3/2015.

CURRENTS OF HISTORY

Journal of the Institute for Recent History of Serbia

3/2015

, 2016.


THE INSTITUTE FOR RECENT HISTORY OF SERBIA

Editor-in-chief

Editorial board

.
.
. ()
. ()
()
()
()

Editorial secretary

Editing and proofreading

Text editing

English editing and proofreading

949.71
YU ISSN 0354-6497

a ,


CONTENTS
3/2015.

ARTICLES

Dragan BOGETI
DISCORD BETWEEN YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND THE BASIC
DETERMINANTS OF THE BIPOLAR DETENTE PROCESS 19711975...................11
Aleksandar R. MILETI
NON-TARIFF PROTECTIONIST SCHEMES 19181928.
SOUTHEAST AND EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES..............................41

Duan BOJKOVI
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE AUTOCRATIC
RULE OF KING ALEKSANDAR KARAOREVI..............................................................65
Aleksandar V. MILETI
UNREALIZED NORDIC DREAM. MILOVAN ILAS AND
THE SCANDINAVIAN SOCIALISTS.........................................................................................89

Aleksandar RAKOVI
BIJELO DUGME IN CONCERT AT HAJDUKA ESMA IN BELGRADE (1977):
SOCIAL EVENT OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE AND RECOGNITION
OF A UNIQUE PHENOMENON..............................................................................................107
He YANQING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINO-U.S. AMBASSADORIAL TALKS AGAINST
THE BACKGROUND OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT 1955: PRCS DIPLOMATIC
ACHIEVEMENTS WITH THE HELP OF THE SOVIET UNION...................................135

IN MEMORIAM
(19312015)
Nadeda Jovanovi, Ph. D., (19312015).........................................................................165


SOURCES


1926.
(Aleksandar IVOTI, Docent Ph. D.
REPORT OF GENERAL DRAGUTIN MILUTINOVI ON THE SITUATION
AT THE FRONT ON THE BORDER WITH BULGARIA IN 1926)..............................169

REVIEWS

. . , 2015.
(Milo Vojinovi. Political Ideas of Young Bosnia. Belgrade, 2015) . ....................191

, .
.
, 2014.
, , .
2,
. , 2014.
(Slaana Bojkovi, Miloje Pri. Reports on the Great Crime Documents
on Austro-Hungarian Crimes Committed Before and After the Battle of Cer.
Belgrade, 2014.
Slaana Bojkovi, Miloje Pri, Radovan Pilipovi. Reports on the
Great Crime 2, Documents on Austro-Hungarian Atrocities Before and After
the Battle of Kolubara. Belgrade, 2014)............................................................................195

: . , 2014.
(History and Geography: Encounters and Permeation, Belgrade, 2014).............198

(19141918):
. , 2014.
(Serbian Orthodox Church in World War I (19141918)
Selected Documents. Belgrade, 2014)................................................................................204


. :
. , 2015.
(Milovan Mitrovi. Villages in Serbia: Change of Structure and
Problems of Sustainable Development. Belgrade, 2015)............................................207

M . . , 2014.
(Miodrag Peri. Vlachs of Northeast Serbia. Petrovac na Mlavi, 2014)...............217

INFORMATION ON CONFERENCES

XXII
(International Committee of Historical Sciences), ,
, 2329. 2015...........................................................................................223
,
8th Annual Summer Workshop for Holocaust Scholars: Non-Jewish Jews
During the Shoah: Fate and Identity
( :
: )..................226
,
Polska i Jugoslawia po II wojnie swiatowej,
Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy, (),
30. 1. 2015.
(Poland and Yugoslavia after the Second World War, University of Casimir
the Great in Bydgoszcz, Poland, 30. September 1. October 2015)....................231


Articles

 327(497.1)1971/1975
327.56(497.1)1971/1975

: 10. 7. 2015.
: 24. 9. 2015.

Dragan BOGETI
Institute for Contemporary History
dbogetic@gmail.com

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and the Basic

Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975*
Abstract: The paper analyzes the determinants and political
implications of the different approaches of Yugoslavia and the
two superpowers to the policy of bipolar dtente and the optimal strategy of eliminating hotbeds of world crises during
the first half of the 1970s. The clear discord between Yugoslav
foreign policyon this issue and the current bloc strategy was a
serious obstacle to the advancement of political and economic
cooperation of Yugoslavia with the big superpowers and the
safeguardof Yugoslav independence and nonalignment.
Key words: Yugoslavia, USA, USSR, dtente, settlement,
North-South, economic development, nonalignment, discri
mination

A new and specific period in the history of international relations,

often characterized as an era of bipolar dtente between the two superpowers and general relaxation of international tensions began at the beginning of the 1970s. For the first time in the post war history of international relations, an American president visited the Soviet Union and P. R. of
China and attended the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.
At that time, the PR of China was finally admitted to the United Nations becoming a permanent member of the Security Council instead of the representative of the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan.

This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project Serbian
Society in the Yugoslav State in the 20 Century: Between Democracy and Dictatorship,
( 177016), financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological
Development of the Republic of Serbia.

11

3/2015.

According to the policy endorsed by Belgrade and numerous official statements made by Tito, such a positive change in international relations represented an important victory for the principals and goals which
Yugoslavia and all the nonaligned countries, as well as peace movements
and organizations in the world, supported for years. However, when we
analyze Titos tendency to point out the serious limitations of this process, and occasionally express open doubt about the peaceful intentions
of the superpowers, all in the context of undoubtedly very affirmative
statements on the process of the bipolar dtente of the two superpowers a certain discord and insincerity of the Yugoslav officials can be
noticed. Thus, it seems natural to pose the question: what were the reasons for such a discord between the formally propagated and the actually
desired; that is,what were the reasons for such an evident discordbetween
the numerous Yugoslav appeals to the superpowers to solve their conflicts
solely by negotiations and the restrained and somewhat negative Yugoslav
perception of certain aspects of the actual bipolar dtente.The answer to
this question, actually, explains all the specificity and amorphousness of
the Yugoslav international position during the first part of the 1970sand
the periodical inconsistency of the Yugoslav officials in the implementation of the basic premises of the nonaligned and non-bloc policy.
The new superpowers policy on solving world issues and new
challenges in the international community, no matter how paradoxical
it seemed, actually jeopardized the up to then relatively stable international position of Yugoslavia and its policy of nonalignment. A new reality was established in which Yugoslavia could no longer obtain considerable political and economic benefits from its role of mediator between
the USA and the USSR, and the Non-Aligned Movement was not any
more in the position to impose itself as the key player in extinguishing
the hotbeds instigated by the clash of the two blocs on the territories of
third countries. Belgrade assessed that the bipolar dtente would have
a pronounced negative impact on the future economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USA. There was fear that the Americans would
not be so forthcoming in granting economic concessions to Yugoslavia
and as cooperative on the issue of Yugoslav financial requests. The USA
had previously been exceptionally forthcoming in this regard towards
Yugoslavia, because this cooperation was to be a model for economic cooperation with other socialist countries and an incentive to them to lead
an independent policy. As the US now established closer relations with
the East European countries- its interest for such a strategy diminished.1
1

Aleksandar ivoti, Vaingtonski pregovori 1951, Jugoslovensko pribliavanje SAD,

(Beograd, 2015), [Washington Negotiations 1951, Yugoslav Rapprochement to the USA,

12

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

Tito especially expressed a high doze of discomfort, concern and

significant reserve towards the process of the bipolar dtente because of
his fear that the two superpowers would reach an agreement that would
be to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia. Namely, since Yugoslavia was still
considered a grey zone in Europe, not being clear whether it belonged
to the socialist bloc countries or not there wasrealistic fear that the
Americans would put Yugoslav interests in the background and abandon
the previous strategy of support to Yugoslav independence, in other to
secure Soviet concessions on some important European and global issues. The current US readiness to accept the Soviet initiative for the convening the Conference on European Security and Cooperation that would
finally permanently sanction the de facto situation established in Europe
in the post war era (especially the integrity of the existing borders) and
the tendency of the two superpowers to draw the political map of the
world in direct negotiations, contributed to the fears of the Yugoslav officials. Although Tito endorsed the policy of peaceful coexistence among
the blocs in conflict and supported the doctrine of the Richard Nixon,
the American president, on the need for confrontation to give way to negotiations, there was fear that the underlined joint cooperativity of the
two superpowers would eventually result with their agreement at the
expense of small countries.2

(Belgrade, 2015)]; Ljubodrag Dimi, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat. Ogledi o spoljnoj politici
Josipa Broza Tita (19441974), (Beograd, 2014), [Yugoslavia and the Cold War. Essays
on the Foreign Policy of Josip Broz Tito 19441974, (Belgrade, 2014)]; Dragan Bogeti,
Amerike analize budunosti Jugoslavije posle Tita s poetka 70-ih godina, Tokovi istorije
[American Analysis on the Future of Yugoslavia After Tito at the Beginning of the 70s,
Currents of History], 1/2012, 159174; Robert D. ulcinger, Amerika diplomatija od 1900.
godine, (Beograd, 2011), [US Diplomacy Since 1900, (Belgrade, 2011)]; Zbornik radova
Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu, (Beograd, 2010), [Proceedings from Yugoslavia in the Cold
War, (Belgrade, 2010)]; Momilo Pavlovi, Dokumenta CIA o Jugoslaviji 19481983. anse
Jugoslavije posle Tita, (Beograd, 2009), (CIA i slom Jugoslavije), Momilo Pavlovi, CIA
Documents on Yugoslavia 19481983. Chances of Yugoslavia after Tito, (Belgrade, 2009),
(CIA and the Collapse of Yugoslavia)]; 125 Years of Diplomatic Relations between the USA
and Serbia, (Belgrade, 2008); Josip Monik, United States-Yugoslav Relations, 196180: The
Twilight of Titos Era and the Role of Ambassadorial Diplomacy in the Making of Americas
Yugoslav Policy, (Bowling Green, Ohio, 2008); Yugoslavia After Tito, From National
Communism to National Collapse, US Intelligence Community. Estimate Products on
Yugoslavia. 19481990; Ivo Viskovi, Odnosi Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Amerikih Drava,
Jugoslovenski pregled [Relations Between Yugoslavia and the United States of America,
Yugoslav Review], XXXII, 1 (1988), 2345; Duan Nikoli, SAD. Strategija dominacije,
(Beograd, 1985), [USA. Strategy of Dominance, (Belgrade, 1985)].
Leo Mates, Meunarodni odnosi socijalistike Jugoslavije, (Beograd, 1976),
[International Relations of Socialist Yugoslavia, (Belgrade, 1976)]; Dragan Bogeti,
Jugoslovensko-ameriki odnosi 19611971, (Beograd, 2012) [Yugoslav-American
Relations 19611971, (Belgrade, 2012)], 321335.

13

3/2015.

Thus, when Josip Broz Tito visited the USA in October 1971, he
had animportant task of convincing President Nixon that the current internal problems of Yugoslavia would soon be localized, the political and
economic system consolidated and that Yugoslavia would remain an
important factor of stability in Europe and the Balkans. This time, the
Yugoslav president was resolute in his attempt to clarify to his hosts the
guidelines of the current Yugoslav international strategy and resolve the
dilemma of the future American policy towards Yugoslavia. If Nixons
promise given a year earlier in Belgrade reflected his sincere stance on
the readiness of the American government to resolutely support the independence of Yugoslavia and it attempts to resolve the economic crisis,
then the American president should not oppose the formalizing of such a
course with a special joint Yugoslav-American communiqu, that would
in a certain way norm the principals underlining the relations between
the two countries and a charter that would demystify the new platform
of Yugoslav relations with the countries of the Western bloc.3
In that sense, it could be said that the most important part of
Titos visit to Washington took place outside the official talks, during
the dinner Nixon organized in Titos honor in the White House on 28
October 1971. It is a very important and unusual episode, not marked
in relevant archival domestic documents but one which is described
in detail in the documents of the American State Department.4 Titos
suspicion that his closest associates, as well as the translator, may be
working for the Soviets, and his insufficient knowledge of the English
language complicated communication with Nixon and William Rogers
the Secretary of State. In a complicated way (using a whole series of enigmatic messages) the Americans were asked to confirm in an explicit
statement their resolution to continue to give full support to Yugoslav
independence and that every attempt to jeopardize it (from the bloc
of pro-Soviet countries) would encounter a strong reaction of the USA
and NATO. After Nixon finally managed to comprehend Titos message
with visible efforts and constant consultations with Rogers, Nixon together with the Yugoslav President issued a special Joint Statement at
the end of the talks that had a more longstanding, broader and different
3

Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Kabinet predsednika Republike (KPR), I-2/SAD, Politiki

aspekti odnosa, Kominike, [Archives of Yugoslavia (AY), Cabinet of the President
of Yugoslavia (CPR), 1-2/USA, Political Aspects of Relations, Communique]; Ibid.,
Unutranji razvoj i spoljnopolitika aktivnost SAD i SFRJ i njihovo dejstvo na
meusobne pozicije i odnose [Internal Development and Foreign Policy Activity of
the USA and the SFRY and their Impact on Mutual Positions and Relations].
Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS), 19691976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe,
Eastern Mediterranean, 19691972, doc. 233, Editorial Note.

14

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

character than was usually the case with these kinds of documents.It is
a fact, that American presidents would sign such documents only in exceptional circumstances, which says much about its political weight.
Since this document represented a long term platform for relations
between Yugoslavia and the USA and since it precisely formulated the
principles of future USA-Yugoslav relations, as was the case with the
document signed in 1955 by Tito and Khrushchev in Belgrade after a
long Yugoslav-Soviet conflict, this document modeled on the Belgrade
declaration was later often mentioned as the Washington Declaration.5
However, judging by the numerous messages the Yugoslav politicians sent to Washington during 1972 and 1973, certain concern was
still present in Belgrade that the Americans intended to, in the course
of their policy of dtente with the Soviets, reach an agreement with
them which would be to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia. How much Tito
and his associates feared the Soviet intervention,which could be the result of a new phase of East-West relation, could be seen from the talks
on this issue, held in outmost secret during 1972 and 1973 between the
Yugoslav officials and the new American ambassador Malcolm Toon.
Specially indicative were the talk sheld between the American ambassador and Stane Dolanc, the Secretary of the Executive Committee of
LCY(League of Communists of Yugoslavia), who the Americans all the
more saw as Titos successor.6 Toon reported to his government on his
first meeting with Dolanc on 20 May 1972. During the talks, saying that
the United States only condemned the invasion on Czechoslovakia but
refrained from doing anything else, Dolanc openly asked the American
ambassador what the US would do if the USSR attacked some other
country that was not a member of the Warsaw pact. Toon answered:
that a whole series of factors would influence such a reaction (among
others: which specific country was attacked, what the circumstances
of the invasion were, if the people of that country were resolute to defend themselves, what the stance of the American public and Congress
was) and that because of these factors he was not in a position to give
5
6

Dragan Bogeti, Razgovori TitoNikson oktobra 1971. Politike implikacije

Vaingtonske deklaracije, Istorija XX veka [TitoNixon Talks October 1971. Political
Implications of the Washington Declaration, History of the XX Century] 2/2011,
159172.
The Americans considered that Tito had a high opinion of S. Dolanc because he
was highly respected both in the Party and in the military, and he unreservedly
supported the forces fighting against the disintegration of Yugoslavia. His special
positive reference within that framework was that although being a Slovene, he was
acceptable to other nations. - FRUS, 19691976, Volume E15, Part 1, Documents
on Eastern Europe, 19731976, Yugoslavia, doc. 61.

15

3/2015.

a concrete answer to such a complex question. Dolans expressed his

incomprehension of such an answer and suddenly changed the topic.7
Commenting on Dolencs behavior and the general situation in
Yugoslavia, Toon pointed to very powerful centrifugal forces in that
country and the concern of the Yugoslav leadership that the USSR
would use that opportunityas motive for intervention and political involvement. The American ambassador noted that other Yugoslav officials
and diplomats also contacted the Americans and asked a similar question (Minister of Foreign Affairs Marko Tepavac in January 1972, Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaka Petri at the beginning of February and
Bogdan Osolnik, member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal
Assembly).8
However, at the beginning of the 70s, the Yugoslav side noticed
that Brezhnev and his followers also expressed certain interest in the
rapprochement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations within the opening process of the bipolar dtente and the need of the USSR to strengthen its
position on the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Soviet concern over
the improvement of American-Chinese relations and Nixons visit to
Beijing, as Soviet exceptional interest for the convening of the European
Conference on Security potentially contributed to the heightened
interest of the Kremlin rulers for a more broader cooperation with
Yugoslavia. However, at the same time, Belgrade assessed that the
Soviet leadership basic premise was that the complete collapse of the
Yugoslav model of socialism was near and that such a situation would
spur the healthy forces (Tito was included in them) to join the socialist bloc and save themselves form the devastating consequences of the
economic, national, party and general state crisis. Although Brezhnev
and his associates desired such a turn of events, the Yugoslav officials
considered that the Soviets were primarily sincerely worried about the
possible major international repercussions in case of the breakup of
Yugoslavia. The Soviet leadership did not want a situation anywhere in
Europe which could created a new crisis in East/West relations. They
put a lot of effort in the convening the European Conference on Security
and Cooperation which would finally sanction the postwar order and
the existing boundaries. Now, after two years of intensive activity, they
were close to their goal that Europe and the USA would formally acknowledge the state established in Europe after World War II, and the
7
8

FRUS, 19691976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969

1972, doc. 236, Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of
State, Belgrade, April 20, 1972.
Ibid.

16

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

breakup of the Yugoslav system could induce unfavorable international

complications.9 Therefore, during his visit to Yugoslavia in September
1971, Brezhnev offered Tito assistance in remediating the disturbing
situation in Yugoslavia, remarking that the Soviet Union does not intend or did it ever intend to use force against Yugoslavia. He insisted on
the establishment of Yugoslav-Soviet friendship society, criticized the
anti-Soviet writing of the Yugoslav press and asked Tito to accept the
role of mediator between the USSR and the USA, during his upcoming
meeting with Nixon, and convey the Soviet leaderships message to the
American president on their willingness to solve all controversial issues through direct negotiations of the two superpowers.10
Besides Yugoslav reservationsin regards to the bipolar dtente, due to concerns that the American-Soviet agreement would
be to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia, Tito and his associates were
also concerned that the bipolar dtente between the USSR and USA
would give the two superpowers a sort of monopoly on the resolution of all important international issues. These issues, official
Belgrade assessed, would be resolved from a position of power,
jointly acknowledged and respected interests, spheres of influence,
the balance of nuclear weapons and negations, which all seemed
much like Kissingers ideal of an international order based on the
balance and consensus of power and the legitimacy of the most powerful. Such a system of balance of power in the world was not only in
9

10

AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, O unutranjoj i spoljnoj politici Sovjetskog Saveza, [AY, CPR,
1-3/USSR, On the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union].
AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, Izlaganje predsednika Tita na proirenoj sednici Izvrnog biroa
Predsednitva SKJ, odranoj 3. oktobra 1971. na Brionima, [AY, CPR, I-3-a/USSR,
President Titos Address made before the Session of the Executive Bureau of the
Presidency of the LCY held at Brionion 3 October 1971]; Ibid., Stenografske beleke
sa razgovora Josipa Broza Tita, Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika Saveza komunista
Jugoslavije i Leonida Iljia Brenjeva, generalnog sekretara Centralnog komiteta
Komunistike partije Sovjetskog Saveza, odranih u Beogradu, dana 23. septembra
1971. u 9,00 asova, [Shorthand notes of the talks between Josip Broz Tito, President
of the SFRY and President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and Leonid
Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, held in Belgrade at 9:00 a.m on September 23, 1971]; Ibid.,
Stenografske beleke sa zavrnih razgovora Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika Saveza
komunista Jugoslavije druga Josipa Broza Tita i generalnog sekretara Centralnog
komiteta Komunistike partije Sovjetskog Saveza Leonida Iljia Brenjeva, voenih
24. septembra 1971. god u 21,00 asova u Karaorevu, [Shorthand notes of the
final talks between Josip Broz Tito, President of the SFRY and President of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Ilyich
Brezhnev held in Karaorevo at 21:00 on September 2, 1971].

17

3/2015.

direct collision with the concept of nonalignment, but also contrary

to Yugoslav efforts to involve all countries in the resolution of key
international issues on equitable basis. Therefore, Tito kept criticizing the limitations of the bipolar dtente and the tentativeness
of the solutions accepted by the superpowers against or contrary
to the wishes of other countries. The bipolar dtente was, in its essence, a negation of the Non-Aligned Movement as an important an
independent international factor. 11
During the afore mentioned TitoBrezhnev talks held in Belgrade
in September 1971, Brezhnev tried to persuade Tito to forge closer ties
with the pro-Soviet bloc countries because the Yugoslav nonaligned
policy was allegedly losing its raison dtre by the opening of the bipolar dtente.12 Negating the significance of the Non-Aligned Movement,
he openly expressed his opinion: Nehru died, Nasser died, you are the
only one left. So, there is little chance of you keeping the nonaligned
countries together.13 The Soviet politicians were unanimous in their
view that without the existence of a global system of socialism, it would
not be possible to conduct the non-aligned policy nor possible to form
the Non-Aligned Movement. Consequently, they saw the close bonding
of the nonaligned countries to the socialist bloc and the USSR as the
basic prerequisite for the survival of such a policy and the realization of
its goals. In that spirit, during Titos talks held in Moscow in June 1972,
the Soviet side presented an assessment of the scope of the bloc policy
and the nonaligned countries in the bipolar dtente process, as well
as the significance of the American President Nixons meeting with the
Chinese and Soviet officials.14
However, while the direct personal contacts of the leaders of
the three most powerful countries were rated as a significant incentive for the relaxation of tension in the world and the strengthening
of international cooperation, when the American Secretary of State
11
12
13
14

Nikoli, SAD. Strategija dominacije [USA. Startegy of Dominace]; Bogeti, Amerike

analize budunosti Jugoslavije [American Analysis on the Future of Yugoslavia],
159174; Viskovi, Odnosi Jugoslavije [Relations of Yugoslavia], 2345; Dimi,
Jugoslavija i Hladni rat [Yugoslavia and the Cold War], 357383.
AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, Stenografske beleke sa zavrnih razgovora [AY, CPR, 1-3-a/
USSR, Shorthand notes of the final talks].
AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, Izlaganje predsednika Tita [AY, CPR, 1-3-a/USSR, President
Titos Address].
AJ, KPR, I-2/53, Materijal o poseti J. B. Tita SSSR, jun 1972 [AY, CPR 1-2/53,
Material on the Visit of J. B. Tito to the USSR, June 1972]; Zajedniko saoptenje
o jugoslovensko-sovjetskim razgovorima [Joint Statement on Yugoslav-Soviet
Talks], Borba, June 11, 1972.

18

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

William Rogers visited Yugoslavia the following month,15 the Yugoslav

side also expressed doubt that this time perhaps it is just a case of
establishing a new balance of power and not about new prospects
for peace. The Yugoslav officials thought that the best way to remove
such doubts was the necessity to resolve the burning issues and hotbeds of crisis. They primarily had in mind Vietnam and the Middle
East. Thus, they insisted that warfare in Vietnam be replaced by negotiations and the solution found which would be based on the respect of the legitimate rights of Vietnam to decide on its fate alone.
Concern was voiced that the negotiations of the superpowers would
not accomplish much if other countries did not participate in them,
even those who economically and military wise did not play a significant role in international relations. We do not expect only the big and
powerful countries to govern the world. They are neither that big nor
that powerful. It will be easier for the big countries if they accepted
the equitable cooperation of the whole international community not
only regarding the issues that concern the whole world, but even in
respect to the issues that they are mutually concerned about. There
is no issue of bilateral relations between the superpowers, that will
not have an impact on the whole world. There is no reliable peace between the superpowers, without the guarantee of peace for the small
countries. There is no lasting prosperity for the rich countries, without the accelerated development of the poor.16
Rogers reply to the toast of the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign
Affairs showedmuch more cordiality towards the host, then the
Yugoslav side expressed towards him, and his flattering appraisal of
the relations between the two counties. As to the Yugoslav position that
the bipolar dtente must expand to the whole international community, and not be reduced to the negotiations between the superpowers Rogers pointed to the existence of full complementarity between
Yugoslav and American views on this question: We agree that better
relations among all countries the large and small, the weak and powerful will contribute to achieving peace. That is the essence of the initiative undertaken by President Nixon in the Soviet Union and Peoples
15

16

Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DAMSP), 1972,

Politika arhiva (PA), SAD, f-106, 423 331, Izvetaj o zvaninoj poseti Jugoslaviji
dravnog sekretara SAD V. Rodersa [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (DAMFA RS), Political Archive (PA), USA, f-106, 423
331, Report on the Official Visit of the USA Secretary of State W. Rogers to Yugoslavia].
Zdravica saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove Mirka Tepavca u ast amerikog
dravnog sekretara [Toast of Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mirko Tepavac
in Honor of the American Secretary of State], Borba, July 8, 1972.

19

3/2015.

Republic of China. That is also an important aspect of President Titos

nonalignment policy.17
During Titos talks with Rogers held in his residence in Brioni on 9
July, the principals of the Joint Statement signed by Tito and Nixon in 1971
were reaffirmed.18 Since that document specified that the differences between Yugoslav and US views on key international problems must not be
an obstacle for their bilateral cooperation, the Yugoslav officials in their
talks with American diplomats kept insisting that this document must
be respected, as they insisted in the talks with the Soviet politicians that
the principles of the Belgrade Declaration from 1955 must be respected.
The reaffirmation of the principles of the Washington Declaration was
significant for Yugoslavia, since the USA announced it would harden its
policy towards Yugoslavia because the Yugoslav politicians had a tendency to openly criticize and condemn the American policy and see it as the
main source of most of the crises that shook the modern world. Rogers
endeavored to convince Tito that both sides were in agreement on this
issue. At the beginning of the talks, he emphasized that the principles of
bilateral cooperation formulated by the two presidents were a steadfast
foundations for friendly and stable Yugoslav-American relations.19
Due to Yugoslav fears that Nixon may have made an agreement
with Brezhnev to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia, Rogers thoroughly informed Tito on the fine points of the American-Soviet talks and emphasized a few times the American support to Yugoslav independence and
nonalignment and that they did not for a moment abandon this course
in Moscow, that is, that there was nothing which that would have negative repercussions on third countries. Rogers drew his hosts attention
to the point that President Nixon asked to come to Yugoslavia to con17
18

19

Zdravica amerikog dravnog sekretara Vilijema Rodersa [Toast of American

Secretary of State William Rogers], Borba, July 8, 1972.
DAMSP, 1972, str. pov., f-2, 92, Zabeleka o razgovoru Predsednika Republike
sa dravnim sekretarom za inostrane poslove SAD Vilijemom Rodersom, 9. jula
1972. na Brionima [DAMFA, 1972, topsecret, f-2, 92, Note on the talks between the
President of the Republic and the US Secretary of State William Rogers in Brioni on
July 9, 1972].
FRUS, 19691976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969
1972, doc. 238, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia,
Washington, July 25, 1972; AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-201, Zabeleka o razgovoru, 9. jul
1972. na Brionima, [AY CPR, I -3-a/107-201, Note on the talks in Brioni July 9,
1972]; DAMSP, 1972, PA, SAD, f-106, 423 331, Izvetaj o zvaninoj poseti Jugoslaviji
dravnog sekretara SAD V. Rodersa, [DAMFA, 1972, PA, USA, f-106, 423 331,
Report on the Official Visit of US Secretary of State William Rogers to Yugoslavia].
In the communiqu on the talks that Rogers had with the Yugoslav officals it was
said that the Joint Tito and Nixon Statement from 30 September 1971 represents
long term basis for cooperation between the two countries. - Borba, July 10, 1972.

20

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

vince President Tito that we have not made any agreements with the
USSR behind our friends back. In that respect, Rogers underscored
that the USA specially strove that the formulation of the documents
they adopted with the USSR did not contain stances which could harm
third countries or be interpreted as such, that is, which would give the
USSR special rights in any region () It was made clear to the USSR that
dtente, as the mentioned principles of independence, sovereignty and
noninterference should apply to all countries in Europe and that the
USA would not change its position. Rogers stressed that there were
no private (secret) talks on Yugoslavia.20 Tito was satisfied with this
explanation and said: that Soviets told him the same thing. He emphasized that Brezhnev informed him on his agreement with Nixon to
the organize and convene the Conference on European Security and
Cooperation.21
However, Tito could not accept that dtente as the key determinant of modern international relations was exclusively limited
to the relations of the two superpowers and territorially to Europe.
Brezhnevs explanation followed, after Tito pointed this out him during their next meeting in Kiev in mid November 1973, he said that this
was actually about: an exceptionally wise temporary solution which
would allow the communists to outsmart their ideological enemies in
the West because the imperialist are feverishly fighting to encircle
socialism from all sides and imperialist strive to deceive us wherever it is possible, wherever they can they want to install their bases ()
They are, it is a ugly word, they are bastards (scoundrels) () They
are afraid of the offensive of socialism, because they are aware of the
power of the working class. In addition, Brezhnev explained to Tito
that he opted for the policy of a bipolar dtente having in mind the
original principals of Marxism-Leninism: Lets also read Lenin. He
supported cooperation with the imperialists. He wrote a letter saying that it was possible to form an alliance with every devil, but one
should not to allow the devil to deceive you, you should deceive the
devil () The long term class struggle is in front of us. We conduct a
20
21

DAMSP, 1972, PA, SAD, f-106, 423 331, Izvetaj o zvaninoj poseti Jugoslaviji
[DAMFA, 1972, PA, USA, f-106, 423 331, Report f-106, 423 331, Report on the
Official Visit to Yugoslavia].
FRUS, 19691976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 1969
1972, doc. 238, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia,
Washington, July 25, 1972; AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-201, Zabeleka o razgovorima Tito
Roders, 9. jul 1972, [AY, CPR, I -3-a/107-201, Note on the TitoRogers Talks, 9 July
1972]; DAMSP, 1972, PA, SAD, f-106, 423 331, Izvetaj o zvaninoj poseti Jugoslaviji
[DAMFA, 1972, PA, USA f-106, 423 331, Report on the Official Visit to Yugoslavia].

21

3/2015.

class policy. Some thought that we have started to compromise, that

the Soviet Union hasembarked on a road of bowing to the USA.22
It seems that Brezhnevs witty remark best illustrates the background of both the Soviet and American approach to the bipolar dtente
policy. Tito agreed with Brezhnev that the Soviet approach to cooperation with the West was a class approach.23 But, Yugoslavia insisted that
the dtente must have a universal character, that all interested countries
should take part in it on equitable basis, that it must spread to all geographic areas (not only Europe) and it must involve all issues that burden
the international relations (that is, not only the issues that the superpowers marked as having current priority of its negotiations).24
One of the key issues that Yugoslavia and the nonaligned countries
energetically advocated dealt with the imperative for a radical transformation of the existing system of international relations and overcoming
the increasingly wider gap that separated the rich North from the poor
South. During the 70s, Tito kept stressing that the bipolar dtente policy
could notachieve any significant results unless it focused on the resolution of economic backwardness in the world. Thus, he considered that
international peace was not sustainable in the circumstances of sharp
confrontation between the industrially developed countries and developing
countries of the third world.25
Since the USA and the USSR ignored such demands, the ones that
the nonaligned countries persistently tried to place on the agenda, it
was decided at the Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries held in Algiers
in September 1973, to launch an initiative for convening a Special
Session of the General Assembly of the Unite Nations which would be
22

23
24
25

AJ, KPR, I-2/55, Stenografske beleke sa razgovora voenih izmeu Predsednika SKJ
i Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS L. I. Brenjeva,
odranih 12. novembra 1973. u Kijevu [AY, CPR, I-2/55, Shorthand notes on the talks
held between the President of the LCY and the President of the SFRY Josip Broz Tito
and the General Secretary of the CC CPSU L. I. Brezhnev held in Kiev on November
12, 1973].
Ibid.
AJ, KPR, I-2, Put J. B. Tita u Finsku. Nacrt platforme SFRJ za Konferenciju o evropskoj
bezbednosti i saradnji od 8. juna 1973, [AY CPR, I-2. Visit to Finland. Outline of SFRs
Platform for the Conference on European Security and Cooperation from June 8,
1973]; Dimi, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat [Yugoslavia and the Cold War], 357383.
Godinjak Instituta za meunarodnu politiku i privredu 1974 [Annual of the Institute
for International Policy and Economy 1974], 5360, 909942; Ljubia S. Adamovi,
Don R. Lempi, Rasel O. Priket, Ameriko-jugoslovenski ekonomski odnosi posle
drugog svetskog rata, (Beograd, 1990) [American-Yugoslav Economic Relations after
the Second World War, (Belgrade, 1990)]; Skupovi nesvrstanih zemalja 19611974,
(Beograd, 1974) [Conferences of Non-aligned Countries 19611974, (Belgrade,
1974)].

22

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

exclusively dedicated to the issues of economic development.26 In order to exert pressure on the two superpowers to finally seriously take
into account the demands of the third world, Yugoslavia supported
two moves worthy of respect that the nonaligned countries undertook
which seriously questioned the continuation of the process of the bipolar dtente and which lead to a profound economic crisis from which
the Western world has not recovered to this day. The first move was
the introduction of an oil embargo to the Western countries (the ones
that supported the Israeli occupation of Arab territories), and the second was to increase the price of crude oil on the world market four
times.27 The impact of these actions was evident next year a Special
Session of the UN General Assembly was held and it adopted, in accordance with the Yugoslav and the nonaligned initiative, a Declaration
on the Establishment of the New Economic Orderand International
Development Strategy which specify the measures that would lead to
the implementation of this project.28
However, the energy crisis caused by the radical actions of the
nonaligned countries caused a serious economic crisis, increase in unemployment and inflation in the Western countries, simultaneously the
fall of the standard of living and the economic growth rate and in the end
turned into a serious political crisis. Thus, it can be said that the bipolar
dtente was a era when the previous East-West confrontation was somewhat eased, but also an ear when a new kind of confrontation began in
the international community the North-South confrontation.
Both superpowers thought that Yugoslavia and the nonaligned
countries seriously jeopardized the dtente processand the current
trend of general relaxation of international tension by its radical policy.
Indeed, such accusations did not explicitly come from Moscow
but they were expressed within a broader context on the limited achievements of the nonaligned policy in regards to the initiatives and actions of
the progressive and peace-loving forces for the advancement of peace
26

27

28

AJ, KPR, I-4-a/15, Informacija o IV konferenciji nesvrstanih zemalja; Izvetaj

delegacije SFRJ o toku i rezultatima IV konferencije efova drava ili vlada
nesvrstanih zemalja [AY, CPR, I-4-a/15, Information on the IV Conference of Nonaligned Countries; Report of the Yugoslav Delegation on the Course and Results of
the IV Conference of the Heads of Sate or Governments of the Nonaligned Countries].
Dragan Bogeti, Nesvrstanost i novi meunarodni ekonomski poredak,
Marksistika misao [Nonalignement and the New International Economic Order,
Marxist Thought] 1/1979, 159176; J. S. Singh, A New International Economic Order.
Towards a Fair Redistribution of the World Resources, (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1977), 1314.
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order: United
Nations Assembly document, A/RES/S-6/3201 of May 1, 1974.

23

3/2015.

and security in the world. The Soviet officials even officially declaratively
supported the demands of the nonaligned countries for a radical transformation of the current international economic order. They did so, in
order not to loose influence in the developing countries and thus allow
the Chinese leadership to impose itself as the protector of the poor and
disempowered Afro-Asian peoples.29
However, American officials strongly condemned this Yugoslav
and nonaligned countries policy. The new American President Gerald
Ford30 and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly attacked the nonaligned countries for forming a new bloc and bringing the world to brink
of a catastrophe at a time when the bloc antagonism between the east
and West was weakening and the two superpowers finally entered the
dtente phase.31
Ford and Kissinger characterized the united stance of the nonaligned countries in the UN and the manifold increase of the price of oil
as well as the demand of the developing countries for the establishment
of a new international economic order as the tyranny of the majority,
29

30
31

AJ, KPR, I-3-1/107-215, Neki aktuelni aspekti meunarodnih ekonomskih odnosa

i politike SAD [AY, CPR, I-3-1/107-215, Certain Current Aspects of International
Economic Relations and Policies]; AJ, KPR, I-4-c, Predstojee zasedanje Generalne
skuptine OUN o meunarodnim ekonomskim problemima [AY, CPR, I-4-c,
Forthcoming Session of UN General Assembly on International Economic Problems];
DAMSP, 1975, str. pov., f-1, 5. Pregled najnovijeg razvoja situacije u svetu [DAMFA,
1975, top secret, f-1, 5. An Overview of the Latest Developments of the Situation in
World]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/29, Tok dosadanje debate Zasedanja Generelne skuptine UN
[AY, CPR, I-5-c/29, Course of the Debate of the Session of the UN General Assembly
So Far]; AJ, KPR, I-4-c/2-21, Sedmo specijalno zasedanje UN [AY, CPR, I-4-c/2-21, VII
Special UN Session]; AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-20 [AY, CPR, I-5-b/104-20].
In August 1974, G. Ford took office of the US president, after President Richard
Nixon had resigned because of the Watergate Affair the scandal broke out because
Nixons associates spied on and wiretapped Democratic Party offices and officials.
AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-212, SAD i politika nesvrstavanja. Nastup Predsednika Forda na
XXIX redovnom zasedanju GS UN [AY, CPR, I-3-a/107-212, The USA and the Nonaligned Policy. President Fords Address to the XXIX Regular Session of the UN
General Assembly]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/21, Sednica Saveta za nacionalnu bezbednost.
Primena vojnih mera [AY, CPR, I-5-c/21, National Security Council Session. Use of
Military Measures]; AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-20, Kisinderov intervju asopisu Busines
week, januar 1975. Izjava o moguoj upotrebi vojne sile [AY, CPR, I-5-b/104-20,
Kissingers interview to the journal Business Weekly, January 1975, Statement on
the Possible Use of Military Force]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/25, Kisinderov govor u Misuriju,
15. maj 1975 [AY, CPR , I-5-c/25, Kissingers Address in Missouri, May 15, 1975];
Fordov govor na Universitetu Viskonsin instituta za svetske poslove u Milvokiju, 14.
jul 1975, [Fords Address at the University of Wisconsin, Institute of World Affairs
in Milwaukee, July 14, 1975]; H. Kissinger, A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A
Durable Peace, An Address made before the 28th Session of United Nations General
Assembly, September 24, 1973, Department of State Bulletin October 15, 1973, 470.

24

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

and openly threatened to military intervene if the energy situation in the

world become critical for the West.32
Since Yugoslavia was specially exposed in advocating this policy,
the dispute between the industrially developed countries and the developing countries, inevitably implied a dispute between Yugoslavia and the
USA. Washington assessed that Yugoslavia was forced to conform to the
general strategy of the Afro-Asian countries in order to keep it leading position in the Non-Aligned Movement. When the movement becomes more
radical, the Yugoslavs are obliged to adopt more radical stances in order
to retain their leading position.33 The disagreement between Belgrade
and Washington over the Yugoslav concept for a radical transformation
of the existing international economic order was specially intensified in
April and May 1974, when the Special Session of the General Assembly
of the UN dedicated to problems of raw material and economic development and issues on overcoming the widening of the gap between the
rich North and poor South was convened and held.34 During this session
the US expressed an increasingly critical stance towards the Non-Aligned
Movement and directly connected it with the economic issues energy
crisis and economic crisis in the Western countries. Not one country
Kissinger said or a bloc of counties, can unilaterally shape the future ()
The organizing of a group of countries into a bloc will sooner or later, give
rise to the potential victims organizing into a contra bloc () The transfer
offunds from the developed countries to the developing countries, necessary for any hope in progress, can take place only with the support of the
technologically developed countries. The policy of pressure and threats
will undermine the internal basis of such a support.35
32

33

34
35

AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-212, SAD i politika nesvrstavanja. Nastup Predsednika Forda na

XXIX redovnom zasedanju GS UN [AY, CPR, I-3-a/107-212, USA and the Policy of
Nonalignment. President Fords Address to the XXIX Regular Session of the UN General
Assembly]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/21, Sednica Saveta za nacionalnu bezbednost. Primena
vojnih mera, [AY, CPR, AJ, I-5-c/21, Session of the National Security Council. Use of
Military Measures]; AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-20, Kisinderov intervju asopisu Business
week, januar 1975. Izjava o moguoj upotrebi vojne sile [AY, CPR, I-5-b/104-20,
Kissingers interview to the journal Business Week, January 1975, Statement on the
Possible Use of Military Force]; AJ, KPR, I-5-c/25, Kisinderov govor u Misuriju [AY,
CPR, I-5-c/25, Kissingers Address in Missouri, May 15, 1975]; Fordov govor na
Universitetu Viskonsin [Fords Address at the University of Wisconsin].
FRUS, 19691976, Volume E15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 19731976,
Yugoslavia, doc. 69, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 25, 1974, 2:373 p.m.
Godinjak Instituta za meunarodnu politiku i privredu 1974, (Beograd, 1975)
[Annual of the Institute for International Politic and Economy 1974, (Belgrade,
1975)], 5461.
H. Kissinger, The Challenge of Interdependence, Statement made before the Sixth
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, April 15, 1974, Department

25

3/2015.

During the talks between Milo Mini and Kissinger in New York,
just before the VI Special Session of the UN General Assembly on 15 April,
Kissinger said that the USA was ready to help the developing countries
but that this issue should be approached from a practical and not ideological position. Mini agreed with this stance, but pointed out that unsustainability of the existing system of international economic relations
which disfavors developing countries. In his opinion, it was difficult to
maintain peace in the world in the circumstances where the gap between
the developed and undeveloped countries was constantly increasing,
when the prices of industrial goods (coming from the developed countries) kept increasing but the prices of raw material (produced by the
other group of countries) kept falling. In reply to Kissingers question
how he thought it was possible to change such a system, Mini answered
that it was possible only with the acknowledgement of the new principles
on which the economic relations in the international community should
be based the principles of nondiscrimination, non-reciprocity and preferential treatment in favor of the developing countries. Besides that, it
had to be ensured that the natural resources of the developing countries
should be used exclusively for their development and not allowed for the
profit to be channeled to the developed countries.36
The Yugoslav politician considered that the mentioned American
strategy most clearly shows the limitations of dtente between the two
superpowers and an increased danger for the third world countries,
especially the nonaligned and especially in the areas where the interest
of the two superpowers are not clearly delimited thus in reaching their
agreements elements of conflict, competition and rivalry are present.
However, such danger also existed in areas which were strictly demarcated by blocs. Namely, since the bipolar dtente implies noninterference in the existing crisis in the opposite bloc or sphere of interest and
the resolution of all issues within such a framework, USSRs reactions
to the interference of the USA into the affairs of other countries were
limited and mostly of propaganda character (Chile, Cyprus, etc.) It has
been noted that, although the USA had a tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of countries they considered belonged to their sphere of
interest in the whole postwar period, they have never publically, form

36

of State Bulletin, May 6, 1974, 477.

DAMSP, 1974, PA, SAD, f-124, 418 133, Zabeleka o razgovoru potpredsednika SIV
i saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove, M. Minia sa dravnim sekretarom za
inostrane poslove SAD, H. Kisinderom, 15. aprila 1974. u Njujorku [DAMFA, PA, USA,
f-124, 418 133, Note on the talks held between the president the FEC and Federal
Secretary of Foreign Affairs M. Mini and the US Secretary of State H. Kissinger in
New York, April 15, 1974].

26

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

the place of highest authority, proclaimed such actions to be part of their

official foreign policy.37 Fords statement was in many ways reminiscent
of Brezhnevs statement given at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United
Workers Party, on 12 November 1968, in which he for the first time publically proclaimed the Doctrine on the Limited Sovereignty of Socialist
Countries.38
These compatible views were evaluated in Belgrade as a logical
consequence of the international strategy of the two superpowers resulting from the bipolar dtente policy. However, this strategy implied
the avoidance of direct confrontations in Europe, but the continuation of
the two superpowers interventionist policy on the Afro-Asian continents
with the aim of spreading their spheres of interest. That is, the USSR and
the USA did not give up the policy of threats and pressure as a means of
suppressing undesirable trends in international relations. Ambassador
Toma Granfil warned, in his reports from Washington, of a whole series of
articles and commentaries in the American Press in which Kissinger and
the American officials openly announced a military intervention against
the oil producing countries if their policy jeopardized the survival of
Western economies. In that regard, Kissinger said in his interview given
to Business Week,39 discussing the possibility of a military intervention
pointed to its undesirability, he nevertheless added: What we would do
if no other means were possible to avoid the financial bankruptcy and
collapse of Western structures, I cannot speculate now. I am certain it
will not come to that () The third world countries must accept the fact
that they live in an interconnected world. They cannot insist on the coop37

38

39

AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-212, Neki elementi spoljne politike SAD [AY, CPR, I-3-a/107-212,
Some Elements of US Foreign Policy]; Ibid., SAD i politika nesvrstavanja [USA and
the Non-aligned policy]; DAMSP, 1974, SAD, f-124, 445 570, Govor predsednika
Forda na Generalnoj skuptini Ujedinjenih nacija [DAMF, 1974, USA, f-124, 445 570,
President Fords Address before the UN General Assembly].
Namely, on that occasion the Soviet leader justifying the intervention in
Czechoslovakia as an action taken in the spirit of the principle of proletarian
internationalism, said that the protection of the achievements of socialism in each
individual country was an international debt of all communists which entailed helping
the socialist country in which socialism was endangered. Brezhnevs Doctrine
meant that the Soviet Union had an exclusive right to assess whether socialism
was endangered in a country or not and then for the sake of its alleged protection
undertake a military intervention. As was the case with the USA, the Soviet authorities
had acted in that spirit before but never up till then was such a doctrine openly and
publically propagated. - AJ, KPR, I-3-a/SSSR, k. 175, Teorija ogranienog suvereniteta.
Javne i interne izjave sovjetskih rukovodilaca i karakteristini napisi u tampi [AY, CPR,
I-3-a/USSR, k. 175, Theory of Limited Sovereignty. Public and Internal Statements
Made by Soviet Leaders and the Characteristic Writing of the Press].
AJ, KPR, I-5-c/21-28, Osvrt na Kisinderov intervju asopisu Business Week [AY, CPR,
I-5-c/21-28, Review of Kissingers Interview Given to the Journal Business Week].

27

3/2015.

eration of the western countries and keep waging a war an economic

and political one against the developed countries.40 Commenting this
and many other statements made in the same spirit (on the detailed elaboration of an adequate military plan for intervention in case of new oil
price increases and the training of military units for desert warfare and
taking of oil fields), Granfil expressed his view saying that their meaning
was mostly of psychological-tactical character and that their purpose
was to serve as a means of applying pressure on and sending a warning
to the oil producing countries not to go too far and not to count on the
passivity of the US if the West was put in a critical situation. At the same,
linking these statements with Fords statement on the justification of the
American intervention in Chile, Granfil warned that they were not just
measures of pressure but also a realistic option that can be activated
in case of a negative combination of circumstances. Granfil though that
the American threats should neither be underestimated nor dramatized
but seen within the context of a serious domestic situation in the USA and
in international relations. He reminded that the US went into the most
sever recession in its history since the economic crisis of the 1930s.41
The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid significant attention
to Kissingers interview and took seriously his threat to the oil exporting
countries and the Non-Aligned Movement in general which supported
their policy. They assessed that it was one more official attempt of the
American side to justify and legalize the use of force, even the right to
war, in cases when the USA determines that not only are its interests
threatened but also those of the western countries in general, regardless
of the fact whether they agree with it or not. What specially concerned
the Yugoslav officials was the fact that Kissingers blatant attempt to legalize the possibility of using force against the nonaligned countries, did
not provoke the expected stormy protests and sharp reactions of officials
neither in the nonaligned countries nor in the USSR (the reactions in the
West and in the American Congress were much sharper). The Yugoslav
leadership interpreted the mild Russian reaction as its attempt to preserve good relations with the USA at any coast and maintain the current bipolar dtente. In regards to that, the American testing of Soviet
40
41

DAMSP, 1974, PA, SAD, f-124, 461 944, Telegram Ambasade SFRJ u Vaingtonu
Dravnom sekretarijatu inostranih poslova, 14. decembar 1974 [DAMFA, PA, USA,
f-124, 461 944, Telegram from the Embassy of SFRY in Washington to the Federal
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, December 14, 1974].
DAMSP, 1974, PA, SAD, f-119, 4475, Telegram Ambasade SFRJ u Vaingtonu
Dravnom sekretarijatu inostranih poslova, 6. januar 1975 [DAMFA, PA, USA, f-119,
4475, Telegram from the Embassy of SFRY in Washington to the Federal Secretary
of Foreign Affairs January 6, 1975].

28

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

lenience in this case achieved positive results. Both Ford and Kissinger
had reasons to be satisfied. As far as the nonaligned countries were concerned, Belgrade assessed that Kissinger with his statement succeeded
in causing a certain rift among them and instigated some of the US allies
among the OPEC members (Saudi Arabia, Jordan) to redefine their policy
towards the other developing countries. The nonaligned countries were
now put in an even more delicate situation which required urgent measures to be taken and anecessity to connect with all forces in the world
that saw the danger of the current American policy. However, at that moment it seemed difficult to do so.42
On the other side, Washington was not satisfied that Yugoslavia
adopteda too radical stances regarding American foreign policy and
not expressing enough understanding for vital American interests. In
that sense, the American ambassador to Belgrade Malcolm Toon, reporting to the State Department his assessment of the current international
Yugoslav strategy pointed out that although the Yugoslavs showed a
new awareness and understanding for the sensitive areas of American
foreign policy it should be understood that the Yugoslav government
will always support the communist stance, that Yugoslavia is a free
and independent communist country that is nevertheless anti-imperialistic in its foreign policy course. In addition, it was evaluated that
the whole foreign policy strategy of Yugoslavia was in the function of
retaining and strengthening it leadership position in the Non-Aligned
Movement.43
An opportunity to resolve and overcome serious disagreements
between Yugoslavia and the USA occurred during the mentioned visit of
the American Secretary of State Kissinger to Belgrade on 4 November
1974. That was the first visit of such a highly positioned American official
to Yugoslavia in 1974, that is, during the period when both sides tried to
overcome the unsatisfactory situation in bilateral relations caused by different approaches to current hotbeds of world crisis.44

42
43
44

AJ, KPR, I -5-b/104-20, Osvrt na Kisinderov intervju asopisu Business Week [AY, CPR,
I -5-b/104-20, Review of Kissingers Interview Given to the Journal Business Week].
FRUS, 19691976, Volume E15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 19731976,
Yugoslavia, doc. 69.
AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-215, Zabeleka o razgovoru Predsednika SFRJ J. B. Tita sa
Dravnim sekretarom SAD H. Kisinderom, odranim 4. novembra 1974. godine [AY,
CPR, I-3-a/107-215, Note on the talks between the President of SFR of Yugoslavia
and US Secretary of State H. Kissinger held on November 4, 1974] i Beleka o
razgovoru predsednika SIV - Demala Bijedia sa Dravnim sekretarom SAD dr
H. Kisinderom, 4. XI 1974 [Note on the talks between the President FEC Demal
Bijedi and US Secretary of State Dr. H. Kissinger held on November 4, 1974].

29

3/2015.

During his talks with Tito and the Yugoslav leadership in Belgrade,
Kissinger paid respect to the Yugoslav policy of nonalignment and its active contribution to the greater understanding among nations in search
for a peaceful resolution of international problems and conflicts. He
stressed that the USA respects the independence of Yugoslavia, including its independence from the USA, and that this can be solved within a
broad framework () to make the cooperation long term.45
Tito and Kissinger agreed that the existing energy crisis cannot
be resolved by confrontation but exclusively by constructive cooperation
between the developed countries and the developing countries. They
agreed that during the VI Special Session of the UN General Assembly
a confrontation between these two groups of opposing countries took
place but they had a completely different view of who was to blame for
this confrontation. According to Kissinger the culprits were the developing countries and according to Tito the culprits were the developed counties. Kissinger saw the solution in closer united approach of consumers
in regards to the oil producers and criticized the egoism of the oil producing countries. He asked Tito: What good will the high prices do for
the producers, if inflation makes all the good they want to buy more expensive. The money they have earned has to a great extent lost its value.
A rational solution must be in the interest of both sides, the consumers
and producers. Tito on the other hand justified the synchronized action
of the nonaligned countries for the radical transformation of the existing system of economic relations and the use of oil as a powerful lever
in spurring the developed countries to take into account the demand of
the developing countries. He underscored that it was the undeveloped
countries who suffered the most. They are the hardest hit. The USA and
the USSR were not hit that much.46
Kissinger agreed that those countries were hit the hardest but he
pointed out that they cannot just press a button and the problem will be
solved overnight () The injustices that took place in the previous century
can not be corrected overnight () not even in five years. The atmosphere of
confrontation is not a good way to continue. He said that if the proposals are
reasonable, we will support them, but having in mind that the developing
countries have gone too far in their demands so the proposals have become
unreasonable the USA is forced to vote against them. Kissinger supported a
comprehensive approach of resolving the situation that was not conducive
to anyone. He stressed that it was a unique paradox that the USA favored

45
46

Ibid.
FRUS, 19691976, Volume E15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 19731976,
Yugoslavia, doc. 71. Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, November 4, 1974.

30

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

global planning, but the Soviet Union favored a free market. He announced
that he would endorse the undertaking of concrete measures that will allow
them to break the vicious circle of confrontation that was utterly useless.47
The cooperativeness that the USA and the USSR showed in resolving the contentious issues that burdened relations in Europe during the final summit stage of the Conference on European Security and
Cooperation, was of great significance for the improvement of relations
between the two countries. The Final Act of the conference, often called
the European Charter, due to its far-reaching importance, was adopted in
Helsinki where the summit was held from 30 July to 1 August 1975. This
document has in its essence taken the role of peace agreement the superpowers did not manage to agree on after the end of the Second World
War. The principles of the nonaligned policy have to a great extent been
incorporated into the Final Act ( respect for full sovereignty, sovereign
equality and territorial integrity of all states, refraining from the threat
or use of force, non intervention in internal affairs), as well as the goals
the nonaligned countries supported: overcoming the bloc division, democratization of international relations, indivisibility of world peace
linking the security in Europe with the security of the rest of the world.48
Tito and the other Yugoslav representatives, who took a very active part in the Conference were satisfied with the results of the gathering on the whole. Thanks to the relatively united activity of the group
of seven nonaligned and neutral countries (Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Malta,
Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland) among which Yugoslavia was
specially active the Conference adopted the proposal on the need for a
continuation of the conference and the need to hold periodic meetings
of the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs even after the
Conference was finished. The final decision on this was postponed for
the first meeting of this kind, that was to take place in Belgrade in 1977.
Thus, special recognition was paid to Yugoslavia, not only for its constructive initiatives at the CSCE but also for its mediating role in times
when it seemed that it would be difficult to attain mutually acceptable
compromises between the confronted blocs.49

47
48
49

Ibid.
ulcinger, op. cit., 304; uro Nini, Evropska povelja, Meunarodna politika
[European Charter, International Policy], 116 August 1975; Ljubivoje Aimovi,
Evropski principi, Meunarodna politika [European Principles, International
Policy], 1 October 1975.
AJ, KPR, I-4-d, Konferencija o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji, Godinjak Instituta za
meunarodnu politiku i privredu 1975, (Beograd, 1976) [AY, CPR, I-4-d,Conference
on European Security and Cooperation, Annual of the Institute of International
Policy and Economics 1975, (Belgrade, 1976)], 3436, 6394.

31

3/2015.

Nevertheless, Tito in his speech delivered before CSCE expressed

a doze of skepticism on the future scope of decisions adopted at the conference, if the omnipresence of the current bipolar dtente and the dominant role of the two superpowers was still felt: our expectations will
only be realized if this process is spread to all parts of the world and
includes all the most important international issues and if all countries
equally participate in it, regardless of their size, degree of development
and socio-political system. The current positive trends in the political
relaxation of tensions would very quickly be faced with a crisis, if the
detente was reduced to communication between the blocs instead of becoming a form of communication of all peoples on the basis of respect,
independence, sovereignty, equality and noninterference in the internal
affairs.50
The officials in Belgrade kept expressing a large doze of skepticism towards all forms of international settlements that were a reflection
of the bipolar and not a multilateral dtente. However, they thought that
CSCE in regards to its general achievements did significantly transcend
the bloc and regional barriers. The Yugoslav delegation focused a large
part of its activity on achieving a consensus about the stance that the
European cooperation and European security be discussed and regulated within a broader geographic and political framework. Special importance was given to the inclusion of the Mediterranean component into
the concept of European security, since it was difficult to ensure security
while the Mediterranean was the scene of confrontation of the superpowers and the hotbed of violent local conflicts (the Middle East crisis,
the Cyprus crisis). The Yugoslav efforts in regards to these issues were
adopted and incorporated in the Final Act, in the Preamble of the chapter
dedicated to issues of security and the Principle Ground Rules of the operating section on the military aspects of security.51
Tito and his associates saw the basic weakness of the Final Act
adopted in Helsinki in the fact that because it was a compromise of the
three global political approaches (Eastern, Western and the third world),
it was too general, broadly formulated, imprecise, unclear and based on
partial solutions. That was understandable to a certain extent because
the complex issues considered, required first a general agreement to be
reached in principle and then to move on to a concretization. Thus they

50
51

Govor predsednika Tita na Konferenciji o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji u

Helsinkiju [President Titos Address before the Conference on European Security
and Cooperation], Borba, August 1, 1975.
Godinjak Instituta za meunarodnu politiku i privredu 1975, (Beograd, 1976) [Annual
of the Institute of International Policy and Economics 1975, (Belgrade, 1976)], 90.

32

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

had high hopes for the Belgrade meeting to be held in 1977 where it was
expected that each group of issues, that have broadly been regulated by
the Final Act in Helsinki would be fully treated.52
Immediately after the Helsinki conference, Tito had another opportunity to influence the superpowers in that direction and to once
more express his impressions and discuss the main topics of the Helsinki
Conference in his meeting with President Ford in Belgrade. Both statesmen manifested a high dose of cooperation regarding these and other
important issues connected to the advancement of bilateral cooperation.
Thus, that meeting played an important role in the efforts of both sides to
improve the Yugoslav-American relations and suppress the mutual disagreements into the second plane.
Tito, supported Fords opinions on the positive impact of the
Helsinki concept on the resolution of key international problems, and expressed his view on the role of the forthcoming Conference on European
Security to be held in Belgrade in 1977. He boasted: All the international
conferences held in Belgrade have been successful. For example, the first
conference of nonaligned countries.53
Ford replied with dissatisfaction at the mentioning of the nonaligned countries: Now they are bigger than the two blocs. It is the biggest bloc now. I think that dividing the world into blocs is not the best
way to deal with problems. In the kind of world we live in today, there
can no longer be the kind of confrontation and military activity which
took place during your time and mine. I will dedicate myself to eliminating all sources of conflict that can lead to military confrontation. That will
be our orientation.54
Tito and the Yugoslav leadership taking part in the talks with
Ford energetically opposed the American presidents view that the NonAligned Movement was a third bloc and that the nonaligned countries
had provoked a new confrontation and conflict in the world. Demal
Bjedi reacted first: No, it is not a bloc, and then Tito interrupted saying:
Yes, it is not a bloc. Kardelj went even further and warned Ford: Much

52
53

54

AJ, KPR, I-4-d, Konferencija o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji [AY, CPR, I-4-d,
Conference on European Security and Cooperation].
AJ, KPR, I-3-1/107-215, Stenografske beleke sa razgovora Predsednika Republike
Josipa Broza Tita sa Predsednikom SAD, Njegovom ekselencijom gospodinom
Geraldom R. Fordom, odranih 3. avgusta 1975. u Beogradu [AY, CPR, I-3-1/107215, Shorthand notes of the talks held between the President of the Republic Josip
Broz Tito and his Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford in Belgrade August 3, 1975]; FRUS,
19691976, Volume E15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 19731976,
Yugoslavia, doc. 73, Memorandum of Conversation, Belgrade, August 3, 1975.
Ibid.

33

3/2015.

depends on you for it not to become a bloc. We should talk and not confront each other. Kissinger tried to overcome the undesirable tension in
the talks and the unpleasant atmosphere that was increasingly felt in the
communication between the two delegations noting at the expense of the
nonaligned countries: You have become a powerful bloc we must count
on, especially as discipline in your bloc is better than in ours. Accepting
Kissingers conciliatory tone, Tito replied: The discipline has been a little shaky lately but I think we shall cope with the situation, it is not good
to be exclusive.55
Returning to the topic that was only superficially addressed at the
beginning of the talks, the forthcoming Conference on European Security
and Cooperation that was to be held in Yugoslavia in 1977, Kardelj pointed out the significance of the consultations and contacts Yugoslav diplomats hadwith the politicians of participant countries and especially to
the cooperation with the USA. Mini added as far as the cooperation with
the USA is concerned the ministries and embassies of the two countrieshave had close communication and consultations for a longer time and
that it had proved to be very useful and that we can further intensify
such contacts. Ford and Kissinger agreed. Kissinger said that they: attach great importance to the understanding between Yugoslavia and the
USA, given the standingof Yugoslavia in the Non-Aligned Movement.
That was one of the reasons why Kissinger stressed: We will do our
best to stay in close contact. By that he was not referring to the preparations for the Conference in Belgrade but the VII Special Session of the
UN General Assembly, dedicated to the problems of economic development that should be held in September (we hope that we will continue
our consultations and that we will consult before the special session next
month).56
It was of great significance for the USA that Yugoslavia use its influence on the nonaligned countries and developing countries and try to
convince them to abandon their radical demands for the establishment
of a new international economic order.57 Kissinger followed up on Minis
55

56
57

AJ, KPR, I-3-1/107-215, Stenografske beleke sa razgovora Predsednika Republike

Josipa Broza Tita [AY, CPR, I-3-1/107-215, Shorth and notes of the talks held between
the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito]; FRUS, 19691976, Volume E15, Part
1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 19731976, Yugoslavia, doc. 73, Memorandum of
Conversation, Belgrade, August 3, 1975.
Ibid.
At that time, the prevailing stance of the American administration which was utterly
ungrounded was that the Yugoslav leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement was
called into question by the radically inclined nonaligned countries (Algeria, Iraq,
Syria, Libya) who asserted themselves as authentic representatives of the third

34

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

initiative reminding him that the two of them had previously arranged
to be in contact before the Special Session, because we would like to
avoid confrontations between the nonaligned and developed countries.
It is our wish that the Special Session be a really constructive one.58
As far as the Yugoslav side was concerned, it specially positively
rated that Ford agreed that the confrontation between adversely grouped
countries could be avoided only if all the countries involved in international affairs participated together with a universal approach in addressing all questions that endanger world peace (and not just the ones the
two superpowers are interested in). Thus, the joint statement of the two
presidents said: President Tito and President Ford also emphasized that
the interdependence of all peoples and countries, the developed and the
developing ones, is one of the essential factors in the search for a just andefficient economic development. Reviewing the urgent problems facing
mankind in the area of international economic relations, they agreed on
the need to increase their efforts to find equitable solutions on the basis
of improved international cooperation and respect for the interests of all
countries.59
However, the Yugoslav-American summit in Belgrade was followed by a period when due to a whole set of domestic factors in the USA
and the USSR and new challenges on a broader international scale, the
process of the bipolar dtente gradually declined. Ford himself admitted
that the term dtente was prone to be misused and he stopped using
it.60 The world was once again confronted with the dramatic Cold War
tensions and sharper confrontations of the two superpowers. During this

58

59
60

world and third bloc in an uncompromising battle for the rights of the poor
South antagonized against the rich North. In that spirit, the officials in Washington
considered that the new priorities of the Non-aligned Movement, directed at the
radical transformation of the existing system of international relations, inevitably
led to the marginalization of Titos role in the movement and the favoring of Algerian
President Boumediene who suddenly took a prominent position as the host at the
Summit of Nonaligned Countries at which the project for the new international
economic order was launched. - AJ, KPR, I-5-c/23, Neke amerike ocene politike
nesvrstanih zemalja; Ibid., I-5-c/14, Samit u Aliru [AY, CRP, I-5-c/23, Some
American Assessments on the Polices of the Non-aligned Countries; Ibid., I-5-c/14,
Summit in Algiers].
AJ, KPR, I-3-1/107-215, Stenografske beleke sa razgovora Predsednika Republike
Josipa Broza Tita [AY, CPR, I-3-1/107-215, Shorthand notes of the talk held between
the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito]; FRUS, 19691976, Volume E15, Part
1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 19731976, Yugoslavia, doc. 73, Memorandum of
Conversation, Belgrade, August 3, 1975.
Zajednika jugoslovensko-amerika izjava [Joint Yugoslav-American Statement],
Borba, August 5, 1975.
ulcinger, op. cit., 305.

35

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new period in international relations, the USA significantly changed its

attitude towards politics and nonalignment. Grouping the nonaligned
countries into the pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese and pro-American, the USA
attempted to provoke divisions and confrontations in the Non-Aligned
Movement, the ultimate goal being to breakup the movement and paralyze the joint actions of the nonaligned countries in the United Nations
and in a broader sphere of international relations. Such circumstances
seriously jeopardized the up to then relatively positive trend of improvement of Yugoslav-American cooperation, that was characteristic for the
final phase of the bipolar dtente. The culmination of such a negative
turn of events took place when the American ambassador Laurence H.
Silberman was proclaimed persona non grata in Yugoslavia and recalled
from Belgrade during the summer of 1977.
Sources and Literature
Unpublished sources
Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Kabinet predsednika Republike (KPR),
[Archives of Yugoslavia (AY), Cabinet of the President of Yugoslavia (CPR)]
Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike
Srbije (DAMSP), Politika arhiva (PA)]
Literature

1. Aimovi, Ljubivoje. Evropski principi. Meunarodnapolitika, 1. oktobar 1975.

2. Bogeti, Dragan. Razgovori TitoNikson oktobra 1971. Politike
implikacije Vaingtonske deklaracije. Istorija XX veka 2/2011, 159
172.
3. Bogeti, Dragan. Jugoslovensko-ameriki odnosi 19611971.
Beograd, 2012, 321335.
4. Bogeti, Dragan. Amerike analize budunosti Jugoslavije posle
Tita s poetka 70-ih godina. Tokovi istorije 1/2012, 159174.
5. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order: United Nations Assembly document, A/RES/S-6/3201 of
May 1, 1974.
6. Dimi, Ljubodrag. Jugoslavija i Hladni rat. Ogledi o spoljnoj politici
Josipa Broza Tita (19441974). Beograd, 2014.
36

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

7. Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS). 19691976, Volume XXIX,

Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, 19691972.
8. Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS). 19691976, Volume E15,
Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 19731976.
9. Godinjak Instituta za meunarodnu politiku i privredu 1974.
Beograd, 1975, 1976.
10. Kissinger, Henry. The Challenge of Interdependence, Statement
made before the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General
Assmbly, April 15, 1974. Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1974,
477.
11. Mates, Leo. Meunarodni odnosi socijalistike Jugoslavije. Beograd,
1976.
12. Monik, Josip. United States-Yugoslav Relations, 196180: The
Twilight of Titos Era and the Role of Ambassadorial Diplomacy in
the Making of Americas Yugoslav Policy. Bowling Green, Ohio, 2008.
13. Nikoli, Duan. SAD. Strategija dominacije. Beograd, 1985.
14. Nini, uro. Evropska povelja. Meunarodna politika, 116. avgusta 1975.
15. Singh, J. S. New International Economic Order. Towards a Fair
Redistribution of the World Resources. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1977.
16. ulcinger, Robert. Amerika diplomatija od 1900. godine. Beograd,
2011.
17. Viskovi, Ivo. Odnosi Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Amerikih Drava.
Jugoslovenski pregled XXXII, 1 (1988), 2345.

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3/2015.

19711975.
:

70- .


.

: , , , , ,
, , ,

,

.

. ,
,
a , , .


38

Dragan BOGETI

Discord between Yugoslav Foreign Policy Priorities and

the Basic Determinants of the Bipolar Detente Process 19711975

70- .


.

- -
.
, ,

. ,

, ,
, .
, , - -
.

.

.

39

 339.5.012.435(4-11)

: 5. 10. 2015.
: 16. 11. 2015.

Aleksandar R. MILETI
Institute for Recent History of Serbia
armiletic@yahoo.com
Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928
Southeast and East-Central European Perspectives

Abstract: This article focuses on non-tariff, i.e. unorthodox

trade protectionist schemes imposed by governments of
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland in the aftermath of WWI. The policies of state intervention in the four
countries are analyzed from a comparative perspective, and
presented in a global context of changes. Equal consideration
is given to the legal framework of policy and the ways it was
applied in reality.
Key words: trade protectionism, deglobalization, non-tariff
trade barriers, Southeast Europe, East-Central Europe

Apart from what might be considered regular or tariff-based protectionist schemes,1 the first post-war decade witnessed the advent of a
wide range of new and unorthodox non-tariff measures in the domain of
trade controls. The scale of the application of these measures, and the in

This article has been written within framework of the scholarly project Tradition
and Transformation Historical Heritage and National Identity in Serbia in 20th
Century (No. 47019), funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological
Development of the Republic of Serbia. Apart from the Ministry, the research was
funded by Mediterranean Program of the European University Institute in Florence
and Imre Kertsz Kolleg in Jena.
On tariff-based trade controls I wrote an article: Aleksandar R. Mileti, Deglobalization in the Periphery. Tariff Protectionism in Southeast and East-Central Europe,
19141928, Tokovi istorije 3/2014, 6987.

41

3/2015.

tensity of the state involvement, were particularly high in the newly-created nation states in the territories which used to be under the control of
the Central Powers during the war. During the war, under the regime of
the continental and maritime blockades imposed by the Entente Powers,
these countries/territories were cut-off from their traditional sources of
raw materials and food, this caused scarcity and an unprecedented scale
of state control over available supplies of goods. This tendency would
continue even after the war was over: Bulgaria and the successor states
of Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary (Austria excluded) imposed
the highest levels of tariff protection and the most severe trade restrictions in Europe during the inter-war period. These were exceeded only
by the revolutionary Bolshevik practices in the domestic and foreign
trade of the Soviet Union. Yet, the USSR which was for certain geopolitical
reasons (and due to the nature of its regime) almost completely excluded
from the European and world trade system during the 1920s represents
a unique case.
This article focuses on the series of upheavals in international
trade caused by the violence of the WWI that eventually undermined the
economic and institutional foundations of European prewar capitalism.
In more general terms, it was for the first time in modern history that
large-scale violations of what were formerly conventional rules of the
market economy occurred simultaneously in almost all European countries; important elements of this global retreat from the market economy
continued by inertia in the years following the war. These global changes
were even more dramatic in the economic periphery of Europe, part of
which will be covered by this article. The trade policies of the four countries of Southeast and East Central Europe represent basic units of research and accordingly the contents of this article.
Yet, the very fact that the individual nation states policies are analyzed within separate sections of the article does not imply that there
were no comparative perspectives established between them. On the
contrary, throughout the text, the comparative approach will be applied
whenever referring to particular policy patterns. Namely, after elaborating on Yugoslav trade controls in the first section, the Polish model of
restrictions is explained in the second section in comparison with the
Yugoslav case. In the third section of the paper, the Bulgarian policy pattern will undergo detailed comparison with both the Yugoslav and Polish model. In the case of Czechoslovak trade restrictions, analyzed in the
fourth section, the comparison includes all the countries involved. The
overall assessment of the policy patterns, results and conclusions are
presented in the fifth section.
42

Aleksandar R. MILETI

Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

To some extent, the comparative approach was made easier by

the similarities in the four countries policy patterns, which came as a result of common war experiences and analogous traumatic conditions that
these countries (i.e. their populations) went through. In the immediate
post-war period, these states might have been quite different in terms of
their institutional capacity, social or economic structure, ethnic diversity
etc., yet they all went through similar phases of post-traumatic recovery
and stabilization after the war. The extent to which the national legislations and institutional frameworks of the four countries correspond to
each other is astonishing. The state, society, and the economy interacted
intensively in these processes, which were recasting the institutional
basics of pre-war European patterns of economic organization. This article will provide insight into these dynamics within turbulent areas of
Southeast and East-Central Europe by taking into account the striking
phenomena related to the large-scale state interventions in these economies.
The research topics covered by the article have been largely under-researched and neglected by the regional scholarship. The technicalities and development of state intervention in the economy in EastCentral and Southeast Europe after the First World War have only been
analyzed in a broad and general way, and without a detailed examination of particular phenomena. In the great monographic syntheses of
the economic history of the region, some of the features under study
were only briefly mentioned as a component of the pan-European trend
of post-war stabilization between 1918 and 1923.2 Published analyses
have not gone beyond the reconstruction of the general framework of
the macro-economic measures, statistics, trends and tendencies. While
Lampe and Jackson put emphasis on monetary policies and foreign trade
performance, Berend and Ranki focused primarily on structural changes
in agriculture and general economic performance. Teichovas great monographs cover mainly macro-monetary problems and the most general
economic features. As important an issue as housing rent-control systems has never been the subject of a scholarly study in any of the four
countries, while in the domain of control over population movement and
2

John R. Lampe, Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 15501950. From

Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1982), 329402; I. Berend, G. Ranki, Economic Development in East-Central Europe
in the 19th and 20th centuries, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 171
201; Alice Teichova, The Czechoslovak economy, 19181980 (London, New York:
Routledge, 1988); Alice Teichova, East-central and South-east Europe 191939,
The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. VIII, (Cambridge: University Press,
1989).

43

3/2015.

labour migration, only some isolated aspects have been explored. Only in
the area of trade controls does one find more scholarly works, and even
then, only on the nation-state level.
Yugoslav trade restrictions

The Yugoslav trade policy was developed in chaotic war-time circumstances, and within the complex process of the creation of the new
South Slavic state. In reality, the first trade measures implemented by
the new state were anticipated and enacted by Serbian authorities (even
before the final military breakthrough on the Macedonian frontline took
place)at a time when Serbian territories were still occupied by the Central Powers.3 Namely, in July 1918, the Serbian government (in exile), in
a session held on the Greek island of Corfu, decreed an order prohibiting
exports of foodstuff from the (still occupied!) country. On 26 September
1918, during the decisive military operations in Macedonia and Southern
Serbia, another measure, essential for providing the country with food
supplies from abroad, was decreed by the Serbian government. That regulation exempted the most important foodstuff from tariff taxation according to Serbian customs regulations. These two compatible measures
were reinforced when a new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was
created out of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Southern-Slav territories of
Austria-Hungary. No other policy could have been expected in a country
in which the population had just emerged from the horrific deprivation
caused by wartime blockades. Among them, the population of Dalmatia
was particularly affected by the maritime blockades along the former
Austro-Hungarian Adriatic coastline that lasted until March 1919.
According to these initial measures it is apparent that the Yugoslav state authorities were eager to keep the foodstuffs solely for the domestic market, yet, it soon became obvious that these were the only ex3

A detailed Report on the work of the Ministry for Trade and Commerce will be
applied as the main narrative guideline and the most important archival source for
the reconstruction of the developments of Yugoslav trade affairs and policy. The
report was written in the second half of the 1930s as a part of the preparation for
the Yugoslav state jubilee, namely the 20th anniversary of the new state. It was to
provide necessary documentary material for a publication, which would mark the
anniversary. Regardless of the actual context, the report itself was written in a highly
professional manner and with impressive detail and valuable information. The text
was produced by professionals, after certain time distance, and probably for that
reason one will not find much panegyric undertones, but rather a critical account on
the state policy. If not indicated otherwise, this source will be used in elaboration of
the Yugoslav foreign trade policy. In: AY, Collection of Vojislav Jovanovi - Marambo
(335)-99.

44

Aleksandar R. MILETI

Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

changeable goods that could be bartered on the foreign market. Namely,

due to the transportation problems, the markets of the countries which
could pay with hard currency were inaccessible. Only neighboring states,
and particularly Austria, Hungary and Romania were within the range
of Yugoslav transportation facilities. Since the national currencies of all
these countries were destabilized by high rates of inflation, the bilateral
barter-trade arrangements appeared as the only possible option in trade
transactions. The barter agreements however could only be arranged
and carried out with an approval of the state authorities.
Yet, in the Yugoslav trade policy the problem lay in a great
number of institutions, and in differentlevels of authority, which attained the right to issue these licenses.4 Although only the Ministry of
Finance was legally permitted to allow the import or export of certain
goods, this right was exercised also by other Ministries, provincial governments, and their departments. Owing to loose state control and the
chaotic post-war circumstances, the required documents were provided
even at the local administrative level by the municipal authorities in
some larger Yugoslav towns. A particular complication came from the
huge prerogatives assumed by the provincial governments for Vojvodina
(Banat-Baka-Baranja), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia,
and Slovenia;these were hangovers from Habsburg rule, but continued
functioning even after the new Yugoslav state was created. Some of these
governments or their departments survived until 1924. In the domain of
trade arrangements these provincies were autonomous to such a degree
that a question remains as to whether the domestic trade complications
in Yugoslavia during 1919 and 1920 could rather be regarded within the
domain of foreign or inter-state trade arrangements, as noticed by one
contemporary observer.5 In legal terms, trade was placed under the control of the state, the only problem was that the state itself has not yet
been defined and consolidated in the domain of its authority and range
of powers.
This lack of a unified and integrated trade policy continued even
after a new central institution for trade control was established in March
1919. This was founded with an aim to concentrate control and administration of foreign trade in one place, and was officially designated as
the Central Administration for Foreign Trade Affairs (CAFTA); this in4
5

, [Issue of Jurisdiction, Politika], 4193, 5

October 1919.
See more in: Aleksandar R. Mileti, Unutranja trgovina u Kraljevini SHS 1919
godine, Tokovi istorije [Internal Trade in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
in 1919, Currents of History] 34/2003, 1317.

45

3/2015.

stitution was bitterly criticized by contemporaries. Particularly harsh

were accusations and commentaries published by the Trgovinski glasnik
[Commercial Herald], the organ of the Belgrade Trade Chamber. According to the numerous articles and commentaries of the journal, the CAFTA
was allegedly over-bureaucratizing the procedure with trade licenses,
while at the same time it was incapable of imposing its jurisdiction over
the foreign trade. Far more serious accusations, however, were raised in
the domain of the misuse of power and widespread corruption within
the procedure for the issuingof export licenses.
The Yugoslav CAFTA was entrusted with the power to control
and facilitate the countrys foreign trade. However, as it appears from
the numerous complaints, this office, i.e. its officials, demonstrated their
own sense of agency in the domain of trade affairs.6 The abuse of the system came from the discretionary rights given to officials, which opened
the door for corruption and financial exploitation of applicants. In this
particular domain, export licenses became an item of trade among interested individuals. The Trgovinski glasnik wrote on this issue in November 1919:
After the barter agreements were concluded with German Austria and the Republic of Czechoslovakia, the number of goods which were
allowed for export gradually increased, yet, in the same time, the number
of individuals who could take advantage of the barter arrangements increased also. [...] It seems as if a whole system of illegal procedures developed in order to provide somebody with the import or export license,
only to sell it or to pass it on to another person for a large sum of money.7
The license trade regime became notorious for the wide-spread
corruption involved in its procedures and conduct. Allegedly, CAFTA officials established their own networks of people, usually connected with
political power, but with no experience in either foreign trade or trade
at all. The Trgovinski glasnik was complaining about these political networks which were depriving real traders of their jobs. It was highly unlikely that anyone would be granted a license without the intervention of
politicians. Those who obtained licenses often served only as intermediaries who could pass these on to another person, or to an actual trader.
Of course, the whole procedure was accompanied with (extra-) institu6
7

See: , [Affaire with Export Licenses, Politika],

4205, 17 October 1919. The corruption allegations against the CAFTA can also be
found in the aforementioned Report on the Work of the Ministry of Trade and
Commerce In: AY, 335-99.
, [On Controls over Exports and
Imports, Trgovinski glasnik], 19 June 1919.

46

Aleksandar R. MILETI

Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

tional bargaining between the parties involved, and even with something
that resembled the public auctioning of licenses. It seems that much
more actual trade was involved in the CAFTA procedures for obtaining
necessary papers than in the trade itself:
At the very beginning, it was noted that the licenses for export of
large quantities of dried plums had been issued to individuals who had no
previous experience in trade affairs; these licenses were later resold. In the
Parliament there wastalk about an MP who after many appeals had managed to obtain an import license from the Minister for Nourishment, allegedly in order to import three freight cars of sugar for his district. He resold
it later at a high price. On one occasion, a young man, a non-trader, who
was related to a certain powerful man was issued an approval for export
of 400 freight cars of dried plums and jam, and 300 freight cars of plum
brandy, to the region of Timisoara [Romania], and for the import of one
freight car of sugar, 5 freight cars of flour, and 1000 head of oxen from this
region. Recently this young man was publicly offering this license for sale.8
Since the CAFTA proved completely inefficient in the domain of
control, and probably because of the aforementioned complaints and accusations, it was dissolved in November 1919, only six months after it
was established. The new system of trade controls which were inaugurated in the course of 1920 was a more realistic one, at least in domain
of perceiving the basic administrative limits of human infrastructure.9
Namely, instead of the procedure of issuing individual licenses based on
the state officials arbitrary decisions, the new system introduced a general ban on the export of certain goods for certain period of time by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry. In this way, the system was more flexible
to a certain extent, and the state could manage to control the business of
export, or imports of certain goods, in accordance with the situation on
the domestic market. Moreover, in this way the state policy did not rely
on the arbitrary decisions of the untrustworthy state officials any longer.
In addition, the new provisions were to combat the autonomous trade
policies of the provincial governments whose jurisdictions were gradually decreasing in scale and authority in the course of 1920. By the end of
that year both domestic and foreign trade of Yugoslavia were completely
out of jurisdiction of the provincial authorities.
8
9

Ibid.
It was in August 1919 that Trgovinski glasnik had already advocated for such model
of control as a more suitable one in terms of preventing corruption by providing
unfortunate licenses that were easy to abuse as it was previously case. See in:
, [For a Freedom of Trade, Trgovinski
glasnik], 12 August 1919.

47

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The introduction of the export tariffs in October 1919, and a

strong commitment to charge import tariffs, proved to be significant
novelties in the Yugoslav trade policy introduced at the end of 1919.10
In general terms, the reintroduction of the export tariffs in global trade
relations after the First World War is one of the striking curiosities of
inter-war period. During the period of prosperous 19th century capitalism, export taxation, being harmful to trade, had been almost completely
abolished in most of European economies; in Great Britain it was terminated in 1842, in France in 1857 and in Prussia in 1864.11 In 1914, on the
eve of the war only few countries from the economic periphery of Europe
still retained some of the remnants of export taxation. In Spain it was
levied on coke, in Romania on forest products, in Serbia on oxen and goat
skins. The inter-war period witnessed a restoration of export taxation,
which was functional for the state policies mainly for fiscal reasons as an
important source of cash revenue. It was also useful in slowing down the
export rates for the goods which were critically needed for the domestic population. The extensive taxation on exports was applied mostly by
the countries on the economic periphery of Europe including all four
countries under review. Today, just as during the inter-war period, export taxation found application in some developing countries (such as
China, Russia, and Argentina) mainly for fiscal reasons.
The first Yugoslav export tariffs were imposed in October 1919,
mainly on agricultural and forest products.12 During the period of reconstruction and post-war recovery these were to curb exports and to
serve the countrys fiscal policy. When the food provisions ceased to be a
top priority for domestic policy namely after the harvests of 1919 and
1920 the export taxation of agricultural products was kept chiefly for
fiscal reasons. Considerable rates of the taxation came as consequence
of incredible price divergences that occurred between European countries and regions. According to a calculation by the Trgovinski glasnik, the
price divergence ratio between domestic prices in Yugoslavia and Switzerland was not less than 67.5 against 1 in favor of Switzerlands mar10
11
12

Raspis ministarstva finansija o naplaivanju izvozne carine za raznu robu [Order

of the Ministry of Finance on export taxation for different kinds of goods of 17
October 1919], Slubene novine 121, 24 October 1919.
See: Goode et al., Role of Export Taxes in Developing Countries, Staff Papers
International Monetary Fund, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Nov., 1966), 454455 and article Tariff,
Encyclopdia Britannica Online, retrieved on 05 Dec. 2009, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/583535/tariff
Raspis ministarstva finansija o naplaivanju izvozne carine za raznu robu [Order
of the Ministry of Finance on export taxation for different kinds of goods of 17
October 1919], Slubene novine 121, 24 October 1919.

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Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

ket prices! The author of the article claims that the profit was enormous,
even taking into account huge freight costs between these two countries.
On each 100 kilograms of the grain exports a trader would gain around
35 Swiss Francs at a net profit or about 50 percent of its market price in
Switzerland. The net income was so immense that additional tariff taxation could not harm traders interests. Not only did the official organ of
the traders association, Trgovinski glasnik, not complain against the introduction of export tariffs, but these were justified as an expected economic measure.13
The fiscal contribution of export tariffs was paramount only immediately after the war in 1919 and 1920. For instance, in 1920, the export tariff revenues were slightly higher than those raised from import
tariffs, no matter that exports accounted for only around 40 percent of
the value of that years imports. The export tariffs contributed significantly to the budget incomes of Yugoslavia in 1920 when these totaled
around 10 percent of all the revenues. However, in following years the
fiscal importance of the export tariffs declined. In 1921, these contributed to revenues of no more than 5 percent, and later the percentage
became even smaller.
The Polish model of trade controls

The Polish foreign trade was subjected to restrictions and controls similar to those applied in Yugoslavia. In Poland one also finds unorthodox trade policy measures such as export tariffs, a licensed export/
import system, bans on export/import, barter arrangements and above
all, the governments right to make arbitrary exceptions in the application of any of these measures. However, notable differences existed at the
institutional level of state intervention, and the degree and the time-span
of the application of these measures. In the next few paragraphs we will
see how the Polish system of trade controls developed.
Since the dissolution of Polish predecessor countries (the three
Central and Eastern European Empires) in 1918 was directly connected with inadequate provisions of food stuff and other basics items, one
of the first priorities of the new Polish authorities was to impose their
own system of control over trade affairs. Many trade-control measures
had already been applied by the Partition countries; in the new Polish
state these were maintained at the level of the provincial government.
13

, [Export Tariffs, Trgovinski glasnik], 2.

October 1919.

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The provincial governments, in charge of the former Partitions, were

based in Poznan (for the German Partition), Warsaw (for the Russian),
Krakow and Lvov (for the Austrian), and Cieszyn (for the Upper Silesian
autonomous region made up of previous Austrian and Prussian territorial units). All these governments created special institutions designed
to control exports from, and imports to, their territories. In April 1919
a huge step towards the unification of the system was undertaken when
the Galician offices for trade control in Lvov and Krakow were placed under the jurisdiction of the Warsaw based State Commission for Imports
and Exports (SCIE).14 In November 1920, the SCIE was renamed and reorganized into a General Bureau for Imports and Exports (GBIE) which
was designed to become a nation-wide institution for trade control.15 The
German Partition was the only remaining territory outside of its control,
as the Poznan provisory government was by far the most autonomous in
the domain of economic policy. Not before autumn 1921 was this province integrated into the economic and tariff policy of the united Poland.16
The problems with integration of Upper Silesia were connected with issues of plebiscite and special economic arrangements foreseen by the
Treaty of Versailles. In this particular context, the Polish situation is comparable to, and almost simultaneous with, the Yugoslav complications
arising from the more or less self-governing provincial governments in
1919 and 1920.
A similarity with the Yugoslav case applies also to the initial
trade measures applied in the immediate post-war period. Given the urgency of providing food provisions and all kinds of supplies for the new
states population and economy, trade control jurisdiction of the Warsaw
based SCIE was limited mainly to control exports, while imports were
more than welcomed in the war-torn country. In Poland, due to an ongoing war with Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics (19191920), the
provisioning problems became even more dramatic. Zigmunt Miduch, a
contemporary analyst, remarked that the Polish imports policy in this
14
15

16

Landau and Tomaszewski, op. cit., 325.

Rozporzdzenie Ministra Przemysu i Handlu, Ministra Skarbu, Ministra
Sprawiedliwoci, Ministra Kolei elaznych, Ministra Poczt i Telegrafw oraz Ministra
b. Dzielnicy Pruskiej z dnia 30 padziernika 1920 r. w przedmiocie organizacji i
przepisw postpowania urzdw oraz izb przywozu i wywozu, Dziennik Ustaw
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland, Order By
Ministers of Industry and Trade, of Finance, of Railways, and of former Prussian
Partition, of 30 October on issue of Organization of Exports and Imports], Item 703,
No. 107, 22 November 1920.
Ferdynand Zweig, Poland between Two Wars. A Critical Study of Social and Economic
Changes, (London, 1944), 28.

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Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

formative period was compelled to move towards protectionism in the

domain of industrial goods, but at same time towards liberalism [] in
the domain of importation of the foodstuff and basics.17 On the other
hand, when the issues of export policy are regarded, state interests were
quite reversed.
In Poland, as in Yugoslavia, the licensing system was adopted
with the aim of controlling trade. Yet, while in Yugoslavia it lasted for no
more than 6 months, in Poland it went through a much longer history
of administrative use. Almost two years after the creation of the state,
each shipment of both imports to and exports from Poland, still required
procedural approval, and the issue of a license by the central trade authorities (GBEI for the former Russian and Austrian Partition, and corresponding institutions in the Upper Silesia and the German Partition).
This was probably a consequence of the war with the Soviet Republics
that lasted up to the end of 1920. In the course of 1921, a certain liberalization of the trade regime occurred when the authorities established
a list of the goods that could be traded without restrictions. For all other
products, still encompassing the main agricultural products, a general
ban and the complicated procedure for licensing exports was still in
force. From time to time, some changes would occur within the list of the
products, but by and large the main principle of controls governed by the
Warsaw based MBEI remained the same. The first significant attempts to
stimulate exports of foodstuff caused huge social turmoil during second
half of 1923.18
The institutional framework of the GBEI and licensing system of
trade control in Poland were terminated in MayJune 1924 as a part of
the restructuring of the general state policy in this domain. Instead of
individual licenses issued for each transaction of trade, the government
was given the right to impose a general ban on the export/import of
some goods for certain period of time. This was the same solution which
was applied in Yugoslavia after the abolishment of the licensing system.
Yet, it seems as if the Polish government could not function long without it. After the Second Polish Republic entered a sort of tariff war with
Germany in 1925, the bureaucratic complications became once again an
integral part of almost every trade action. A list of products that were
17
18

Zygmunt Miduch, Polska polityka celna i traktatowa, Bilans gospodarczy

dziesiciolecia Polski odrodzonej II. [Polish Policy of Customs and Trade Agreements,
Economic Balance of the Two Decades of the Reborn Poland], eds W. Schramm and E.
Taylor, (Poznan, Wydawnictwo Powszechnej Wystawy Krajowej, 1929), 70.
Zbigniew Landau, Jerzy Tomaszewski, Gospodarka Polski midzywojennej 1918
1939. (I volume) [Economy of Inter-war Poland 19181939], (Warsaw: Ksika i
Wiedza, 1967), 333334.

51

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forbidden to be imported was made public, and government bodies were

authorized to give licenses in each individual case. An additional problem with these restrictive measures was that although they only aimed
at trade with Germany, the control shad to be extended to all suspicious
cargos. Almost the entirety of Polish foreign trade was affected in reality,
since the German goods could arrive through intermediary traders from
other countries. In each individual case it was necessary to investigate
the origin of the goods which took much time and paperwork. This overbureaucratized and cumbersome system remained in power until the
end of the period under study.19
The export tariffs in Poland went through a history of gradual
implementation by the fiscal authorities. At the very beginning, export
taxation was applied in a form of an ad valorem quasi tariff imposed on
certain exported goods. According to the numerous orders published in
the Polish official state journal, this peculiar institution was very much
in use throughout the period between October 1922 and May 1924. This
was not a regular tariff charge, since there was no such institution according to the official 1919 tariffs legislation, but a kind of taxation that
was meant, at the beginning, only for the administrative costs of the state
personnel engaged in the state facilitated exports businesses. Under this
pretext and in this form it was levied on goods exported to Yugoslavia,
Austria and Czechoslovakia, at a rate of 2 percent of the amount of the
purchase price of the exported goods.20
It seems that the developed form of the later exports taxation
evolved from this initial procedure. In October 1922, it was charged in the
form of taxation imposed on the export of geese at a rate of 60 percent
of the export profit. The taxation was introduced by an order of the Minister of Finance in accordance with the Minister of Trade and Industry
and after obtaining opinion of the GBEI.21 The same procedure and the
same semantic formula were applied in an order of January 1923, when
a tax of 50 percent on profits was imposed on the exportation of sugar. In
June 1923, another order established a 30 percent profit taxation on the
export of millet, 30 percent on buckwheat, 50 percent on beans, 60 percent on peas, and the same percentage for both slaughtered and livestock
poultry. The export taxation on barley and barley bran was 60 percent,
and on treacle it was established at 50 percent in May 1924 when the last
19
20
21

Ibid., I, 333334; II, 285286.

Alfred Siebeneichen, Reglamentacja handlu w Polsce [State Regulations on Trade in
Poland], (Warszawa: Min. Przemysu i Handlu, 1920), 28.
Dziennik Ustaw, Item 893, no. 97, 11 November 1922.

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Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

such measure was inaugurated.22 After the new tariffs system and new
legislation on tariff administration were enacted in May 1924, the export
taxation ceased to exist as the Polish authorities finally introduced the
institution of export tariffs. It is difficult to give an estimation of the fiscal
benefits that came from these quasi-tariffs export taxation since it was
not listed separately in the budget but rather within other administrative taxes revenues. Taking into account the fact that it was calculated on
the basis of the actual profit, it might help compensating for the negative
impact of the high rates of inflation.
Bulgarian non-tariff trade controls

In Bulgaria, the post-war trade policy continued basic restrictions imposed during the war. In 1919 and 1920, control over both foreign and domestic trade was placed under strict control of the war-time
military dominated Directorate for the Economic Affairs and Social Planning (DEASP), which replaced in April 1918 the Committee for Economic
Affairs and Social Planning (CEASP), it was established in March 1915 in
anticipation of the Bulgarian entry into the war. In institutional terms,
the directorate was placed within the Ministry of War, but it was also
under the control of the Bulgarian government. By an order of 27 April
1918 it was renamed the directorate. According to the Law on Social
Planning, of 4 March 1915, the committee was to consist of 14 members
who represented the interests of the industrial and trade chambers and
the state ministries. The committee had a much broader jurisdiction and
more executive powers in the domain of internal rather than in the foreign trade. An exceptional right of declaring bans on exports of certain
goods remained with the central government; the committee could declare bans only in accordance with the government.23
However, the social planning in Bulgaria started even before
the committee was founded. By the decrees issued between 29 July and
12 August 1914, the Bulgarian government forbade the export of grain,
wool, and other agricultural products. Exceptions from the ban were possible only with an approval, i.e. license issued by the Ministry of Trade
22

23

Dziennik Ustaw, Item 74, No. 11, 1 February 1923; Ibid., Item 457, no. 61, 21
June 1923; Ibid., Item 787, no. 100, 5 October 1923; Ibid., Item 1104, No. 133, 23
December 1923; Ibid., Items 444 and 446, No. 42, 21 May 1924; Ibid., Item 487,
No. 48, 10 June 1924. The last order was decreed on 15 May 1924 before the tariff
system was passed by the parliament.
Law on Social Planning, Draven vestnik, 54, 7 March 1915.

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and Commerce, of each individual case.24 A part of this jurisdiction was

later shared with the committee, while a general ban on exports and
imports was introduced when the country entered the war. The license
system in Bulgaria thus, can be traced from July 1914 onwards. Since the
task of providing supplies for the Bulgarian war machine and the provisioning of the civilian population became ever more complicated by the
end of the war export bans were extended to more and more goods and
materials. Yet regardless of these measures, much of the goods ended up
with the Central Powers whose authorities had high expectations of, and
demands from, Bulgarian agriculture.25
The devastating influence of the war is evident in the Bulgarian
trade balance when compared to that of 1911: the calculation shows that
total imports tonnage decreased by around 7 times, while overall export
tonnage shrunk by 52 times! The tonnage gradually increased in next
few years, however the exports tonnage came up to only 37.7 percent of
the 1911 level in 1924, while that year imports rose to only 68.6 percent.
Apart from the general problems related to transportation, currency, and
exchange, this balance was certainly also connected with a restrictive
trade policy. Namely, in Bulgaria, even after the war was over, the system
of bans and licenses continued to function. After the war, foreign trade
controls functioned through the government authorized lists of the items
banned from being exported or imported. These items could be traded
only with special licenses issued by the directorate. As we learnt from the
order issued by the DEISP these lists were updated on a monthly basis
and published in its official organ.26
According to the same source, the state controlled not only the
items of trade but also the traders profit. It was set at 8 percent for gross
selling and 20 percent for retailers.27 Moreover, in domain of the grain
trade a new revolutionary institution was inaugurated by the Law on the
Trade with Grains and its Products, and for [Food] Provisioning of November
24

25
26

27

The Decree on Ban on Grain exports of 29 July 1914, Draven vestnik, 177, 4
August 1914; The Decree on Ban on export of wool, of 3 August 1914, Ibid., no. 178,
8 August; The Decree on Ban of Flour exports of 12 August 1914, Ibid., 181 (15
August). See also: Ikonomika na Blgaria do socialistieskata revolucija [Bulgarian
Economy before the Socialist Revolution], ed. Ljuben Berov, (Sofia, 1989), 387.
Ikonomika na Blgaria, 391.
. 460, 22 1920, [The Directoriat
for Economic Affairs and Social Planning, Order No. 460 of 22 May 1920],
, [Journal of
the Directorate for Economic Affairs and Social Planning], 26, 10 June 1920. See the
Article 23 of the order.
Ibid., see the Article 2.

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1919.28 This law established a complete and unrestricted state monopoly

in the domain of foreign trade, while on the domestic market a certain role
was still to be played by private companies and individual traders.
The implementation of the state monopoly was entrusted to a
Consortium for Grain Exports founded by the capital assets of the National, Agrarian and Cooperative Banks of Bulgaria. The Consortium had
the exclusive right of exporting grains from the country; the individual
traders or trading companies could sell grain products abroad, but only
with approval from the Consortium. Backed by the state, and supplied
with sufficient amounts of money assets, the Consortium was capable of
buying up all the available grain stocks designated for exportation. The
profit seems to be guaranteed since global prices were much higher than
domestic ones, which were set by the law on the grain trade. Only ten
percent of prospective profits were to be shared between the banks cofounders and 90 percent was intended for the Fund for the Improvement of Agriculture. In first instance these assets were intended for
modern type grain elevators necessary for the storage of large quantities
of grain.29
The consortium went through several legislative modifications
which aimed at strengthening the positions of agricultural cooperatives in the domain of exports. In ideological terms, the very concept of
the consortium was the materialization of the program of the Bulgarian Agrarian Movement. In technical terms it aimed at gaining the best
possible price on the global market. This sort of a state-facilitated trade
eliminated many previous market mechanisms related to a liberal market economy. It was proven however that Bulgaria was surprisingly independent in its management of trade, especially for a country that had just
lost the war, and was under extensive control of the Entente powers. Let
us observe how this control functioned in trade affairs.
Bulgarian trade policy, unlike that of the other three countries,
provides interesting material related to the attempts at restoring the
premises of liberalism in trade policy by an institutional framework foreseen by the Paris Treaty Conference. In this particular case it was the
Inter-Allied Control Commission, designed by Neuilly Treaty of August
1919, that was constantly opposing the interventionist trade policies of
the Bulgarian government. In the domain of foreign trade, the commission decisively contributed to the abolition of the Grain consortium, and
was resolutely against the introduction of new import and export tariffs. This sort of external influence in internal affairs of the country was
28

29

In: , 200, 5 December 1919.

Articles 2, 7-20 of the law of November 1920. In: Ibid.

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possible only because of Bulgarias limited sovereignty. Under huge pressure from the commission, the consortium was terminated at the end
of 1920.30 Probably not by accident, at the same time, Bulgarias trade
system based on profit control, licensing, and administrative bans, was
gradually also abandoned.31
Freedom of trade was officially proclaimed and the export tariffs
system, founded by legislation in 1921 and 1924, was the only remaining systematic unconventional trade policy measure applied in Bulgaria
after 1920, and by the end of period under study. The export tariffs found
a broad application and ranged from 6 to 30 percent for food products,
and went as high as 50 and even 100 percent in the case of some strategic
goods or raw materials. In addition, from time to time, the government
declared bans on exports or imports of some goods, but this was rather
an exception than a systematic trade policy.32 The licensing system was
finally liquidated in 1926, after the stabilization of the Bulgarian national
currency, when tariff protectionism could replace non-tariff measures.33
Czechoslovak policy pattern

Due to its advanced industrial production and early monetary

stabilization, the trade policy of Czechoslovakia was slightly different in
comparison with the other three countries. In general terms, however, the
principal institutional features of the trade protectionist policy including
application of non-tariffs measures can also be found in the Czechoslovakian model.. This was particularly true for the chaotic circumstances during the first months after the new state was proclaimed. One of the first
30

31

32
33

Ikonomika na Blgaria, 416; John D. Bell, Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski

and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 18991923, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977), 170; , .
, I, [Rumen Avramov, Communal Capitalism. From
Bulgarian Economic History, I], (Sofia, 2007), 587588.
. . 933, 26 X 1920, [Freedom of Import, Order No. 933,
26 October 1920],
, [Report of Directorate for economic problems and social planning],
48, 29 October 1920;
, [The Orders Are Being Abolished and A Freedom of
Export Trade and the Commerce Are Established], Ibid., 53, 30 November 1920.
, [Raham Berahov, Our
Industrial Protectionism], (Sofia: Kooperativna peatnica Napred, 1927), 6667.
,
[Dinko Toev, Industrial Policy of Bulgaria after the First World War], (Varna,
1943), 4849.

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measures of the new authorities was to impose strict controls over both
the export and import of all goods. No goods could enter or exit state territory without a license issued by the Imports and Exports Commission
established by an order of the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Commerce
of 22 November 1918.34 A priority was placed on controls over exports
of foodstuff and coal. The situation was much more complicated when
it came to machinery, semi-manufactured goods, and the raw materials
necessary for maintaining industrial production.
A scale of priorities for exports and imports of these items was significantly different from those applied by the predecessor Habsburg regime. Nobody could understand this complexity better than businessmen,
or at least this reasoning influenced Czechoslovakian authorities when they
established a sort of a corporatist trade-control model. The new regime
was established by an order of 26 February which inaugurated Industrial
Exports and Imports Cartels for each branch of industrial production.35
Founded on the corporatist principles, with the unrestricted membership
of all industrial sectors engaged in specific production, these cartels were
entrusted with the authority to decide on applications for export or import
licenses. Very soon, it proved that this was not a very fortunate solution
since the problems and divisions existed within cartels themselves.
The decision-making process was not always efficient, nor was it
transparent, and many misuses occurred with the licenses, this similar to
the practice in other countries under review here. The Czechoslovakian
exports and imports cartels seem to be quite far away from the presupposed ideal of a corporate governing body. By June 1920, these cartels
were replaced by a special Foreign Trade Bureau established as state enactment of the law of June 24, 1920. This institution continued with the
practice of individual applications and licenses for every export or import
transaction on the international market, yet in the course of time it was
entrusted with fewer and fewer jurisdictions as more and more trade became free of non-tariff measures. For almost all export items the licensing was abolished by the autumn of 1921, and for the majority of import
goods by mid-1920s. In 1928, only 1 percent of exports- and 10 percent
34

35

The principal source for Czechoslovakian trade policy applied here are two studies
written by thecontemporary Czechoslovakian analyst Ferdinand Peroutka: The
Commercial Policy and the Tariff, Czechoslovakia: A Survey of Economic and Social
Conditions, ed. Josef Gruber, (New York, 1924), 127137 and Foreign Trade, Ibid.,
110126. Other sources, mainly of legal provenance, used for these topics will be
indicated in the text.
Nazen o dovoznch a vvoznch syndiktech (no 100/1919) [Order on export
and import cartels (no. 100/1919)], Sbrka zkon a naizen SR of 3. March 1919.

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of import items still required a license from the authorities.36 The only
unconventional trade measure which remained in use in Czechoslovakia
throughout the period was export taxation, imposed on some crucial agricultural export goods (sugar, hops, malt, and spirits). According to the
contemporary Czechoslovakian economist Vilibald Mildschuh, the state
collected more than 6 billion koruna from this source during the period
between 1919 and 1921.37 The amount is indicative as it totals about one
third of the annual Czechoslovakian budget for 1921.
Concluding remarks

One of the distinct features of the four countries trade polices

was the existence of all the distinctive institutional patterns of non-tariff
trade control, which have been applied in the turbulent post-war period (i.e. the license system, contingent quota system, barter agreements,
export tariffs, bans, import tariffs). Such scale and degree of unorthodox trade restrictions could not be found in other European regions of
that time (USSR excluded). In this regard the four countries in this study
proved to be among the most interventionist with respect to the degree
of tariff protection, and unconventional (i.e. the non-tariff policy measures applied in foreign trade). Yet, is it feasible to construct a developmental typology of these restriction patterns? In other words, can we define criteria upon which one of these measures is to be considered more
or less liberal or statist than the other one?
For that purpose we could accept the League of Nations criteria
appliedin this respect. Namely, according to the expertise, proposals, and
appeals, of the dozens of the international conferences organized under
the auspices of the League of Nations during the 1920s, it seems that the
moderate imports tariff policy was the only acceptable and legitimate
measure of trade protection. The excessive import tariffs, export tariffs,
quota contingents, and trade prohibitions, were all considered inappropriate and damaging from the point of international trade. However, it is
difficult to compare these measures in the domain of a scale of damage,
which depended not only on the institutional pattern that was applied,
36
37

Ale Skivan, K charakteru, rozsahu a zamen eskoslovenskho vvozu v

mezivlenm obdob, [On Main Features, Volume and Orientation of Czechoslovak
Export during the Inter-war Period], Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 7 (2007), 368, 371.
Peroutka, The Commercial Policy and the Tariff, 131; Vilibald Mildschuh, Currency
Conditions, Czechoslovakia: A Survey of Economic and Social Conditions, ed. Josef
Gruber, (New York, 1924), 188.

58

Aleksandar R. MILETI

Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

but also on the degree of taxation, or the extent of contingent restrictions.

For instance, moderately high import tariffs under some circumstances
might cause much more difficulties for trade than very low export tariffs.
In the same way, very high export tariffs might restrict trade far more
than would be possible with quota limitations.
For all these reasons, apart from the general League of Nations
principles, it is not possible to construct a feasible universal system of developmental typology in the domain of foreign trade restrictions. In the
domain of post-war stabilization, however, abolishment or alleviation of
any of the unorthodox measures will be considered as an indication of
normalization and recovery. As it regards Southeast and East-Central European countries under study it can be safely concluded that many of the
unconventional means of trade controls were abolished by mid-1920s
as a response to stabilization of their national currencies. This refers to
licensing schemes, administrative bans on exports/imports and barter
arrangements brokered by the state. Due to a prolonged war period and
a sort of tariff-war with Germany, Poland proved to be a notable exception in broader European terms. Regardless of the administrative efforts
which were inclined towards normalization this country maintained unconventional trade controls throughout the period under review. This refers also to export tariffs which were gradually reduced yet in legal terms
maintained during that period. Therefore, the four countries under study
contributed immensely to the breakdown of the international trade market in the interwar period.

Sources and literature

Unpublished sources

Arhiv Jugoslavije (AY), Collection of Vojislav Jovanovi - Marambo (335)-99.

Newspapers and magazines

(Sofia)
Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw)

(Sofia)
(Belgrade)
(Belgrade)
(Belgrade)
Sbrka zkon a naizen SR (Prague)
59

3/2015.

Literature
1. , . .
I. Sofia: Fondacia Blgarska nauka i kultura, Centar za liberalni strategii, 2007.
2. Bell, John D. Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 18991923. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977.
3. , . . Sofia:
Kooperativna peatnica Napred, 1927.
4. Berend, I., G. Ranki, Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the
19th and 20th centuries. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
5. , .
. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1989.
6. Goode, Richard, Lent, E. George and P. D. Ojha. Role of Export Ta
xes in Developing Countries. Staff Papers International Monetary
Fund, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Nov., 1966), 453503.
7. Lampe, John R., Marvin R. Jackson, Balkan Economic History, 1550
1950. From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
8. Landau, Zbigniew and Jerzy Tomaszewski. Gospodarka Polski
midzywojennej 19181939, I volume. Warsaw: Ksika i Wiedza,
1967.
9. Miduch, Zygmunt. Polska polityka celna i traktatowa. Bilans gos
podarczy dziesiciolecia Polski odrodzonej II, eds. W. Schramm and
E. Taylor. Poznan: Wydawnictwo Powszechnej Wystawy Krajowej,
1929.
10. Mildschuh, Vilibald. Currency Conditions. Czechoslovakia: A Survey
of Economic and Social Conditions, ed. Josef Gruber. New York, 1924.
11. Mileti, Aleksandar R. Deglobalization in the Periphery. Tariff Protectionism in Southeast and East-Central Europe, 19141928. Tokovi istorije 2014/3, 6987.
12. Mileti, Aleksandar R. Unutranja trgovina u Kraljevini SHS 1919
godine. Tokovi istorije 34/2003, 1317.
13. Peroutka, Ferdinand. The Commercial Policy and the Tariff. Czechoslovakia: A Survey of Economic and Social Conditions, ed. Josef Gruber. New York, 1924.
14. Peroutka, Ferdinand. Foreign Trade, Czechoslovakia: A Survey of
Economic and Social Conditions, ed. Josef Gruber. New York, 1924.
15. Siebeneichen, Alfred. Reglamentacja handlu w Polsce. Warszawa:
Min. Przemysu i Handlu, 1920.
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Aleksandar R. MILETI

Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

16. Skivan, Ale. K charakteru, rozsahu a zamen eskoslovenskho

vvozu v mezivlenm obdob. Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 7
(2007), 367382.
17. Tariff, Encyclopdia Britannica Online. Retrieved on 05 Dec. 2009.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/583535/tariff
18. Teichova, Alice. The Czechoslovak economy, 19181980. London, New
York: Routledge, 1988.
19. Teichova, Alice. East-central and South-east Europe 191939, The
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. VIII. Cambridge: University Press, 1989.
20. , .
. Varna: Godinik na VTU, 1943.
21. Zweig, Ferdynand. Poland between Two Wars. A Critical Study of Social and Economic Changes. London: Secker & Warburg, 1944.

61

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.
,

, 19181928.

:
a , ,

.

.

.
: , , , -, ,

.

.
.
, /, , ,
.

,
.

.
62

Aleksandar R. MILETI

Non-tariff Protectionist Schemes, 19181928

.
,
,
20-.
,
.

.
.
, ,
.

. , ,
-,
. ,
.

63

 329.15(497.1)1929/1933
323(497.1)1929/1933

: 11. 6. 2015.
: 14. 7. 2015.

Duan BOJKOVI
dsnbojkovic@gmail.com

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi
Abstract: This paper presents the results of research made
on the stance of the leadership of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia towards the Yugoslav regime during the dictatorship of King Aleksandar Karaorevi, followed by the problem of cooperation between communists and Ustae and the
changes in Partys territorial organization at the beginning
of the 1930s. Both archival and published sources of Partys
central, provincial and regional subdivisions, as well as newspaper articles and relevant literature have been covered in
the research.
Keywords: Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Communist Party of Yugoslavia, dictatorship, Great-Serbian hegemonism, banovinas

The promulgation of dictatorship

and the division of state into banovinas

During the second half of the 1920s, the political stage of the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (hereinafter referred to as: SCS)
was marked by numerous tribulations. Fierce conflicts among the ruling parties in the National Assembly undoubtedly pointed to a rift in a
society divided over numerous burning issues, among which the Croatian issue presented itself as the most significant. Polemical discussions
among the Peoples Radical Partys and Peasant-Democratic Coalitions
(hereinafter referred to as: PDC) MPs reached a critical point in 1928.
In a heated and tense atmosphere, inside the National Assembly, after a
65

3/2015.

set of mutual accusations, insults and threats, on 20 June, Punia Rai,

killed Pavle Radi and ura Basariek and wounded Ivan Pernar, Ivan
Grana and Stjepan Radi, who succumbed to the wounds on 8 August.1
That event had, according to Branko Petranovi, definitely sealed the
fate of parliamentarism in the Kingdom of SCS, and opened the door to
absolutism.2 At the same time, we should keep in mind King Aleksandars
permanent aspiration to absolute rule.3
The dilemma whether to amputate Croatian territories and
form a new state which would encompass all Serbian lands or establish absolute rule, was resolved by King Aleksandars decision to implement the latter solution. Finally, the Law on Royal Power and High State
Administration from 6 January 1929 annulled the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921 and proclaimed the King as the holder of all authority in
the country while the Law on the Protection of Public Safety and State
Order abolished public political life and banned the activity of politi1

2
3

More on this subject: . , , IIII,

(, 2002), [B. Gligorijevi, King Aleksandar Karaorevi, IIII, (Belgrade,
2002)], II/301311; I. Dobrivojevi, Dravna represija u doba diktature kralja
Aleksandra 19291935, (Beograd, 2006) [State Repression and the Period of King
Aleksandars Dictatorship 19291935, (Belgrade, 2006)], 3743. By the verdict of
the Court of Appeal in Belgrade, dated October the 15th 1929, Punia Rai was
sentenced to twenty years of prison. The verdict itself says, among other things,
how Rai fired from a revolving gun mark Steyr at the former MP, now deceased
Stjepan Radi and with a single shot inflicted upon him a physical injury, which
correlates to the final cause of death of the deceased Stjepan Radi, [Archives of
Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as: AY), Administration of Penitentiaries funds
(Poarevac, Sremska Mitrovica, Maribor): items of the convicted communists, box
no. 1, document no. IV]. However, there is an opinion in modern historiography that
the wounding of Stjepan Radi was not life-threatening from the medical point of
view, and that the tragic outcome has occurred in conjunction with Radis chronic
alcoholism and a severe case of diabetes. - B. Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije, IIII,
(Beograd, 1988) [History of Yugoslavia IIII, (Belgrade, 1988)], I/174175; .
, , III, (, 19921994) [. Stankovi,
Challenges of New History, III, (Belgrade, 19921994)], I/132133.
Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije, I/175.
As an indicator of King Aleksandar Karaorevis absolutistic nature it has often
been mentioned that in the period from 1918 till 1929, out of the 24 government
cabinets in total, only two were disbanded by the National Assembly, while the
others were toppled by the monarch himself. - . ,
, III: , ( , 2001) [Lj. Dimi, History
of Serbian Statehood, vol. III: Serbia in Yugoslavia (Novi Sad, 2001)], 98107;
19291931,
, , (hereinafter
referred to as: ), (, 2002), , XXXII, [Minutes
from the Session of the Ministerial Council of the Kingdome of Yugoslavia 19291931,
edited by Ljubodrag Dimi, Nikola uti, Blagoje Isailovi (hereinafter referred to as:
Minutes MC KY), (Belgrade, 2002), Introductory Study, XXXII].

66

Duan BOJKOVI

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

cal parties and religious associations.4 In the 6 January proclamation, the

King stepped forth as the guardian of national and state unity, which was
greeted with relief and approval, by most of the people.5 A whole set of
laws adopted during 1929 and 1930 paved the road to the implementation
of national unification, enshrouded in a veil of Yugoslav national identity.6

The ideology of integral Yugoslav national identity was further
strengthened by the Law on the Name and the Division of Kingdom into
Administrative regions passed on 3 October 1929. The new name of
the country Kingdom of Yugoslavia symbolically presented the rejection of the previous concept of preservation of tribal (ethnic) pluralism within a unique Yugoslav nation.7 The same law proclaimed the
division of country into nine territorially-administrative regions.8 Even
4
5
6

7
8

B. Petranovi, M. Zeevi, Jugoslovenski federalizam. Ideje i stvarnost, tematska zbirka dokumenata, III, (Beograd, 1987) [Yugoslav Federalism. Ideas and Reality, thematic collection of documents, III, (Belgrade, 1987)], I/293303.
Stankovi, op. cit., I/128; Dobrivojevi, op. cit., 5152; . , .
, , ( , 2007) [.
Popov, Great Serbia. Reality and Myth, third edition, (Sremski Karlovci Novi Sad,
2007)], 225226.
More on this topic: I. Dobrivojevi, Sudstvo i sudije u doba estojanuarskog reima
kralja Aleksandra (19291935), Tokovi istorije [Judiciary and Judges in the Sixth of
January Dictatorship of King Alexander 19291935, Currents of History], 34/2005,
29; . , ,
(, 1993) [B. Petranovi, Yugoslav Experience of Serbian National Integration,
(Belgrade, 1993), 3739]; Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije, [History of Yugoslavia],
I/176185; T. Stojkov, Opozicija u vreme estojanuarske diktature 19291935,
(Beograd, 1969) [Opposition in the Time of the Sixth January Dictatorship 19291935,
(Belgrade, 1969)], 5372; Dimi, op. cit., 137143; . , .
, , ( ), (, 1998) [Lj. Dimi,
Serbs in Yugoslavia. Territory, Socoety, Politics (a view from the end of the century,
(Belgrade, 1998)], 124135; , [Minutes MC KY,
Introductory Study], XLXLI.
[Minutes MC KY], 100.
In article no. 2 of the Law on the Name and the Division of Kingdom into
Administrative Regions from 3 October 1929 the following banovinas are listed:
Banovina of Drava with an administrative seat at Ljubljana, Banovina of Sava with
an administrative seat at Zagreb, Maritime Banovina with an administrative seat at
Split, Banovina of Vrbas with an administrative seat at Banja Luka, Banovina of Drina
with an administrative seat at Sarajevo, Banovina of Danube with an administrative
seat at Novi Sad, Banovina of Vardar with an administrative seat at Skopje, Banovina
of Morava with an administrative seat at Ni, Banovina of Zeta with an administrative
seat at Cetinje. Area of the City of Belgrade with Zemun and Panevo was separated
as a special administrative unit under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior
Affairs. - . IV : 19291931
(hereinafter referred to as: ), , (, 1932) [Almanac
of the Kingdome of Yugoslavia, IV jubilee volume: 19291931 (hereinafter referred
to as: Almanac KY), second edition, (Zagreb, 1932)], 143.

67

3/2015.

though the new administrative borders were justified by the most objective criteria,9 the forming of banovinas was undertaken primarily
with the aim of achieving a tighter centralization of government rule
and the prevention of further development of disintegrative processes
and separatism. The omnipresent rule of the King hindered banovinas
from achieving higher degree of autonomy. In accordance with the new
national identification, government officials said that this division established a precondition for our people within the harmony of national unity to completely enjoy a free and peaceful life, to completely
devote themselves to cultural and economic advancement, and as such,
to be of greater use to the international community, thus remaining a
completely reliable element of international peace.10
Disregarding the natural and historical boundaries, banovinas broke up old provinces, which in an administrative sense lost
their outlines and names which had lasted for several centuries. During the drawing of new internal borders a lot of attention was paid
to the strengthening of Serbian national element in the banovinas by
securing the majority of Orthodox Christians.11 On the other hand,
contrary to Slovenia, which was contained within the boundaries of
the Banovina of Drava, and contrary to the Croatian lands (Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia) which in most part were contained within the
Banovina of Sava and Maritime Banovina, and contrary to Montenegro, Macedonia and Vojvodina, whose historical continuity was not
drastically jeopardized by the creation of larger administrative units
(Banovinas of Zeta, Vardar and Danube), the territory of Serbia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina was broken up respectively into five and four
9

10
11

At the XXIII session of the Ministerial Council held on 3 October 1929 it was said that
with the new division of the country into banovinas the central government is now
unburdened and administration [...] is simplified and more effectively organized
and that by transferring many important jurisdictions from the central body, [...]
a more expedient accomplishment of many tasks, which were delayed because
of the present constitution would be enabled. It was highlighted that during the
establishment of new areas borders great care has been taken that the new borders
be natural, that is to say they took in consideration communications and natural
connections of certain areas and their respective centers. Finally, an attempt was
made for the new division to be adjusted to the needs of the other administrative
bodies. [...] New areas were named primarily after the great rivers which flow
through those areas, since these names are already well known among the people,
and they very clearly mark certain banovinas. - [Minutes MC KY],
99.
Ibid., 100.
B. Petranovi, M. Zeevi, Agonija dve Jugoslavije, (Beograd, 1991) [Agony of Two
Yugoslavias, (Belgrade, 1991)], 9091.

68

Duan BOJKOVI

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

banovinas.12 By identifying the Serbian issue with the problem of the

Yugoslav states survival, the ruling regime was willing to sacrifice the
interest of the Serbian people by fragmenting its national territory
into eight banovinas and offering it a Yugoslav national identity, the
new national identification. Therefore, there is an opinion in modern
historiography, according to which the new administrative arrangement was the most damaging to the interest of the Serbian people.13
Thus, the introduction of King Aleksandars absolute rule further
strengthened the already existing stereotypes about Serbian hegemony in a mutual state and its tendency towards total domination among
the existing anti-Yugoslav national and religious elements.
Communists and the 6 January regime

Beside a few of bourgeois politicians (Dragoljub Jovanovi, Anton Koroec, Svetozar Pribievi, Vlatko Maek) the regimes oppression
was primarily focused on communists and their sympathizers. Members
of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred to as: CPY)
and the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (hereinafter referred
to as: LCYY) were exposed to frequent persecutions and arrests. Already
during 1929, the Central Committee (hereinafter referred to as: CC) had
ceased operating as a monolithic leadership, while during April of the
next year the Politburo was relocated abroad. Among the victims of the
white terror were the CPYs Organizational Secretary uro akovi
and the secretary of the Red Help Nikola Haimovi, who according to
the official report, were killed on 25 April 1929 at the Austrian-Yugoslav
12

13

Concerning the breaking up of Serbia in 1929, there had already been a previous
division of country into smaller administrative units. Upon the implementation of
the Statute of the Division of Country into Administrative Areas from April the
26th 1922, observed from within the borders of 1914, there were 15 out of 33
administrative units in total on the territory of Serbia. -
, , ,
, , (, 1927) [Decree on the
Division of Country into Regions, Law on General Administration, Law on the
Regional and District Self-government, edited by Dr. Mihajlo Ili, third edition,
(Belgrade, 1927)], 1116; B. Petranovi, M. Zeevi, Jugoslavija 19181984. Zbirka
dokumenata, (Beograd, 1985) [Yugoslavia 19181984. Collection of Documents,
(Belgrade, 1985)], 184185.
B. Gligorijevi, Unutranje (administrativne) granice Jugoslavije izmeu dva svetska
rata 19181941, Istorija 20. veka [Internal (Administrative) Borders of Yugoslavia
Between the Two Wars 19181941, History of the 20th Century], 12/1992, 3032;
Popov, op. cit., 181.

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3/2015.

border, during an escape attempt.14 The Partys internal organization

network was almost completely destroyed.15 However, this small, well
organized Party with capable members further strengthened by influx
of young and well-disciplined members, who were fanatically loyal to the
ideals of the world revolution, well-adjusted to non-parliamentary forms
of struggle and highly conspiratorial modes of operation managed to
stand up to the regime with more success than it did in the early 1920s
when Obznana (1920) and the Law for the Protection of Public Security and Order in the Sate (1921) were passed.
The deep crisis which shook the Yugoslav state during 1928 was
seen by communists as an unequivocal indicator of the breakdown of the
bourgeois system, while the murder and wounding of Croatian MPs was
placed within the context of Serbian hegemony over Croats and other
peoples and national minorities.16 Punia Rai was presented in Partys
announcements, as an agent [...] of the ruling Serbian bourgeoisie and
a clique of the court and generals,17 while the Croatian provincial leadership of the CPY kept emphasizing that with the murder of the leaders of Croatian Peasant Party in the National Assembly on October the
20th, the bourgeois government had shown [...] the way in which it wants
to suppress Croatian agrarian movement in Croatia [underlined in the
document itself D. B.]18
The events that occurred in the National Assembly placed the
Croatian issue which already had a dominant position in the national
politics of most of the bourgeois parties and the CPY at the focus of
almost all political factors in country. The shots fired in the Parliament
marked for the communists in Serbia the beginning of the armed strug14
15
16
17
18

More on this subject: , (,

1963) [Overview of the History of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, (Belgrade,
1963)], 161179.
. ,
(19211930), [K. Nikoli, Terrorist Activity
of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Kingdome of SCS (19211930),
Historical Herald], 12/1993, 99.
D. Luka, Radniki pokret u Jugoslaviji i nacionalno pitanje 19181941, (Beograd,
1972) [Workers Movement in Yugoslavia and the National Question 19181941,
(Belgrade, 1972)], 245248.
AY, fund of Communist Youth International (hereinafter referred to as: CYI),
1928/55.
AY, fund of Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
(hereinafter referred to as: CC LCY), Corpus Croatia, I/2. The leadership of the CPYs
Local Committee in Zagreb said that after the events that occurred in the National
Assembly, Stjepan Radi was poisoned in a hospital, on the order of the Yugoslav
regime. - AY, fund of Communist International (hereinafter referred to as: CI),
1928/69.

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The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

gle for the national emancipation of Croats. The secretariat of the CPY
for Serbia issued a proclamation on the same day, aimed at the working people of towns and countryside, which assessed that it was high
time for the Croatian people to shatter those shameful fetters and to gain
freedom and its national emancipation in an open fight against the rulers
in Belgrade. That emancipation would be expressed in the formation of
the independent Croatian republic.19 The slogan of independent Croatia, without the mention of the rest of Yugoslav provinces, was posted
in the proclamation of the CPYs Local Committee in Zagreb, regarding
the death of Stjepan Radi on 8 August 1928.20 Representatives of the
LCYY held an opinion that never before had the Croatian people been
so exploited, so cheated and murdered as under the bloody Serbian government of financial magnates concluding that this [1928] regime was
worse than Russian tsarist regime.21 According to historical research,
during the second half of 1928, a more serious resistance against the regime, through organization of protests and strikes, was offered by the
communists, but only in Zagreb, while in other cities there was only passive resistance, due to undeveloped connection between Party cells.22 In
a wider perspective the Yugoslav communists spoke about the creation
of a federation of free worker-peasant republics, which would encompass Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Albania.23
Leaders of the world workers movement within the Communist
International (hereinafter referred to as: CI, Comintern) have insisted on
armed combat to be organized inside the Serbia itself, which was viewed
19

20

21
22
23

In the proclamation of the provincial Party subdivision in Serbia, full solidarity

with the Croatian people had been expressed: In that justified struggle against the
hegemonistic bourgeoisie and militaristic monarchy, which is the greatest enemy
of, not only Croatian people, but of the Serbian working people as well, the working
class of Yugoslavia, together with Serbian workers at its front, shall be alongside the
Croatian people with both its body and soul. - AY, CI, 1928/42.
The text of the proclamation of the CPYs Local Committee in Zagreb on August the
8 1928, mentions that Stjepan Radi perished because of the Great-Serbian fascist
power holders which first wounded him in the Parliament and then poisoned him
in a Belgrade hospital. On the day of Stjepan Radis funeral the Local Committee in
Zagreb announced a general workers strike as a sign of protest against barbaric and
murderous government, which beats, poisons and murders its political adversaries.
- AY, CI, 1928/69.
AY, fund of the Central Committee of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia
(hereinafter referred to as: CC LCYY), 1928/11, 1.
B. Gligorijevi, Kominterna, jugoslovensko i srpsko pitanje, (Beograd, 1992) [Comitern,
the Yugoslav and Serbian Question, (Belgrade, 1992)], 243244; S. Cvetkovi, Idejne
borbe u KPJ, (Beograd, 1985) [Ideological Conflicts in the CPY, (Belgrade 1985)],
209210; Luka, op. cit., 249264.
AY, CI, 1928/50, 1.

71

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as a political center and a stronghold of monarchy and ruling Belgrade

oligarchy. A letter for Serbia sent from Moscow in July 1928, said that
Yugoslav working masses outside of Serbia should hear the words of our
workers and peasants from Serbia proper, and be assured that they are
also fighting against the hegemony of Serbian bourgeoisie.24
At the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, besides
frequent accusations against the politics of the Serbian bourgeoisie,
the CPY also criticized the military leadership, the court clique and
King Aleksandar as the personification of Yugoslav regime. For the communists, the Yugoslav monarch bloody eunuch King Aleksandar the
Last was with his lowly bootlickers the generals a representative of
big industrialists and landowners.25 In the proclamations of provincial
subdivisions of the CPY, there were mentions of the bandit gang headed by bloody and devious King Aleksandar, which has been plundering and killing for a whole ten years,26 while according to the opinion
of representatives of the progressive youth, the Serbian bourgeoisie
had strengthened its positions, discarded the Croatian bourgeoisie like
a drained peace of lemon and openly started to persecute and exploit
Croatian bourgeoisie and Croatian paupers.27

Such strong statements made by the CPY against the Yugoslav
regime and especially against the Serbian bourgeoisie were direct
results of the process of bolshevization of the Party. During the 1920s,
and especially after 1924, when the Comintern undertook to resolve the
Yugoslav issue,28 there were struggles within the CPY against faction24
25
26
27
28

AY, CI, 1928/61. Communists from Serbia proper were told that the masses in
Serbia should be explained that it is in their best interest to take part in a mutual
struggle with the Croatian people, against the mutual enemy. - AY, CI, 1928/76, 7.
AY, CC LCY, Corpus Serbia, I/9.
AY, CI, 1928/46.
AY, CC LCYY, 1928/11, 12.
Besides the involvement in internal issues of the CPY at the beginning of the 1920s,
Comintern strove to directly influence the situation in the Kingdom of SCS. CI saw
the power with which it was possible to act against the Great-Serbian regime in the
political activity of the Stjepan Radi, who was working on the internationalization
of the Croatian issue since the 1922. At the invitation of the representative of the
world workers movement, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party came to Moscow
at the beginning of June 1924, where he signed an agreement on the cooperation of
the CPP and the Peasant International. CI directed its activity towards the faction
wars an internal issue of the CPY at the beginning of 1925. By assuming the
role of the supreme arbitrator, the Comintern formed a Commission for the
Yugoslav Issue, on March the 25th, whose members were, among the others, Joseph
Stalin, Dmitry Manuilsky and Georgy Zinoviev. - More on this subject: G. Vlaji,
Jugoslavenska revolucija i nacionalno pitanje [Yugoslav Revolution and the National
Question], (Zagreb, 1984), 143156, 180194.

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of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

ism, social democratic remnants, liquidationism, petty bourgeoisie

tendencies, anarcho-communist activities, opportunism, disloyalty,
reformism, and so forth. As far as the role of Comintern in the so-called
faction wars within the CPY is concerned, there are numerous studies that show the introduction of discipline via the political isolation of
prominent individuals of the older generations, who were adjusted to the
pre-war methods of political activity and could not accept the abolition
of pluralism in deliberation, under the slogan of building a monolithic
world workers movement.29 In the process of eliminating left wing and
right wing tendencies within the CPY, there was a particularly fierce
struggle against the group of Sima Markovi, whose center was located
in Belgrade.30
The aforementioned period (19241928) was marked by a radical shift in politics of the CPY towards the Yugoslav community. The thesis of national unity of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was discarded, while
the pro Yugoslav attitude from the beginning of the 1920s quickly faded
away.31 The transformation of attitudes of the CPY in the spirit of dissolution of the Kingdom of SCS viewed as a Versailles creation coincided with the growing crisis in the country. Simultaneously, stereotypes
were formed, on the hegemony of the Serbian, that is, the Great-Serbian
bourgeoisie, and Serbian people as a whole. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the conclusions of the Fourth Congress of the CPY, held in
Dresden four months after the events in the National Assembly had
occurred presented the highpoint of anti-Yugoslav, anti-Serbia and, as
a final instance, general anti-Serbian sentiment in the Party. The policy
of breaking up the mutual state by enforcing the peoples right to selfdetermination and their complete emancipation was verified in 1926, at
the Third Congress of the CPY and was further strengthened by the conclusion that the same right be given to the national minorities. In relation
to that principle, there were mentions at the Fourth Congress of the CPY
about the right of Hungarians and Germans in Vojvodina and Albanians
(Arnauts, Shqiptars) in Kosovo and Metohija. Concerning the latter
according to the Yugoslav communists one third of the Albanian population was under the rule of the Great-Serbian bourgeoisie against which
it pursues the same oppressive regime, as it does in Macedonia, along
29
30
31

B. Jaki, Svest socijalnog protesta. Ogled o meuratnom jugoslovenskom marksizmu,

(Beograd, 1986) [Conscience of the Social protest. Essays on the Inter-war Yugoslav
Marxism, (Belgrade, 1986)], 158.
AY, CI, 1927/17; AY, CI, 1927/25; AY, CI, 1927/29; AY, CI, 1927/62; AY, CI, 1928/7...
More on this subject: . ,
(19191935), (, 1983) [D. Pei, Yugoslav Communists and the National
question (19191935), (Belgrade, 1983)], 82244.

73

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with the permanent tendency to occupy northern parts of Albania. Representatives of the CPY expressed the solidarity of workers and peasants
for other peoples of Yugoslavia, and above all Serbia, with Albanian national-revolutionary movement under the guidance of the Kosovo Committee,
calling for the working class to whole heartedly support the oppressed
and fragmented Albanian people in their struggle for the independent and
unified Albania. It is worthy noticing that the term Albanian areas, within
Partys rhetoric, included the areas occupied in Macedonia and Kosovo.32
Introduction of King Aleksandars absolute rule on 6 January1929, along with the institution of a tighter central administration
in the country, followed by a wave of persecutions of both proven and
suspected opponents of the regime, convinced communists even more in
the correctness of their attitudes. Filip Filipovi pointed out the class
character [...] of the union between Serbian, Croatian and Slovene great
financial bourgeoisie under the monarchial hegemony.33 Within the
Party, there was an opinion that the autocracy in Yugoslavia presents
a veil for the dictatorship of the Belgrade stock market.34 Institution of
the dictatorship also presented a brutal assault on the working class: it
presents a barbaric exploitation of peasantry and further national oppression; it presents the weakening of petty bourgeoisie and firing of a
great number of staff members.35
Beside what was already said, Party leaders spoke about the influence of foreign capitalist factors on the situation in the Kingdom of SCS.
According to the words of Josip iinski (Milan Gorki) the royal-military
overthrow in Yugoslavia was not an independent and isolated fact, but a link
in a common chain of politics of international imperialism.36 Thus, the attempts made to establish the central government in the mutual state were
in concordance with the politics of the creation of anti-Soviet block in the
Balkans. Filip Filipovi wrote that with the help of a wild and ruthless white
terror, the bourgeoisie tries to maintain and solidify the rule of its class.
32

33
34
35
36

, II:
19191937 (hereinafter referred to as: ),
(, 1949) [Historical Archive of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, vol. II:
Congresses and national Conferences of CPY 19191937, (hereinafter referred to
as: HA CPY), (Belgrade, 1949)], 152163, 183.
F. Filipovi, Sabrana dela, IXIV, (Beograd, 19871989) [Collected Works, IXIV,
(Belgrade, 19871989)], XI/30.
AY, CI, 1929/4, 3.
Filipovi, op. cit., XI/36.
Revolucija pod okriljem Kominterne. Izabrani spisi Milana Gorkia, priredio i
predgovor napisao Boidar Jaki, (Beograd, 1987) [Revolution Under the Auspices
of the Comintern. Selected Writings of Milan Gorki, compiled and preface written by
Boidar Jaki, (Belgrade, 1987)], 131137.

74

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The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

[...] After ten years of bloody rule of its class, the Great-Serbian bourgeoisie
openly treads on parliamentarism, the constitution and other products of
bourgeois-democratic revolutions, because it wants to be more independent towards special interests of certain capitalist groups; it wants to carry
out politics which suit the interests of international imperialism [underlined
in the document itself D. B.] and Yugoslav upper bourgeoisie. Therefore
military coup dtat greatly increases danger of war, so dictatorship is a
sign for an uproar for the international proletariat as well. Belgrade was
the center of militarism for the communists, so much more, because it was
the main center of the Russian military White Guard emigration.37

In the CPYs rhetoric of the inter bellum period, the thesis of the
preparation for war, by the Great-Serbian bourgeoisie, aimed at the
institution of total dominance in the Balkans, did not fade, despite the
ideological redirections and the dynamics according to which the Partys
official politics were changing.38 For the sake of defending the first country of socialism, the communists emphasized the slogan: War against
war.39 Expecting a quick breakdown of the Yugoslav state and the Versailles system in general, representatives of the CPY have, beginning
from the 1928, paid special attention to working in the army. At the
Fourth Congress of the Party, the army of the Kingdom of SCS was seen
as a part of the bourgeois state apparatus, which the proletariat was
obliged, not to democratize, but to crush. Exceptionally negative disposition of the CPY towards the military leadership was based on the already
existing stereotypes about the Great-Serbian bourgeoisie, since in Yugoslavia, most of the officers came from the ruling [Serbian] nation. On
the other hand, it was assessed that most of the soldiers [...] came from
the oppressed nations, and therefore the conditions for revolutionary
activity were very favorable.40
37
38

39
40

Filipovi, op. cit., XI/31, 9293, 189.

Communists believed that the policy aimed at involving Yugoslavia in a war against
USSR were also determined by the attitude of French and English imperialism
towards Yugoslavia. These two countries were inclined to help the rule of the
Great-Serbian bourgeoisie and militaristic monarchy as a main stronghold of
their imperialism and the strongest military power in the Balkans, and also to
give armament loans and loans for the construction of strategic railways and to
reconcile the differences between the ruling bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of the
oppressed nations, and finally to suppress revolutionary movements of working
class, peasantry and oppressed nations. - [IA CPY], 189.
During the 1920s and the beginning of 1930s, Yugoslav communists said that
proletariat has a homeland that it has to defend the Soviet Union the homeland
of the working class of all countries (underlined in the document itself D. B.). - AY,
CI, 1927/248, 13.
[IA, CPY], 194195.

75

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The communists considered the Yugoslav monarch to be a personification of dictatorship and militarism. This opinion, which was
common for the CPY, the separatist movements and most of the bourgeois politicians, was further strengthened by Kings manner, his lifestyle, his work methods and his political activity. Among the recollections of the contemporaries it was noted that King Aleksandar appeared
in public dressed in military uniform, almost every time, often carrying
his personal arms (saber, pistol) and that he often had very close connections with his officers.41 By appointing division general Petar ivkovi,
commander of the Kings Guard and leader of the White hand officers
league, to the position of Prime Minister, the communists judgment of
King Aleksandar as a militaristic dictator was only reinforced.
Beside the strong influence of military factor (militarism) and
pronounced absolutism (dictatorship), fascism was, according to the
communists, a third pillar of King Aleksandars absolute rule. By examining the ten year results of life in a mutual state, communists considered
that the process of spreading fascism, which began in 1920, by passing
Obznana and breaking of the CPY,42 was running simultaneously with
the preparation of the conditions for the introduction of the absolute
41

42

Both the study of memoirs and historiography agree in assessment that King
Aleksandar, like his father Petar, was born as a soldier, and that his first court was
a military tent, where he was educated and developed as a person. The development
of his personality was highly influenced by the seven year long experience in the
Balkan Wars and World War One (19121918), at the end of which he was crowned
with victorious glory as the Avenger of Kosovo. Years spent on the front have
developed in Aleksandar Karaorevi a sense of discipline and a tendency towards
an energetic, direct, and commanding communication with people. Those wartime
years also introduced him to the world of non-parliamentary mode of rule and
inspired disdain towards political parties and their leaders. In the years after 1918,
the Yugoslav monarch was inclined towards absolute rule, not wanting to accept
the role of a formal representative of the state, limited by the Constitution and the
Parliament. More on this subject: ,
[Gligorijevi, King Aleksandar Karaorvi], I/3304; Petranovi, Zeevi, Agonija
dve Jugoslavije, 155158, [Agony of Two Yugoslavias], 155158; ,
[Minutes MC KY, Introductory Study], XXXXXXIII.
AY, CC LCY, 1928/10, 1. A report from Slovenia says that as early as 1922, a fascist
movement was detected in that province, presented by an indigenous organization
Orjuna (AY, CI, 1923/28, 1). According to the communists the international
Fascist movement was exceptionally well received in Yugoslavia, among the
Yugoslav bourgeoisie of all tribes (ethnic groups). In addition the ruling [Serbian]
bourgeoisie organizes a fascist organization for the combat against all other nations
and tribes, in order to implement its hegemony through terror, [AY, CI, 1923/29
9, 6]. It was also pointed out that in the fight against the workers, the regime is
starting to use fascism on a greater scale (underlined in the document itself D. B.)
- AY, CI, 1923/69, 1.

76

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The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

rule of King Aleksandar. Even though in the Yugoslav case fascism is trying to hide the dictatorships class character, representatives of the CPY
believed that the the primary mission of fascism and fascist dictatorship which thirsts for workers blood43 was the destruction of revolutionary vanguard of working class.44
Simultaneously as it was fighting class combat against the
militaristic-fascist dictatorship, that is the Great-Serbian bourgeoisie, the CPY was emphasizing the national issue as the key issue for the
resolving of existing crisis in the country. At the end of 1920s, national
politics of the Party were based on the thesis of the supremacy hegemony of the Serbian bourgeoisie over other peoples. Therefore according to Josip iinski, it was through autocracy that the concentration
of the entire Yugoslav financial bourgeoisie under the leadership of its
Serbian part [...] Disregarding the fact that there are five Croats and one
Slovene45 within the government, we can view the overthrow as the end
[...] of the ruling function of the Serbian bourgeoisie. Participation of the
members of the Croatian upper bourgeoisie within the new government
does not reduce the national-oppressive character of the Great-Serbian
dictatorship.46 Filip Filipovi considered the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to
be a great dungeon for all the oppressed peoples within it, that is the
darkest circle of Dantes Balkan Inferno.47
The Communists thought that not only did the ten year long
bloody regime of Great-Serbian bourgeoisie fail to solve the national
and the peasant issue, but it even worsened national differences within Yugoslavia.48 Responsibility for the entire crisis in the country was
borne by King Aleksandar, who as an obedient and loyal instrument
of the Great-Serbian bourgeoisie, energetically [...] worked on the concentration of all upper bourgeoisie elements of Yugoslavia under the
hegemony of the Great-Serbs. With that aim he actively worked on the
breaking up of national and religious parties.49 Even though the promo43
44
45

46
47
48
49

AY KOI, 1929/50, 1.
Filipovi, op. cit., XI/30, 9192.
, ,
(18351941), , (,
1988) [Constitutions and Governments of the Principality of Serbia, Kingdome of
Serbia, Kingdome of the SCS (18351941), edited by Duan Mrenovi, (Belgrade,
1988)], 267268; [Minutes of MC CY], 34.
Revolucija pod okriljem Kominterne. Izabrani spisi Milana Gorkia [Revolution Under
the Auspices of the Comintern. Selected Writings of Milan Gorki], 138139.
Filipovi, op. cit., XI/84, 228.
AY, CC LCY, 1928/10, 1.
Filipovi, op. cit., XI/69.

77

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tion of the integral Yugoslav national identity as the new state ideology
was performed at the expense of all national parties and associations,
and carried out in all Yugoslav provinces, the communists believed that
the Serbs and Serbia were in a highly privileged position. By identifying
Yugoslav national identity with Great-Serbianism, leaders of the CPY,
after 6 January 1929, were saying that all national, cultural and sport
organizations in Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Dalmatia and
Vojvodina have been banned and their property confiscated. Instead of
those organizations, fascist Yugoslav ones were founded.50
Beside the struggle for national emancipation of Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins, at the end of the 1920s, a decision was made
that the Party must strengthen its activity within the national revolutionary movement of Macedonians, Albanians and so forth.51 In the aim
of expanding the revolutionary base in the CPYs rhetoric, peoples right
to self-determination was expanded to cover national minorities. On the
ideological plane the process of grouping all oppressed peoples in the
aim of struggle against the ruling nation was on its way. Therefore, the
CPYs Central Committee for Serbia called for the overthrow of the main
enemy of militaristic-fascist dictatorship and Great-Serbian monarchy,52
while the Party literature said how never before was the hatred of oppressed nations Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Albanians, Germans, Hungarians, towards Serbiaas great, as it is now [1930].53
Negative notions within the CPY about the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia as an expanded Serbia created in a violent manner have arisen
from the central world workers movement.54 Already at the middle of
50
51
52
53
54

Ibid., XI/183184.
AY, fund Red Syndical International, 1929/2, 4.
AY, CC LCY, Corpus Serbia, I/5.
AY, CC LCY, 1930/2, 4.
Vlaji, op. cit., 142143. The term Great Serbia appears in a negative context for
the first time at the so called High Treason Trial in Zagreb in 1908. Ljubomir Tadi
mentions that the entry Great-Serbian was taken from the vocabulary of AustroHungarian anti-Serbian propaganda. - . , ,
(, 1992) [Lj. Tadi, On the Great Serbian Hegemonism, (Belgrade, 1992)],
5960. On the other hand, in the years that preceded the unification of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes, Great Serbia was most often mentioned by Serbs both from Serbia
proper and outside of it but not in an affirmative or neutral way, and definitely not
in a negative one. During the autumn of 1914, the state leadership of the Kingdom of
Serbia was praising the Serbian idea aimed at the creation of powerful Slavic state
in the Balkans, which would unite all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. They considered
that after the war, such a strong and great Serbia, enlarged by Serbian and Croatian
lands from Austro-Hungary could secure a balance in the Adriatic, and in certain
way, in the Mediterranean as well. (quoted in: Dimi, op. cit., 912]. About the
development of Serbian national program and Great Serbia, more at: Popov, op. cit.

78

Duan BOJKOVI

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

the 1920s there were mentions of the dictatorship of Old Serbia55 over
the newly included areas.56 The Comintern warned that the strengthening of the position of the ruling regime could awaken the the national
oppression of Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Albanians, Montenegrins
etc., which would turn the Kingdom of SCS into a Great Serbia in which
[the regime] would try to denationalize all non-Serbian peoples.57 By
completely accepting the directives of CI, Yugoslav communists, after the
events that occurred in the National Assembly in 1928, called for the oppressed and working people to fight against the Serbian monarchy.58
Terrorism in the CPYs activities and cooperation with Ustae movement

Party leadership viewed the introduction of King Aleksandars

absolute rule as a signal to raise the social revolution.59 During January
1929, Filip Filipovi wrote how numerous signs show that Yugoslavia
is at the brink of civil war, while in addition the duty of the Party was
to provide political support to individual armed insurgencies, to keep
them in unison and coordinate their activity, to connect them with the
revolutionary combat of the city proletariat, to subordinate them to the
common combat plan of the working class in the aim of overthrowing
the military dictatorship60 The leadership of the CPY through its proclamation of 16 February 1929, called for the working class, petty and
middle peasants and working masses of the oppressed nations to embrace armed combat in order to overthrow the bourgeois dictatorship
and institute the rule of workers and peasants.61
However, circumstances in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the first
half of 1929 were not in accordance with the expectations of the CPY.
Even though the opinion that with the introduction of absolutistic dictatorship the Yugoslav bourgeoisie did not manage to improve its shaken
position at all was still persistent, the leadership of the Party was forced
to a conclusion at the extended session of CCs Politburo in May 1929 that
the revolutionary situation was not ripe.62 By temporarily suppressing

55
56
57
58
59
60

61
62

This is a reference to the Kingdom of Serbia within the pre-1912 borders.

AY, fund The Peasant International, 65, 3.
AY, fund Balkan Communist Federation, 94, 2.
AY, CC LCY, 1929/13.
D. Pei, op. cit., 249251; Proleter, 1, (March 1929), 3.
F. Filipovi, op. cit., XI/33, 64, 79, 99101.
AY, CI, 1929/29, 4.
AY, CI, 1929/33, 16.

79

its direct action slogan, the CPY did not lose its revolutionary essence,
but the thesis on an armed insurrection, after May 1929, returned its
revolutionary character, instead. The idea of the violent overthrow of the
state structure was still present among the communists, which saw the
growth of national dissatisfaction in the numerous problems of the Yugoslav economic, social and political scene.63 Besides that, consequences
of the economic crisis, whose duration coincided with the 6 January dictatorship, was ignored in the Party propaganda.
Comintern stated its position on the raising of a revolution in Yugoslavia, quite late. In a letter sent to the leadership of the CPY on 30
May 1930 stands that the slogan of armed insurrection still remains as
a slogan of mass agitation, but that it is not an action slogan. Agitation
for that slogan, in contemporary conditions, needs to explain, to the public masses, both the political need for an armed struggle for the overthrow of fascist dictatorship and the forms of practical preparation for
the armed insurgence.64
The aforementioned attitude of the Comintern simultaneously
implied the condemnation of individual terror as a mean of struggle of
the CPY against Yugoslav regime. According to historical research, terrorist disposition among the communists, which was particularly expressed during 1929 and 1930, was a result of conviction and well measured politics of Party leadership.65 In this period members of the LCYY
and the CPY who lost their lives in an armed conflict with the police,
during arrest, were celebrated in the Party newspapers as heroes of the
working class.66 However, after 1930, these actions were discarded as an
expression of petty bourgeois despair. Party leadership concluded that
individual terror cannot be of any use to the working class and peoples struggle, but causes direct harm, instead.67Contrary to undertaking individual acts, leadership of the CPY encouraged penetration into
the masses, that is, working on winning over the masses of the working
people.68
Communists found allies in their struggle against the Belgrade
power-holders primarily within the Ustae members, who also had a
63
64
65

66
67
68

Already in October 1929, it was assessed that there is a deep revolutionary brewing
among the working masses which are radicalizing and activating. - Filipovi, op.
cit., XI/156.
AY, CI, 1930/18.
Gligorijevi, Kominterna [Comintern], 245247; Nikoli, op. cit., 145146.
AY, CYI, 1929/37.
Revolucija pod okriljem Kominterne [Revolution Under the Auspices of the Comintern],
392393.
Proleter, 28, (December 1932), 2.

Duan BOJKOVI

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

strong anti-Yugoslav disposition. The communists did not view the Croatian Party of Rights (hereinafter referred to as: CPR) as a fascist one, but
as a bourgeois-nationalist party which possesses a left wing [...] quite
close to us.69 Planting reliable Party members into this left wing of
the Ustae movement was supposed to provide a permanent connection
with the leadership of the CPR and in a further perspective take control
of the entire movement.70 Principally, the communists condemned the
cooperation of Ustae with Italy and other imperialistic powers. However, according to Josip iinski, a temporary strategic compromise with
the [foreign] imperialism [...] is permitted in order to depose the Yugoslav regime.71 Therefore, the communists were acquiring their weaponry
through fixed smuggling channels, leading from Italy to Hungary, through
Yugoslav territories at the end of 1920s and beginning of 1930s.72
Leadership of the CPY expressed special solidarity with the
Ustae movement in September of 1932, during the so called Insurrection of Lika. The Communists marked this unsuccessful attack on a police
station in Brumani carried out by few Ustae members as an uprising
against the Yugoslav authorities. The fact that the Ustae movement is
starting its actions in Lika and North Dalmatia the poorest areas of Yugoslavia meant, according to the Party leadership, that the social-economic and national moments play a great role in that movement. Local
subdivisions of the CPY were told that it was the duty [...] of all communist organizations and every communist to support, organize and lead
that movement.73 However, contrary to all expectations, there was no
further escalation of the Insurrection.

Beginning of the transformation of the CPYs territorial

organization structure

Anti-Yugoslav attitudes within the CPY were particularly augmented after the division of the state into banovinas in 1929. Party leadership believed that the Great-Serbian bourgeoisie wanted to destroy
every single national and historical characteristic of certain areas [...],
to fragment national provinces and to suppress all legal possibilities for
leading struggle for national emancipation.74 In their opinion, banovinas
69
70
71
72
73
74

AY, CYI, 1929/28.

Gligorijevi, op. cit., 258270; B. Nikoli, op. cit, 151152.
AY, CYI, 1929/24.
Gligorijevi, op. cit., 245.
Proleter, 28, (December 1932), 23.
Filipovi, op. cit., XI/83.

81

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in essence present the crown of national oppression, since the Law of

3 October practically created Great Serbia [underlined in the document
itself D. B.].75By neglecting the real situation, the communists said that
the formation of nine banovinas pashaluks76 actually denotes the
breaking up of Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and
Slovenia.77 Despite the rhetoric of the CPY, there can be no word about
the atomization of the aforementioned provinces (except Bosnia and
Herzegovina), because through the institution of new inner borders, the
historical continuity was not particularly broken up. In addition, among
the preserved historical sources of Party provenance there is no mention
of the division of Serbia into five banovinas.
During the 1920s and the beginning of 1930s, there were no particular discussions about situation in Old Serbia within the CPY.78 Due
to regimes oppressive measures,79 part of the leadership had already left
the country in the 1929, while the rest of the CC soon stopped acting as
a unique body. Occasional reports from the 1931, assessed that the Party
is not active, it does not show signs of life.80 The Comintern undertook
to address the situation within the CPY, as late as the middle of 1932,
by performing the first purge of Yugoslav members and by forming a
temporary leadership in Vienna, headed by Josip iinski.81 During the
second half of 1932, the CPY was working on the restoration of Party
structures in the country.82
Concerning the introduction of new administrative measures in
the south of the country, the communists believed that in order to colonize these areas as soon as possible the territory of Kosovo and Metohija
75

76
77
78
79
80
81
82

AY, CC LCY, 1930/2, 3. The thesis of the CI and the CPY about the Kingdom of SCS as
a Great Serbia was close to the positions of the CPP. Discussing with the leaders of
Comintern in Moscow during June 1924, Stjepan Radi asserted that in the current
composition of the Peasant International [...] there can be no representative of
Yugoslavia, because there is no Yugoslavia at this moment, only a militaristic and
bandit Great Serbia under the name of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. - AY,
CI, 1924/37, 2.
AY, CI, 1930/2; Proleter, 8, (1 December, 1929), 1.
AY, CI, 1929/62, 6.
The term Old Serbia encompassed areas of former Kosovo eyalet, excluding
Macedonia.
More on this subject: Dobrivojevi, Dravna represija [State Repression], 256280.
AY, CI, 1931/4, 4. One report from January 1935 about the attitude of Party structures
in a country says that during 1931, the CPY did not have its organization. - AY, CI,
1035/20, 5.
Gligorijevi, op. cit., 248253.
[Review of the History of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia], 161190.

82

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The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

was split into three banovinas: Morava, Zeta and Vardar. [...] Dictatorship set the same goal as in the redistribution of land in Croatia, Bosnia
and Dalmatia the creation of Great-Serbian supremacy in the majority
of banovinas and extension of aggressive political, economic and national oppression.83
After 3 October 1929, the CPY did not adapt its territorial organization structure to the new situation in the field, but instead it kept its
old division into provincial, district, regional, county and local committees. This principle, based on the negation of the domestic politics of the
Yugoslav authorities, was abandoned only in the area of Old Serbia. So
the process of separating Metohija, Kosovo and Sandak from the CPYs
PC for Serbia and the inclusion of the aforementioned areas into Montenegrin provincial organization was under way.84 By deciding to separate
the aforementioned areas from within the CPYs PC for Serbia, the communists acted in the spirit of undoing the injustice, committed in the
period of wars from 1912 to 1918 by the Great-Serbian bourgeoisie,
which with the help of French imperialism conquered so many nonSerbian peoples by force.85 In that manner, leaders of the CPY wished
to move closer to the national-revolutionary movements of the oppressed peoples, by which they especially meant the Montenegrins
and the Arnauts. In the latter case, the national policy of the CPY suffered a complete defeat during interbellum, because the communists did
not manage to penetrate into the Arnaut masses.
Sources and literature
Sources
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, ): (Archives
of Yugoslavia. Administration of Penitentiaries funds (Poarevac,
Sremska Mitrovica, Maribor): items of the convicted communists)
(Archives of Yugoslavia. Fund Balkan Communist federation)
.
(Archives of Yugoslavia. Fund of the
Central Committee of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia)

83
84
85

Proleter, 10, (20 January 1930), 5.

AY, CI, 1932/173; 1933/480.
AY, CC LCY, Corpus Serbia, I/7, 1.

83

3/2015.

.
, (Archives of Yugoslavia. Fund of Central
Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Corpus Serbia)
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Croatia)
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Newspapers and magazines

Proleter (19291932)

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The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

8. Dobrivojevi, Ivana. Dravna represija u doba diktature kralja Ale

ksandra 19291935. Beograd: ISI, 2006.
9. Dobrivojevi, Ivana. Sudstvo i sudije u doba estojanuarskog reima
kralja Aleksandra (19291935). Tokovi istorije 34/2005, 2853.
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12. Jaki, Boidar. Svest socijalnog protesta. Ogled o meuratnom
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Zbirka dokumenata. Beograd: Rad, 1985.
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sveta, 1987.
18. Petranovi, Branko. Istorija Jugoslavije, IIII. Beograd: Nolit, 1988.
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25. Stojkov, Todor. Opozicija u vreme estojanuarske diktature 1929
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26. , . . :
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: :
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The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Autocratic Rule

of King Aleksandar Karaorevi

.
.

3. 1929. .
1928. 1929. .
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87

 327(497.1:48)1952/1954(093.2)
329.14(48)1952/1954(093.2)
32:929 .1952/1954(093.2)

: 14. 9. 2015.
: 26. 10. 2015.

Aleksandar V. MILETI
Institute for Recent History of Serbia
samiletic@gmal.com

Unrealised Nordic Dream.

Milovan ilas and the Scandinavian Socialists

Abstract: At the beginning of 1950s, Yugoslavia faced the

ideological problem of justifying its complicated foreign
policy position, due to its conflict with the Eastern Bloc and
the growing need for the cooperation with the West. While
trying to solve this issue, Yugoslav leadership started establishing contacts and cooperation with the Western European
Left. The aim of this paper is to present one episode of Milovan ilass foreign policy activities related to the establishment of the first steps for cooperation between Yugoslav
communists and a representative of Scandinavian socialists
in the period of 19521954.
Key words: Milovan ilas, Scandinavian socialists, Yugoslav
communists, Yugoslavia, Scandinavia

After the Informbiro (Cominform) Resolution in 1948, Yugoslavia

was in a difficult international situation. The complexity of the situation
was reflected in the fact that Yugoslavia, as a socialistic country, could no
longer rely on aid and support from the East (the USSR and its satellites),
but neither could it start cooperation with the capitalist West, first due
to ideological reasons, since such an activity would mean an indubitable

This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project Serbs
and Serbia in the Yugoslav and International Context: Internal Development and
Position within European/World Community ( 47027), financed by the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

89

3/2015.

compromise within the international labour movement. That is why the

Yugoslav political confrontation with the East, as the conflict was escalating, directed its government more intensely towards searching for an
alternative cooperation in the foreign policy field, and which, it was obvious, should have been sought on the opposite side of the world already
divided into blocs. The West European Left was an important link for
the Yugoslav undertaking in the period of establishing political connections with the West. The importance of cooperation with the West European Left is reflected in the practical, political and ideological sphere.
The visits of Western political representatives to Yugoslavia, as
well as the visits of Yugoslav political officials to Western countries, were
important for the introduction and connection of the Yugoslav government with the West.1 The Yugoslav side consciously initiated such meetings and visits, since each political contact and connection in the West
was precious support for the current policy. Even though the contacts
with some of the representatives of the Western European movements
and left parties had already existed, and some individuals had visited
Yugoslavia (even before 1948),2 more serious activities began in 1950.
1

See: Ljubodrag Dimi, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat. Ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza
Tita (19441974), (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014) [Yugoslavia and the Cold War. Essays
on the Foreign Policy of Josip Broz Tito 19441974, (Belgrade: Arhipelag, 2014)];
Dragan Bogeti, Jugoslavija i Zapad 19521955. Jugoslovensko pribliavanje
NATO-u (Beograd: Slubeni list SRJ, 2000) [Yugoslavia and the West 19521955.
Yugoslav Rapprochement to NATO, (Belgrade: Slubeni list SRJ, 2000)]; Darko Beki,
Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama 19491955 [Yugoslavia in the
Cold War. Relations with the Superpowers], (Zagreb: Globus, 1988); ,
, 19451992, (: Clio, 1999), [Walter Laqueur, Europe in
Our Time, a History 19451992, (Belgrade: Clio, 1999)]; Spoljna politika Jugoslavije
19501961, urednik S. Selini, (Beograd: INIS, 2008), [Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia
19501961, dited by S. Selini (Belgrade: IRHS, 2008)]; Velike sile i male drave u
hladnom ratu 19451955. Sluaj Jugoslavije, urednik Lj. Dimi, (Beograd: Filozofski
fakultet, Arhiv SCG, INIS, 2008), [Superpowers and Small Countries in the Cold
War 19451955. The Case of Yugoslavia, dited by Lj. Dimi (Belgrade: Faculty of
Philosophy, Archive of SCG, IRHS, 2008)]; , .
, (: , 2010), [Yugoslavia in the Cold War, dited by A. ivoti,
(Belgrade: IRHS, 2010)]; D. Bogeti, Jugoslovensko pribliavanje Zapadu u vreme
sukoba sa Kominformom, Istorija XX veka [Yugoslav Rapprochement to the West
during the Conflict with the Cominform, History of the XX Century] 1/1998, 61
67; Milovan ilas, Vlast i pobuna, (Beograd: Knjievne novine, 1991) [Power and
Rebellion, (Belgrade: Knjievne novine, 1991)].
See: Archives of Yugoslavia (Y), Cabinet of Marshal of Yugoslavia (CMY), 1-2/120, Marshal Tito Receives British Labour Delegates and Secretary in the British
Government G. Henry, S Bing and G. Word Snows (Belgrade), 6 September 1946,
14; Y, CMY, 1-2-/121, Marshal Tito Receives British Labour Delegate Conny
Zilliakus, (Belgrade), 7 September 1946, 14; Y, CMY, 1-2-/122, Marshal Tito
Receives British Labour Delegate John Platts-Mills (Belgrade), 8 January 1947,

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Milovan ilas and the Scandinavian Socialists

Among the Western European Left, the British Labour Party was the
most important, as well as the French Socialists (SFIO), German SocialDemocratic Party (SDP), etc. Scandinavian socialist also had an important position, especially the Swedish and Norwegian party. Milovan ilas,
the president of the Commission for International Relations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CC CPY), was given
the task of establishing aforementioned contacts.
Political contacts with the Swedish Social-Democratic Party
(Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti SAP), were establish in the
mid-1951. The relationships were developing without any difficulties,
so that the visit of a SAP representative to Yugoslavia3 was arranged in
spring of the following year. However, contrary to other Western European Left parties, a strong theoretical dispute with the representatives of
Yugoslav communists characterized the relationship with the SAP.
The proposal for the visit of a SAP representative to Yugoslavia
was made by the Yugoslav side. At the meeting of a Yugoslav representative with the SAP secretary Sven Aspling4 and SAP secretary for the international affairs Kaj Bjrk in Stockholm in March 1952,5 it was decided
that a Swedish socialist and journalist Kaj Bjrk6 would pay a visit to
Yugoslavia in April. The goal of this visit was to introduce the Yugoslav
society and political system to the SAP representative. Yugoslavia was

5
6

13; Y, CMY, 1-2-/124, Marshal Tito Receives Group of British Parliamentarians,

Labour Delegate (Belgrade), 6 October 1947, 111; Y, CMY, 1-2-/128, Marshal
Tito Receives Member of the British Parliament Conny Zilliakus, (Belgrade), 4
September 1949; Y, CMY, 1-2-/130, Marshal Tito Receives Former delegate of the
British Parliament Conny Zilliakus by (Belgrade), 30 April 1950.
Y, 507/IX, Central Committee of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY),
Commission for the International Relations and Correspondence (CIRC), Sweden,
125/II-14, Record of the Conversation with the Secretary of the Swedish SocialDemocratic Party Sven Aspling, on 26 January 1952; Y, 507/IX, CC LCY, CIRC,
Sweden, 125/II-14, Record of the Phone Conversation with Sven Aspling.
Sven Gustav Aspling (19122000), Swedish socialist politician and journalist. Born
in Filipstad. Before WWII, he worked as a journalist in the Swedish daily Vrmlands
Folkblad. Organizational Secretary of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party (SAP)
from 1946 and a general secretary from 1948. He was a representative of the SAP
in the Swedish parliament (19561985) and the Minister of Social Affairs (1962
1976). He died in Stockholm in 2000.
Y, 507/IX, CC LCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-14, Record of the Conversation with Sven
Apsling and Kaj Bjrk, 5 March 1952.
Kaj Ake Bjrk (1918), a Swedish socialist politician, diplomat and journalist. Born
in Goteborg. He was a Secretary for International Affairs in the Swedish SocialDemocratic party (19471955). He edited social-democratic newspapers Tiden and
Ny Tid. He was a delegate in the upper chamber of the Swedish Parliament (1965
1973), a SAP representative in the Socialist International and a Swedish ambassador
in China. He lives in Goteborg.

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completely unknown to the Swedish socialists, and while arranging the

visit, Bjrk defined his fields of interests and issues to be discussed with
the representatives of Yugoslav communists. Bjrk primarily wanted to
obtain a general picture of Yugoslavia and to discuss the Yugoslav foreign policy position. He then added that, as for the theoretical issues,
he was especially interested in a discussion about socialism and democracy and the Yugoslav experience in those matters, that he wanted to be
introduced to the work of mass organizations and the press, and that
he wanted to pay a visit to an industrial facility.7 Kaj Bjrk stayed in Yugoslavia for two weeks, from 8 to 22 April 1952, and on the day he arrived,
he dined with Milovan ilas, Rodoljub olakovi and Vladimir Dedijer.8
During his stay, Bjrk was enabled to stay in several cities (Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zenica, Zagreb, Rijeka, Ljubljana and Bled) and thus visit some
industrial facilities and meet a number of prominent individuals.9
During the aforementioned visit to Yugoslavia, Kaj Bjrk had an
opportunity to speak with some of the party leaders. A month-long theoretical discussion with Rodoljub olakovi had started on that occasion
and developed later on, which opened a number of issues primarily from
the area of theory, ideology and political practice, on which Yugoslav
communists and Swedish social-democrats profoundly disagreed. The
basic issue that was discussed, and generally the problem that was the
point of misunderstanding was the question of parliamentary democracy and the single-party system. They had a great influence both on the
official political cooperation of the two parties, and the state cooperation
of Sweden and Yugoslavia in that period, since the SAP leadership made
it perfectly clear to the Yugoslavs that we in principle tend to cooperate
only with foreign parties that share our basic attitude towards political
democracy and are members of the Socialist International.10 However,
this did not mean that communication and exchange of experience,
even through unofficial cooperation ceased to exist; quite the contrary,
the connections and contacts deepened in the following months, and the
friendship between the two parties was cherished and emphasized.
7
8
9
10

Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-14, Record of Kaj Bjrks Arrival, a

Representative of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-14, Agenda of Kaj Bjrks Stay in Yugoslavia,
1.
Read more: Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-14, Material on Kaj Bjrks stay
in Yugoslavia from 8 to 20 April 1952 and the Correspondence between CPY and
SAP.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-14, Letter of Sven Aspling, general secretary
of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party to the Commission for International Affairs
of CC CPY, 12 May 1952.

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Milovan ilas and the Scandinavian Socialists

This has been confirmed by the documents which clearly

showed that the Swedish Social-Democratic Party was concerned with
maintaining mutual contacts and connections with the Yugoslav communists, regardless of the fact that such a practice, for reasons of principle and ideological consideration for other parties (the members
of the Socialist International), should not have been formalized. In his
letter, addressed to the Foreign Policy Commission CC CPY, on 12 May
1952, Kaj Bjrk expressed the desire (besides official detachment from
direct political cooperation for the aforementioned reasons), to share
information that are of mutual interest and proposed the theoretical discussion that should have been led in the Swedish social- democratic weekly Tiden (the editor in chief was Bjrk), and in a Yugoslav
weekly.11 A positive reply from the Yugoslav side soon arrived in the
letter written by Milovan ilas, on behalf of Foreign Policy Commission of CC CPY on 13 June, addressed to the SAP secretary Sven Aspling.
Having understood the political conditions that prevented direct cooperation, ilas accepted the theoretical discussion, emphasizing that
it is a very convenient form to explain and introduce the attitudes and
aspects of some of the most important issues of the labour movement,
and to comprehend political democracy, and he finished the letter with
the following words: the CPY has never, and certainly not today, stood
on non-democratic positions, neither when it comes to its internal life,
nor to the development of its country, and the fact that it was necessary
for Yugoslavia to take a revolutionary path, has not proved yet that such
a path has to be completed by the establishment of non-democratic social forms, like in the USSR. Both the internal and international positions of Yugoslavia are completely different from the one in the USSR
twenty or more years ago. However, those are precisely the issues that
can be illuminated both for you and us only through a discussion.12
Thus, the challenge for a theoretical discussion was accepted, and Rodoljub olakovi (with whom Kaj Bjrk had already stared the discussion during his stay in Yugoslavia)13 was officially appointed as an interlocutor on the Yugoslav side. The topic of the discussion was socialism
and democracy, and in the following several months of its duration, it
revealed the profound differences between Yugoslav communists and
Swedish Social-Democrats in the matters of democracy and the multi11
12
13

Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-14, Kaj Bjrks Letter to Janez Stanovnik,
12 May 1952.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-14, Milovan ilass Letter to Sven Aspling,
General Secretary of the Swedish Social-Democratic Party.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-14, Vladimir Dedijers Letter to Kaj Bjrk.

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party parliamentary system of the western type (i.e. the possibility for
it to be established in Yugoslavia).14

Due to the lack of sources (primarily archival material), we cannot precisely offer a general picture of the cooperation with the Norwegian socialists, i.e. Norwegian Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet AP). However, it can be determined from the limited sources that the cooperation
with the AP was fairly dynamic, and that the activities in that area were
present from 1951, when the contacts were established. The AP delegation stayed in Yugoslavia in the same year, and in the following period,
Yugoslav and Norwegian journalists paid mutual visits and strengthened the cooperation. The report of the Commission for International
Relations (December 1953), stated that contrary to other parties in the
Scandinavian countries, as well as many others, this party has been most
persistent in their contacts with us.15 The review of the cooperation with
Norwegian socialists is important for our topic because of an invitation
addressed to Milovan ilas in mid 1953 to visit Norway, and the proposal
of AP to, while on the journey, visit both Denmark and Sweden. Some details of the proposal to Milovan ilas can be ascertained in the notes from
the conversation with Haakon Lie,16 secretary of the AP. The document
shows that the visit would follow an invitation of the AP, and its goal was
contact and mutual exchange of opinions with the party leadership, the
representatives of the government and labour organizations, etc. The
visit should have had a private character. Lie considered it useful for ilas
to visit both Denmark and Sweden. Thus, it was arranged for ilass visit
to last for about 7 days, and together with Denmark and Sweden about
12 days. Meanwhile, ilas, besides meeting with the AP leadership and
the representatives of the government and labour organizations, would
have the opportunity to visit industrial facilities and factories. The Scandinavian parties would bear all costs, while ilas would bear only the
costs of the arrival and return. The general secretary of the AP emphasized the importance of the visit to Scandinavia as a whole. There was
an attempt, during the conversation, to indirectly associate this with the
14
15
16

Read more: Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-16, Contribution to the Topic
Socialism and Democracy Published in Sweden and Yugoslavia as Agreed with LCY
and SAP.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Working Groups of the Commission, S/a-19, On Previous
Relations with the Socialists, (from the beginning including 1953) 31 December
1953, 45.
Haakon Steen Lie (19052009), a Norwegian socialist politician. Born in Christiania
(todays Oslo). At the beginning of the 1920s, he joined the Norwegian Labour
Party (AP). During WWII he was an active member of the Norwegian Resistance
Movement. After the war he performed the duties of a general secretary of the AP
(19451969). He died in Oslo in 2009.

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Milovan ilas and the Scandinavian Socialists

potential change of the Norwegian and Danish foreign policy course towards the Atlantic Treaty, i.e. the potential creation of the alliance of the
Scandinavian countries on the basis of neutrality, which Lie denied as
the possibility of future politics of Norway, as well as other Scandinavian
countries.17 Beside the need for the AP and CPY to come together, some
of the political benefits of this visit were especially emphasized in a telegram sent form Oslo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1953.
Having received a recommendation from the AP leadership, the Yugoslav
embassy highly recommended to comrade ilas to accept the invitation for the visit to the Scandinavian countries, all the more so as Norwegian Labour Party is now the Executive of the Social International.18

So, in the last few months before Milovan ilas was dismissed,
the agreement on his visit to Sweden and Norway had been reached. The
proposal was offered by the Yugoslav side (via the Commission for the
International Affairs and Vladimir Dedijer), but originally it had referred
to the Swedish Social-Democratic Party (SAP). The motive was a recent
theoretical discussion led by Rodoljub olakovi, a member of CC LCY
and Kaj Bjrk, the AP secretary for foreign affairs.19 Since the invitation
17

18
19

Diplomatic Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Serbia (DFARS),

Political Archive (P), 1953, Norway, f. 64, no. 415178, The Record of the
Conversation of Consul P. Popovi with the General Secretary of the Norwegian
Labour Party, Haakon Lie in Oslo on September 1953. In the annual report of
the Yugoslav embassy in Oslo from December 1953, a special part refered to the
cooperation with the Norwegian Labour party and LCY in which ilass visit to
Norway was the most important topic: As to the continuation of the cooperation
on the mutual introduction of the Norwegian Labour Party and the League of
Communist of Yugoslavia, which actively started in 1951 when the delegation of
the Labour Party and trade union visited our country, this year the initiative for
comrade ilas to visit Norway and possibly Sweden and Denmark at the beginning
of the following year, came from the Labour Party... The visit would be of purely
private character, and its goal would be to establish closer contacts between the
AP and the LCY and possible talks on issues of mutual interest. According to the
proposal, which comrade ilas accepted, comrade ilas with two or three members
of the League would spend about 10 days in Norway, coming into contact with the
party and political individuals and public officials, as well as with the representative
of the workers and other organizations, and would visit some important Norwegian
industrial centers. - DFARS, P, 1953, Norway, f. 64, no. 417481, Annual Report
of the SFRJ Embassy in Oslo for 1953, 24 December 1953, 5.
DFARS, P, 1953, Norway, f. 64, no. 411769, Telegram from Oslo to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs on 27 August 1953.
In the conversation with the Yugoslav ambassador in Sweden, Vladimir Dedijer,
commenting on the dispute olakovi Bjrk and its disadvantages, proposed that,
for the sake of better acquaintance, Milovan ilas pay a visit to the Scandinavian
countries, and hold a lecture similar to the one delivered in London in January 1951.
- Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, The Record of the Conversation of
Comrades Dedijer and Stojakovi with Dr. Darko ernej, Our Ambassador in Sweden

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from the Norwegian Labour Party was in the meantime issued to Milovan ilas to pay a visit to Norway (which has already been mentioned),
the Norwegians suggested that Milovan ilas visit Sweden and Denmark
as well, while on the way to their country (as their socialists guest).20
Having been informed about Norwegian Labour Party proposal, Sven
Aspling, the SAP secretary, responded positively to the Norwegian proposal in a letter addressed to Milovan ilas on 28 December1952 and
officially invited ilas to visit Sweden together with Norway.21 This was
the last invitation issued to Milovan ilas as a Yugoslav official to visit a
foreign country. The visit should have been realized in February 1954.
However, due to Milovan ilass dismissal, it never took place.

Officially, Sven Asplings invitation was handed to Milovan ilas
on 5 January 1954 by Jdahl, the Swedish ambassador in Belgrade. On
that day, Milovan ilas, as a Yugoslav official, had his last meeting with
a foreign representative.22 In 45 minute long talks during which ilas
and Jdahltouched discussed various current issues, the last manifestation of his views before a foreign representative, prior to his dismissal
from the government could be perceived. This document proves that the
Swedish were undoubtedly aware of Milovan ilass position and that
they followed his critical writings. As it was indicated in the report on the
talks, at the beginning the Swedish representative, having congratulated
Milovan ilas on his recent election for the President of the Federal Assembly23 and the establishment of the details for the visit, said that it
might be dangerous for him, a Swedish socialist, to declare that comrade
ilass articles confirm Swedish methods. The Swedish observe every
problem practically and do not feel the need to don every single political
step with the veil of ideology. He then added that the articles were very
interesting. When he arrived in FPRY, some foreign diplomats told him
that he had arrived too late, since the most important period of the development of Yugoslavia had already passed. However, he is not of such
opinion.24 These words of the Swedish representative clearly showed
20
21
22
23
24

Held in the Commission for the International Affairs on 8 July 1953.

Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, Vladimir Dedijers Telegram, 3 October
1953.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, Letter from Sven Aspling to Milovan
ilas, 28 December 1953.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, Record of the Meeting of Comrade ilas
with the Swedish Ambassador Mr. Jdahl, 5 January 1954 (from 11:00 to 11:45).
On 25 December 1953, Milovan ilas was unanimously elected President of the
Federal Assembly of the SFRJ (SFRY).
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, Record of the Meeting of Comrade
ilas with the Swedish Ambassador Mr. Jdahl, 5 January 1954 (from 1. to 11:45), 1.

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that foreign representatives were (however, Jdahl did not say who those
foreign diplomats were) actively following the development of the political situation in Yugoslavia, and therefore the activities of ilas himself,
and that they noticed the end of a political course that was marked by
the democratization of society, the most interesting period of the development of Yugoslavia, and which was abruptly interrupted in the last
few months. The end of ilass public political activities, which were a
symbol and embodiment of the democratic reforms, was thus implicitly
announced. ilass era was definitely over, although his articles were
fairly interesting to the Swedish representative.

We will also point out Jdahls remark that Sweden strictly separated ideological issues from the practical, i.e. political ones, where
ilas opposed him with his attitude that the theory and practice are inseparable, and that the lack of theory represents one of the greatest
weakness of the Western socialist parties.25 Djilas than mentioned the
theoretical dispute between olakovi and Bjrk, believing that, although
the dispute itself was not of great interest for him, Bjrk dominated
over olakovi, regardless of the fact that the latter was closer to him.26
ilas also emphasized that, at that moment, a new form of patriotism
was being created, i.e. national unity quite different from the Soviet
one, which was a great-Russian and pure bureaucratic creation, and
that this process had not been understood by the West.27 At the end of
the conversation, ilas told the Swedish representative that he personally felt best in 1949 when we were arguing with the Russians. Now the
things are developing slowly adding that the battle against the bureaucratism is not over yet. It might be over ideologically but not politically
and practically.28 It was more than clear to which foreign policy course
ilas actually adhered to, where he placed himself politically and ideologically with his activities throughout the previous years, that is, what
the normalization of the relations with the USSR could possibly mean to
him and a possible major shift in the foreign policy.

It could be noticed, from the talks Milovan ilas had with Jdahl,
the Swedish ambassador in Belgrade, that, at least when it came to Swedish diplomats, that ilass articles were registered as part of an overall
25
26
27

28

Ibid., 2.
Ibid.
Speaking about it, ilas attempted to clarify to Jdahl the notion of the national
unity: Consider Trieste, for example, the West believed that only the Slovenians had
been interested in the issue. However, it proved that both Serbian and Macedonian
farmers, etc. were interested in it. There is no more danger of the nationalism that
we have experienced it in the past . - Ibid.
Ibid., 56.

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movement of democratic society reforms (the articles are fairly interesting), although some foreign diplomats noticed that in the last months
those reforms had been abruptly stopped (the most interesting period of
the development in Yugoslavia has already passed).29 Since he presumably had already sensed the course of events, Jdahl interviewed ilas carefully. When asked if his articles encountered considerable opposition,
ilas replied that they encountered some opposition, but not a very serious one, and that some comrades considered the articles were published
prematurely, adding that the articles are not of general theoretical importance. Also, when replying to a Jdahls remark, as stated in the document, ilas confessed that his articles have had a political goal and that
he is a politician. Having received such an answer, the Swedish minister
repeated to ilas, who wanted to proceed with theoretical explanation of
his attitude, the weak interest of the Swedish socialist party in theoretical
questions.30 ilas then steered the conversation back to his articles, when
Jdahl remarked that his latest articles had been written in lighter style.31
This suggests that the Swedish delegate inconspicuously but actively followed ilass writings. Before ending the conversation, Jdahl added that
he heard some rumours that ilas had abandoned his old ideas.32 All this
indicated that the Swedish diplomatic representatives in Yugoslavia actively but unobtrusively followed ilass activity, and therefore the course
of events that would officially start the ilas affair in a few days to come.
ilas finished the talks with the Swedish minister before noon.
In the evening of the very same day, the members of the national security service picked ilas up from a cinema and took him to Rankovi and
Kardelj for an interview, thus, the affair unofficially started.
The very next day after publishing the Executive Committee (EC)
CC LCY report and the public pursue of the ilas case, the Norwegian
press wrote about the case in a sensationalist way, according to the telegram from the Yugoslav representative citing the article from the Norwegian Labour Party newspaper Arbeider Bladet, with the title Political
Dispute: the Vice-President Milovan ilas Exposed to Sharp Criticism
and with subtitle The First Idealist of the Country Acted Against the
Central Leadership and the Party. The telegram also stated that the caption under ilass picture read Milovan ilas Before the Fall?!33 The last
foreign representative ilas had talked with, the aforementioned min29
30
31
32
33

Ibid., 1.
Ibid., 23.
Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 5.
DFARS, P, 1954, Yugoslavia, f. 45, no. 4460, Telegram to the Secretariat of
Foreign Affairs from Oslo, 11 January 1954.

98

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Unrealised Nordic Dream.

Milovan ilas and the Scandinavian Socialists

ister Jdahl, demanded a meeting with some of the Yugoslav diplomatic

representatives. Thus, on 13 January, Jdahl got in touch with Miroslav
Kreai, a Yugoslav diplomat and consul of the embassy in Stockholm.
Kreais records of the conversation showed that the Swedish delegate
was bewildered by the course of events, and that he said on that occasion
that he received the assignment via telegram to urgently send reports
on the whole case, and that it is very difficult for him since he does not
have enough elements. Kreai avoided the detailed discussion on the
issue, referring the interlocutor to the scheduled party plenum during
which the issue would be resolved. On the other hand, the Swedish delegate did not vehemently insist on it, which Kreai recorded: He did not
force the discussion and out of the particular questions, he asked only if
the EC report meant that the Marshal did not agree with ilass attitudes.
When I confirmed, he added that it was obvious that, in our country, such
issues were resolved in a completely different way than in the USSR. Jdahl added that he had had a meeting with Dedijer as well and that, on
Jdahls statement that he hoped there would be no change regarding
the visit to Sweden and Norway, Dedijer replied So do I.34
In the meantime, the Norwegian press, especially the social-democratically oriented one, proceeded with writing about the ilas case.
The newspapers began publishing more and more analytical texts on
Milovan ilas and his critical writings. In the telegram sent to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs by the Yugoslav embassy in Oslo on 14 January
1954, it was stated that in last three days the whole Norwegian press is
writing a lot about comrade ilass articles and the report of the CC. On
12 January the aforementioned Arbeider Bladet, the Labour Party newspaper, published three analytical articles, one of which was titled From
Dictatorship to Democracy, and which gave an overview of the events at
the Sixth Congress and ilass biography. According to the information
from the telegram, the article stated that ilas is more progressive that
the official party line, but with the assessment that nothing dramatic
will happen.35 The Stockholm delegation informed SFA on 19 January
that the Swedish press had conveyed the news about the CC CPY plenum
(January 1617) on the first pages of the agency news, and that it dealt
mostly with Titos speech. The press was also mentioned, but poorly,
publishing combinations regarding ilass visit to Scandinavia.36
34
35
36

DFARS, P, 1954, Yugoslavia, f. 45, no. 4441, Record of the Conversation with the
Swedish Ambassador Jdahl on 13 January 1954.
DFARS, P, 1954, Yugoslavia, f. 45, no. 4460, Telegram to the Secretariat of
Foreign Affairs from Oslo 14 January.
DFARS, P, 1954, Yugoslavia, f. 45, no. 4634, Telegram to the Secretariat of
Foreign Affairs from Stockholm, 19 January 1954.

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According to the information in the telegram sent to SFA from

Stockholm on 20 January, a Swedish social-democrat Kaj Bjrk, previously informed about ilass dismissal, stated in the conversation with a
certain Yugoslav diplomat that he completely understood that ilas had
gone too far and that his ideas were too demanding and premature.
Bjrk also expressed his doubts on ilass visit to Scandinavia. The same
telegram also stated that the General Secretary of Swedish Social-Democrats, Sven Aspling, told the internal circle of social-democrats that he
grieved for what had happened because he appreciated ilas as a great
democrat and because he was preparing to use the visit to have an open
discussion about all issues. The unsigned author of the telegram considered that ilas should have replied to the invitation.37
Since he was dismissed from the government in the meantime,
ilas cancelled his journey to the Scandinavian countries. He did so in
a letter addressed to Kaj Bjrk on 20 January 1954. With confused and
chaotic handwriting, which obviously revealed his current psychological state, ilas wrote: I am very grateful for the kindness of the leadership of your party who invited me as a representative of the Socialist
Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) to visit your country
and share opinions with the leadership of your party. However, as you
might be informed from the press, my personal position in the SAWPY
has considerably changed recently. The opinion that I would hold in
the arranged contacts would no longer have the support of the SAWPY,
because my views are different from theirs. Hence it is rather understandable why my arranged visit must be cancelled.38 ilas handed
this letter to Maria Vilfan, requesting it to be delivered to delegate Jdahl, who should have sent it to Bjrk. In regards to this, the meeting of
the Commission for International Affairs was summoned on 20 January
1954, where it was decided that ilass letter should be delivered to the
Swedish delegate and to have a talk with him.39 The next day, Vilfan
immediately met with Jdahl and conveyed to him that ilass case
would not affect the further cooperation with Scandinavian social-democratic parties and that the Commission for the International Relations
of the SAWPY was writing directly to their secretary to inform him that
37
38
39

DFARS, P, 1954, Yugoslavia, f. 45, no. 41557, Telegram to the Secretariat of

Foreign Affairs from Stockholm (unsigned), 20 January.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, Milovan ilass Letter to Kaj Bjrk, 20
January 1954.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Working Groups of the Commission, S/a-19, Report on
the Meeting of the Commission for the International Relations of SFRY Held on 20
January 1954, 2.

100

Aleksandar V. MILETI

Unrealised Nordic Dream.

Milovan ilas and the Scandinavian Socialists

the cooperation would continue.40 A letter from the Commission to the

SAP leadership was soon to follow, in which the reasons for cancelling
ilass journey were fully explained (or better to say clarified). The letter stated that For a long time, comrade ilas did not concur with the
leading people from our League (LCY) in particular purely theoretical
issues it was discussed with him, but no one called him to account for
it, nor intended to do so. It followed immediately after he had transferred to the field of practical politics, to the issues on whose resolution
depended not only the development of socialism in Yugoslavia, but also,
to a great extent, its existence as an independent country. Those were
primarily issues of organizational character and issues dealing with
the form of Yugoslav democratic development. ilas proposed different resolutions on these issues at the Sixth Congress and thus opposed
the decisions of the Congress.41 Further on, ilass abstract theoretical stand, which was not in accordance with the political reality and
which harmed the power of socialism, was emphasized in the letter.42
Then, ilas was accused of violation of party discipline,43 disloyalty
to the party leadership and personal arrogance, and his attitudes were
qualified as dangerous to unity, LCY, SAWPY and the country.44 At the
end, it was stated that Nevertheless, ilas was not expelled from the
League of Communists, due to the fact that he confessed before his
comrades criticism that his views had been harmful for the country
and its socialistic development.45 The letter was finished with wishes
for further cooperation.
ilass fall had repercussions in Scandinavian socialist circles.
As an example, we point out the Swedish social-democratic newspaper
Morgon-Tidningen, of 4 February 1954, which devoted its editorial to
the ilas case, under the title of Intermezzo ilas At the beginning of
the text, ilas was presented to readers in the following way: Milovan
ilas, a 43 year old veteran of Titos heroic time, had reasons for express40
41
42
43

44
45

Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, Record of the Conversation of Comrade

Maria Vilfin with the Swedish Minister Jdahl on 21 January 1954.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, Letter of the Commission for the
International Relations to the Swedish Social-Democratic Party Leadership, 1.
Ibid.
There is an eye-catching sentence here which is related to the previous statements
that ilas could express his views at the highest party forums, which was later
crossed out by hand. The statement goes as following: He did not want that, as he
did not want to stop publishing his own articles when the attention was drawn to
the harmful consequences his articles can have. - Ibid., 2.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 23.

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ing his opinion with more discomfort. He was elected the President of
Parliament last year, and, burdened with his leading position, he is now
dismissed from all duties in the government, expelled from the Parliament, withdrawn from the position of the most probable Titos successor. He only seems to have the rank of a colonel general, assigned to him
during the battle in the Bosnian Mountains.46 The insightful editorialist of Morgon-Tidningen further attempted to analyze the whole case
in layers. Referring to the writings of Yugoslav party newspapers, the
author of this text perceived ilass fall as following: When one reads
the documents of the ilas Affair, which were published by Borba, the
mouthpiece of the Yugoslav Communist Party, one cannot but have the
impression that ilass fall is not in the forefront of a private individuals
issue. Not in the way for this free-minded Montenegrin to be deemed as
a leader of an opposition that jeopardizes the regime and must be rendered innocuous. No, the standpoint remained that ilas is presented as
a remorseful leader for all communist regimes, who, to his misfortune,
got depressed having encountered his own propaganda that has buried
him.47 Evaluating the context of ilass criticism in regard to the official
policy, the author emphasized slight absurdity of his political position:
What ilas published in his articles in Borba is actually a trenchant
from of what has been presented as more or less official clarification of
last years brave change of the political course in the country.48 According to this author, ilas jeopardized the strong (Sovietized) bureaucratic
apparatus with his critical activities, which led to his dismissal, since
many people saw the cessation of relations with the USSR with vacillation and followed Tito only out of loyalty to the party () Suddenly it became clear that they personally faced retreat () In such a situation Tito
had only one possibility if he wanted to retain power: to return to the
previous political position. He sacrificed ilas as a symbol of his loyalty
to the people who brought him to power.49 However, he did not give any
chance to the Yugoslav leadership to return to the Soviet positions, writing that Tito precisely knows what the fate of an infidel is, and knows
that Moscow will consider him as one and that tactics are possible in
the political sense, but in ideological sense, it is a completely different
matter, and is out of question: The Yugoslav path does not go to the
East but to the West but not as quickly as ilas (and Tito as well) de46
47
48
49

Y, 507/IX, CC LCY, CIRC, Sweden, 125/II-18, Morgon Tidningen, 4. II 1954,

Intermezzo ilas, 1.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 2.

102

Aleksandar V. MILETI

Unrealised Nordic Dream.

Milovan ilas and the Scandinavian Socialists

ceived themselves; it is not half-hearted work and the veering is bound to

happen, what the recently finished episode has just proved.50 At the end
of the editorial, the author wondered whether Tito would deprive ilas,
whom he called a failed successor, of his political role for a long time.
In the telegram from the Yugoslav embassy in Stockholm addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on 8 February it was reported
that Sven Aspling, the general secretary of the Swedish Social-Democrats
and Kaj Bjrk, a secretary for foreign relations, show a lot understanding for the resolution of the ilas case. Regarding ilass planned visit
to the Scandinavian countries, it was reported that there was no pressure to realize the visit by sending other officials, because unless they
were the highest ranking ones it would be considered that the less important ones were sent. We consider that we should wait for a while.51
Planning the visit to the Scandinavian countries was ilass last
foreign policy activity before his was dethroned. Three days after the
Third Plenum, on 20 January 1954, the Commission for the Internal Relations of the SAWPY was summoned, the main topic was the ilas case
in the context of the current activities.52 Out of four agenda items, three
were devoted to Milovan ilas, and other issues were under the item
Varia. Firstly, ilass and Dedijers journey to the Scandinavian countries was reconsidered. This issue was assessed as important (especially
for Norway as the initiator of the visit), because it affected the relations
with the three Scandinavian countries (Bebler even conveyed that the
Danes had felt insulted due to the cancellation of ilass visit). In the end,
the resolution on the continuation of the cooperation was adopted, regardless of the ilass case and his absence, but without imposing that
issue on the Scandinavians.53
Immediately after his was dethroned, ilas would write his personal and emotional essay, titled The Nordic Dream, in which he expressed his personal experience of the overall situation of his decline
from power, and the title itself would be a reminder of his last planned
foreign policy activity in which he did not participate.

50
51
52

53

Ibid., 23.
DFARS, P, 1954, Yugoslavia, f. 45, no. 41557, Telegram to the Secretariat of
Foreign Affairs from Stockholm, 8 February 1954.
Y, 507/IX, CCLCY, CIRC, Working groups of the Commission, S/a-19, Report on the
Meeting of the Commission of the International Relations Held on 20 January 1954.
Ibid., 12.

103

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Sources and literature

Unpublished sources
1. Archives of Yugoslavia (Y), fond: 507/IX, Central Committee of League
of Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY), Commission for the International Relations and Correspondence (CIRC):
- Cabinet of Marshal of Yugoslavia (CMY),
- Commission for the International Relations and Correspondence (CIRC).
2. Diplomatic Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Serbia
(DFARS), Political Archive (P), 19531954.


Literature

1. Beki, Dark. Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama

19491955. Zagreb: Globus, 1988.
2. Bogeti, Dragan. Jugoslavija i Zapad 19521955. Jugoslovensko
pribliavanje NATO-u. Beograd: Slubeni list SRJ, 2000.
3. Bogeti, Dragan. Jugoslovensko pribliavanje Zapadu u vreme sukoba sa Kominformom. Istorija XX veka 1/1998, 6167.
4. Velike sile i male drave u hladnom ratu 19451955. Sluaj Jugoslavije, zbornik radova, urednik Lj. Dimi. Beograd: Filozofski fakultet,
Arhiv SCG, INIS, 2008.
5. Dimi, Ljubodrag. Jugoslavija i Hladni rat. Ogledi o spoljnoj politici
Josipa Broza Tita (19441974). Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014.
6. ilas, Milovan. Vlast i pobuna. Beograd: Knjievne novine, 1991.
7.  , , .
. : , 2010.
8. , . , 19451992. : Clio, 1999.
9. Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 19501961, zbornik radova, urednik S.
Selini. Beograd: INIS, 2008.

104

Aleksandar V. MILETI

Unrealised Nordic Dream.

Milovan ilas and the Scandinavian Socialists

.
,
.

: 50- ,
,
. ,

.
, 19521954.
: , , , ,

-
.
.
.
.
1950. .
, , .
, .

, . 1952. 1954. ,
105

3/2015.

.
, , , , .
. ,

,
. 1953.

. ,

.
1954. , .

, 5. 1954.
. ,
1954, , .
, . ,
.

106

 785.6:784.067.26(497.1)1977(093.2)
316.723:784.067.26(497.1)1970/...(093.2)

: 21. 8. 2015.
: 10. 10. 2015.

Aleksandar RAKOVI
Institute for Recent History of Serbia
rakovic@gmail.com
Bijelo dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):
Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon*
Abstract: This paper shows how the concert at Hajduka
esma established Bijelo dugme as a unique Yugoslav phenomenon. The event is presented in analogy with Beatlemania and mass gatherings of the hippies in the West. Based on
research, the paper proves the soundness of the analogy. The
study is written on the basis of archival documentation available at the Archives of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije AY), the
Historical Archives of Belgrade (HAB), Yugoslav press (daily,
youth, party, political, music, entertainment), interviews with
contemporaries, Serbian, Yugoslav and foreign scholars and
other literature.
Key words: Bijelo dugme, Concert at Hajduka esma, League
of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, rock and roll, phenomenon

In the mid-sixties of the 20th century and especially after the Belgrade Guitar Festival in 1966 (Gitarijada), rock and roll was accepted as
the music of the Yugoslav youth. By then, the idea that rock and roll cul

This article has been written within the framework of the scholarly project Serbs
and Serbia in the Yugoslav and International Context: Internal Development and
Position within European/World Community ( 47027), financed by the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

107

3/2015.

ture did not interfere with the socialist ideology and could be used for
the benefit of Yugoslav society has been generally accepted among the
Communist party authorities and the Socialist youth organization. The
rise of a political hippie movement in the West which promoted NeoMarxism, pacifism, anti-imperialism and decolonization, further confirmed the link between Yugoslav socialism and rock and roll.1
On the one hand, the Yugoslav rock and roll bands were building their careers, partly but importantly, by refreshing the memory of the
Yugoslav socialist revolution in a rock mode. During the seventies, the integration of rock and roll into the Yugoslav social system, which played a
role in the suppression of ethnic, cultural and social differences among the
youth, was so explicit that the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia (Savez
socijalistike omladine Jugoslavije), whose program was based on the policy
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, imposed on the Musical Youth
of Yugoslavia (Jeunesses Musicales Yougoslavie) to introduce rock and roll
as an extracurricular activity in music education of Yugoslav youth.2 Thus, it
happened that Yugoslav rock and roll of the seventies, perceived as an unusual social phenomenon, became mainstream culture on the whole territory
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the eighties.
On the other hand, the leaders of the hippies Gerome Ragni (coauthor of the musical Hair) and John Lennon expressed their respect for
the freedoms in the Yugoslav society and socialist self-management. During his stay in Belgrade in 1969 at the performance of Hair at Atelje 212,
Ragni said for Borba daily: Everyone here [in Belgrade] is so positive,
kind, and beautiful. Everything seems to be about eating, drinking and
singing. I see nothing of those issues that Hair deals with. No wastelands
and no need for young Yugoslavs to seek refuge in drugs.3 In 1971, John
Lennon said for the Zagreb weekly Vjesnik u srijedu: I do not belong to
1

2
3

Aleksandar Rakovi, Rokenrol u Jugoslaviji 19561968: izazov socijalistikom

drutvu, (Beograd, 2011) [Rock and Roll in Yugoslavia 19561968: A Challenge to the
Socialist Society, (Belgrade, 2011)], 463523, 533566. See also: Zoran Janjetovi,
Od internacionale do komercijale: popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 19451991,
(Beograd, 2011) [From the International to the Commercial: Popular Culture in
Yugoslavia 19451991, (Belgrade, 2011)]; Radina Vueti, Koka-kola socijalizam:
amerikanizacija jugoslovenske popularne kulture ezdesetih godina 20. veka,
(Beograd, 2012) [Coca-Cola Socialism: Americanisation of Yugoslav Popular Culture
of the Sixties of the 20 Century, (Belgrade, 2012)].
Aleksandar Rakovi, Savez socijalistike omladine Jugoslavije i Muzika omladina
Jugoslavije u sporu oko rokenrola (19711981), Tokovi istorije [League of Socialist
Youth of Yugoslavia and the Jeunesses Musicales Yougoslavie in Dispute on Rock and
Roll (19711981), Currents of History] 3/2012, 159189.
Jedan trenutak sa Deromom Regnijem i Demsom Radom, [A Moment with
Gerome Ragni and James Rado], Borba, June 22, 1969.

108

Aleksandar RAKOVI

Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

the communist or any other party, but all my sympathies are on the side
of communism. I believe in communism as a system of the future of humanity. Of course, I believe in a real communism (...) the one that you,
Yugoslavs, are trying to create.4
Heterogeneous Yugoslav rock and roll scene has produced a multitude of long-haired bands two of which had a leading role in the seventies: Korni grupa from Belgrade (19701974) and Bijelo dugme from
Sarajevo (19741978). Both bands were socially engaged and included
socialist motives in their work. Korni grupa never acquired the status of
a unique Yugoslav phenomenon although it was the leading band of a
Yugoslav rock and roll phenomenon in that period. Their music was perceived as too complicated,5 and the band was also aware of the fact that
in the pursuit of perfection they become unlistenable for that part of the
audience who wanted to listen to a simpler music.6
In contrast, Bijelo dugme merged rock and roll and Yugoslav
folk music. In the seventies, Bijelo dugme (trans. White Button) was in a
hard rock, hippie and glam mode. Their studio albums, Kad bi bio Bijelo
dugme (1974), ta bi da si na mom mjestu (1975), Eto! Ba hou!
(1976) and Bitanga i Princeza (1979) reached hundreds of thousands
of copies. Bregovi boasted that that Bijelo dugme had sold as many records as there were gramophones in Yugoslavia.7 In 1976 Sergije Luka
wrote for Belgrade political weekly NIN that Bijelo dugme won over the
youth by newly composed folk songs plugged into the highest voltage
as well as business people of Yugoslav shows and managers of discohouses, and in one year they sold 600,000 records and held 200 concerts.8 In 1975, Bijelo dugme held over a hundred concerts day after day.9
4

5
6
7

8
9

Bitlsovski san bila je puka la [The Beatle Dream Was a Mere Lie], Vjesnik
u srijedu, August 4, 1971. About Lennon and Yugoslav socialism see in detail:
Aleksandar Rakovi, Don Lenon, leviarski aktivizam i jugoslovenski socijalizam,
Tokovi istorije [John Lennon, Leftist Activism and Yugoslav Socialism, Currents of
History] 34/2013, 251265.
Kad se raskopa Bijelo dugme [When Bijelo dugme Is Unbuttoned], Mladost,
September 16, 1977.
An interview of Aleksandar Rakovi with Bojan Hreljac, February 12, 2011.
Nenad Stevovi, Kad bi bio Bijelo dugme [If I Were Bijelo dugme], (Kragujevac, 2005),
39, 89; Petar Janjatovi, Ex YU rock enciklopedija 19602006, (Beograd, 2007) [Ex
YU Rock Encyclopaedia 19602006, (Belgrade, 2007)], 3133; Ivan Ivakovi, Kako
smo propevali: Jugoslavija i njena muzika, (Beograd, 2013) [How We Used to Sing:
Yugoslavia and Its Music, (Belgrade, 2013)], 129; Duan Vesi, Bijelo dugme: ta bi
dao da si na mom mjestu, (Beograd, 2014) [Bijelo dugme: What Would You Give to Be
Me, (Belgrade, 2014)], 88, 121.
Bijela dugmad, Pro Musica no. 84/1976, 21.
Amir Misirli, Bijelo dugme, (Beograd, 2005), 26.

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Back in that time, Bijelo dugme raised Yugoslav patriotism and a

socialist attitude more than any other band. Goran Bregovi and eljko
Bebek said to Duboks that they were the members of the League of Communists.10 In 1974, thousands of young people sang a song devoted to Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito Drue Tito, mi ti se kunemo with Bijelo
dugme, Yugoslav pop-group of the year.11 On New Years Eve of 1976
Bijelo Dugme performed very shortly for President Tito at the Croatian
National Theatre in Zagreb.12 The youth organization press supported
the work of the members of Bijelo dugme on youth work action (voluntary youth work brigades) Kozara 76.13 Jugokoncert, the state concert agency of Yugoslavia, organized their tour in Poland in April 1977.14
Goran Bregovi took part in the work of the Conference of the League of
Socialist Youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina and asked the youth organization in 1977 to give him space for social engagement and allow him social
responsibility because he could be heard by thousands of young people.15
Immediately after the concert at Hajduka esma in Belgrade in 1977, the
lead singer of Bijelo dugme eljko Bebek in the show Vibracije at Studio B radio station said that the band was the most Yugoslav variant.16
Then, in 1978 Bijelo dugme received a plaque of the Ninth Congress of
the League of Socialist Youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina for exceptional
results in gathering youth.17 And so on.
In August 1975, Mladost weekly wrote about Bijelo dugme as an
exceptional phenomenon.18 This phenomenon was perceived but it took
another two years before the extraordinary event that fully recognized Bijelo dugme as a unique Yugoslav social phenomenon. Therefore, the concert at Hajduka esma in Belgrade (August 28, 1977) made Bijelo dugme
a unique phenomenon within already recognized phenomenon of Yugoslav rock and roll culture. Their Yugoslav patriotism was desirable and
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18

Hit 74 super-spektakl muzikih super-starova [Hit 74 Super Spectacle of

Musical Super Stars], Duboks, January 1, 1975.
Praznik nae pop-muzike [Holiday of Our Pop Music], Mladost, November 28,
1974.
Vesi, op. cit., 95.
Zvuci naeg podneblja [The Sounds of Our Country], Nai dani, June 15, 1978.
Vesi, op. cit., 128.
Dobili smo ludu, generacijsku borbu [We Got a Crazy, Generation Conflict],
Mladost, February 11, 1977.
Bijelo dugme in Studio B, Duboks, October 1977.
Za izuzetne rezultate plaketa [Plaque for Exceptional Results], Nai dani, June
23, 1978.
ta bi dao da si na mom mjestu? [What Would You Give to Be Me?], Mladost,
August 1, 1975.

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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

well received. However, the phenomenon of Bijelo dugme was so strong

that some within the youth organization intended to relativize it because
it could threaten the social ideals. The phenomenon was known as Dugmemania (Button mania): the intense fan frenzy, hundreds of thousands
records sold, tens of thousands young Yugoslavs attended their concerts,
many of them interested in representation of Yugoslav patriotism provided by band members. Bijelo dugme combined a Yugoslav version of Beatlemania (in terms of popularity and number of followers) and Woodstock
Nation (in terms of musical expression, physical expression and number
of followers, but not as a counter-culture) and it could not get by without a
corrective phenomenon YES, but idealization and idolatry NO.
Introduction to the Theme of the Concert at Hajduka esma

In the first half of 1977, the biggest Yugoslav rock and roll band
Bijelo dugme was at a turning point. Ipe Ivandi (drummer), Zoran Redi
(bass player) and Vlado Pravdi (keyboard player) began their military
service in 1976. The relations between two remaining members Goran
Bregovi (guitarist) and eljko Bebek (singer) became tense and they
cancelled the Yugoslav tour in the summer of 1977 which was supposed
to engage three new members. Their relations were so bad that the spirit
of break-up could be felt hovering above the band.19
According to Goran Bregovi, their conflict was not caused by
the growing glory; it was rather discontent over the absence of three old
friends. However, after the return of Ipe Ivandi and Zoran Redi, and
the arrival of a new keyboard player Lazar Ristovski, Bijelo dugme decided to hold a concert at Hajduka esma in Belgrade, overcome personal
pride and return to the path of success.20 Radio DJ and journalist Slobodan Konjovi wrote that Bijelo dugme needed an incentive to regain
confidence and avoid an immediate break-up.21 Konjovi underlined that
the concert at Hajduka esma gave them the needed incentive and gave
credit to the rock and roll journalist and critic Petar Peca Popovi.22 It
was Popovi who suggested Bijelo dugme should play in the open air at
Hajduka esma (trans. Brigands Fountain),23 a location around a small
spring in the woods at the foot of the Koutnjak hill.
19
20
21
22
23

Sukob nas je opametio [The Conflict Made Us Wiser], Ilustrovana politika,

September 13, 1977.
Ibid.
Vie od koncerta [More than a Concert], Politika, August 30, 1977.
Samopotvrda jednog mita [Self-Confirmation of a Myth], Duboks, October 1977.
Vesi, op. cit., 140.

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Bregovi explained for Politika ekspres that the farewell reference

to the concert at Hajduka esma was only temporarily because he was starting military service, and the farewell was for a year. Despite the fact that the
crisis in the band was publicly known and frequently written about, Bregovi
had a need to emphasize: There is no reason for the break-up when we are
at the top. We have reached the peak of technical possibilities, sounding better than ever.24 Beside Belgrade, the farewell concerts were supposed to be
held in Gorade, Viegrad, Borike, and Sarajevo.25
The concert at Hajduka esma in Belgrade was written about
and analysed by daily newspapers: Politika, Veernje novosti and Politika ekspres, weekly of the Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia Mladost, political
weekly NIN, music magazine Duboks, entertainment magazine Ilustrovana politika the press published in Belgrade, whereas the weekly of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the League of Communists
of Serbia Komunist and the daily newspaper of the Socialist Alliance of
Working People of Yugoslavia Borba wrote nothing about the concert
at Hajduka esma probably because it was not deemed to be serious
enough for their readers. The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (Socijalistiki savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije) was the largest
socio-political organization in Yugoslavia, established within the agenda
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia for better promotion of selfmanaged socialism within the widest masses of the working class people and civic society in spite of their specific ideological beliefs.26
Zagreb daily Veernji list and Sarajevo daily Osloboenje did not
say a word about the concert at Hajduka esma. Instead of writing at
least something about the event, Veernji List wrote that Bijelo dugme
acted inappropriately towards the Zagreb audience because at five
minutes to twelve it cancelled the concert in the capital of the Socialist
Republic of Croatia scheduled for August 25, 1977: Once role models
for a professional approach to music, which they were, and which, after
all, made them famous, just tarnished their name once more.27
Weeks after, the concert at Hajduka esma was not mentioned
in the journals of the League of Socialist Youth in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Polet and Nai dani. They might have ignored it, especially
24
25
26
27

Dugmii vrsto uiveni [Dugmii Sewed on Well], Politika ekspres, August 28,
1977.
Ibid.
Rado Smiljkovi, Drutveno-politike organizacije u SFRJ, (Beograd, 1979) [SocioPolitical Organizations in SFRY, (Belgrade, 1979)], 267268.
Bijelo dugme iznenada otkazalo koncert u Zagrebu. Neslavno za kraj [Bijelo
dugme Suddenly Cancelled Concert in Zagreb, Infamously for the End], Veernji list,
August 29, 1977.

112

Aleksandar RAKOVI

Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

in Zagreb, because they were dissatisfied with Bijelo dugme. However,

the reason might have also been the fact that the audience did not expect
the concert at Hajduka esma to turn into an extraordinary event and
therefore, the editors of some papers outside the Yugoslav capital did
not send their reporters or correspondents to report on the concert at
Hajduka esma.
The Course of the Concert at Hajduka esma

The organizers of the concert at Hajduka esma were the Tourist Organization of Belgrade and the Tourist Organization of Sarajevo.
The concert was advertised in the media and Politika wrote about the
giant power of propaganda machine. On the day of the concert a plane
was flying over Belgrade pulling a banner Bijelo dugme.28 Concert organizers were given permission to throw leaflets from airplanes,29 and
20,000 to 30,000 people were expected to come.30 Goran Bregovi said
that Bijelo Dugme expected about 50,000 visitors.31 Entrance to the concert was free, and the organizers invested more than 300,000 dinars (30
million old dinars),32 or about 38,000 West German marks.33 According
to the currency exchange in 1977 (1 US dollar = 18.45 Yugoslav dinars),34
the organizers expenses were more than 16,260 US dollars. There was
no revenue.
Early in the morning, while the technical staff was preparing
the stage and sound equipment for the concert of Bijelo dugme, the
first visitors started arriving and spreading mattresses and blankets
by the stage to occupy the best positions. In the afternoon hours, Belgrade Transportation Company (Gradsko saobraajno preduzee,
GSP) introduced fourteen additional buses, eight additional trams and
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon called Bijelo dugme], Politika,

August 29, 1977.
Sukob nas je opametio [The Conflict Made Us Wiser], Ilustrovana politika,
September 13, 1977.
Vie od koncerta [More than a Concert], Politika, August 30, 1977.
Sukob nas je opametio [The Dispute Made Us Wiser], Ilustrovana politika,
September 13, 1977.
Ibid.
Vesi, op. cit., 140.
About the exchange rate of the Yugoslav dinar see: Biljana Stojanovi, Exchange
Rate Regimes of the Dinar 19451990: An Assessment of Appropriateness and
Efficiency, Workshops No. 13: Proceedings of the sterreichische Nationalbank
Workshops, (Vienna, 2008), 222.

113

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twelve minibuses to enable the audience from the city centre to reach
Hajduka esma in the suburb of Topider.35 The police (milicija), military police and brigade were in charge of the security at the concert at
Hajduka esma.36
The support bands chosen by Bijelo dugme were: Leb i Sol from
Skopje, Korak from Sarajevo, Zebra (which did not perform) and Zdravo
from Belgrade, and as well Belgrade musician Slaana Miloevi.37 Belgrade band ako also performed.38 The presenter at the concert was
Ljubomir akula.39 Support bands started playing at 5 p.m.40 The first to
perform was Leb i Sol and Radio Belgrade reported that there was about
30,000 people at that moment. The bands played one after another, and
the last one was Slaana Miloevi whose performance was interrupted
by the arrival of Bijelo dugme.41
As the support bands were playing, the number of visitors was
changing by the minute.42 In addition to the crowded public transportation and private cars, the river of visitors flowed toward Topider: The
valley at Hajduka esma was turning into a boiling cauldron. When
there was no more space, the visitors started climbing the trees.43 The
crowd was so great that it blocked the rails in Topider and temporarily
blocked the rail traffic.44 The program was occasionally interrupted with
information about children, fifty of them, that were lost at the concert
and should wait for their parents at the stage.45
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42
43
44
45

Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,

August 29, 1977.
Organizatori bez sluha! [Organizers Have No Ear for Music], Veernje novosti,
August 29, 1977.
Dugmii vrsto uiveni [Dugmii Sewed On Well], Politika ekspres, August 29,
1977.
Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,
August 29, 1977.
Tako ti je mala moja kad svira Bosanac [Thats How It is, Baby, When a Bosnian
Plays], Ilustrovana politika, September 6, 1977.
Vie od koncerta [More than A Concert], Politika, August 30, 1977.
Tako ti je mala moja kad svira Bosanac [Thats How It Is, Baby, When a Bosnian
Plays], Ilustrovana politika, September 6, 1977.
Ibid.
Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,
August 29, 1977.
Dugme okupilo 70.000 ljudi [70,000 People Gathered to Hear Dugme], Politika
ekspres, August 29, 1977.
Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,
August 29, 1977; Tako ti je mala moja kad svira Bosanac [Thats How It Is, Baby,
When a Bosnian Plays], Ilustrovana politika, September 6, 1977.

114

Aleksandar RAKOVI

Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

At 8 p.m. when Bijelo dugme came out at the stage the crowd
went hysterical.46 Several girls were taken backstage in a state of shock.
Girls in the audience were shaking and crying.47 The police back-up arrived to maintain order.48 The soldiers could be seen asking military
police officers to extend their permissions until midnight and handing
them papers with permission from the cheering crowd.49 Politika ekspres
reported: Those moments, however, can hardly be described in words.
The screams of weaker sex seemed to prevail over the noise made by
boys. The pieces of clothes flew, the audience swayed like stalks of grain.
Police cordons, barely managed to keep seventy thousand young people
who were trying to break through to the stage itself. The performance
was interrupted more than once, the organizers tried in vain to reason
with boys and girls, security guards intervened, but the hysteria already
peaked.50 Radovan Raka Mari, the associate of Bijelo dugme, said for
Ilustrovana politika that he feared that everything would crush and that
everybody would go after them.51 Duko Pavlovi, Bregovis friend, testified that Bebek asked the audience not to tear down the stage and the
audience calmed down.52
The influence of Bijelo dugme was best illustrated by the following fact. Neither police nor military police could calm the audience. But
when eljko Bebek addressed the audience, saying: Now let us all sit
down. We will also sit down, according to Politika it had immediate effect: He sat on the stage. A few seconds of uncomfortable silence followed. Then a murmur rushed through seventy thousand visitors, and
each one of them tried to sit.53 Bijelo dugme finished the concert at 10
p.m. and the band sat in a car that was supposed to make its way through
the crowd. However, the fans of Bijelo dugme raised the car, and accord46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,

August 29, 1977.
Tako ti je mala moja kad svira Bosanac [Thats How It is, Baby, When a Bosnian
Plays Music], Ilustrovana politika, September 6, 1977.
Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo Dugme], Politika,
August 29, 1977.
Tako ti je mala moja kad svira Bosanac [Thats How It Is, Baby, When a Bosnian
Plays], Ilustrovana politika, September 6, 1977.
Dugme okupilo 70.000 ljudi [70,000 People Gathered to Hear Dugme], Politika
ekspres, August 29, 1977.
Tako ti je mala moja kad svira Bosanac [Thats How It Is, Baby, When a Bosnian
Plays], Ilustrovana politika, September 6, 1977.
Duko Pavlovi, Bijelo dugme, (Gornji Milanovac, 1980), 65.
Tako ti je mala moja kad svira Bosanac [Thats How It Is, Baby, When a Bosnian
Plays], Ilustrovana politika, September 6, 1977.

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ing to Ilustrovana politika, carried it along three hundred meters.54 The

crowd around Hajduka esma lasted until midnight.55
Only five incidents were recorded which was rather a symbolic
number when one bore in mind the fact that it was the most massive
gathering of young people.56 Slobodan Konjovi wrote for Politika that
the technical organization of the concert and location were inadequate
and that it was pure luck that major incidents were avoided.57 In contrast,
a famous journalist Bogdan Tirnani wrote for NIN that he felt safe in the
crowd, much safer than at a football match or in a city bus.58
Mladost wrote that the concert at Hajduka esma was attended by over 70,000,59 and possibly as many as 100,000 people.60 Mladen
Zvonarevi, a social psychologist from Zagreb, in the paper Pop music Alienation and De-alienation, written for the Tenth Yugoslav Colloquium on
Leisure Time (Deseti jugoslavenski kolokvij o slobodnom vremenu, January
31 February 3, 1979) and for the purposes of the League of Socialist Youth
of Yugoslavia, stated that the concert of Bijelo dugme at Hajduka esma
gathered about a hundred thousand people, mostly young.61
Goran Bregovi stated that there were 70,000 people.62 Music
magazine Duboks also estimated that there were more than 70,000 people and probably about 100,000 which, according to them, was more than
on all Yugoslav festivals put together in the past ten years.63 Ilustrovana
politika reported that the performance of Bijelo dugme was attended by
between 70,000 and 100,000 visitors.64 Veernje novosti which had four
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

61
62
63
64

Ibid.
Dugme okupilo 70.000 ljudi [70,000 People Gathered To Hear Dugme], Politika
ekspres, August 29, 1977.
Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,
August 29, 1977.
Vie od koncerta [More Than a Concert], Politika, August 30, 1977.
Koncert kod Hajduke esme [Concert at Hajduka esma], NIN, September 4,
1977.
Na 11.000 vati [At 11,000 Volts], Mladost, September 2, 1977.
Kad se raskopa Bijelo dugme [When Bijelo dugme Is Unbuttoned], Mladost,
September 16, 1977.
AY, Savez socijalistike omladine Jugoslavije, [The League of Socialist Youth of
Yugoslavia], Fond 114, Fascicle 130.
Sukob nas je opametio [The Conflict Make Us Wiser], Ilustrovana politika,
September 13, 1977.
Koncert kod Hajduke esme je veliki korak za Bijelo dugme, ali jo vei za domau
rock muziku [The Concert at Hajduka esma Is a Giant Step for Bijelo dugme, but
an Even More Giant Step for Domestic Rock Music], Duboks, October 1977.
Tako ti je mala moja kad svira Bosanac [Thats How It Is, Baby, When a Bosnian
Plays], Ilustrovana politika, September 6, 1977.

116

Aleksandar RAKOVI

Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

reporters at Hajduka esma announced that the concert was attended

by 80,000 fans.65 Politika reported that the concert at Hajduka esma
was seen by more than seventy thousand young people.66 Politika ekspres also reported that the concert at Hajduka esma was attended by
more than 70,000 young people.67
On the other hand, Bogdan Tirnani, who was at Hajduka esma
with a TV Belgrade crew, wrote for NIN that there were about 40,000
young people at the concert.68 Immediately after the end of the concert,
Slobodan Konjovi said for Vibracije at the radio station Studio B that
there were about 50,000 people.69
It was hard to tell the exact number of the people who attended
the concert of Bijelo dugme at Hajduka esma. Belgrade daily newspapers
experienced in covering the football matches and mass gatherings, evaluated that the number of visitors of the concert at Hajduka esma amounted to more than 70,000 people. However, the press and documentation
of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia reported that the concert at
Hajduka esma was attended by approximately 100,000 visitors.
Interpretation of the Success of the Concert at Hajduka esma
and the Phenomenon of Bijelo dugme

After the concert at Hajduka esma, the public underlined the

already observed phenomenon of Bijelo dugme, but now fully recognized
and better interpreted. In the title of a report about the event at Hajduka
esma, Politika stressed: The phenomenon called Bijelo dugme.70 In
Duboks Slobodan Konjovi referred to the fans of Bijelo dugme as a
movement, and Bijelo dugme as a national phenomenon. It was also
written that radio, television, film and press suddenly realized the essential power of a rock ritual.71 Marko Lopuina wrote for Mladost that the
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Dugme ostaje i postaje vee [Dugme Is not Disbanding It Is Becomes Bigger],

Veernje novosti, August 29, 1977.
Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,
August 29, 1977.
Dugme okupilo 70.000 ljudi [70,000 Gathered to Hear Dugme], Politika ekspres,
August 29, 1977.
Koncert kod Hajduke esme [Concert at Hajduka esma], NIN, September 4,
1977.
Bijelo dugme u Studiju B [Bijelo dugme in Studio B], Duboks, October 1977.
Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,
August 29, 1977.
Samopotvrda jednog mita [Self-Confirmation of a Myth], Duboks, October 1977.

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concert of Bijelo dugme at Hajduka esma and a forty-day tour of Kragujevac band Smak confirmed the final triumph of the quality of Yugoslav
rock style, which was the phenomenon of youth culture. Lopuina emphasized that after the concert at Hajduka esma Yugoslav rock and roll
received important recognition because the media comments regarding
the event were serious.72
The phenomenon of Bijelo dugme, but also the phenomenon of
the Yugoslav rock and roll, could also be seen in the fact that the director
Mia Miloevi recorded inserts for the film Nije nego at the concert at
Hajduka esma. A famous Yugoslav director Jovan Risti Rica was filming at the same place.73 Aleksandar Tijani, influential journalist, wrote
that Bijelo dugme gave Belgrade bands a lesson and reduced Belgrade to
a music periphery.74 Zlatko Dani, pop-music editor at Radio Sarajevo,
said that the departure of extraordinary Belgrade band Korni grupa
from the scene, whose powerful music was hardly acceptable by the audience, and the departure of Zagreb band Time, opened the space for the
dominance of Bijelo dugme which was finally established in the concert
at Hajduka esma.75
Bogdan Tirnani wrote about the phenomenon of Bijelo dugme
first dealing with the audience which was said to be twelve to sixteen
years old and which was running away from the world of adults in a
group of peers where it was easier to overcome the crisis of identity and
adolescent frustration. The music of Bijelo dugme, wrote Tirnani, had
a therapeutic effect on adolescents because it de-alienated them as
it was the case with the fans of rock and roll in the fifties and sixties.
Tirnani also wrote about the phenomenon of Bijelo dugme band by analyzing the music and the character of the band leaders. Tirnani therefore
stressed that the success of Bijelo dugme derived from the combination
of undoubted social vitality of neo-folk music and rock and roll. He concluded that Goran Bregovi was the first authentic artistic personality
of our rock music and that real success of rock music could not have
happened in our society until such a person appeared.76
Bratimir Braca Mini wrote for Duboks that the success of Bijelo
dugme was also in the fact that they appeared at the moment when a new
72
73
74
75
76

Nova dimenzija [New Dimension], Mladost, September 16, 1977.

Dugmii vrsto uiveni [Dugmii Well Sewed], Politika ekspres, August 28, 1977.
Beogradska pop pustinja [Pop Wasteland of Belgrade], Ilustrovana politika,
September 1977.
Kad se raskopa Bijelo dugme [When Bijelo dugme Unbuttons], Mladost,
September 16, 1977.
Koncert kod Hajduke esme [Concert at Hajduka esma], NIN, September 4,
1977.

118

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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

generation of rock and roll audience was growing up and was younger than
the band, unlike the fans of Korni grupa, Indexi from Sarajevo and Time who
were the same age as the members of these bands. Mini also said: One
massive need and massive desire found its satisfaction in Bijelo dugme. We
experienced the Yugoslav version of Beatlemania belated, but for our circumstances no less eventful! Its climax, probably, was at Hajduka esma.77
Slobodan Konjovi wrote for Politika about the concert of Bijelo
dugme at Hajduka esma: Concert is really an outdated word in rock
terminology and the only reason we still use it is our inability to find an
alternative, because everything that happened this Sunday evening on
the slopes of Koutnjak was beyond the academic rigidity and traditional
understanding of the relationship between performer and audience implied in this term.78
Veernje novosti reported that the concert at Hajduka esma was
a follow-up of the earlier guitar festivals and that the concert of Bijelo
dugme was such an event that could not be described but only heard
and seen,79 that Bijelo dugme proved to be the best and most popular
pop band of all times.80 For Politika, the concert at Hajduka esma was
an event of extreme proportions, musical pilgrimage, modern Kaaba,
so far the largest music gathering of young people in our country.81 The
Duboks poster from the concert at Hajduka esma bore the inscription:
The Biggest Pop Event in Europe.82 Duboks qualifications of the event
might seem pretentious, but they were not.
In addition to the analogy that was drawn between the Yugoslav
context of Dugmemania and Beatlemania, when it comes to the concert
at Hajduka esma there were two more analogies be taken into account:
1) The Belgrade Guitar Festival in 1966 (Gitarijada); 2) Mass gatherings
of the hippies at rock and roll festivals in the United States and the United
Kingdom (19671970).
Tomislav Badovinac, then President of the Peoples Youth of Yugoslavia/the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, testified that the
77
78
79
80
81
82

Koncert kod Hajduke esme je veliki korak za Bijelo dugme, ali jo vei za domau
rock muziku [Concert at Hajduka esma Is a Giant Step for Bijelo dugme, but an
Even More Giant Step for Domestic Rock Music], Duboks, October 1977.
Vie od koncerta [More than a Concert], Politika, August 30, 1977.
Dugme s kamatom [Dugme With an Interest Rate], Veernje novosti, August 30,
1977.
Dugme ostaje i postaje vee [Dugme Is Not Disbanding and It Is Become Bigger],
Veernje novosti, August 29, 1977.
Fenomen zvani Bijelo dugme [Phenomenon Called Bijelo dugme], Politika,
August 29, 1977.
Duboks, October 1977.

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Belgrade Guitar Fest in January and February 1966, for which he gave his
consent, was a prelude to the performance of a rock band Elipse on May
24, 1966 in Belgrade Youth Centre (Dom omladine Beograda) on the occasion of President Tito receiving the Relay of Youth (tafeta mladosti). Badinovac underlined that the performance before Tito affirmed rock and roll
as the music of Yugoslav youth.83 Mladost announced the identity card of
rock and roll bands, participants of the guitar festival, presenting them as
exemplary youth.84 In 1966, a sexologist Dr Aleksandar Kosti wrote for
NIN about the phenomenology of a guitar festival.85 The Belgrade Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia after the Belgrade Guitar
Festival (1966), made an analysis of The youth in contemporary social
events some of the issues and problems of Belgrade youth in which the
party admitted that the Yugoslav rock and roll bands formed a cultural
movement.86 Therefore, the Belgrade Guitar Festival in 1966 was a crucial
moment in the history of Yugoslav society when it comes to the relationship towards the youth. Rock and roll was established as a phenomenon
and observed as a movement. This phenomenon survived to the end of
socialist Yugoslavia and received an upgrade by establishing Bijelo dugme
as a phenomenon by itself whose audience, after the concert at Hajduka
esma, was described as a movement by Slobodan Konjevi.
Therefore, I cannot agree with Bogdan Tirnani that an explosion of the Yugoslav rock and roll came with Bijelo dugme because history of our attempts in the rock sphere was the history of a long series of
failures, mistakes and misunderstandings.87 I cannot agree with Darko
Glavan and Draen Vrdoljak that before Bijelo dugme pop and rock music existed, but had been moving for years along the line which took it to
the periphery of the mass occupation and that Yugoslavia discovered
rock music twenty years after its appearance.88
83
84
85
86

87
88

From e-mail correspondence of Aleksandar Rakovi with Tomislav Badovinac,

February 2527, 2011.
Slobodanka Mievi ima pravo da svira [Slobodanka Mievi, Has the Right to
Play], Mladost, January 26, 1966.
Nai domai bitlsi [Our New Beatles], NIN, February 27, 1966.
HAB, Fond Gradski komitet Saveza komunista Srbije Beograd, [The Belgrade
Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia], Fascicle 209. - Analysis Mladi u
savremenim drutvenim zbivanjima neka pitanja i problemi omladine Beograda
[The Youth in Contemporary Social Events Some Questions and Problems of the
Belgrade Youth] was done on the basis of tests conducted in the spring of 1966. A
memo dated on October 15, 1966 ref. no. 05-6/20.
Koncert kod Hajduke esme [Concert at Hajduka esma], NIN, September 4,
1977.
Darko Glavan, Draen Vrdoljak, Nita mudro: Bijelo dugme autorizirana biografija
[Nothing Wise: Bijelo dugme an Authorized Biography], (Zagreb, 1981), 14.

120

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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

When it comes to mass gatherings of hippies in the United States

and the United Kingdom expressing countercultural attitude towards Anglo-American imperialism, let us mention the most important. The Monterey Pop Festival in California (June 1618, 1967) gathered 200,000 people,
which was a prelude to the gathering of about 100,000 hippies around San
Francisco known as the Summer of Love. Further, the Woodstock Festival in New York State (August 1518, 1969) gathered about 500,000 visitors89 and at the Altamont Festival in California (December 6, 1969) about
300,000 people.90 there were about 600,000 people (August 2630, 1970)
at the third festival on the Isle of Wight in the United Kingdom in 197091
Let us now see a comparative table that says a lot.929394
The percentage of those present at the biggest rock and roll festivals /
concerts in the total population of the home country for Woodstock in
the United States (1969), Isle of Wight in the United Kingdom (1970) and
Hajduka esma in Yugoslavia (1977)

Attendants
Citizens

Percentage

Woodstock

The Isle of Wight

203,235,298 (USA)92

55,928,000 (UK)93

500,000
0,25%

Hajduka esma

600,000

70,000 x 100,000

1,07%

0,34% x 0,49%

20,522,602 (YU)94

Therefore, we can see that the percentage of visitors compared
to the population of the home country was such that for the Yugoslav
89
90
91
92
93
94

Robert Walser, The Rock and Roll Era, The Cambridge History of American Music,
(Cambridge, 2004), 364365.
Mark Hamilton Lytle, Americas Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of
Richard Nixon, (Oxford New York, 2006), 336.
Gina Arnold, Nobodys Army: Contradictory Cultural Rhetoric in Woodstock and
Gimme Shelter, Countercultures and Popular Music, ed. Sheila Whiteley, Jedediah
Sklower, (SurreyBurlington, 2014), 129.
According to the census in the United States: 1970 Census of Population:
Characteristics of the Population, U.S. Department of Commerce, May 1972, VIII.
Julie Jefferies, The UK population: past, present and future, Office for National
Statistics, 2005, 7. - The total population of the United Kingdom in 1971 is
statistically shown as: 55,928.0.
According to the census in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1971). See:
Savezni zavod za statistiku, Popis 1991. (sa osvrtom na rezultate ranijih popisa
19211981) [Census 1991 (with a view on results of previous censuses 1921
1981)], CD, (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku [Belgrade: Federal Bureau of
Statistics], 1998).

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community the concert at Hajduka esma had to be just as striking as

the festivals at Woodstock and the Isle of Wight for their local communities. Duan Vesi, rock journalist, said: For the older generations, it was
important who was at Woodstock and for us it became equally important
who was at Hajduka esma. If one was old enough to be there, one must
have been there. No excuses.95 Of course, the festivals in the United States
and the United Kingdom had a global character, while similar events in
Yugoslavia did not. However, the possibility that these events can be estimated quantitatively testify that the concert at Hajduka esma was a
Yugoslav social event of the utmost importance.
League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, Bijelo dugme and the
Concert at Hajduka esma

According to the tasks which the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia gave to their official authorities, and which on March 18, 1977
were explicitly underlined, Mladost had an obligation to be engaged on
all important matters of interest for the young generation and society in
general.96 Among other things, it also included addressing the phenomenon of Bijelo dugme, especially after the concert at Hajduka esma.
Mladost wrote that the history of the Yugoslav rock and roll and
pop music can be divided into the period before and after the concert
of Bijelo dugme at Hajduka esma. Official newspaper of the League of
Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia underlined that it was a comprehensive sociological, psychological, philosophical, ecological and political phenomenon.97 It was an opportunity for the officials of the youth organizations,
experts and journalists to discuss this topic.
After the concert at Hajduka esma, Azem Vlasi, the President
of the Conference of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia said that
Bijelo dugme was a unique phenomenon and therefore deserved to
be thoroughly analysed and closely examined as a new discovery for a
good portion of our youth. Vlasi obviously had a need to compliment the
members of Bijelo dugme who responded to calls of youth organizations
to play, participate in work actions and other youth events. He particu95
96
97

Vesi, op. cit., 140.

Y, Savez socijalistike omladine Jugoslavije [The League of Socialist Youth of
Yugoslavia], Fond 114, Fascicle 121. - A draft concept released by NIP Mladost as the
theme for the session of the Presidency of the Conference of the League of Socialist
Youth of Yugoslavia, March 31, 1977, no. 360.
Kad se raskopa Bijelo dugme [When Bijelo dugme Is Unbuttoned], Mladost,
September 16, 1977.

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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

larly underlined that Goran Bregovi was a hardworking member of the

League of Socialist Youth.98

Vesna Pei, a sociologist, made an analogy between the concert
at Hajduka esma and the Woodstock Festival. Pei said that the audience which was present at Hajduka esma, simply used the chance
for free and spontaneous gathering, without mediation of any single social institutions. Vukoje Bulatovi, the director and chief editor of Politika spoke about the analogy with musical events in the West and asked
whether the concert at Hajduka esma was phenomenon similar to
those that occur abroad or it had elements of our mentality.99
On the other hand, Lev Kreft, member of the Secretariat of the
League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, said that the Yugoslav youth does
not see Bijelo dugme as a substitute for true social ideals. He particularly underlined that the enthusiasm of young Yugoslavs towards rock
and roll did not mean that we, by analogy with some events in the West
(which also belonged to the past), had fallen into Dugmemania.100
So we see that the analogy between Bijelo dugme and past phenomena in the West Beatlemania and Woodstock Nation aroused
suspicion in the part of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia. During the sixties, Yugoslav press reported that the Beatles were the most
important remnant of the wreckage known as British Empire.101 For
the need of the Analytical Department of the Central Committee of the
League of Communists of Serbia in May 1968 Rajko Danilovi submitted
an analysis entitled Youth New Left in Europe and America and some
conceptual developments in this regard in our society, which said that
the hippie movement, under the new left, was most radical and could
have a revolutionary role in the United States.102
Beatles who were more popular than Queen Elizabeth and the
hippies who acted against US presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon because of the intervention in Vietnam could have made Lev
Kreft underline that Bijelo dugme could not be a substitute for true so98

Ibid.
Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Olupina zvana Britanska imperija [Wreckage Known as the British Empire], NIN,
December 10, 1967. - Taken from Spiegel and Newsweek.
102 HAB, Fond Gradski komitet Saveza komunista Srbije Beograd, [The Belgrade
Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia], Fascicle 520 The analysis
Omladinska nova levica u Evropi i Americi i neka idejna kretanja u vezi s tim u
nas [The New Left Youth in Europe and America and Some Ideological Trends
Connected With It In Our Country], Analytical Department of the Central Committee
of the League of Communists of Serbia completed this analysis in May 1968.
99

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cial ideals, although in case of Bijelo Dugme it was not as nearly possible to speak of counterculture. On the contrary, when it comes to young
people, Bijelo dugme glorified socialist values more strikingly than others. However, on the top of the social ideals of socialist Yugoslavia, there
was a supreme leader, President Josip Broz Tito. Bijelo Dugme could have
been a social phenomenon, but no ideal and/or idol of young Yugoslavs.
According to Mladen Zvonarevi who, at the Tenth Yugoslav Colloquium on Leisure Time (January 31 February 3, 1979) in Dubrovnik
submitted a report called Pop Music Alienation and De-alienation,
also written for the purposes of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, said that in the broader social context Bijelo dugme were like
the Beatles in the world. However, Zvonarevi intended to relativize the
popularity of Bijelo dugme by limiting their influence to young people
between the age of thirteen and seventeen, almost exclusively in urban
areas and to the girls who had crush on the band members. Therefore,
Zvonarevi wrote, the great importance given to Bijelo dugme and even
rock and roll was unjustified. Zvonarevi underlined that only obsessed girls could see the members of Bijelo dugme as their idols.103 On
the same occasion, the research team led by Darko Glavan submitted a
report called The Motives for the Use of Rock Music which concluded
that the Yugoslav youth listened to rock and roll in order to be informed,
entertained and relaxed and that there was no idolatry in that.104
While the League of Socialist Youth analyzed the phenomenon
of Bijelo Dugme, the member of the youth organization Goran Bregovi,
who was thought decent by Azem Vlasi, decided to break the image of an
exemplary youth. In a radio show Vibracije on Studio B, two hours after
the concert at Hajduka esma, Bregovi said that the public had a wrong
impression about Bijelo dugme. He underlined that rock and roll was not
a passing phase in their lives, that they would not get a haircut and start
to live a normal life. He denied he was a good student and explained that
for Bijelo dugme rock and roll was the only way they knew.105
Also, in his interview to Ilustrovana politika after the concert,
Bregovi insisted he did not want to be seen as exemplary because he
no longer passed exams as he did earlier during the university studies.
He underlined that music was the only way he wanted to live.106 Bregovi
103

AY, Savez socijalistike omladine Jugoslavije [The League of Socialist Youth of

Yugoslavia], Fond 114, Fascicle 130.
104 Ibid.
105 Bijelo dugme u Studiju B [Bijelo dugme in Studio B], Duboks, October 1977.
106 Sukob nas je opametio [The Dispute Make Us Wiser], Ilustrovana politika,
September 13, 1977.

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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

was even more explicit in an interview for Duboks: Everything around

us, around Bijelo dugme, is rock and roll. Rock and roll is not only in that
what we play, not only in the music. Rock and roll is the way we live. So,
all that money that has come and that we will spend unscrupulously (...)
All that glory that we have and that will also be spent unscrupulously;
all those people who are around us and who love us, will reject us one
day (...) all that energy that we will spend in the beds of these crazy girls
hanging around us (...) All that is what we play, all that is rock and roll.107
At that moment, Bregovi either took off on the wings of the concert at Hajduka esma or maybe wanted to present himself as a bad guy
interested in nothing but rock and roll, women and money (and also attributed these qualities to other members of the band) in order to set up
a barrier towards young people who looked upon him and Bijelo dugme
as their idols, which was considered inappropriate in the youth organization (i.e. the party structures). Youth organization fully recognized the
phenomenon of Bijelo dugme, nurturing it to a large extent and the rewarding the band, but could not allow idolatry that Bijelo dugme seemed
to inspire in a small portion of the youth.
In recent publications, we can see comparisons and analogies
between Josip Broz Tito, on the one hand and Goran Bregovi and Bijelo dugme on the other hand. For example, in 2015 Radovan Raka Mari
stated: Bijelo dugme was more popular than Tito.108 Ivan Ivakovi
wrote that there were those who called Goran Bregovi Tito of the Yugoslav rock and roll.109 Ljubia Stavri and Vladimir Sudar assessed that
Bregovi was a kind of Tito of music.110 However, it is certain that the
Yugoslav teenagers in urban areas had mostly thought and dreamed of
Bijelo dugme from 1974 to the end of the seventies. So, it was limited to
a certain period of time and a certain part of population. In the overall
Yugoslav context, Bijelo dugme could not have been more popular than
Tito in the seventies.

107

Goran Bregovi, Duboks, October 1977.

Bijelo dugme je bilo popularnije od Tita [Bijelo dugme Was More Popular than
Tito], Nedeljnik, Maj 21, 2015.
109 Ivakovi, op. cit., 134.
110 Ljubia Stavri, Vladimir Sudar, Kad sam bio Bijelo dugme [When I Was Bijelo dugme],
(Beograd, 2005), 3132.
108

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League of Socialist Youth as a publisher of literature on Bijelo dugme

The League of Socialist Youth stood behind three books dealing
with the phenomenon of Bijelo dugme and the Yugoslav rock and roll
that were written in the second half of the seventies (two of these were
published in the early eighties). In the books on Yugoslav rock and roll
Bijelo dugme takes a crucial or very important role.
In 1976 and 1977 Darko Glavan and his colleagues Velibor Jerbi,
Stoja Luki and Vladimir Tomi, were given the task, within the Research
Department of the Centre of Social Activities of the League of Socialist Youth of Croatia (Znanstveno-istraivaki odsjek Centra drutvenih
djelatnosti Saveza socijalistike omladine Hrvatske), to study the sociocultural importance of pop music. It is a research team that has already
been mentioned as the author of The Motives for the Use of Rock Music
presented at the Tenth Yugoslav Colloquium on Leisure Time (January
31 February 3, 1979) in Dubrovnik. The research was entrusted to the
Croatian Cultural Institute (Zavod za kulturu Hrvatske), the Centre of Social Activities of the League of Socialist Youth of Croatia and the Croatian
Institute for Education and Pedagogy (Zavod za prosvjetno-pedagoku
slubu). The research team led by Glavan, conducted surveys with those
who attended the concerts of the Rolling Stones (June 2122, 1976) and
Bijelo dugme (1977).111 It was the concert of Bijelo dugme in the spring
of 1977 which the Zagreb press rated as poor.112 Finally, the research of
Glavan and his associates was published by the Centre of Social Activities
of the League of Socialist Youth of Croatia as a book titled Pop glazba i
kultura mladih 1 (Pop Music and Youth Culture 1) (Zagreb, 1978).
At about the same time Mio Kuli, a philosopher and sociologist of culture from Sarajevo, wrote the feuilleton Izazov rok kulture
(The Challenge of Rock Culture) (December 1976 March 1977) for the
official weekly of the League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia Mladost in
which he positively rated domestic rock music as the Yugoslav phenomenon because rock music had a socially integrating role.113 He edited
his feuilleton and published it as a book Rok kultura u izazovu (Rock Culture under Challenge) (Sarajevo, 1980), published by the City Conference
of the Literary Youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gradska konferencija
111

Darko Glavan, Velibor Jerbi, Stoja Luki, Vladimir Tomi, Pop glazba i kultura mladih
1 [Pop Music and Youth Culture 1], (Zagreb, 1978), 7, 9, 14, 5556.
112 Bijelo dugme iznenada otkazalo koncert u Zagrebu. Neslavno za kraj [Bijelo
dugme Suddenly Cancelled the Concert in Zagreb, Infamous for the End], Veernji
list, August 29, 1977.
113 Ljubav, najprisutnija [Love, the Most Present of All], Mladost, March 18, 1977.

126

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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

Knjievne omladine Bosne i Hercegovine). He concluded that the concert

of Bijelo dugme at Hajduka esma which was attended by nearly one
hundred thousand people, was the culmination of the interest of the Yugoslav youth in rock and roll.114
The League of Socialist Youth also published the book on the
phenomenon of Bijelo dugme. Precisely, Darko Glavan and Draen Vrdoljak published a book Nita mudro: Bijelo dugme: autorizirana biografija
(Nothing Wise: Bijelo dugme: Authorized Biography) (Zagreb, 1981) in
Polet-rok edition issued by the Centre of Social Activities of the League
of Socialist Youth of Croatia.
On the other hand, the book Istina o Bijelom dugmetu (Truth
about Bijelo dugme) was published by the author Danilo trbac in Belgrade, 1977. In 1980, Duko Pavlovi wrote a book Bijelo Dugme (Gornji
Milanovac, 1980) which was published by Duboks. The League of Socialist Youth was not behind these books.
During the sixties, party organs supported the research and analysis of the attitude of Yugoslav youth towards rock and roll and the counterculture that can be found only in archival funds, whereas in the seventies the research and analysis of the same type were published as books,
available to the public, and published by the youth organization acting
under the guidance of the party. Here we have two intertwined and inseparable phenomena of the seventies: 1. Phenomenon of Yugoslav rock
and roll 2. Phenomenon of Bijelo dugme. The phenomenon of Yugoslav
rock and roll lasted continuously from 1966 to 1991 (and possibly from
1964) and the unique phenomenon of Bijelo dugme over the seventies.
With the maturing of audience and band members entering the age of
thirties they moved from hard rock towards a softer sound. Thus, during
the eighties, Bijelo dugme was a part of a phenomenon of the Yugoslav
rock and roll scene but no longer a unique phenomenon.

114

Mio Kuli, Rok kultura u izazovu [The Challenge of Rock Culture], (Sarajevo, 1980),
88.

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Sources and Literature

Unpublished sources
A
 rchives of Yugoslavia (AY). Savez socijalistike omladine Jugoslavije (The League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia), Fond 114,
Fascicle 121. A draft concept released by NIP Mladost as the theme
for the session of the Presidency of the Conference of the League of
Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia, March 31, 1977, no. 360.
A
 rchives of Yugoslavia (AY). Savez socijalistike omladine Jugoslavije (The League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia), Fond 114, Fascicle 130. The paper by Mladen Zvonarevi Pop music alienation
and de-alienation presented on January 31 February 3, 1979.
A
 rchives of Yugoslavia (AY). Savez socijalistike omladine Jugoslavije (The League of Socialist Youth of Yugoslavia), Fond 114,
Fascicle 130. The paper by Darko Glavan and others The motives
for the use of rock music presented on January 31 February 3,
1979.
H
 istorical Archives of Belgrade (HAB). Fond Gradski komitet
Saveza komunista Srbije Beograd (The Belgrade Committee of
the League of Communists of Serbia), Fascicle 209. The analysis
Mladi u savremenim drutvenim zbivanjima neka pitanja i problemi omladine Beograda. A memo dated on October 15, 1966 ref.
no. 05-6/20.
H
 istorical Archives of Belgrade (HAB). Fond Gradski komitet
Saveza komunista Srbije Beograd (The Belgrade Committee of
the League of Communists of Serbia), Fascicle 520. The analysis
Omladinska nova levica u Evropi i Americi i neka idejna kretanja u
vezi s tim u nas, completed in May 1968.
A
 uthors interviews with contemporaries: Dr Tomislav Badovinac
(February 2527, 2011) and Bojan Hreljac (February 12, 2011)
Newspapers and magazines

Borba (Belgrade)
Duboks (Belgrade)
Ilustrovana politika (Belgrade)
Komunist (Belgrade)
Mladost (Belgrade)
Nai dani (Sarajevo)

128

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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

NIN (Belgrade)
Polet (Zagreb)
Politika (Belgrade)
Politika ekspres (Belgrade)
Pro Musica (Belgrade)
Veernje novosti (Belgrade)
Veernji list (Zagreb)
Vjesnik u srijedu (Zagreb)

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socijalistikom drutvu. Beograd: Arhipelag, 2011.
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242. Vienna: sterreichische Nationalbank, 2008.
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20. Vesi, Duan. Bijelo dugme: ta bi dao da si na mom mjestu. Beograd: Laguna, 2014.
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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

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Bijelo Dugme Concert in Hajduka esma in Belgrade (1977):

Social Event of the Utmost Importance
and Recognition of a Unique Phenomenon

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133

 327(510)1955(093.2)
327(510:73)1955(093.2)
327(510:47)1955(093.2)

: 26. 11. 2015.
:14. 2. 2016.

He YANQING
Institute for China Studies
University of Malaya

The Implementation of the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks against

the Background of the Geneva Summit 1955: PRCs Diplomatic
Achievements with the Help of the Soviet Union
Abstract: This article uses the newly declassified archives
of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, some other Chinese archival materials and some declassified archives of the United
States to reexamine the process of implementing Sino-US
ambassadorial talks and analyze the links between these
talks and the four-power Geneva Summit in 1955, with
particular attention dedicated to the mutual cooperation
and mutual support between China and Soviet Union. In
contrast to previous scholarship, this article believes that
the Soviet Union exercised a more important role in the
process of implementation of the Sino-US ambassadorial
talks. This process was a perfect example of the honeymoon period of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the mid1950s. This article also discovers that some of the first
cracks in the Sino-Soviet relationship also appeared during the golden years of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
Key words: Geneva Summit, Geneva spirit, Sino-US
ambassadorial talks, Sino-Soviet relations

The very first summit of great powers after the Second World
War, which was co-sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and France, was held on July 1823 1955, in Geneva.
135

3/2015.

The government of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) held this summit in very high esteem. The following statement was made by Chinese
officials: The four-power Summit, following the Korean armistice conference in Geneva last year and this years Asian-African Conference,
once again proved that the resolution of international disputes could
only come through negotiations. If every country could hold negotiations in a sincere spirit, and could work together through joint efforts,
every international problem could be resolved in a gradual and smooth
way.1 Later, this spirit of mutual cooperation was colloquially dubbed
as the Geneva spirit by the PRC and the Soviet Union. Of course, the
Geneva spirit came about under Soviet Unions vigorous advocacy
and it meant peaceful negotiations between states living under different systems. A week after the closure of the Geneva Summit, China and
the United States began to implement protracted and rather famous
Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks.2 At first, the location of these talks was
also in Geneva. Did the Geneva Summit have any influence on the beginning of the series of ambassadorial talks between these two countries?
How did China finally decide to sit at the table with the United States
after the three-year war in Korea, PRCs bombardment of the off-shore
islands in the Taiwan Straits, and a very long period of mutual hostilities? Did the implementation of Sino-US ambassadorial talks have any
connection with the Soviet Union and its policies?
Research on the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks is not new in the
fields of diplomatic history studies and political science. And a significant part of this research focused its attention on the following questions: the general role of these talks,3 the decision-making process in
1

This comes from Premier Chou En-lais speech at the second session of the First
National Peoples Representative Meeting on July 30, 1955. Peoples Daily, July 31,
1955.
On August 1, 1955, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the United
States started a series of ambassadorial-level talks in Geneva to discuss the
repatriation of nationals and other issues of mutual concern. Because the
two countries did not have formal diplomatic relations, these talks were the
principle form of contact between them for sixteen years and 136 different
meetings were held. According to the place of these talks, the whole series
of talks could be divided into the Geneva Talks (lasting from 1955 to 1957)
and the Warsaw Talks (lasting from 1958 to 1970). They ended when the U.S.
President Richard Nixon visited China and set the stage for the eventual U.S.
recognition of the Peoples Republic.
According to their different attitudes about the role of the talks, American researchers
can be divided into two different fractions. Kenneth T. Young, who is probably the
first American scholar who did research on the ambassadorial talks, is also one of
the famous scholars in the positive-attitude fraction. He analyzed ten meetings of
the Sino-US ambassadorial talks from SeptemberNovember 1958. His attitude is

136

He YANQING

The Implementation of the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks against

the Background of the Geneva Summit 1955: PRCs Diplomatic
Achievements with the Help of the Soviet Union

the United States,4 the process of the talks and their characteristics.5
However, research and analysis of the decision-making process in

that these talks, which lasted 12 years, proved to be worthwhile. This has played
a useful role in easing tensions and controlling crises. Young further stressed that
these ambassadorial talks provided for both sides the most important experiences
before the reconciliation negotiations later. These negotiations were unique and
paradoxical. And these talks slowly cultivated some kind of trust which was vital to
the stability of the international situation. Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the
Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 19531957, (New York: McGrawHill, 1968). - Harry Harding and Appu K. Soman also affirmed that the ambassadorial
talks have promoted the final normalization of Sino-American relationship. Harry
Harding and Ming Yuan, Sino-American Relations, 19451955: A Joint Reassessment of
a Critical Decade, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1989); Appu K. Soman,
Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and
China, 19501958, (Praeger, 2000). - Another fraction, represented by some of the
historical participants in the Sino-American relations, such as Alexis Johnson, Jacob
Beam and Henry Kissinger, was inclined to consider the talks as useless. Because
there were few new concepts that these talks had put forward. Jacob Beam, Multiple
Experience: An American Ambassadors Unique Perspective on East-West Issues, (New
York: W.W. Norton 1978); Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an
American Diplomacy, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984). In China, most
scholars regarded these talks as useful, same as was the official attitude of the PRC
government which was embodied in: The Diplomatic History of PRC, 19491956,ed.
by Pei Jianzhang, (Beijing: The World Knowledge Press, 1998) and The Diplomatic
History of PRC, 19571969, ed. by Wang Taiping, (Beijing: The World Knowledge Press,
1998). They believed that the ambassadorial talks proved to be a unique channel of
communication between the two sides which proved to be working. As one of the
Chinese witnesses, Wang Bingnan, who was the Chief Representative of China in the
nine-year-long Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks, believed these talks were a form of
special communication that proved to be more effective for contemporary relations
than some other official diplomatic contacts. Wang Bingnan, Retrospect of the 9-year
Talks between China and the US, (Beijing: The World Knowledge Press, 1985), 93.
Due to the possibility of easier access to the official archives, scholars have done a
lot research on Washingtons decision-making process. Besides the achievements as
mentioned above, such as Kenneth T. Youngs, a lot of other works are alsooutstanding.
For example, Steven M. Goldsteins article: Dialogue of the Deaf? The Sino-American
Ambassadorial-Level Talks, 19551970, Re-examining the Cold War: US-China
Diplomacy, 19541973, Collected in Robert Ross & Jiang Changbin eds, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2001), 200237; Yafeng Xias article: Negotiating at
Cross-Purposes: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, 19611968, Diplomacy and
Statecraft, 16:2, June 2005, 297329 and his book: Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.China Talks during the Cold War, 19491972, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 2006); Dayong Nius: Warsaw Ambassadorial-Level Talks between China and the
United States, 19611963 (Historiography at the Peking University, 2000).
Although many scholars are interested in the Sino-American ambassadorial talks,
most of them considered the Geneva talks as more worth studying, especially
concerning the agreement on the citizens returning to their original countries and
interactions regarding the Taiwan crisis in 1958. Besides that, the 135th and 136th
Ambassadorial Talks in 1970 have also attracted much attention because they were
preludes of the Sino-American rapprochement.

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China are still inadequate, generally due to the lack of Chinese government archives.6 As for the question about Soviet Unions influence on
the process of decision-making in China, there is much less research.
In this article, the author will analyze the implementation process of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks against the background of the
Geneva Summit. This process was also an outstanding reflection of the
real relationship existing between China and the Soviet Union in the mid1950s. Inside China, contemporary research in the field of Chinese diplomatic history studies has been divided into different fractions according
to their different fields of interest: different countries. This kind of division is so deep that there are few cross achievements among the different
fractions. Thus, there is also a vacuum zone in Chinese diplomatic history studies. The triangle relationship between China, the Soviet Union
and the U.S. in 1955, also falls into that category. This article is going to
explore this vacuum zone and it will try to give a new perspective to the
Sino-Soviet and Sino-U.S. relations.
First of all, let us turn to the time before the implementation of
Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. The direct contact between the governments of the Peoples Republic of China and the United States after the
Korean War took place in the shadow of the Soviet Union. A year before,
during the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina (April 26 July 20
1954), the PRC government not only ascended on the international stage
as a superpower for the first time, but also Beijing achieved certain results: it came into direct contact with the Americans. But the direct contact came through the Soviet side which passed on messages between
the Chinese and U.S. delegations. According to the reminiscences of Wang
Bingnan,7 who was in charge of internal affairs of the Chinese delega6

One of the main papers that aims at analyzing Beijings decision-making process
in the Sino-US ambassadorial talks is Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguos article: The
Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber and Surveying Instrument in Antagonism: SinoAmerican Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the Chinese Perspective, Contemporary
China History Studies, Vol. 1, 2000. Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo mentioned in their
article: The Chinese leaders would like to ease their relations with the U.S., while
improving their international position through the talks. After 1956, the Chinese
government began to lose their higher expectation in ambassadorial talks; reversely
they resorted to American civics, actively promoted the Peoples Diplomacy
between China and U.S. In the Warsaw talks, China utilized the ambassadorial talks
as a microphone. At the end of 1960s, Chinese leaders intended to normalize the
Sino-American relationship, so they utilized the ambassadorial talks as a political
probe. Beijing changed its conception and treatment of the talks in different periods.
Wang Bing-nan was Secretary General of the Chinese Delegation at the Geneva
Conference. And he was appointed as Chinese ambassador to Poland in March, 1955.
At the ambassadorial post in Poland, he was concurrently the Chief Representative
of China in the nine-year-long Sino-US ambassadorial talks.

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tion in Geneva, this was how things happened: One day Molotov came
to find our Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and told Zhou that he had invited
the delegation of the United States to dinner before their Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles arrived to Geneva. During this dinner, he had a
personal conversation with the deputy head of the U.S. delegation Walter
Bedell Smith and he had found out that Smith had a critical view on some
policies of the U.S. government. According to Molotovs statement, Smith
had an opinion that the hostile policies which the United States pursued
towards the PRC were unrealistic.8 Inspired by this message, the Chinese
delegation seized the opportunity to get in touch with Smith. At that moment, the United States government urgently requested the repatriation
of American soldiers and civilians held inside Chinese borders. Therefore,
Beijing government also called for direct contact between the two governments of China and U.S., not via third party. Although Washington
worried about the prospect that direct contact with China could cause
some misunderstanding inside the U.S. government concerning the policy of refusal to recognize the PRC government. However, the issue of
returning the U.S. citizens home was so important that they could not
refuse to hold talks with Beijing. It was agreed to talk to the Chinese
under the sponsorship of the British charge daffaires in Beijing Baron
Trevelyan. From June 5 to 21 1954, Beijing and Washington conducted
four talks at the consular level. Then, from July 16 to 21 1954 both sides
sent liaisons and were in contact twice. After the end of 1954 Geneva
Conference, regular contacts at the consular level had been realized and
the first direct contact started on July 29, 1954. This kind of contact continued until July 1955. In order to avoid any misunderstandings concerning these contacts between Washington and Beijing, U.S. Sectary of State
Dulles specifically pointed out in his telegram to the U.S. Embassy in the
United Kingdom: Arrangement for informal exchange information with
Chinese Communists at subordinate Consular level in Geneva is merely
an extension of the staff level conversations at the Geneva Conference on
re-detained Americans. No negotiations or representations contemplated at Geneva. Geneva arrangements in no way intended to interfere with
the British representation of American interests in Communist China.9
Even so, the PRC government had still made a small hole on the tightly
closed door, a channel to observe Washington and make contact with it.
Such a breakthrough happened under the influence of the Soviets, intentionally or not.
8
9

Wang Bingnan, Retrospect of the 9-year Talks between China and the U.S., 19.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 19521954, Vol. 14, Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 1985, 515.

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After that, the Soviet Union continued to work closely with China
and Moscow used various international forums to contribute to the direct talks between the governments of PRC and the U.S.
The Preparation of the Geneva Summit and the
Possibility of Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks

In the second half of 1954, just when the Soviet Union was actively
preparing to participate in the coming Geneva summit, the First Taiwan
Strait Crisis unexpectedly broke out. Therefore, the Soviet Union was
preoccupied with crisis mediation. Soviets tried to seize the opportunity
of this Summit to help the PRC carry out some of the appeals and get into
direct touch with the U.S.
As for the Summit topics which the Soviet government had prepared, some of the Chineses requirements were also included. At the
end of 1954, the Moscow government sent the documents of the coming
Geneva Summit to Beijing and solicited some of the Chinese views on
them. On January 1, 1955 Chinese Foreign Ministry sent a formal reply
to Moscow as Our Answer to the Central Committee of CPSU about the
Four-Nation Summit in Geneva. In this reply, the Chinese side expounded: We fully agree with the position of the CPSU Central Committee and
its basic expectation for the Summit. But according to their estimate,
Chinese officials also said: Even though the Americans are not prepared
to solve any substantive issues at this summit, our sincere initiatives
and active movements to ease the tension in the world would somewhat
contribute to the success of the Summit. In the end, the meeting could
achieve a certain degree of agreement. The only suggestion put forward
by the PRC government was that the Far Eastern problems should be
considered as one of the important topics at the Geneva Summit.10
As for the Taiwan Strait issue, the PRC government agreed with the
opinion of Moscow: We agree with the CPSU Central Committees view
that it should contribute a lot to the realization of the Sino-U.S. direct
talks, since that is the most likely way to achieve peaceful negotiations.
As for the other ways, such as holding a special five-superpower summit
to discuss the Taiwan issue and the Far Eastern problems, we also welcome that, but we look upon them as the indirect method which could be
used in the right moment in time. In addition, we think that the beginning
of direct negotiations between China and the U.S. could be implemented
by the envoys of both countries that are stationed in Moscow, New Delhi

10

Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (PRC FMA), Record ID: 111-00065-02.

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or London.11 As for the release of American pilots, which had been previously raised by the Soviet Union in its letter to CPC, the Chinese side also
expressed full agreement with its content. Beijings reply to Moscow was:
We agree with the views of the CPSU Central Committee concerning this
problem. Sometime around the Geneva Summit, we are ready to reveal
the news to the Indians that we will soon release the Americans.12
Thus, the PRC and the USSR shared the consistent and common
interest with regards to the problem of lessening international tensions.
They held necessary contacts and cooperated with regards to the issue of
realization of Sino-U.S. direct talks. In addition, in order to create an atmosphere of dtente between the East and the West, which could prove
to be beneficial to the success of the Geneva Summit, the Soviet Union
expressed its utmost interest in Chinas own problem of releasing the
captive American pilots, which was also an issue of the greatest importance for the United States.
As a key suggestion to incite the direct talks between China and
America, a Ten-Nation Meeting which included the PRC, the U.S., the U.K.,
the USSR, France, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon was proposed by Molotov in his statement about easing tensions in the Far East
area on February 2, 1954. Beijing government immediately acknowledged the importance of Molotovs proposal, while Zhou Enlai expressed
his opinion on the issue of tensions in Asia and the Taiwan Straits problem to Indias ambassador to China Nedyam Raghavan in the famous West
Flower House of the Sea Palaces. That time Zhou said: If there were an
international meeting to discuss these problems, the United State would
have to talk with Chinese face to face. And we will not refuse to talk with
the Americans during such a meeting Since it is the Americans who
have caused such tensions in the Far East, it is not us China, therefore it is
the Americans who really need to talk directly to China. We can talk during an international meeting, also joined by other countries. But now the
Americans hide behind and incite Chiang Kai-sheks government to step
forward and start negotiations with others. This is a plot to engage us into
a two-China discussion on one hand, and put their responsibility on us
on the other.13 In addition, the Peoples Daily continually published news
about endorsements on the Ten-Nation Meeting proposed by Moscow
coming from the governments and media of Indonesia, Romania, India
11
12
13

PRC FMA, Record ID: 111-00065-02.

Ibid.
The Diplomatic History Research Office of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhou
Enlai Diplomatic Activities Memorabilia, 19491975, (Beijing: The World Knowledge
Press, 1993), 100.

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and Burma.14 But the Washington government had no interest in such an

international meeting which excluded the Chiang Kai-shek government
and eventually they refused to attend it.
As for the famous statement of Zhou Enlai at the Bandung
Conference in which the Chinese government expressed its desire to sit
at the table and negotiate with the Americans for the first time, Moscow
immediately demonstrated its support and appreciation for Chinas
proposals. Zhous statement was issued on April 23, 1955, during the
meeting of the heads of delegations of India, Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Philippine, Indonesia and China. With regards to the Taiwan
Strait Crises which was developing at that time, Zhou said: Relations between the Chinese People and the American People are friendly. Chinese
people are unwilling to fight with the United States. Chinese government
is willing to negotiate with the United States. We can sit down and discuss the problems to lessen tensions in the Far East, especially in the
Taiwan Strait Crisis.15 It was in this statement that Zhou Enlai officially
expressed Beijings approval of the Ten-Nation Meeting proposal of the
Soviet Union. Zhou said: With regards to the form of negotiations between China and the United States, the Chinese government believes that
the proposal of the Soviet Union on the Ten-Nation Meeting is acceptable. But we are also willing to consider other forms of negotiations.16
Moscow also demonstrated its official support for Chinas attitude on
Sino-U.S. direct talks. Later on, Moscow strongly emphasized that the
Soviet delegation will support comrade Zhou Enlais proposal on April 23
concerning the direct talks between China and the United States.17 Such
close interactions could show the depth of trust and corporation between
Beijing and Moscow on the issues of lessening of tensions in the Taiwan
Strait and implementing the agenda of the Sino-American direct talks.
But the attitude of the U.S. government toward direct talks with
the PRC was negative. On April 26, 1955, three days after Zhous statement in Bandung, Secretary of State Dulles made a statement during a
press conference. Dulles did not deny the possibility of direct talk with
Chinese, but he said: Whether or not that was a sincere proposal remains
to be seen. Perhaps the Chinese Communists were merely playing a propaganda game. But we intend to try to find out. However Dulles refused
14
15
16

17

Peoples Daily, February 16, 1955, 1; Peoples Daily, February 18, 1955, 1.
The Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai Chronicle,
19491976, Vol. 1, (Beijing: The Central Literature Press, 1997), 470.
Zhou Enlai, Report on the Asian-African Conference, The Peoples Daily, May 17,
1955.
PRC FMA, Record ID: 206-00061-07.

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to enter into any multilateral or bilateral discussions with the Chinese

Communists without the presence of the Chinese Nationalists. He said,
We are not going to deal with the rights of the Chinese Nationalists, and
their claims, in their absence. In addition, Dulles believed that the very
first thing of such talks was to find out whether there is a possibility
of a cease-fire in the region. So Dulles regarded a cease-fire as the indispensable prerequisite to anything further.18
The Chinese government initially expressed intense criticism of
the Dulles statement, but sometime later, it took further steps to ease
tensions and seek a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan Strait issue. As
for Dulles statement, Zhou Enlai insisted that China is not at war with
the United States, the cease-fire problem is completely irrelevant.19 And
then he announced: At any time, the Chinese government cannot accept
that the Chiang Kai-shek clique participates in any international conference. There are only two possible ways for the Chinese people to liberate
Taiwan: war and peace. If it is possible, the Chinese people are willing to
use peaceful means.20 It seemed that there was no possibility for compromise on Chinas side. However, a few days later, there was a change
expressed during Zhou Enlais conversation with V. K. Krishna Menon,
Indias representative to the United Nations. Zhou said: We have never
said that we refuse to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek. On the contrary, we
said we are willing to negotiate with him on April 23, during the Bandung
Conference. But we did not express this attitude publicly and we will announce this when the appropriate time comes. Cease-fire is the problem
between the central PRC government and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. We
will undertake direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. But these negotiations are totally different from the international negotiations held
between China and the United States.21 In addition, China adopted a proactive stance when it announced the release of four American pilots on
May 30. Such action demonstrated Chinas sincere hope forpeaceful and
direct talks with the U.S. In addition, this move also raised further concern about the re-detained Americans inside the U.S.
Recognizing that the proposal for the Ten-Nation Meeting could
not be achieved, the Soviet Union put forward another proposal to finally
18
19
20

21

FRUS, 19551957, Vol. 2 (1986), 519520.

Zhou Enlais conversation with Trevelyan, The Literature Research Center of the
CPC Central Committee, Chou En-lai Chronicle, 19491976, Vol. 1, (Beijing: The
Central Literature Press, 1997), 477.
Zhou Enlai, Report on the Asian-African Conference, Peoples Daily, May 17, 1955.
Zhou Enlai Diplomatic Activities Memorabilia, 19491975, (Beijing: The World
Knowledge Press, 1993), 111.

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launch the Sino-U.S. direct talks. That was the Five-Power Conference.
This proposed conference was misunderstood by the Americans immediately. Washington was worried that Moscow could use such a conference as an alternative to the Geneva Summit. Such misunderstanding had
existed for a few days until Dulles discussed this with Molotov on May
14, 1955, and took notice of Moscows real intentions. In Dulles report
toU.S. President Eisenhower that day, he said: One of Molotovs most
significant remarks was that they would propose a five-power conference. This clearly indicated that they would not stipulate that this first
four-power conference should itself be a five-power conference.22 From
then on, Washington did not worry about the possibility that Moscow
could refuse to attend the four-power summit in Geneva. However, there
were serious worries that the representative of the Soviet Union would
put forward the Five-Power Conference during the Geneva Summit or
talk about some other issues related to the direct negotiations between
America and Communist China. Some U.S. senators even estimated that
the biggest difference during the Geneva Summit might be rooted in Far
Eastern problems.23
Moscows proposal of a Five-Power Conference had a substantial
impact on Washingtons actions around the Geneva Summit. To counter
such a proposal, Washington mainly undertook three different actions.
The first one was to form the common consensus among the Western allies. For example, on May 31, 1955, Eisenhower wrote to the U.K. Prime
Minister Anthony Eden and requested London to maintain a consensus
with Washington during the Geneva Summit.24 The second action was to
prepare the counter proposal for the Summit. Dulles did a lot of preparation for the topics supposed to be discussed during the Summit and
reported them back to Eisenhower on June 18: 1. global disarmament,
atomic and conventional; 2. unification of Germany; 3. European security; 4. satellite liberation; 5. international Communism; 6. trade. Dulles
especially emphasized satellite liberation and trade, since he believed
that the former would be strongly opposed by the Soviets, while the latter would be most attractive to them.25 The third action was to offer an
opportunity of direct talks to the Chinese, and let Moscows proposal of
22
23
24
25

Department of State, Eisenhower and Marshal Zhukovs meeting in Geneva, July 20,
1955, reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Document
Number: CK3100270862.
In the Bipartisan Legislative Meeting Pre-Geneva Summit Conference on July 12nd,
1955, Senator Clements stated his concerns about this problem. DDRS, Document
Number: CK3100408884.
DDRS, Document Number: CK3100436248.
DDRS, Document Number: CK3100190453.

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a Five-Power Conference on Far Eastern issues lose any meaning of urgency. On July 8, Eisenhower sent a message to the Indian Prime Minister
Nehru and expressed his willingness to hold ambassadorial level talks
with Beijing. Then, couple of hours later, in a telegram from Dulles to
the U.K. Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan, Dulles said he was all ready
to request your Government as representing US interests at Peiping to
make suggestion to Chou En-lai about the direct talks between the U.S.
and PRC. He also urged Macmillan to get something under way soon, as
suggested, so that it will be in the works before we get to Geneva and, as
you suggest, will provide the best answer to the Russians.26 This action
was just fitting into the original intentions of Moscow and Beijing.
Although Washington proposed a direct dialogue with Beijing, it
was still not willing to discuss additional issues except the problem of
stranded Americans in China, which only made Beijing somewhat disappointed. After some communication with Macmillan and Nehru, Dulles
modified his suggestion to Beijing on July 11, which was then orally
conveyed to Zhou Enlai by the British charge daffaires ONeill two days
later. This proposal finally looked like this: Your and our consular representatives at Geneva have been engaged in intermittent talks during the
past year regarding the repatriation of civilians who desire to return to
their respective countries. The results have been disappointing to us. It
has been suggested that it would aid in settling this matter if these talks
were conducted on a more authoritative level, and that this could facilitate further discussion and settlement of certain other practical matters
now at issue between the two of us. If you think well of this, we will designate a representative of ambassadorial rank to meet on the above basis
with your representative of comparable rank at Geneva on a mutually
agreeable date.27 Dulles especially said in his telegram to Macmillan:
The oral message had omitted any expression of reference to the proviso in Presidents letter to Nehru that we could not deal with the rights
of third parties in their absence. We leave this thought implicit in the
phrase practical matters now at issue between the two of us in the hope
that this treatment will give a lesser impression of rigidity.28 In other
words, the United States would not like to discuss any issues beyond the
problem of repatriation of civilians, particularly the situation regarding Taiwan. The American side only raised the level of the talks between
the U.S. and the PRC, but they did not extend the scope of these talks.
The Chinese had a clear view about the true attitude of U.S. and they felt
26
27
28

FRUS, 19551957, Vol. 2, 640641.

FRUS, 19551957, Vol. 2, 642643.
Ibid., 643.

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deeply disappointed about it. In the telegrams from the Chinese Foreign
Ministry to its embassies in Warsaw, Geneva and Moscow on July 18, it
was said: Proposal of the U.S. government is the result of various pressures. The U.S. wants to sway the international public opinion in its favor,
so that it could solve some practical problems. Even if these problems
cannot be solved, it could use it to criticize our delay. The true meaning
of such a suggestion is to avoid the mounting pressure on discussing the
situation in Taiwan and rejecting Mr. Menons mediation on this issue.
The U.S. also neglected our suggestion of direct contacts between the
ambassadors of China and U.S. at the capitals of USSR, UK or India. But if
the Sino-American ambassadorial talks suggested by them can only solve
some specific issues they care about, then the U.S. may agree to take additional steps to discuss about other issues too. In general, the U.S. is taking a swing policy; it will depend on its real interests to get into talks.29
Beijing did not really like the suggestions brought forward by
Washington, but also it could not reject them altogether. Therefore, with
the Soviet backing, Beijing attempted to change the agenda of these talks
and compel the U.S. to give certain concessions during the period of the
Geneva Summit.

Cooperation between China and the Soviet Union during the Geneva
Summit and the Implementation of Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks

Beijing government did not attend the Geneva Summit, but it had
a full exchange and discussion on the Summit with the Soviet Union and
it hoped that the Soviet Union would put pressure on the United States
to force Washington do give some concessions on the ambassadorial
talks. Beijing agreed to talk with Washington at the ambassadorial level
when the latter expressed its willingness for such solution through the
British charge daffaires. But China also tried its best to avoid making
concessions according to American expectations, thus letting the Soviet
Union put forward the topic of the Far East during the Geneva Summit.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry then stated: The ambassadorial talks will
aim at solving some practical problems and strengthen the pressure on
the United States. Therefore, these talks might be a prelude for high-level negotiations between China and the United States, which could then
lessen tensions in the Taiwan Strait. However, these talks cannot hinder
the discussion on the Taiwan Strait issue during the Geneva Summit; this
should also contribute to the proposal put forward by Soviet Union dur29

PRC FMA, Record ID: 111-00014-01.

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ing the Summit. It should also improve the mediating efforts of the USSR,
the U.K. and India between the U.S. and China.30
In order to achieve this purpose, at first Beijing made a proposal to begin the ambassadorial talks during the session of the Geneva
Summit, so that the Chinese side could cooperate with the Soviets during
this conference. Thus, if the United States was unwilling to discuss the
situation in the Far East and boycotted Soviet proposals, then it should
agree to directly talk with China on these issues later on. The proposed
date for Sino-US ambassadorial talks by Beijing was July 21, and the
Geneva Summit was going to start on July 18 and close on July 23. The
Chinese Foreign Ministry instructed its negotiators: At the first meeting, you should try to ascertain the issues whether the Americans will
upgrade the ambassadorial talks to a higher level and whether they are
prepared to talk about the issue of easing tensions in the Taiwan Strait
area. Therefore, we can coordinate our actions with the Soviet Union in
Geneva and let the existing pressure on the U.S. produce some favorable
results.31 That is to say, because of the previous exchanges of opinion,
Beijing was convinced that the Soviet representatives would propose
the Far Eastern issue to the Geneva Summit. In order to coordinate with
Moscows action, the copy of Beijings instructions to its relevant embassies and the English copies of the Sino-U.S. exchanged letters were also
sent to Moscow on July 18.32 On the same day, Peoples Daily published an
editorial: Welcome, the Four-Power Summit. The editorial pointed out
that the summit should work to end the Cold War, restore mutual trust
between countries, and further lessen tensions in the international situationTherefore, we believe that the Four-Power Summit should discuss
the Far Eastern situation, since it is of special importance to the Chinese
people and the people of Asia.33
The Soviet Union was, indeed, actively preparing to meet Chinas
demands and present the Far Eastern issue at the Geneva Summit. At
midnight on July 18, Moscow sent a document to Zhou Enlai whose title
was Position of the Soviet Union Delegation at the Geneva Summit. This
document conveyed to Beijing the following ideas: As for Asia and the
Far Eastern problems, the Soviet government prepared to propose to the
Summit to discuss the following questions: a) restoration of Chinas legitimate rights in the United Nations, b) the Taiwan issue. The Soviet del30
31
32
33

Telegram from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to its embassies in Warsaw, Geneva and
Moscow on July 18, PRC FMA, Record ID: 111-00014-01.
Ibid.
PRC FMA, Record ID: 111-00009-03.
Peoples Daily, July 18, 1955.

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egation will try to make the Taiwan issueone of the most important questions to be raised at this meeting. Because we believe that the solution of
this problem would be necessary and imperative to the normalization of
the Far Eastern situation in general and to the consolidation of peace in
this area... If the U.S. representative would reject to discuss this problem
because of the absence of the Chang Kai-shek group, then we would point
out that the Chiang Kai-shek group cannot be considered as one party of
this international conflict, so it should not be invited to the meeting.34
Although the Soviet government generously agreed to cooperate with
China, it also had a more realistic assessment of the actual effectiveness
of the Geneva summit: In the current situation, it is difficult to expect
that the Summit could obtain a common consensus on the specific pending issues. Nevertheless, there will be some important personal contacts among the four-power leaders. We will pay more attention to this
aspect, and we will try to make the Geneva talks have further contributions to the easing of international tensions.35
However, the situation in Geneva was worse than what the Soviet
Union or China had expected. First, Washington did not agree to Beijings
proposal on the opening date of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. On
July 15, U.S. Department of State received a message relayed through the
British Foreign office that Zhou Enlai had accepted Washingtons proposal to conduct further negotiations in Geneva at the ambassadorial
level, while the Chinese side also proposed that the first meeting should
be held on July 21. The Acting Secretary reported this to Eisenhower
and he later expressed great interest in this message but felt it might
create serious complications if these talks would commence during
the meeting of the Heads of Government in Geneva. After further discussions, Eisenhower agreed that the earliest acceptable date would be
July 25.36 But later, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Walter S. Robertson insisted that the talks with Chinese Communists
could not start until the heads of four powers had left Geneva. Therefore,
Washington officially asked Beijing to start the first meeting on August
1.37 Second, the Far Eastern issue which the Soviet delegation proposed
during the Geneva Summit was unanimously opposed by the three
Western Powers. On the morning of the Summits second day, that was
July 19, the Plenary Meeting of the Summit passed a resolution which
34
35
36
37

PRC FMA, Record ID: 206-00061-07.

Ibid.
FRUS, 19551957, Vol. 2, 655.
Tao Wenzhao, The History of Sino-U.S. Relations, 19491978, (Shanghai: Shanghai
Peoples Publishing House, 2004), 190.

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indicated that the Summit agenda should only include the questions that
all four-power heads had interest to discuss or they had discussed on
an earlier date. There were four issues that could be included into the
conference agenda: a) Germany; b) European security; c) disarmament;
and d) expansion of contacts between the East and the West.38 From then
until the closing meeting on July 23 in the afternoon, the Soviet proposal
about the Far East was never discussed during the formal sessions of the
Summit. In fact, there were no other specific agreements reached by this
Summit, besides the Instructions from Heads of Four Powers to their
Foreign Ministers. The four heads of state could only promise to hold a
meeting of Foreign Ministers in order to continue further consultations
regarding the above mentioned issues. However, the Soviet Union vigorously propagated the success of the Geneva Summit and it pointed out
that this summit had set up a base for sincere contacts and mutual respect among the heads of these four powers. Moscow also believed that
the success of the Geneva Conference owed much to the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding.39
Under these new conditions, China reluctantly adopted new
strategies to continue cooperation with the Soviet Union. First, Beijing
government pointed out to the unreasonable conditions put forward by
Washington in its proposal on the ambassadorial talks, so the Chinese
side consciously delayed its answer to American demands concerning
the date of the meeting. At the same time, Moscow pretended that it knew
nothing about the Sino-U.S. direct talks and continued to exert pressure
on the West to discuss the situation in the Far East in international forums. On July 18, Zhou Enlai received another American message through
consul D. W. ONeill. The message was put together in an identical way:
As a result of communication between Peiping and Washington through
the diplomatic channels of the United Kingdom, it has been agreed that
the talks held last year between consular representatives of both sides at
Geneva should be resumed at the ambassadorial level in order to assist
in settling matters concerning the repatriation of civilians who desire to
return to their respective countries and to facilitate further discussions
and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between
both sides. The first meeting of ambassadorial representatives of both
sides will take place on August 1, 1955, in Geneva. After Zhou Enlai read
this message, he changed his calm attitude and launched some fiery criticisms of the U.S. message : Why did they use the word Peiping? China
38
39

The Peoples Daily, July 21, 1955.

Bulganin, Report on the Results of the Four Powers Geneva Summit, August 4, 1955,
the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, The Peoples Daily, August 6, 1955.

149

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has an old saying Name has to follow the owner. Americans are always
unreasonable. But you, our British friend, as a matter of courtesy, should
have declined even to transmit such a proposal. In addition, Zhou Enlai
expressed his regret that the Americans had refused to consider July 21
as the date for the first ambassadorial talks. He also did not give any formal reply to the U.S. proposal on the August 1 timetable. His harsh attitude not only frightened ONeill, but also shattered American and British
expectations. Thus, the Americans had to primarily hold consultations
on Chinas stance with the heads of other powers meeting in Geneva,
particularly with the Soviet delegation. For example, Dulles discussed a
number of matters about China with Marshal Bulganin on July 21, 1955,
in Geneva. During this meeting, Bulganin suggested to his American
counterparts to get in touch with the Chinese Peoples Government
as if he knew nothing about the previous contacts between Beijing and
Washington through British diplomatic channels. And he also pretended
not to understand the true meaning of the word Peiping to Chinese
Communist leaders. However, Bulganin did pose a question with Dulles
that raised most concern in Beijing, whether you will just discuss about
nationals staying on both sides or you will also broaden the scope of your
talks.40 On July 22, Dulles recalled that the Chicoms have not yet agreed
to the Geneva meeting and he was concerned that they have changed
their mind. Macmillans words further disturbed Dulles. Macmillan
thought Beijings acceptance might have been to get to Geneva when the
Conference was in session, and when the date was put after its adjournment, they might have decided not to go ahead.41 Washington did not
receive Beijing governments reply on the text of press announcement
until July 23, the very last day of the Geneva Summit. American officials
only found out that there were just two words which the Chinese had
altered. It was Peking instead of Peiping and conducted instead of
resumed.42 After a bit of haggling, Beijing and Washington finally released a press announcement on the coming Sino-U.S. ambassadorial
talks on July 25.
Second, the Chinese government adjusted the negotiation tactics for the ambassadorial talks and attempted to make the talks more
suitable to the new international situation. On the same day as the press
announcement on Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks was released, Chinese
Foreign Ministry set up the Geneva Talks Steering Group which was directed at researching the background of the Sino-U.S. negotiations and
40
41
42

FRUS, 19551957, Vol. 2, 670671.

Ibid., 672673.
Ibid., 675.

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shaping the proposals for the Chinese negotiations plans. This group
was headed by Zhang Hanfu who was one of the Vice Foreign Ministers.
Its main members included Qiao Guanhua, He Fang, all famous Chinese
diplomats, as well as Ling Yun who was one of the Vice Ministers of the
Chinese Public Security Ministry.43 On July 26, Chinese Foreign Ministry
handed this report to Zhou Enlai. The report had the following title
The Supplement Request for Instructions for the Geneva Talks: The
original program was formed under the assumption that the Sino-U.S.
ambassadorial talks would begin on July 21. So it had taken into account
some steps to coordinate actions with the Soviet delegation at the Geneva
Summit. But now, the four-power meeting had ended, thus these specific
instructions were not necessary any more. So we have to adjust our tactics as these talks will start on August 1. Our new plan should aim at
increasing the pressure on the United States, trying to solve some practical problems through the talks, preparing for higher level talks between
China and U.S. which can then ease the tensions in the Taiwan Strait area.
However, Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks cannot hinder mediation efforts
which are pursued by the Soviet Union, Britain and India. We should ensure that these talks be conducive to improving such mediation efforts.44
In addition, this report proposed some concrete steps to be taken during
the first meeting: We should still be ready to propose two following issues during the first proposed meeting of the talks: problem of the repatriation of their nationals. At Bandung China recommended to sit down
and make an effort to ease the tensions in the Taiwan Strait as a preparatory work for the negotiations, but since the four-power meeting has
ended, some concrete steps should be made accordingly. For example, if
the representatives of the United States claim not to have the authority
to discuss the second issue, we should still tell that to the press, but not
immediately after the meeting on the same day.45
Third, the Chinese government adjusted its attitude towards the
outside world under the Geneva spirit which was also readily advocated by the Soviet Union. Beijing fully endorsed the propaganda of the
Geneva spirit and it also hoped to seize the opportunity to draw a new
pattern for Chinas diplomacy in a relatively friendly international atmosphere. On July 30, 1955, Zhou Enlai gave a speech at the second meeting
of the First Session of the Chinese Peoples Congress on the topic of The
Current International Situation and Our Foreign Policy. He stated: The
USSR, the U.S., the UK and France held their first summit after the Second
43
44
45

Biography of Zhang Hanfu, (Beijing: The World Knowledge Press, 2003), 306307.
PRC FMA, Record ID: 111-00009-04.
PRC FMA, Record ID: 111-00009-04.

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World War in Geneva this month The summit will further promote relaxation of international tensions, rebuild the necessary trusts between
the great powers, and it will also inspire the peace-loving peoples and
countries all over the world to make greater efforts for the consolidation
of lasting peace. As for the coming Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks, Zhou
Enlai also said: As long as both sides express sincerity during consultations, these talks will promote the reconciliation between China and
the U.S. First of all, the issue of civilians from both sides finally returning
home should be solved in a reasonable way But we also expect that
these talks will produce other effects as both sides announced in their
press statement: facilitating further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides.46 Before
dawn on July 31, the Chinese Foreign Ministry gave instructions to the
Chinese representatives present at the Sino-U.S. talks and it also proposed a fundamentally new tactic during this first meeting: At the beginning of tomorrows meeting, you can suddenly announce that we have
released 11 illegal U.S. military personnel a short time ago. This move
will remove any complaints coming from the U.S. representatives about
our insincerity and it will put additional pressure on them to make the
next move. Then, you should seek solutions to some specific issues at the
meeting, as if you were making preparations for the high-level negotiations between China and the U.S. Our concessions disguised under this
initiative will also compel the U.S. to become more isolated and passive.47
Later that day, Zhou also met with the Soviet charge daffaires in Beijing
and passed on a memorandum to him: The First Meeting of the SinoU.S. Ambassadorial Talks in Geneva on August 1. This memorandum presented in details Chinas stance and strategy concerning this meeting.48
This meant that the continuous close cooperation between Beijing and
Moscow was carried on.
On August 1, 1955, the first meeting of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks was finally held in Geneva. China gave full recognition of
Soviet Unions assistance during the process of preparing the ambassadorial talks. Peoples Daily published an editorial dedicated to the Soviet
Unions contributions in ending the Cold War. The editorial stated: The
Chinese people warmly welcome the Soviet governments initiative to
support China which is doing its best to ease the situation in Asia and the
Far Eastern area. The Soviet government has always been maintaining
46
47
48

Peoples Daily, July 31, 1955.

These instructions were sent out at 3am, July 31, 1955. PRC FMA, Record ID: 11100014-03.
Zhou Enlai Diplomatic Activities Memorabilia, 19491975, 121122.

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peace in Asia. Its efforts have already exercised an important role in easing the situation in Asia and it will always play a significant role in this
area. After the end of the Geneva four-power Summit, it is quite possible
that the spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, which was embodied in the Summit, will relax the explosive situation in the Far East.
Therefore, the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks, which started on August 1,
are held under favorable circumstances. In addition, the editorial said:
If both sides of Geneva talks follow the Geneva spirit, whose core concept is replacingforce by negotiations and taking a conciliatory attitude
towards negotiations, then these talks could present a favorable way to
solve problems in Asia and the Far Eastern area.49
Indeed, in the process of the four-power Summit in Geneva, the
Soviet Union closely cooperated with China on Far Eastern issues. First
of all, Soviet representatives had been trying to discuss the Far Eastern
problems during some of the formal meetings of the Summit. Second,
when they had to give up on this issue at the formal forums in Geneva,
they had repeatedly discussed Far Eastern problems and the China problem on some personal occasions. Soviet initiative did put more pressure
on the United States, while the concrete developments of the international situation made the Americans attach more importance to the China
problem. Therefore, the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial level talks took place in
Geneva shortly after the Summit had ended.
Conclusion: The Sino-Soviet Relations Embodied in the
Implementation Process of Sino-US talks

From the five-power Geneva Conference in 1954 to the four-power Geneva Summit in 1955, Beijing adhered to the negotiations rather
than force rule, which was at the core of the Geneva spirit, and actively
pursued the implementation of ambassadorial level talks with the United
States in a more relaxed international atmosphere after the Korean War,
acquiring generous assistance from the Soviet Union. This process reflected the high level of Sino-Soviet cooperation, solidarity and co-ordination in international relations. However, there were also certain inconsistencies, due to their particular interests and some small differences in
their stances. But as the two main members of the Socialist Camp of the
world, both China and Soviet Union set their goals on their overall objectives, ignoring any differences between them.
49

Keeping Work For Ending the Cold War, Peoples Daily, August 6, 1955.

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First, the close coordination between the governments of the

PRC and the USSR in promoting Sino-U. S. direct talks reflected some of
the key features characteristic for the golden years of Sino-Soviet relations, also known as the honeymoon period of Sino-Soviet relations.
The Soviet Union never forgot to assist Chinas international position
during that time. During the Geneva Summit, although their proposal
on discussing the Far Eastern issue was rejected by the three western
powers, the head of the Soviet delegation still emphasized in his closing
statement: There is one matter that made us, the Soviet delegation, feel
regret. Asia and the Far Eastern area problems have not been given due
attention during this summit. Thus, some urgent problems cannot be delayed any more, such as the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China
as the only lawful representative of China in the United Nations, recognition that the Chinese people have indisputable rights concerning the
Taiwan issue, realization of the Geneva Agreement on Indochina, and so
on. These problems have to be resolved in accordance with the interests
of the people of Asia and the Far East, as well as in accordance with the
international peace and security.50 Besides this official statement, Soviet
representatives used this opportunity provided by the Geneva Summit
to discuss with their American counterparts all outstanding issues connected with China. For example, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal
Georgy Zhukov, utilized his close personal relationship with Eisenhower
in order to discuss with him the China issue a couple of times. On July 20,
Zhukov had lunch with Eisenhower and he told the American President
that he had thought the settlement of the Chinese problem had great importance for the relaxation of tensions. There was, first of all, the question of Chinas membership in the UN, Zhukov reminded Eisenhower,
indicating that PRCs absence from that international organization
meant that a nation of 600 million people was not represented in this
organization. Then, of course, there was the question of Taiwan itself,
added the Soviet Marshal. He felt that the delay in settling these issues
was not advantageous even to the United States.51 On July 23, Zhukov
made another reference to China during his next meeting with the U.S.
President. He said that he believed that the Chinese had no intention to
resort to armed force, since they have been waiting patiently for settlement of these matters and if some hope could be given to them there
was no doubt that they would continue to wait with patience. Therefore,
Zhukov felt that the initiation of direct talks between the United States
50

51

Peoples Daily, July 25, 1955.

DDRS, Document Number: CK3100207051- CK3100207064.

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and China would give such hope.52 In short, the Soviets utilized the diplomatic language which the Chinese side also used and they took some
steps which China had also taken.
Chinese diplomats had a more intuitive understanding of the
developments taking place inside the Sino-Soviet friendship during this
period. For example, in one of the reports which was sent by the Chinese
Embassy in Moscow to the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the end of May,
1955, Chinese diplomats in the USSR said: During the past six months,
due to the relaxation of the international situation and the development
of the Sino-Soviet friendship, there have been more and more friendly
activities between our two countries every single day. The Soviets have
taken a number of new practices which never happened in the past while
communicating with us. These new practices included: The Soviet
Foreign Ministry was extending warmer welcomes and farewells to different Chinese delegations which were only passing thorough the Soviet
Union; the Soviet Foreign Ministry was inviting Chinese diplomats to attend more and more friendly activities, some of them even going beyond
the formal diplomatic routine.53 By the end of 1955, the Chinese embassy in Moscow reported again: Over the past year, the Sino-Soviet relations have been closer; all kinds of personal exchanges are very frequent
now.54 At that time, Chinese citizens travelling to Western countries
having no diplomatic relations with the PRC got their visas through the
Chinese Embassy in Moscow, while Western citizens travelling to China
had to get their visas through their own embassies in the Soviet Union.
In 1955, the Beijing governmentset up a specific information-exchange
station in Moscow which was aiming at contacting embassies of Western
countries in Moscow. If the Chinese government was planning some important diplomatic initiatives, it would always tell Moscow in advance,
conducting consultations with Soviet officials and seeking for their advice. Moscow was also willing to share sensitive information with Beijing.
However, even during the Golden Period of the Sino-Soviet relationship, certain differences still existed between the two communist
powers. As mentioned above, in order to fight against the Soviet proposal of a Five-Power Conference to solve the Far Eastern problems, the
United States prepared six corresponding proposals to be discussed at
the Geneva Summit. One of their intentions was to compel the Soviets
to give up on their Far Eastern proposal in exchange for U.S. abandonment of the proposal concerning the communist satellites. A passage of
52
53
54

DDRS, Document Number: CK3100207065- CK3100207069.

PRC FMA, Record ID: 117-00456-05.
PRC FMA, Record ID: 118-00558-02.

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Bulganins statement could reflect such an exchange. In his report on

the Geneva Summit at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR: Unfortunately, the proposal raised by us that the meeting should
also discuss Asian and Far Eastern issues was not accepted, even though
these issues were obviously pressing due to the real situation in this
area. But, of course, the Soviet delegation could also not agree to discuss
the issues concerning Eastern European countries and international
communism. We had to point out that if such issues were discussed at
this summit, it meant that we would interfere into the domestic affairs of
East European countries.55 So, maybe we can speculate: the issues about
Eastern European countries and international communism were more
important to the Soviet Union than the issues concerning Asia and the Far
East, even though the latter had been repeatedly stressed by the Chinese.
This was a kind of sacrifice of Beijings interests, Chinas full coordination
of its policies with Moscow notwithstanding. At that time, China desperately wanted to ensure that the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks take place
during the Four-Power Summit.
On the other hand, the Chinese did adhere to a basic rule in diplomatic practices an independent foreign policy. This meant that if
Soviets touched upon some issues relating to Chinas national interests,
the Chinese side would be uncompromising and stick to its own opinion. In Chinese political terminology, Soviets touched upon some soft
nails. For example, on December 12, 1954, Soviet Ambassador to China
Pavel Yudin conveyed to Zhou Enlai some of the reflections made by
British diplomats on the issue of the trial of 13 U.S. spies who had been
arrested in China. It was obvious that the Soviets wanted to mediate
this problem. On December 16, Zhou Enlai gave an answer to Yudin in
which he said: This is our domestic affair and we refuse any interference coming from any country. Yudin decided to press on, so he questioned Zhou why would China then welcome the Secretary General of
the UN Hammarskjold to come to China and discuss this issue. Zhou replied: If we reject him (Hammarskjold), we will fall into a passive situation, and they (Americans) will continue to take actions through neutral
countries in Asia. For example, Ceylon would certainly put forward this
question at the Colombo Meeting. That will be unfavorable for us and
will affect our attendance of the Asian-African Conference next year.56
Moscow was disappointed with Beijings refusal. Even through some of
the personal contacts with the Americans, some Soviet officials could not
55
56

Bulganin, Report on the Results of the Four Power Geneva Summit, August 4, 1955,
the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, The Peoples Daily, August 6, 1955.
Zhou Enlai Diplomatic Activities Memorabilia, 19491975, 95.

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hide their disaffection with some of the Chinese policies. In an informal

meeting, when Dulles mentioned that there had been a lot of MIGs in
China, Bulganin answered: We are not giving them MIGs anymore. We
find the more we give them, the more they want.57Although we cannot
exclude that Bulganins statement was a deliberate gesture towards the
Americans, it could also be a kind of real reflection of the Soviet disenchantment with Chinas impatience.
The US had never forgotten to drive a wedge between the USSR
and the PRC since 1949. Washington would never give up this aim, even
when it had direct contacts with the PRC. In the mid-1950s, with the rise
of Chinas international status, the independence of initiative in Chinese
diplomacy was also increasing. But the intelligence community of the
United States found, While this Soviet acknowledgment of Chinas international position has given rise to some speculation about future differences and difficulties between the two powers, as of years end there
were virtually no significant cracks visible here in the monolithic facade
of relations between the two.58 Therefore, while there were some unharmonious voices in Sino-Soviet relations in 1955,the main stream was still
true friendship.
All in all, the close relationship between China and the Soviet
Union could be also seen in the propaganda of following words Geneva
spirit, which embodied the same goals both countries shared in their
efforts at easing international tension. Both of these countries needed
firm guarantees of peace and stability in order to achieve their domestic reconstruction. After Stalins death, the Soviet Unionbegan gradual
changes as to pull their domestic system away from Stalinist demands.
Moscow had to pay more attention to increasing domestic production
and improving peoples living standard, while China had to do the same,
but the situation was far more pressing due to the consequences of the
Korean War. Beijing made it clear that the main purpose of the so-called
independent and peaceful foreign policy was to construct our country
into a prosperous, powerful and wealthy socialist country.59 In addition,
China had basically completed the domestic social changes, while the
Chinese Communists had consolidated their regime by the end of 1954.
Therefore, Zhou Enlai announced with much self-confidence: Now, we
57
58
59

FRUS, 19551957, Vol. 2, 670671.

American Consulate General, Hong Kong, DESP, No. 1612, Analysis of Sino-Soviet
Relations in 1954, March 28, 1955, MF2523166-0105, Main Library of the University
of Hong Kong.
Zhou Enlai,Current International Situation and Our Foreign Policy Speech at the
Second Session of the First Session of the National Peoples Congress of the PRC,
Peoples Daily, July 31, 1955.

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have gone through a preliminary reorganization, our house has been

cleaned up, so we can invite some guests to come home now.60 From
the Geneva Conference in 1954 to the Bandung Conference and the SinoU.S. ambassadorial talks in 1955, China had gradually exercised a much
different role in its international entanglements. Full-time propaganda
of the Geneva spirit also took place during this period. However, by the
late 1950s, some of the more radical reforms also occurred in China; the
Great Leap Forward was a particularly famous one. Chinese diplomatic
policies had by then turned to the left and communist revolution had
become a paramount goal by then. Negotiations and relaxation of tensions were not considered as a favorable orientation of Chinas international strategy. Propaganda of the Geneva spirit also cooled down.
These obvious changes could be also observed through the data published in the Peoples Daily. In 1955, the number of articles and reports
which praised the Geneva spirit and seen it as the core spirit of countrys international activities was 111. That number was 43 in 1956, 8
in 1957, 0 in 1958, and only 2 in 1959. After 1960, Peoples Daily rarely
mentioned the Geneva spirit. But there was one exception. In 1967,
there was an article in the Peoples Daily which mentioned this expression and it was titled The Counterrevolutionary Face of Sholokhov. It said
the following: From the Geneva Spirit to the Moscow Spirit, Sholokhov
and Khrushchev, one master and one servant, echoed each other, walked
on a more and more despicable path of betraying Communism. They
have become loyal lackeys of imperialism. The meaning of the Geneva
spirit had totally changed. The evolution of this term in China can also
reflect the specific path of development of the Sino-Soviet relationship,
from friends to enemies.
Although there were no definite and unified conclusions about
the historical role of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks, one could not
deny two things: first, it was of diplomatic importance, since it was an
initiation of long-term contacts between the two sides that ultimately led
to Chinas recognition by Washington in the 1970s. Second, these talks
also proved to be a special diplomatic channel between the two sides
to discuss some of the outstanding issues and try to diffuse explosive
situations. Therefore, the realization of these ambassadorial talks was a
diplomatic victory for Beijing and this victory could never been achieved
without the close cooperation and coordination between China and the
Soviet Union.
60

Zhou Enlai Chronicle, 19491976, Vol. 1, 420.

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Sources and Literature

Archives and Databases

- Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives (PRC FMA)

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- Peoples Daily

Memoirs, Biography and Chronicle

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Foreign Affairs. Zhou Enlai Diplomatic Activities Memorabilia, 1949
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- The Diplomatic History of PRC, 19491956, ed. by Pei Jianzhang.

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Information on conferences

XXII

(International Committee of Historical Sciences),

, , 2329. 2015.

, 115


. ,
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, 1926. .
, 2010. ,
2020. ,
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, XXIII
.
.

225

3/2015.

8th Annual Summer Workshop for Holocaust Scholars,

Non-Jewish Jews During the Shoah: Fate and Identity,

, 69. 2015.

6. 9. 2015. ,
,
- ,
.
(David Bankier), think tank
,
. ,

.
.


: . ,
- ,

, (Yehuda Bauer).
6. (Dan
Michman), , Head of the
International Institute for Holocaust Research and Incumbent of the
John Najmann Chair of Holocaust Studies,
. :
, .
.

:
.


, . 226

, , ,
,
.

:
(Assaf Yedidya) A : (The Aryan
Side of the Non-Jewish Jews: Converts in Nazi Germany)
(Maria Von Der Heydt) Geltungsjuden 1939. 1945.
(Geltungsjuden between Non-Jewish and Jewish Communities in
Germany 19391945). (Ofer
Ashkenazi) .

, : - (Suzanne Brown-Fleming)
-
, : - (Whoever Receives Holy Baptism is
just like other Christians: The Vatican and Non-Aryan Catholics);
; (Eliot
Nidam Orvieto),
, : (Non-Jewish Jews in Convents:
The Case of Notre Dame de Sion in France); (Ion Popa)
,

(Seeking Sanctuary Jews Conversion to Christianity
During the Holocaust in Romania).
,
;
Yad Vashem Studies.
(Dina Porat), ,
. ,
(Robert Wistrich), .

, 7. ,
: (Rachel Brenner)
227

3/2015.

- : (Rescuers and
Rescuees in Wartime Warsaw: A Complex Interaction); (Katarzyna Person)
(Converts and Highly Assimilated
Jews in the Jewish Order Service in the Warsaw Ghetto);
(Emunah Nachmany
Gafny) :
(Life under False Identity:
Jewish Children Wandering on the Aryan Side in Poland).
(Havi Dreifus),
.
:
:
() (Multiplicity of
Identities: The Complexity of (Non)Jewishness in Occupied Yugoslavia),
: (Assimilation and Mixed Marriage: Listing of the Victims
and Problems of Research).
,
(Yisrael Gutman).
, 8. , - (Michaela Raggam-Blesch)
:

(Precarious Protection: Half-Jews and Mixed Marriages during the Nazi
Regime in Vienna) (Maximilian Strnad)
:

1944/45 (The Fortune of Survival Intermarried German Jews in the
Final Stage of the Shoah 1944/45).
(Amir Teicher) .
, (Geraldien Von
Frijtag)
: 1941
1945. (Turning Jews into Aryans: The Work of Hans Georg Calmeyer in
the Occupied Netherlands, 19411945), (Jaap Cohen, NIOD
, )
228

: (The Action
Portuguesia: How the Dutch Sephardim Collectively Tried to Become
Non-Jews during World War II). .
, 9. ,
(Ella Florsheim)
, (Susanne Urban)
,
? 1945. (Displaced in
the Home Country? German Non-Jewish Jews as DPs and Their Efforts to
Resettle Anew After 1945) (Joanna Michlic), :
: (Grayer Shades of Jewish Identity: Atypical Histories
of Children during and in the Aftermath of the Holocaust).
, (Valeria Galimi),
,
: ,
(The Non-Jewish Jews Seen by the Republic
of Sal: Arrests, Deportations, and Rescue in Italy)
(Maura De Bernart), ,
, .
: ,
19221945. (Was Italian Antisemitism Redemptive? The Case of NonJewish Jews in the City of the Duce, 19221945). (Iael Nidam Orvieto),
, ,
.
, ,

: , , , , . ,
.
, Yad Vashem Studies
(David Silberklang) 43/1
,
229

3/2015.

. , , , , ,

- -a .
, ,

,
, .

230

Polska i Jugoslawia po II wojnie swiatowej,

Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy, (),
30. 1. 2015.

- 20. .
, ,
(Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy)
. ,
.
.
()
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,
. 2014. (Jugoslovensko-poljski odnosi u XX veku, zbornik
radova, urednici prof. dr Momilo Pavlovi, dr hab. Andrzej Zaminski,
dr Dragomir Bondi, Beograd, 2015). .
.
- 20.
21. . , (Monika Opioa, Micha Kosman, , Jacek
Tebinka, , Piotr urek, , Pawe
Wawryszuk, Tadeusz Wolsza, Aleksander Lasik, , Andrzej
Zamiski, Gordana urev-Makiewicz, , Ewa
Bujwid-Kurek).
,
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.
1968,
1989. ,
231

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1980. 1990.
Zdzisaw Biegaski, Mariusz Guzek Joanna Szczutowska

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99, Issue 99-4, 505515. Datum pristupa 28. 8. 2015. http://www.

persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/abpo_0399-0826_1992_
num_99_4_3459
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The Case of Bogdan Dundjerski. Balcanica XLII (2011), 117132. Datum
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In memoriam . , . 70, 27. 1928.

Biao, Lin. Renmin zhanzheng shengli wansui. Peaples Daily, September

3, 1965.

, .
. , . . ,
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, . 1968 . 1968
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the Danube Province (Tuna Vilayeti), 1864-1868. A Masters Thesis, The
Department of History Bilkent University Ankara, June 2007. Datum
pristupa 8. 6. 2015. http://www.thesis.bilkent.edu.tr/0003316.pdf
247

15. 9.
1954. /
19451978. ,
, 135138. : , 2012.
Dokument 510. Pariz, 16. XI Talijanski ministar S. Sonino Predsedniku
vlade V. Orlandu. Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave (1. I 20. XII
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drutvenih nauka, Odeljenje za istorijske nauke, Serija III Graa,
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u Beogradu 19211938, knj. 1: (19211930), knj. 2: (19301939),
prireiva ivko Avramovski, prevodilac Nenad Feji. Beograd: Arhiv
Jugoslavije, Zagreb: Globus, 1986.

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Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krlea, 1986.
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1927. Datum pistupa 31. 8. 2015. http://www.kinoteka.org.rs/di/efg/
Http/EFG/00-efg_S_index01.htm
- .
)

Govor kneza Pavla emitovan prilikom predstavljanja novootkrivenih

snimaka na Kolarcu 18. 10. 2013. Predratni radio govori,
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Otkupio dr Dragoljub Pokrajac. Datum pristupa 28. 8. 2015. http://www.
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, . , . . :
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249

:

, 11
:
Colorgrafx,

:
200

CIP -
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93/94

:
= Currents of history
: journal of the Institute for Recent History
of Serbia /
. - 1993, . 1/2. - :
, 1993- ( : Colorgrafx). - 30 cm
: () = ISSN
0354-1223
ISSN 0354-6497 =
COBISS.SR-ID 44343042