ATSAP Briefing Sheet

Please post throughout your facility, and utilize the subject and
lessons learned during crew briefings as a method to raise April 21, 2010
awareness within the workforce.

Interim Altitudes Again

An ATSAP Alert was disseminated on August 6th, 2009 in regards to safety issues with interim, or "T," altitudes.
Subsequently, refresher training was developed and conducted in the field regarding this functionality, between
August and October of 2009. However, ATSAP continues to receive reports where interim altitude displays
have caused unsafe situations. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) has also recently disseminated an
alert message to FAA offices because of a de-identified report forwarded via the ATSAP system detailing interim
altitude problems.
We have put together a media file using an actual incident to reemphasize the
importance of verbally coordinating ANY altitude changes after an inter-facility
hand-off has been initiated. If an altitude change is made after the handoff is
initiated, even if you take it back, both controllers will see “T” altitudes, but not the
same altitudes. The receiving controller’s data block will not update to the revised
altitude.
The media file can be accessed at:
https://employees.faa.gov/org/linebusiness/ato/safety/sp/atsap/atsap%5Fbriefing%5Fsheets/media/coordination.html

"I was working the XYZ sector, and I was busy with aircraft climbing and descending on J-Airway. The rides in the sector
were not good and this was further complicating my workload. At 0035Z, I accepted a hand-off from ABC Center (ABC sector)
on Aircraft 1, which was approx. 100 SW of Airport 1. The data block showed an interim altitude of FL350 and the aircraft was
climbing out of FL 300. When Aircraft 1 checked on the frequency, the pilot reported he was climbing to FL370. I have seen
this a couple of times with ABC Sector since the new procedures of allowing interim altitudes to be seen between DEF and
ABC Centers.

Recommendation: Bring back team briefings. Everyone would benefit from weekly or bi-weekly meetings where these mistakes
. can be talked about and rectified. I think everyone needs to be reminded that once you hand-off an aircraft with an altitude in
the data block to another center, that altitude is what the other center is going to see."

Weekly Statistics for April 12th to

Weekly Update
April 19th

214+
ATSAP is going national! Eastern
Eligible Facilities
and Southern legacy regions are in
Eligible Employees 15000+
the process of receiving ATSAP
Total Reports 14843 training.
Reports Filed this Week 246

By submitting your reports, you contribute important safety information that will help the 1
ATO identify negative trends, safety issues, and procedural deficiencies.
 ATSAP Briefing Sheet

"A new automation procedure between centers has been recently enacted. It allows for interim altitudes to show with a "T" to
the next center. Previously only "hard" altitudes would display. On the event in question Aircraft X showed on my scope as
altitude 390T390. I believe the aircraft was leveling at FL390 as I had traffic at FL 380 (Aircraft Y) opposite direction. Air-
craft X came on frequency descending to FL350. FL350 was behind the "T" and "hard" in the flight plan. We displayed
FL390. I called the facility who had given me Aircraft X. They acknowledged using FL350 "hard" and 390 “interim" and
stated they didn't know we showed the "T" altitudes. This is the third time this has happened and been reported. "T" times
never used to show and were used "in house" only. They are generally used for planning or a stop gap. I still believe this
automation change is unnecessary and undesirable. The ability to show "T" altitudes to adjacent centers should not be au-
thorized and should be shut off. The negative possibilities far outweigh the few gains."

"I had an aircraft proceed into Sector 1 without a hand off initiated. When I noticed this and after the aircraft had proceeded
into ABC center I flashed the aircraft and the Sector 1 controller immediately took the hand-off. I then called the controller
and they said that they had radar on the aircraft. I had multiple departures and DEF arrivals that needed to be descended
that I believe led the situation to occur. I believe the interim altitude coordination was the biggest factor that contributed to
me missing the handoff. I had the auto handoff feature turned off, because it increases workload when the aircraft flashes
with an interim altitude in the data block. If an aircraft flashes with the interim altitude and I take the handoff back because I
am going to climb the aircraft when clear of traffic, I still need to call the next sector and re-coordinate what the aircraft is
doing. This increases controller workload so many controllers disable the auto handoff feature. This along with the depar-
ture push and DEF arrivals that are required to be descended alongside the departures were contributory to this incident. I
believe that the interim altitude LOA should be changed so we can update altitudes of what the aircraft are doing with out the
amount of coordination required if they auto flash. If I could have run the sector with the tools provided me, instead of having
to work around a known problem this would not have happened."

ATSAP Positives
Issue: ATSAP has received several reports describing discrepancies with the infor-
mation being provided within the Special Airspace Management System (SAMS).
Information provided within the tabs can be contradictory and certain functionality
does not adhere to specific requirements.
Potential Hazard: Miscommunication of airspace changes.
Positive: The Event Review Committee (ERC) relayed important safety information
to the office of responsibility to help make improvements. Modifications to the system are being developed.

Issue: An automation issue existed when an En Route facility was having difficulties handing off aircraft to a Termi-
nal facility that were flying a specific route. Technical Operations investigated the issue and found that the Host
equipment was operating within specification.
Potential Hazard: Increased coordination leads to increased workload.
Positive: After the Event Review Committee (ERC) helped facilitate a fix between the Terminal facilities, the En
Route facility continued to research the issue. Due to the feedback and ERC inquiry, the En Route facility found a fix
so that the Host automatically inputs a “hard” lower altitude to generate flight plan information for hand offs to the
Terminal facility.

By submitting your reports, you contribute important safety information that will help the 2
ATO identify negative trends, safety issues, and procedural deficiencies.