Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Civpro Cases
Civpro Cases
Civpro Cases
SECOND DIVISION
MANUEL C. BUNGCAYAO, SR., G.R. No. 170483
represented in this case by his
Attorney-in-fact ROMEL R. Present:
BUNGCAYAO,
Petitioner, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
FORT ILOCANDIA
PROPERTY HOLDINGS,
AND DEVELOPMENT Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondent. April 19, 2010
x - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the 21
November 2005 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 82415.
The Antecedent Facts
Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of
the two entrepreneurs who introduced improvements on the
foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort
Ilocandia
Hotel
started
its
construction
in
the
area. Thereafter, other entrepreneurs began setting up their
own stalls in the foreshore area. They later formed
themselves into the DSierto Beach Resort Owners
Association, Inc. (DSierto).
In July 1980, six parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now
Calayad) were transferred, ceded, and conveyed to the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1704. Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was erected on
the area. In 1992, petitioner and other DSierto members
applied for a foreshore lease with the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and was
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner appealed from the trial courts decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 November 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in resorting to
summary judgment as a valid procedural device for the
prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only a legal issue and not a genuine issue as to any material
fact. The Court of Appeals ruled that in this case, the facts
are not in dispute and the only issue to be resolved is
whether the subject property was within the titled property
of respondent. Hence, summary judgment was properly
rendered by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the counterclaims raised by
respondent were compulsory in nature, as they arose out of
or were connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing partys claim
and did not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court could not acquire jurisdiction.The
Court of Appeals ruled that respondent was the rightful
owner of the subject property and as such, it had the right
to recover its possession from any other person to whom
the owner has not transmitted the property, including
petitioner.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated
February 13, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City, Branch 13 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Thus, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in his Memorandum:
[12]
1.
Whether
respondents
counterclaim is compulsory; and
2.
Whether summary judgment is
appropriate in this case.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Compulsory Counterclaim
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any
relief, which a defending party may have against an
opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is
necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs
complaint.[13] It is compulsory in the sense that it is within
the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the
future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the
same case.[14] Any other counterclaim is permissive.[15]
The Court has ruled that the compelling test of
compulsoriness characterizes a counterclaim as compulsory
if there should exist a logical relationship between the main
claim and the counterclaim.[16] The Court further ruled that
there exists such a relationship when conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail
substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and
the court; when the multiple claims involve the same
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served,
move with supporting affidavits, depositions
or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment has been explained as follows:
Summary judgment is a procedural device
resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. When the
pleadings on file show that there are no
genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules
allow a party to obtain immediate relief by
way of summary judgment, that is, when the
facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed
to decide the case summarily by applying the
law to the material facts. Conversely, where
the pleadings tender a genuine issue,
summary judgment is not proper. A genuine
issue is such issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished
from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two
(2) requisites for summary judgment to be
proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue
as to any material fact, except for the amount
of damages; and (2) the party presenting the
motion for summary judgment must be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and a moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment is
proper if, while the pleadings on their face
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
On
September
20,
2004,
petitioners moved
for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on February 22,
2005. Hence, the present recourse.
Issues
I.
Our Ruling
Petitioners action designated as mandamus was dismissed
by the trial court on the ground that it is insufficient in form
and substance. This begs the question: when is an action
sufficient in form and when is it sufficient in substance?
and
Address of
the
party
or
occupy up
premises;
to
now,
the
above
described
xxxx
xxxx
10. On
September
14,
1989, Plaintiffs
completed the payment of the amortizations
due over the property in question, and this is
evidenced by an official receipt, numbered
19492, which Defendants cashier, Yasmin D.
Aquino, issued to the Plaintiffs themselves,
although the official name of the payor
indicated therein was still that of the deceased
Lourdes Bulado;
xxxx
12. Significantly, that receipt contained the
annotation
appearing on
the
left
side
thereof, that
the
amount
paid
thereon
constituted "full payment";
13. Since then, Plaintiffs have been demanding
from the Defendant the issuance of the deed of
sale and the title over the property in question,
but, inexplicably, and without any legal
justification
whatsoever,
Defendant
has
refused to issue that deed of sale and title;
14. On January 28, 2003, Plaintiffs, through
counsel, sent a letter to the Defendant seeking
the issuance of that deed of sale and title but,
the name
supplied)
of
Lourdes
Bulado.29 (Underscoring
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139018. April 11, 2005]
ESTHERLITA CRUZ-AGANA, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AURORA
SANTIAGO-LAGMAN (In her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan) and B.
SERRANO ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
DECISION
The Case
This petition for certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Order
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan
(trial court), dated 4 June 1999, recalling its previous Order
dated 25 May 1999 dismissing B. Serrano Enterprises, Inc.s
(respondent) counterclaim upon a motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner Estherlita Cruz-Agana (petitioner).
Antecedent Facts
On 18 March 1996, petitioner filed a Complaint for
annulment of title with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction against respondent. Petitioner claims that as the
sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz, she is the sole owner of a
lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3907.
Petitioner further claims that the lot was fraudulently sold to
Eugenio Lopez, Jr. who later on transferred the lot to
respondent. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan presided by Judge Aurora
Santiago-Lagman and docketed as Civil Case No. 210-M-96.
Respondent seasonably filed its Answer with compulsory
counterclaim. Petitioner moved to dismiss respondents
counterclaim for lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping.
In an Order dated 11 March 1999, the trial court denied
petitioners motion to dismiss respondents counterclaim. The
trial court reasoned that respondents counterclaim is
compulsory and therefore excluded from the coverage of
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved
that the trial court reconsider its Order invoking the
mandatory nature of a certificate of non-forum shopping
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
[2]
On 25 May 1999, the trial court reversed its 11 March
1999 Order and dismissed respondents counterclaim for
lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Respondent
seasonably
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration arguing that Administrative Circular No. 0494 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims following the
ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla.3 On
4 June 1999, the trial court again reversed itself and
recalled its Order dismissing respondents counterclaim.
Petitioner now comes before this Court through Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found that respondents counterclaim is
compulsory in nature. The trial court ruled that the filing of
a compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of
non-forum shopping. On the effect of Santo Tomas on
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, the trial court explained:
It is settled rule that it is one of the inherent powers of
the court to amend and control its processes and orders so
as to make them conformable to law and justice. This power
includes the right to reverse itself, specially when in its
honest opinion, it has committed an error or mistake in
judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause
injustice to a party litigant.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the following issue:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS COUNTERCLAIM.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue presented is not novel. This Court has
squarely settled this issue in Santo Tomas University
Hospital v. Surla.[3] Writing for the Court, Justice Jose C.
Vitug began hisponencia thus:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005]
SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, and NEAL B. CHRISTIAN, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
pendency of the case? This is the basic issue raised in this petition
for the Courts consideration.
Sometime in 1996 and 1997, petitioner Swagman Hotels and
Travel, Inc., through Atty. Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David
Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively, obtained
from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by three
promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14
July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of
US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest
of 15% per annum payable every three months. [1] In a letter dated
16 December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner corporation
that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter
payment in the total amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid interests
in the total amount of US$13,500.[2]
On 2 February 1999, private respondent Christian filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59, a complaint for
a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation,
Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. The complaint alleged as follows: On 7
August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997, the petitioner, as
well as its president and vice-president obtained loans from him in
the total amount of US$150,000 payable after three years, with an
interest of 15% per annum payable quarterly or every three
months. For a while, they paid an interest of 15% per annum
every three months in accordance with the three promissory notes.
However, starting January 1998 until December 1998, they paid
him only an interest of 6% per annum, instead of 15% per annum,
in violation of the terms of the three promissory notes. Thus,
Christian prayed that the trial court order them to pay him jointly
and solidarily the amount of US$150,000 representing the total
amount of the loans; US$13,500 representing unpaid interests
from January 1998 until December 1998; P100,000 for moral
damages;P50,000 for attorneys fees; and the cost of the suit. [3]
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and
vice-president, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of
action and novation of the principal obligations. According to them,
Christian had no cause of action because the three promissory
notes were not yet due and demandable. In December 1997, since
the petitioner corporation was experiencing huge losses due to the
Asian financial crisis, Christian agreed (a) to waive the interest of
15% per annum, and (b) accept payments of the principal loans in
installment basis, the amount and period of which would depend
on the state of business of the petitioner corporation. Thus, the
petitioner paid Christian capital repayment in the amount of
US$750 per month from January 1998 until the time the complaint
was filed in February 1999. The petitioner and its co-defendants
then prayed that the complaint be dismissed and that Christian be
ordered to pay P1 million as moral damages; P500,000 as
exemplary damages; and P100,000 as attorneys fees.[4]
In due course and after hearing, the trial court rendered a
decision[5] on 5 May 2000 declaring the first two promissory notes
dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997 as already due and
demandable and that the interest on the loans had been reduced
by the parties from 15% to 6% per annum. It then ordered the
petitioner corporation to pay Christian the amount of $100,000
representing the principal obligation covered by the promissory
notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997, plus interest of
6% per month thereon until fully paid, with all interest payments
already paid by the defendant to the plaintiff to be deducted
therefrom.
The trial court ratiocinated in this wise:
(1) There was no novation of defendants obligation to the plaintiff.
Under Article 1292 of the Civil Code, there is an implied novation
only if the old and the new obligation be on every point
incompatible with one another.
The test of incompatibility between the two obligations or
contracts, according to an imminent author, is whether they can
stand together, each one having an independent existence. If they
cannot, they are incompatible, and the subsequent obligation
novates the first (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV,
1991 ed., p. 384). Otherwise, the old obligation will continue to
subsist subject to the modifications agreed upon by the parties.
Thus, it has been written that accidental modifications in an
existing obligation do not extinguish it by novation. Mere
modifications of the debt agreed upon between the parties do not
constitute novation. When the changes refer to secondary
agreement and not to the object or principal conditions of the
contract, there is no novation; such changes will produce
modifications of incidental facts, but will not extinguish the original
payments or a partial
387). Neither does the
amount to a novation
or condonation of the
In the instant case, the Court is of the view that the parties merely
intended to change the rate of interest from 15% per annum to
6% per annum when the defendant started paying $750 per
month which payments were all accepted by the plaintiff from
January 1998 onward. The payment of the principal obligation,
however, remains unaffected which means that the defendant
should still pay the plaintiff $50,000 on August 9, 1999, March 14,
2000 and July 14, 2000.
(2) When the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none of
the promissory notes was due and demandable. As of this date
however, the first and the second promissory notes have already
matured. Hence, payment is already due.
Under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
complaint which states no cause of action may be cured by
evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff
had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant complaint,
as defendants obligation are not yet due and demandable then, he
may nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes in view
of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations
covered by the two promissory notes are now due and
demandable.
(3) Individual defendants Rodney Hegerty and Atty. Leonor L.
Infante can not be held personally liable for the obligations
contracted by the defendant corporation it being clear that they
merely acted in representation of the defendant corporation in
their capacity as General Manager and President, respectively,
when they signed the promissory notes as evidenced by Board
Resolution No. 1(94) passed by the Board of Directors of the
defendant corporation (Exhibit 4).[6]
In its decision[7] of 5 September 2003, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioners appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court, holding as follows:
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a
cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an
action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
action in court, and the trial court should have therefore dismissed
his complaint.
Despite its finding that the petitioner corporation did not
violate the modified terms of the three promissory notes and that
the payment of the principal loans were not yet due when the
complaint was filed, the trial court did not dismiss the complaint,
citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which reads:
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with
the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if
the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of
substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant
a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
According to the trial court, and sustained by the Court of
Appeals, this Section allows a complaint that does not state a
cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without
objection during the trial. Thus, it ruled that even if the private
respondent had no cause of action when he filed the complaint for
a sum of money and damages because none of the three
promissory notes was due yet, he could nevertheless recover on
the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March
1997, which became due during the pendency of the case in view
of the introduction of evidence of their maturity during the trial.
Such interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is erroneous.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a
case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive
been made until the interest has been covered. In this case, the
private respondent would not have signed the receipts describing
the payments made by the petitioner as capital repayment if the
obligation to pay the interest was still subsisting. The receipts, as
well as private respondents summary of payments, lend credence
to petitioners claim that the payments were for the principal loans
and that the interests on the three consolidated loans were waived
by the private respondent during the undisputed renegotiation of
the loans on account of the business reverses suffered by the
petitioner at the time.
There was therefore a novation of the terms of the three
promissory notes in that the interest was waived and the principal
was payable in monthly installments of US$750. Alterations of the
terms and conditions of the obligation would generally result only
in modificatory novation unless such terms and conditions are
considered to be the essence of the obligation itself. [25] The
resulting novation in this case was, therefore, of the modificatory
type, not the extinctive type, since the obligation to pay a sum of
money remains in force.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132753. February 15, 1999]
MARIO SIASOCO, ANGELITA E. SIASOCO, MA. BELLA SIASOCO,
ESTER SIASOCO-LAMUG, MA. LOURDES SIASOCO LAMUGBARRIOS, MA. RAMONA SIASOCO LAMUG, MA. VICTORIA
SIASOCO LAMUG-DOMINGUEZ, BELEN SIASOCO-JOSE,
RAFAEL
SIASOCO
JOSE,
CYNTHIA
SIASOCO
JOSE,
CRISTINA SIASOCO JOSE, ROBERTO SIASOCO JOSE,
CARIDAD SIASOCO JOSE, RAMON SIASOCO JOSE, OSCAR
SIASOCO, RUBEN
SIASOCO, SALOME SIASOCO-PAZ,
SYNOPSIS
On January 14, 1997, private respondent Iglesia ni Cristo filed
civil suit for specific performance and damages against petitioners
Mario
Siasoco,
et
al.
and
Carissa
Homes
and
Development Properties, Inc. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of improper venue and lack of capacity to sue. On
the other hand, Carissa Homes filed its answer. Pending resolution
of petitioners Motion to Dismiss, private respondent negotiated
with Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the
subject properties of Carissa Homes by private respondent. On
April 24, 1997, private respondent filed an Amended Complaint,
dropping Carissa Homes as one of the defendants and changing
their cause of action to damages only. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Strike Out Amended Complaint, contending that the complaint
cannot be amended without leave of court, since a responsive
pleading had been filed. On August 11, 1997, the trial court
denied the said motion. On August 31, 1997, petitioners filed a
Motion for Suspension of Proceeding pending the resolution of the
Motion to Dismiss earlier filed. Again, the trial court denied the
second motion and it ordered the petitioners to file their respective
answers within fifteen days from receipt of the order. Thus, the
petitioners questioned the orders of denial of their two motions
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the two
aforementioned orders of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
The Court ruled that indeed, where some but not all the
defendants have answered, plaintiff may amend their Complaint
once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely
against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims
asserted the other defendants.
Further, the RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint
because the said original Complaint involved specific performance
with damages. In La Tondea Distillers v. Ponferrada, this Court
ruled that a complaint for specific performance with damages is a
personal action and may be filed in the proper court where any of
the parties reside.
The petition is DENIED.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI;
NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR APPEAL. -- For the
writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, the petitioner must
show not only that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion, but also that there is no appeal, or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Since the questioned CA Decision was a disposition on the
merits, and since said Court has no remaining issue to
resolve, the proper remedy available to petitioners was a
petition for review under Rule 45, not Rule 65. Furthermore,
as a general rule, certiorari under Rule 65 cannot issue unless
the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration, has
been given an opportunity to correct the imputed error.
Although there are recognized exceptions to this rule,
petitioners do not claim that this case is one of them. For this
procedural lapse, the instant petition should be dismissed
outright.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT; AMENDMENT; AS A
MATTER OF RIGHT TO NON-ANSWERING DEFENDANTS.
-- Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have
answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a
matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against
the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted
against the other defendants.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. -- The rationale for the
aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that after responsive pleading has been
filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense is
substantially altered. Such amendment does not only
prejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays the
action. In the first place, where a party has not yet filed a
responsive pleadings, there are no defenses that can be
altered. Furthermore, the Court has held that [a]mendments
to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may
so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order
to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuity of action and
DECISION
II
We come now to the issue of propriety of the issuance of the Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
Petitioner argues that such a Writ can only be issued in cases of
Forcible Entry, whereas the case below is actually one for Unlawful
Detainer. Petitioner relies on section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court taken from Article 539 of the Civil Code. To quote:
Sec. 3. Preliminary injunction. The Court may
grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the
defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.
A
possessor
deprived
of
his
possession
through forcible entry may within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint present a motion to
secure from the competent court, in the action
for frcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to restore him in his possession. The
court shall decide the motion within thirty (30)
days from the filing thereof. (Emphasis supplied by
petitioner).
Art. 539.
xxx xxx xxx
A possessor deprived of his possession through
forcible entry may within ten days from the filing of
the complaint present a motion to secure from the
competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a
has not been superseded. In fact, said ruling was also upheld
in Dikit vs. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 45 (1951). The case of Sevilla vs. de
los Santos (holding that when the action is one for Unlawful
Detainer originating from a Justice of the Peace Court and
retaining the same nature during the pendency of the appeal in the
Court of First Instance, the issuance of preliminary injunction by
the latter Court is improper) appears to be contrary to Article 1674
and Section 9 of Rule 70.
Article 1674 of the Civil Code was designed "to put, an end to the
present state of the law which unjustly allows the lessee to
continue in possession during an appeal". 18 It provides for an
additional ground for execution before final judgment. It
authorizes the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction where a lessor's appeal is prima faciemeritorious.
In his assessment of SHELL's appeal before him, respondent Judge
found it prima facie meritorious and issued the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction. He acted well within the purview of Article
1674 of the Civil Code,supra, and cannot be said to have
committed grave abuse of discretion. If at all, he committed an
error of judgment, which may be offset by the bond posted by
SHELL to answer for damages that may be suffered by petitioner
should it be finally decided that SHELL was not entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, the Writ of certiorari prayed for is denied, and this
case hereby remanded to respondent Court for the determination
of the appeal in the merits and rendition of the corresponding
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
al. vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., et al., 47 O.G. [371 1170.) Besides,
the amendment was merely one of form; it did not change the
cause of action, but only set forth the promissory note on which
the action was based.
We find that the points being raised on this appeal are supposed
failures to follow formal proceedings, not substantial requirements
of procedure. Upon examination of the motion to set aside the
order of default, we find it to be lacking in the following substantial
requirements: it does not contain an affidavit of merits, the motion
to set aside the order of default.
We next come to the denial of the motion to set aside the
judgment and grant relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The
motion, it is true, contains an affidavit of merits, but this affidavit
is merely a denial of the supposed authenticity of defendant's
signature to the promissory note which is transcribed in the
amended complaint. And in counter-affidavits plaintiff has
presented witnesses declaring that defendant's signature to the
promissory note is authentic. We believe that this is a last minute
attempt to defend a losing case. If the defendant really had any
valid defense, this should have been brought at the first
opportunity, that is, by the first motion to set aside the order of
default. Besides, we doubt if the same issue raised in the original
motion to set aside the order of default, may again be raised in a
petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The general
rule is that once a matter in issue has been decided by the court, it
may no longer be brought again in the form of another objection,
and in the guise of a motion under another provision of the rules.
But even laying this objection aside, we find that the court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a reconsideration of the
order of default and to set aside the consequent judgment
ordering the defendant to pay the sum demanded in the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed, with cost against
defendant-appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62781 August 19, 1988
CORTES, J.:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147937. November 11, 2004]
THE
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Antecedents
On September 22, 1999, respondent Milagros P. Morales
filed a Complaint[2] for damages and reimbursement of
insurance premiums against the petitioner with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 10, docketed as Civil
Case No. 27554-99. The complaint specifically stated that
the petitioner could be served with summons and other
On
January
14,
2000,
the
RTC issued
an
Order[12] denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and supplemental oral motion to strike out the amended
complaint. The RTC reiterated that it would be improper to
dismiss the case at its early stage because the remedy
would be to issue an alias summons. Anent the motion to
strike out the amended complaint, the RTC held that the
The petitioner further avers that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it upon the service of alias
summons on the amended complaint because such alias
summons was improperly issued. Sec. 5,[14] Rule 14 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides
that the previous summons must have been lost or
unserved to warrant the issuance of alias summons. The
petitioner opines that the issuance of an alias summons
presupposes the existence of a previous valid summons
which, however, has not been served or has been lost. It
maintains that considering that there are specific
circumstances that need to exist to warrant its issuance, the
alias summons cannot be treated as a matter of
nomenclature.[15]
summons to them was improper and that hence the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over them. On December 15, 1987, the court
denied their motions to dismiss and upheld the validity of the
extraterritorial service of summons to them on the ground that
"the present action relates to property rights which lie in contracts
within the Philippines, or which defendants claim liens or interests,
actual or inchoate, legal or equitable (par. 2, complaint). And one
of the reliefs demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendants from any interest in such property for the reason that
their transactions with plaintiff's former president are ultra vires."
Furthermore, "as foreign corporations doing business in the
Philippines without a license, they opened themselves to suit
before Philippine courts, pursuant to Sec. 133 of the Corporation
Code of the Philippines." (Annex H) The petitioners' motions for
reconsideration of that order were also denied by the court (Annex
M), hence this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance
of a temporary retraining order which We granted.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 17. Extraterritorial service. When the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines and the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent, or in which the relief
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
the defendant from any interest therein, or the
property of the defendant has been attached within
the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service
as under section 7; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and
for such time as the court may order, in which case
a copy of the summons and order of the court shall
be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant, or in any other manner
the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting
such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which
because
of
the
impossibility
of
acquiring
jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court. But, when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff residing in the
Philippines, or is intended to seize or dispose of
any property, real or personal, of the defendant
located in the Philippines, it may be validly tried by
the Philippine courts, for then, they have
jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the personal status of
the plaintiff or the property of the defendant and
their jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not essential. Venue in such
cases may be laid in the province where the
property of the defendant or a part thereof
involved in the litigation is located. (5 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd Ed., p. 105.)
In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of summons and
complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them
to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to
reach them outside the region over which they exercise their
authority (Sec. 3-a, Interim Rules of Court; Sec. 21, subpar. 1, B.P.
Blg. 129). Extraterritorial service of summons will not confer on
the court jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders.
Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons
acquire jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment
against a non-resident defendant who has no property in the
Philippines for "the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in
personam over non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment,
must be based uponpersonal service within the state which
renders the judgment "(Boudard vs. Tait, 67 Phil. 170, 174).
Respondents' contention that "the action below is related to
property within the Philippines, specifically contractual rights that
petitioners are enforcing against IVO" is specious for the
"contractual rights" of the petitioners are not property found in the
Philippines for the petitioners have not filed an action in the local
courts to enforce said rights. They have not submitted to the
jurisdiction of our courts.
On May 7, 1980, the private respondent C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. filed
a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief in the then
Court of First Instance of Manila against seventy-nine (79)
Japanese corporations as defendants, among which are the
petitioners herein. Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
132077. The complaint alleges, among others, that the plaintiff is
a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines; that there is another corporation organized under the
law of Japan with the corporate name C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha;
that the plaintiff and C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha are in all respects
separate and distinct from each other; that C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha appears to have incurred obligations to several creditors
amongst which are defendants, also foreign corporations organized
and existing under the laws of Japan; that due to financial
difficulties, C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha failed and/or refused to
pay its creditors; and that in view of the failure and/or refusal of
said C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha to pay its alleged obligations to
defendants, the latter have been demanding or have been
attempting to demand from C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., the payment of
the alleged obligations to them of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha,
notwithstanding that C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. is a corporation
separate and distinct from that of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha and
that the former had no participation whatsoever or liability in
connection with the transactions between the latter and the
defendants.
As alleged in the complaint, the private respondent prayed for
injunctive relief against the petitioners' demand from the private
respondent for the payment of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha's
liabilities to the petitioners.
As an alternative to injunction, the private respondent prayed that
a judicial declaration be made that, as a separate and independent
corporation, it is not liable for the obligations and liabilities of C.F.
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha.
Since the defendants are non-residents, without business
addresses in the Philippines but in Japan, the private respondent
prayed for leave of court to effect extraterritorial service of
summons.
On July 13, 1981, the respondent Court issued its order denying
said special appearances. The motion for reconsideration of said
order filed by the petitioners was also denied on September 22,
1981.
Hence, the present petition.
After the required pleadings were filed, the First Division of this
Court, in the resolution of April 14, 1982, gave due course to the
petition and required both parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. Both parties
complied by submitting the required memoranda.
The main issue in this case is whether or not private respondent's
complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief is within the
purview of the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
The petitioners contend that the respondent judge acted contrary
to the provisions of Section 17 of Rule 14 for the following
reasons: (1) private respondent's prayer for injunction, as a
consequence of its alleged non-liability to the petitioners for debts
of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha of Japan, conclusively establishes
that private respondent's cause of action does not affect its status;
(2) the respondent court cannot take jurisdiction of actions against
the petitioners as they are non-residents and own no property
within the state; (3) the petitioners have not as yet claimed a lien
or interest in the property within the Philippines at the time the
action was filed which is a requirement under Section 17 of Rule
14; (4) extra-territorial service on a non-resident defendant is
authorized, among others, when the subject of the action is
property within the Philippines in which the relief demanded
consists in excluding defendant from any interest therein; and (5)
inasmuch as the reliefs prayed for by the private respondent in the
complaint are in personam, service by registered mail cannot be
availed of because Section 17 of Rule 14 authorized this mode of
service only in actions in rem or quasi in rem.
For its part, the private respondent countered that (1) the action
refers to its status because the basic issue presented to the lower
court for determination is its status as a corporation which has a
personality that is separate, distinct and independent from the
personality of another corporation, i.e., C.F. Sharp Kabushiki
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 121576-78. June 16, 2000]
BANCO DO BRASIL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ARSENIO M. GONONG, and CESAR S. URBINO, SR., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
The
material
antecedents,
as
quoted
from
the Vlason[7] case, are:
Poro Point Shipping Services, then acting as
the local agent of Omega Sea Transport
Company of Honduras & Panama, a
Panamanian Company (hereafter referred to
as Omega), requested permission for its
vessel M/V Star Ace, which had engine
trouble, to unload its cargo and to store it at
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) compound
in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting
transhipment to Hongkong. The request was
approved by the Bureau of Customs.
[8]
Despite
the
approval,
the
customs
personnel boarded the vessel when it docked
on January 7, 1989, on suspicion that it was
the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med
Line Philippines Co., and that its cargo would
be smuggled into the country.[9] The district
customs collector seized said vessel and its
cargo pursuant to Section 2301, Tariff and
Customs Code. A notice of hearing of SFLU
Seizure Identification No. 3-89 was served on
its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of
Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International
Co., Ltd. of Thailand.
While seizure proceedings were ongoing, La
Union was hit by three typhoons, and the
vessel ran aground and was abandoned. On
June 8, 1989, its authorized representative,
Frank
Cadacio,
entered
into
salvage
agreement with private respondent to secure
and repair the vessel at the agreed
consideration of $1 million and "fifty percent
(50%) [of] the cargo after all expenses, cost
and taxes."[10]
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 158002. February 28, 2005]
SPOUSES
AURORA
N.
DE
PEDRO
and
ELPIDIO
DE
PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.
ROMASAN
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and MANUEL KO,respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
brought about by the double issuance of title for H-162341 but the
technical descriptions of OCT No. P-691 describing a land different
from the actual occupation of the plaintiff was a result of the
defective survey.[6]
The survey team made the following findings: (1) TCT No.
236044 originated from OCT No. 438 in the name of Marcelino
Santos, which was based on a Homestead Patent. The said OCT
was, in turn, based on Plan H-162341 surveyed on March 8, 1935
and approved on June 30, 1937; (2) under the Cadastral Map
Sheet of the Lungsod Silangan Cadastre or CM 14-38 N., 121-12 E
on file with the Records Division of the DENR, Region IV, H162341, the land covered by the said OCT was reflected as Lot
10455; (3) OCT No. P-691, under the name of petitioner Aurora de
Pedro, was based on Plan Cad. 04-0097-63-D which was a
subdivision survey of Lot 10455 of the Lungsod Silangan Cadastre;
(4) Lot 10455 was subdivided into Lots 10455-A to 10455-G; (5)
Lot 10455-G was the subject of the petitioners application for a
Free Patent; and (6) the land occupied by petitioner Aurora de
Pedro is actually a portion of Lot 10454/H-164008 originally
registered on July 2, 1965 under OCT No. 468 based on
Homestead Patent No. 99480 under the name of Isidro Benitez.
[7]
The survey team further declared that:
The nature of this case, however, is one of overlapping titles
even if the erroneous technical descriptions rectified because even
while it may not fall inside the titled H-162341, the lot of Mrs. de
Pedro, et al. given the correct description of the boundary, falls
inside another titled parcel under H-164008. Both H-162341 and
H-164008 are presently registered in the name of Romasan
Development Corporation, the defendant.
The granting of Free Patent to Mrs. de Pedro, et al. over a
previously titled property is unwarranted or can be unwittingly an
act resulting in double titling by the CENRO, DENR in Antipolo City.
[8]
Based
on
the
report,
the
respondents
filed
a
Manifestation/Motion to Dismiss, averring that there was no legal
or factual basis for the complaint as shown by the findings of the
survey team; hence, the petitioners had no cause of action against
them.[9] The petitioners did not file any opposition to the motion.
courts holding that the petitioners were not barred from filing the
appropriate action where they may seek to correct whatever
mistake or irregularity that their title had.[17]
On April 11, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners; hence, this
petition for review.
The petitioners rely upon the following grounds in support of
their petition:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
AND DECIDED THE ISSUES IN THE INSTANT CASE IN
A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE BY HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT
CASE IS A SIMPLE CASE FOR DAMAGES.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED AND DECIDED THE ISSUES IN THE INSTANT
CASE IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE BY HOLDING THAT THE
RESULTS OF THE PRIOR RELOCATION SURVEY
ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY THEREBY
DISPOSSESSING
PETITIONERS
OF
THEIR
OWNERSHIP
OVER
THE
DISPUTED
PROPERTY
DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT:
A. THE TITLE OF PETITIONER AURORA N. DE PEDRO
IS VALID AND INDEFEASIBLE; AND
B.
THE
TITLE
OF
RESPONDENT
ROMASAN
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION IS DEFECTIVE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED AND DECIDED THE ISSUES IN THE INSTANT
CASE IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONERS HAD BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL.[18]
The petitioners maintain that petitioner Aurora de Pedro is the
registered owner of the subject property as evidenced by OCT No.
P-961, and that this title is conclusive of their ownership over the
same.[19] They aver that their title cannot be the subject of a
collateral attack.[20]
SECOND DIVISION
GENTLE SUPREME G.R. No. 183182
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, J
J.
RICARDO F. CONSULTA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 1, 2010
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Saraybas secretary. Thus, neither the sheriff nor the RTC had basis
for assuming that Canave would find a way to let Consulta know of
the pending case against him. Consulta concluded that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person.
In its answer to the petition,[13] GSP insisted on the validity
of the service of summons on Consulta. Also, assuming that
summons was not properly served, Consultas ignorance was
contrived. His knowledge of the case against him may be proved
by the following circumstances:
1. On February 25, 2006 CTC faxed GSP a letter proposing
a schedule of payment for the adjudged amounts in the RTC
decision. Admittedly, it was only Sarayba who signed the letter. By
the rules of evidence, however, the act and declaration of a joint
debtor is binding upon a party.[14] This means that Saraybas
knowledge and admission of the case and the defendants
corresponding liability to GSP was binding on Consulta. Besides,
Consulta, together with Sarayba, signed the postdated checks as
partial payment of CTCs obligation to GSP;
2. The RTCs sheriff garnished CTCs bank accounts on the
day the summons was served. As company president, it was
incredulous that Consulta was unaware of the garnishment and the
reason for it;
3. Consulta admitted that CTC was properly served with
summons through Canave. By that statement, it can be deduced
that Canave was in charge of the office, Consultas regular place of
business, signifying proper service of the summons on him.
On March 18, 2008 the CA rendered a decision, holding
that the RTC sheriff did not properly serve summons on all the
defendants. It ordered the remand of the case to the trial court,
enjoining it to take steps to insure the valid service of summons on
them.[15]
Respondent Consulta filed a motion for partial reconsideration of
the decision but the CA denied it for being late. Petitioner GSP also
filed a motion for reconsideration [16]which the CA denied on May
29, 2008 for lack of merit,[17] hence, this petition.
The Issue Presented
before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was
being subjected to cancellation proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage
with
respondent
was
nullified
by
the
court.
When petitioner appeared before the BID, she was furnished with the
copies of the following documents: (1) petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0177; (2) petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306;
(3) Decision,4 dated December 11, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-0306 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260 (RTC), Paraaque City, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent as void ab initio; and
(4) their marriage contract5 with the subject decision annotated
thereon. Petitioner was perplexed that her marriage with respondent
had
been
declared
void ab
initio.
The above documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed
a petition for declaration of nullity6 on the ground of psychological
incapacity before the RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. CV01-0177. Respondent stated that petitioners address was 600 Elcano
St., Binondo, Manila. There was no showing of its status, whether
pending,
withdrawn
or
terminated.
On July 19, 2002, respondent filed another petition for declaration of
nullity7 on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0306. Respondent indicated that
petitioners address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden
Homes, Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC issued summons. 8 In
his Servers Return,9 process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that, on
August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with the copy of the
petition was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally on petitioner. The said documents were received by Mr. Roly
Espinosa,
a
security
officer.
The Facts
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and
respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married
on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood-Malate Church. 3cralawlawlibrary
On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision 10 in Civil Case No.
02-0306 finding respondents marriage with petitioner as void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. It stated that summons was served on petitioner on
August 1, 2002, but she failed to file her responsive pleading within
the reglementary period. The public prosecutor also stated that there
were no indicative facts to manifest collusion. Thus, the RTC concluded
that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential
marital
obligations.
November 24, 2008, claiming that she was never notified of the cases
filed against her. She prayed that the RTC decision, dated December
11, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-0306, be nullified on the grounds of
extrinsic
fraud
and
lack
of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud
because, as seen in Civil Case No. CV-01-0177, he deliberately
indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the
trial;second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired in Civil Case
No. 02-0306 because of an invalid substituted service of summons as
no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal service,
was stated before resorting to substituted service of summons; third,
the alleged substituted service was made on a security guard of their
townhouse and not on a member of her household; and fourth, she
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
obligations.12cralawlawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 27, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision finding the
petition for annulment of judgment to be devoid of merit. It held that
there was no sufficient proof to establish that respondent employed
fraud to insure petitioners non-participation in the trial of Civil Case
No.
CV-01-0177.
Relying on Robinson v. Miralles,13the CA further ruled that the
substituted service of summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was valid. It
found that there was a customary practice in petitioners townhouse
that the security guard would first entertain any visitors and receive
any communication in behalf of the homeowners. With this set-up, it
was obviously impossible for the process server to personally serve the
summons upon petitioner. It also declared that the process servers
return carries with it the presumption of regularity in the discharge of
a
public
officers
duties
and
functions.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by
the
CA
in
its
Resolution,14 dated
March
26,
2013.
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
1.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 020306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.
2.
Court
the
petition.
Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 29 was
(2)
Specific
Details
in
the
issued on July 29, 2002. In his servers return, 30 the process server
resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002.
Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted
service of summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the
summons.
The
servers
return
stated
the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SERVERS RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of
summons with copy of petition, were effected to respondent, Yuk Ling
H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa St., Manresa Garden Homes,
Manresa Garden City, Quezon City, after several futile attempts to
serve the same personally. The said documents were received by
Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer
thereat.
Therefore, respectfully returning to Court, original copy of summons,
Duly Served, this 2nd day of August, 2002.
RODOLFO
P.
TORRES,
JR.
Process
Server
(Emphasis supplied)
The servers return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts
undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on
petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons
was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally.
The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to
perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the
corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying
reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there
were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in
the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner,
though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted
service.
The servers return did not describe in detail the person who received
the summons, on behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the
summons was received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and
discretion, the Security Officer thereat. It did not expound on the
competence of the security officer to receive the summons.
Also, aside from the servers return, respondent failed to indicate any
portion of the records which would describe the specific attempts to
personally serve the summons. Respondent did not even claim that
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 184333 : April 1, 2013
SIXTO N. CHU, Petitioner, v. MACH ASIA TRADING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The
factual
and
procedural
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
antecedents
are
as
SO ORDERED.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hence,
the
petition
assigning
errors:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the CA opined, among
others, that the requirement of due process was complied
with, considering that petitioner actually received the
summons through his security guard. It held that where the
summons was in fact received by the defendant, his
argument that the Sheriff should have first tried to serve
summons on him personally before resorting to substituted
service of summons deserves scant consideration. Thus, in
the interest of fairness, the CA said that the process
server's neglect or inadvertence in the service of summons
should not unduly prejudice the respondent's right to
speedy justice.
the
following
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
SERIOUS
ERROR
IN
DEFIANCE
OF
LAW
AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
DEFENDANT EVEN WHEN THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF
SUMMONS WAS IMPROPER.12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
II
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sheriff's
Return
x x x.
In the interest of fairness, the process server's neglect or
inadvertence in the service of summons should not, thus,
unduly prejudice plaintiff-appellee's right to speedy justice.
x x x 19chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143440. February 11, 2003]
SERENA T. BACELONIA, GRACIANO BACELONIA, SR. and GRACIANO
T. BACELONIA, JR., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and SPS. VICTORINO S. BOLOS, JR. and OLIVIA P.
BOLOS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
THIRD DIVISION
JEHAN SHIPPING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 159750
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ
NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY, Promulgated:
Respondent.
December 14, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Issue
Respondent National Food Authority (NFA) assailed before
the Court of Appeals, via a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order, the trial courts January 8,
2002 Joint Resolution, January 16, 2002 Writ of Execution,
and January 25, 2002 Order.
Main Issue:
Lack of Notice of Hearing
in a Motion for Reconsideration
Admittedly, respondent committed a procedural lapse
in failing to include a notice of hearing in its Motion for
Reconsideration,[8] filed on the very last day of its appeal
period or on October 16, 2001. Again, it committed the
same lapse in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
[9]
which it filed on November 12, 2001.[10] It postulates,
though, that the procedural lapse should not defeat its
Motions for the following reasons: (1) petitioner was able to
oppose squarely the issues raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent; and, (2) in deciding
against the latter, the trial court manifestly committed a
grave error, which resulted in huge losses for the
government. Respondent adds that the procedural rule,
which is intended to secure substantial justice, may be
Petitioners Opportunity
To Be Heard
A close perusal of the records reveals that the trial
court gave petitioner ten days within which to comment on
respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed its
Opposition to the Motion on November 26, 2001. In its 14page Opposition,[18] it not only pointed out that the Motion
was defective for not containing a notice of hearing and
should then be dismissed outright by the court; it also
ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of
the Motion and of the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. Notably, its arguments[19] were recited at
length in the trial courts January 8, 2002 Joint Resolution.
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to deny the Motions on
the sole ground that they did not contain any notice of
hearing.
The requirement of notice of time and hearing in the
pleading filed by a party is necessary only to apprise the
other of the actions of the former.[20] Under the
circumstances of the present case, the purpose of a notice
of hearing was served.
Equally important is the fact that the trial court set
the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration for hearing on December 7, 2001,
during which petitioners counsel appeared. [21] In other
cases,[22] the Court has held that lack of notice is cured
when, after learning that a motion has that defect, the trial
court promptly resets a hearing with due notice to all the
parties. Hence, we find no reversible error committed by the
CA in ruling that the Motion for Reconsideration was not pro
forma and in setting aside the subject Orders of the trial
court.
Counsels Duty
Indeed, in this particular case, the purpose of the
notice requirement in motions has been duly served. But
assailed
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The matter began as a simple civil suit for damages arising from
an unremarkable traffic accident. However, the procedural aspect
of the case has since taken on a life of its own, transforming what
should be a molehill into a mountain built on sediments of
compounded errors.
This case finds its origin from a vehicular collision that occurred in
La Union on 19 March 1996 between a bus owned by petitioner
Reconsideration had been denied for having been filed out of time.
Neither circumstance was met by petitioner. Subsequently, the
MTC likewise denied a Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner.9
Hence this petition for review under Rule 45, seeking that the
Court "annul and set aside the questioned Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals x x x as well as the twin Orders of [the RTC] x x x and
remand the case [to] the court of origin for further proceedings
and give petitioner its right to present its case in the interest of
due process and substantial errors." 27
Two sets of arguments are raised. The first concerns the errors
ascribed to the Court of Appeals in dismissing outright the petition
for annulment of judgment. The second concerns the alleged grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in directing the issuance
of the writ of execution even without resolving petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The fact that the previous authority may have been misplaced or
lost, thus causing petitioner to authorize a new person to file the
necessary pleadings or petitions in the case involving the
respondent, is of no consequence if the new authority is issued
before the filing of the pleading that requires verification or
certification against forum-shopping. The circumstance is similar to
a situation where the previously authorized person had died or
severed his or her connection with the corporate litigant. Juridical
persons appearing before the courts are not perpetually bound to
maintain the same authorized representatives in the preparation
and certification of pleadings.
The appellate court cited the rule that substantial compliance could
not cure the defect in the verification or certification requirements.
Yet the bare fact remains that counsel for petitioner was
authorized to prepare the petition and to execute the verification
and certification requirements at the time the petition was filed
with the Court of Appeals, a fact borne out by the Certificate of
The Court of Appeals did rely on another ground for the dismissal
of the petition for annulment of judgment, the reliance on the
ground of extrinsic fraud which could have been availed of in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief. The formulation by the
appellate court on that score cannot be fully adopted by the Court.
However, to demonstrate why the Court of Appeals erred in that
regard, it is necessary to discuss the more fundamental errors that
have attended the facts of this case, errors for which petitioner is
mostly to blame, errors which militate against the grant of this
petition.
From the timeline, it appears that petitioners woes began after the
motion to withdraw as counsel filed by its former lawyer was not
allowed by the MTC due to the absence of the written conformity
thereto of the petitioner.33 At the next hearing date, when
petitioner was to commence its presentation of evidence, nobody
appeared in its behalf, causing the MTC, upon motion, to consider
as waived petitioners right to present its evidence. The
subsequent rendition of the MTC Judgment without considering the
evidence of petitioner would form its initial cause of distress.
Not only did the defect render the motion for reconsideration itself
unworthy of consideration, it more crucially failed to toll the period
to appeal. A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a
mere scrap of paper that does not toll the period to appeal, and
upon the expiration of the 15-day period, the questioned order or
decision becomes final and executory. The rationale behind this
rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing,
the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party
agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on
his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period
within which he may file his reply or opposition.35
Thus, the MTC judgment became final and executory despite the
filing of the Motion for Reconsideration thereto, as said motion did
not toll the period for filing an appeal therefrom. Yet that did not
mean that petitioner was left bereft of further remedies under our
Rules. For one, petitioner could have assailed the MTCs denial of
the Motion for Reconsideration through a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTC in denying
the motion. If that remedy were successful, the effect would have
been to void the MTCs denial of the Motion for Reconsideration,
thus allowing petitioner to again pursue such motion as a means
towards the filing of a timely appeal.
from denial of appeal] in such court and in the same case praying
that the appeal be given due course." 36 Such petition should be
filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment or final order, and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or final order was entered. The facts of this case
indicate that petitioner could have timely resorted to this remedy.
Truth be told, the fact that the MTC had taken more than eighteen
(18) months before it acted on the Notice of Appeal is close to
scandalous, even if such delay was caused in part by the inhibition
of the original judge who heard the case. Still, the delay could not
have extenuated the defunctness of appeal as a remedy available
to petitioner. A notice of appeal presupposes that appeal still exists
as a right to the appellant, hence the use of the term "notice,"
since the function of the submission is merely to notify the trial
court that the appellant was availing of the right to appeal, and not
to seek the courts permission that it be allowed to pose an appeal.
In the same vein, the "denial" or refusal to take cognizance of a
notice of appeal is predicated on a finding that the right to appeal
did not or no longer existed, and not on the refusal of the trial
court to allow the appellant to pursue the appeal.
Notably, it was only after the Notice of Appeal was denied that the
petitioner had pursued the two remedies it could have undertaken
from the MTC Order declaring its motion for reconsideration as a
mere scrap of paper. First, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the MTC. The problem with this remedy was the
utter belatedness in the resort thereto. Section 3 of Rule 38
requires that said petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding
to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered. Neither benchmark was met
by the petitioner, since the petition was filed only on 25 October
1999, or some sixteen (16) months after the rendition of the
judgment sought to be set aside, and around fourteen (14)
months after such judgment was declared final and executory.
Petitioner had opportunely learned of both the rendition of the
judgment and the Order refusing to give cognizance to the motion
for reconsideration. Had it simply consulted the rulebook, it should
have realized that a petition for relief from judgment was a
remedy available to it, and certainly one more appropriate than
the Notice of Appeal it ultimately resorted to.
On those MTC rulings that still fell within the timely scope of
certiorari, particularly the rulings denying the petition for relief
from judgment,42 we agree with the RTC that there could have
been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC in
denying the petitions since the latter was merely enforcing the
reglementary period under Section 3, Rule 38.
Still, it was the RTC rulings which were subject of the petition for
annulment filed with the Court of Appeals which had jurisdiction
over such actions.46 This recourse was ill-advised, to say the least,
for varied reasons. For one, the RTC rulings dismissing petitioners
special civil action for certiorari could have been the subject of an
ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Section 1, Rule 41
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since such dismissals partake
of a final order that completely disposed of the original petition
filed with the RTC. It may have been that petitioner was
threatened by the impending execution of the adverse MTC
decision, despite the fact that it had a pending motion for
All told, even if we were to hold that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition on the perceived defect in the verification
and certification requirements, the appellate court would have
been left with an action stigmatized by error upon error
interminably. Most frustratingly, for every procedural misstep
committed by petitioner, there existed a corresponding viable
alternative which would have necessitated a ruling on the merits,
and which petitioner could have chosen with ease. Instead of filing
a Notice of Appeal, it could have instead filed a special civil action
for certiorari or a petition for relief from judgment. Instead of filing
the no longer timely petition for relief from judgment, it could have
instead by then filed a petition for annulment of judgment. When it
did file a petition for annulment with the Court of Appeals, it could
have instead filed a more feasible petition for annulment with the
RTC.
June 5, 2009
The case stems from a petition3 filed against respondents with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, for revocation and/or reduction of
insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife
and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were
Loretos illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva)
was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter,
thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance
policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) 4 and
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife);5(3) the
illegitimate children of LoretoOdessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angeliewere entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the
legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and
those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were
inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be
deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian
and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of guardianship.
Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a
cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the
designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her
designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified
her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare
as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie,
considering that no settlement of Loretos estate had been filed nor
had the respective shares of the heirs been determined. Insular
further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies
designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries
pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
During the pre-trial on July 28, 2004, both Insular and Grepalife
moved that the issues raised in their respective answers be
resolved first. The trial court ordered petitioners to comment
within 15 days.
Guzman, Grepalife and Insular Life is hereby SET ASIDE, and the
case against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners appealed the June 16, 2005 Resolution to the CA, but it
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the
decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action involved a pure question of law. The
appellate court also noted that petitioners did not file within the
xxxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the
allegations appear unfounded; or
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.16 A complaint states a cause of action when it
contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action(1) the legal
right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of the legal right. If any of these elements is absent, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.17
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court
that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they
were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by
Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners claim is that Eva,
being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not
entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil
Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be
governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of
the Insurance Code states
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied
exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or
for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the
policy.
In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial
court should be upheld. In the same light, the Decision of the CA
dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the appellate
court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal; the
issue of failure to state a cause of action is a question of law and
not of fact, there being no findings of fact in the first place. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198075, September 04, 2013
The Deed of Donation also stipulated that the lease over the
subject property is renewable for another period of twenty-five
(25) years upon mutual agreement of FKI and the
respondent.12 In which case, the amount of rent shall be
sided with the petitioner with respect to the issues regarding the
insufficiency of the respondents demand and the nullity of
the 2005 Lease Contract.54 The MeTC thus disposed:chanrobles
virtua1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
case
x
x
x,
without
pronouncement
as
to
costs.
SO ORDERED.55
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). This
appeal was assigned to Branch 274 of the RTC of Paraaque City
and
was
docketed
as
Civil
Case
No.
10-0255.
On 29 October 2010, the RTC reversed56 the MeTC and ordered the
eviction of the petitioner from the subject land:chanrobles
virtua1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the
appealed Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77,
Paraaque City, is hereby reversed, judgment is thus rendered in
favor of the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendant-appellee,
and ordering the latter
(1) to vacate the lease[d] premises made subject of the case and
to restore the possession thereof to the plaintiff-appellant;
(2) to pay to the plaintiff-appellant the amount of Nine Million
Three Hundred Sixty Two Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Six
Pesos (P9,362,436.00), penalties and net of 5% withholding
tax, for the lease period from May 25, 2009 to May 25, 2010
and such monthly rental as will accrue during the pendency of
this case;
(3) to pay attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000.00 plus
appearance fee of P3,000.00;
(4) and costs of suit.
As to the existing improvements belonging to the
defendant-appellee, as these were built in good faith, the
provisions of Art. 1678 of the Civil Code shall apply.
SO ORDERED.57
The ruling of the RTC is premised on the following ratiocinations:
1 The respondent had adequately complied with the
requirement of demand as a jurisdictional precursor to an
unlawful detainer action.58 The First Demand Letter, in
substance, contains a demand for petitioner to vacate
this
appeal.
Court
For
sees
this
it,
reason,
that
We
is
fatal
mistake.
grant
the
petition.
before discussing what these legal effects are, We shall first deal
with the challenges posed against the application of such
arbitration
clause.
Challenges Against the Application of the Arbitration Clause
of
the
2005
Lease
Contract
Curiously, despite the lucidity of the arbitration clause of the 2005
Lease Contract, the petitioner, as well as the MeTC, RTC and the
Court of Appeals, vouched for the non-application of the same in
the instant case. A plethora of arguments was hurled in favor of
bypassing
arbitration.
We
now
address
them.
At different points in the proceedings of this case, the following
arguments were offered against the application of the arbitration
clause of the 2005 Lease Contract:
1 The disagreement between the petitioner and respondent
is non-arbitrable as it will inevitably touch upon the issue
of the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract.71 It was
submitted that one of the reasons offered by the petitioner
in justifying its failure to pay under the 2005 Lease
Contract was the nullity of such contract for being contrary
to law and public policy.72 The Supreme Court,
in Gonzales v. Climax Mining, Ltd.,73 held that the
validity of contract cannot be subject of arbitration
proceedings as such questions are legal in nature and
require the application and interpretation of laws and
jurisprudence
which
is
necessarily
a
judicial
function.74cralaw virtualaw library
2 The petitioner cannot validly invoke the arbitration clause
of the 2005 Lease Contract while, at the same time,
impugn such contracts validity.75cralaw virtualaw library
3 Even assuming that it can invoke the arbitration clause
whilst denying the validity of the 2005 Lease Contract,
petitioner still did not file a formal application before the
MeTC so as to render such arbitration clause
operational.76 Section 24 of Republic Act No. 9285 requires
the party seeking arbitration to first file a request or an
application therefor with the court not later than the
preliminary conference.77cralaw virtualaw library
4 Petitioner and respondent already underwent Judicial
Dispute Resolution (JDR) proceedings before the
None
R.A. No. 7942 but only issues relating to the validity of certain
mining related agreements, this Court held that such complaint
could not be arbitrated before the PA-MGB. 85 It is in this context
that we made the pronouncement now in discussion:chanrobles
virtua1aw 1ibrary
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when
there is a disagreement between the parties as to some provisions
of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and
the application of that particular knowledge and expertise
possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of
the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or
agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this
case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of
arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the
execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and
require the application and interpretation of laws and
jurisprudence
which
is
necessarily
a
judicial
function.86 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court in Gonzales did not simply base its rejection of the
complaint for arbitration on the ground that the issue raised
therein, i.e., the validity of contracts, is per se non-arbitrable. The
real consideration behind the ruling was the limitation that was
placed by R.A. No. 7942 upon the jurisdiction of the PA-MGB
as an arbitral body. Gonzales rejected the complaint for
arbitration because the issue raised therein is not a mining
dispute per R.A. No. 7942 and it is for this reason, and only for
this reason, that such issue is rendered non-arbitrable before the
PA-MGB. As stated beforehand, R.A. No. 7942 clearly limited the
jurisdiction of the PA-MGB only to mining disputes.87cralaw
virtualaw
library
Much more instructive for our purposes, on the other hand, is the
recent case of Cargill Philippines, Inc. v. San Fernando Regal
Trading, Inc.88 In Cargill, this Court answered the question of
whether issues involving the rescission of a contract are arbitrable.
The respondent in Cargill argued against arbitrability, also citing
therein Gonzales. After dissecting Gonzales, this Court ruled in
favor of arbitrability.89 Thus, We held:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Respondent contends that assuming that the existence of the
contract and the arbitration clause is conceded, the CA's decision
is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit
or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or
proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement: Provided, That the applicant
for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
[Emphasis supplied]
R.A. No. 9285
The violation by the MeTC of the clear directives under R.A. Nos.
876 and 9285 renders invalid all proceedings it undertook in the
ejectment case after the filing by petitioner of its Answer with
Counterclaimthe point when the petitioner and the respondent
should have been referred to arbitration. This case must,
therefore, be remanded to the MeTC and be suspended at said
point. Inevitably, the decisions of the MeTC, RTC and the Court of
Appeals
must
all
be
vacated
and
set
aside.
The petitioner and the respondent must then be referred to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the 2005 Lease
Contract.
This Court is not unaware of the apparent harshness of the
Decision that it is about to make. Nonetheless, this Court must
make the same if only to stress the point that, in our
jurisdiction, bona fide arbitration agreements are recognized as
valid;102 and that laws,103 rules and regulations104 do exist
protecting and ensuring their enforcement as a matter of state
policy. Gone should be the days when courts treat otherwise valid
Case
No.
CV
b
c
09-0346
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
FIRST DIVISION
STRONGWORLD
CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, LEO CLETO A. GAMOLO, and
REYNOLD P. MOLO,
Petitioners,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 27, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
DECISION
Petitioner
Strongworld
Construction
Corporation
(Strongworld) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
construction. Petitioners Leo Cleto A. Gamolo (Gamolo) and
Reynold P. Molo (Molo) are members of the Board of Directors of
petitioner Strongworld. On 31 October 1997, petitioners filed a
Complaint[3] for Sum of Money and Damages with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, presided over by
the Hon. N. C. Perello, and docketed as Civil Case No. 97-222,
against private respondents First Peoples Bank (formerly known as
Rural Bank of San Teodoro), Bank of Commerce, Orlando O.
Francisco (Francisco), and Editha Lizarda (Lizarda).
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that: in
1996, Rizal Cement Company, Inc. delivered to petitioner
Strongworld four (4) checks [4] as payment for the construction of
housing units;[5] at the time of the issuance of the aforesaid
checks, petitioner Strongworld maintained a single account with
private respondent Bank of Commerce, San Pedro Branch, [6] with
private respondents Francisco, former president of petitioner
Strongworld, and its incumbent president, petitioner Gamolo as
authorized signatories; the subject checks were not deposited to
the account of petitioner Strongworld; instead, private respondents
Francisco and Lizarda, conspiring and confederating between
themselves and with the employees of private respondent First
Peoples Bank, maliciously and fraudulently diverted the checks to
their personal accounts, specifically First Peoples Bank Savings
Account No. 51-03025-5, without the knowledge and consent of
petitioners Gamolo and Molo, and without authority from the Board
of Directors of petitioner Strongworld; [7] and that repeated
demands against the private respondents were not heeded
resulting in the damage and prejudice of petitioners.
The petitioners prayed for the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be
rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff
Strongworld,
jointly
and
severally,
the
amount
of P5,085,615.22 constituting the value of plaintiff
corporations checks, and P3,000,000.00, constituting lost
1998. In the alternative, they prayed that the 7 May 1998 Order
be reconsidered and set aside, that the Complaint be reinstated,
and that private respondents First Peoples Bank and Francisco be
declared in default.[27]
Resolving petitioners Motion for Clarification, the trial court issued
an Order[28] in open court, dated 17 July 1998, reiterating that the
case should remain dismissed as petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was defective, and hence, unbinding against the
Order of 7 May 1998. Similarly, the trial court corrected the Order
of 29 May 1998 to refer to the Order of 7 May 1998, which
sustained the dismissal of the case. [29] The court a quo reasoned,
thus:
Even as the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION by
the Plaintiff was not assailed by the other Defendant, but
due to lack of notification, this Motion should not have
been received by the Court at all, therefore [it] is a mere
scrap of paper which requires no ruling.
1. A motion that does not contain a notice of
hearing is a mere scrap of paper, it represents no question
which merits the attention of the Court. (Goldloop
Properties, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 498).
2. Rule 15, Sec. 4. Hearing of motion- Except for
motions which the Court may act upon without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant.
Assignment of Errors
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition for Review,
submitting that the Court of Appeals erred, viz:
I.
II.
III.
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT REINSTATING THE COMPLAINTS (sic) AND IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN: 1) DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT A
BOARD RESOLUTION WAS NOT RECITED IN OR ATTACHED TO THE
COMPLAINT; 2) IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT EVEN AGAINST
THE RESPONDENTS WHO DID NOT FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS
AND WHO DID NOT RAISE THE SAME GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
THE TRIAL COURT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT; 3) IN
REINSTATING ITS JANUARY 9, 1998 ORDER AND IN NOT
RECALLING THE JANUARY 9, 1998.[35]
Issue
For our resolution is whether the appellate court was in error when
it dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari on the ground that
appeal was the appropriate remedy under Rule 41 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and not a Petition for Certiorari,
under Rule 65 thereof.
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, attention must be called to Section 1, Rule 41 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not
been complied with.
Section 5 of the same Rule, recites the effect of a dismissal
under Sections 1(f),[46] (h),[47] and (i),[48] thereof, thus:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. Subject to the
right of appeal, an order granting a motion to
dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of
section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same
action or claim.
Briefly stated, dismissals that are based on the following
grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) that the claim or
demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (3) that the claim on
which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions
of the statute of frauds, bar the refiling of the same action or
EDGARDO
PINGA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF GERMAN, SANTIAGO represented by FERNANDO
SANTIAGO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
By July of 2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed.
Moreover, respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their
evidence. It appears that on 25 October 2004, the RTC already
ordered the dismissal of the complaint after respondents counsel
had sought the postponement of the hearing scheduled
then.10 However, the order of dismissal was subsequently
reconsidered by the RTC in an Order dated 9 June 2005, which
took into account the assurance of respondents counsel that he
would give priority to that case.11
Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal
due to failure to prosecute on the pending counterclaims. As a
result, there arose what one authority on remedial law
characterized as "the nagging question of whether or not the
dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim."22 Jurisprudence construing the previous Rules was
hardly silent on the matter.
In their arguments before the RTC on the dismissal of the
counterclaim, respondents cited in support City of Manila v.
Ruymann,23 Domingo
v.
Santos,24 Belleza
v.
25
Huntington, and Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,26 all of
which were decided more than five decades ago. Notably though,
none of the complaints in these four cases were dismissed either
due to the fault of the plaintiff or upon the instance of the
defendant.27
In Metals, the complaint was expunged from the record after the
defendant had filed a motion for reconsideration of a trial court
order allowing the filing of an amended complaint that corrected a
jurisdictional error in the original complaint pertaining to the
specification of the amount of damages sought. When the
defendant was nonetheless allowed to present evidence on the
counterclaim, the plaintiff assailed such allowance on the ground
that the counterclaim was compulsory and could no longer remain
pending for independent adjudication. The Court, in finding for the
plaintiff, noted that the counterclaim was indeed compulsory in
nature, and as such, was auxiliary to the proceeding in the original
suit and derived its jurisdictional support therefrom. 42 It was
further explained that the doctrine was in consonance with the
primary objective of a counterclaim, which was to avoid and
prevent circuitry of action by allowing the entire controversy
between the parties to be litigated and finally determined in one
action, and to discourage multiplicity of suits. 43 Also, the Court
noted that since the complaint was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, it was as if no claim was filed against the defendant,
and there was thus no more leg for the complaint to stand on. 44
In International Container, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss
which was granted by the trial court. The defendants counterclaim
was dismissed as well. The Court summarized the key question as
"what is the effect of the dismissal of a complaint ordered at the
instance of the defendant upon a compulsory counterclaim duly
raised in its answer."45 Then it ruled that the counterclaim did not
survive such dismissal. After classifying the counterclaim therein
as compulsory, the Court noted that "[i]t is obvious from the very
nature of the counterclaim that it could not remain pending for
independent adjudication, that is, without adjudication by the court
of the complaint itself on which the counterclaim was based." 46
Justice Regalado also adverted to Sta. Maria and noted that the
objections raised and rejected by the Court therein were the same
as those now relied upon by the plaintiff. He pointed out
that Dalman and International Container, both relied upon by the
majority, involved the application of Section 2, Rule 17 and not
Section 3, which he insisted as the applicable provision in the case
at bar.51
Similarly, Justice Feria notes that "the present rule reaffirms the
right of the defendant to move for the dismissal of the complaint
and to prosecute his counterclaim, as stated in the separate
opinion [of Justice Regalado in BA Finance.]"55 Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Herrera pronounces that the amendment to
Section 3, Rule 17 settles that "nagging question" whether the
dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the
counterclaim, and opines that by reason of the amendments, the
rulings in Metals Engineering, International Container, and BA
Finance "may be deemed abandoned."56 On the effect of
amendment to Section 3, Rule 17, the commentators are in
general agreement,57 although there is less unanimity of views
insofar as Section 2, Rule 17 is concerned.58
Nonetheless, a new rule was introduced when Act No. 190 was
replaced by the 1940 Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 30 of the
1940 Rules specified that if a counterclaim is pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss,
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendants objection
The first point is derived from Section 4, Rule 9, of the 1964 Rules
of Court, while the two latter points are sourced from American
jurisprudence. There is no disputing the theoretical viability of
these three points. In fact, the requirement that the compulsory
counterclaim must be set up in the same proceeding remains
extant under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 66 At the same
time, other considerations rooted in actual practice provide a
counterbalance to the above-cited rationales.
very well been lodged as a complaint had the defendant filed the
action ahead of the complainant.69 The terms "ancillary" or
"auxiliary" may mislead in signifying that a complaint innately
possesses more credence than a counterclaim, yet there are many
instances wherein the complaint is trivial but the counterclaim is
meritorious. In truth, the notion that a counterclaim is, or better
still, appears to be merely "ancillary" or "auxiliary" is chiefly the
offshoot of an accident of chronology, more than anything else.
The central issue in this case is whether the absence of the counsel
for defendants at the pre-trial, with all defendants themselves
present, is a ground to declare defendants in default and to
authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte.
Petitioners asked Judge Kapili to inhibit himself from the case. The
judge denied the motion.9
Pre-trial was initially set for 24 April 2003, but this was reset to 3
June 2003 on motion of respondents' counsel. But the pre-trial set
on 3 June 2003 did not push through either because none of the
parties appeared.
There are two cases which, at first blush, may seem to affirm the
action of the RTC. In the disbarment case ofMiwa v. Medina,31 a
lawyer was suspended from the practice for one (1) month for,
and only if, there exists sufficient basis in fact and in law to do
so.39 There being a manifest lack of such basis in this case,
petitioners would be unjustly denied of the opportunity to fully
defend themselves should the Court affirm the questioned orders
which were evidently issued by the RTC with grave abuse of
discretion. The better and certainly more prudent course of action
in every judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the
merits rather than dispose of a case on technicalities. 40
While counsel is somewhat to blame for his non-attendance at pretrial, incidentally the operative act which gave birth to the
controversy at bar, it would be most unfair to penalize petitioners
for what may be the deficiency of their lawyer when the
consequent penalty has no basis in law. Particularly mitigating in
the instant case is the fact that the counsel for private respondents
intimated, at an earlier hearing, a possibility of an amicable
settlement to the case. Then, counsel for petitioners submitted a
manifestation41 requesting therein that the parties be given ample
time to respectively discuss their proposals and counter-proposals
and that the hearing for 23 January 2004 be moved to a later date
as may be agreed upon by the parties for submission of their
possible compromise agreement. It may well have been that
counsel for petitioners labored under the false understanding that
a compromise agreement was an imminent possibility. The Court
nonetheless notes that counsel was remiss in assuming that his
motion to reset the scheduled hearing would necessarily be
granted by the court a quo.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209605, January 12, 2015
NEIL
B.
AGUILAR
CALIMBAS, Petitioners, v. LIGHTBRINGERS
COOPERATIVE, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
AND
RUBEN
CREDIT
cash
each
to a
loan.
RTC
Ruling
On January 2, 2013, the RTC rendered separate decisions in
Civil Case No. DH-1300-1218 and Civil Case No. DH-12991219 which affirmed the MCTC decisions. It held that the PNB
checks were concrete evidence of the indebtedness of the
petitioners to respondent. The RTC relied on the findings of
the MCTC that the checks bore no endorsement to another
person or entity. The checks were issued in the name of the
petitioners and, thus, they had the right to encash the same
and appropriate the proceeds. The decretal portions of the
RTC
decision
in
both
cases
similarly
read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby DENIED. The Decision dated May 9, 2012 of the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (1st MCTC), DinalupihanHermosa,
Bataan
is
hereby
affirmed in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
On January 18, 2013, the petitioners filed their joint motion
for reconsideration/new trial20 before the RTC. Aguilar and
Calimbas reiterated their position that they did not receive
Ruling
Second
Procedural
Issue
Nevertheless, instead of remanding the case to the CA, this
Court deems it fit to rule on the merits of the case to once
and for all settle the dispute of the parties.
trial.37chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bench, the petitioners failed to attend the
pre-trial conference set on August 25, 2009. They did not
even give any excuse for their non-appearance, manifestly
ignoring the importance of the pre-trial stage. Thus, the
MCTC properly issued the August 25, 2009 Order,38 allowing
respondent
to
present
evidence ex
parte.
The MCTC even showed leniency when it directed the
counsels of the parties to submit their respective position
papers on whether or not Aguilar and Calimbas could still
participate in the trial of the case despite their absence in
the pre-trial conference. This gave Aguilar and Calimbas a
second chance to explain their non-attendance and, yet,
only respondent complied with the directive to file a position
paper. The MCTC, in its Order,39 dated April 27, 2011,
properly held that since the proceedings were being
heard ex parte, Aguilar and Calimbas had no right to
participate therein and to cross-examine the witness.
Thus, as it stands, the Court can only consider the evidence
on record offered by respondent. The petitioners lost their
right to present their evidence during the trial and, a
fortiori, on appeal due to their disregard of the mandatory
attendance
in
the
pre-trial
conference.
Substantive
Issue
And on the merits of the case, the Court holds that there
was indeed a contract of loan between the petitioners and
respondent. The Court agrees with the findings of fact of the
MCTC and the RTC that a check was a sufficient evidence of
a loan transaction. The findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on the findings are accorded high
respect,
if
not
conclusive
effect.40chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the
petition
is PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
March 9, 2011
LINDA
M.
CHAN
KENT,
represented
by
ROSITA
MANALANG, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONESIO C. MICAREZ, SPOUSES ALVARO E. MICAREZ & PAZ
MICAREZ,
and
THE
REGISTRY
OF
DEEDS,
DAVAO
DEL
NORTE, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The Facts
This petition draws its origin from a complaint for recovery of real
property and annulment of title filed by petitioner, through her
younger sister and authorized representative, Rosita MicarezManalang (Manalang),before the RTC. Petitioner is of Filipino
descent who became a naturalized American citizen after marrying
an American national in 1981. She is now a permanent resident of
the United States of America (USA).
At the end, petitioner prayed that she be declared as the true and
real owner of the subject lot; that TCT No. T-172286 be cancelled;
and that a new one be issued in her name. 3
After the parties had filed their respective pre-trial briefs, and the
issues in the case had been joined, the RTC explored the possibility
of an amicable settlement among the parties by ordering the
referral of the case to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). On
March 1, 2008, Mediator Esmeraldo O. Padao, Sr. (Padao) issued a
Mediators Report6 and returned Civil Case No. 13-2007 to the RTC
allegedly due to the non-appearance of the respondents on the
scheduled conferences before him. Acting on said Report, the RTC
issued an order on May 29, 2009 allowing petitioner to present her
evidence ex parte.7
Petitioner,
through
her
counsel,
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration10 to set aside the order of dismissal, invoking the
relaxation of the rule on non-appearance in the mediation
proceedings in the interest of justice and equity. Petitioner urged
the trial court not to dismiss the case based merely on
technicalities contending that litigations should as much as
possible be decided on the merits. Resolving the motion in its
second assailed Order11 dated November 21, 2008, the RTC ruled
that it was not proper for the petitioner to invoke liberality
inasmuch as the dismissal of the civil action was due to her own
fault. The dispositive portion of said order reads:
WHEREFORE, there being no cogent reason to depart from
our earlier Order, this instant motion for reconsideration is hereby
ordered DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
The denial prompted the petitioner to file this petition directly with
this Court claiming that the dismissal of the case was not in
accordance with applicable law and jurisprudence.
ISSUES
1. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE SIMPLY ON THE REASON THAT PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO APPEAR DURING THE MEDIATION
PROCEEDING, ALTHOUGH PRESENT FOR TWO (2)
TIMES.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of the case was unjust because
her representative, Manalang, and her counsel, Atty. Etulle, did not
deliberately snub the mediation proceedings. In fact, Manalang
and Atty. Etulle twice attended the mediation conferences on
January 19, 2008 and on February 9, 2008. On both occasions,
Manalang was present but was not made to sign the attendance
sheet and was merely at the lobby waiting to be called by Atty.
Etulle upon arrival of Atty. Miguel. Manalang and Atty. Etulle only
left PMC at 11:00 oclock in the morning when Atty. Miguel had not
yet arrived.13
12. Sanctions
Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the
appropriate sanction including but not limited tocensure,
reprimand, contempt and such other sanctions as are provided
under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case
any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for
Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 13-2007, the Court finds this sanction too severe to be
imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is devoid
of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation
proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that the absence of
petitioners representative during mediation proceedings on March
1, 2008 was intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the
case. Neither is it indicative of lack of interest on the part of
petitioner to enter into a possible amicable settlement of the case.
The Court notes that Manalang was not entirely at fault for
the cancellation and resettings of the conferences. Let it be
underscored that respondents representative and counsel,
Atty. Miguel, came late during the January 19 and February
9, 2008 conferences which resulted in their cancellation and
the final resetting of the mediation proceedings to March 1,
2008. Considering the circumstances, it would be most
unfair to penalize petitioner for the neglect of her
lawyer.1avvphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds it just and proper that
petitioner be allowed to present her cause of action during trial on
RESOLUTION
Petitioners
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration[6] contending, inter alia, that the disposition
of the trial court with respect to Lot No. 3, should not have
been annulled by the Court of Appeals because the petition
for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents
concerned only Lot No. 2. They prayed that the January 19,
2001 decision of the Court which affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals be reconsidered insofar as Lot No. 3 is
concerned.
On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution
partially granting petitioners motion for reconsideration by
reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of
the trial courts Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3, thus
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED and our Decision promulgated on January 19,
2001 is MODIFIED as follows:
(1) reinstating paragraph (4) and (5) of the
Partial Decision of the court a quo; and
(2) affirming the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that
judgment be rendered declaring:
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in
line with the decisions this Honorable Court
had already rendered;
2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its
original area of 52,949,737 square meters;
3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not
forest land and is covered by OCT No. 333;
4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No.
Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are null
and void; and
5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No.
Q-35672 is null and void, no notice of the
hearings/proceedings having been sent to the
Republic and other interested parties.
The facts are fully stated in the dissenting opinion; and the cases
involve in the main the simple question of the right of a person
who has acquired the subject of litigation prior to the rendition of
the judgment to intervene for the purpose of being heard in the
supplemental proceedings for fixing the fees of the attorneys for
the successful plaintiffs. The pertinent facts are briefly these: After
Lim Cuan Sy & Co. had taken out several policies of insurance on a
certain stock of goods in different insurance companies, a fire
occurred which destroyed the insured merchandise. The insurance
companies concerned refused to pay the policies on the ground of
fraud on the part of the insured in submitting its claims of loss,
whereupon the insured instituted six separate actions to recover
upon as many different policies, and inasmuch as the issues in all
the actions were identical, only one of the cases was tried, while
the others were left pending under a stipulation that these actions
should be disposed of in the end in conformity with the final
judgment entered in the litigated case. The case thus tried was
fought to a finish in the Supreme Court, where the judgment of
the Court of First Instance favorable to the plaintiff was finally
affirmed on November 13, 1930. 1 At the conclusion of this
litigation the attorney for the plaintiff filed a motion in the
Supreme Court, asking that his fees as attorney in the case be
noted as a lien of record. This motion was granted. When the
record was finally returned to the lower court, the money due to
the insured under all of the policies was paid into court by the
insurers; and in natural course it became incumbent upon the
court to fix the fees of the attorney for the successful plaintiff. At
this stage the present petitioners sought to intervene, and the
respondent judge having refused to accede to the motion of
intervention,
the
present
applications
for
the
writ
ofmandamus were filed in this court. The only other fact of
importance pertinent to the case is that Lim Cuan Sy & Co. had, in
the meanwhile, been forced into insolvency. Trinidad Jurado Te Kim
Juan having been appointed assignee.
CRUZ, J.:
April 8, 1991
After examining the issues and arguments of the parties, the Court
finds that the respondent court committed no reversible error in
sustaining the denial by the trial court of the petitioners' motion
for intervention.
THIRD DIVISION
The Court observes that even with the denial of the petitioners'
motion to intervene, nothing is really lost to them.1wphi1The
denial did not necessarily prejudice them as their rights are being
litigated in the case now before the Securities and Exchange
Commission and may be fully asserted and protected in that
separate proceeding.
Question Presented
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were
covered by physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the
RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes motion. It also
denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a
special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient
in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be
said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form
in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in
denying Josielene her request for the production in court of
Johnnys hospital records.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated
September 17, 2007.
SO ORDERED.
In
this
petition
for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction, the novel question presented is
whether respondent Judge, in denying a motion for the
arrest of a material witness, in a criminal case, or in the
alternative, to cite him for contempt, relying on Section 9 of
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court to the effect that a witness is
not bound to attend as such before any court, judge or
other officer out of the province in which he resides unless
the distance be less than 50 kilometers from his place of
residence to the place of trial by the usual course, acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
In a petition dated February 4, 1965, it was alleged by the
City Fiscal of Zamboanga, as counsel for the People of the
Philippines, that on September 23, 1963, Criminal Case No.
3225 was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
City against a certain Felix Wee Sit for double homicide and
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY
HIS
MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
that
his
516-a.
Acknowledgment
of
paternity.
(a)
An
acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section
one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section
four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health
law shall establish the paternity of and liability for the
support of a child pursuant to this act. Such
acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed
pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b
of the public health law with the registrar of the district in
which the birth occurred and in which the birth certificate
has been filed. No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged
acknowledgment of paternity.
Sec. 6.
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the
qualified
person described
in subsection (2)
conducting
the
blood
or
tissue
typing
or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and
the DNA identification profile and summary report are
admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is
presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic
testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a
probability of paternity greater than 99%, the
contracting laboratory shall conduct additional
genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative
fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or
more putative fathers who have identical DNA.
Epilogue
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] to set aside the
Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate
court affirmed two Orders[3] issued by Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (trial court) in SP No. 9888759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo
Herrera (petitioner) to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a
valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA
technology may be integrated into our judicial system and
the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in
a paternity suit.[10]
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
the
Just
like
in
fingerprint
analysis,
in DNA
typing, matches are determined. To illustrate, when
DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect
in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the
crime scene is compared with theknown print. If a
substantial amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be
a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA
or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have
come from the suspect.
In
1989, State
v.
[43]
Schwartz
modified the Frye standard.
Schwartz
was
charged with stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles and
blood samples of the accused and the victim were submitted
for DNA testing to a government facility and a private
facility. The prosecution introduced the private testing
facilitys results over Schwartzs objection. One of the issues
brought before the state Supreme Court included the
admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal proceeding.
The state Supreme Court concluded that:
Daubert cautions
that
departure
from
the Frye standard of general acceptance does not mean
that the Federal Rules do not place limits on the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must
ensure that the testimonys reasoning or method is
scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility
would depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or
technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
techniques operation; and (5) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Probative Value of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial
courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis
as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:
standards
and
procedures
were
followed
in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.[51]
We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA
analysis used in paternity cases:
Right Against
Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him
for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76519 : December 21, 1990.]
192 SCRA 575
TIMOTEO POJAS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MERCEDES GOZODALOLE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE, CITY OF TAGBILARAN,
IRENEA POJAS, CESARIA LAGROSA and CORNELIA BETINOL,
Respondents.
PARAS, J.:
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
ATTY. EDWARD ANTHONY A.M. No. P-12-3061
B. RAMOS, [Formerly OCA-IPI No. 08-3022-P]
Complainant,
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
PERLASBERNABE, JJ.
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
is reprimand for the first offense, suspension of 1-30 days for the
second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.
The record shows that Teves had previously been
administratively charged with grave abuse of authority and gross
discourtesy in OCA-IPI 08-2981-P. Although the Court dismissed
the charge for lack of merit on November 18, 2009, it reminded
him to be more circumspect in dealing with litigants and their
counsel.
In two consolidated administrative cases, one for grave
misconduct and immorality and the other for insubordination, [3] the
Court meted out on Teves the penalty of suspension for six months
in its resolution of October 5, 2011. The Court of course decided
these cases and warned Teves to change his ways more than a
year after the September 8, 2008 incident with Atty.
Ramos. Consequently, it could not be said that he ignored with
respect to that incident the warnings given him in the
subsequently decided cases.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
August 3, 2005
reconsideration.
Resolution5 denying
petitioners
motion
for
Factual Antecedents
On October 11, 1977, the trial court rendered a Decision in Civil
Case No. 24858 in favor of respondent Josephine Anne B.
Ramnani. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the trial
court. On June 6, 1978, then Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Alarcon
conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 480537 (subject
property) during which respondent was the highest bidder.
Consequently, a certificate of sale was executed in her favor on
even date. On November 17, 1978, a writ of possession was issued
by the trial court. On March 8, 1990, the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. 480537. Thereafter, the taxes
due on the sale of the subject property were paid on September
26, 2001.1avvphi1
The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ
of execution is not applicable in this case. Less than a year from
the October 11, 1977 Decision, respondent exercised her right to
enforce the same through the levy and sale of the subject property
on June 6, 1978. Although the certificate of sale was annotated on
TCT No. 480537 only on March 8, 1990, petitioner did not exercise
his right to redeem the subject property within one year from said
registration. Thus, what remains to be done is the issuance of the
final certificate of sale which was, however, not promptly
accomplished at that time due to the demise of the trial courts
sheriff. The issuance of the final certificate of sale is a ministerial
duty of the sheriff in order to complete the already enforced
judgment.
In its August 19, 2004 Order, the trial court granted the motion:
The CA denied the petition in its assailed May 13, 2005 Decision:
10, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 159, Pasig City in Civil Case No.
24858 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the CA noted that the
subject motion is a non-litigious motion, hence, the three-day
notice rule does not apply. Further, it agreed with the trial court
that the issuance of the final certificate of sale is not barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel because the October 11, 1977
Decision was already executed through the levy and sale of the
subject property on June 6, 1978. Respondent is entitled to the
issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right because
petitioner failed to redeem the subject property.
Respondents Arguments
Respondent contends that the subject motion is a non-litigious
motion and that petitioner was not denied due process because he
was given an opportunity to be heard by the trial court. She also
points out that said motion is not barred by prescription, laches
and estoppel considering that the levy and sale of the subject
property was conducted on June 6, 1978 and petitioner failed to
redeem the same.
Issues
Our Ruling
1. Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the fatally defective motion and the
subsequent issuance of the Orders dated August 19, 2004
and November 10, 2004;
2. Whether respondent is barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel.8
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner contends that the motion dated February 16, 2004 filed
by respondent to compel the sheriff to execute the final certificate