Engineering Geology, 24 (1987) 89--92

Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam -- Printed in The Netherlands

THE BALDWIN HILLS RESERVOIR F A I L U R E IN RETROSPECT*

DISCUSSION

89

PREPARED

THOMAS M. LEPS
Consulting Civil Engineer, P.O. Box 2228, Menlo Park, Calif. 94026 (U.S.A.)
(Accepted for publication December 1986)

The paper by Casagrande et al. (1972) has been reviewed by the present
writer with the benefit of unusually detailed acquaintance with the documented design, construction and performance, but no original involvement
in the design and construction of the reservoir. This review also has the tempering benefit of over 20 years of hindsight.
One aspect of the paper that emerges time and again is the apparently irresistible t e n d e n c y to make qualitative statements of judgment which would,
if used in court, have been supportive of the interests of the authors' clients,
Standard Oil Co. and others. The following review will be basically restricted
to reactions to those qualitative statements, but will, by implication, compliment the authors on their excellent presentation of factual descriptions and
performance data, by not commenting on that aspect of their paper.
Item 1

On p.551, the authors state unequivocally, "Early on the day of failure,

portions of the reservoir lining collapsed into large voids formed by long
term piping." This statement is no more than misleading speculation in that
there were no "large voids" related to long term, "trickle" seepage actually
found in the foundation except in Fault V, about 70 ft. south of the south
b o t t o m drain, where an open cavity up to 3 ft. in diameter and 30 ft. long,
in and along the trace of Fault V, was discovered to exist, generally a few
feet under the asphalt membrane. The reservoir lining had n o t collapsed into
this cavity despite its size. All other cavities found in the postfailure exploration, e x c e p t those eroded on the day o f failure, were no larger than 1% of
the Fault V cavity. Accordingly, the implication of the existence of preexisting or seepage-created large voids in the foundation is unsupported by
direct observation, but might certainly have served the client's interests in
diverting attention from the subject of subsidence effects. The same misplaced emphasis on, and exaggeration of, "...Large erosional cavities and
pipes..." appears again at the b o t t o m of p.568. Note that no dimensions were
quoted, so the reader must guess what " L a r g e " means.
*By Casagrande et al., 1972.
0013-7952/87/$03.50

1987 Elsevier S c i e n c e

Publishers

B.V.

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Item 2

On p.570, the authors state: "...Regional subsidence or uplift is caused by

tectonics, oil field operations, and possibly by other as yet unidentified
causes..." First, it is agreed that regional subsidence has been repeatedly identified as having been the result of oil field operations (production of oil, gas
and water). Second, tectonic adjustments in a geologic time frame characteristically are known to have caused major blocks to move upward, downward and sideways, but extremely slowly. Third, there is clear evidence that
localized, differential uplift has been caused by oil field operations, specifically by pressure injection of brine into the oil and gas producing horizons.
Fourth, subsidence due to groundwater withdrawal is widely recognized.
Fifth, what purpose is served by raising the issue that "...other as yet unidentified causes..." result in subsidence or uplift, except hopefully to introduce
an element of uncertainty.
Item 3

On p.573, the authors state: "...The authors conclude that sharp differential settlements of a b o u t 0.2 to 0.3 foot developed across Fault I well in advance of failure, as a result of compression of the looser soils located immediately West of Fault I, and not by Fault displacement..." Other equally
well qualified experts, (i.e., Castle and Youd, 1972), have concluded that the
surface expression of block movements adjacent to Faults I, II and V, as defined b y available settlement surveys are fully explained by consolidation of
the oil producing horizons at depth, not by shallow consolidation of "looser
soils". Since there is no absolute proof of either conclusion, it seems only
fair to conclude that both mechanisms may have contributed, including distortion caused b y the uplift mechanism involving full-scale, high-pressure,
brine injection in the oil production horizons which was carried out after
1957 by the oil field operators. Incidentally, the small earthquakes of Feb. 18,
1963 and March 10, 1963, which damaged oil well casings in the producing
zones were u n d o u b t e d l y caused by the brine injection program. Such events
are w o r t h y of careful consideration when evaluating uplift east of Fault I.
One very illuminating performance record which the authors may not
have noticed is illustrated in their fig.12, p.573, as follows: Differential
settlement of the south parapet wall, which crosses Faults I and V, has increased steadily since the 1963 failure period, despite the fact that loading of
the "looser soils" by reservoir water ceased in Dec. 1963. Does this not mean
that all differential aspects of the settlement profile since that date are due
to subsidence-caused, block movement rather than compression due to reservoir loading?
Item 4

The authors' fig.15, p.578, exhibits contours of subsidence between 1950

and 1963. This interpretation is grossly misleading in that it presents only

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average contours, with no recognition of the strong irregularities that were
evidenced at each of the three fault traces. These irregularities, which amounted to offsets of as much as 0.5 to 0.6 ft., were of the same order of magnitude as the smoothed contours, and hence totally invalidate the impression
conveyed by the contours of gentle, regional tipping.
Item 5

On p.581, the authors state: "...The authors, however, find no convincing

evidence t h a t any fault movement occurred under the reservoir prior to
failure..." Perhaps the authors failed to consider the detailed settlement
records for the bench mark on Pier 1 of the elevated water tank located on
the block east of Fault I, over 500 ft. south of the reservoir, and sufficiently
distant to be independent of reservoir loading and leakage effects. The records show that this bench mark rebounded 0.05 ft. between July 1 and
Sept. 15, 1963, and rebounded another 0.01 ft. by Nov. 15, 1963. It did n o t
settle back to its master regional subsidence trend curve for 18 months. This
remarkable a m o u n t of rebound, shown by settlement records for the inlet
tunnel and inspection chamber to have been concentrated east of Fault I,
can logically only be ascribed to the oil field brine injection operations to
the south of the water tank. It chronologically just preceded, but is entirely
compatible with, the larger a m o u n t of rebound measured at the east side of
Fault I at the reservoir on Dec. 17, 1963. That rebound, of as much as
0.18 ft., was clearly due to the combined removal of (a) reservoir loading
and (b) the block uplift recorded at the water tank which was progressing
slowly northerly from the injection well area.
On p.581, the authors repeat: "...The authors, however, find no convincing
evidence t h a t any fault movement occurred under the reservoir prior to
failure..." After reviewing the foregoing discussion, one wonders if they would
now agree t h a t fault movement at the reservoir's Fault I u n d o u b t e d l y occurred during the 24 h prior to failure, and may well have contributed the final
increment of foundation distortion which permitted piping to commence.
Item 6

On p.585 the authors state: "...There is no evidence that vertical displacements along faults have occurred at the time of failure anywhere in the
Baldwin Hills..." It is suggested by this discusser that the record quoted in
Item 5 strongly disputes that conclusion. Furthermore, there is an extensive
record of prior surface cracks and vertical differential displacements along
subsidiary and subparallel minor faults south of the reservoir during the
period 1959--1963 (see Grant IV, 1968). These sub-fault-block displacements
were highly evident across paved areas and structures in the vicinity of La
Brea Avenue, Stocker Avenue and Overhill Drive. Vertical offsets of up to
11/2 inches were reported. Paving repairs were made frequently. Some of this
surface response was ascribed by Grant IV to rebound coincident with nearby

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brine injection, w h e r e fluid pressures o f m o r e t h a n 1 0 0 0 psi w e r e a p p l i e d to
the oil p r o d u c t i o n levels at a n d b e l o w a d e p t h o f 1 4 3 5 ft.
In c o n c l u s i o n , a n d a f t e r reviewing t h e discussions a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
p r e s e n t e d at this W o r k s h o p , it is h o p e d t h a t the a u t h o r s w o u l d n o w be wilting t o revise t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e i r c o n c l u d i n g s t a t e m e n t on p . 5 8 6 w h i c h
seems t o be g r a t u i t o u s l y p h r a s e d t o d e f e n d the oil field o p e r a t o r s , as follows:
" . . . T o w h a t e x t e n t these m o v e m e n t s are caused b y oil r e c o v e r y or b y t e c t o n i c
m o v e m e n t s is a c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n . . . "
REFERENCES
Casagrande, A., Wilson, S.D. and Schwantes, Jr., E.D., 1972. The Baldwin Hills Reservoir
failure in retrospect. In: Proceedings ASCE Specialty Conference, Purdue University,
June 1972.
Castle, R.O. and Youd, T.L., 1972. Discussion, Baldwin Hills Reservoir failure. Proceedings ASCE Specialty Conference, Purdue University, V, III.
Grant IV, U.S., 1968. Report on Earth Cracks in the vicinity of La Brea Av. and Stocker
St., Baldwin Hills, Calif. Unpublished report to Los Angeles Dept. of Water Resources.