able to examine Hermie Bantilan on that
day of December 27, 1994?
A: I was able to examine Hermie Bantilan when he
was brought to the hospital about 5:15 in the
afternoon.
Q: Do you know who brought him there in the
hospital if you can remember?

Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing in front portion of his sexual organ.
Prosecutor:
Q: How big was the fresh blood that you saw in his
brief?
A: Specks of blood pinhead size.
Court:

A: I dont know it was PNP members.

Q: How many specks of blood?
Q: Now, in your findings in this medical certificate
that you had identified to have issued, here is in the
diagnosis and findings, the patient appeared to be
drunk.How did you conclude that the patient
appeared to be drunk at that time?
A: His facial appearance, his face was red.
Court:
Q: How about his smell?

A: So many, your honor.

Court:
Go ahead.
Prosecutor:
Q: Now, can you tell the Honorable Court the number
two finding the size of the blood on the portion of his
brief which contained specks of blood?

A: I cannot smell, your honor.

A: Around 2/3 of the front area of his brief.
Q: Did you notice if he smell of an alcohol?
A: I did not notice, your honor.

Q: Did you ask this Hermie Bantilan when you

examined why it happened that he has fresh blood on
his brief?

Q: How did you conclude that he was drunk?

A: I failed to ask on that.[9]

x x x.

67
There is no doubt that Jita Quinto was raped. The physical evidence in the instant case
showing the use of brutal force on her when she was sexually assaulted certainly speaks louder
than words. The failure to find the presence of spermatozoa in the victims vagina does not in any
way weaken the prosecutions theory of rape for, indeed, there was enough evidence to prove the
existence of rape and that the appellant was the author of the crime. In fact, the most
incriminating pieces of evidence against appellant were his bloodied shirt and
underwear. Reminded by the bloodied panty of the victim strewn on the floor, the investigating
officer told appellant to pull up his shirt. There were bloodstains at the edges of his shirt and on the
front portion of his underwear (brief). Upon closer examination, there were also tiny specks of fresh
bloodstains, many of which were the size of a pinhead on the lower portion of his sexual
organ. Appellant could not explain how and why he got those bloodstains at the edge of his shirt
and in the front portion of his underwear.
In a strained effort to seek an acquittal, counsel of appellant even argues that the prosecution
failed to prove that these bloodstains were human bloodstains in the light of the ruling in People v.
Alicando.[10] The facts in that case are different and, therefore, cannot have any material bearing on
this case. There, the police investigators found bloodstains on the pillow and on the t-shirt of the
accused found in his house. The Court discarded the evidence because there was no testimony
that the stains were caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim and, (i)n addition,
there was no testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly
committed the crime x x x. Moreover, a material circumstance peculiar in Alicando, was the
accuseds claim that he was a butcher in a market. In stark contrast, bloodstains in the case at bar
were found not only on the shirt belonging to appellant, but, of all places, on his sexual organ and
on the front portion of his brief. If, for instance, tomato sauce or a red substance (other than blood)
accidentally spilled on him, why did it get into his sex organ and the front portion of his brief
without his trousers being stained, as well, in the process?Yet, he could not even offer the lamest
explanation why and how he got the red substance that had all the appearances of human
blood. One other critical dissimilarity between this case and Alicando is that, here, the appellant
was physically examined right after the brutal killing was committed; thus, the possibility of a
smear getting into appellants genitals and the front portion of his brief with something else other
than blood belonging to the victim is nil.In Alicando, on the other hand, the accused therein was
arrested at the meat section of a supermarket the morning following the commission of the rape;
hence, the posibility was injected that he could have smeared his shirt in some place other than
where the victim was rape and murdered.
It must be noted that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. [11] Conviction can be had on
the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the appellant is the author of the crime
to the exclusion of all others. [12] The law provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[13] We agree with the trial court that all these requirements
were adequately met in the case at bar to sustain the accused-appellants conviction.
The prosecution has indubitably established appellants culpability through the following
circumstances: (1) Few minutes before the rape-slay of the victim, appellant asked Rosie (victims
younger sister) her whereabouts; (2) Appellant left unnoticed; (3) Shortly thereafter, Rosie heard a
commotion upstairs; (4) About ten minutes later, appellant appeared and informed Rosie that her
sister wanted her upstairs. (How else could he have told Rosie that Jita wanted to see her sister
were it not for the fact that he had come from upstairs?); (5) The victim was seen sprawled dead in
her bedroom; (6) Appellant did not lift a hand to help; (7) Few hours later, appellant was turned
over to the police authorities for investigation, wherein it was discovered that his shirt, underwear
and genital organ were sprinkled and splattered with bloodstains. He could not explain why and
where he got those bloodstains; and (8) The victim, meanwhile, was found to have been brutally
killed and sexually assaulted.[14]
Bantilan denied being at the scene of the crime. He interposed the alibi that he was in Surigao
City buying a meter stick. Defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and have always been
viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. [15] On its
face, these defenses are worthless considering that Rosie Balabala positively testified that the
accused-appellant was in the house of the deceased at or about the time of the commission of the

68
crime. No corroboration as to his whereabouts was ever presented. Neither can we impute bad
faith or malice on the part of Rosie in testifying against Bantilan. Bantilan was a distant relative and
a good friend of the two sisters and oftentimes went to visit them at the store. [16]The trial court
found no motive for Rosie Balabala to wrongfully implicate Bantilan in so serious a charge as in the
case at bar. In the light of the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime,
the defense of alibi must fail.
Appellants evil intention was obvious. After inquiring from Rosie where her sister was, he
slowly and stealthily moved away and disappeared. A good thirty minutes later, Rosie heard a
commotion upstairs and after ten minutes, appellant appeared and informed Rosie that her sister
wanted her upstairs. How did he know then that Jita was upstairs if he had not been there? Soon
after, Jita was discovered sprawled on the floor. Appellant was the only person who came down
from upstairs. No plausible theory was offered, much less evidence presented, to demonstrate the
possibility that somebody else other than the appellant could have gone upstairs and raped the
victim.
The post-mortem examination revealed that the victims death was caused by
asphyxiation. When Rosie went upstairs, she discovered the room in disarray, her sister lifeless on
the floor, her face bluish and eyes wide open. The examining doctor opined that there was an
object placed on her face which prevented her from breathing which consequently, led to her
death. The strength of the hands or object that smothered the victims face must have been so
great that the victim was not even able to bleat out cries, shouts, or shrieks of help which could
have at least alerted the people downstairs. This is why Rosie heard only a small commotion from
upstairs, which must have come from the desperate struggle to break away from his stronghold to
reach for air. Given such established facts, this was the only way resorted to by the appellant in
order to silence the victim while he succeeded in satisfying his lust on her. In the absence of a
showing that anyone else, other than the appellant, had the opportunity to be at the scene of the
crime during the very short period between the time appellant went upstairs and the moment
Rosie heard a commotion coming from there, followed by the appellant telling her that Jita wanted
to see her, appellant must necessarily be considered as the author of the rape and the resulting
death of the victim.
The Court is satisfied with moral certainty that the trial court has established the guilt of the
appellant for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659 provides that:
x x x.
when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed , the penalty shall be
death.
Thus, the Court is constrained to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court. Four
justices of the Court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act 7659
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority to
the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
In line with the recent jurisprudence, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the victim of rape
with homicide is in the amount of P100,000.00 which is fully justified and properly commensurate
with the seriousness of the said special complex crime. [17]
The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is granted. Moral damages may be additionally
awarded to the heirs of the victim in a criminal proceeding without the need for pleading or proof of
the basis thereof; the fact that they suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to
still require the recital thereof at the trial.[18]
However, one Justice votes to acquit accused-appellant expressing the following:
DISSENTING OPINION

69
With much trepidation, I regret that I can not agree to the majoritys decision to affirm the death
penalty imposed on the accused.
It is a basic rule in criminal procedure that, the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the
offense charged lies upon the prosecution, and that the burden must be discharged on the strength
of its own evidence and not upon the weakness of the evidence submitted by the defense (People
vs. Adofina,239 SCRA 67, 81-82 [1994].) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense (People vs. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335, 347 [1997], citing People vs. Guamos, 241 SCRA 528,
531 [1995], citing People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992], People vs. Pizarro, 211 SCRA 325
[1992] and People vs. De la Cruz, 207 SCRA 449 [1992].) In the case at bar there is misplaced
reliance by the majority on the presence of bloodstains in the undershirt and genital organ of the
accused. This circumstance is inadequate to show that he committed the crime of rape with
homicide.
The presumption of innocence is founded upon the basic principles of justice and is a substantial
part of the law. Thus, it cannot be overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture, i.e., a probability that
the accused committed the crime or that he had the opportunity to do so (People vs. Isla, 278
SCRA 47, 52 [1997]; see also People vs. Salem, 280 SCRA 841 [1997].)
We have held that the presence of bloodstains on the garments, without further proof that the
same are necessarily the by-products of the rape committed and that they are the dried blood of
either appellant or the victim, cannot for lack of connecting proof be considered, even as part
of circumstantialevidence in determining appellants culpability (People vs. Ilao, G.R. No. 129529,
September 29, 1998.)The conclusion of the trial court that the bloodstains were indicia of
rape is speculative andconjectural because there is no evidence showing that blood was exuded
from appellant or the victim during or after the sexual intercourse in question. With the failure of
the prosecution to show that copulation necessarily leads to bleeding and that the stains were the
victims or appellants dried blood, other circumstances and events cannot be excluded as the
possible sources thereof (People vs. Ilao, supra.) This ruling may well be the rationalization in this
case.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains were not submitted for examination; there was no finding that
they belonged to the accused or to the victim, hence, as held in the above cited case, it should not
have been considered as part of the circumstantial evidence. It can not be considered as
an indicia that accused raped the victim much more that he killed the victim.
As emphatically ruled in People vs. Isla (Supra, on p. 570, citing People vs. Jumao-as, 230 SCRA 70
[1994]), mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the
guilt of an appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The probability that accused was the one who raped
and killed the victim is based on speculation arising from the bloodstains found in the garments
and person of the accused.
In imposing the supreme penalty of death, we must exercise utmost caution. We value human life
no matter how heinous the crime may be attributed to the suspect. In People vs. Godoy (250 SCRA
676, 732 [1995]), we repeated the age old observation and experience of mankind on the
penological and societal effect of capital punishment: If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.
I submit that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. I
vote to acquit.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision sentencing the accusedappellant Hermie Bantilan to the supreme penalty of death. Accused-appellant is directed to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, in addition to the
sums ofP100,000 as civil indemnity and P14,000 as actual expenses awarded by the trial court.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of his pardoning power.

70
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

(11) People vs. Caraig

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DONATO CARAIG, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Donato Caraig challenges the consolidated decision [1] dated 28 April 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1)
three counts of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-88-684 to Q-88-686 for the death of Melencio
Castro, Jr., Roberto Raagas, and Placido Agustin; and (2) frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. Q88-687 for the mortal wounding of Edmundo Diaz.
Initially, only a certain Rolando Laomoc and four Does were charged in the separate
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-88-684 to Q-88-687. The informations, however, were
subsequently amended to substitute the names of Richard Doe and Roger Doe with Renato
Laxamana and Donato Caraig. The trial court approved the amendments in its Order of 28 February
1989.[2]
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-88-684 reads:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO LAOMOC Y CABE, DONATO CARAIG Y
GARCIA, RENATO LAXAMANA and TWO (2) DOES, the latter whose true names and whereabouts
have not as yet been ascertained, of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of October 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and confederating with
and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of one MELENCIO CASTRO Y PASCUA, JR., by then and there shooting him with a
gun, hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of said Melencio P. Castro, Jr., in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of
the New Civil Code.[3]
The informations for murder in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-88-685 and Q-88-686 are similarly
worded, except as to the victims who were Roberto Raagas and Placido Agustin, respectively. [4]
The information for frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. Q-88-687 reads:
That on or about the 5th day of October 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of one EDMUNDO DIAZ Y DE DIOS, by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting
him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries, the
offenders thus performing the acts of execution which would produce death as a consequence, but
which nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes independent of the wills of the
perpetrators, that is, the timely medical intervention given to the latter, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the
New Civil Code.[5]

71
Laomoc was arrested, while the warrants for the arrest [6] of Laxamana and Caraig were
returned unserved.
On 9 November 1988, Laomoc was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. [7] Trial proceeded as
against him. However, on 31 May 1989, on motion of the prosecution and with Laomocs consent,
the trial court ordered the provisional dismissal and archival of the cases as against him on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. But later, on 28 October 1991, the prosecution filed a motion
to revive all the cases as against Laomoc. [8] In its Order of 4 December 1991, the trial court granted
the motion and issued a warrant for the arrest of Laomoc. [9] The latter, however, has remained at
large.[10]
Meanwhile, or on 18 July 1991, Caraig was arrested in Cavite. [11] Upon arraignment, he entered
a plea of not guilty in each case.[12] The trial then proceeded as against him.
The prosecutions principal witness was Edmundo Diaz. He testified that at around 11:00 p.m.
on 4 October 1988, he, together with Roberto Raagas, Melencio Castro Jr., and Placido Agustin went
to the Orchids Beerhouse in Quezon City, in front of Ali Mall, Cubao. As they were leaving the
beerhouse at past midnight or in the early morning of 5 October 1988, Caraig confronted
them (sinita) whether they were military men. They did not answer.[13] A rumble or fight suddenly
ensued between his group and Caraig. It was a brief scuffle. Caraig then ran back to the Orchids
Beerhouse.[14] Thereafter, Edmundo and his companions rode on a Rocalex taxi. They were chased,
however, by an old 1976 model white Galant car, which eventually blocked the taxi along
12th Avenue and P. Tuazon St., Quezon City, about 100 meters from the Orchids Beerhouse.
[15]
Caraig, Laxamana, and Laomoc alighted from the Galant car. Each of them held a .45 caliber
gun, which they simultaneously fired upon Edmundo and his companions. [16] While the hail of
bullets went on, Edmundo played dead. He then heard somebody utter: Pare, tama na yan. Patay
na lahat ang mga iyan. When the car left, he asked the people who gathered around the scene to
bring him to a hospital, where he underwent treatment for eighteen days. [17]
Another prosecution eyewitness, Danilo Javier, corroborated Edmundos story. Danilo testified
that at around 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1988, he was at the Orchids Beerhouse drinking beer with
several companions, namely, Caraig, Laxamana, and a certain Lando. [18] Later in the night, a
commotion took place at the beerhouse exit. From there, Caraig re-entered the beerhouse shouting
that someone had taken his gun. All the men in their table rushed towards the exit. Caraig,
Laxamana, and Lando got into a car and chased a taxi.[19]
From the street pavement, Danilo observed that the taxi was moving rather slowly away from
the beerhouse. The car blocked the taxi.Laxamana pointed a .45 caliber gun at the person inside
the right side of the taxi, while Caraig went to the left side of the taxi. Then somebody handed over
a .9 mm. gun to Caraig. When he received the gun, Caraig suddenly fired it upon the passengers in
the taxi.Laxamana followed suit. A person tried to get out of the taxi, but Laxamana grabbed him
and shot him in the head. Danilo claimed that he was about twenty-five meters from the scene of
the incident.[20]
Prosecution witness SPO4 Lino Banaag, one of the policemen who responded to the shooting
incident, declared that he found the dead body of Roberto Raagas on the passengers seat beside
the driver, that of Placido Agustin at the passengers seat at the back, and that of Melencio Castro
Jr. on the pavement beside the taxi. The victims were identified through their identification
cards. He also found empty shells and slugs of .45 caliber and .9 mm. firearms around the
taxi. Banaag was also informed by the other police officers that an injured person, whom they were
able to identify as Edmundo Diaz, was brought to the Quirino Memorial Hospital. There, they took
Edmundos statement.[21]
Dr. Valentin Bernales, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified
that he conducted an autopsy on the bodies of the three victims. He found that the cause of the
death of Roberto Raagas was hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds resulting to shock. [22] He
opined that from the location of the gunshot wounds it could be gleaned that when the victim was
fired upon he was stooping forward and sitting. He approximated that the bullets came from a .9
mm. to a .45 caliber gun.[23] His autopsy on Placido Agustins cadaver revealed that the cause of his
death was also hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds resulting to shock. [24] The body
sustained eleven wounds. The varying measurements of the entrance wounds disclosed that the

72
firearms used were a .9 mm. to .45 mm. caliber range. On the cadaver of Melencio Castro Jr., Dr.
Bernales testified that he found two gunshot wounds. The first was located on the head at the back
portion, right side and directed forward slightly downward and medially to the left. It involved the
brain, the skull bone, and exited on the auxillary area or at the back on the left side. The second
was directed backward, downward and laterally; it involved the lungs and exited on the back
portion of his scapula.[25]
Dr. Alberto Capuno, a resident surgeon at the Quirino Memorial Medical Center, testified that
he treated Edmundo Diaz for three gunshot wounds. These wounds perforated the chest, stomach,
and leg and were fatal.[26]
The wives of the dead victims testified on the civil aspect of the crime.
Mrs. Ruth Agustin testified that her husband was 37 years old at the time of his death. Her
husband was an employee of the Social Security System receiving a monthly salary of P5,000. She
and her children had suffered mental anguish and torture and financial setback as a result of her
husbands untimely demise. She spent around P150,000 for the funeral of her husband.[27]
Mrs. Rhodora Raagas testified that her husband was 40 years old at the time of his death. He
was the President of Sinclair Security and Allied Services, a family-owned corporation, with a
monthly compensation of P30,000. Mrs. Raagas claimed to have spent more thanP100,000 for
funeral expenses. She said that she and her children were at a loss and in a state of shock as a
consequence of her husbands death.[28]
Mrs. Merle Loria-Castro testified that her husband was 36 years old at the time of his
death. He was a taxi driver of New Rocalex with an average earning of P500 per day or P7,500 a
month. She spent a total of P19,900 for the burial of her husband.[29]
The defense presented as its sole witness appellant Caraig, who was still a member of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) when the incident in question happened. He recalled that on the night
of 4 October 1988, he went to the Orchids Beerhouse to look for Rolando Laomoc, a driver of the
service vehicle of the PC. Caraig was with Laxamana, another member of the PC. They used their
service car, a 1979 white Galant. They found Laomoc and joined him in drinking beer with twelve
other persons, one of whom he recognized as prosecution witness Danilo Javier. Later, he gave the
car keys to Laomoc and excused himself from the group, as he wanted to go back to the barracks.
[30]

When Caraig stepped out of the beerhouse, a man whom he later identified as prosecution
witness Edmundo Diaz approached him and asked whether he was a member of the PC. Caraig
replied in the affirmative. Edmundo countered that he was a member of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS). Caraig then asked for identification or proof of Edmundos claim, but the latter
remarked, CIS to. Makulit ka. Ignoring Edmundo this time, Caraig proceeded to the street
pavement.[31]
Suddenly, Edmundo poked a gun at Caraigs side. But Caraig merely turned his back against
Edmundo. The latter then hit him with a gun on his left eyebrow and lips. Suddenly, the
companions of Edmundo ganged up on him, held his arms, and hit him on the different parts of his
body. They took his service pistol. After almost ten minutes, he was able to kick the side of a
parked car, and they all fell down. He forthwith ran towards the beerhouse and told his companions
that his service pistol was grabbed from him. His companions scampered towards the exit of the
beerhouse.[32]
Caraig was aided by Laxamana while he walked towards the exit. He pointed to Laomoc the
taxi where his assailants rode. Laomoc and his companions rode in the Galant car and chased the
taxi. Laxamana and Caraig were still at the street pavement when they saw the taxi passengers
exchange gunfire with those riding in the Galant car. The gunfire ceased when the car blocked the
taxi. Caraig was shocked with what he saw, and he remained rooted from his vantage point for one
or two minutes. After the gunfight, he noticed his pistol service on the ground, got it, and later rode
in the car with Laxamana and Laomoc back to their headquarters. [33]

73
Caraig denied that he was one of the assailants. He also claimed that Danilo Javier was still in
the beerhouse when the chase started, and arrived at the scene only when everything was over. [34]
In its challenged decision, the trial court found that the prosecution established with moral
certainty that Caraig was one of the assailants who shot the victims. The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were clear, straightforward, and convincing as opposed to the testimony of
the defense witness, which consisted merely of denial and alibi. These defenses cannot prevail
over the positive identification of Caraig by eyewitnesses Edmundo Diaz and Danilo Javier, as well
as the documentary, physical, and other testimonial evidence offered by the prosecution. The trial
court appreciated treachery and conspiracy in the commission of the crime. It then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered accused Donato Caraig is found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the three counts of murder for the deaths of Melencio Castro, Roberto Raagas and Placido
Agustin and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the offense and
ordered to pay the heirs of Melencio Castro the sum of P19,900 for burial expenses, P50,000 for
indemnity and P100,000 for moral damages; to pay the heirs of Roberto Raagas the sum
of P140,000 for burial expenses,P50,000 for indemnity and P500,000 for moral damages [and] to
pay the heirs Placido Agustin the sum of P150,000 for burial expense, P50,000 for indemnity
and P300,000 for moral damages.
Accused is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of frustrated murder for
the mortal wounding of Edmundo Diaz and sentenced to serve the penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the cost.[35]
Caraig seasonably appealed to us from the judgment of conviction.
For causes hereunder discussed, the disposition of these cases was delayed.
On 26 September 1994, we accepted the appeal in these cases but required the clerk of court
of the trial court to explain why the records of the cases transmitted were incomplete, and directed
him to require the stenographers concerned to submit the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs).
In our resolution of 23 November 1994, we noted the Compliance of the clerk of court, who
explained that a part of the records were irretrievably lost and that he required the stenographers
to submit to the trial court their copies of the TSNs.
Except for Mirasol Ramos, the stenographers submitted the TSNs. Mirasol Ramos was the
stenographer who took down the stenographic notes of the 1 February 1989 hearing, specifically
the testimony of Dr. Jose Albert Capuno and part of the testimony of Merle Castro. Despite diligent
efforts to do so, Mirasols whereabouts could not be located. Finally, our Office of Administrative
Services reported that she had been officially dropped from the rolls. Thus, in our resolution of 12
February 1997, we required the parties to manifest whether the TSNs for the 1 February 1989
hearing could be dispensed with.
It also appeared that Caraigs counsel of record, Atty. Phytagoras Oliver, was no longer holding
office in the address given in the records. We then required Caraig to manifest whether he was
willing to be represented by a counsel de oficio. It took Caraig some time to submit his
manifestation. So on 18 April 1997, we appointed Atty. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., as his counsel de oficio.
In its Compliance with our 12 February 1997 Resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) manifested that it was inclined to dispense with the TSNs in question. On the other hand, in
his Compliance filed on 18 July 1997, Atty. Gupit maintained that if he would be compelled to take a
stand, he ha[d] to state that the missing transcript should not be dispensed with because the
accused on appeal is entitled to due process in its full spectrum, no more and no less.
Thus, in our Resolution of 11 August 1997, we required the trial court to retake the testimonies
of Dr. Jose Albert Capuno and Merle Castro. The retaking of the testimony was, however, delayed
for a number of reasons. Finally, on 9 August 2001, we received the letter dated 20 July 2001 of
Judge Abednego Adre, then Presiding Judge of Branch 88 of the RTC of Quezon City, informing us
that the testimony of Dr. Capuno was retaken on 13 September 2000 and the TSNs thereof were

74
transmitted to us on 8 March 2001 by registered mail. Judge Adre also stated that Merle Castro had
been missing and efforts to locate her had proved futile; hence, her testimony could not be
retaken.
On 3 September 2001, we required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
dispense with the TSNs of the testimony of Merle Castro. In its Manifestation, the OSG answered in
the affirmative. Atty. Gupit, on the other hand, manifested that the TSNs of the testimony of Merle
Castro could be dispensed with only if the facts sought to be proved by her testimony would be
disregarded. The Court noted the manifestation of the parties.
In his Appellants Brief filed on 1 April 2002, Caraig asserts that the trial court erred in (a)
believing the alleged eyewitnesses testimonies of Edmundo Diaz and Danilo Javier; (b) discarding
his defense of alibi and denial; (c) finding the existence of a conspiracy and treachery; (d) finding
as established beyond reasonable doubt the criminal charges filed against him; and (e) ordering
him to pay damages.
Caraig emphasizes that Edmundo Diaz and Danilo Javier are not credible witnesses because it
took them quite some time, i.e., three years from the time of the incident, before they testified in
court. He then boldly asserts that his conviction is based on mere gut feeling, as the proverbial axe
which has to fall on someone did fall on him by his convenient presence at the place and time
when the crime was committed.
In the Appellees Brief filed on 26 August 2002, the OSG counters that the trial court
committed no errors in these cases. The trial court correctly rejected the defenses of alibi and
denial, which could not outweigh Edmundo Diazs positive identification of Caraig as one of those
who peppered with bullets the taxi that carried the victims to their death, and Edmundo to his near
death. This identification was corroborated by Danilo Javier, who was one of Caraigs drinking
buddies at the beerhouse.
On Caraigs attempt to diminish the credibility of the eyewitnesses accounts on the ground
that they were reluctant witnesses, the OSG maintains that the initial reticence of prosecution
witnesses for fear of reprisal is not uncommon. Such observation is supported by jurisprudence and
explained in these cases, as Caraig was a PC member at the time of the incident. The OSG likewise
agrees with the trial courts appreciation of treachery and conspiracy.
After a careful review of the records of the cases and the evidence adduced by the parties, we
agree with the OSG. The trial courts decision was not based on gut feeling. The proverbial axe
falling on someone did fall on Caraig on the basis of the evidence duly established at the trial.
The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Caraig, in conspiracy with his coassailants, killed Roberto Raagas, Placido Agustin, and Melencio Castro Jr. and almost killed
Edmundo Diaz. They used the Galant PC service car to pursue the victims, who were riding on a
Rocalex taxi, and to block the path of the taxi. They alighted from the car and then used their .45
caliber and .9 mm. service guns to pepper the taxi and the victims with bullets, and they left them
for dead. Only Edmundo Diaz escaped from the carnage because of timely medical treatment and
attention.
The foregoing acts undoubtedly showed unanimity in design, intent, and execution of the
attack on the part of Caraig and his co-assailants. They performed specific acts with closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design to bring about the death of
the victims. Conspiracy among Caraig and his co-assailants was thus established with moral
certainty.
Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence; deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a
joint purpose and design, a concerted action, and a community of interest. [36] It was not even
necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victims.
Caraig wants to impress us that he was merely a horrified spectator of the gruesome events
that unfolded before him. We are not persuaded. His version is incredible and must be rejected in
light of his positive identification as one of the assailants, as well as the categorical and

75
straightforward testimony of the prosecution witnesses. His bare and uncorroborated denial
amounted to nothing more than a negative and self-serving evidence unworthy of weight in law. [37]
Caraig cannot fault the prosecution witnesses initial reluctance to testify. It is not uncommon
for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case. The
natural reticence of most people to get involved is of judicial notice. It is understandable for a
witness to fear for his safety, [38] especially in this case where PC men were involved in the
commission of the crime.Such initial reticence does not affect the witnesses credibility. [39] Besides,
their delay in testifying was principally caused by the delay in the trial caused by, among other
things, Caraigs success in avoiding the service of the warrant of arrest. It was only in 1991 when he
was finally arrested.
We also agree with the OSG and the trial court on the finding of treachery. There is treachery
when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against
persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. [40] Two elements must therefore concur: (1) the
means of execution employed gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and the (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. [41]
The attack upon the victims in these cases was attended by treachery. Per Danilo Javiers
testimony, the taxi on which the victims were riding was moving slowly away from the beerhouse
when Caraig and his co-assailants pursued it and then blocked its path. The interception took place
at less than 100 meters away from the beerhouse. Since the victims were inside the taxi, they had
no chance to fight back or defend themselves. The number of the victims individual wounds and
their relative positions when found dead by the police emphasized further the essence of
treachery. The means, method, and form of the attack in this case were, therefore, consciously
adopted and effectively forestalled the victims from employing a defense against their attackers.
Accordingly, as correctly found by the trial court, Caraig should be held liable for three counts
of murder and one count of frustrated murder.
And now on the civil liability of Caraig.
In awarding in favor of the heirs of Roberto Raagas the amount of P140, 000 for burial
expenses, the trial court relied on Exhibits A and A-1, which are merely lists of expenses written on
a PCIBank check booklet.[42] It based the award for burial expenses in the amount ofP19,900 in
favor of the heirs of Melencio Castro Jr. on Exhibits C (receipt issued by Memorial Homes), D(list of
expenses), and D-1(Affidavit of Adjudication). [43] Notably, these exhibits were presented during the
trial of the cases against Laomoc on 14 December 1988 and 1 February 1989 before appellant
Caraig was arrested. They were not among the documentary evidence offered in evidence during
the trial of the consolidated cases against Caraig. [44] Hence, they cannot be considered as evidence
against him.
Besides, a list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been issued as
a matter of course in business transactions. [45] Neither can the mere testimonies of the victims
widows Ruth Agustin, Rhodora Raagas, and Merle Castro in the consolidated cases against Caraig
justify the awards for funeral or burial expenses. It is necessary for a party seeking the award of
actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such
award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely
incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim will be recognized in
court. [46]Nonetheless, in line with People v. Carillo,[47] reiterated in People v. Bonifacio,[48] we shall
award nominal damages in the amount ofP10,000 for each group of heirs of the victims, since they
clearly incurred funeral expenses.
Anent the awards for moral damages, the same must be sustained in addition to the awards of
civil indemnity. Ruth Agustin and Rhodora Raagas testified on the mental anguish they and their
children suffered as a consequence of the death of their respective husbands.
As to Merle Castro, it is unfortunate that the TSNs of her testimony in the cases against Caraig
were irretrievably lost and could not anymore be reproduced, and her testimony could not be
retaken. Moreover, the decision of the trial court did not mention of a testimony on her moral

76
suffering. What remained in the records is the TSN of her testimony during the trial of Laomoc,
where she declared that she experienced difficulties in life as a consequence of Melencios death
and that she and her children missed him so much. However, this testimony was not adopted in
the cases against Caraig; hence, it cannot be taken into consideration for purposes of determining
the civil liabilities of Caraig. Nevertheless, conformably with People v. Carillo,[49] People v. Panela,
[50]
and People v. Panado,[51] where we reconsidered our policy on moral damages and held that an
award therefor is mandatory and does not require allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim, we uphold the award of moral damages in favor of Melencios heirs even granting that there
is no allegation and proof of their emotional suffering. We reiterate what we said in People v.
Panado:
Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of
the victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when
a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not
only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love,
affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been
done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering. Verily Hilda and her son Louie Gee would
forever carry the emotional wounds of the vicious killing of a husband and a father. With or without
proof, this fact can never be denied; since it is undisputed, it must be considered proved. [52]
The amounts of moral damages awarded for each group of the deceaseds heirs are, however,
reduced to P50,000 in accordance with current jurisprudence.[53]
We also observe that there was testimonial evidence by the widows of Placido Agustin,
Roberto Raagas, and Melencio Castro Jr. on their respective husbands monthly compensation and
age at the time of death. The trial court, however, was silent on the indemnity for loss of earning
capacity under Article 2206 of the Civil Code. In view of the testimonial evidence on the loss of
earning capacity, we deem it necessary to make a pronouncement on the matter.
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefor may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence, provided that there is testimony that the victim was
either (1) self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that in the victims line of work no documentary evidence is
available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.[54]
The testimonial evidence shows that Placido Agustin, Roberto Raagas, and Melencio Castro Jr.
were not self-employed or employed as daily-wage workers earning less than the minimum wage
under the labor laws existing at the time of their death. Placido Agustin was a Social Security
System employee who received a monthly salary of P5,000. Roberto Raagas was the President of
Sinclair Security and Allied Services, a family owned corporation, with a monthly compensation
of P30,000. Melencio Castro Jr. was a taxi driver of New Rocalex with an average daily earning
of P500 or a monthly earning of P7,500. Clearly, these cases do not fall under the exceptions where
indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given despite lack of documentary
evidence. Therefore, for lack of documentary proof, no indemnity for loss of earning capacity can
be given in these cases.
On a final note, moral damages in the amount of P50,000 should also be awarded to Edmundo
Diaz. He testified that he was treated for eighteen days at the hospital for the injuries he sustained.
He also showed the scars of said wounds on his chest, left foot, knee, and the back of his leg. [55] As
stated earlier, Dr. Alberto Capuno, the physician who treated Edmundo, testified that these wounds
were fatal.[56] The fact that he sustained nearly fatal wounds for which he was treated for eighteen
days at the hospital constituted the trauma of physical, psychological, and moral sufferings on
which the award for moral damages under Article 2219(1) of the Civil Code could be based. Moral
damages can be awarded without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof if it is too
obvious to still require the recital thereof. [57]The physical suffering of Edmundo is quite obvious to
still direct him to recount the same.

77
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-88-684 to Q-88-687 is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant DONATO CARAIG is
found guilty of three (3) counts of murder and of frustrated murder, andSENTENCED to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the first three cases and an indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in the fourth case. The awards of civil indemnity
decreed by the trial court for the heirs of Roberto Raagas, Placido Agustin, and Melencio Castro
Jr. are affirmed. The awards for burial expenses are, however, deleted for lack of documentary
proof, and in lieu thereof, an award for nominal damages in the amount of P10,000 is hereby
adjudged in favor of each group of heirs of the deceased victims. The award of moral damages is
reduced to P50,000 for each group of the heirs of the deceased. Appellant is likewise ordered to
pay Edmundo Diaz moral damages in the amount of P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
(10) People vs. Quisay
***If homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the rape, indemnity in the amount of
100, 000 pesos is fully justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said special
complex crime.
Art. 2219, New Civil Code provides cases where moral damages may be awarded.
(a) Indemnify the offended woman;
(b) Acknowledge the offspring, unless the law prevents him from doing so;
(c) To support the offspring, pursuant to Art. 283 of the New Civil Code.***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME QUISAY y IGNACIO, accusedappellant.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Dumaguete City, Branch 41, finding accused-appellant Jaime Quisay guilty of rape with
homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories
provided by law and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as
damages.
The accusatory portion of the Information dated December 12, 1990 states that
that at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of October 21, 1990, at Barangay Suba, Bayawan,
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the victim AINNESS MONTENEGRO, a 2 years and
11 months old baby girl; that on the occasion of the said rape, and taking advantage of
superior strength and with intent to kill, treacherously and attack, assault and use personal
violence upon victim Ainness Montenegro, thereby inflicting upon her the following physical
injuries, thus:
1. Hematoma forehead middle part;

78
2. Multiple abrasions forehead;
3. Hematoma nose with bloody discharges;
4. Hematoma submadibular area, right;
5. Multiple abrasions nose and face;
6. Hematoma left iliac area;
7. Hematoma thigh right upper 3rd;
8. Depressed fracture, right supra-orbital area, 3-4 cm. length;
9. Multiple confluent Hematoma Right and Left leg, posterior aspect;
10. Multiple confluent hematoma and abrasions, neck both side;
11. Contusion, labia minora;
12. Hematoma, labia Majora, right aspect;
Which injuries caused the instantaneous death of said Ainness Montenegro. [2]
The accused, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter trial on the
merits ensued.
As synthesized by the Solicitor General in the Peoples brief, the evidence of the
prosecution is as follows:
Prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses. First witness presented was Dr. Lydia
Villaflores, 45 years of age and a resident physician of Bayawan District Hospital. She
testified that she was the one who examined a child by the name of Ainness Montenegro
on October 21, 1990 (tsn, June 10, 1991, p. 7). She claimed that in connection with her
examination, she issued a medical certificate dated October 29, 1990 (marked as Exhibit
A for the prosecution) stating the following findings:
1. Hematoma forehead middle part;
2. Multiple abrasions forehead;
3. Hematoma nose with bloody discharges;
4. Hematoma submadibular area, right side;
5. Multiple abrasions nose and face;
6. Hematoma left iliac area;
7. Hematoma thigh right upper 3rd;
8. Depressed fracture, right supra-orbital area, (tsn, Ibid, p. 8);
9. Multiple confluent Hematoma Right and Left leg, posterior aspect;
10. Multiple confluent hematoma and abrasions, neck both side;
11. Contusion, labia minora;

79
12. Hematoma, labia majora, right aspect;
She further testified, however, that findings No. 9 up to 12 in the medical certificate were not her
findings but that of Doctors Aurelia and Calo-oy (tsn, Ibid, p. 10). On re-direct, Dr. Villaflores
admitted that before she signed the medical certificate with the additional findings, consultation
with Drs. Aurelia, Calo-oy and Flores, the latter being the Chief of the Hospital, was conducted and
that she agreed on the additional findings (tsn, Ibid, p. 20). She testified that during her
examination on the body of the victim, including its genital organ, she did not notice any damage
although she admitted that the hematoma may have developed later (tsn, Ibid, p. 28).
Second prosecution witness was Dr. Arnold Calo-oy, Municipal Health Officer of Bayawan,
Negros Oriental. Dr. Calo-oy testified that he had been a Municipal Health Officer of Bayawan,
Negros Oriental, since April 1987 up to the present time. As Municipal Health Officer, it is one
of his duties to conduct post mortem examination. On October 22, 1990, he and two other
doctors, Dr. Aurelia, a senior resident physician of Bayawan District Hospital and Dr. Felimon
Flores, Chief of the Bayawan District Hospital conducted a post mortem examination on the
dead body of Ainness Montenegro at the residence of Alejandro Montenegro, father of the
victim (tsn, June 10, 1991, pp. 32-34). In connection with the examination, four (4) additional
findings were added to the findings of Dr. Lydia Villaflores. These findings are:
1. Multiple confluent hematoma, right and left leg, posterior aspect;
2. Multiple confluent hematoma and abrasions, neck both sides;
3. Contusion, labia minora;
4. Hematoma, labia majora, right aspect, (tsn, Ibid, p. 35).
Dr. Calo-oy added that these injuries may have been caused by a hard object applied with force
(tsn,Ibid, pp. 36-37). He also testified that these injuries may not be found prominently right
after the application of the force because hematomas or any defect of this nature develop
slowly and thus, may not immediately be seen after the cause of the hematoma (tsn, Ibid, p.
37). On cross-examination, Dr. Calo-oy admitted that there was already a post mortem
examination on the body of the victim conducted by Dr. Lydia Villaflores but since the father of
the victim requested for another examination, he, together with Dr. Aurelia and Dr. Flores
conducted another one (tsn, Ibid, p. 41). Witness Dr. Calo-oy testified that the second
examination was done in the residence of the victim and that upon observing the additional
findings, they conferred with Dr. Villaflores and they (all four doctors) signed the medical
certificate (tsn, Ibid, p. 53). Dr. Calo-oy added that with the injuries sustained by the victim, it
was a possibility that there was sexual assault (tsn, ibid, p. 56).He added that even if the
second examination occurred after twenty hours from the initial examination, no amount of
tampering of the cadaver could have resulted any hematoma since any blow on any part of the
body when such body is already dead is not possible inasmuch as there is no more blood
circulation (tsn, Ibid, p. 58). He further added that the hematoma that developed were those
acquired at the time the victim was still alive and may have developed at the time of the first
examination but cannot be seen by naked eye and became prominent only during the time the
second examination was conducted (tsn, ibid, pp. 58-59).
Third prosecution witness Alejandro B. Montenegro, [Jr.] testified that he is the father of the
victim, Ainness Montenegro. He claimed to have known accused-appellant Jaime Quisay
because the latter lived in his mother-in-laws house for the past seven months. The house of
his mother-in-law is just adjacent to his house (tsn, June 18, 1991, p. 3). When witness
Montenegro was asked whether he knows the accused-appellant, he answered in the
affirmative and pointed to a man in the courtroom who answered to the name of Jaime
Quisay. Witness Montenegro further testified that at past 7:00 in the evening of October 21,
1990, right after having his supper, he went to look for his daughter, Ainness.His daughter was
borrowed by accused-appellant Quisay from his wife allegedly to bring the little girl out to the
store to buy candies (tsn, Ibid, pp. 4-5). When accused-appellant Quisay and his daughter
Ainness did not come back. Witness Montenegro went looking for them. Having failed in his
search, witness decided to go home and on his way, he saw a police car coming (tsn, ibid, p.
5).Together with the police, they searched the place and a neighbor by the name of Mrs. Ong

80
told the search party to check the area of Mr. Maypa as she heard something from that area,
thus, the search party focused their search thereon (tsn, Ibid, p. 6).
The search party found Ainness Montenegro in a dark area of Maypa compound lying flat on
her back on the ground (tsn, Ibid, p. 6). Ainness clothes were pulled up to cover her face. Upon
seeing his daughter, witness Montenegro went to his daughter and discovered that the child
was already dead (tsn, Ibid, p. 7).
On cross-examination, witness Montenegro claimed that he went back to the site of the crime
after the incident and found a piece of slipper of a child, a pair of slippers of accused-appellant
Jaime Quisay and a brief (tsn, Ibid, p. 11). When asked why these facts were never stated in his
affidavit executed on November 5, 1990, witness Montenegro claimed that the items found at
the site of the crime were turned over to the police for safekeeping (tsn, Ibid, p. 17).
Fourth prosecution witness Leo Magbanua testified that he knows accused-appellant Jaime
Quisay since 1990 because they were neighbors (tsn, June 18, 1991, p. 25). When asked to
identify accused at the courtroom, he pointed to a man who answered by the name of Jaime
Quisay. On October 21, 1990, at around 8:00 in the evening while witness was at home having
arrived from a friends house watching betamax movie, he heard a baby crying from outside
their house (tsn, Ibid, p. 27). He peeped through the window and saw a person carrying a
crying child going to the Maypa compound (tsn, Ibid, p. 38). Upon seeing what he saw, witness
Magbanua called his grandfather who wanted to go out and check but was stopped by his
(witness) grandmother for fear that the man carrying the child might be armed (tsn, Ibid, pp.
28-29). Witness Magbanua further testified that he heard somewhat like a pounding sound
coming from the place where the child was crying and that he heard a very loud cry as if in
pain (tsn, Ibid, pp. 30-31). After the pounding sound, witness Magbanua saw the accusedappellant go toward the dancing place with a child (tsn, Ibid, p. 31).Having witnessed all these,
witness Magbanua and his grandfather asked help from a neighbor, Mrs. Mary Joy Ong, who has
a telephone and who immediately called the police (tsn, ibid, p. 33). A partrol car came and,
thus, searched for Ainness Montenegro (tsn, Ibid, p. 34). The next thing witness saw was the
dead body of the child, Ainness Montenegro, when found at the Maypa compound by the police
(tsn, Ibid, p. 35).
Fifth prosecution witness was Dr. Filemon B. Flores, Chief of Hospital II, Bayawan District
Hospital, Bayawan, Negros Oriental. Dr. Flores testified that on October 22, 1990, he reported
for work at the hospital and learned about the death of one of the daughters of one of the
hospital nurses, Mr. Alejandro Montenegro. He, together with two (2) other doctors, Dr. Calo-oy
and Dr. Aurelio, went to the house of the nurse to pay their respect. Upon arrival at the house
of the nurse, the father of the victim requested that the three doctors take a look at the dead
child. Out of curiosity, they gave into the request and was able to find four more injuries on the
body of the victim not found by Dr. Lydia Villaflores, the doctor who examined the dead child
when brought to the hospital on the night of October 21, 1990. With the additional findings
witness Flores instructed the two doctors, Dr. Calo-oy and Dr. Aurelia to coordinate with Dr.
Lydia Villaflores as regards the new findings (tsn, July 2, 1991, p. 4). He further testified that
injury No. 11 which is contusion, labia minora, could have been caused by any object applied
with pressure on the area, while injury No. 12 which is hematoma, labia majora, right aspect,
could have been caused by blunt object that was presented on the area too. When asked
whether such injuries could have been caused by sexual abuse, witness Dr. Felimon Flores
answered possible (tsn, Ibid, p. 7).
Sixth prosecution witness Raymundo Cebumit testified that he knew accused-appellant as they
are neighbors (tsn, July 3, 1991, p. 3). When asked to identify the accused, witness Cebumit
pointed to a man in court who answered to the name of Jaime Quisay, in the evening of
October 21, 1990, while he was attending to his pig at its pig pen, a patrol car arrived. Curious
as to what was happening, he inquired from the policemen what was wrong and was informed
that they were searching for a missing child. Upon hearing the news, he joined in the search
and was one of those who found the child by the palm and acacia trees (tsn, Ibid, p. 5). He
further testified that at the time he saw the child/victim, her dress was raised up to her face
and that she was no longer breathing (tsn, Ibid, p. 7).

81
Last prosecution witness Pablo Tagacan testified that he knows accused-appellant Jaime Quisay
because their houses are just near each other. When asked to identify accused-appellant in
court, witness pointed to a person sitting on the accused bench who answered the name of
Jaime Quisay.According to witness Tagacan, on the evening of October 21, 1990, he was in his
house when Jaime Quisay passed by carrying a child (tsn, August 7, 1991, pp. 5-6). Witness
claimed that he recognized the child as the daughter of Mrs. Montenegro. According to witness
Tagacan, he saw accused-appellant carrying the child going towards the inside place of Moring
Maypa. When inside the area, accused-appellant sat near the banana plants, perhaps trying to
hide and checking whether people were watching him.
While accused-appellant was sitting near the banana plant, the baby was crying (tsn, Ibid, pp. 67).Witness claimed that he did not try to go near the accused-appellant for fear that he might be
armed.A neighbor, however, telephoned the police, when the police came and found the baby, the
child was already dead (tsn, Ibid, p. 8). Witness Tagacan further testified that he saw accusedappellant leave the place where the baby was found prior to the discovery of the body of the
victim. Witness saw accused-appellant walk towards the house of the Montenegro. An hour after,
the body of the child was discovered (tsn, ibid., p. 10). [3]
On the other hand, accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and claims that the
death of Ainness was accidental. His version is as follows:
On October 21, 1990, more or less six months after he first entered Toledos abode, at around
7:00 oclock in the evening, accused-appellant came home from watching a movie and saw little
Ainness crying. Ardiocena Montenegro, mother of Ainness, gave accused-appellant a peso and
ordered him to bring Ainness to the store to buy some candies for the child. Accused-appellant
carried the little girl. (Ibid., pp. 8-10)
On their way to the store, around 35 meters away from Toledos residence, Ainness requested
accused-appellant to let her down. After her feet landed on the ground, Ainness walked
away. Accused-appellant cautioned her not to run. However, she turned her direction to the left
which caused her to stumble in a 2 meter deep reef-wrap (sic) canal. (Ibid., pp. 10, 11, 16, 17)
Accused-appellant instinctively jumped into the canal to help the child. He heard the child cried
while in his hands but a moment later, the child stopped crying and the head hang limply towards
the right side of her body. (Ibid., p. 18) Accused-appellant lifted the child to the shoulder of the
road. After touching the childs chest, accused-appellant realized that she was already dead. Fear
engulfed accused-appellant. He ran towards the Toledo residence, leaving the dead body of Ainness
at the shoulder of the road, to inform the family of the incident. Upon reaching home, he was asked
by Pedro Toledo where the child was. Much to his desire to inform Pedro Toledo of the unfortunate
incident, accused-appellant suddenly became speechless. Sensing something wrong happened to
his granddaughter, Pedro Toledo boxed accused-appellants mouth. Accused-appellant went towards
the door (Ibid., p. 20) with the intention to report the accident to the authorities inasmuch as Pedro
Toledo was not inclined to listen to his story.However, he saw a police patrol car approaching the
gate. While waiting for the authorities, somebody struck him on his nape which caused him to lose
consciousness. He regained consciousness inside the jail. (Ibid., pp. 20-21)[4]
To corroborate accused-appellants defense, Crisanto Panaligan testified [5] that he knew the
accused-appellant because the latter worked with his brother in the Catholic Church of
Bayawan, Negros Oriental. On October 21, 1990 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening while he
was at the fisheries waiting for a fishing boat to leave he noticed a man in blue short pants
carrying a child heading towards a store at the fisheries in San Miguel. When the child ran, she
fell into the canal. The man who carried the child went down into the canal, lifted the child on
the side of the road and then got out of the canal and ran away. Upon seeing this he
(Panaligan) cried out saying The child fell and the people of the neighborhood came out of their
houses.After a while he saw Jaime Quisay with a bleeding mouth inside the patrol car.
On cross-examination,[6] he declared that it was only after accused-appellant was caught
by policemen that he came to know that the man he saw carrying the child on October 21,
1990 was Jaime Quisay.

82
The trial court rejected the version of the defense that the death of Ainness was due to an
unforeseeable accident. It found accused-appellant Jaime Quisay guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape With Homicide, as charged and
proved beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt, there being no mitigating circumstance
attending the commission thereof, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessories of the law and to indemnify the complainant and the victims
family of the jurisprudential amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos, as damages
thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED[7]
The accused-appellant has appealed to this Court submitting in his Appellants Brief the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM AINNESS
MONTENEGRO WAS DUE TO ACCIDENT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT JAIME QUISAY OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE BASED ON MERE POSSIBILITIES AND SUSPICION; AND
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON
HIS IMMEDIATE REACTION AFTER THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
After a painstaking scrutiny of the records of this case we are convinced that the trial court
correctly held that the guilt of herein accused-appellant has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
At the outset, accused-appellant questions as irregular the conduct of the second postmortem examination made twenty (20) hours after the death of the child-victim. He argues
that the findings under the second examination were merely fabrications intended to conform
to the theory of the prosecution that the injuries found on the body of the victim were
intentionally inflicted by him.
True, the body of the victim was subjected to two (2) post-mortem examinations. The first
one conducted immediately after the incident by Dr. Lydia Villaflores indicated that there was
no evidence of contusions or hematoma on the genital of the victim. The second one
conducted by three (3) physicians, namely: Drs. Arnold Calo-oy, Aurelia and Filemon Flores, 20
hours after the body of the victim was pronounced dead, showed four (4) additional injuries
sustained by the victim, viz:
1. Multiple confluent hematoma right and left leg;
2. Multiple confluent hematoma and abrasions, neck both side;
3. Contusion, labia minora;
4. Hematoma, labia majora, right aspect.[8]

83
However, the results of these two medical examinations hardly suggest any conflict or
inconsistency that would constrain us not to give probative weight to the second postmortem examination.
The second examination, while unusual, is not prohibited. As correctly reasoned by the
Solicitor General in the Peoples Brief, viz:
It may not be procedurally correct to re-examine the body of the victim after the examination
conducted by Dr. Lydia Villaflores, but it is not prohibited or illegal. The family of the
victim/child requested for a second examination and they have the right to do so. Nothing was
illegally done, more so that even the chief of the hospital [Dr. Filemon Flores] gave consent to
the re-examination of the cadaver.[9]
Moreover, the differences in the findings were duly explained. Dr. Lydia Villaflores, the
physician who conducted the first post-mortemexamination, testified that she was not able to
see the aforesaid four additional findings because the cadaver of the victim was brought to her
immediately after it was found and while it was still soft. The hematoma then may not have
developed or appeared immediately. [10] Dr. Calo-oy further explained that after the body of the
victim was pronounced dead during the first post-mortem examination no amount of tampering
could cause these hematomas or contusions because the circulation of the blood had already
ceased.[11]
The medical qualifications of all the physicians who examined the cadaver of the victim
particularly those of Dr. Arnold Calo-oy, Dr. Lydia Villaflores and Dr. Filemon Flores who were the
ones presented by the prosecution as their expert witnesses, were not assailed by the
defense.Although the defense claimed there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses no specific or particular contradictory evidence was pinpointed that
would make their findings unworthy of credence.
Anent the proximate cause of death of the victim Ainness Montenegro, Dr. Lydia Villaflores
and Dr. Arnold Calo-oy categorically testified that the proximate cause of death of the victim is
intracranial hemorrhage or a bleeding inside the brain secondary to a depressed fracture on
the scalp of the victim.[12] They are also one in saying that the intracranial hemorrhage could be
inflicted on the victims head only if the scalp was hit by a hard object or if during the fall, the
victims head hit a hard surface. Dr. Calo-oy further clarified that if the victim landed on a
smooth surface the depressed fracture on the head of the victim would not be possible without
a stronger force to inflict it;[13] may be a stone or a hard object, a wood or anything because
this is a bone.[14] This Court notes that no less than the accused-appellant himself during his
testimony conceded that the bottom surface of the canal was mostly covered with mud about 8
inches thick and water about 2 inches deep. [15] Accordingly, it is not probable that an accidental
fall of the victim into the 2-meter deep canal would cause a fracture on the bone of the victims
head even if the latters head hit the bottom surface of the canal.
The theory of accused-appellant that the various injuries sustained by the victim were
inflicted when the victims head and other parts of her body hit the stones on the wall of the
canal is not supported by evidence. We find no cogent justification to set aside or disturb the
findings of the trial court that the location of these physical injuries negates his contention;
thus,
Now, if by the accuseds own testimony, that the place, where the deceased fell into, is covered
by an eight (8) inch mud, then, the impact of the fall would not be enough to create a fracture
on the skull, as to cause internal hemorrhage. The rip-rap of the stones were only on the side
walls of the canal.And to think that the canal is wide enough to negate contact with riprap side walls of the said canal.
Next, one glaring fact which the defense cannot credibly explain is --- if the child-victim did die
from that alleged single fall into the canal --- then, why is it that there were several injuries
suffered or inflicted on the said victim? Why? Corollary thereto, if the alleged fatal injury --- the
intercranial (sic) hemorrhage --- was suffered on that alleged single fatal fall --- then, why were
injuries found and detected on the labia menora and labia majora? Why?

84
Also, why was the hematoma found on the right upper third of the thigh and, in the opposite
area, on the left iliac area another hematoma also appeared?
Likewise, why were other injuries found on both the right and left legs and, consistently
thereto, why were confluent hematoma and abrasions found on both sides of the neck? Why
were these perplexing physical medico-legal injuries found in other inconceivable parts of the
victims body?
Now, if the proximate cause is intercranial (sic) hemorrhage, which could have caused
instantaneous death, then, the existence of the other injuries, found on the victims body, would
become superfluous and clearly irrelevant.
In a nutshell, the only plausible conclusion is that there was a violent struggle --- to rape
the child-victim and followed by that heard shrilly cry of pain --- before a strong
blow on the head was fatally inflicted thereon by the accused.
And to think that this legal conclusion or presumption was never overturned by the defense
itself. In fact, they have never traversed the same. Thus, the legal conclusion cannot be
avoided herein --- that the accused had committed the charge of rape with homicide. [16]
Accused-appellant invokes in his defense the exempting provision of paragraph 4 of Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code. He argues that when the victim fell into the 2-meter deep canal,
her head and other parts of the body hit the stones at the wall of the canal and this explains
the various injuries of the victim that led to her death. Thus, the victims death was due to an
unforeseeable accident and was without his intervention.
The exempting circumstance cannot be invoked. Paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code pertinently provides:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
1. x x x
2. x x x
3. x x x
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
5. x x x.
6. x x x.
Accused-appellants theory is that he was taking care of the victim when the victim ran away
and fell into the canal. The issue is whether his version is credible compared to that of the
prosecution. We find that the trial court correctly rejected the contention of the accusedappellant.
The fundamental rule is that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the trial
courts determination on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect. [17] The trial
judge is best situated to assess and evaluate the probity and trustworthiness of witnesses, for
he is able to observe directly their behavior and manner of testifying, and is thus in a much
better situation to determine whether they are telling the truth or prevaricating. [18] An
exception is when the trial court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. [19] Since no arbitrariness or any cogent
reasons were cited that would call the reversal of the lower courts evaluation of credibility of
witnesses, the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution are accorded full faith and
credence by this Court.

85
The physical evidence failed to support the version of accused-appellant that the victim
Ainness Montenegro fell accidentally into the canal. The location and nature of the physical
injuries found on the victim, numbering 12, were concentrated on specified parts of the
anterior region of the body i.e. on her head, on both sides of her neck, and on her female
organ. This supports the conclusion of the trial court that they were inflicted to repel any
resistance that the child-victim may offer the accused-appellant. The injuries found on the
victims sex organ and on both sides of her neck could not have been solely due to a single
accidental fall into the canal. No bruises or injuries were found on other parts of the body of the
victim i.e. in the hands, arms, knees, or at the back of the body of the victim, that would be
consistent with the accused-appellants version of accident. Accused-appellants denial is
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence and is self-serving and thus deserves no
weight in law.[20] Where the evidence of the prosecution convincingly connects the crime and
the culprit the probative value of denial is negligible. [21]
Accused-appellant also claims that contrary to the statements made by prosecution
witnesses Leo Magbanua and Pablo Tagacan his shirt was dominantly colored red, not
white. These two prosecution witnesses had testified that the person they saw from a distance
and during nighttime carrying a child towards the place where the body of the victim was found
wore a white shirt; thus error in identification was not a remote possibility.Accused-appellant
relies on the testimony of Alejandro Montenegro, Jr., another witness for the prosecution, who
testified that when accused-appellant went back to their house to change his pants accusedappellant wore a red-striped shirt. Thus, accused-appellant asserts that it is very hard to
believe that he was the person seen by the other prosecution witnesses carrying the victim to
the Maypa compound.
The identification made by these witnesses, however, was not mainly based on the
clothing of the person whom they saw carrying the child victim. Both Leo Magabanua and Pablo
Tagacan categorically testified that the person they saw carrying the child was accusedappellant whom they personally knew. Leo Magbanua and Pablo Tagacan both declared in court
that they knew accused-appellant because the latter was their neighbor. [22]Leo Magbanua went
on to explain that his positive identification of the accused-appellant who was carrying the
victim Ainness was also brought about by the flourescent light attached to a post along the
side of the road.[23] Pablo Tagacan, for his part, declared that when he saw the accusedappellant with the crying child-victim going towards the Maypa compound he saw the accusedappellant sitting near the banana plants apparently observing whether other people had
noticed them.[24] Both of these witnesses who testified on affirmative matters had no improper
motive whatsoever to falsely impute to the accused-appellant such a grave offense. It is an
accepted principle that testimonies of witnesses who have no motive or reason to falsify or
perjure their testimonies should be given credence. The testimony of Alejandro Montenegro, Jr.,
the father of the victim, that accused-appellant wore a red-striped shirt when the latter went
back to their house to change his pants refers to a minor detail and does not suffice to make
the identification of the two witnesses less credible. What remains is the uncontroverted fact
that accused-appellant was the one seen carrying the crying child towards the Maypa
compound; that he was also the person seen sitting with the victim inside the compound where
the body of the latter was found; that he went back alone, barefooted, to the house of the
victims grandparents to change his wet pants; that the muddied body of the victim was
subsequently found in the said compound; and that the following day the brief and the slippers
of the accused-appellant were recovered from the crime scene.
Accused-appellant maintains his innocence on the basis of the fact that immediately after
the death of Ainness, he went back to the house of the victims grandparents, a reaction alleged
inconsistent with guilt. This contention is not tenable. There is no established doctrine to the
effect that, in every instance, non-flight is an indication of innocence. [25] Non-flight is not always
an indication of innocence. [26] We are inclined to affirm the observation of the trial court that his
conduct reflected the silence of guilt;
x x x, if the child did really die from the alleged fall --- accidentally, then, the dictates of a clear
conscience would have instinctively urged him to carry the child, with loving and tender care,
to her parents. But the knowing finger of guilt made him realize that gnawing feeling of deep
guilt; hence, not knowing what to do, left the child lying lifeless where she was.

86
Thus, when confronted by the grandparents, as to where the child is --- he stood tongue --- tied
and speechless, with not a single word coming out from the accuseds lips. It was the silence of
guilt. So accused said:
Q. So, you were not able to tell them what really happened to Ainness Montenegro, is
that right?
A. I was not able to tell them. Thats true.
(TSN., p. 196; Stress ours).[27]
Accused-appellant further contends that even assuming without conceding that
hematomas and contusion were found on the labia of the child-victim, the same were caused
not by sexual abuse but by the hard stones in the canal. He claims that the penis of a matured
person inserted into the genital of a two-year old child will not only cause hematoma and
contusion but will definitely result to an apparent perineal laceration due to the disparity in
size. Not even the physicians who examined the deceased could ascertain that the victim was
ravished. Thus, he claims that their opinion that the child was raped is a mere possibility that
cannot be considered evidence.
Accused-appellants contention is untenable. Based on the medical testimony of Dr. Calooy, if the injuries found on the female genital were caused by a rubbing of her private part on
any hard object (i.e. the stones on the walls of the canal) there might only be an abrasion and
not a hematoma. For hematomas are brought about by an impact caused by a force or a hard
object. It is a blood clot. It forms a bluish discoloration because of the blood clot underneath
the skin.[28] The injuries found on the genital of the victim were not just bruises but were
hematomas on both the labia menora and the labia majora that repudiate accused-appellants
claim of accident. Dr. Flores also testified that the injuries in the labia majora and the labia
menora could not be caused without opening the legs of the child-victim. [29]
While it may be true that the medical certificate or testimonies of the physicians who have
examined the victim may not alone suffice to prove that the victim was raped, [30] such evidence
may be offered to corroborate the testimony of other prosecution witnesses to prove the fact of
rape. The sexual assault in this case was proven not merely by the medical testimony of the
prosecutions expert witnesses but on other convincing pieces of evidence.
The record shows that when the body of Ainness Montenegro was found at the Maypa
compound she was lying flat on her back, already dead, with her dress raised up to cover her
face. The victims head was wet and muddy, and some parts of her body were muddied. [31] The
day after, the brief and the slippers of the accused-appellant were found at the crime scene. As
the trial court observed, the accused-appellant after realizing that gnawing feeling of deep
guilt; hence, not knowing what to do, left the child lying lifeless where she was.
An examination of the nature and location of the injuries sustained by the victim, as
reflected in the two post-mortem examinations, corroborates the fact that these injuries could
not have been inflicted without the accused-appellant having placed himself in control of his
victim. With respect to the injuries on the genital of the victim, the same could not have been
inflicted unless her legs were spread to enable the accused-appellant to pursue his evil
design. The fact that no perineal laceration was found on the genital of the victim does not
dispel a finding of rape. Complete penetration of the female genitalia is not essential. The
important consideration in rape cases is the penetration of the pudenda. [32] The slightest
degree of penetration of the pudenda by a male sex organ suffices to consummate the crime of
rape.[33] Jurisprudence is well-settled to the effect that for rape to be consummated, rupture of
the hymen is not necessary, nor is it necessary that the vagina sustain a laceration, especially
when the victim is a young girl.[34]
Considering the relative physical position of an accused in inflicting injuries upon a victim
of rape and the victim, the usual location of the external bodily injuries of the victim is on the
face, neck, and anterior portion of the body,[35] as in this case. These physical pieces of
evidence, though mute, constitute an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates high in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[36] What is more, the other surrounding circumstances and

87
physical evidence extant in the records of this case as gleaned from the testimonies of other
witnesses for the prosecution, convincingly indicate the perpetration of rape and the
commission of homicide.
In a plethora of cases, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is
generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes
even more difficult to prove when the complex crime of rape with homicide is committed
because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, even though
the crime of rape must be proven as convincingly as the crime of homicide, resort to
circumstantial evidence is unavoidable, as in this case. [37]
Circumstantial evidence, under the Rules of Court, is sufficient to sustain a conviction
if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which inferences are derived are
proven; and, (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[38] Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence constitute evidence that, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court. [39] Here, the circumstantial evidence pointed out by the
trial court is sufficient to support the finding that accused-appellant raped and killed the victim,
to wit:
The defense of the accused, x x x, is mainly denial and alibi, which is the weakest of all
defenses. It is very easy to concoct and to fabricate. Besides, there was no physical
impossibility for the accused to be somewhere else at the time of the occurrence of the
incident. In fact, the accused was seen in the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime. Not
only that, he was in the custody and care of the child-victim minutes before the happening
thereof.He was positively identified carrying the child-victim in his arms. He was pinpointed
carrying the same child towards the very place where the child-victim was later discovered
dead already. He was definitely identified coming out of the scene of the fatal incident
moments after entering the said place. When he entered into the place of the incident, with the
crying child-victim, he was positively identified wearing a white T-shirt and with short blue
denim pants. When he came out of the place of the incident, alone and without now the childvictim with him, he was, likewise, positively identified, by the light of the NORECO street-light
lamp, also with the same clothing on his body. [40]
In People v. Develles,[41] a conviction for rape with homicide was upheld where the accused
was positively identified to be the last person seen with the victim on or about the time she
was killed at the place where the latter was found dead. The appellant therein being a family
friend, the victim had no reason to be afraid of him and had no premonition of evil when she
went with him, as in this case.
With respect to the testimony of Crisanto Panaligan, the corroborating witness for the
defense, the trustworthiness of his testimony which tried to fill the needed details to support
the theory of the defense leaves much to be desired. He failed to report what he had witnessed
to the proper authorities when an opportune time appeared, first, when he came back from his
fishing interlude, a day after witnessing the incident, to the place of the incident, and second
when he visited the accused-appellant at the Bayawan Municipal Jail. His declaration in court
that after the incident happened he shouted that the child fell; that he went near the place of
the canal together with other people who heard his shout; that he saw a man and a woman
take the child-victim; that he never told anybody at that time about what he saw, not even his
companion at the fishing boat, Marvin Atiledo, [42] does not inspire belief. Human experience
would naturally motivate one to instantaneously relate what happened to the other people who
responded to the commotion, or at least relate the same to his fishing companions. All he
(Panaligan) did was to go near the canal and he kept unexplainably silent about what he had
witnessed. Jurisprudence is settled that whatever is repugnant to the standards of human
knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and lies outside judicial
cognizance.[43]
The crime subject matter of the instant appeal was committed on October 21, 1990, prior
to the effectivity of the death penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659, in cases of heinous
crimes. Said law which took effect on December 31, 1993, and which reimposes the death

88
penalty, does not apply to crimes committed prior to its effectivity. [44] Hence, the penalty for
the complex crime of rape with homicide should only be reclusion perpetua.
The trial court awarded the heirs of the victim civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This should
be increased to P100,000.00 in accordance with the ruling in People v. Payot[45]and
People v. Robles,[46] in which it was stated:
With regard to the civil indemnity, the court hereby rules that the victim of rape with homicide
should be awarded the amount of P100,000.00. Prevailing judicial policy has authorized the
mandatory award of P50,000.00 in case of death, and P50,000.00 upon the finding of the fact
of rape. Also, under recent case law the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased
amount ofP75,000.00 if the crime of rape committed is effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws
[R.R. No. 4111 and R.A. No. 7659]; Thus, if homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of
the rape, indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 is fully justified and properly commensurate
with the seriousness of the said special complex crime.
An award of P50,000.00 for moral damages should likewise be made in favor of the heirs
of the victim in accordance with recent ruling of this Court. [47]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City,
Branch 41 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of civil indemnity is increased
to P100,000.00 and, the heirs of the victim are also awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

(13) People vs. Cabical

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.
ESTEBAN, accusedappellant.

ROLITO

CABICAL

LITO

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Appellant Rolito Cabical was charged with the crime of Murder before Branch 27 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya in an information which reads:
That on or about 5:30 in the afternoon of December 3, 1996, at Barangay Pieza, Municipality of
Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, who was then armed with a piece of wood, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, and by means of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hit and strike the head of Reynaldo Fernando y
Ramos, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds and injuries on his head which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
During arraignment, appellant Cabical entered a plea of not guilty and underwent trial.
The evidence shows that at about 5:30 in the afternoon of December 3, 1996, Joniper Pontino,
riding on a carabao and heading south, was on his way home from the rice fields in Purok
Namnama, Barangay Pieza, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He saw the victim, Reynaldo Fernando,
going north and being closely followed by appellant Cabical. Cabical held a piece of wood and was
walking faster than Fernando. When Pontino was around five (5) meters away from the two, he saw
Cabical strike Fernando at the nape with a wood. Fernando slumped to the ground, snored, and

89
blood came out from his nose and mouth. Pontino got afraid and rushed home. [2] He encountered
his father, Rodolfo, drinking with a group of people. He told them about the incident. [3]
Rodolfo, in turn, reported the matter to Danilo Duro, the barangay captain of Pieza, Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya. Duro, together with Kagawad Renato Martin, went to the scene of the crime and
found Fernando lying in a prone position on the road outside the fence of the house owned by
Cabical, and clenching a sapling or seedling in his right hand. [4] Duro lifted Fernando and placed
him in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital. When he lifted Fernando, he said he did not
smell any alcohol on the victim. Instead, the victim had a fish-like smell (malangsi). [5]
The testimony of Duro that he did not smell any alcohol on the victim was corroborated by Dr.
Elpidio Quines who performed an autopsy on Fernando. Quines stated that he did not smell any
alcoholic breath, although he admitted that he did not take any gastric content from Fernando so
as to actually determine the presence of alcohol in the body. [6] He also declared that only one injury
was inflicted on Fernando. The injury was located at the back of his head and could have been
caused by any hard object, possibly a piece of wood. [7]
Esperanza, the widow of Fernando, declared that she was working in Malaysia when her
husband was killed. As a result of his death, she suffered endless sleepless nights and was not able
to eat or think properly.[8] She demanded P52,500.00 as actual damages. [9] She also claimed that
her husband earned a living from the buy and sell of pigs, cows and carabaos, and farming. He
allegedly earned an annual income of P124,290.00.[10]
The defense presented appellant Cabical and his wife, Alice Cabical, as witnesses. They
justified the killing as an act of self-defense. Alice Cabical narrated that in the afternoon of
December 3, 1996, appellant was working in the nearby house of Joel Calimlim. She was at their
house cooking and watching over their kid when she heard Fernando, who was drunk, shouting
vulva of your mother at the same time mentioning the name of her husband. She did not mind him
until she heard him at their door, looking for Cabical and allegedly holding a stone in his back. She
shouted for the appellant and beckoned with her hand for him to come to their house. Appellant
came and told Fernando to go home because he was drunk. Instead, Fernando told him, vulva of
your mother I am always helping you but you are not helping me. With his husband calm, Alice
went inside their house to continue cooking. When she went out again, she saw the bloodied body
of Fernando.[11]
Appellant testified that Fernando was drunk and passed by the place where he was working.
Fernando shouted at him, vulva of your mother you have a fault against me. He did not mind
Fernando until his wife called for him to come home. When he arrived at their house, Fernando
continued insulting him. He placed a hand on Fernandos shoulder but the latter suddenly faced him
and struck him with his right hand which was holding a stone. He bent and evaded the blow. While
bent, he was able to pick up a wood with which he struck Fernando. Fernando fell to the ground.
After verifying that Fernando was still alive, appellant left him and looked for a vehicle to bring him
to the hospital. When he returned, however, he saw that there was already a vehicle that would
bring Fernando to the hospital. He no longer approached them and merely watched from a
distance.[12] In the morning of December 4, 1996, he surrendered to Barangay Captain Duro. [13]
The trial court convicted appellant of murder. Thus:
WHEREFORE, finding Rolito Cabical y Esteban GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or 20 years and one
day to 40 years; to pay the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P20,000.00 as moral
damages; P44,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Appellant interposed this appeal, raising the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
JONEFER (sic) PONTINO INSTEAD OF THAT (sic) SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE APPELLANT.

90
II.
ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
SELF-DEFENSE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE
OFFENDED PARTY WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY.
IV.
ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY FOR THE DEATH OF
REYNALDO FERNANDO AND TREACHERY WAS PRESENT, HE SHOULD NOW ONLY BE HELD LIABLE
FOR THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE CONSIDERING THAT TREACHERY WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. [15]
Murder, as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by (a)ny person
who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 (parricide) shall kill another, x x x with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
x x x x x x x x x.
The justifying circumstance of self-defense is provided for in Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, viz:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
x x x x x x x x x.
Appellant justifies the killing of Fernando as necessary to save himself. He claims that while he
was working in the house of Calimlim, Fernando passed by and shouted insulting words at him.
Thereafter, Fernando proceeded to his house, continued to insult him and then tried to strike him
with his right hand which was holding a stone. He found a piece of wood, picked it up and used it to
strike Fernando in the nape in self-defense.
In self-defense, the accused admits the killing of the victim. The burden to justify the killing
shifts to him.[16] The rule is that where the claim of self-defense is not corroborated by independent
and competent evidence, and is extremely doubtful, it cannot prosper. [17]
We cannot sustain appellants claim of unlawful aggression. There is unlawful aggression when
the peril to ones life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. [18] In this case, it is clear from the
testimony of appellant that the danger to his life was not actual or imminent when he faced
Fernando, viz:

91
Q: As a matter of fact, are you in effect telling the Court that you did not have any
reaction whatsoever when Reynaldo Fernando shouted those words to (sic) you
during that time, is that correct?
A: No sir, he usually did (sic) that whenever he passed (sic) by our house and shouting
(sic) those words, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: In other words, you simply took for granted this untoward act of Reynaldo Fernando, is
that correct?
A: Yes sir, I knew that he was drunk.[19]
xxxxxxxxx
Q: And at that moment when Reynaldo Fernando faced you, the appearance of his face
(sic) did not appear angry at that time?
A: He looked angry, sir.
Q: Are you telling the Court that when Reynaldo Fernando saw you at that distance of
about 2 meters, did he already flare up or become very angry (sic)?
A: When we saw each other eye to eye, I could observe that his face was angry, sir.
Q: Actually, he looked very, very angry at that time, is that correct?
A: I could not state that he was very angry but I could observe that he was angry, sir.
Q: And your observation that he was angry was not based on the appearance of his face
at that time but was gauged merely by your internal feeling, is that correct?
A: Because I observed that his physical appearance was angry, I calmed myself and went
near him, sir.
Q: In fine, when you approached Reynaldo Fernando, you were not actually sure whether
he was very angry at you, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Because according to you, it did not appear in his face, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And so since his face did not appear to be angry at you during that time, you
immediately approached Reynaldo Fernando and placed one of your hands on his
shoulder, is that correct?
xxxxxxxxx
A: Yes, sir.[20]
Assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression, the aggression already ceased at the
time appellant struck him with a stone. In his testimony, appellant admits that when he struck
Fernando at the back, the latter was no longer in possession of the stone. Thus:
Q: Am I correct in saying that when you were actually in the process of picking (up) the
piece of wood that Reynaldo Fernando had actually hit you with a piece of stone or I

92
reform the question, your Honor. When you were actually in the process of reaching
out for the piece of wood, did Reynaldo Fernando hit you with a piece of stone or was
it during the moment when you have already picked up the piece of wood that
Reynaldo Fernando hit you with a piece of stone?
A: Before I picked up the piece of wood, he tried to hit me but I evaded the blow, sir.
Q: Now, in hitting you with a piece of stone, did Reynaldo Fernando actually throw the
piece of stone at you?
A: He did not throw the stone(.) (H)e was holding it and swung it towards my body from
the back to the front, sir.
Q: At the moment when according to you, you subsequently struck Reynaldo Fernando
with a piece of wood, was Reynaldo Fernando still holding the piece of stone or was
there no more stone in his hand?
A: No more, sir.
Q: In fine, at the very moment when you struck Reynaldo Fernando with a piece of wood,
Reynaldo Fernando was not at all holding any piece of stone, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: Where did the stone go, if you noticed?
A: When he tried to hit me and I evaded his blow, he hit my shoulder that is why the
stone was thrown away to the ground. (Witness pointing to his right shoulder.) [21]
As was also ratiocinated by the trial court:
In her testimony, Alice (Cabical) initially did not mention the stone until defense counsel cunningly
intercalated the stone by a question (See TSN, January 26, 1999, p.7). A scrutiny of Exh. 1 reveals
no stone mentioned. This is significant because the defense of the accused was that he killed the
victim who attacked him with a stone. Without the stone, the plea of self-defense would collapse.
And the inability of Alice to mention the stone in Exhibit 1 while she had a lot to say about it in her
subsequent direct testimony and cross-examination, was intended to buttress the self-serving
claim of Rolito that the victim attacked him with a stone. [22]
Moreover, the claim of appellant that Fernando struck him first with a stone cannot be given
credence over the testimony of eyewitness Pontino that he saw the appellant strike Fernando from
the back without any aggression on the part of the latter (Fernando). There is no showing that
Pontino had any ill-motive to testify against the appellant.
The claim of self-defense is also not corroborated by any other witness except the wife of
appellant. As was noted by the Solicitor General, no other impartial or disinterested persons were
presented to corroborate the testimony of appellant although there were other people working at
the neighboring house of Calimlim.
It will further be noted that when the policemen went to the house of appellant on the night of
the accident, he merely stayed in the kitchen. It was only his wife and sister-in-law who faced Duro.
Thus, the trial court correctly stressed that such act was not consonant with his innocence.
Although he invoked safety for not talking to the police, this is not a good reason for him to hide
from them if it was really true that he acted in self-defense. That he surrendered on the following
day to the Barangay Captain was too late as by then he would have been able to think of a good
story to tell the authorities albeit it was not true. For self-defense to be worthy of credence,
admission of the same should be spontaneous.[23]

93
We likewise agree with the trial courts finding of treachery. Treachery is committed when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [24] In the instant case, the
prosecution was able to prove the sudden and unexpected attack on Francisco by appellant.
Pontino narrated how appellant practically stalked Francisco in silence before he delivered the blow
from the back which cracked the victims skull and instantly rendered him unconscious. Being a
credible witness, there is no further need for Pontinos testimony to be corroborated.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of the
appellant. First, he had not been actually arrested at the time he surrendered; second, he
surrendered to a person in authority; and third, his surrender was voluntary. [25] Although he did not
surrender to the policemen on the same night that the incident occurred, he did surrender himself
to the barangay captain early the next day. Besides, when the policemen came that night, they
were not looking for a specific person but were merely inquiring about the incident that happened
in front of the house of appellant. There is no dispute that early the very next day, appellant
surrendered himself to a person in authority and admitted the killing, before a warrant for his arrest
was issued. In People v. Bautista,[26] we considered as a mitigating circumstance the voluntary
surrender of the accused to a police authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime.
With regard the civil liability of the appellant, the award by the trial court of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity is in accord with recent jurisprudence. The widow of the victim is also entitled
to P50,000.00 as moral damages for the anguish she suffered for the sudden death of her husband.
As to the actual damages, it has been consistently ruled that the party must produce competent
proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award. In People v. Judy Matore y Guevara,
[27]
we held that a list of expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been issued
as a matter of course in business transactions. Thus, in the case at bar, the transportation and
hospitalization expenses which were not supported by receipts cannot be included in the
computation. Moreover, the expenses relating to the 40 th day and first year death anniversary of
Fernando cannot be considered as actual expenses because of the lapse of a considerable time
from his death.[28] The award of P44,000.00 granted by the trial court is therefore reduced
to P27,040.00.
The widow, Esperanza, also testified that she lost a source of income for her family due to the
death of her husband, who she claimed had an annual income of P124,290.00 from farming and
from the business of buying and selling of cows, carabaos, and pigs. Of theP124,290.00, P81,600
or P6,800.00 per month comes from the business of buying and selling of animals,
while P42,690.00 comes from farming. In People v. Panabang,[29] we laid down the rule that for
lost income to be recovered, there must be an unbiased proof of the deceaseds average, not just
gross, income. Although in general, testimonial evidence is insufficient to substantiate a claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity, testimonies of the relatives on the income of the deceased
have been allowed to prosper when documentary evidence is unavailable, such as when the
deceased is self-employed and the amount claimed is reasonable. [30] Esperanza stated that her late
husband used to sell 3 cows, 2 carabaos and 10 pigs per month. However, it is of judicial notice
that the buy and sell of animals is a seasonal business. There are certain months of the year when
business is good, such as during the fiesta and Christmas seasons. In the same manner, there are
times when business is bad. In the exercise of our discretion, we reduce the claim of Esperanza to a
reasonable amount. We compute the award for the loss of income of Fernando, as follows:
Net annual income = (Annual income) (necessary and incidental expenses computed at
50% of the annual income)
Net annual income = P100,000.00 50,000.00
Net annual income = P 50,000.00
Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 age during the time of death)
Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 45)
Life expectancy = 23.33

94
Loss of earning capacity = (net annual income) x (life expectancy)
Loss of earning capacity = P50,000.00 x 23
Loss of earning capacity = P1,150,000.00[31]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we modify the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court and find the
accused-appellant Cabical GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, punishable
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is
credited in his favor, thus he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered
to pay the heirs of Fernando civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00, actual
damages of P27,040.00 and P1,150,000.00 for loss of earning capacity.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., on leave.
(14) People vs. Mallari, 404 SCRA 170
***The rule is the documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity.***

(15) People vs. Mallari 404 SCRA 211

***The rule is the documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity.***
(16) People vs. Bisda
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and GENEROSA JENNY
ROSE BASILAN y PAYAN, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court on automatic review is the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City, Branch 272, convicting appellants Alma Bisda and Generosa Jenny Rose Basilan, of
kidnapping for ransom; sentencing each of them to the extreme penalty of death by lethal
injection, and ordering them to indemnify the parents of the victim Angela Michelle Soriano the
amount of P100,000 as moral damages, and to pay the costs of the suit.
The Case
In an Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-2647-MK, the appellants were
charged with the felony of kidnapping for ransom committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd of September 1998, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did there and then willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly kidnap,
detain and deprive ANGELA MICHELLE SORIANO y SAN JUAN of her liberty for six (6) days for the
purpose of extorting ransom from her/or her family.
Contrary to law.[2]
When arraigned, the appellants, assisted by counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty. [3]
The Evidence for the Prosecution[4]
William Soriano, a training consultant by profession, and his wife Marymae Soriano, had two
children: Kathleen Denise and Angela Michelle. They rented a house at No. 5 Col. Divino St.,
Concepcion, Marikina. Their landlady who lived nearby had a telephone with number 942-49-18.
[5]
During the school year 1997-1998, then five-year-old Angela was in Prep at the Mother of Divine
Providence School in Marikina Heights, Marikina City. The couple employed Lea and Wendy
Salingatog as the yayas of their children. Angela met appellant Jenny Rose Basilan when the latter
visited her niece Wendy in the Soriano residence. Jenny Rose was, thus, no stranger to Angela.
About 11:00 a.m. on September 3, 1998, Angelas classes had just ended and she was on her
way to her school bus which was parked outside the school campus near the exit gate. She was in
her school uniform and wore black shoes. Unknown to Angela, appellants Alma and Jenny Rose
were outside of the school gate waiting for her. When they saw Angela, Alma and Jenny Rose

95
proceeded to the gate and showed a visitors gate pass to the security guard. They approached the
young girl, and told her that her parents were waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela
initially refused to go with the two women, but because Alma held on to her hand so tightly and
poked a knife at her, Angela had no choice but to go with them. They rode a tricycle and went to
the Jollibee Restaurant where Jenny Rose ordered spaghetti for Angela. When Angela did not see
her parents, she wondered why she went with Jenny Rose and Alma in the first place. With Angela
in tow, Alma and Jenny Rose boarded a white taxi and went to a dirty house where they changed
Angelas clothes. The girl was made to wear blouse and shorts, yellow t-shirt and a pair of panties.
[6]
Alma and Jenny Rose took her earrings. They fed her with the spaghetti they earlier bought at the
restaurant. Alma then left, leaving Angela and Jenny Rose in the house.
Jenny Rose sent Angela to sleep, and after a while, Alma returned. When Angela woke up,
Alma and Jenny Rose served her meriendaand allowed her to watch television. Henceforth, Angela
was kept in the house. At one time, Alma and Jenny Rose tied up Angelas hands and feet, and
placed scotch tape on her mouth. Angela was sometimes left alone in the house but the door was
kept locked. To pass the time, Angela watched television and made drawings. Jenny Rose and Alma
did not fail to feed and bathe Angela. Angela did not call her parents through the telephone
number of their landlady.
In the meantime, when William arrived home shortly before noon on that day, Lea and Wendy
told him that Angela had not yet arrivedhome from school. He rushed to the school to fetch Angela,
but was informed by the school security guard that his daughter had already been picked up by
two women, one of whom was registered in the visitors slip as Aileen Corpuz. Because he did not
know anyone by that name, William immediately proceeded to the registrars office to verify the
information, only to find out that Aileen Corpuz had earlier inquired at the said office about the
possibility of transferring Angela to another school. The school staff panicked when William
demanded to know how unknown persons were able to get his daughter. He then started calling his
friends and relatives to help him locate Angela. He also sought the help of Rizza Hontiveros, a TV
personality who promised to relay his plea to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF). The school staff also reported the incident to the Marikina Police Force which dispatched
a team of investigators to the Soriano residence.[7]
When apprised of the incident, the PAOCTF organized a team headed by then Chief Inspector
Ricardo Dandan with SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, SPO1 Charles Larroza and civilian agent George
Torrente, as members, to conduct surveillance operations and to recover the victim and arrest the
culprits. The team proceeded to the Soriano residence and to Angelas school to conduct an initial
investigation.
At about 6:00 a.m. on September 4, 1998, Williams landlady went to his apartment to tell him
that a lady had called up earlier and left a message for him: Pakisabi na lang kay Mr. Soriano na
kakausapin ko siya bukas ng umaga. When the landlady asked who the caller was, the voice
replied, Hindi na importante iyon.[8] William thereafter convinced his landlady to have her telephone
set transferred to his residence to facilitate communication with his daughters abductors. [9]
Shortly before midnight that same day, George arrived at the Soriano residence and asked
William if the kidnapper had already made contact. William responded that a woman had earlier
called, through his landlady. George then instructed William to prolong the conversation should the
kidnapper call again, to enable the agents to establish the possible location of the caller. [10]
On September 5, 1998 at around 9:25 p.m., William received a call from an unidentified
woman who told him, Kung gusto mo pang makita yong anak mo, maghanda ka ng five million
pesos. He replied, Saan naman ako kukuha ng five million? Alam mo naman na nakatira lang ako
sa apartment. The caller said, Hindi ko masasagotyan. Tatanungin ko na lang sa aking mga
boss. William informed George of his conversation with the caller. George relayed the information
by means of a hand-held radio to the other PAOCTF operatives standing by. [11]
On September 7, 1998, at about 11:25 a.m., Marymae received a telephone call from a
woman demanding for ransom money. The caller called two more times, at 7:00 p.m. and at 9:26
p.m. Marymae pleaded with the caller to reduce the ransom money to P25,000, or if that was not
possible, to an amount not exceeding P50,000. The caller said, Hindi ko masasagot iyan. Dadaihin
na lang namin ang bata sa boss namin. Marymae relayed the conversation to William, their other
daughter Kathleen and to George.[12]
At about noon that day, PAOCTF Chief of Operations Superintendent Michael Ray Aquino
received a call from an anonymous source informing him that a woman who had talked about a
ransom and had acted in a suspicious manner was spotted at the MSC Freight Service office
located at No. 1303 Paz Street, Paco, Manila. Acting on the information, Ricardo, Charles, Tito and
other PAOCTF operatives swooped down on the place and saw a woman, who turned out to be
Alma Bisda, emerging from a small house at No. 1258 Paz Street, some fifty meters or so away
from the said office. She had just bought food from an adjacent store at No. 1246 Paz Street, Paco,
Manila. Surveillance operations were thereafter conducted.
At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, George and Charles were at the Soriano residence.
Ricardo and Tito were in the periphery of Almas house, monitoring her whereabouts and
movements. Alma again left her house and after locking the door, went to the small store nearby.
She lifted the telephone and called someone. The telephone in the Soriano residence rang. When
William lifted the receiver, he heard a voice similar to that of the woman who had called him the
first time. The caller was asking where the money was. William told her that the P25,000 was
ready, to which she replied, Hindi ko masasagot iyan, dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa aking
boss. William told the caller that he was willing to give P50,000 but pleaded that he be given ample
time to produce the money. The woman reiterated: Hindi ko masasagot iyan.[13]

96
Ricardo and Tito heard the sound of a car horn blowing while Alma was using the telephone.
Tito called up Charles and inquired whether he (Charles) heard the same sound while William was
talking to the caller. After William hung up the telephone, he told George that he could hear the
horn off a car blowing in the background. George then called up Ricardo by phone and relayed the
information. When George inquired if Ricardo heard the sound of the horn of a car while Alma was
talking over the telephone, Ricardo replied in the affirmative. The PAOCTF operatives concluded
that Alma was the kidnapper.
After making the call, Alma hung up the telephone and returned to her house. The PAOCTF
operatives followed. When Alma unlocked the door to the house, the operatives accosted her. She
tried to escape, to no avail. Tito heard the cry of a child coming from inside the house, pleading for
help: Tita ilabas mo ako![14] He rushed to the house and saw the victim Angela. He then carried her
outside to safety. The agents searched the house for evidence and found a pair of black shoes, a
pair of panties, a yellow shirt, a set of blouse and shorts with red, yellow and white stripes. The
evidence was placed in a plastic bag. [15] The victim and the suspects were thereafter brought to the
PAOCTF office for proper documentation.
When informed that his daughter had already been rescued, William rushed to the PAOCTF
headquarters where he and Angela were reunited. Angela identified Alma as her kidnapper. When
William asked Alma why she kidnapped Angela and what she would do with the one-million-peso
ransom she was demanding, she replied: Kuya, wag kang maghusga, pareho lang tayong
biktima. When William asked Alma: Biktima, saan? Alma replied: Ang anak ko, kinidnap din nila.[16]
Chief Inspector Dandan turned over to Evidence Custodian P02 Joseph Bagsao, the pieces of
evidence contained in a blue Shoe Mart (SM), plastic bag which the operatives found in Almas
house: a pair of black shoes, a pair of panties, a yellow shirt, a set of white blouse and shorts with
red, yellow and white stripes, all of which were sized to fit a child of 4 to 7 years of age.[17]
On October 19, 1998, an Information for kidnapping for ransom was filed against Alma and
Jane Doe.
On October 26, 1998, at around 11:00 a.m., Jenny Rose arrived at the PAOCTF Headquarters in
Camp Crame, and proceeded to P02 Joseph Bagsaos office where she announced that she was one
of Almas cohorts. P02 Bagsao took Jenny Roses fingerprints and entered the data in a fingerprint
index card.[18] Jenny Rose was thereafter placed in a police line-up. Angela, who arrived at the
PAOCTF office with her father, identified Jenny Rose as one of her kidnappers. Police Chief Inspector
Atty. Aurelio C. Trampe, Jr., the Legal and Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF, later referred
Jenny Rose to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, for preliminary investigation. [19]
The prosecutor later amended the Information by deleting the name Jane Doe and substituting
the name Jenny Rose Basilan y Payan as the second accused.
Almas Evidence
Alma denied having kidnapped Angela for ransom. She testified that she was married, and a
resident of Block 38, Lot 38, G. Maliputo Street, Phase II, Area 4, Kaunlaran Village, Navotas, Metro
Manila. She was a businesswoman who ran a local employment agency for household help. She
was also engaged in the business of buying and selling palay grains. Her local employment agency
was located in Navotas. She had another office at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, which served
as a bodega for items she sent to the province, as well as items she purchased. She had an
adopted daughter named Mary Rose, who, in September 1998, studied at Harris School in Antipolo.
She had employed Wendy Salingatog for a time as the yaya of her adopted daughter. Alma was
then residing in V. Luna Street, Quezon City.
Alma employed Jenny Rose as secretary in her employment agency. In payment for services
rendered, Jenny Rose was sent to school at the Lyceum of the Philippines to study B.S. Business
Administration. She was also given an allowance.
In September 1998, Alma was looking for a school run by nuns that would be willing to accept
her adopted daughter in the middle of the school year. Jenny Rose suggested the Divine Providence
School in Marikina City. In the morning of September 3, 1998, Jenny Rose brought her to the said
school. They proceeded to the administration office where Alma inquired if the school would allow
her adopted daughter to enroll. When Jenny Rose and Alma were about to leave, a little girl, who
turned out to be Angela, approached them and asked what Jenny Rose was doing in her school.
Jenny Rose introduced Angela to Alma as her niece, and informed Alma that she would be bringing
Angela with her to her boarding house in Espaa Street.
At that point, Alma asked Jenny Rose and Angela if they wanted to eat. When they agreed, the
three of them proceeded to the Jollibee Restaurant near the Meralco office in Marikina City. After
eating, Alma bade them goodbye and was about to leave for her office when Jenny Rose asked if
she and Angela could come along with her to Cubao. She acceded to the request, and they rode a
Tamaraw FX taxi. Because Angela was getting sleepy, Alma offered to bring them to Jennys
boarding house in Espaa, and dropped them off there. Alma thereafter proceeded to her office at
1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila, where she had been holding office since January 1997, and arrived
thereat at about 2:00 p.m.
At or about 8:00 p.m. of the same day, Alma passed by Jenny Roses boarding house to give
her instructions on what to do the following day. She saw Angela crying profusely. She told Jenny
Rose to bring Angela home, but Jenny Rose told her that Angelas parents would be coming to fetch
her. Thinking that Angela was probably bored, Alma suggested that they stay in her office in Paco
so that they could watch television while waiting for Angelas parents. Jenny Rose agreed. They
arrived at the said office at around 8:40 p.m. Alma left at around 10:00 p.m. and went home to her
rented house in Palmera Homes, Antipolo, where she stayed until September 6, 1998.

97
On September 7, 1998, at around 12:00 noon, Alma arrived at her office in Paco, Manila, and
found that Jenny Rose and Angela were still there. Jenny Rose assured Alma that Angela would be
fetched by her parents. At around 4:00 p.m., Alma instructed Jenny Rose to go to the province to
collect some debts, Jenny Rose left for the province on the same day. Alma stayed in the office
because she was having her menstrual period at the time and was not feeling well. She took care
of Angela while Jenny Rose was away.
The next day, September 8, 1998, Alma was still in her office with Angela. At about 3:00 p.m.,
while she was watching television with Angela, someone knocked at the door. When she opened it,
two male persons entered. One of them was Inspector Ricardo Dandan who showed her a
photograph of Angela and asked if she knew the child. Alma answered in the affirmative. Ricardo
then asked her, Dont you know that this is kidnapping? to which Alma replied, I do not know. She
also told Dandan that she did not know what was happening to her. Suddenly, Alma was
handcuffed. Angela cried and asked Alma: What are they doing to you, Tita? She was brought to
Camp Crame where she was interrogated and detained. Alma did not make any telephone calls
that day. William, Marymae and Angela arrived at Almas detention cell. When Angela saw her, the
girl tried to run to Alma but William held on to his daughter. William asked Alma why she took
Angela, Alma replied that it was Jenny Rose who brought the girl along with them. She told William
that they were both victims.
Sometime on October 26, 1998, Jenny Rose visited Alma to ask for forgiveness and to assume
full responsibility for the incident. Jenny Rose also informed her that she wanted to ask forgiveness
from the Sorianos so that she could finish her schooling. It was only then that she realized
what Jenny Rose had done to her. Nevertheless, she still believed that Jenny Rose was a good
person. She advised her to go home and continue with her studies.
When Angelas sworn statement was shown to her, Alma noticed that Angela did not mention
Jenny Rose as one of the two persons who had kidnapped her. Alma executed a handwritten
statement denying the truth of the contents of Angelas affidavit. [20]
Jenny Roses Evidence
Jenny Rose did not testify in her defense. She presented Atty. Aurelio Trampe, Jr. as her witness
who testified[21] that he was the Legal and Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF. On October
26, 1998, he interviewed Jenny Rose when the latter surrendered to the task force. Jenny Rose
insisted that she wanted to help Alma and get all the blame for the kidnapping. She wanted to
admit her participation in the crime, and volunteered the information that she and Alma kidnapped
Angela. Atty. Trampe, Jr. wrote a letter [22] to the Department of Justice requesting for her inclusion in
the ongoing preliminary investigation. He believed that it would be more appropriate for the
prosecutor handling the case to investigate and determine whether Jenny Rose was the Jane Doe
referred to in the complaint. Atty. Trampe, Jr. admitted, however, that aside from the voluntary
surrender of Jenny Rose, he did not have any other evidence to include her as one of the suspects
in the case. Further, he did not provide a lawyer for Jenny Rose because he did not intend to
conduct an exhaustive interrogation, and he knew that even if she admitted her participation, the
statement would not be admitted as evidence. [23]
Jenny Rose adduced in evidence the letter of Atty. Trampe, Jr. to prove that she voluntarily
surrendered and that there was lack of evidence against her.
On September 16, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and GENEROSA
BASILAN y PAYAN are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and is
sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of DOUBLE DEATH by lethal injection, the two accused
having conspired in the commission thereof. They are further ordered to pay solidarily the parents
of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages, and costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The assigned errors ascribed by the appellants to the trial court may be synthesized, thus: (a)
the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of kidnapping; (b) the trial court erred in
sentencing the appellants to double death.[25] The Court will delve into and resolve the issues
simultaneously.
The prosecution adduced
proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellants
kidnapped the victim.
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to muster proof, beyond reasonable doubt that,
they kidnapped and illegally detained Angela. Angela in fact voluntarily went with them, and she
was free to roam around the house, and to call her parents through the telephone of their landlady
which Angela knew by heart.
There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kidnap Angela.
Appellant Bisda avers that she is guilty only of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code because (a) Angela stayed in her office for only three days; and (b) the
circumstance of a female offender and a female offended party is not one of those included in the
definition of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC.
The trial courts reliance on Angelas testimony is misplaced because the records do not show
that Angela had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong when she testified in open court. The
appellants point out that she was merely six years old at the time. Although Angela took an oath
before she testified, the trial judge failed to ask any questions to determine whether or not she

98
could distinguish right from wrong, and comprehend the obligation of telling the truth before the
court. Hence, one of the standards in determining the credibility of a child witness was not
followed. There is, thus, a veritable doubt that Angela told the truth when she testified.
Moreover, Angelas testimony is, besides being inconsistent on material points, contrary to
ordinary human experience. Angela did not shout or cry when she was forced to leave the school
premises and brought to the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela could have easily sought help from the
security guard at the exit gate of the school and from the customers in the restaurant, or even
from the tricycle and taxi drivers; but Angela did not. Angela even admitted that she voluntarily
went with the appellants. She did not cry while detained in the office of appellant Bisda, and even
admitted that it was only that time when she was rescued that she cried. The conduct of Angela,
the appellants insist, is contrary to ordinary human experience, knowledge and observation. By her
own admission in her sworn statement [26] to the PAOCTF agents, Angela was assisted by her parents
while she was giving the said statement. This raised doubts as to the veracity of her testimony.
The contentions of the appellants are bereft of merit.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
I. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any
of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by RA No.
7659).[27]
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender
is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. [28] If the victim of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. [29] The word female in paragraph 1(4) of Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code refers to the gender of the victim and not of the offender.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty under
any of the above-mentioned circumstances, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused
to effect the same.[30] There must be a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly
restrain the victim because taking coupled with intent completes the offense. [31] Kidnapping which
involves the detention of another is by its nature a continuing crime. [32]
The victims lack of consent is also a fundamental element of kidnapping. The involuntariness
of the seizure and detention is the very essence of the crime. [33] The general rule is that the
prosecution is burdened to prove lack of consent on the part of the victim. However, where the
victim is a minor especially if she is only five years old, lack of consent is presumed. She is
incompetent to assent to seizure and illegal detention. [34] In this case, Angela was merely five years
old when she was kidnapped; thus incapable of giving consent. The consent of such child could
place the appellants in no better position than if the act had been done against her will. The
appellants cannot rely on Angelas initial willingness to go along with them to the restaurant. As
Judge Shepherd stated in State v. Chisenhall:[35]
It is clear that the consent of the child, obtained by means of persuasion, is no defense, since the
result of such persuasion is just as great an evil as if it had been accomplished by other means.
A kidnapper should not be rewarded with an acquittal simply because she is ingenious enough
to conceal her true motive from her victim until she is able to transport the latter to another place.
Although Angela was free to roam around in the dirty house, to draw and to watch television
during the entire period of her detention, and was regularly fed and bathed, the appellants are
nevertheless guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining the five-year-old child. As Judge McGill of
the United States Court of Appeals said in United States v. McCabe[36],to accept a childs desire for
food, comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the context of kidnapping would
render the concept meaningless.
In People v. Baldogo,[37] this Court held that illegal serious detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of her liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It includes a situation
where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded
in his liberty to move.[38] In this case, the door to the office of appellant Bisda was locked while
Angela was detained therein. Even if she wanted to escape and go home, Angela, at her age, could

99
not do so all by herself. During the period of her confinement, Angela was under the control of the
appellants. The helpless child was waiting and hoping that she would be brought home, or that her
parents would come and fetch her.
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to
kidnap and illegally detain Angela. The appellants testimonies even buttressed the testimonies of
both the victim and the other witnesses for the prosecution.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. [39] In People v. Pagalasan,[40] this Court
held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted
with a common purpose and design. [41] Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished unless
abandoned or broken up.[42] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
[43]
There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.[44]
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences
even though it was not intended as part of the original design. [45] Responsibility of a conspirator is
not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral
acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. [46] Conspirators are held to
have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which
necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable
with intending that result.[47] Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator
unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. [48] As
Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,[49] when a conspirator embarks upon a
criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be
it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them.
The appellants enveigled Angela into going with them by telling her that her parents were
waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant.Appellant Bisda poked a knife at Angela and held her
hands so tightly that the helpless child had no recourse but to come along. The appellants
transported Angela on board a taxi and brought her to Cubao, and then to appellant Bisdas office
at No. 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila. The appellants tied her hands, covered her mouth with scotch
tape, and detained her from September 3, 1998 until September 8, 1998, when she was
providentially rescued by the operatives of the PAOCTF.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellants before, during and after the
kidnapping and the illegal detention of Angela constitute indubitable proof that the appellants
conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Angela and detain her
illegally. The appellants are thus principals by direct participation in the kidnapping of Angela and
illegally detaining her.
Appellant Basilan cannot escape conviction for the crime charged on her barefaced claim that
she merely accompanied appellant Bisda to the latters office with the victim in tow. The records
show that the appellant presented as her sole witness Atty. Aurelio Trampe, Jr., then PAOCTF Legal
and Investigation Division Chief, who testified that when she surrendered to him, the appellant
admitted that she and appellant Bisda had kidnapped Angela:
ATTY. SALAMERA:
This court would like to be cleared (sic). Did she admit to you the condition of the alleged
kidnapping on September 3, 1998?
WITNESS:
She volunteered that statement that she was together with Ms. Alma Besda (sic) kidnap
(sic) Angela Michelle Soriano.[50]
The appellants contention that the prosecution failed to establish that Angela understood the
nature of an oath and the need for her to tell the truth must fail.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of evidence provides that the examination of
witnesses shall be under oath or affirmation:[51]
SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a
trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1a).[52]
An oath is defined as an outward pledge, given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. [53] The object of the rule is
to affect the conscience of the witness and thus compel him to speak the truth, and also to lay him
open to punishment for perjury in case he willfully falsifies. [54] A witness must be sensible to the
obligation of an oath before he can be permitted to testify. [55] It is not, however, essential that he
knows how he will be punished if he testify falsely. [56] Under modem statutes, a person is not
disqualified as a witness simply because he is unable to tell the nature of the oath administered to
a witness.[57] Inorder that one may be competent as a witness, it is not necessary that he has a
definite knowledge of the difference between his duty to tell the truth after being sworn and
before, or that he be able to state it, but it is necessary that he be conscious that there is a

100
difference.[58] It cannot be argued that simply because a child witness is not examined on the
nature of the oath and the need for her to tell the whole truth, the competency of the witness and
the truth of her testimony are impaired. If a party against whom a witness is presented believes
that the witness is incompetent or is not aware of his obligation and responsibility to tell the truth
and the consequence of him testifying falsely, such party may pray for leave to conduct a voire
dire examination on such witness to test his competency. [59] The court may motu proprio conduct
the voir dire examination. In United States v. Buncad, [60] this Court held that when a child of tender
age is presented as a witness, it is the duty of the judge to examine the child to determine his
competency. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court held that:
[W]hen a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to
his examination on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows before trial that a
witness is incompetent, objection must be made before trial that a witness is incompetent,
objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if the incompetency appears on the
trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes apparent. [62]
The competency of a person to take the prescribed oath is a question for the trial court to
decide.[63]
If a party admits proof to be taken in a case without an oath, after the testimony has been
acted upon by the court, and made the basis of a judgment, such party can no longer object to the
admissibility of the said testimony. [64] He is estopped from raising the issue in the appellate court.
This was the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[65] thus:
Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such
evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes
apparent, otherwise the objection will be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the
records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. The failure of petitioner to interpose a
timely objection to the presentation of Divinaflors testimony results in the waiver of any objection
to the admissibility thereof and he is therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal.
In this case, Angela was six years old when she testified. [66] She took an oath to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truthbefore she testified on direct examination. There was nary a
whimper of protest or objection on the part of the appellants to Angelas competence as a witness
and the prosecutions failure to propound questions to determine whether Angela understood her
obligation and responsibility of telling the truth respecting the matter of her testimony before the
court. The appellants did not even bother requesting the trial court for leave to conduct a voir
dire examination of Angela. After the prosecution terminated its direct examination, the appellants
thereafter cross-examined Angela extensively and intensively on the matter of her testimony on
direct examination. It was only in this Court that the appellants raised the matter for the first time,
that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to examine Angela on the nature of her oath,
and to ascertain whether she had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. It is too late in the
day for the appellants to raise the issue.
The determination of the competence and capability of a child as a witness rests primarily with
the trial judge.[67] The trial court correctly found Angela a competent witness and her testimony
entitled to full probative weight. Any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if she can
perceive and perceiving, can make known to others, and that she is capable of relating truthfully
facts for which she is examined. [68] In People v. Mendiola,[69] this Court found the six-year-old victim
competent and her testimony credible. Also in Dulla v. Court of Appeals, [70] this Court gave
credence to the testimony of a three-year-old victim. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court
that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded by the appellate courts high respect if not conclusive effect absent clear and
convincing evidence that the trial court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances which if considered warrants a reversal or modification of the outcome of the case.
[71]
In this case, the Court finds no basis to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial
court on the competency of Angela, and the probative weight of her testimony.
Appellants must come to grips with case law that testimonies of child victims are given full
weight and credit. The testimony of children of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and
truthful than that of older persons.[72] In People vs. Alba,[73] this Court ruled that children of sound
mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older
persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons. Angela
was barely six years old when she testified. Considering her tender years, innocent and guileless, it
is incredible that Angela would testify falsely that the appellants took her from the school through
threats and detained her in the dirty house for five days. In People v. Dela Cruz,[74] this Court also
ruled that ample margin of error and understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who,
much more than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty and the experience in
testifying before the trial court.
The credibility of Angela and the verisimilitude of her testimony is not impaired by her failure
to shout for help when the appellants took her, or to make any attempt to call her parents or to
escape from her captors and to use the telephone to call her parents. At five years old, she could
not be expected to act and react to her kidnapping and detention like an adult should. She did not
shout and seek help from the school security guards because the appellants told Angela that her
parents were waiting for her. Appellant Basilan was the niece of Angelasyaya. She then believed
that nothing was amiss. It was only when she failed to see her parents that Angela blamed herself
for going with the appellants in the first place.
Atty. Laracas:

101
Now, they told you that your parents were at Jollibee. When you did not see your
parents, what did you do?
Witness:
I told myself, why did I go with them.
Atty. Laracas:
So you just told that to yourself?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Laracas:
So initially, Angela, you are not blaming yourself when you went with Jenny Rose?
Witness:
Yes, maam.[75]
The evidence on record shows that appellant Bisda poked a knife at Angela and her hands
were held tightly by the appellants as they proceeded to the restaurant from the school. Although
the Soriano spouses were by Angelas side when the latter gave her sworn statement [76] in the
PAOCTF office, there is no showing on record that the spouses ever influenced their daughter to
prevaricate. Significantly, the appellants counsel did not even cross-examine Angela on her sworn
statement.
In this case, appellant Bisda asserts that Angelas testimony contains four inconsistencies on
material points; hence, is incredible. First, Angela testified on cross-examination that the appellants
approached her but she did not talk to them.[77] In contrast, Angela testified on cross-examination
that she saw appellant Basilan, and talked to her. [78] Second, Angela testified on direct examination
that she first came to know the identities of the kidnappers when she was brought to the dirty
house.[79] Angela contradicted herself when she testified on cross-examination that when she was
brought to the said house, she already knew appellant Basilan. [80] Third, Angela testified on direct
examination that she went with the appellants to the Jollibee Restaurant when they held her hands
firmly.[81] On cross-examination, Angela testified that the appellants threatened her when they
kidnapped her by pointing a knife at her which made her cry. [82] Angela further contradicted herself
when she testified on direct examination that the appellants pointed a knife at her one night.
[83]
Fourth, Angela said that when she was in the office of appellant Bisda in Paco, Manila, her feet
were tied and her mouth was covered with scotch tape. [84] However, on cross-examination, Angela
revealed that she was free to roam around and even watched television and made drawings. [85]
Anent the first and second set of inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants, the same
pertain only to minor and peripheral matters and not to the principal occurrence or the elements of
the crime charged, and the positive identification of the appellants. Hence, the credibility of
Angela, and that of her testimony were not impaired by the said inconsistencies. [86] The inscrutable
fact is that the appellants took the victim from the school and detained her at the office of
appellant Bisda at No. 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila, until she was rescued. Whether or not Angela
talked with the appellants as she was being brought to the restaurant or that she came to know of
the identities of the kidnappers before or when she was brought to the dirty house, are
inconsequential. The overwhelming evidence on record is that no other than the appellants
kidnapped her from her school and illegally detained her from September 3 to 8, 1998. Indeed,
when asked to point and identify her kidnappers, Angela did so spontaneously and positively. [87]
Pros. Junio:
If you see... this Alma Besda (sic), if you will be able
to see her again, if you see her again, will you be
able to recognize her?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Will you point to her.
(The witness is pointing to a lady, seated at the
second from the left at the corner at the last seat.)
Court:
Identify yourself.
(The person pointed to, stood up and identified
herself as Alma Besda [sic]).
Pros. Junio:
What about Jenny Rose, will you be able to
recognize her?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Pros. Junio:
You point to her Angel.
(The witness is pointing to the first lady seated on
the left side)
Court:
Stand up and identify yourself.
The lady stood up and identified herself as Jenny
Rose Basilan.[88]
Appellant Basilan did not controvert the evidence of
the prosecution that she was the niece of
the yaya of the victim, and that the said appellant,
at one time, went to the Soriano residence where
Angela saw and met her. The victim was, thus,

acquainted with appellant Basilan even before the

kidnapping.
Angela testified on direct examination, thus:
Atty. Junio:
So when Alma and Jenny Rose told you that Mommy
and Daddy were at Jollibee, what did you do?
Witness:
I did not want to go with them but they held me
firm.
Pros. Junio:
What part of the body did they hold firmly?
Witness:
My hands.
Pros. Junio:
After Alma and Jenny Rose held your hand firmly,
what did, where did you go?
Witness:
To Jollibee.[89]
Angela was not asked by the public prosecutor
whether or not the appellants threatened her with
any weapon before proceeding to the Jollibee
Restaurant. The additional fact was revealed by
Angela, ironically, on cross-examination:
Atty. Salamera:
Now, were you threatened on September 3 at
around eleven in the morning when both accused
allegedly abducted you?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
There are two accused, who threatened you?
Witness:

102
They pointed knife against me.
Atty. Salamera:
Who pointed the knife upon your person?
Witness:
Alma, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Did you cry?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Did you also cry inside the Jollibee?
Witness:
No, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Was Alma still holding a knife at the Jollibee?
Witness:
No, sir.[90]
The prosecutor tried on re-direct to take advantage
of Angelas revelation but the appellants counsel,
realizing that he had just committed a faux
pas, objected to the questions of the public
prosecutor. It turned out that the latter was himself
confused because instead of adverting to a knife, as
testified to by Angela, he blurted that appellant
Bisda used a gun in intimidating the victim. Even
Angela must have been bewildered by the repartees
of the prosecution and the appellants counsel such
that, instead of answering one time, to the
questions of the prosecutor, she said one night.
Redirect:
Pros. Junio:
Angel, how many times did Alma and Jenny
Rose point a knife at you?
Atty. Salamera:
Objection. Improper at this point in time. First it
was not covered.
Pros. Junio:
How many times did Alma point a gun?
Atty. Salamera:
Knife, your Honor.
Pros. Junio:
It was covered on cross.
Court:
Objection denied. Overruled. Witness may answer.
Witness:
One night.[91]
There was, thus, no inconsistency in Angelas
testimony on this point.
Angelas hands were tied, and her mouth
was covered with scotch tape the day after she was
brought to the dirty house. Angela testified on direct
examination, thus:
Pros. Junio:
Okay, where did you go?
Witness:
To the dirty house.
Pros. Junio:
Who was with you or who were with you at that
time?
Witness:
Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Where is this dirty house located?
Witness:
I do not know, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Upon arriving at that dirty house, what did you do?
Witness:
They changed my clothes once.
Pros. Junio:
Do you remember the color of the dress?
Witness:
No, maam.
Pros. Junio:
After they changed your dress or your clothes, what
happened next? What did they do to you?
Witness:
They fed me, maam.
Pros. Junio:
After they fed you, what did you do?

Witness:
They send (sic) me to sleep.
Pros. Junio:
When you woke up, what did they do to you?
Witness:
They fed me (pinamiryenda) (sic)
Pros. Junio:
After you ate your miryenda (sic) what else did they
do to you?
Witness:
They allowed me to watch tv, maam.
Pros. Junio:
What about your hands, your mouth, what did they
do?
Witness:
They tied my hands.
Pros. Junio;
And your mouth?
Witness:
It was sealed with scotch tape.
Pros. Junio;
And your feet?
Witness:
They were also tied, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Who tied your hands?
Witness:
The two of them, maam.
Pros. Junio:
Will you mention their names again?
Witness:
Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose.[92]
On cross-examination, Angela testified that on the
day she was rescued, she could watch the
television, make drawings and roam around the
room:
Atty. Larracas:
You did . . . At that time you were allegedly rescued,
Jenny Rose was not at the place where you were
rescued?
Witness:
She was not there, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
All along you were watching tv (sic) at the place
where you were taken?
Witness:
Only once, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
And when you were not watching tv (sic), what were
you doing Angela in that dirty house?
Witness:
I was drawing, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
So you watched tv once and the rest of the time you
were drawing?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
Of course, you cannot draw if your hands were tied,
Angela?
Witness:
Yes, mam.
Atty. Larracas:
So your hands were not tied?
Witness:
No, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can move along freely at that time?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can walk?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:
You can drink?
Witness:
Yes, maam.
Atty. Larracas:

103
Of course, you cannot walk if your feet were
tied and cannot drink if your mouth was sealed?
Witness:
Yes, maam.

Atty. Larracas:
When the police arrived, what were you doing?
Witness:
I cried, maam.[93]

It is not quite clear whether the counsel for the appellants were asking about Angelas activities
during her detention, or during her rescue. Taking into account Angelas answers, it is evident that
her hands were tied and her mouth covered with scotch tape the day after she was kidnapped, but
that she was free to roam around the room, practice on her drawings and watch television during
the rest of the period of her detention.
PROPER PENALTIES
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove that in kidnapping and illegally
detaining the victim, they intended to demand ransom from her parents. William Soriano, the
victims father, failed to prove that the appellants or any of them called through the telephone
demanding ransom. The collective testimonies of police operatives Tito Tuanggang, Ricardo
Dandan and George Torrente were hearsay evidence; hence, barren of probative weight. The trial
court likewise failed to take into account the voluntary surrender of appellant Basilan.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, posits the view that the prosecution mustered
the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that the appellants and no other demanded ransom
from the parents of the victim.
The appellants contention does not hold water. Admittedly, the prosecution failed to adduce
direct evidence that the appellants demanded ransom for the release of the victim. However, the
prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellants, or at least one of them, demanded ransom from the Soriano spouses for the release of
their daughter.
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part
of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty;
and (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the
victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be
proved by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the
victim.[94] Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed.[95] Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense;
meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity. [96] It may
include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for
the release of the victim.[97]
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance if (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are proven; (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of others as the one who demanded ransom.
The circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and that at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty.[98] The prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the appellants.[99]
In this case, the chain of circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution proves that no
one other than the appellants or one of them called up the spouses Soriano through the telephone
and demanded ransom of P5,000,000:
1. Appellant Basilan is the niece of Wendy Salingatog, who was for a time the housemaid of
appellant Bisda;
2. The appellants kidnapped Angela shortly before noon on September 3, 1998, and detained
her at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, where appellant Bisda held office;
3. The following morning, William was informed by his landlady that a woman had earlier
called up over the telephone requesting her to inform William that she (the caller), would call again
the next day, September 5, 1998;
4. On September 5, 1998, William received a telephone call from a woman demanding a
ransom of P5,000,000 for Angelas freedom. When William complained that he did not have the
amount, she told William that she cannot be responsible for it and that she would inquire from
her bosses. Williams testimony reads:
Pros. Junio:
And what did she tell you?
What did she say?
Witness:
Witness:
She told me KUNG GUSTO MO PANG MAKITA
She answered, HINDI KO MASASAGOT YAN.
IYONG ANAK MO, MAGHANDA KA NG FIVE
Pros. Junio:
MILLION PESOS.
Did she tell you why she could not respond to
Pros. Junio:
you?
What did you told (sic) her if any?
Witness:
Witness:
She continued to say TATANUNGIN KO
SAAN AKO KUKUHA NG FIVE MILLION PESOS?
NA LANG SA AKING MGA BOSS.[100]
ALAM MO NAMAN NA NAKATIRA LANG AKO SA
5. In the morning of September 7, 1998,
APARTMENT.
Inspector Ricardo Dandan and SPO4 Tito
Pros. Junio:
Tuanggang, acting on an anonymous tip,

104
rushed to the vicinity of No. 1303 Paz Street,
Paco, Manila, the office of the MSC Freight
Service, to conduct surveillance operations.
Later in the afternoon, they saw appellant
Bisda emerging from a small house about fifty
meters from the office of the MSC Freight
Service;
6. At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998,
appellant Bisda emerged from the house at No.
1258 Paz Street, and went to the small store
near the house. Chief Inspector Dandan and
Tito Tuanggang were about two meters from
the store and saw appellant Bisda enter the
same, lift the telephone and talk to someone
over the telephone;
7. At about the same time, William received a
telephone call from a woman demanding where
the money was and when William replied that
he was ready with P25,000, the woman
replied: Hindi ko masasagot iyan, dadalhin na
lang namin ang bata sa aking boss. When
William intimated that he could raise P50,000
but pleaded for more time to produce the
amount, the woman retorted: Hindi ko
masasagot iyan. Williams testimony reads:
Pros. Junio:
On September 8, 1998, at about 3:40 in the
afternoon, what happened if any?
Witness:

At around 3:40 in the afternoon of September

8, a lady caller called again. I answered the
telephone.
Pros. Junio:
Who was this lady caller?
Witness:
I would say, my perception is it was the same
lady caller who called the first time I answered
the telephone.
Pros. Junio:
And what did she tell you?
Witness:
And she told me where is the money.
Pros. Junio:
And what did you tell her?
Witness:
And I also told her if its okey with you, my
twenty-five is ready.
Pros. Junio:
Then what did she say?
Witness:
She said HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN, DADALIN
NA LANG NAMIN ANG BATA SA AKING BOSS.
Pros. Junio:
What happened next after that?
Witness:
I would like to plead that I will make it fifty
thousand, just give me ample time.
Pros. Junio:
How did she react to your suggestion?
Witness:
HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN. Then she hanged (sic) the phone.[101]
8. After making the telephone call, appellant Bisda left the store and returned to the house at
No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila;
9. The operatives from the PAOCTF followed appellant Bisda and confronted her before she
could enter the house. The operatives then barged into the premises of No. 1258 Paz Street where
they saw Angela in the room;
10. When William arrived at the PAOCTF office, with Angela that day, he inquired from
appellant Bisda why she kidnapped Angela and what she would do with the P5,000,000 ransom she
was demanding, and the appellant replied: Kuya, wag (sic) kang nang maghusga, pareho lang
tayong biktima. When William asked Alma: Biktima, saan? The appellant replied: Ang anak ko,
kinidnap din nila.
In light of the foregoing facts, there can be no other conclusion than that appellant Bisda
demanded a ransom of P5,000,000 from William Soriano; hence, she is GUILTY of kidnapping for
ransom. Being a conspirator, appellant Basilan is also guilty of the said crime. The penalty for
kidnapping for ransom is death, a single and indivisible penalty. The aggravating circumstance of
use of a motor vehicle under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal Code was attendant in
the commission of the crime.[102] However, said circumstance, as well as the voluntary surrender of
appellant Basilan, are inconsequential in the penalties to be imposed on the said appellants,
conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.[103]
CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANTS
The trial court awarded P100,000 moral damages to the spouses William and Marymae
Soriano, the parents of the victim. The trial court did not award any moral and exemplary damages
to the victim. The decision of the trial court has to be modified. Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of
the New Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal arrest and detention. In
this case, the appellants poked a knife on the victim as they took her from the school. The
appellants also tied her hands, and placed scotch tape on her mouth. The hapless victim was so
shocked when operatives of the PAOCTF barged into the office of appellant Bisda, and took custody
of the victim that she cried profusely. The victim suffered trauma, mental, physical and
psychological ordeal. There is, thus, sufficient basis for an award of moral damages in
the amount of P300,000.[104] Since there were demands for ransom, not to mention the use by the
appellants of a vehicle to transport the victim from the school to the Jollibee Restaurant and to
the office of appellant Bisda, the victim is entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.[105] Although the victim claims that the appellants took her earrings, the prosecution
failed to prove the value of the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City,
Branch 272, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellants, Alma Bisda and Generosa Jenny
Rose Basilan, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom under paragraph
4 and the last paragraph of Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code, and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection. The appellants are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally
to the victim Angela Michelle Soriano the amount of P300,000 by way of moral damages and P
100,000 by way of exemplary damages. Costs against the appellants.

105
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority
that the law is constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this Decision, to the Office
of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
(17) People vs. Ibanez
PEOPLE vs IBAEZ
Zaldy Ibaez y Francisco was charged with three counts of Rape under three informations, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cavite, Branch 21.
When arraigned, appellant entered pleas of not guilty. Whereupon, trial on the merits ensued.
On the first charge of rape, AAA testified that she was in their home at xxx, Cavite in June 1997. On
the second charge of rape, AAA testified that appellant raped her eight times from January to
December 1998 in their home and she did not tell her mother because she was afraid of appellant.
AAA testified that the third rape happened sometime in the morning of April 1999 in their house
while her mother was at work.
Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed that he was often away from home and
usually returned only four days after because he was hooked on gambling and drugs. He would
usually return home in the morning after his wife had gone to work to avoid quarrels. By then, AAA
would already be in school. He admitted being in a rehabilitation center for sometime, but
continued to take drugs upon his release. He also admitted that he would beat and threaten his
wife if she did not give him money for drugs. He testified further that in January 1999, he left the
house, stayed in Pasig and returned home only to steal his wifes car. his cousin to return it minus
the stereo. When he returned home, his family After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape in the first and last but was acquitted on
the second.
ISSUE
should the precise dates of the commission of the rape be alleged in the information?
Ibanez: informations are not explicit and certain as to the dates of the rape. Such uncertainties run
afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him
HELD:
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential
element of the crime charged. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to
be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The gravamen of the
offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing
on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate
precision.
Also, it cannot be seriously asserted that appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him when the prosecution failed to
state the exact date of the commission of the offense. At any rate, it is now too late for appellant to
question the sufficiency of the criminal informations regarding the dates of the commission of the
offense. Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment 22 or a
motion to quash on the ground that the informations alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of
plea. However, he did not. Instead, he had himself arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the
crime of rape. Such being the case, appellant has waived his right to object to the informations on
the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged rape.

(18) People vs. Bajar

***In recent jurisprudence, the Court has held that the award of moral damages is mandatory in
the cases of murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.***
[G.R. No. 118240. October 28, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GIOVANNI BAJAR y CABOG, accusedappellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

106
Giovanni Bajar y Cabog was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12, of
the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 90-87734 and meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Bajar was also ordered to pay the amount of P20,700.00 allegedly taken
from the deceased victim, Ramon Mallari, plus civil indemnity of P50,000.00, to the latter's
heirs. Bajar's conviction for that crime arose from an information that read:
That on or about September 11, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with three other persons, whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another, all armed with firearms and
bladed weapons, and therefore in band, while in front of the Pritil Market along Juan Luna St.,
Tondo, Manila, a street used by persons or vehicles for the movement or circulation of persons or
transportation of goods, articles or property, or both, with intent to gain and by means of force,
violence against and intimidation of person, that is, by shooting one RAMON MALLARI Y DELA CRUZ
several times with their said firearms, hitting him on his head and other vital parts of his body, and
shouting `Walang makikialam. Holdup ito, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
take, rob, and carry away the sum of P20,200.00, Philippine currency, in cash, of said Ramon
Mallari y dela Cruz against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the same sum as
aforesaid; that by reason and on the occasion of the said robbery, the said Ramon Mallari y dela
Cruz, sustained mortal gunshot wounds, which were the direct cause of his death immediately
thereafter.
"SO ORDERED.[1]
The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. [2] During the trial, the prosecution moved for an
amendment of the information to conform to the evidence, i.e., that the amount taken from the
victim was P20,700.00 and not P20,200.00 as so initially alleged.
Twenty five-year old[3] Ramon Mallari helped in tending the family's grocery store at the Pritil
market in Tondo, Manila. Lucia Mallari, Ramons mother, remembered having taken into her employ
Bajar, the accused, as a store helper. Her son, Ramon, would repair to the store every afternoon
and there stay until early evening when the two would return home with the stores earnings for the
day. On 11 September 1990, when the store was just about ready to close, the proceeds of sale
had reached P18,500.00.[4]
Melchor Santos, a "sidecar" driver, was standing near a Ford Fierra and attending to his
passengers pieces of baggage when he heard a gunshot. He did not see at that instant where the
gunfire originated from but he could see that Ramon Mallari was evidently the victim of the
gunshot. The latter, with a bloodied head and body, crawled under the Ford Fierra. Then, Santos
saw the gunwielder. The latter approached and pulled the victim from under the vehicle. The
gunman fired two more shots on the now cowering victim. The assailant, after staring momentarily
at Santos, walked away towards Dandan to the direction of the Tondo Church. Santos, prodded by
his passenger, hurriedly drove his "sidecar" away from the scene. Santos later went to the
homicide section of the Western Police District to give a statement. [5] He identified Bajar to be the
person who shot Mallari from among the eight persons who were lined up at the police station.
[6]
The assailant was not unfamiliar to Santos. He would see the man about three times or so a week
around the Pritil market.
Meanwhile, Mallari was rushed to the Moriones Hospital; he did not make it. [7] He sustained
three gunshot wounds one on the left side of his forehead, another on the lower portion of the neck
and the third on the chest backside" towards his left. [8] The latter wound was the most fatal since it
affected a vital organ, the left lung. [9] His body was brought to the Veronica Memorial Chapel in
Pasay City where it was photographed, [10] identified by his sister Lydia, and later autopsied by Dr.
Roberto Garcia.[11]
Aside from the missing sales proceeds of P18,500.00 for the day, the deceased victim also lost
his wallet containing P1,000.00 and his wedding ring worth P1,200.00.[12]
Bajar interposed denial and alibi in his defense. A native of Masbate, Bajar went to Manila to
seek employment. He first found it in the Mallari Grocery at the Pritil market in Tondo, Manila. Lucia
Mallari, the victims mother, readily took him in her employ. He worked at the grocery shop from
1987 until some time in 1988 when he went home to Masbate for a vacation. In June 1990,

107
appellant returned to Manila.Failing to get himself re-employed at the Mallari Grocery, he sought
and found another job, as a "live-in" employee, at the Ricardo Patea Rice Supply in Maypajo
Market, Caloocan City, starting July 1990 until 01 October 1990. On that particular day of 01
October 1990, he was supposed to leave for Masbate with an aunt but he missed the ship. He then
applied for employment with, and was hired by, the Melao Grocery and Rice Supply. Just before
lunchtime on 03 October 1990, four men unexpectedly came to arrest him at Melao's store. [13]
Bajar's story was corroborated, in part, by his previous employer, Ricardo Patea, who said that
Bajar was Patea's helper from 1987 to October 1990. On 11 September 1990, Patea left his
residence with Bajar and two other employees at around 6:15 a.m., arriving at the store about
fifteen minutes later. Nobody left the store until about 8:30 in the evening when they drove back to
the residence.[14]
Parenthetically, the complete records of the case, left undecided by the presiding judge of
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Manila, were forwarded, on 09 March 1994, by Judge Rosmari D.
Carandang to the Judiciary Planning Development and Implementation Office (JPDIO). [15] Pursuant
to Administrative Order No.68-92, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun was designated to assist in the
disposition of the inherited case.[16]
In his appeal from the judgment convicting him, Bajar, through the Public Attorneys Office,
contended that I
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY
THE LONE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
"II
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO PAY THE HEIRS OF RAMON
MALLARI THE AMOUNT OF P20,700.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES AND P50,000.00 AS DEATH
INDEMNITY.[17]
The Court has carefully gone over the records and finds no plausible reason or justification to
overturn the judgment of the trial court. It must, therefore, reject appellant's plea for a reversal of
his conviction.
The positive identification of appellant as the gunwielder who had delivered the fatal shots
that killed the victim was not convincingly assailed. Santos, an eyewitness, testified:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY FISCAL PAZZIUAGAN:
"Q Mr. Santos, on September 11, 1990
at around 7:30 in the evening do
you remember where were you?
"WITNESS

"Q After hearing a gunshot, what did you do if

you did anything?
"A I went near my side car and the people
there thought that was someone, a sidecar
boy who was killed, sir.

"A I was in front of my side car when I heard a

gunshot, sir.

"PROSECUTOR

"Q Now, where were you specifically situated,

what area?

"Q When you heard that gunshot, Mr. Witness,

do you know where it come (sic) from?

"A At Juan Luna St., Tondo, Manila, sir.

"WITNESS

"Q What were you doing at that time?

"A At the very front where I was standing

then, sir.

"A I was then taking passengers baggages

(sic) to my side car, sir.

108
"Q And how far were you from that place
where you heard the gunshot?
"A The place where I was standing was near
the Ford Fierra, with the distance of 2 meters
away from me, sir.

"Q When you saw the victim being shot and

pulled from the Ford Fierra where was the
person who shot Ramon facing at the time in
relation to your place now?
"WITNESS

"Q Do you know who fired that shot?

"A He was facing Ramon Mallari, sir.

"ATTY. ALISUAG

"Q In relation to you where was he at the

time?

He will be incompetent.
"COURT
If he knows let him answer.
"WITNESS
"A I dont know who fired the gun but I just
heard a gunshot, sir.
"Q And do you know who was he shooting at?
"A All I saw is that Ramon Mallari was shot
and he crawled under the Ford Fierra and was
pulled out and was shot again, sir.
"Q How many times was Ramon Mallari was
shot (sic) ?
"A I just heard three gunshot, sir.
"Q And do you know how many person shot
Ramon Mallari?
"A I dont know, sir.
"Q This Ramon Mallari, do you know him?
"A I know him sir, he was being called Ramon
Mallari.
"Q Why do you know him Mr. Witness?
"ATTY. ALISUAG
That would be misleading, Your Honor.
"COURT
Reform your question.

"A Assuming the Ford Fierra is in front of me,

the person who shot the victim was facing
beside the Ford Fierra, sir.
"Q And your position is there?
"A I was beside the Ford Fierra, obliquely
facing the assailant - - at the rear end of the
Ford Fierra, sir.
"Q The question is where is the person who
shot Ramon facing at the time in relation to
your place now?
"A I was standing near the rear end of the
Ford Fierra facing the sidecar and when I
heard the gunshots I turned my back to may
left and facing the Ford Fierra, sir (sic).
"Q Now, Mr. Melchor Santos, for example the
sidecar is here where were you?
"INTERPRETER
The witness described the scene by showing
that the Ford Fierra was parked sidewise while
his sidecar was parked in such a way that its
rear portion is facing the right side of the
parked Ford Fierra. Then he pointed to the
rear portion of his sidecar as the place where
he was standing such that he was facing the
rear portion of his sidecar while the assailant
was facing the right side of the Ford Fierra
when he shot Ramon after he pulled him
under the Ford Fierra then when he stated
when he hard (sic) the shot the witness
turned around to his left and he saw the
assailant pulled hout (sic) the victim, Ramon
Mallari, then he shot him again (sic).
"PROSECUTOR

"PROSECUTOR

"Q Now, what happened after you saw Ramon

Mallari being shot again after he was pulled
by the assailant?

"Q How did you know that he was Ramon?

"WITNESS

"A I came to know him when he was pulled

out under the Ford Fierra, sir.

"A The person who shot the victim walked

toards (sic) Dandan proceeding Tondo,
towards the direction of Tondo Church, sir.

"PROSECUTOR
"PROSECUTOR

109
"Q Base(d) on where you were standing, to
what direction did the assailant go, was it
towards the place where you were standing or
away to (sic) where you were standing?
"WITNESS
"A Away from me, but before he passed by
me we had the chance of staring at each
other, sir.
"Q Now Mr. Witness, was it the first time that
you saw that person who shot the victim?
"ATTY. ALISUAG
No basis, Your Honor.
"COURT
Reform you question, Fiscal.
"PROSECUTOR
"Q Aside from that time when you saw that
assailant when you were stared at him when
was the first time that you saw him, aside
from that time when you were staring at him?
"WITNESS
"A After we have stared at each other, we did
not meet again, sir.
"ATTY. ALISUAG
Considering
that
the
answer
is
not
responsive, Your Honor, may we request that
that answer.
"PROSECUTOR
"Q You said that you stared at that assailant
during the shooting incident, is that correct?
"WITNESS
"A I first saw him when he was roaming along
Torres Tondo, Manila.

"A Yes sir.

"Q Will you please point to him?
"INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to a person who gave the
name GIOVANNI BAJAR when asked.[18]
During a startling event, the natural tendency of
witnesses would be to strive to look at the
appearance of the perpetrator of the crime and to
observe
the
manner
of
its
perpetration.
[19]
Eyewitness Santos was barely two meters away
from the shooting and his vision remained focus on
the incident. The momentary power outage did not
prevent him from seeing what was taking place. He
explained:
Q At that time that you saw the incident, what
was the condition of the area, was it dark or
lighted?
"ATTY. ALISUAG
Your Honor, the defense
"Q (sic) At first it was lighted then later on the
light were went of (sic).
"PROSECUTOR
"Q When did the light go off, Mr. Witness, was
it after the victim was shot, will you please
tell us?
"A On the second gunshot the light went off,
sir.
"Q After the second gunshot how about when
you stared at the assailant was the light still
on?
"ATTY. ALISUAG
Leading.
"PROSECUTOR
Alternative.

"Q And how often do you see him at Torrest

St. (sic), before that incident?

"COURT

"A Sometimes three times a week, sir.

Alternative, let the witness answer.

"x x x x x x x x x.

"A When we stared at each other there was a

light coming in the nearby store using a gas
lamp, and very soon the light went on, sir. [20]

"Q Is the person who shot now, if he

happened to be inside the courtroom will you
be able to identify?

110
Illumination by a gas lamp could be sufficient for purposes of identification of the malefactor. [21] In
any event, the electric power was cut-off only for a moment and restored almost instantly, even
before the third gunshot was delivered.
The fact that the prosecution has presented only one eyewitness to the crime is of little
consequence. The testimony of a single witness, when credible and trustworthy, could be sufficient
to convict.[22] Significantly, appellant has not imputed any ulterior motive why Santos, a stranger,
would testify against him.[23]
The positive identification made by an eyewitness of the culprit effectively effaced the claim
of alibi.[24] Additionally, this defense failed to establish the physical impossibility of appellant being
at the crime scene when it transpired, an essential element for the defense of alibi to prosper.[25]
Appellant argues that if, indeed, he has committed the crime, then he would have fled and
sought employment elsewhere to avoid the clutches of the law. [26] Non-flight, however, is not
always an indication of innocence. In People vs. Lamsing,[27] the Court has said:
Appellant also argues that his arrest in a place near the scene of the crime negates his guilt. He
contends that since flight is evidence of guilt and of a guilty conscience, then conversely non-flight
is an indication of innocence. The argument is untenable. If the contention is correct then all that a
criminal must do to profess his innocence would be to remain at or near the place of the crime and
declare, when arrested, that he is innocent otherwise he would have fled. The crime may have
been committed with impunity and he may have thought that the victim or his heirs would not
complain, or that the eyewitness will not be able to identify him." [28]
The crime charged against appellant is robbery with homicide, the elements of which, under
Article 294, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 293, of the Revised Penal Code, [29] are: (a) intent to
gain, (b) unlawful taking of personal property belonging to another and (c) violence against or
intimidation of any person by reason of which, or on occasion thereof, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed.In robbery with homicide, it is essential, however, that there should be a
direct relation or an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior
or subsequent to the former or whether or not both crimes are committed at the same time. [30]
Santos, in his testimony, failed to mention the robbery angle. In fact, in his sworn statement,
he stated categorically that he did not know whether the assailants had taken anything from the
victim (Hindi ko po alam kung may kinuha po.) The other alleged eyewitness, Edgardo Celso y
Hubilla, whose sworn statement[32] was taken by the police on 13 September 1990, did not swear
that the victim was actually robbed. The only hint to indicate robbery was Celsos statement that
one of the culprits had been heard to say that they were conducting a hold-up; thus:
[31]

10. T: Maari bang ikuwento mo sa amin kung ano yong nasaksihan mong pangyayari?
"S: Ganito po iyon, habang hinihintay ko si Pareng Efren para kunin sa kanya ang pedicab
na ibebeyahe ko napansin na may dalawang lalaki na parang nag-aaway sa tabi ng Ford
Fiera maya maya nakita ko ko (sic) yong isang lalaki, tapos nakita ko bumagsak yong lalaki
at napunta sa ilalim ng Ford Fiera, tapos nakita yong isa pang lalaki na may dalang baril na
nagsabi ng `WALANG MAKIKIALAM HOLD-UP ITO tapos nakita ko yong lalaking bumaril doon
sa anak ni Mallari na hinihila yong anak ni Mallari na nabaril tapos nakita ko na muling
binaril nong lalaki ang anak ni Mallari, tapos nakita ko may may (sic) tatlong lalaki na
tumakbo na may mga dalang baril at ang isa ay may da (sic) dalang balisong na tumakbo
papuntang Pritil Detachment. Tapos nakita ko yong lalaki bumaril sa anak ni Mallari na
tumakbo na papuntang Divisoria. Ang ginawa namin mga sidecar boys ay nilapitan (sic)
namin yong lalaking nabaril at isinakay namin sa jeep tapos dinala namin sa hospital. [33]
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to present Celso at the witness stand. Absent any evidence
that appellant indeed robbed the victim, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide would
not stand. The fact that the Mallari family lost some amount of cash or valuables did not
necessarily establish, let alone beyond reasonable doubt, that it was appellant's doing.
Given all the evidence, the only crime proven is one of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code that imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal. In the absence of any

111
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, appellant should be meted the medium period of the
penalty.[34] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no reasons shown for its
inapplicability, that penalty can be anywhere within the range of prision mayor, as minimum, to the
medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, appellant
must indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the appealed judgment of the trial court by now holding
that appellant Giovanni Bajar y Cabog is guilty of the crime of homicide for the killing of Ramon
Mallari, for which crime he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of the medium
period of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years and four (4) months of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to indemnify the heirs of Ramon Mallari in
the amount of P50,000.00. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

(19) People vs. Dagami

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALBERTO DAGAMI, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This case was certified and elevated to this Court by the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section
13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court [1] after it had reviewed the decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Palo, Leyte, which convicted the accused-appellant of rape. The CA affirmed the decision
of the trial court with modification, increasing the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua and the
amount of indemnity.
The antecedents are as follows:
On the basis of a criminal complaint [3] of the victim Visitacion Locaas, an Information for rape
was filed against appellant, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of October, 1991, in the Municipality of Palo, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ALBERTO
DAGAMI did, then, and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, intimidation
and threat have carnal knowledge with VISITACION LOCAAS, against her will and consent.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial forthwith ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution0[5]
Thirty-six-year-old Visitacion Locaas and her three children lived in a farm located
at Barangay Castilla, Palo, Leyte.[6] Her husband, Fortunato Locaas, was serving sentence at the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,[7] for the killing of a certain Hinlo, Jr.[8]
In the early morning of October 31, 1991, while Visitacion and her children were sleeping in
the sala of their house, she was awakened by a noise in the kitchen. [9] Curious, she lifted the
mosquito net to check what it was. [10] She was shocked when she saw the appellant from the
kitchens doorway, bearing down upon her. [11] With the aid of a kerosene lamp that was lighted in
the kitchens table,[12] she recognized the appellant, who also happened to be a neighbor. He
pointed a short firearm at Visitacion and warned her not to shout or else she would be killed.
Terrified, she raised her hands. [13] The appellant thereupon grabbed her hand and pulled her
towards the kitchen floor.[14]Visitacion fell prostrate to the ground, face down.[15] The appellant
grappled with her and turned her over. [16] He then went astride her legs and straddled them.
[17]
Visitacion resisted and struggled to free herself, but the appellant poked his gun against her
abdomen and manhandled her.[18] He then raised her duster up to her neck [19] and stripped down
her underwear.[20] The appellant proceeded to fondle her vagina [21] and to take off his shorts.[22] With
the gun pressed against her chest,[23] Visitacion could not cry out.[24] The appellant then mounted
her, pinning both her arms on the floor. [25] He inserted his penis into her vagina, [26] and made pushand-pull movements while inside her. [27] Satiated, the appellant stood up, and at gun- point, warned
Visitacion not to divulge the incident to anyone, otherwise he would kill her. [28] Thereupon, the
appellant jumped out of the window and disappeared. [29] Visitacion, trembling and in a daze, could
not do anything but cry.[30]
In the afternoon of the same day, Visitacion, went to her father at Sitio David, Barangay San
Agustin, Palo, Leyte, and revealed her ordeal at the hands of the appellant. [31] The following day,
accompanied by her father, she reported the incident to Barangay Captain Roberto Dagami, the
appellants brother, who told them to lodge their complaint with the police authorities. [32]
On November 2, 1991, Visitacion submitted herself to a medical examination at
the Tacloban City Medical Center. She was examined separately by Dr. Giovanni Zilmar of the

112
Surgery Department, and Dr. Isabelita M. Alo of the OB-GYNE Department. [33] On November 6,
1991, the attending physicians issued a Medico-Legal Report which stated that:
FINDINGS
- Contusion, 1 cm. right forearm middle 3rd anterior aspect.
- Abrasions anterior chest wall right.
- Abrasions, left anterior axillary line.
OB-GYNE findings:
- Pelvic examination findings:
- Normal external genitalia.
- Parous introitus
1. Abrasion 1 cm. right labia minora at 7:00 oclock position with erythema.
2. Abrasion 1 cm. left labia minora at 5:00 oclock position.
3. Abrasion, 0.5 cm. fourchet with erythema.
4. Lacerations, superficial, 1-2 mm. in length # 3 at para-uretheral orifice.
- Vagina admits 2 finger with ease.
Cervix pinkish with eversion, small, firm, closed, non-tender.
Uterus 6 cms from S/P
Discharge Whitish, scanty
Spermatozoa examination No spermatozoa seen.
UCG exam Negative for UCG.
x-x-x-x-x-x [34]
Dr. Alo recalled that when she examined Visitacion, she noticed a redness on the entrance of
her vagina.[35] She opined that abrasions Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, above, sustained by Visitacion could
have been caused by the rubbing or by the force and friction of a sexual act. [36]She explained that
though there were no traces of spermatozoa in Visitacions vagina, this does not negate rape since
the same could had been expelled out or had simply died after 72 hours. [37]
Dr. Zilmar, elaborating on his finding, declared that the contusion on the right forearm and the
abrasions on the left anterior axillary line and right chest of Visitacion could have been caused by
the forceful application of a blunt force and/or a struggle. [38]
On November 6, 1991, Visitacion reported the incident to the police authorities. [39]
In the meantime, in January 1992, Visitacion received a letter from her husband Fortunato
advising her of his coming release from prison in April of that same year. Thus, in March 1992,
Visitacion left for Manila to fetch her husband.[40]
The Case for the Appellant[41]
The appellant testified that he was a next-door neighbor of Visitacion in Barangay Castilla,
Palo, Leyte.[42] He eked out a living as a farmer [43] and doubled up as a Chief barangay tanod at
night.[44] He denied having raped Visitacion and vigorously claimed that they were lovers. [45] He
began courting her in August of 1991 and being a convicts wife, won her love effortlessly. [46] The
following month, they had sexual intercourse three times in her house, usually at around 11:00
p.m.[47] The appellant said that as Chief barangay tanod, he had a convenient excuse to his wife for
his nocturnal escapades.[48] As his lover, he brought Visitacion palay during harvest season.[49]
On October 30, 1991, at about 10:00 p.m., Visitacion summoned him to her house. Visitacion
showed him a letter from Fortunato, informing her of his forthcoming release from prison in May
1992. She told him that she was carrying their love child. [50]
To the appellants surprise, his brother told him that Visitacion filed a criminal complaint
against him.[51] He immediately went to Visitacions house to straighten things out. The appellant
was accompanied by his mother. He confronted Visitacion but elicited no answer. [52] He then told
Visitacions mother, Jovencia, of his illicit love affair with her daughter and that the latter was
pregnant. Jovencia got furious and started calling her daughter names. [53] Unable to control herself,
Jovencia went berserk and started beating up Visitacion. The appellant explained that this
particular event accounts for the injuries of Visitacion as reflected in the medico-legal report. [54]
The appellant further testified that Visitacion went to Manila to remove herself from the prying
eyes and ears of her barriomates. There, months after or on June 29, 1992, she gave birth to a
baby boy at the Cogio Hospital.[55] He was present when Visitacion delivered their child. The child
was thereafter given up for adoption, and was adopted by Rizalina Estiller. [56]
The appellant asserted that Visitacion merely fabricated the rape charge to save herself from
the shame and ignominy of having been impregnated by him, and, likewise, to escape the wrath of
her ex-convict husband.[57]
Carolina Cobacha corroborated the appellants claim that the latter was Visitacions paramour.
She testified that despite being a neighbor and a kumadre of Visitacion, she came forward to shed
light on the truth.[58] She was a farmhand of Visitacions mother who knew of the love affair between
the appellant and Visitacion. In March 1991, she saw them twice in a very uncompromising
situation.[59] The first was during a harvest, when the appellant and Visitacion were kissing and
caressing each other inside a nipa hut located in the rice-field. [60] The other was when the appellant
dropped by the house of Visitacion. The two kissed in her presence. [61]
Juanita Tayubong, 80 years old, testified that on October 31, 1991, at about 7:00 p.m., she
was at her porch when she heard Jovencia shouting at Visitacion at the top of her voice and
berating her about the illicit relationship. [62] From Visitacions window she witnessed Jovencia punch,
scratch, and pinch Visitacion on different parts of her body. [63] The incident attracted the attention
of the neighbors who rushed to the house of Visitacion. [64]
Adelina Ronquillo, 56 years old, is the maternal aunt of Visitacion and resided at Bonifacio St.,
Bangkal, Makati City.[65] She said that sometime in November 1991, Visitacion went to her place,

113
seeking financial help for her rape case. [66] Initially, she obliged, but when she found out from
Visitacions parents and other relatives that the charge was but a sham, she stopped extending
financial assistance.[67]Thereafter, Visitacion returned home to Leyte. In January 1992, Visitacion
again went back to Manila where she gave birth to a child onJune 29, 1992 at
the Antipolo Municipal Hospital. She said that the child was adopted by Visitacions sister, Riza. [68]
The prosecution then recalled Visitacion to the witness stand as a rebuttal witness. She
testified that after the release of her husband from prison, they left Barangay Castilla,
Palo, Leyte and settled down at her husbands place at Moroboro, La Paz, Leyte.[69] She indignantly
denied that the appellant was her sweetheart and that she had consensual sexual relations with
him.[70] She said that she was neither impregnated by the appellant, nor had given birth to a child
on June 29, 1992 sired by the appellant.[71] Her youngest child was born on April 23, 1995 and its
father was her husband, Fortunato.[72] She averred that in June 1992, her Aunt Adelina approached
her and sought the dropping of the case by offering money, which she flatly refused. [73] According
to Visitacion, her mother and her aunt Adelina were not in speaking terms, as the two were
squabbling over some property left by her maternal grandmother. [74] She further said that
the nipa hut located at the rice-field being alluded to by Carolina as their love tryst was an open
hut without any wall.[75]
On July 3, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused ALBERTO DAGAMI, alias
Bebot, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the consummated offense of RAPE, as
defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the use of a deadly weapon,
a handgun, and applying the pertinent provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, convicts him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor,
as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law.
Pursuant to Art. 345 of the RPC, the accused is hereby condemned to: (1) indemnify the offended
party, Visitacion Locaas, the sum of P30,000.00; & (2) to acknowledge and support the offspring
resulting from the accuseds illegal act subject of this indictment.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[76]
The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. [77] On October 26, 1998, the CA promulgated
its decision[78] affirming the decision of the trial court but with modifications. The decretal portion of
the decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting the accused-appellant Alberto Dagami is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATIONS that (a) the penalty of imprisonment to be imposed is reclusion perpetua; (b)
that Alberto Dagami indemnify Visitacion Locaas in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
(c) that the order for the recognition and support be deleted.
Considering the imposable penalty and pursuant to Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court,
instead of entering judgment, this case is certified to the honorable Supreme Court for review. Let
the entire records be accordingly elevated.
SO ORDERED.[79]
The appellate court found no cogent reason to disturb the judgment of the trial court, but
ruled that the trial court erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law because the law does
not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua. Rape is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty which, under Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code,
must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Thus, the CA increased
the penalty meted to the appellant from reclusion temporal toreclusion perpetua, and likewise
increased his civil liability from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. It deleted the order of the trial court on
the matter of acknowledgment and support of the offspring for being incongruous. [80]
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that it erred in:
I. CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT DESPITE THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT;
II. CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT DESPITE THE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY THAT THEY WERE LOVERS;
III. CONDEMNING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO RECOGNIZE THE OFFSPRING RESULTING
FROM ACCUSEDS ILLEGAL ACT SUBJECT OF THIS INDICTMENT; and,
IV DENYING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND/OR RE-TRIAL. [81]
The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He stresses that the trial court should have given due weight and credence to the testimonies of
defense witnesses who were all not actuated with improper motives in testifying in his favor,
instead of believing the uncorroborated testimony of Visitacion, which is full of inconsistencies and
contradictions.[82]
The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of force and
intimidation beyond a shadow of doubt. He argues that if there was any resistance at all from
Visitacion, it was only perfunctory and superficial. He added that she failed to resist to the last
ounce of her strength, the attempts of the appellant to rape her. [83]
The argument is bereft of merit. In People v. Fraga,[84] we held:
The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim
that if she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out.
Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual

114
assault. It is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained physical
injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the intercourse takes place against her will or if
she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did not do so. Indeed, the law
does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. [85]
In the present case, the appellant was armed with a handgun and threatened to kill Visitacion
if she resisted. This notwithstanding, she still struggled with all her might to ward him off, but to no
avail. During her testimony, Visitacion clearly described how the appellant suddenly grabbed her,
forcibly pulled her to the kitchen and ravished her, and afterwards threatened to kill her if she told
others what he had done to her. She testified, thus:
PROSECUTOR DAGANDAN :
Q In the early morning of October 31, 1991, do you
recall where you were?
A Yes, maam, I was in our house.
Q Do you recall what you were doing at that time?
A We were sleeping.
Q Do you recall if there was any unusual incident that
happened?
A Yes, maam.
Q What was that?
A I heard a noise in our kitchen.[86]
Q So, when you heard the noise, what did you do?
A I got up and verified what was happening.[87]
Q Since you said that you tried to verify the noise,
were you, in fact, able to verify?
A No, maam, because when I was near the door
Alberto Dagami was there already at the door.
Q What door of your house?
A Door to the kitchen.[88]
Q You said that it was early morning, how were you
able to identify the accused (Alberto Dagami)
since you said it was early in the morning?
A We have a kerosene lamp which was lighted.[89]
Q Will you describe again the accused as you saw
him?
A As I was raising the edge of the mosquito net
because I want to go out to verify the noise in
the kitchen, Alberto Dagami was already at the
door and he said you shout now or else you will
die.[90]
Q What was his position when he said those words?
A He was pointing his gun towards me.[91]
Q So, what was your reaction as the accused had
uttered those words?
A I was shocked and afraid. I said, why is this gun
pointed at me.
Q So what did the accused do after saying those
words?
A He grabbed my hand.
Q Towards where?
A Towards the kitchen.
Q So, what happened at the kitchen?
A I fell down.
Q What was your position when you fall (sic) down?
A I was as if in a crawling position.[92]
Q What did he do?
A Because I fell down, face downward, he held my
hand and turned my body facing upward.[93]
Q So, what did the accused do after that?
A He sat down on my knees.
Q In what manner? Will you demonstrate?
A He was sitting on my knees straddling.[94]
Q What happened after that?
A He raised my dress because I was wearing a duster
at that time.
Q Up to what portion of your body was your dress
raised?
A Up to the upper portion of my chest, up to my neck.
Q After that, what did he do?
A He held and massage my vagina.[95]
Q So, what else happened?

A I tried to struggle, and then he pointed his gun

towards my abdomen and I could not do
anything.
( I would like to manifest that when the witness
testified, she was shaky and crying)
Q Was he successful with your struggle?
A No, maam.
Q Why not?
A Because he was sitting on my legs and pointing his
gun towards me.[96]
Q So, what happened after that?
A He took off my panty.
Q With what hand?
A With his left hand.
Q How about the right hand?
A The right hand was used in holding the gun and it
was always pointed at me.
Q In what part of your body was the gun pointed?
A Towards my chest.[97]
Q So what did you do next?
A He pulled out his shorts and placed himself on top
of myself, face downward.
Q What did he do with that position?
A He raped me.
Q How did you come to know that he raped you?
A He raped me and sexually molested me.
Q How did you come to know that he raped you?
A He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q Did you feel anything?
A He was doing push and pull.
Q How did you feel at that particular time?
A I was afraid.
Q For how long a time did the accused place himself
on top of you?
A It did not take a long time.
Q What did you do when he was on top of you?
A I tried to struggle. While he was on top of me having
that push and pull movement, I had my legs
stretched.
Q For what purpose?
A So that he cannot be successful in what he wanted
to do.
Q Did you make an outlet or did you shout?
A No, maam.
Q Why not?
A Because I was afraid.[98]
Q So, after the accused made that push and pull
movement, what else happened?
A After he sexually abused me, he got up.
Q And after that what happened next?
A He said, If you will tell somebody, I will kill you.
Q Do you recall where was the gun (sic)?
A He was holding the gun with his right hand. When
he said that if you will tell somebody, I will kill
you, he was holding that gun it was pointed to
me.
Q So, what did the accused do?
A He jumped off from the window of the kitchen.
Q How about you?
A When he jumped out, I got up.[99]

The contusion on Visitacions forearm, the abrasions on her chest and other parts of her body,
and the redness of her genitalia are eloquent physical evidence of the force employed by the
appellant in defiling her. In a rape case, the physical evidence showing use of force speaks louder
than words.[100] And as disclosed by the records, Visitacion constantly cried during her testimony.
[101]
Her tears add poignancy to verity born out of human nature and experience. [102]
The case for the prosecution is not enfeebled by the testimony of Juanita Tayubong and the
failure of the prosecution to present Visitacions mother Jovencia; and to adduce in evidence
Fortunatos letter to Visitacion of his impending release from the national penitentiary; nor by the
failure of Dr. Giovanni Zilmar and Dr. Isabelita M. Alo to pinpoint the exact time when Visitacion
sustained her injuries.[103]
The matter of deciding who to present as a witness for the prosecution is not for the appellant
or the trial court to decide, as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor. Besides, the testimony of
Juanita is belied by the findings of Dr. Alo that the redness and abrasions on Visitacions genitalia
were caused by the rubbing or by the force and friction of a sexual act. [104]
Assuming that Visitacions mother is a vital witness, her non-presentation was the appellants
own undoing. There was nothing that could have prevented the appellant from presenting the said
witness in order to discredit the testimonies of Visitacion and the other witnesses of the
prosecution. Case law has it that the presumption of suppressed evidence does not apply when the
same is equally accessible to the defense.[105]
Contrary to the appellants claim, Dr. Alo categorically declared when she testified that the
incident, per her interview of Visitacion, occurred on October 31, 1991, thus:
PROS. DAGANDAN :
Q- On this Medico-Legal Report when did the incident happen?
R- The incident occurred on October 31, 1991 at about 1:00 oclock in the morning.[106]
Besides, it is of no moment that Dr. Zilmar failed to give the exact time when Visitacion
suffered the contusions and abrasions. Medical findings or proof of injuries, virginity, or an
allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not essential in a
prosecution for rape.[107] In any event, even a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable to the successful prosecution of rape. [108] Expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction. [109] Even without a medical report, the rape victims
credible testimony, standing alone, is sufficient basis for conviction. [110]
It was not unnatural for Visitacion to report the incident to her father the following day despite
the appellants threat that she would be killed if she divulged to others what he had done to her.
She must have been overwhelmed by cascades of fear when he pointed his gun at her and
threatened to kill her if she resisted. However, she regained the courage and equanimity the next
day and decided to reveal her misfortune to her father. [111]
This Court has repeatedly held that the workings of the human mind placed under a great deal
of emotional and psychological stress (such as during rape) are unpredictable, and different people
react differently. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling, frightful or traumatic experience some may shout, some may faint, and
some may be shocked into insensibility. [112] As this Court has pointed out, the conduct of a woman
immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth
or falsity of her claim. In the case at bar, if Visitacion had not been forced and intimidated into
submitting to the lustful designs of the appellant, her natural reaction, as a married woman, would
have been to conceal her illicit activity instead of denouncing it immediately as rape, for otherwise,
her conduct would constitute adultery.[113]
Equally incredible is the appellants claim that he was the paramour of Visitacion and that she
charged him with rape because she needed a scapegoat for her pregnancy, in anticipation of the
possible retribution by her ex-convict husband should the latter discover their relationship. [114]
In People v. Manalo,[115] this Court said that the sweetheart defense is a much-abused defense
that rashly derides the intelligence of the Court and sorely tests its patience. Being an affirmative
defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof. [116] Since the
appellant admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant several times, [117] he bears
the burden of proving his defense by clear and convincing evidence. [118] The appellant failed to
discharge his burden. Visitacion adamantly denied that the appellant was her sweetheart.
[119]
Although the appellant presented witnesses to support his claim, the corroborating testimonies
were neither credible nor convincing. Incredible was the story of Carolina Cobacha that in March
1991, she saw the appellant and Visitacion twice in very uncompromising situations. The testimony
is even inconsistent with the appellants testimony. By the appellants account, he began courting
Visitacion only in August 1991, [120] and had sexual intercourse with her the following month. Also,
the nipa hut, where Carolina allegedly saw the appellant and Visitacion kiss each other, is located
in the rice-field. Visitacion must have been so morally depraved as to allow herself to be seen in
the arms of a man not her husband, in a conspicuous place, in a very rural community where
everyone practically knew each other. The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in
rural areas in this country, women by custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence,
and that great caution is observed so that their reputation remains untainted. [121] As to Adelina
Ronquillo, her testimony, with respect to the love affair of her niece and the appellant, is hearsay.
She testified that she learned of the illicit affair from Visitacions parents and other relatives.
[122]
When evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any
evidentiary weight, being patently hearsay. Moreover, it has been shown that Adelina Ronquillo was
a biased witness. She never denied that she sought from Visitacion the dropping of the charge
against the appellant by offering money, which offer was flatly rejected by Visitacion. Hardly can
her corroborative statements be accepted as gospel truth. Juanita Tayubongs testimony is, likewise,

as unreliable, as she merely overheard the alleged illicit relationship of Visitacion with another man
from Jovencia.[123]
We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the sweetheart story was a mere
concoction of the appellant in order to exculpate himself from his criminal liability. In People v.
Venerable,[124] we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused-appellant was unavailing and selfserving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like, to attest to his alleged amorous
affair with the victim. Hence, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of
the theory that he and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as
tokens, mementos, and photographs. If the appellant were really the paramour of Visitacion, she
would not have gone to the extent of charging the appellant with rape which inevitably exposed
her to the humiliation of recounting in public the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she would
not have implicated a person, who was allegedly her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable
crime and thereby lay open their illicit relationship to public shame and ridicule, not to mention the
ire of an ex-convict husband and the smoldering contempt of her children were it not the truth.
[125]
Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be credible in
itself such as one that the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.[126]
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the appellant and the private complainant were
indeed sweethearts as he claims, this fact alone would not extricate him from his predicament. The
mere assertion of a love relationship would not necessarily rule out the use of force to consummate
the crime.[127] It must be stressed that in rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. [128] Visitacion, even if she was
indeed the appellants lover, cannot be forced to have sex against her will. [129] Definitely, a man
cannot demand sexual gratification from a loved one, worse, employ violence upon her on the
pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.[130]
The appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of the private complaint hardly persuades
us. In the afternoon after the rape, Visitacion told her father of the rape incident. The day after, she
went to the barangay captain to report the same. Later, she submitted herself to medical
examination and went to the police station to report the rape incident. She lodged a criminal
complaint for rape against accused-appellant before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Palo, Leyte. This
sequence of events after the rape indicates that indeed, Visitacion was deeply wronged and
aggrieved, otherwise she would not have instituted this case at all. As aptly pointed out in People
v. Mendoza,[131]a married woman with a husband and three daughters would not publicly admit that
she had been criminally abused unless that was the truth. Similarly, it defies reason in this case
why a mother of four would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts and publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were other than to fight
for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her. Pertinently, it stands to reason that
Visitacion would not bring herself, her family and her husband to embarrassment, to public scrutiny
and being the talk of the community unless what she had testified that she was raped is true. [132] It
is settled that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous
crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. [133]
In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis of the victims testimony,
provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and normal course of
things.[134] Indeed, even the testimony of a lone witness is sufficient to support a conviction,
especially when the testimony enjoys the badges of sincerity and veracity. [135]
The time-honored rule is that the trial courts factual findings [136] and assessment of credibility
of witnesses,[137] especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and
are even conclusive and binding on this Court, barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance.
Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter that peculiarly falls within the province of
the trial court as it had the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the
witnesses at the time of their testimony.[138] Similarly, assigning value and weight to the
testimonies of witnesses is also within its jurisdiction. [139] Thus, the trial courts evaluation and
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses should be given weight by this Court, especially
because it had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, the appellant has failed to
provide a substantial argument to warrant a departure from this rule, nor has he pointed to a
matter of weight or substance that had been overlooked by the trial and appellate court.
During the trial, the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a weapon (handgun) and
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling were proven. Nonetheless, these aggravating
circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty because the same were not alleged in the
Information. Sections 8[140] and 9[141] of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now
provide that aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information;
otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if proven during the trial. Being
favorable to the appellant, this rule, as amended, should be applied retroactively to this case.
Although the aggravating circumstances in question cannot be appreciated for the purpose of
fixing a heavier penalty in this case, they can, however, be considered as basis for an award of
exemplary damages. Evidence proving these circumstances forms part of the actual commission of
the crime and justifies an award of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code even
when the said aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the information. [142]
Furthermore, the appellate court correctly increased the amount of civil indemnity,
from P30,000 to P50,000, in accordance with the recent ruling of this Court. [143]

The Court of Appeals, however, erred in not awarding moral damages and exemplary damages
in favor of the victim. In line with recent jurisprudence and in recognition of the victims injury as
being inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the crime of rape, an
additional P50,000 should be awarded to the victim as moral damages. [144] As discussed above and
pursuant to People v. Catubig,[145]an award of P25,000 as exemplary damages is also proper.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that, in addition to the amount of P50,000 awarded as civil indemnity,
accused-appellant Alberto Dagami is ORDERED to pay complainant Visitacion Locaas the amount
of P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.