G.R. No.

141489

November 29, 2002

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D.

EBALLE, LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA
ANN
P.
ROSALES
and
PATRICIA
M.
SARENAS, petitioners,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE
A.R. MELO, VICENTE V. MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and
REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL M. GONZALES,
DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON Q. BUESER, 1 NAPOLEON R.
BERATIO, SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR,
JR., respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. 141490

November 29, 2002

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D.

EBALLE, LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA
ANN
P.
ROSALES
and
PATRICIA
M.
SARENAS, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, its Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT BLAS
F. OPLE, and Members, namely: SENATORS FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
RENATO L. CAYETANO, LOREN LEGARDA-LEVISTE, ROBERT Z.
BARBERS, ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG, GREGORIO HONASAN,
RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR., TERESA AQUINO-ORETA, RAUL S. ROCO,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, VICENTE C. SOTTO III and REPRESENTATIVES
LUIS A. ASISTIO, EMILIO R. ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO E. TAADA,
MANUEL M. GARCIA, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, ANTONIO M. DIAZ,
FAUSTINO S. DY, JR., PACIFICO M. FAJARDO, ERNESTO F. HERRERA,
NUR G. JAAFAR, CARLOS M. PADILLA, ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO and
SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the

composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET" for

brevity)2 and the Commission on Appointments ("CA" for brevity).3 Petitioners
pray that respondents be ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and
reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and the CA to include party-list
representatives in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act. Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA be enjoined
from exercising their functions until they have been reorganized.
Antecedent Facts
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party-list system
in the House of Representatives ("House" for brevity), as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be
provided by law except the religious sector."
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. The Act sought to
"promote proportional representation in the election of representatives, to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."4

On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national
elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through
popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would
become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including petitioners from party-list
groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives 5 (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA),
NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC
was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list
groups had one representative each. Also elected were district
representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent 6 by electing
its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the
procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members
who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. 7 From available records, it
does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in
the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As
of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the
HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging
to the different political parties.
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, 8 as Chairman of the CA, and
to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), 9as
Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively,
to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary
of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives.10 On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B.
Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement11 of even date, referred the letter to House of
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, 12 and

against the CA, its Chairman and Members.13 Petitioners contend that, under
the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives
should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, 14 and 2.4 seats in the
CA.15Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its
Resolution of February 8, 2000,16 the Court en banc directed the
consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.
On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a motion 17 to amend
their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional
respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the
members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the
amended petitions.
Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to
protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer
and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives
from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
"Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty

session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members,"18 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7941:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those
under the party-list. xxx"19
According to the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment, 20 at the time
petitioners filed the instant petitions the House had 220 members, 14 of
whom were party-list representatives, constituting 6.3636% of the House. Of
the remaining 206 district representatives affiliated with different political
parties, 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%), 36 belonged to LAKAS
(16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%) each to
KBL, PDRLM, Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1
representative was an independent.
In their Reply to Consolidated Comment,21 petitioners alleged that, following
the Solicitor Generals computation, the LP and LAKAS were over-represented
in the HRET and the CA. Petitioners particularly assail the presence of one LP
representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain that the LP
representatives should be ousted and replaced with nominees of the 14
party-list representatives.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HRET.
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE
ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.

3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO

RECONSTITUTE
THEMSELVES
TO
INCLUDE
PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petitions are
procedurally defective and substantially lacking in merit for having been
filed prematurely, thus:
"It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the pleading
determine the existence of a cause of action. In the instant petitions,
petitioners failed to aver that they or any one of them was elected by a party
or organization registered under the party-list system as a Member of the
HRET or CA to represent said party or organization under the party-list
system of the House of Representatives."22
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in the petitions under
review, citing the following pronouncement in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :23
"Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the alleged
facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance, and the
transcendental importance to the public of the case demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely brushing aside xxx technicalities of
procedure."
Petitioners reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is misplaced. The
"procedural questions" that petitioners want the Court to brush aside are not
mere technicalities but substantive matters that are specifically provided for
in the constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its
district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution24 explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority
to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators
and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,25each chamber of Congress
exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who

among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers
respective electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998
Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
"Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and the election of the Members of the House of
Representatives who are to compose the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of the
Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its organization and adoption
of such resolutions as it may deem proper." (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments
provides:
"Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within
thirty (30) days after both Houses of Congress shall have organized
themselves with the election of the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Appointments
shall be constituted. It shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented herein.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient
number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and
the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI

of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House

that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in
the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of
the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the
HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this
Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may
bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse
to this Court is premature.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is
not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on
proportional representation.26 However, under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.27Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each
branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees
fit.28 Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if
party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET
and the CA.
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented
the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of
members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the May
11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from
seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the
available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply
refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list
representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they
filed the instant petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not
consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As
the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by
petitioners at this time.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be
heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of
judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must be an actual controversy; (2) the
person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and

substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy

must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the resolution
of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final determination of
the controversy.29
The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case
have not alleged that they are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived
of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither have they claimed that they have
been nominated by the party-list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA.
As such, they do not possess the personal and substantial interest required
to confer them with locus standi. The party raising the constitutional issue
must have "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."30
We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET
and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17
and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the
HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by
subsequent events. On May 14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list
representatives were elected to the House. The Court cannot now resolve the
issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the
"present composition" of the House of Representatives as presented by
petitioners and the Solicitor General. With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is
certain that the composition of the House has changed. In the absence of a
proper petition assailing the present composition of the HRET and the CA,
the instant petitions must fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant
petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering an advisory opinion,
which is outside our jurisdiction.31
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163756

January 26, 2005

GEORGIDI B. AGGABAO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, the PROVINCIAL BOARD of
CANVASSERS of ISABELA, and ANTHONY MIRANDA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari1 seeks to annul and set aside as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion Resolution No. 7233 of the COMELEC
En Banc and the proclamation of private respondent Anthony Miranda as
Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela.2
Petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao and private respondent Anthony Miranda
were rival congressional candidates for the 4th District of Isabela during the
May 10, 2004 elections. During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass
of votes (COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon and San Agustin, Miranda
moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it was
tampered with; prepared under duress; differed from other authentic copies
and contained manifest errors.3
Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by Miranda are proper
only for a pre-proclamation controversy which is not allowed in elections for
Members of the House of Representatives.4
On May 22, 2004, the reconstituted Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC)
excluded from canvass the contested COCVs and used instead the 4th and 7th
copies of the COCVs.5 Based on the results, Miranda garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Congressman.
On appeal with the COMELEC,6 petitioner asserted that the PBC acted
without jurisdiction7 when it heard Mirandas Petition for Exclusion. Even
assuming that the PBC had jurisdiction over the petition, it still erred in
excluding the contested COCVs as they appeared regular and properly
authenticated.8
On June 6, 2004, private respondent filed a Very Urgent Motion for
Proclamation9 which was opposed10 by petitioner who contended that the
pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC Second Division is a bar to
Mirandas proclamation.

In a Memorandum dated June 8, 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain,

commissioner in-charge for Regions II and III, approved the proclamation of
the remaining winning candidates for the province of Isabela.11
On June 9, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 7233 likewise
directing the proclamation of the remaining winning candidates in
Isabela.12 On the same day, petitioner filed with the COMELEC an Urgent
Motion to Set Aside the Notice of Proclamation with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order.13
On June 14, 2004, Miranda was proclaimed as the duly elected Congressman
for the 4th District of Isabela.14
Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed this petition assailing
Resolution No. 7233. He claimed that the COMELEC En Banc acted without
jurisdiction when it ordered Mirandas proclamation considering that the
Second Division has not yet resolved the appeal.
In his Comment,15 Miranda moved for the dismissal of the petition
considering that the issue raised by Aggabao is best addressed to the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).16
On August 27, 2004, the petitioner filed a Consolidated Motion for Early
Resolution; Manifestation that the COMELEC Second Division Issued a
Resolution Sustaining the Appeal of the Petitioner; and Reply to the
Comment.17 He manifested that on August 16, 2004, the COMELEC Second
Division gave due course to his pending appeal.18 At the same time, he
bewailed the failure of the COMELEC Second Division to annul the
proclamation.19
The basic issue for resolution is whether we can take cognizance of this
petition.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is
concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of power for it to prosper.20

Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organization registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections21 we ruled that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective
Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, thereby
divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of
the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now
bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies
against members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.22
It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath
and assumed office on June 14, 2004. As such, petitioners recourse would
have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His remedy is not this
petition for certiorari. Thus:
Finally, the private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. has already been
proclaimed as the winner in the congressional elections in the fourth district
of Quezon City. He has taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as
representative; hence, the remedy open to the petitioner was to have filed

an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of

Representatives.23
The allegation that Mirandas proclamation is null and void ab initio does not
divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. Thus:
(I)n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning
candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as
Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason
for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash
of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the peoples
mandate.24
In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections25 we ruled that, upon proclamation of
the winning candidate and despite its alleged invalidity, the COMELEC is
divested of its jurisdiction to hear the protest. Thus:
The petition is impressed with merit because the petitioner has been
proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as
Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest
against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral
Tribunal.l^vvphi1.net The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which has
been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities
in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival
candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to
the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling
or modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC. After the proclamation,
petitioners remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET. The resolution
of the issues presented in this petition is best addressed to the sound
judgment and discretion of the electoral tribunal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, G.R. No. 189466

Petitioner,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,
JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ
and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------- x
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. G.R. No. 189506
PALPARAN, JR.,
Petitioner,
- versus HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET),
DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,
CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN,
ANTONIO FLORES and Promulgated:

JOSELITO USTAREZ,
Respondents. February 11, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These two cases are about the authority of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the
nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of
Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee
of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of
Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin
C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with
respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in
HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a
party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that
petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list
nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the
party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding
elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral
party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor,
and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed
that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list
organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having
lost a bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no
jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and
the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a
party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the

COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions
involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns
of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as
against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
petitioner Abayon.[1] The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET
denied the same on September 17, 2009, [2] prompting Abayon to file the
present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of
the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the
members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr.,
Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and
Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed
with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its
nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others
alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as
party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of
communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs),
former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan
committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his
person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to
and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed
that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his
eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question
must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the
petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or
qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparans qualifications.
[3]
Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution
dated September 10, 2009,[4] hence, the recourse to this Court through this
petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their
consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat
Tayo andBantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at
the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007
elections.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act
(R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to
determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek
party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed,
the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they
sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners
Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their
respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no
jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the
COMELEC which already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat
Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays personality is so
inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the
HRET cannot dismiss the quo warrantoaction against Bantay without
dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the
House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, [5] identifies
who the members of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party -list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:

members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts and those who
x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This means
that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives
who are elected into office, not their parties or organizations. These
representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system
that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where
the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such
party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list
representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative
rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws
that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also
subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three
consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself
recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House of Representatives,
thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall
promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through
a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral
parties
or
organizations
or
coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring
supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v.
Commission on Elections,[6] a party-list representative is in every sense an
elected member of the House of Representatives. Although the vote cast in a

party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote
for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the
qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section
9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No
person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue until the
expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The
Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a bona fide member
of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.[7]
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular
qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member
or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat
Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented
interests that they presumably embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority
to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or
organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine
the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among
them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.
[8]
But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen
and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in

the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position,
the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state,
the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner
Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to
approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not
resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by
the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution[9] provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees
are elected members of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.[10]
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat
Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
WHEREFORE, the
Court DISMISSES the
consolidated
petitions
and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated
September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

HENRY JUN DUEAS, JR.,

G.R. No. 191550

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,*
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
-versus-

BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

HOUSE OF
ELECTORAL

REPRESENTATIVES Promulgated:

TRIBUNAL andANGELITO JETT P.

REYES,

May 4, 2010

Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
praying that the Decision[1] of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) dated February 25, 2010 and its Resolution [2] dated March 18, 2010
be declared null and void ab initio.

Petitioner was proclaimed as the Congressman for the Second Legislative

District of Taguig City. Private respondent filed an election protest with the
HRET. After revision of ballots in 100% of the protested precincts and 25% of
the counter-protested precincts, the case was submitted for resolution upon
the parties' submission of memoranda. However, in its Order[3] dated
September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and
appreciation of ballots for the remaining 75% of the counter-protested
precincts. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Order was denied in
a HRET Resolution dated October 21, 2008 which reiterated the Order to
continue revision in the remaining 75% of the counter-protested
precincts. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
docketed as G.R. No. 185401, seeking the nullification of said order of
revision, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. On July
21, 2009, the Court promulgated a Decision dismissing the petition. Said
Decision became final and executory and the HRET continued the proceeding
in the electoral protest case.

On February 25, 2010, the HRET promulgated its Decision which declared
private respondent as the winner with a margin of 37 votes.

In the instant petition, the main thrust of petitioner's argument is that since
private respondent's margin of votes is merely 37, this shows that the
alleged reason for the HRET's order of revision, i.e., that the proclaimed
results of the congressional elections in Taguig City have been substantially
affected by the results of the initial revision and appreciation of ballots, is
baseless. Petitioner then continued to reiterate his arguments raised in his
earlier petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the HRET Resolution
dated October 21, 2008. He also pointed out that the three Justices of the
Court who are members of the HRET took no part in the HRET's Decision and
Resolution denying reconsideration.

In his Comment, private respondent counters that petitioner's allegations do

not show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET.

The Court resolves to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and

orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere
with the electoral tribunals exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. [4] Grave
abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where
the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty.
[5]

Such showing of grave abuse of discretion is sorely wanting in this

case. Petitioner dwells on his theory that there was no justification for the
HRET's Order to continue the revision of ballots in 75% of the counterprotested precincts. Since it was eventually determined that private
respondent's margin of votes is only 37, this allegedly shows that the results
of the initial revision of ballots really had no substantial effect on the
proclaimed results and, thus, the order for continuation of revision of ballots
was uncalled for. In petitioner's view, the HRET's continuation of revision of
ballots, in addition to the circumstance that none of the Supreme Court
Justices who are members of the HRET took part in the Decision, are proof
that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion.

The Court has long declared in Dueas, Jr. v. House of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal,[6] that the HRET was acting well within the rules when it
ordered the continuation of revision of ballots. Petitioner cannot resurrect his
claims, which had been finally adjudged unmeritorious by this Court, through
the present petition. Thus, the fact that the HRET went on with the revision
of ballots in 75% of the counter-protested precincts cannot be considered as
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the electoral tribunal.

Likewise, the circumstance that none of the three Supreme Court Justices
took part in the Decision, cannot be taken as proof of grave abuse of
discretion. Rule 89 of the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal provides that [f]or rendition of decisions and the adoption
of formal resolutions, the concurrence of at least five (5) Members shall be
necessary. The HRET Decision dated February 25, 2010 had the concurrence
of six of its members. Verily, the HRET was acting in accordance with its rules
and cannot be said to have committed any abuse of its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated February 25, 2010 and the Resolution dated March 18, 2010 of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T.
SARMEN, AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ, SILVERIO J.
SANCHEZ, GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE GUZMAN, EUGENE M.
PABUALAN, RODOLFO E. PEREZ, HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO
ARENAS, TIRSO C. BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C.
GOLO& JONATHAN DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND
AS LEGITIMATE MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF ADHIKAING
TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP PARTY
LIST),Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND
THE SELF-STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST REPRESENTED BY
AMPARO T. RIMAS, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case involve the
seemingly elementary matter of the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC)
jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the
House of Representatives, on the one hand; and from his party-list
organization, on the other.

The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list
organization, the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One
group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who
represents the organization in the House of Representatives, and the other
group by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents herein, or the Rimas Group).
THE CASE
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 641 in relation to Rule
65,2 seeking to annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012
and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on
16 November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the
Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policymaking body
is the National Convention. The Central Committee, however, takes over
when the National Convention is not in session.3
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010
Elections.4 On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its
nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina as
second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning
party-list groups.5Based on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v.
COMELEC,6 Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,7 and
thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list
organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee
Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by
its nominees.8 Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year term.9
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during
which it introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the
salient changes was the composition of the Central Committee,10 which
would still be composed of 15 representatives but with five each coming
from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation).11 The

amendments likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central

Committee members within six months after the Second National
Convention.12
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent
members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the
Central Committee.13 The Interim Central Committee was dominated by
members of the Rimas Group.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed
office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for
disloyalty.14 Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption,
the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing
agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion
under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.15
On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with the Interim Central Committee,16 which subsequently denied the same
in a Resolution dated 29 December 2011.17
While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration was pending, the Lico
Group held a special meeting in Cebu City (the Cebu meeting) on 19
December 2011. At the said meeting, new members of the Central
Committee, as well as a new set of officers, were elected.18 The election was
purportedly held for the purpose of implementing the 5-5-5 equal
representation amendment made during the Second National Convention.19
On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in
Paraaque City20 (the Paraaque convention), at which a new Central
Committee and a new set of officers were constituted.21 Members of the
Rimas Group won the election and occupied all the corresponding seats.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC
SECOND DIVISION
On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed
with COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12039.22 The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second
Division, prayed that petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating
Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession of the second
nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in the House.
The Rimas Group thereafter filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC on
14 May 2012, this time impleading not only petitioner Lico but the entire Lico
Group. The Amended Petition also prayed that the COMELEC nullify the
election conducted at the Cebu meeting and recognize the Paranaque

convention.
In both the Petition and the Amended Petition, the Rimas Group alleged that
Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list
group, such as malversation, graft and corruption, and that he had "boldly
displayed his recalcitrance to honor party commitment to be upright and
consistently honest, thus violating basic principles of the Ating Koop."23 The
Amended Petition stated further that the Cebu meeting held by the Lico
Group violated notice and quorum requirements.24
In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012,25 the COMELEC Second Division upheld
the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as
the duly qualified nominee of the party-list group.26 The Second Division
characterized the issue of the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from
Ating Koop as an intra-party leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an
incident of its power to register political parties.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC
EN BANC
Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the
Second Division's Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31
January 2013. The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVES,
as it hereby RESOLVED, to:
a. DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the
House of Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the
Second Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its
Party Representative, for lack of jurisdiction;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b. UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro Lico from ATING KOOP
Party-list Group; [and]
c. UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President,
Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group accredited by the
Commission on Elections, to the exclusion of respondents Atty. Isidro Q. Lico,
Rafael A. Puentespina, Proculo T. Sarmen, Amelito L. Revuelta, William C.
Ybanez, Silverio J. Sanchez, Gloria G. Futalan, Hilario De Guzman, Eugene M.
Pabualan, Rodolfo E. Perez, Hipolito R. Quillan, Mario Arenas, Tirso C.
Buenaventura, Lydia B. Tubella, and Jonathan Dequina.28
chanrobleslaw
In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no
jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives,
considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as

member of the House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's
expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central
Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members
remained in hold-over capacity even after their terms had expired;29 and that
the COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of
Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the expulsion.30
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as the legitimate
representative of Ating Koop considering that: 1) it found nothing in the
records to show that the Lico Group made a valid call for the special election
of Central Committee members as required under the Amended Constitution
and By-Laws;31 2) there is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of
100 attended the Cebu meeting;32 and 3) the Paraaque convention was in
accordance with Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-Laws.33
Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before Us, praying for a
review of the COMELEC Resolutions.
The Court's Ruling
On the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
the expulsion of a Member of the House
of Representatives from his party-list
organization
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its
jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his
expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second
nominee as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this
reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as
it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34 endows the HRET with
jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning
party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of

the House of Representatives.35In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating

Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not
the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the
COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from
Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the
disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon the qualification
requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list
group sought to be represented.
The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by
relying on the rule that it can decide intra-party matters as an incident of its
constitutionally granted powers and functions. It citedLokin v. COMELEC,
where We held that when the resolution of an intra-party controversy is
necessary or incidental to the performance of the constitutionally-granted
functions of the COMELEC, the latter can step in and exercise jurisdiction
over the intra-party matter.36 The Lokin case, however, involved nominees
and not incumbent members of Congress. In the present case, the fact that
petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion from
Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not
parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on
intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The
jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and
decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the
proclaimed winner.37
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the
House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop,
which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list
nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or
organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.
Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is
a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office,
whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption
of office, but during the officer's entire tenure.39
This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET
jurisdiction over the requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. In Abayon v. HRET,40 it was argued that the petitioners did not
belong to the marginalized and under-represented sectors that they should

represent; as such, they could not be properly considered bona

fide members of their respective party-list organizations. The Court held that
it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona
fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.41
Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity
of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his
qualifications to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an
error of jurisdiction correctible by a writ of certiorari;42 the COMELEC should
not have encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority
to do so.
Distinguished from Reyes v. COMELEC
Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v.
Commission on Elections.43 In that case, We upheld the disqualification by
the COMELEC of petitioner Reyes, even as she was already proclaimed
winner in the elections at the time she filed her petition with the High Court.
In doing so, We rejected the argument that the case fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET.
In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections,
and took her oath of office before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. However, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she
was not yet a member of the House of Representatives: petitioner Reyes
had yet to assume office, the term of which would officially start at noon of
30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo
Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 assailing the Resolutions ordering the
cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. In the present case, all three
requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and assumption of office were
satisfied.
Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution disqualifying petitioner
on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship and residency had become final and
executory when petitioner elevated it to this Court.44 It should be mentioned
that when petitioner Reyes filed her petition with the Court, the COMELEC En
Banc had, as early as 5 June 2013, already issued a Certificate of Finality
over its 14 May 2013 Resolution disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no
longer any pending case on the qualifications of petitioner Reyes to speak of.
Here, the question of whether petitioner Lico remains a member of the
House of Representatives in view of his expulsion from Ating Koop is a
subsisting issue.

Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the HRET to be a

non-issue, since the recourse of the petitioner to the Court appeared to be a
mere attempt to prevent the COMELEC from implementing a final and
executory judgment. We said that the petitioner therein took an inconsistent,
if not confusing, stance, considering that she sought remedy before the
Court, and yet asserted that it is the HRET which had jurisdiction over the
case.45 In this case, the question on the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion
from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls within the jurisdiction of the
HRET, as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as party-list
representative.
On which group legitimately represents
Ating Koop
We now pass upon the question of which, between the two contending
groups, is the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop.
At the outset, We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide which of the feuding groups is to be recognized, and
that it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies. Indeed, the COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for
leadership within the party is well established. This power to rule upon
questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an
incident of its enforcement powers.46
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop
officers for the simple reason that the amendments to the Constitution and
By-laws of Ating Koop were not registered with the COMELEC. Hence,
neither of the elections held during the Cebu meeting and the Paranaque
conference pursuant to the said amendments, were valid.
Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that their respective
elections were conducted pursuant to the amendment introduced in the
Second National Convention held on 14 May 2011. In particular, Section 1 of
Article VI of Ating Koop's By-laws called for the conduct of an election of
Central Committee members within six months after the Second National
Convention.47
There is no showing, however, that the amendments were actually filed with
the COMELEC.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's
approval must be obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case
of Dayao v. COMELEC,48 We declared that it is the State, acting through the

COMELEC, that breathes life to a party-list organization. The implication,

therefore, is that the State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal
contracts entered into by the party-list organization and its members - the
Constitution and By-laws - such that any amendment to these contracts
would constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the parties involved.
An amendment to the bylaws of a party-list organization should become
effective only upon approval by the COMELEC.
Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of filing of the amended
by-laws and subsequent conformity thereto of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under corporation law. Under the Corporation Code, an
amendment to a by-law provision must be filed with the SEC. The
amendment shall be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of a
certification that it is not inconsistent with the Corporation Code.49
There being no showing that the amendments on the by-laws of Ating Koop
were filed with and subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election
conducted pursuant thereto may not be considered valid. Without such
requisite proof, neither the Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be
the legitimate set of officers of Ating Koop.
Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling for a special election
were effective, this Court still cannot declare any of the feuding groups as
the legitimate set of officers considering that the respective sets of evidence
presented were evenly balanced. With respect to the Lico Group's Cebu
meeting, the COMELEC correctly found - and the records bear out - that the
notices sent were deficient and that there was no sufficient proof of quorum.
Hence, the Cebu meeting was held to be invalid. On the other hand, the
COMELEC failed to appreciate the fact that the Paranaque convention
suffered from the same infirmity, the records of the said convention,
consisting merely of the Minutes thereof, likewise fail to establish due notice
and a quorum.50
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the
equipoise doctrine comes into play. This rule provides that when the
evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets
of evidence of both parties are evenly balanced, the party having the burden
of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party succeeds in making out a case,
neither side prevails. The courts are left with no other option but to leave
them as they are. The consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of the
complaint/petition.51
The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC, had the burden
of proving that it is the petitioner, and not the Lico Group, that is the
legitimate group. As the evidence of both parties are in equipoise, the Rimas
Group failed to discharge its burden. The COMELEC should have dismissed

the petition of the Rimas Group insofar as it sought to be declared the

legitimate group representing Ating Koop.
Yet, the COMELEC held that the Paranaque convention "appeared to be in
conformity" with Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-Laws.52 It should
be stressed that the COMELEC did not even substantiate this conclusion. 53
The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the COMELEC s appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence.54 But when the COMELECs assessment of the
evidence is so grossly unreasonable that it turns into an error of jurisdiction,
the Court is compelled to intervene and correct the error.55
As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties was able to establish
its legitimacy. The evaluation of the evidence by the COMELEC in deciding
the issue of which group legitimately represents Ating Koop was therefore
grossly unreasonable, which amounts to a jurisdictional error that may be
remedied by certiorari under Rule 65.
The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the
two groups is the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?
We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central Committee,
whose members remain as such in a hold-over capacity.
In Seneres v. COMELEC,56 the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by
Buhay Party-List through its President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the
ground that his term had expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied
by analogy the default rule in corporation law to the effect that officers and
directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until
such time as their successors are elected or appointed.57Seeres ruled that
the hold-over principle applies in the absence of a provision in the
constitution or by-laws of the party-list organization prohibiting its
application.
In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and Bylaws of
Ating Koop and We do not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or
impliedly, the application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in accordance with
corporation law, the existing Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate
entity with full authority to bind the corporation and to carry out powers
despite the lapse of the term of its members on 14 November 2011, since no
successors had been validly elected at the time, or since.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC
Second Division Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the expulsion

of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Partylist Group represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate
Party-list Group.
A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee
and set of officers legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim
Central Committee and set of officers prior to the split of Ating Koop.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtua