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THE

FRAGMENTS
THAT REMAIN OF THE

LOST WRITINGS OF PROCLUS,

SURNAMED

THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR.

E|
t/T

op.f/.aruv

ni-st

xoti

tptXoffo^ia.; ysvo;, ou

ru Qvuru ysvu

dagnQei/ *

(tti&v

Plat. Tim.
E;

Ss

ro rot; opS-aX/tot;

/SAssrs/v

ayaS-w our

vXQ'.v

9-Siuv.

xSy,

ro

rot;

p. 40. Edit.

rn;

\pu^r;

Beck.
ofj.fj.a.tn'i

AltlSTOT.

o%u$ogxuv tart Sauftarrov.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR.
AND SOLD BY BLACK, YOUNG, AND YOUNG, TAVISTOCK-STREET,
COVENT GARDEN.
1825.

LONDON
PRINTED BY

J.

MOYES, BOUVERIK STREET.

TO

Mrs.

ELIZABETH HOWARD,
A LADY

NO LESS DISTINGUISHED BY HER GREAT MORAL EXCELLENCE,

THAN BY HER VERY EXTRAORDINARY

LITERARY ATTAINMENTS,

THIS
IS

WORK

RESPECTFULLY AND GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED,

BY HER MOST OBEDIENT SERVANT,

THOMAS TAYLOR

Digitized by the Internet Archive

,

in

2016

https://archive.org/details/b22402068

PREFACE.

To

the lovers of the

wisdom

of the Greeks,

any remains of the writings of Proclus

always be invaluable, as he was a

will

man who,

for the

variety of his powers,

the beauty of his diction, the magnificence

of his conceptions, and his luminous de-

velopment of the abstruse dogmas of the

ancients,

is

among

As, therefore, of

of Plato.

sophical

unrivalled

the disciples

all

his philo-

works that are extant,

have

translated the whole of some, and parts

of others,*

was

also desirous to present

have translated the whole of his Six Books on

the Theology of Plato, and have added a Seventh Book,

in order to

supply the deficiency of another Book on

PREFACE.

VI

the English reader with a translation of

the

works as are

Of
is

Fragments of such

existing

lost.

these Fragments, the largest,

which

on the Eternity of the World, and

this subject,

the whole of his

Plato

and of

Euclid.

his

Commentary on

Commentary on

of the substance of his

the First

From

the Greek.

Commentaries on the

Mor-

have also translated his admirable Treatise on

am now

all

which are published.

waiting for an opportunity, which

soon be afforded me, of publishing

his Solution of

his Treatise

century.

First

These are from

the barbarous Latin version of

Providence and Fate;

* This

Book of

and have given a translation

Alcibiades and Parmenides of Plato.

the Timseus of

have also translated nearly the whole of his

Scholia on the Cratylus

beka,*

ori-

which was written by Proclus, but since

lost;

of his

my

And

trust will

Translation of

Ten Doubts concerning Providence, and

on the Subsistence of

Morbeka was Archbishop

Evil.

of Corinth in the twelfth

PREFACE.

VII

arguments,

ginally consisted of eighteen

wants only the

complete

argument

first

and of this

to render

it

have endeavoured

to

collect the substance, from

has written against

translation of the
in

whatPhiloponus

There

it.

work

a Latin

is

of Philoponus*

which these Arguments are alone

found
1557.

by

Joannes Mahotius
from which,

fol.;

reader will

perceive,

been enabled
text.

that

learned

have frequently'

to correct the printed

The acute Simplicius

this

work

be

Lugdun.

the

as

to

is

of Philoponus

Greek

of opinion,
is

replete

with garrulity and nugacity, and a considerable

portion of his

Aristotles Treatise
sists

of a

Commentary on

on the Heavens, con-

confutation of the

sophistical

reasoning of this smatterer in philosophy.

The Greek

edition

of this

work of Philoponus

against Proclus was printed at Venice, 1535,

fol.

PREFACE.

VI 11

In doing this, likewise, he invokes Hercules

him

to assist

Augean

in the purification of

such an

stable.

remarkable, that though the writings

It is

of Proclus are entirely neglected, and even

unknown

to

many

in this country,

teemed

in

ivho are called scholars,

yet they are so

much

es-

France and Germany, that such

of his works as were only before extant in

manuscript, have been recently published

by the very learned Professors Boissonade,

The second

Victor Cousin, and Creuzer.*

Of

the works of Proclus, the

fessors has published the Scholia

first

of these Pro-

on the Cratylus; the

second, the Commentaries on the First Alcibiades, and

Five out of the Seven existing Books on the Parmenides

of Plato

and

Treatise on

also,

from the version of Morbeka, the

Providence and Fate;

Solution of Ten

Doubts concerning Providence; and the Treatise on

the Subsistence of Evil
taries

and the

third,

the

Commen-

on the First Alcibiades, and the Theological Ele-

PREFACE.

IX

of these learned men, indeed, conceived so

highly of the merits of Proclus, as to say

of him,
scures,

that, like

by

Homer

own name,

his

himself, he ob-

names of

the

all

those that preceded him, and has drawn to

himself alone the merits and praises of

The eulogy

[the Platonic philosophers].

therefore, of

all

Ammonius Hermeas,

that

Proclus possessed the power of unfolding

the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific

judgment of the nature of

things, in the

highest perfection possible to humanity,*

All

hrents.

honour
in

to

these

speak of

the letters which

learned

me
I

in the

men have done me

handsomest manner, both

have received from them, and

The

the above-mentioned publications.

in particular,

the

has adopted most of

my

last of

in

them,

emendations of

the Greek text of the Theological Elements.

*

E<

ri

x.xi

cruipyivuciv,

Yiptus

dvvYi&ir/)/&iv

ct7ror/i uovivcrccvTZs
l

Yifisov

didciB-xotXov

tmvfyKur
rojv

zfyy/itrzav

tw

rov Bztov

TI^oxXov rov 7rXctro>vixcv $ix^o%ev,

rov

rov ug

PREFACE.

will be

immediately assented

one who

much

is

by every

to

with

conversant

the

writings of this most extraordinary man.

Perhaps, however, the ignorance

this

in

country, of the writings of this Coryphean

philosopher,

may be

counted

by what Mr. Harris says

for,

very reasonably ac-

the Preface to his Hermes,

in

Tis per-

viz.

haps too much the case with the multitude

in every nation, that as they

beyond themselves and

their

know
own

little

affairs,

out of this narrow sphere of knowledge,

so,

they think nothing worth knowing.

we, Britons, by our

situation, live di-

vided from the whole world,

will

xx^ov
T0<5

be found

Tjj?

ccv6^U7ftvrif

7TX\CU01S

tuv ovtuv
cpo\ayr,G-xt/xiv.

to

perhaps,

this,

be more remarkably our

tyv<nu$

tfwXfUV,

As

KXi

xtrKYirxvTOS,

tyiv

TT/V

ts i^rtytiTiKw

tuv ookovvtmv

17T HTTn/XOV iXYjV

TY)S

7roXX*)v XV Ten Xoyicp

Ammon. Herm. de Interpret,

6i 01

p. 1.

%XgtV

PREFACE.

And hence

case.

the

XI

reason,

that

studies are usually satisfied in the

of our

own countrymen

profane,
selves,

ludicrous,

we

think

and that

farther.

it is

works

that in 'philosophy,

in poetry, in every kind of subject,

serious or

our

whether

perfection

whether

sacred or

with

our-

superfluous to search

TRANSLATION
OF

THE FRAGMENTS
THAT REMAIN OF THE

LOST WRITINGS OF PROCLUS.

ON LIGHT.*
I

with respect to light, one kind

is

material, but

another immaterial, according to the difference of

those illuminating natures,
light

which

corrupted

immaterial

is

fire

and the sun, the

in a certain respect ,

is,

but material light, in a certain respect,

pervades through material substances

whole

air

the

for

appears to be no less illuminated by the

sun than by the

fire

that

is

procured by us.

when clouds pass under the

*

This and the

five following

sun, the light

Fragments are

to be

And
is

in

found in

the Treatise of Philoponus against Proclus, on the Eternity of the

World.
-f*

Immaterial light

the recipient of
the light which

it
it

is

is,

in a certain respect , corrupted, because

corruptible

and when

received departs to

its

this is corrupted,

fountain, the sun.

2
one part intercepted, and we do not receive the

whole of

For how can the light which

it.

the heavens be continuous with that which

the air? since the latter

former not.

from

And

proper principle

its

is

cut

corruptible, however,

the incorruptible

for

specifically different

is

in

suspended

is

but the other,

off,

in

corruptible, but the

the one, indeed,

should so happen,

The

is

is

and sometimes

is

if

not.

is

not continuous with

two things of

this

kind are

from each other.

Tim&us of Plato, against

Objections made to it by Aristotle.

In Defence of

Artstotle

the

objects to the very

digm, asserting that

much more

hostile to the

and particularly

as

evident from

physics.

And

it

name

metaphorical

it is

ideas,
is

it

dogma which

to that

appears, that this

averse to any of the

of para-

and he

itself,

in his

Meta-

man

not so

is

dogmas of Plato as he

the hypothesis of ideas

is

introduces

of animal

what he says

the

is

to

not only in his Logical

Treatises calling ideas sonorous

trifles,

but also

in

his Ethics contending against the existence of the

good

itself.

think
to

it

ideas

In his Physics, likewise, he does not

proper to refer the generations of things

:

for

he says this

in

his

Treatise

on

And

Generation and Corruption.

tility

the

to

doctrine

of ideas*

apparent in his Metaphysics

cussion there

is

this his hos-

much more

is

because the dis-

concerning principles

for there

he adduces numerous arguments against ideas,

in the beginning, middle,

and end of that

treatise.

In his Dialogues, also, he most manifestly exclaims,

that he cannot

assent to

dogma,

this

though some one may think that he speaks against

it

for the

purpose of contention.

T h e maker
him

rated by

God

always existing, that which

make

makes, but the universe

or,

is

or,

he indeed always

not always generated

he always makes, and the universe

generated.

But

if

gene-

For either

likewise always exists.

does not always

is

God does

is

always

not always make, he

will evidently be [at a certain time]

an

efficient in

capacity, and again an efficient in energy, and he

will be

an imperfect Demiurgus, and indigent of

time.

If,

* See

my

however, he always makes, but the

Dissertation on the

which the opposition of Aristotle

is

shewn

to

have been employed

Philosophy of
to

Aristotle, in

Platos doctrine of ideas

for the purpose of

guarding from

misapprehension, and not of subverting that doctrine.

-f

Proclus here uses the word ymrai, generated , because the

universe, on account of the flowing condition of

always rising into existence, or becoming

to be.

its

nature,

is

4
universe

generated at a certain time, an im-

is

For when that which

possibility will take place'.

makes

in energy, that

is

which

is

Both,

be generated in energy.

also

exist always

generated will
therefore,

the one being generated, and the

other producing perpetually.

The world is always fabricated

and as the
Demiurgus fabricated always, and still fabricates,
;

so likewise the world

now

rising into

to be]

cated.

And

cate,

and

and

is

was generated, and,

is

always generated [or be-

so that the world

is

always fabri-

Demiurgus always did

as the

still

always fabricated, and

existence,

having been made,

coming

is

fabri-

was always
becoming to be,

fabricates, so the world

fabricated

and while

it is

was generated, and having been generated,

is

always generated.
Proelus assents to what

is

by Aristotle

said

concerning the perpetuity of the world

says

it

was not just

to be generated,

in

him

but he

to accuse Plato.

For

does not signify, with Plato, the

beginning of existence, but a subsistence in perpetually becoming to be.

established

For the natures which are

above time, and which are eternal,

have the whole of their essence and power, and

the perfection of their energy, simultaneously present.
its

But every thing which

proper

life

For whatever

collectively
is

in

time,

is

in

time has not

and at once present.

though

it

should be

extended to an

infinite time,

certain time.
it

has an existence at A

For that portion of being which

not [wholly] present at once

jput is

and was not produced

infinitely,

The

period in the past time.

was thus generated,

at

is

generated
a certain

universe, therefore,

as not having a subsistence

such as that of eternal

is

For time

possesses exists in a certain time.

being-s,

but as that which

generated, or becoming to be, through the whole

of time, and always subsisting at a certain time,

according to that part of time which

And

again, the universe

being the cause to

deriving

which

is

essence

its

present.

is

was generated,

itself

of

subsistence from

its

not

as

existence, but

some other nature,

the fourth signification of a generated

I

mean

that which has a cause of

its

generation.

But
which

may

if

Timseus [in Plato]

will

calls the

be at a certain time

(for

world a

perhaps this

give disturbance to some), and induce

to ask

whether he gives

in a part of time

to the

For

God
them

world a generation

the once, or at a certain

must be admitted by us to be a certain part

of time. To this we reply, that every thing which

time,

is

in time,

whether in an

time, will always exist at

whatever portion of
tion

is

it

infinite or in a finite

a certain time.

moy be assumed,

in a certain time.

For

this por-

For the whole of time

6
does not subsist at once, but according to a part.
therefore,

If,

any thing

be extended to an

in time,

is

But

becoming

should

generated,

is

it

and

to be, to infinity,

it

has indeed an

infinite time, it

existence at a certain time.

or

though

always pass-

is

ing from an existence at one time* to an existence

And

at another.

was

it

and

at a certain time,

is

be at a certain time.f

will

This existence too, at a certain time,

The world, however, when

different.

and

at a certain time,

is

it

always

exists at

a certain time, has a no less [continued] existence.

Hence that which has

its

time, at a certain time

is

certain time

is,

which

that

sense requires (and this

we

a)./. craro
-|-

The

becoming

read,

owon

is

and

will be.

at a

But

ftithfrufttvos.

is

But the

confirmed by the version of Maliotius,)

conformably

to

the above translation,

rov Wars us XX, x. r. X.

corporeal world
to be ,

without the
is

au

us aXXo

is

continually rising into existence, or

but never possesses real being.

image of a tree in a rapid torrent,

yet

to be,

in every time [or for ever]

* In the original, xx

that

becoming

and at a certain time

exists

should

hypostasis in a part of

reality,

and seems

to

it

Hence, like the

has the appearance of a tree

endure perpetually the same,

continually renewed by the continual renovation of the

stream.

The world

therefore

certain time , in the same

of a tree in a torrent, that

it

and

was,

manner

as

it

may

was yesterday,

is,

and

will be at

be said of the image

is

to-day, and will be

to-morrow, without any interruption of the continuity of

its flux.

Philoponus, not perceiving this, has, with his usual stupidity,

opposed what

is

here said by Proclus.

indeed at a certain time, but

becoming

or
he,

to be

imitates that

always generated,

is

and in perpetually becoming

which always

to

is.

This, therefore, alone ought to be considered,

whether

it

necessary to denominate a celestial

is

body, and in a similar manner the whole world, a

But how

thing of a generated nature.

sible not to assert this

is it

pos-

from the very arguments

which Aristotle himself affords us

For he says

that no finite body has an infinite power; and this

he demonstrates in the eighth book of his Physics.

If,

therefore, the world is finite (for this

monstrates),

necessary that

is

it

But

possess an infinite power.

power.

eternal subsistence, since

finite

power.

should not

in the former part

we have shewn that eternity is

The world, therefore, has not an

of this treatise
infinite

it

he de-

If,

it

however,

does not possess init

has not an eternal

hypostasis, (for a thing of this kind participates of

eternity,

but that which participates of eternity

participates of infinite power,)

it is

necessary that

the world should not always be.*

always,

is,

is

In

tlie

to exist

according to Aristotle himself, the pe-

culiarity of eternity, since, as

*

For

original,

ct.va.yxti g.tt

not always, a/.Xa yiynrai an,

or, rising into existence

since

he says, eternity

nvai rov xotTfxov an.

hut

is

For the world

always becoming

to

be ,

i.

e.

it

has not an eternal sameness of

being, hut a perpetually flowing subsistence.

8
from
is

this derives its appellation.

For that which

which

true of eternal being, is not true of that

always

is

generated

becoming

[or

be], viz.

to

the possession of infinite power, through being

perpetually generated,

maker of

Hence,

it.

but this pertains to the

always generated,

too, it is

acquiring perpetuity of existence through that

which, according to essence,

but

generated

So that the

may

definition of that

itself

which

is

generated,

is

essentially entirely destructible

being bound by true being,

and the whole of

to be,

be adapted to the world.

also

Every thing, therefore, which

deed

eternally being

does not possess perpetuity, so far as per-

it

tains to itself.
is

is

it

Hence [though naturally

in-

but

it

remains in becoming

is

a generated nature.

destructible]

not

is

it

destroyed, in consequence of the participation of

existence which

since the universe

has not an
strates

derives from true being.

it

is finite,

infinite

but that which

is

For,
finite

power, as Aristotle demon-

and as that which moves with an

motion moves with an

infinite

power,

it is

infinite

evident

that the immovable cause of infinite motion to

the universe, possesses itself an infinite power

that, if

from

its

you conceive the universe

immovable cause,

to infinity, nor will

it

it

so

to be separated

will not be

moved

possess an infinite power,

but will have a cessation of

its

motion.

If,

how-

you again conjoin

ever,

moved

verse, it will be

this cause

with the uni-

through

to infinity

Nor

it.

there any absurdity in separating by concep-

is

tion things

may

which are conjoined,

what

perceive

the other

will

itself,

happen

we

one from

to the

and, in consequence of perceiving this,

may understand what

from

in order that

and what

the inferior nature possesses

it

from

derives,

rangement, from that which

co-ar-

its

superior to

is

we

For, in short, since, in terrestrial natures,

it.

see

that they are partly corrupted through imbecility,

and are partly preserved through power, much

more

will perpetuity

and immortality* be inherent

in things incorruptible,
for every finite

For

power

the celestial

should say,
heat which

is

fire

is vivific,

through

corrupted.

not caustic, but, as

is

in the

same manner as the

naturally inherent

is

power

infinite

in

us.

And

on the Genera-

Aristotle himself, in his Treatise

tion of Animals, says, that there

is

a certain illu-

mination from which, being present, every mortal

*

111

hvia.f/.t't

is,

the original,

rroXXut u.a.\>.w

'iyXwoTt afuoav.

Multo magis

rot;

But from the version

his, qua*

it is

which

non intereunt, conveniat perpetuitas,

atque immortalitas, propter vires, easque infinitas,

that, for y

a tv

of Mahotius,

requisite to read y

agreeably to the above translation.

it

V, Storys koci

appears

10
nature
fire

lives.

All heaven, therefore, consists of a

of this kind

but the stars have, for the most

part, this element, yet they

of the other elements.*

have also the summits

Moreover,

consider, that earth darkens

tures,

which

all

if

we

likewise

illuminative na-

and produces shadow, but that the elements

are situated between earth

and

fire

being

naturally diaphanous, are the recipients of both

darkness and light, and yet are not the causes of

either of these to bodies, but that fire alone is the

manner

supplier of light, in the same

as earth

is

of darkness, and that these are at the greatest

distance from each other,

may understand how

we consider

if

that they illuminate in the

both,

it

is

fire.

If,

we

the celestial bodies are na-

turally of a fiery characteristic.

sublunary

this,

it is

evident

same manner as our

however

manifest that the

For

this is
fire

common

which

allied to the fire of the celestial bodies.

is

to

here,

It

is

is

not

proper, therefore, to introduce to the universe a

celestial nature, as

something foreign to

it,

but

placing there the summits of sublunary natures,

we should admit

that the elements

which are

here,

derive their generation through an alliance to the

nature of the celestial orbs.

* Viz. the sublunary elements have, in the stars and in the

heavens, a causal subsistence.

third book

ol'

my

See more on this subject in the

translation of Proclus

on the Timaeus of Plato.

11
I

The Original of the following Extracts, from the

same Treatise of Proclus,

is

only to be found in

Commentary of Simplicius on the Third

Book of Aristotle's Treatise on the Heavens .*

the

In answer

to the objection of Aristotle, that if

the elements are generated by a dissolution into

planes,

it is

absurd to suppose that

not generated from each other,

all

things are

Proclus observes,

that we must assert the very contrary.

For the

phaenomena do not accord with those who trans-

mute

earth,

we never

and move things immovable.

see earth

changed into other things

changed, so

terrestrial natures are

full

* In order to understand
the objections of Aristotle,

far as

it

what

cius, the hypothesis of the

is

is

said

but

is

un-

by Proclus in answer to

requisite to relate,

from Simpli-

Pythagoreans and Plato, respecting

the composition of the elements from the

live regular bodies.

They supposed two primogenial right-angled

triangles, the

one

but the other scalene, having the greater side the

double in length of the

because

they are

All earth, however,

of air or water.

isosceles,

For

it is

less,

and which they

call

a semi -triangle,

the half of the equilateral triangle, which

by a perpendicular from the vertex

isosceles triangle,

which

T imams

to the base.

calls

is

And

bisected

from the

a semi-square, four such

having their right angles conjoined in one centre, a square

formed.

But the union of six such

Viz. of six

triangles-)-

is

having eight angles,

squares, or six times four isosceles triangles,

whose right angles are conjoined in one centre.

12
changeable, because earth alone becomes, as

For

were, ashes, or a calx.

in metallic opera-

whole of the moisture

tions, the

in metals is con-

Not

sumed, but the ashes remain impassive.

that earth
for

parts of

But

it

remain,

if it

cold

themselves

make one body.

changed into other things, being

fire

and earth

than into water

itself,

alone,)

heaven,

(/.

is

e.

is

though water,

but earth, when

when

not burnt.

is

indeed,

forms a cube, which

be more swiftly

will

appears to be burnt,

subsisting by

the

again falling on each

and dry, earth

changed into
indeed,

yet the

it

should be said that earth, on account of

its qualities, is

itself

until

from

they

other,

entirely impassive to other things

is

divided by them falling upon

it is

it

adds,

And

divisible

nor

He

neither

the element of earth.

The

however, constitutes the pyramid, the octaedron,

dron, which are distributed to

fire, air,

pure earth,

it is

semi-triangle,

and the

icosae-

And

the py-

and water.

ramid, indeed, consists of four equilateral triangles, each of which

composes six semi -triangles.

equilateral triangles,

icosaedron

is

But the octaedron

consists of eight

and forty-eight semi-triangles

and the

formed from twenty equilateral triangles, but one

hundred and twenty semi -triangles. Hence, these three, deriving

their composition from one element, viz. the semi-triangle, are

naturally adapted, according to the Pythagoreans and Plato, to be

changed into each other

from another triangle

but earth, as deriving

specifically different,

its

composition

can neither be re-

solved into the other three bodies, nor be composed from them.

13
mutable

but the earth existing as the most

divisible,

within

bodies

the

ancient of

heaven,

the

is

but not mutable; and the intermediate

natures are both divisible and mutable.

Aristotle observes, that earth

element, and
is

alone incorruptible,

is

indissoluble

For earth alone

another

into

incorruptible,

is

is

especially an

is

if

that

which

and an element.

incapable of being dissolved

The

body*

philosopher Proclus

replies to this objection, yielding to

says about earth, viz. that

Aristotle

perfectly inca-

is

it

what

pable of being changed into the other three ele-

ments.

And he

calls

the

it

first

this account,

and most ancient of the bodies

and that the other elements give comple-

tion to the earth, in

water,

viz.

on

heaven, as unchangeable into other

within the
things,

says, that Plato,

air,

whose bosom they

and sublunary

fire.

are seated,

But

in con-

sequence of being, after a manner, divided by the

other elements,
sion
If,

is

it

becomes one of them

for divi-

a passion which exterminates continuity.

however,

elements,

it

suffers being divided

on

and energises

by the other

them, embracing,

compressing, and thus causing them to waste

away,

it

is

very properly co-divided with those

things from which

energises

according

certain respect.

it

to

suffers,

the

For there

is

and on which

same passion

in

it

a division of each.

14

though the more attenuated are divided by the

more sharp
and

augers,

one way, as in the arts by saws,

in

gimlets

and the more gross in

another way, by trampling and compression.

In the next place, Aristotle says, But neither
in those things

which

are dissolved,

sion of triangles reasonable.

is

the omis-

This, however, takes

place in the mutation of the elements into each

other, because they consist of triangles unequal
in multitude.

The philosopher Proclus here

observes,

that

when

fire re-

in the dissolution of water into air,

solves

it,

part of

two parts of

But

fire.

generated from

air are generated,

and one

Avhen, on the contrary, water

air,

is

three parts of air being re-

solved, the four triangles

which are mingled

to-

gether from the same cause, viz. from condensa-

with two parts of

part of water.
He adds, But
tion, together

wonderful, that they should be

form

there
tent

for it
is

it

moved

must be granted, that

something without form,

make one

air,
is

not at

all

in a certain

in all mutations

to a certain ex-

but being vanquished by some form, they

pass into the nature of that which vanquishes.

For we also acknowledge, that, in the mutation of

the elements with which

we
r

are conversant, cer-

tain half-generated parts frequently remain.

Aristotle adduces, as a fourth absurdity, that

15
hypothesis makes the generation of body

this

But

simply, but not of some particular body.

body

generated upon body,

is

that there

must

if

which

body
is

is

was before shewn

necessarily be a separate

which the authors of

For

it

this hypothesis

generated,

incorporeal.

vacuum,

do not admit.

generated from that

it is

It is

if

necessary, therefore,

that there should be some void place the recipient

Hence,

of the generated body.

body

is

generated from planes,

from body

rated

breadth alone.

To

they say that

will

not be gene-

plane has length and

for a
this,

it

if

however, Proclus replies,

that natural planes are not without depth

body distends the whiteness which

for

upon
it, it will much more distend the planes which
contain it.
But if the planes have depth, the

if

generation of

which

is

fire

will

falls

no longer be from that

incorporeal; but the

more composite

will

be generated from a more simple body.

In the next place Aristotle observes, that
those

who

attribute a figure to each of the ele-

ments, and by this distinguish the essences of them,

necessarily

make them

to be indivisibles.

For

a pyramid or a sphere being in a certain respect

divided, that which remains will not be a sphere
or a pyramid.
fire,

Hence, either a part of

fire is

not

but there will be something prior to an

element, because every body

is

either an element

16
or from elements

Proclus, in

makes

body

or not every

reply

divisible.

is

blames him who

pyramid, and who does not

to

be a

to

fire

this,

abide in the Platonic hypothesis, since Plato says

that a pyramid

not say that

is

is

it

the Jigure of

For

fire.

pyramids, any one of which

of

its

smallness; nor will

vided into

fire,

fire,

therefore,

this

it

is

invisible

is invisible,

so long as

no

longer

from

fire,

bodies?

is

it

in

di-

One

but the

it

If,

would

composed of elements,

would not be divided

For,

it is

smallness.

its

into

wonderful

be something inordinate

should

on account

pyramid were divided,

And why

planes.

but he does

a collection of

fire is

fire,

neither be an element, nor

since

be divided into pyramids.

pyramid, however,
element of

fire

in

pyramids or
that

there

sublunary

the mutation of the elements

with which we are conversant, there is somethinoinordinate.

Proclus adds, that certain differences also
lential

are produced,

which occasion

pesti-

consequences in the whole genus, and turn

the elements into a condition contrary to nature.

But what impossibility

this

section

of an

is

there, says he, that

element

being

taken,

and

fashioned into form and figure by atoms, should

again become a pyramid, or some other element,

in

consequence of being assimilated

which comprehend and compress

to the natures

it.

17

The

argument of

sixth

shew, that

Aristotle endeavours to

the elements are fashioned with the

if

above-mentioned figures, there must necessarily

be a vacuum which

not even asserted by the

is

But he shews

advocates for planes.

from

this

and

there being but few figures, both in planes

which

solids,

are able to

point, so as to leave

the place about one

fill

no vacuum.*

* In planes this can only be accomplished by the equilateral

triangle, the square,

and the hexagon

pyramid and cube alone can

Of the

point.

first

by

viz.

fill

six equilateral

But in

and three hexagons.

triangles, four squares,

the place, which

solids,

about one

is

part of this admirable theorem, which

mentioned, with the praise

it

the

deserves, by Proclus in his

is

also

Com-

mentary on the First Book of Euclid, the following demonstration

In order that any regular figures fre-

given by Tacquet

is

may

quently repeated

fill

may form one continued

many figures of that

space, viz.

superficies, it is requisite that the angles of

species

many

composed about one point make four right angles

exist about

of the First

one point as

Book

is

evident from Coroll.

3.

for so

Prop. 13.

of Euclid.

Thus, for instance, that equilateral

place,

requisite that

triangles

may

triangles

composed about one point should make four right angles.

But

fill

it

is

G equilateral triangles

make 4

right angles

of one right angle, and therefore 6

The

4 right angles.

make 4

right angles

make

2
3

'

of

make

and

for

of

right, that

is,

of

multiplied by any

again 4 right.

number

found,

it is

be

than, or exceed, 4 right angles.

right,

if,

its

makes

right,

is

this is likewise the case

For one makes

other figure can effect this, will clearly appear,

less

4 angles of a square, also, as

3 angles of a hexagon.
quently 3

some angles of such

i. e.

evident,

with the

and conse-

But that no
angle being

for the angles will

always

18
Proclus observes, in reply to this argument of

that the elements being placed by

Aristotle,

and supernally compressed by the

each other,

heaven, the more attenuated are compelled into

the places of the more gross.
pelled,

they

entering, into the place about one point,

and

fill

Hence, being im-

up the deficiency.

For Plato also assigns

no vacuum being

this as the cause of

left,

that less are arranged about greater things.

thus the cavities of the

up the place

fill

octaedra

air

is

For

have pyramids which

those of water have dispersed

and those of earth have

and no place

viz.

all

the figures

empty.

In the seventh argument, Aristotle says, that

all

simple bodies appear to be figured in the place

which contains them, and

air.

adds,

He

it is

especially water

impossible, therefore, that

the figure of an element should remain

whole would not on

But

all

figure,

would no longer be water,

in figure
it

so that

it

for the

which

were changed into another

it.

it

sides touch that

contains

if it

and

is

if it differed

evident that the figures of

are not definite, See.

Proclus, in opposition to this seventh argument,

observes, that he does not admit that the ele-

ments have a characteristic

neither have
says, that

it

stably, nor

it is

figure, since they

can

He

also

abandon

it.

not the wholenesses of these four

19
bodies which are fashioned with these figures, but
the elements of these, viz. those small and invisible bodies

from the congress of which these sen-

sible natures,

fire,

water,

air,

and

earth, are pro-

But the wholes of the elements have a

duced.

spherical figure, being on

sides assimilated to

For each of them has something;

the heaven.
better than

all

own

its

characteristic property, from

more divine natures, just

which ap-

as things

proximate to the heaven have a circular motion.

It is evident, therefore, that the last

which

of the pyramids

are with the circumambient,

(i. e.

moon,

are in contact with the sphere of the

being the sphere in which

tained,)

that

this

proximately con-

though they consist of plane

yet, being

order

fire is

which

triangles,

compressed, they become convex, in

may

they

be adapted to the cavity

But the

of the heaven.

parts existing in other

things, as in vessels, and receiving configuration

together with them, do not destroy the figure of

the

elements.

For the

bodies

which

contain

others are from right-lined elemnets, and nothing

prevents them from concurring with each other.

But we, expecting

to see

the superficies of the

containing bodies to be cylindrical or spherical,

in

consequence of being ignorant that they also

consist of right-lined elements, are

doubt.

All

the

involved in

containing natures,

therefore.

20
were from the same things as the natures which
they contain, and

are adapted to each other,

all

according to planes.
In the eighth argument, Aristotle says, that
neither flesh nor bone, nor any other composite,

can be generated from the elements themselves,

because that which

is

continued

is

not generated

from composition, nor from the conjunction of

planes

for the

elements are generated by com-

and not those things which consist of

position,

the elements.

that com-

Proclus, in objection to this, says,

position

is

not produced from

water alone.

air alone,

nor from

In these, therefore, things that have

the smallest parts, being assumed between those

that have great parts,

But

if

this is opposition,

not wonder

place,

fill

and not union, you must

neither

they should

for it is necessary that

be distant from each other.

by each

and leave no void.

And

if,

when placed

other, they are with difficulty separated,

is

this

wonderful

bodies which consist of

larger planes, not being naturally adapted to yield

to those

are

which consist of smaller, nor those which

composed of

firmer, to those

which derive

their

composition from easily movable planes.

Aristotle, in the ninth

the earth

and

if

it

is

argument, says, that

a cube, because

it is

stable

abides not casually, but in

if

and abides;
its

proper

21
place,

and

is

moved from a

thing impedes

happens

it

to fire

evident that

fire,

and

foreign place,

if this, in

if

no-

a similar manner,

and the other elements,

and each of the elements

it

is

in a

foreign place, will be a sphere or a pyramid, but

in its proper place a

cube.

In opposition to this ninth argument, Proclus

says,

that though the elements are in their

proper places, yet such as consist of easily movable figures are not without motion

for

pyramids

moved from the dissimilitude of the

vertex to the base.
Thus also with respect to air,
the elements of it, when it exists in its proper
are always

place, are assimilated to things perpetually flow-

ing

and the elements of water love

collision.

For the summits are adjacent to the bases of their

similars,

and being impelled, they

strike against

the whole in the place in which each

But being thus moved, they

is

contained.

imitate the motion

moved from the middle

in a circle, neither being

nor to the middle, but revolving about each other

in their

own

place.

The elements of

ever, remain, because they

same with

their bases.

have their

But nothing

howsummits the
earth,

similar acts

on the similar, whether they possess similitude

according to figures, or according to power, or
according to magnitude.

Farther

still,

says Aristotle,

if fire

heats

22
and burns through

its

angles,

all

the eelments will

impart heat, but one perhaps more than another

since

all

of

them will have angles

as, for instance,

And

the octaedron and the dodecaedron.

accord-

ing to Democritus, a sphere also burns, as being

a certain angle

more and the

so that they will differ

This, however,

less.

is

by the

evidently

false.

Proclus, in opposition to this tenth argument,

that

says,

angle

is

it

improperly assumed that an

is

calorific,

and that a

false conclusion

is

For Timaeus

the consequence of this assumption.

assumes from sense, that sharpness and a power

of dividing are certain properties of heat.

But

that which cuts, cuts not simply by an angle, but

by the sharpness of the angle, and tenuity of the

For thus also the

side.

make

arts

incisive in-

struments, and nature sharpens the angles of those

teeth that are called incisores, and giving; breadth
to

the

grinders, has attenuated the sides.

acute angle also

Hence a power of
to

an

angle

is

An

subservient to rapid motion.

this

kind

simply,

but

is

not to be ascribed

to

the

penetrating

acuteness of the angle, the incisive tenuity of the

side,

and the

celerity of the motion.

It is like-

wise necessary that magnitude should be present,

the pyramid, that

may

as

in

If,

therefore, in fire alone there

it

forcibly enter.
is

acuteness of

23
and swiftness of motion,

angle, tenuity of side,

element alone

this

however,

very properly hot.

not the case with

is

that alone

is

which consists of

which account, as Timaeus

fire

all

fire,

larger

This,

but with

pyramids

on

says, there is a certain

which illuminates indeed, but does not burn,

because

And

is

it

composed of the smallest elements.

according to

this, fire is visible.

Aristotle adds, at the

same time

happen that mathematical bodies

impart heat

for these likewise

also

will

it

will

burn and

have angles

and

atoms, cubes, spheres, and pyramids, are inherent

in

them, especially

visible

if,

For

magnitudes.

and others do

as they say, these are indiif

some of them burn,

the cause of this difference

not,

must be assigned, but not simply so as they

assign it.
Proclus, well opposing

what

is

here said, does

that which Aristotle desires, viz. he assigns the

difference consequent to the hypothesis according
to

which some bodies burn, but mathematical

For Plato says, that burning

bodies do not burn.

bodies are material and

moved

account also he says, that

is

figures

added

on which

to the

name,

Not

this letter being the instrument of motion.

every thing, therefore, which

lorific,

unless

its sides,

it

is

acute-angled,

and may be

easily

angular,

is

is

moved.

is

ca-

attenuated in

24
Again, Aristotle says,

yet, that a

dents to figure

and

is

think that a sword

or a

saw

To

pyramid should neces-

or a sphere spheres,

may

into saws.

mutes them

that

But a sword does not

into itself.

does not dissolve the essence of

makes a

less

its

is

it

act

For

cuts.

it

but by dividing

it,

from a greater quantity

since

it

figure essentially, but from accident.

which cuts changes that

therefore, nothing

which

dissolves

fire

burns, and trans-

it

upon the essence of that which

If,

per-

be divided into swords,

this also Proclus replies,

has not

is

some one should

just as if

the elements of that which

it,

be reasonable,

it

make pyramids,

fectly absurd,

let

and divide should be acci-

therefore, that to cut

sarily

cut into the essence of itself, nor dissolves

the form of

it,

how can

make a division into

But it may be said. Let
it

things similar to itself?

bodies which are burnt be dissolved into triangles,

for instance,

water and

air,

and the elements of

them, the icosaedron and octaedron, yet what

which composes the triangles of these

figure of

fire,

many such

viz. into

the pyramid,

being conjoined,

Plato therefore

says,

in

triangles being dissolved

the

by

fire

is

into the

so as that

produced

Timseus, that the

fire,

do not cease to

pass from one body into another until they

into another form

is

come

for instance, the triangles of

25
the icosaedron, which are divisible into octaedra,
or rather

they pass into

till

dividing nature.
the nature

of

For

fire,

which

fire,

of a

is

they are composed into

if

they cease their transition

since similars neither act upon, nor suffer from

But

each other.

it

will be well to hear the

beautiful words themselves of Plato

most

When

any

one of the forms (says he), becoming invested by

cut by the acuteness of its angles and sides,

fire, is

then, passing into the nature of

farther discerption.

fire, it

For no form

is

suffers

no

ever able to

produce mutation or passivity, or any kind of

alteration, in that

with

itself

thing
the

else,

which

are not

similar

but as long as

it

and the same

passes into some-

and the more imbecile contends with

more powerful,

solved.

is

it

will

however, that the planes

It is evident,

composed

casually,

at one time in this,

and

not cease to be dis-

and as

it

may happen,

at another in that figure

but that which dissolves them exterminates the

aptitude which they had to that figure, for instance, to the icosaedron, this aptitude being
gioss

and turbulent, and

aptitude of the air which

transfers
is

near.

it

to the purer

And

in the first

place, they acquire a bulk from octaedra.

wards being dissolved by

fied

fire,

After-

they are more puri-

and attenuated, and become adapted

composition of a pyramid.

more

But

it is

to the

evident that

20
whatever form they are adapted, from their

to

figure,

they easily receive this form, and on this

account, from water air

then from

is

generated, and

first

air fire.

In the next place, Aristotle says, that

ridiculous to attribute a figure to

pose of dividing alone

collect

fire for

it

the pur-

for fire appears rather to

and bring boundaries together, than

For

separate.

it

is

to

accidentally things

separates

which are not of a kindred nature, and

collects

which are.

especially those

Proclus opposes this argument, and says, that

the very contrary
separates,
tally

For

true.

is

fire

essentially

but collects things together acciden-

since

to

away things

take

of a foreign

nature from such as are similar, predisposes the

concurrence of the latter into each other, and

their tendencies to the

natures, according to

rating power.

same thing.

all

For

all fiery

the senses, have a sepa-

Thus, heat separates the touch, the

splendid separates the sight, and the pungent the

taste.

And

farther

all

still,

medicines which

are of a fiery nature have a diaphoretic power.

Again,

every

which

thing

surround that which

time compelling
to

surround,

it

is

but

collects

collected,
fire

strives

at the

to

same

does not endeavour

but to penetrate through bodies.

Proclus adds, that according to those, also,

who

27
to the elements, fire is

do not give figures

to

rank

among

things of the most attenuated

But a thing of

parts.

kind

this

however,

evident from

this,

that

other things,

That what essen-

than of a collective nature.

separates,

rather of

is

a separating nature, entering into

tially

thought

belongs

to

fire,

is

not only separates

it

things heterogeneous from each other, but every

particular thing

For

itself.

it

melts

and the other metals, because

gold,

and

silver,
it

separates

them.
farther

Aristotle

observes,

addition

in

to

these things, since the hot and the cold are contrary in capacity,

any figure

to the cold, because

the figure which

trary
all

impossible

is

it

is

but nothing

it is

necessary that

attributed should be a conis

to define all things or

Hence

contrary to figure.

physiologists omit this, though

This objection

to attribute

it

is fit

either

nothing by figures.
Proclus dissolving says,

also,

that the argument of Aristotle very properly

requires that a figure should be assigned adapted
to the cold

but that

concerning heat,
is

a pyramid,

how

it
it

but that

is

necessary to recollect

was not said that heat

it

is

a power affective,

through sharpness of angles and tenuity of side.

Cold, therefore,

is

not a figure, as neither

is

heat.

28
but

the

it is

heat

And

is

power* of a

incisive, so cold

as the

And

certain figure.

as

has a connective property.

former subsists according to sharp-

ness of angles and tenuity of sides, so, on the

the

contrary,

the

obtuseness of angles

and

Hence, the former power

according to

subsists

latter

is

of

thickness

sides.

contrary to the latter,

the figures themselves not being contrary, but the

The argument,

powers inherent in the figures.

however, requires a figure, not in reality contrary,

Such figures,
have obtuse angles and thick sides,

but adapted to a contrary power.

therefore, as

have powers contrary to the pyramid, and are

But such

connective of bodies.

Hence

elements of three bodies.

figures are the

all

things that

congregate, congregate through impulsion

fire

alone, as

we have

but

observed, has a separating

power. +
* It

is

(De

well observed by Simplicius,

Ccelo, p. 142,)

that

Plato and the Pythagoreans by a plane denoted something more

simple than

a body, atoms being evidently bodies

assigned commensuration and a demiurgic analogy

that they
[i. e.

active

and fabricative powers] to their figures, which Democritus did

not to his atoms

and that they

differed

from him in their ar-

rangement of earth.
Simplicius here remarks,

that

it

may

be doubted,

how

the powers which are in figures, being contrary, the figures

themselves will not be contrary

for

powers are adapted to the

29
Aristotle adds

a fifteenth argument, after

all

that has been said, objecting to magnitude, and

shewing that the Pythagoreans make the power

of cold

because

it

pores, as

cause,

as

consisting

parts,

compresses and does not pass through

is

indicated

by what Plato says

Timueus about cold.*

calls

the four

in the

Proclus, however, in op-

things by which they are possessed.

Proclus]

of great

Perhaps, therefore, he

[i. e.

the pyramid and the other

figures,

regular bodies, which not being contrary, their powers are contrary

For

since their powers are not according to their figures.

neither the thick nor the thin, neither that which has large nor
that which has small parts, neither that which
difficulty

nor that which

is

easily

is

moved, are the differences of

Perhaps, too, neither are acuteness nor obtuseness of

figure.

angles simply the differences of figure, since neither

simply a figure.

is

an angle

and

therefore, the dispositions of the hot

If,

the cold, which are contrary,

contrarieties,

which

moved with

no absurdity

says, that things

are

effected

will ensue.

according to these

Hence the

which are determined by

contrary, requires a certain circumscription.

proposition

figures are not

For they are not

contrary according to figures, yet they are not prevented from

having contraries.

If,

however, some one should

contrarieties are according to figures,

it

is

insist,

that

necessary to recollect

that Aristotle in this treatise says, that there

is

also in figures

a certain contrariety.
*

What

follows

Plato says on this subject in the Timaeus,

The moist

parts of bodies larger than our

parts, entering into our bodies, expel the smaller parts

is

as

humid
but not

being able to penetrate into their receptacles, coagulate our

moisture, and cause

malous and agitated

it

through equability to pass from an ano-

state,

into one

immovable and

collected.

30

position to this, observes as follows

We

do not

determine the elements of simple bodies by magnitude alone, but also by thinness and thickness,

by sharpness and
and

mobility

facility of

motion, and by im-

which give

difficulty of motion,

and cause things which have

variety to forms,

the same form, not to differ by magnitude alone.

For the magnitude of planes makes the largeness

or smallness of parts in bodies

them
of

of which

and octaedra
taedron

is

fire

since the parts of

Thus, the pyramids

are called elements.

fire,

consists, are the parts of

fire,

For the oc-

are the parts of air.

greater than the pyramid, both beingl^ut the

com-

position, together with so great a multitude,

make

generated from an equal triangle,

For more or fewer

the acute and the obtuse.

triangles

coming together, an angle,

or obtuse,

from a
titude.

planes

generated

is

either acute

an acute angle, indeed,

but an obtuse from a greater mul-

less,

But the
produces

characteristic property of the

facility

or difficulty of motion

these planes existing in a compact state, through

similitude,

but

But that which

is

being

tendency

and endeavours by repulsion

a contrary situation.

tion, a trembling

for

collected together contrary to nature, natu-

rally opposes such a condition,

recall itself into

prepared

In

and numbness takes-place

together with that which produces

it, is

this contest
;

and

all this

denominated

to

and agitapassion,

cold.'

31

Large pyramids, therefore,

through dissimilitude.

do not belong

to things

which

but to

refrigerate,

the larger parts of fire; just as larger octaedra

belong to the larger parts of

attenuated

and thick, and

thin

and gross

since

larger

For from

icosaedra to larger parts of water.

cause waters are

and

air,

are

airs

evident that

is

it

this

these are determined by quantity.

From

the Treatise in

which a Solution

is

given of

Ten Doubts against Providence.

Providence,

therefore, as

we have

defined by the one and the good, and

subsisting prior to intellect,

being

said,

the

for intellect

good

and

all

beings aspire after the good, but the good does not
aspire after intellect,

it

is

necessary that the

knowledge of providence should be above

knowledge of

And

intellect.

necessary that providence should

by

the

thus

it

is

know

all

things*

the one of itself, according to

also

which one,

it

likewise benefits every thing intellective and nonintellective, vital

impressing in

beings
*

and non-vital, beings and nonall

things a unity, as an

In the original, immediately after xato

toovira, it

appears to

are wanting.
lation.

me that

This defect

the words xai ra

I

xu.i

uyutuvu

/xn voovvrx,

ntvrct

ra

xea

have supplied in the above trans-


32
image of

its

own

that this one

is

wise say, that

In short,

one.

productive of

all

when we assert
things, we like-

things are preserved by

all

it,

as

that which has an hyparxis more true than

essence, and more manifest than

all

all

knowledge,

not being divided with, nor moved about, the

and

physical

intellectual

For every

peculiarities.

both in

For

of knowledge.

objects

its

every soul, since

of providence abiding in

knows

all

things

intellection.

its

And

But

after

and

indivisible,

the same manner;

man and

thus knows, not only

the one

unity, being at one

intransitive

other thing of this kind,

which ranks among

the

many,

one

is

ceives in conjunction with motion.

and the same time

has

motion, intellectually per-

is

it

knowledge

its

things,

these

intellect

and

existence,

of

and

sun, and every

but also every thing

particulars.

For nothing

escapes the knowledge of this one, whether you

speak of

its

known.

Thus, the transcendently united know-

existence, or

ledge of providence,

is

its

capability of being-

a knowledge of

all

divisible

same impartible one, and likewise

natures, in the

of things the most indivisible, and of such as are

most

total.

is

as

it

own one,
known by it.*

thing by
thing

And

its

This extract

is

against Proclus on

to be

tire

gave subsistence to every

so

by the same one, every

found in the Treatise of Philoponus

Eternity of the World.

33

From

P ROC LUS

Hook of

the Fifth

of

on the Timceus

Plato .*

In this book, in which he explains the doctrine of Plato

concerning material forms, he says,

that qualities and

material forms derive their

all

subsistence, according to Plato, from non-being,

and again perish by returning

when

the composite

as follows

Would

and not only

which are

depart from matter

and not

are the resemblances of intelligibles

while,

therefore,

departs.

indeed,

If,

absurdity will ensue

something similar
terior to
if

it,

survey

to

to

it
:

whither

we should

and

qualities,

It is

worth

this

form

departs into nature,

for nature

would

an

receive

the things which are pos-

say, that

from generation into an

if

and which proceed from

some one should

qualities,

said to enter into

for these,

then adds

not, however, be better to

say, that material forms,

are the things

He

dissolved.

is
it

into non-being,

it.

Just as

any thing departs

intelligible essence.

assert that this

But

form departs into

we should speak contrary to what

For when fire is extinguished, and
is evident.
the matter is converted into air, we do not see

another matter,

This extract

is

only to be found in the Treatise of Philoponus

against Proclus on the Eternity of the World.

1)

that another matter

And

ture],

if

enkindled [after

is

its

depar-

material forms are in themselves,

they will be intelligibles, and self-subsistent and

impartible natures.

Whence,

derive

Whence interval? Whence

possession of a common sub-

is

its

therefore, does bulk

subsistence?

the war to obtain

ject derived

For things which are

do not contend

in a hostile

manner

in
for

themselves
a

common

seat; since neither are they indigent of a certain

But

subject.

material forms

if

nature nor in themselves, and

it

are neither
is

in

not possible

that such forms should be in matter after their

corruption,

it

is

necessary that they should pro-

For this universe would

ceed into non-being.

not remain,

matter always remaining,

if

form

alone subsisted without generation, and perished

without corruption.*

* Forms,

when they

proceed into matter, and in consequence

of this become materialised, resemble

observes

in

his

Treatise

on

the

(as Plotinus beautifully

Impassivity of Incorporeal

Natures) shadow falling upon shadow, like images in water,

or in a mirror, or a dream.

ARGUMENTS
IN PROOF OF

THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD.

L The

first

argument

may

but from what

substance of

the

unfortunately lost;

is

be collected from Pliiloponus,

it

appears to have been this

that the artificer of the world being an eternally

energising being, and energising essentially, the

universe must be consubsistent with him, in the

same manner

as the sun, which produces light

by

very being, has the light so produced consub-

its

sistent with

posterior

the

to

just as the

that

itself,

and neither
sun,

nor

light

to

shadow which proceeds from a body

situated in the light,

is

sun

the

prior or

light

is

is

always consub-

sistent with it.*

*

rw

Thus,

too, Sallust, in cap. 7?

De

Diis et

Mundo

tov faov ayaPorr,ra ovros rov koh^ov, uure vov

nXiu

rov xofffiov uv?ag%uv,

cxcci.

i. e.

divinity,

Since
it

is

fiiv

xat

the world subsists

faov

ava.yx.yt

ha

avvwpiirrarai

(pcvs,

au/ian

Ss

through the goodness of

necessary that divinity should always be good, and

that the world should always exist

with the sun and with

it is

crvgi

ayaPov aval, xai

produced].

fire,

just as light

is

consubsistent

and shadow with the body [by which

3G

Argument

The

the Second.

paradigm of the

\\orld is eternal

existence, as a paradigm,

and not accidental

sesses the

is

and his

essential,

But because he pos-

him.

to

is

power of being a paradigm

hence, as* he

essentially,

he will be eternally the

eternal,

paradigm of the world.

eternally

that which

is

however, an existence

If,

present with the paradigm, the image

is

also will necessarily always exist

for a

paradigm

a paradigm with reference to an image.

is

the image was not

when

not;f since, in this case,

For either

the image

if

of the

is

not, or

image.

Of

when

things,

is

not be a paradigm

will not

it

the image

no longer be a

will

it

will

it

if

the paradigm was not,

neither will the paradigm be

paradigm.

But

be the paradigm

therefore,

which are

predicated with reference to each other, the one

cannot exist

if

the other

paradigm of the world

it,

the world always

not.

Hence,

eternally the

is

is

is

if

the

paradigm of

an image of an eternally

existing paradigm.

* For

in the original,

it is

Because the paradigm here

necessary to read

is

W/.

essentially a paradigm, so as

not to exist without being a paradigm.

37

Argument

the Third.

If a fabricator [or demiurgus]

is

the fabricator

of a certain thing, he will either be always a fabricator in energy, or at a certain time in capacity
only, so as not to fabricate eternally.

there

fore,

a fabricator in

is

always a fabricator, that which

him

will

always

exist, as

energy,
is

when

is

And

made.

is

built

if

is

it

For Aristotle

is

which

is

which

actually

Plato, in the Philebus, says, that

the maker of a certain thing which

But

if

that which

is

fabricated does not

be in energy.

If,

which

he fabricates, he

fabri-

however, the fabricator

not in energy, he will be in capacity

fore

energy

in

the cause be that

subsist in energy, neither will that

cates

by

fabricated

manner be

actually heals, there will be that

the maker

is

cause be a builder in energy, there will

be that which

healed.

who

the cause exists in energy, the

effect will also in a similar

viz. if the

there-

being a thing fabricated

according to an eternal energy.

says, that

If,

viz.

be-

will possess in capacity the

power of fabricating.

But every thing which

in capacity a certain thing, says Aristotle,

is

becomes

that thing in energy, through some other thing

which
in

exists in energy.

Thus, that which

is

hot

capacity becomes actually hot, through that

38
which

is

hot in energy

cold, the white,

cator,

and the

and the black

who had a

like is true of the

Hence

through some one

fabricator,

And

a fabricator in energy.

is

indeed,

the fabri-

prior subsistence in capacity, will

become an actual

who

the latter,

if

always in energy the cause of the

is

former being a fabricator, the former will always

be a

fabricator

which

says,

also

through the preceding axiom,*

when

produced by

thing which

is

the cause
will

it

in energy, the effect

be in energy

But

is.

so that the

by an eternally ener-

fabricated

gising cause always

is

if

this cause is at a

certain time the cause in capacity of the fabricator

again this cause

fabricating,

other cause, which enables

maker of the energising

it

some

require

will

to be in

fabricator

energy the

and

this in

consequence of the second axiom, which says, that

every thing which

which

is

is

in

capacity requires that

in energy, in order that

a subsistence in energy.

And

it

may

have

itself

again, the

same

reasoning will take place with respect to that other

cause, and

we must

investigating
*

It appears,

either proceed to infinity, in

one cause before

from what

is

this

being the case,

it is

is

wanting, are

more than probable that

ments of Proelus were originally

his Physical

which

here said, that certain axioms pre-

ceded this work, which, as the beginning

and

another,

in the

and Theological Elements.

lost

these argu-

form of propositions,

like

39
leads the proposed cause from capacity to energy,
or

we

shall be compelled to grant, that there

which always

certain cause

this being granted,

that cause

it

follows from the

such as

is in
is

subsist in energy,

always fabricated,

is

always the Demiurgus.

two axioms, one of which

is

the

This
that

is,

that of the other, viz. that

if

the one

and

if

the one

capacity, so also

the other

is

But the

in energy, the other also is in energy.

other axiom
city,

if

the condition of one of two relatives,

is

such also

is

But

exists in energy.

must likewise always

Demiurgus of

follows that the effects of

it

and that the world

is

that every thing which

is,

is

in capa-

changes into another thing in energy, through

a certain thing which

changed being

first in

in energy, the thing so

is

capacity and afterwards in

energy.

Argument

Every
essentially

thing which

immovable

the Fourth.

is

is

generated from a cause

immovable.

which makes

is

immovable,

immutable,

it

makes by

if

it

its

is

For

that

if

immutable

but

very being, not pass-

ing from efficient energy into non-efficiency, nor

from non-efficiency into efficiency.

transition,

it

would

also

For

if it

have mutation,

had

viz.

40
But

transition from the one to the other.

mutation,

it

any thing

is

effector, or

immovable,
will

it

quence of being
be moved.

it

if

will either never be

an

always be so

in conse-

lest,

effective at a certain time,

So that

if

has

Hence,

be immovable.

will not

if it

there

should

immovable

an

is

it

cause of a certain thing, and which neither never

not* a cause, nor

is

time,

it

be true,
petual.

will
it

a cause only at a certain

always be a cause.

If,

however, this

which

will be the cause of that

If,

immovable,
first

is

is

per-

therefore, the cause of the universe

is

being moved, he should be at

(lest,

imperfect, but afterwards perfect, since every

motion

is

an imperfect energy

moved, he should be
produces time,)

this

in

and

lest,

being

want of time, though he

being the case,

is

it

neces-

sary that the universe should be perpetual, as being

produced by an immovable cause.

Hence,

if

any

one wishing to conceive piously of the cause of

the universe, should say that he alone

but that this world

that this cause
in

is

is

is

perpetual,

not perpetual, he will evince

moved, and

is

not immovable,

consequence of asserting that the world

perpetual.

But by asserting that

moved, and

is

* Oux.
also to

is

this

is

not

cause

is

not immovable, he must also assert

here erroneously omitted in the original, and appears

have been omitted in the MS. from which Mahotius made

his translation.

41
that he

is

not always perfect, but that he was at a

certain time likewise imperfect, because all motion

is
is

imperfect energy, and

less excellent, viz.

tion

is

is

indigent of that which

of time, through which

He, however, who asserts that

effected.

this cause is at a certain time imperfect,

always perfect, and that he

is

is

is

and not

indigent of time,

Hence, he who fancies

transcendently impious.

that he

mo-

pious towards the cause of the universe,

in asserting that this cause alone is perpetual,

is,

in

thus asserting, remarkably impious.

Argument

the Fifth.

If time subsist together with heaven

[/. e.

with

the universe], and neither* can the universe exist

if

time

istence

* Ours

is

not, nor time if the universe has

and

is

if

time was not, when the universef

here omitted in

necessary that

it

-f-

O ugavos

is

is

the

original, but

ought to be inserted

the version of Mahotius,

for his version

who found

neque ccelum

and

it to

perceiving this, though

it

it

is

obviously

this is confirmed

outs in this place in his

est, si

non

sit

here wanting in the original

requisite to conceive

no ex-

be implied.

by

MS.

tempus, &c.
or, at least, it is

Philoponus, however, not

must be evident

to every

derstands the reasoning of Proclus, has, as usual,

one

who un-

made himself

ridiculous in his attempt to confute this fifth argument.

42
was

when

not, neither will time be

does not

was

not,

was

not.

exist.

For

if

when time
time was when time

the universe was

then follows that

it

the universe

For that which once was

said to have

is

existed once, in consequence of at a certain time

not having existed

since

eternally exists, nor that

the
is

medium between

it is

which never

exists,

but

But wherever

both.

And

the once, there time exists.

will

neither that which

is

there

the universe

if

be when time will not have an existence, thus

passing from existing at a certain

time to

not

existing at a certain time,* in this case, time will

then be

when

there will be no time [because time

and the universe

rrors

are consubsistent]

a certain time)

(or, at

is

temporal.

neither will

it

If,

be when time ceases to

a subsistence at a certain time

term

there-

when time was

the universe neither was

fore,

for the

not,

For

exist.

which per-

(crors)

tains to both these, time not existing, will yet be

Time

temporal. F

therefore always

is.

For

to a

subsistence at a certain time, either the always

* If the universe will be

when time has no

then not exist at a certain time , because time

as will be pertains to time,

when
j-

time, as

existence,
is

no more.

is

will

it

But

Proclus says, will then be

there will be no time.

Because

if

time once was not, or

if

time hereafter will not

be, then in either case there will be a time

time, which

is

absurd.

when

there

is

no

43
But

opposed, or the never.

be opposed to

the never should

time has an existence.

impossible that

is

it

it

Hence, time

for, in short,

perpetual.

is

But heaven [or the universe] is consubsistent with

For time is the
time, and time with heaven.
measure of the motion of heaven, just as eternity
is

of the

life

which thing

of animal itself

shews that time

is

For

perpetual.

if this

itself

be not

admitted, either eternity will be the paradigm of

nothing, time not existing, though eternity exists,

or neither will eternity itself possess the

always remaining that which

in conse-

is

it

power of

quence of the paradigm of either passing from

non-existence into existence, or into non-existence

The heaven therefore always]; is,

same manner as time, proceeding into

from existence.
the

in

existence together with time, and being generated

* Eternity

is

the second monad,

paradigm of the universe,

triad.

is

and animal

the third

See the Third Book of

my

monad

itself,

or the

of the intelligible

Translation of Proclus on the

Theology of Plato.
J*

The

original of this sentence

xgovtw,

But

fyuvnv o iffn.

former part of
translation
aiiov

it,

ovroi

/U'/j

it is

is,

iva (in

caav

aiav n findivo; n

n finht auro;

it

conformable to the above

and instead of reading Tra^aSuy/ia

to read Tra^aduy/ia,

necessary to read xcu

ai

necessary to alter the punctuation of the

so as to render

J In the original,

rro

xai

a ougca/os ce^a. urriv

ovoavos

au

[in

ovros

(in ovros, catvv wraa-^Mv.

ago. itrnv.

but

it

is

obviously

44
neither prior nor posterior to time
says,

was generated, and

it

is,

and

but, as Plato

through

will be,

the whole of time.*

Argument

The Demiurgus

the Sixth.

alone can dissolve the world

for Plato says [in the

Timseus] that

respect indissoluble, except

in every

it is

by him by

whom

it

was bound for every where it is the province of

him who knows [and is the cause of] a bond, to
;

know

also the

bound
the

mode

Demiurgus

who

of dissolving that which he

the province of him

who knows

of dissolution to dissolve.

But the

and

mode

it is

will

For it
the Timaeus of Plato], that

never dissolve the world.

is

he

it

pertains only to an evil nature to dissolve that

which

is

well.
truly

says [in

beautifully harmonised and constituted

But

good

to

as

it

be

is

evil,

it

world should be dissolved.

dissolved

by any

is

impossible that

For neither can

other, because

the Demiurgus alone to dissolve

dissolved
* This

Timaeus.

is

by

him who

impossible for

its fabricator,

it
it

because

the
it

be

possible for

is

is

nor can
it

is

it

be

the pro-

asserted by Plato, of heaven, or the universe, in the

vince of an evil nature to be willing to dissolve

that which

harmonised.

beautifully

is

therefore, he has not beautifully

world, and, in this case, he

ficers

not the best of arti-

is

lest

it,

he should become

evil,

Hence the universe

a thing impossible.

indissoluble,

and therefore incorruptible.

if

incorruptible,

it

But

was not generated* [according

For corruption pertains

temporal generation].

every thing which

to

and

it,

is

to a

generated, f as Socrates says

is

with Timrnus on the preceding

in his conference
.

harmonised the

or he has beautifully harmonised

will not dissolve

which

is

Either,

own words, but professing to utter

what the Muses assert. And it is evident that
Timrnus did not consider this dogma of the Muses

day,]; not in his

to be superfluous

since he admits that there

certain incorruptible genus.

that which

true,
e.

[*.

never had

is

unbegotten.

perpetual, if it
* Ov

ytyo/jttvov is

this deficiency

here
-f-

is

unbegotten,

incorruptible,

Hence

its

and

also the world

is

unbegotten and incorruptible.

here erroneously omitted in the original ; but

supplied in the version of Mahotius, which has

ne ortum quidem

est.

In the original, vravn

ytvo/Atvu tpUeoa tern,

but after eravn

it

necessary to add yap.

X This
is

is

is

is

any temporal beginning of

is

therefore, this be

incorruptible

is

But the world

existence].

therefore

If,

is

is

asserted in the Eighth

there said, ytvo/atvy

Book

eravTi p0o/>a tarty.

(

of the Republic

for it

46

Argument

the Seventh.

If the soul of the universe

incorruptible, the world also

wise every soul,

ciple of motion.

self-motive

essentially

is

every thing self-motive

is

unbegotten and

is

For the soul of the world, and

corruptible.

universe

unbegotten and

is

If,

perpetual,

is

like;

but

the fountain and prin-

is

therefore,
it

in-

the soul of the

necessary that the uni-

moved by this soul. For

the universe was not moved by the motion of

verse should always be

as

soul, either prior or posterior to soul,

not pos-

should not be the principle of

sible that soul

motion, since

it is

it

is

essentially self-motive,

and on

More-

this account is the principle of motion.

over, soul, through being self-motive,

and

incorruptible.

The

is

unbegotten

universe, therefore,

begotten and incorruptible.

that every [rational soul]

Hence

first

it

its

is

is

un-

evident

ascends into a per-

petual body [as into a vehicle], and always moves

this

body.*

bodies,

it

And

likewise,

when it

is

in corruptible

moves them, though the bodies which

are perpetually

moved by

it.

* Concerning this vehicle of the soul,

which

is

ethereal, see

Translation of the Fifth Book of Produs on the

Plato.

my

T imams

of

47

Argument

Every

thing which

the Eighth.

corrupted,

is

by the incursion of something foreign

and

corrupted

is

to its nature,

corrupted into something foreign to

is

but there

is

itself;

nothing external or foreign to the

universe, since

comprehends

it

in itself all things,

being a whole of wholes, and perfect from things

Neither, therefore, will there

of a perfect nature.

be any thing foreign to the universe, nor can

it

be

corrupted into any thing foreign, or be generated

by a nature foreign
ruptible, and, in

unbegotten.

to

Hence

itself.

consequence of this,

For every thing which

it is

it is

is

incor-

likewise

generated,

is

generated from something which, prior to what

is

generated, was foreign to

be something which

But

is

it

foreign to the universe.

this will be external to that

Hence, there
universe,

will

which

was generated.

is

so that there will

which

is

generated.

be something external to the

foreign to the universe before

But

if this

be the case, there w

it
ill

be something contrary to the universe from which

it

was generated.

duced from each

other

and

Contraries, however, are pro-

these

being

paths between them, as

many arguments

and change into each

other,

in

is

tw o,
r

there

are

two

demonstrated through

the Phaedo, in which

it

is

48
shewn, that of contraries the one yields
other, and that nature
therefore, indeed, that

ment

opposed

is

that which

to

and

from

But

privation,

privation

much more

is

to privation

which

is

there a

is

former

because

latter,

changed

into habits.*

more impossible

generated was generated, in a

be which

a mutation

is

for the

impossible than the

therefore, that

will that

these are opposed

much more

certain privations cannot be

If,

if

disorderly and

is

and there

to habit,

mutation from habit

It is evident,

idle.

what has an orderly arrange-

without arrangement.
as habit

not

is

to the

much

to

be

greater degree

more possible and that which

is

has an orderly arrangement will be changed into

that which

is

without arrangement, and this will

be conformable to nature and the will of divinity

for

he who produces that which

sible, will

much more produce

possible.

But

the

to

if

is

more impos-

that which

is

more

these are contraries, according

law of contraries, the universe will be

changed into the contrary of that from which

was generated.

The

us

di

read

original here

'Sion

is

Tins impnaus us

tiones, qure in

incorruptible.

erroneous, for

afj.i'raSkr.Tci.

this, the version of

it

has been demonstrated, how-

It

ever, that the universe is

*

it is

hon

Instead of which,
t/<r/v

afs.sTaSXnToi.

Mahotius has,

It will

<rrttYitns

it is

urnv, ca

requisite to

Conformably

to

quire nonnullre sunt privn-

habitum sunt immutabiles.

49
not, therefore, be

trary

was

so that neither

and therefore

when

changed

into

it

two

there are

generated [in time],

For

perpetual.

is

any thing con-

it is

not possible,

contraries, that there should

be a path from the former of the two to the

latter,

and yet not from the

Nor

it

latter to the former.

possible in privation

is

and habit, that there should

be a path from privation to habit, but not from

habit to privation.

For in certain things, there

There

from privation to habit.

not a path

is
is,

however, a mutation of contraries into each other,

the universe

is

not incorruptible, or

unbegotten

degree

greater

So that either

the Phsedo.

as Socrates says in

whether that which

in a

it is

than

much

incorruptible,

without arrangement

is

is

contrary to that which has arrangement, or whether

that which

is

of that which

without arrangement
is

by

its

* This
as

thing which

own
is

follows,

evil.*

the Ninth.

is

For

corrupted,

it

is

asserted by Plato, in the

to

the privation

arranged.

Argument

Every

is

%vfj.<purov

oLoa.

kokoi

a.oro\Xu<ni.

is

corrupted

not corrupted by

Tenth Book

iKU/rrou

xui n

its

of the Republic,
oro^noia.

txairrov

50
own proper good,
it,

and which

or

by that which

neither good nor evil, but of an

is

For every thing of this

intermediate nature.**

kind

nor benefits,

injures

neither

neither corrupts nor preserves.

universe could be corrupted,

by

its

own

manner

that

the

Gods

if

be corrupted

the universe

is

because

of that thing.

For

it

also is a

its

Hence,

it

is

is

if it is

is

it

can be generated.

which can corrupt

an

evil to

it.

has

derived,

is

corruptive

vanquished, indeed,
;

but

if

it,

it

Fov

But

since there

there
is

is

nothing

nothing which

For what can corrupt that which

hatpo^ou here, it is

version also of

it

have any thing from

has an orderly arrangement, except that which

*

it

nothing which can corrupt

the universe, neither will

which

it

an assistant cause of corruption.

there

if

God.

nature, neither has

an assistant cause of generation

vanquishes,

is evil,

For that from which

a temporal generation.

is

and on

incorruptible, because

the generation of a thing

is

are blessed

also unreceptive of mutation.

is

not any thing corruptive in

it

[in the Timaeus],

universe, therefore, to which nothing

will never

But

would be corrupted

every genus of Gods being unre-

ceptive of evil,

The

it

a blessed God, and in a similar

is

all

this account,

it

that

so

therefore, the

If,

But Plato says

evil.

that the world

peculiar to

is

necessary to read ubiuQopw.

Mahotius has medium."

is

The

51
without arrangement, or that which
except that which
this

an

is

arranged in an
there

that which

If,

evil to

is

for

adorned, and

is

manner.

orderly

any thing which

is

adorned,

deprived of ornament

is

to

evil,

is

therefore,

the universe,

the universe will contain in itself the unadorned

and the unarranged,

into

which

nothing which

it

will

be dissolved

but

if

will

not be a certain privation of order and orna-

ment

there

is

hostile to the universe,

and adorned.
hostile

was

it

however,

If,

is

is

free

arranged

from

all

generated from any thing deprived of order

kind hostile to
neither will

it

generated

from which

is

if

is

a thing of this

nothing

is evil

have any thing from which

to
it

it,

can

and there not being any thing

it

But

it.

can be generated,

For

begotten.

which

which
it

there

evil to it,

privation of ornament and order, neither

and ornament, since neither

be

is

it

is

generated,

something, since

it

it

must be un-

necessary that every thing

should be
is

generated from

impossible that

it

should

be generated from nothing.

Argument

Each
sists,

the Tenth.

of the elements of which the world con-

when

in

its

proper place, either remains in

52
that place, or

not in

it is

thither.

its

If,

moved in a circle # but when

own place, it endeavours to arrive
is

therefore, the elements of the uni-

verse either remain in their proper place, or are

moved

in a circle

which

is

natural

they remain in the place

if

them, they are then

to

natural condition of being

a circle,

in

but

if

the case,
able,

it is

And

this

evident that the universe

some things

them according

in

it

nor

being

immut-

is

having places adapted to

but others being moved

to nature,

For the

beginning and without end.

without

moved

they are

they will neither have an end

a beginning of their motion. t

in

natures in this sublunary region are changed, in

consequence of being

and the

in a foreign place,

things of which they consist hastening to obtain

their proper abode.

therefore, the elements

If,

of the universe are in their proper

which

nothing

ranks

foreign place, nor

that which

to

if it

in

is

as

its

a whole

and

places,

tends

to

did, could offer violence

proper place,

it

is

ne-

cessary that the universe should be immutable

* This was an axiom of Plotinus, and also of Ptolemy, which

in the original
fxim,
-)

ri

xvkXm

This

is

is,

?rv

kivutui.

<ru/xx

wxXouv

sv

toj oixtieu

totu

ev,

axivuret

Vid. Procl. in Tim. pp. 142 and 274.

demonstrated by Aristotle, and by Produs, in Lib.

Element. Physic.

Theorem. XVII.

Aristotles Treatise on the

See

Heavens, Book

my

II.

II.

Translation of

Chap.

3.

53
since all

always subsist

things

permanently abide

that

that are moved.

Hence,

in

and those

it,

before the universe

if

was adorned, the natures which

in their proper

according

it

such as rank as wholes, but

to nature, not only

those

in

it

contained were

they either permanently

places,

moved in a circle, and

thus again the universe was adorned before it
was adorned, and had no temporal beginning

remained in

of

or were

it,

adornment

its

all

things subsisting in

a similar manner, both

if

now and

it

in

But

formerly.

the several natures which the universe contains

were in foreign places,

places, being bodies,) they

position derived

they were entirely in

(for

from an

would require a trans-

there will be two principles, one of that

preternatural,

but

the

according to nature
natural will he prior
nature ;+

The
it

is

is

and that which

is

which

is

it

is

which

is

preter-

is

according

preternatural

Mahotius

which

to

being a

is

defective,

appears, that after

ra.-

add tZ,ahv trgetrhatrtu. For his version of

Transposition aliunde indigebant.

requisite to
is,

In the original, xai

which

of that

original in the latter part of this sentence

this latter part

j*

other

to that

that which

since from the version of

Sunai;

Hence,

external cause.*

rrgongot ro ara^o, (Quint

doubtless the true reading

est eo,

quod

(Quint,

but Mahotius most erro-

neously translates this passage as follows

secundum naturam, prius

rou xa.ro.

Atque

est contra

id

quod

naturam.

est

54
But nature having no

from nature.

departure

existence whatever, (if these things are admitted,)

neither will there be that which

just as

that which

there be

For that existing

formable

not conformable to

is

tvhich

is

if

to nature,

which

to

art.

not according or conwill be in consequence

to a certain thing,

of that existing

So that

preternatural

had no existence, neither would

art

if

is

is

it

not conformable.

there were places of these according

immanifest whether these places,

it is

being more ancient, subsisted naturally for an

infinite time.

which

were

But

if

there were no other places

proper

the

receptacles

of

these,

neither would those places be foreign in which

they were situated

is

If,

which

referred to that

howevei',

is

foreign

proper or peculiar.

is

when they were

in the recep-

which they then had, just as now they are

not in foreign places,

likewise
in

which

then also these natures were not

in foreign places,

tacles

that

for

the

it

follows that they then

had an existence according

same manner

the world will always exist

different

things

now

as they

subsisting,

to

have.

nature,

Hence,

at different times

either

according to

nature, or preternaturally, with reference to the

beings which the world contains.

the world, so far as

But a thing of

it

this

is

the world,

kind exists

Hence,

too,

is

perpetual.

in

the world

55

And

alone.*

such

if

a thing does not always

be transformed, yet

exist, the universe will

And

be perpetual.

will

subsistence

now

to

is

exists, so is

Both

preternatural to that.

things likewise, and in this,

their proper places

the world to be

all

i.

e.

it

is

in that state of

things existed in

likewise,

made

wisely supposes

alternately, except that

supposes this to take place frequently

admit

what

but differently at different

Empedocles,

times.

that preternatural

as

what now

still

he

but we

to take place only twice.f

thing which at different times has either a natural

or a preternatural subsistence.
-(*

Proclus, in asserting that he admits the world to have been

made only

twice, doubtless alludes to

what

said

is

by Plato

in

the Timaeus, viz. That the Demiurgus, receiving every thing

that was visible, and which
in a confused

was not

order, conceiving that the latter

the former.

in a state of rest, but

and disorderly manner, led

was

it

moved

from disorder into

in every respect better than

This separation, however, of the unadorned from

the adorned never actually existed, but only exists in our conceptions, as Proclus observes, at the

these

Arguments

and,

as

properly remark, only indicates

composition subsists,
is

when

i.

e.

how

and lamblichus

itself, viz.

This twofold

that

it

state, therefore,

the unadorned and adorned,

fabrication admitted by Proclus.

very

the whole corporeal -formed

considered itself by

then disorderly and confused.

of the world,

end of the Fourteenth of

Porphyry

is

the twofold

Argument

Matter
the

fore,

for

but that

exists, is

it

(says Plato) subsists for the sake of

universe,

ration

it

for

is

the receptacle of gene-

the sake of which matter

nothing else than generation.

matter derives

will

the Eleventh.

its

existence from nothing,

exist casually for the sake of

and that which

something

have matter

will

Nothing, however, which subsists

fortuitously.

fortuitously

generated

is

there-

If,

necessary

is

we must

so that

say,

that neither does the fabrication of things possess

But

stability.

and

for the

if

matter

is

from a certain cause,

sake of generation, these,

and generation, necessarily subsist

in

For that which

with each other.

viz.

matter

conjunction

exists for the

sake of a certain thing, and that for the sake of

which a thing

exists, are in conjunction

with each

other; for they have a reference to each other, or

are relatives.

and, so far as

something
it

is

therefore, matter

If,
it is

else,

is

perpetual,

matter, exists for the sake of

generation also

is

perpetual

for

necessary that this also should subsist for

the sake of a certain thing, because

ration.

it

is

Hence, matter and generation are con-

subsistent with each other for ever, in the

manner

gene-

as

that

for

same

the sake of which a thing

57
exists,

and that which exists

For matter exists

thing.

for the sake of

thing, viz. for the sake of the form

For a certain matter

tains.
it

has form.

Hence,

sake of that

for the

it

con-

when

then matter,

is

artists

which

some-

cause matter, which

has not been yet adorned, to become adapted to

the reception of a certain form * and according

which they make

to the proficiency

in preparing

the matter, in such proportion also does form ac-

cede.

For stones are not the matter of the form

of the house,

made smooth,

they are

till

if it

should happen to be requisite, and become properly

and then they are the matter

adapted,

When,

(from w hich the house can be built).

r

therefore, the stones

matter, then form

therefore, that

all

and

is

capacity,

order to

its

truly the requisite

instantaneously present.

is

which

the matter of

become

is

simply matter,

generation, and

is

all

is

If,

entirely

things in

not indigent of any thing in

existence as matter, as

is

the case

with that which ranks as some particular thing,

(for

that

which

exists

simply,

a thing of this kind, and

is

not in want of any thing to

being the case,

* In the original,
outran i/Xmv.

But

all

every where

is

so primarily,
its

existence,)

and

is

this

forms simultaneously exist

xai ivi(>yov woiovtnv

oi

rt%virai,

for ovrav in this passage, I read,

the above translation, xar/xuvrav.

r*v fttfra

conformably to

58
which

in that

is

simply matter

being in want of any thing to

also

Hence,

possession of forms.

cause of

its

the matter.
tible, lest it

the

But

it

as

matter

of

sake of that which

but

for the

perpetually, and

it

that

which

it is

is

is

disor-

Matter

destitute

for the

also

of order.

sake of priva-

and hence the

derived.

thing

the Twelfth.

which

is

generated

matter, and an efficient cause

which

is

of

that cause from which the

Argument

Every

matter

the

is

sake of form

world subsists from

matter of

is

the sake of the world, and not for

For matter does not exist

tion,

it

simply considered.

matter

for

and not

for

its

unbegotten and incorrup-

is

and deprived of ornament.

existed

the

world,

world,

is

should be in want of another matter,

exists

it

the

derly,

it

derives from the

it

the forms of which

existence,

Forms, therefore, subsist in

also

existence,

its

indigent of any thing in order to

not

though

matter not

for

generated

so that,

requires
if

that

does not exist always, but

only sometimes, this takes place either through

the inaptitude
efficient

of the matter,

cause failing

in

or

through

the

productive energy, or

59
both

through

these

neither the

matter being

adapted, nor the maker possessing a sufficiency

of productive power.

world

the

therefore,

If,

formerly was not, or will not be hereafter, this

will

happen

which

to it either

the world was

world,

through the cause by which

consists, or

it

through the matter of

The maker

produced.

of the

however, always possesses a sufficiency

of productive

power, since he

eternally the

is

same, and does not subsist differently at different

times.

maker of the

world

and

respect to matter, either

to

it

now, and

And

hereafter.

will

now, or neither now, though

the

invariably

world

is

same

manner

it

for

which

at one time

such,

either

If,
is,

through

matter

is

remains

maker of the

therefore,

every thing

but at another
the

it

always subsists

the same, just as the

immutable.

with

was always adapted

be adorned after the same manner as

after

the

a sufficiency of

possess

or he possesses this

effective power,

did formerly,

now does

neither

Either, therefore,

is

insufficiency

not,

is

of the

maker, or through matter not always possessing

a proper aptitude
is

but the maker of the world*

not at one time sufficient to produce

another not

sufficient,

nor

is

it,

and

at

matter at one time

properly adapted, but at another not;

if this

be the case, the world will not exist at one time,

but at another not.

The Demiurgus,

therefore.

60
produces,

matter

adorned, and the world

is

is

for ever.

Argument

Plato

the Thirteenth.

that Divinity imparted to the

says,

world a motion adapted to a spherical body,

viz.

a circular motion, which especially subsists about

and wisdom.

intellect

that this motion

is

If,

therefore, he grants

adapted to the world, he will

also grant that heaven, or the universe, naturally

resolves in a circle

but

we must

according to nature,

has this motion

if it

say, that neither

a motion upward, nor a motion downward,

a progressive motion,]*

however,
elements -T

motions

the

are
It

pertain to
of

necessary,

is

The words within

of Mahotius,

natura

sublunary

the

therefore,

that

rectilinear

the brackets are added from the version

whose version of

motum hunc

These,

it.

heaven should be exempt from the

[nor

obtinet,

this

sentence

is,

Quare

neque eurn motum, quo sursum

si

neque eum, quo deorsum descenditur, neque progressionem

convenire dixerimus.
(pumv

xivyjtr/v,

our av

aura) ar^anKuv.

Kara,
-j-

it is

But the Greek

mv

It

ro oivw x/vrunv,

appears,

is,

ovn rnv

It

raurr,v

irti

itur,
ipsi

t%u Kara.

ro xctru

(potif^iv

therefore, that immediately after

requisite to insert the

words ovn mv Kara

xo^uav.

This sentence shews the necessity of the above emendation.

For the motion of

and the motion

fire

and

of water

is

air is

upward, of earth downward,

progressive.

61
of [sublunary]

motions
neither

body

light

heavy,

or

if

nor

tend

which

tend

light

a circle

no one of these elements,

and

heavy,

is

but

that

that which

if

something different from them.

generation and corruption, are
of things contrary to

moved

is

each other

and one thing

(for this is said

the

but things

wholes]

and

contrary to one,

are

[*.

in

corrupted,

e.

the

their

but

if

will be

parts,

If,

how-

and

sublunary

indeed,

generated

celestial

the

but a celestial body

unbegotten and incorruptible.

these

to nature,

these things, indeed,

corrupted and generated

ever,

number

by Plato in the Protagoras,)

this be the case,

will be

is

be

therefore,

If,

among

in

will

it

which have contrary motions according

are contraries,

a celes-

is

that which

downwards
upward is
is

is

it

nor earth, nor any one of the bodies

fire,

which are situated between these

tial

Hence,

bodies.

wholes

always

exist

according to nature, remaining in their proper

places,

and

if

the world consists of these,

viz.

heaven, and the wholes of the four elements

this being the case,

the world will be without

Such

generation, and without corruption.

therefore, as are in

Part

things,

any way whatever generated

and corrupted, are the

*

of

effects,

(says Proclus, in his

and not parts* of

Commentary on the Parme-

nides of Plato,) has a manifold signification

for

we

call

that

62
the world, the Gods which it contains (as Plato
says) # borrowing parts from the world, and the

genera of

a part, which

is

in a certain respect the

and which possesses

Thus, we

totally.

as things which

efficient causes,

same with the whole,

all

such things partially, as the whole does

call

each of the multitude of intellects, a part

of the intellect which ranks as a whole, though

each

verse,
in a

are

all

forms exist in

and we

say, that the inerratic sphere is a part of the uni-

though

this sphere also

manner

different

by the world.

comprehends

all

things in

itself,

yet

from that in which they are comprehended

In the second

place,

we denominate

part which gives completion to a certain thing.

that to be a

we

Thus,

say,

that the whole [celestial and sublunary] spheres, are parts of the

universe, and that the ratiocinative power, and the power by

which we opine, are parts of the soul

the former of which give

completion to the universe, but the latter to the soul. In addition

to these, likewise,
fication,

we denominate,

every thing

part,

common signiway whatever is

according to a

which in any

co-arranged with certain things, in order to effect the consum-

mation of one thing.

is

For thus

it

may

be said, that each of us

a part of the world, not that the universe, so far as

universe, receives its completion through us

it is

for neither

the

would

the universe become imperfect, by the destruction of any one of

us

but because we also are co-arranged with the parts of the

universe that rank as wholes, and are governed in conjunction

with

all

other things, and are, in short, in the world as in one

animal, are ourselves parts of the universe, and give completion

to
is

it,

not so far as

it

exists,

but so far as

it is prolific.

What

here said, therefore, by Proclus, about the natures which are

generated and corrupted in the world, are parts of

to the last signification of part, as

* See the

above explained.

Note on Argument the Fourteenth.

it,

according

63
again to be restored to

These, however, have

it.

the appearance of being parts of the universe,

which are comprehended

in

it

comprehended

though other

their

effects

also

causes,

and are connected by them.

the world

are

consists

and

incorruptible

in

if

be unbe-

much

For the whole would be

than

parts, if

it

Hence,

will itself

it

degree.
its

proper

of things which are unbe-

gotten and incorruptible,

gotten

in

greater

less excellent

indeed had generation and

corruption, but the parts, on the contrary, were

without

though

generation,
it

is

and

without

Plato himself

corruption

who

says,
parts.

that

the

whole

is

more excellent than the

whole

is

not for the sake of the parts, but the

parts are for the sake of the whole.

For the

But that

for

the sake of which a thing exists,

[or the final

better than those things

which subsist

cause,]

is

The elements,
that which has its comAnd hence, that, which

for the sake of the final cause.

however, are parts of

position

from them.

more excellent than

consists of the elements,

is

the elements of which

consists.

it

If,

therefore,

heaven, or the universe, consists of unbegotten

and incorruptible elements,

it

unbegotten and incorruptible.

is

will also itself

And

be

this likewise

demonstrated from Platonic principles.

G4

Argument

Every

the Fourteenth.

artist either

matter of that which

is

gives subsistence to the

the subject of his art, or

he causes the matter which already exists to be

And

adapted to his purpose.

if

he makes the

matter which already exists to be adapted to his

purpose, he makes the matter [on which his art
operates]. For the thing

which

is

properly adapted

to his purpose, indicates the matter [of his art],

and not simply a subject.

So

matter

it

is

without adaptation,

of matter

[i.e.

as

has not the power

not of a matter fit for the operations

Whether,

of art].

far, therefore,

therefore,

the

artist

gives

subsistence to his proper matter, or whether he

makes the matter when

merely exists as a sub-

be adapted to his purpose, he

ject, to

the

it

maker of the matter of

if this is

true of every

is

entirely

But

his proper work.

partial artist,

much more

does the divine Artist make his proper matter,

either

causing
that he

subsistence

giving
it

to be

to

matter

adapted to his purpose

may not be more

itself,
;

or

in order

ignoble than the artificers

of sublunary natures, by borrowing matter which

he does not return, and to which he does not give

subsistence

since these restore the parts

which

they borrowed from him, in order to accomplish

65
the generation of mortal natures.*

Since, there-

fore,

the artificer of the universe. is also the arti-

ficer

of matter, which

tacle

and nurse of generation, f he likewise made

be the receptacle of generation.
For it has

it

to

defined to be the recep-

is

no other existence than an existence as matter,

since the definition of

Hence, whether the Demiu'rgus of

generation.

the universe gave

made

the requisite adaptation, he

it

be the receptacle of generation,

to

it

to be the receptacle of

it is

* Proclus here alludes to the following passage in the

of Plato: OOyCaOTSS

XaSoons

etS-avarov

TCilhlS

xai

aou,

i.

tou xoffpou

As soon

e.

Xtt.1

too irQiTt^oo Sy foiou^yoo,

uttioufx. lorn

u.To

ctioos

TaXio, x. t. X.

Timams

TOU TOOTHS TC&fO, STl&OOTO UUTy,

Trio

agxyo Swrou

Tu^os xai yy; uduTos

oLTo'hor<ro;j.ioa.

01

viz.

as

'lu.oiiZ,of/.iooi

as his children

[i.

e.

the junior gods] understood the order of their father [viz. of the

Demiurgus], they became obedient to

this order

and receiving

the immortal principle of mortal animal, in imitation of their

artificer,

they borrowed from the world the parts of

water and

air,

as

things

which

they

fire

should

and earth,

restore

back

again, &c.
-]-

Matter

says of

Tams

tioai

which

is

is

thus defined by Plato in the

Ttoa ouo Ouoafao xai

it,

ysosasas uTo^oxto auTo,

the reading of

sary, both

culum,

is,

Ti&yoyv.

But

for

he there

for

Timams,

Ti&yoyv,

0100

it is

ti 3-yoyo.

For his version of the

neces-

latter part of this

Hanc utique generationis horum omnium

et quasi

matter

0100

the editions of the

Toiaoti fxaXiUTa

from the citation of Proclus and the version of Ficinus,

to read, xai omv

extract

all

Timams

Qumo auTO UToXyTTSov,

is

nutricem esse.

the receptacle,

and, as

neration.

recepta-

So that, according to Plato,

it

were, nurse of

all

ge-

GG
he made

to be matter

it

or

whether he gave sub-

made

sistence to matter, he immediately

the matter of the world.

makes one

Hence

therefore,

the

to be

also every artist

But whichever he makes of

of these.

he makes, as we have

these,

it

of

artificer

said, matter.

this

universe

If,

made

matter to be the receptacle of generation, he either

gave subsistence to

the vestiges

which matter became moved

of forms,

by
and

in a confused

disorderly manner, being of itself immovable and

perfectly formless

or

we must

say that these ves-

from some

tiges of forms proceeded into matter

other source, viz. from some other deity,

longs to the intelligible order.*

artificer of the universe is the

tiges

of forms,

should

is

it

make matter

If,

who

be-

therefore, the

cause of these ves-

not most absurd that he

properly adapted to be the

receptacle of generation, and should likewise im-

part these vestiges, through which matter would

not be adapted to be properly fashioned, but

would with

difficulty

tasis of generation
is

hostile to that

be rendered

for the

For that which

which

ceptacle of generation

fit

is

is

is

hypos-

disorderly

But the

orderly.

re-

not hostile to generation

* Viz. from Plianes, according to Orpheus, or animal

itself,

according to Plato, which deity subsists at* the extremity of the

intelligible order.

Proclus on the

See the Second Book of

T imams.

my

translation of

67
which has an orderly arrangement.
there

is

forms,

however,

If,

a certain other cause of the vestiges of

is

not irrational to suppose that this

it

cause makes matter to be properly and easily

adapted, but that the other causes

with

difficulty

should wait,

order

till

that

to

be adapted

and that the former of these causes

that which he had produced with

a proper adaptation should

in

it

first

become unadapted,

he might afterwards make

this

which he caused matter

have a proper adaptation, as if he was not

universe, for the sake of

to

which

able to give perfection to that

till

it

became unadapted

For

it

adapted,

is

is

absurd to

suppose that he made matter to be easily adapted,

in order that

it

might alone

the vestiges of forms.

cause

it

For

itself,

by

itself,

in this case

receive

he would

to be properly adapted, that generation

might be inordinately produced.

matter for the purpose of

with arrangement,

how

its

is

But

if

he made

receiving generation

it

possible that, from

those things from W'hich, at the same time that

he caused matter to be properly adapted, he gave

subsistence to generation, he should wait

till

disorderly arrangement took place, in order that

he might thus give arrangement to that whicli

was without arrangement, just

as

if

he was inca-

pable of giving subsistence to order without the

privation of order

If,

therefore, these things are

68
absurd, and the vestiges of forms were not prior
in time to the

arrangement of them, and the sub-

ject matter, together with the vestiges of forms,

unbegotten, the order likewise which

is

unbegotten

to these

neither

which

nor

is

was matter

Moreover,

generated, and afterwards

first

the vestiges of forms

them

there any thing pertaining

prior or posterior.

is

in

is

is

for the very essence of it is

to be matter in conjunction with the vestiges of

Hence,

forms.

which

it

derives

contains these vestiges, from

it

its

subsistence as matter, and

that

it is

same time

For, at the

not prior to these vestiges.

is

adapted to receive them, the cause which

imparts them, also imparts that which

being of matter.

Hence,

if

matter

is

the very

is

unbegotten

and incorruptible, having a perpetual existence,

always possessed the vestiges of forms
gether with these also,

have demonstrated.*

it

gotten and incorruptible.

ranks as

first,

and, to-

possessed order, as

Order, therefore,

unbe-

is

And no one of these

three

but these distinctions exist

only in our conceptions.

Hence, this distinction

in conception being taken away, all these

simultaneous existence,

more on

we

or second, or third [according to a

temporal subsistence]

* See

it

viz.

this subject in the

tion of Proclus on the Timaeus.

have a

matter, the vestiges

Second Book of

my

Transla-

69
But from that from which

of forms, and order.

order derives

derived

subsistence, the world

its

also

so that the world will be unbegotten

is

and

incorruptible.

Argument

The

the Fifteenth.

paradigm of the world

is

Plato]* by these three names,

eternal, all-perfect

And

celebrated [by

viz. only-begotten,

the last of these

names

pertains also to the universe, but to no other ge-

nerated nature

With

all-perfect.

this

respect to the

not present with

is

though

is

however,

with

is

it

of these

we

no other generated nature

for

the celestial orbs

only-begotten.

is

common

shall not find

participate

all

in

each

for

for if this is not,

any thing of which

common.

natures,

perpetual existence,

to all forms

that every form should

this is

only -begot ten,

mundane

all

is

But

if it

is

all

forms

necessary

possess perpetuity,

an image of the eternal,

it

is

for

requisite to

the meaning
o of the ever. Whether, therefore, does it signify that which exists

consider what

for

an

is

infinite time,

* This

is

both with reference to the past

asserted by Plato of the paradigm of the world in the

we have before

Timams, which,

as

by him

or animal

itself.

observed,

is

there denominated

70
and the

future, or that which, with respect to the

past, has indeed a beginning, but, with reference to

the future, has no end ?*

For

if this is

the

mean-

is

similar

ing of the ever, what will that be which

For the eternal has

to the eternal

in

no respect

whatever a subsistence at a certain time only, nor

any extension of existence, nor the prior and posterior,

but

the infinite
universe,-!-

is

not simultaneously present with the

but subsists

in

becoming

perpetually rising into existence].];

the eternal
is],

is

that [which

either nothing

similar to

is

Demiurgus

to

is

to be [or in
If,

however,

we have above

things the world, resembles

since the

But

according to both these.

is infinite

it,

it.

most

said

it

or, prior to all

But

it is

absurd,

and wishes

excellent,

make, and does make, things similar

to the pa-

radigm of the universe, [that the world should be

The

original

But

TiXuirvv.

nXiurnv.

it is

here defective,

is

for

it

is

Kara fu-n^a

obviously necessary to read, Kara Danpu.

Mahotius

also, in his

version, has

ex

St ou

altera

autem finem non habet.

f-

oox,

In the original of

apa

b.

Mahotius
appears to

to axngov

this sentence there is

nothing more than

and, conformably to this, the version of

has infinitum autem non simul constat. ,,

me

to be necessary to read ov% apa

ravri xecgurTiv, agreeably to

my

ot

But

to axugov

it
rt#

translation.

$ Conformably to this, Proclus says of the universe (in Tim.

that, always rising into existence, it is always perfect

lib. ii.)

an

ao'taf/.ivov,

au riXnov

i<tti.

71
in

no respect similar to

The

world, therefore, being in the greatest possible

degree similar to

its

paradigm, possesses perpe-

tuity both with reference

future,

For

eternal paradigm].*

its

and not according

if this

rangement
universe,

one of these only.

to

denied, that which

is

will

through being

unbegotten

therefore,

corruptible

be similar

unbegotten

to

infinite only,

this account,
infinite

incorruptible,

is
is

without ar-

and that

be similar to

If

and every thing

in order that

according to one of these.

than that which

both

is

in-

may

[paradigm], and not

the eternal

that which

it,

things,

these

impossible, every thing which

are

unbegotten

will

incorruptibility.

its

is

be similar to the paradigm of the

which possesses arrangement

through

and the

to the past

is

is

That which was generated,

arranged

is

And on
no more

without arrangement.
therefore, conformably

to the paradigm, ought, according to both these,

to be similar to the paradigm.

was generated conformably

*

The words within

But that which

to the

paradigm, was

the brackets are omitted in the original,

and are supplied from the version of Mahotius.

Greek there
tiwftiovg'you

vrmwrvsrtfovrm,

is

nothing more than

u^urrou ovros,

For in the

a/.x' urovrov, to fortbiva rgovrov too

r.ou (ZavXofcivou opoict vroniv rtu vra.oabuyfji.ari r.ai

It is requisite,

to add, roi Kovrov

therefore, immediately after ro fivhvu

oftotov

uvui

r to vraoabuyfAari

aitjj'uy.

72
Hence the world, not having

the world.

poral] generation,
it

of this kind

[viz.

rupted,]
past.

is

may

thing which

But the world

be cor-

unbegotten, and at the

is

incorruptible.

also

It

possesses

in-

according to both these, in order that, as

Plato says,
its

For a thing

only infinite with reference to the time

same time
finity

tem-

incorruptible, nor, being un-

is

ever be corrupted.

begotten, will

[a

may be

it

in every respect similar to

eternal paradigm.

Argument

the Sixteenth.

If there are two wills in the Demiurgus, one

indeed will be

this, that

what

moved

is

in a con-

fused and disorderly manner should not exist, as

Plato says [in the Timseus]

for

being willing

[says he] that there should be nothing evil, he

brought that which was confused from the inor-

And

dinate into order.

if

the

Demiuro;us has

likewise another will, viz. that the universe should

be bound,
says,

(for,

You

speaking to the junior Gods, he

shall

never be dissolved, in conse-

quence of obtaining

my

will,

which

is

a greater

bond than any of those bonds by which you were

73
connected at the commencement of your generation ;)

and

if

these wills are the very being of

the things which partake of them, one of

them

willing that the inordinate should not exist, but

the other, that what

served

if this

is

orderly should be pre-

be the case,

it is

necessary either

that these wills should always exist in the

De-

miurgus, or each of them sometimes, or one of

them always, but the other

is false,

at a certain time.

It

however, that either of these wills should

exist only at a certain time.

For

it

evident,

is

that to be willing at one time, and at another not,

can by no means accord with the nature of an

eternal being,

been

willing;,

though he should at

but afterwards should be willing

on the contrary, should at

or,

first

posterior,

and the was, and the

will be.

these, Plato says, are the species of time.

however,

will

willingness and unwillingness the prior

in this

and

have been

For there

willing, but afterwards unwilling.

be

not have

first

is

and

But
Time,

not in the Demiurgus, but proceeds

posterior to him.

Hence he was
always willing that the confused and disorderly
from,

is

should not exist, and that what has an orderly

arrangement should

exist.

His

will,

therefore,

essentially producing that which he wished, and

both the inordinate and -the orderly having a per-

petual subsistence, he always produces

them by

74
his very being.*

If,

however, he always produces

that which he wishes to produce, he will certainly,

through one of these

wills,

always abolish the

inordinate, but will preserve, through the other,

that which

him

For thus he

reduced into order.

through both, that which

will effect,
for

is

to effect

is

it

proper

destroying that which he does

not wish to exist, and preserving and defending

which he wishes

that

wills, therefore, of the

which

its

it is

that what

Each

to exist.

of these

Demiurgus, effecting that

province to effect,

is

it

necessary

produced by each should be perpe-

is

For the maker and the thing made exist

tual.

simultaneously with each other, as Plato says in

the Philebus

which
ficer

is

for there

becoming

and maker of

the one

is

it,

be beautiful, and the

therefore,

orotoufft)S o

an,

(houXirai, $

x. r. X. it is

arti-

subsist together, and that

is

* This sentence in the original

aval

that the thing

asserts,

not without the other.

disorderly,

is

to

he

is,

au ixanoa au

That which

always

ms

out

rui

uvai

necessary to read xai au,

abolished,

(houX^mus auru

But

Toir,tru.

x. t. X.

for

conformably to

the above translation, and also to the version of Mahotius, which

is,

cum

quod vult

igitur voluntas ipso esse,

utraque, semper ipso esse

effieiat, ct

Hence, as the world subsists in becoming

artificer of it is

semper

sit

efficiet.
to be,

and the

an eternally energising being, and the one cannot

exist without the other, the world

rising into existence.

must

necessarily be perpetually

75
Demiurgus that it
and that which is orderly is pre-

through the eternal

should not exist,

will of the

served, on account of his will that

exist; each of these wills

it

should always

But

being eternal.

if

both the inordinate and the orderly are perpetually

generated, the inordinate will not be prior to the
orderly, nor the orderly to

however, the inordinate

that which

is

is

the inordinate.

If,

not prior to the orderly,

orderly will not have a beginning;

and

if

not prior to the inordinate,

it

will

not have an end

prior to the inordinate.*

But

posterior to the inordinate

if it

the orderly

is

neither began

posterior to, nor will end prior to, the inordinate,

order

and

without a beginning and without an end,

is

is

both unbegotten and incorruptible.

over, the world

which

is

is

nothing else than order, and that

The world,

arranged.

begotten and incorruptible.

say, since there

More-

For

therefore,
it

is

un-

absurd to

is

are tw-o wills in divinity, either

that one of these should be always effective, but

the other not always

produce by

its

or that one of these should

very being, but the other not; since

both possess the same essence, and have through

the

same cause an

eternal subsistence.^

This follows from what

is

above demonstrated,

For one

viz. that

the inordinate and the orderly are perpetually generated.

-

For

to tvXoyov here, in the original, I

read to kwviov.

both

76
of these, in consequence of being good, as Plato

was willing that the disorderly should not

says,
exist

but the other, in consequence of not being

was willing that the orderly should

evil,

By how much,

therefore, to be essentially good,

is

more adapted

so

much more

be good

will

which

eternal
since

is

and

it is

is

it

is

the will that

is

to divinity

make

the

him, not to be more

to

be lawful so to speak,

it

So that

divine.

in-

than not to be

perfectly absurd to

efficacious, if

is

For to

orderly should exist.

more adapted

more

what

than the will which

exist,

more adapted

is

Hence,

evil.

divine

what

ordains that

by

to divinity than not to be evil,

should not

ordinate

exist.

if it is

consequent

to these wills that the world should be unbeg-otten

through one of them, but incorruptible through

the other,

it

will

be in a greater degree unbegotten

than incorruptible; since

it

possesses the former

through the more principal and more divine

will

of the Demiurgus, but the latter through a sub-

ordinate will.

Moreover, one of these,

corruptibility of the world,

is

manifest to

consequently the other will be

fest
If,

than

this,

viz. that

therefore, the

viz.

all

and

much more mani-

the world

is

unbegotten.

two are one, the universe

similarly unbegotten

the in-

and incorruptible.

will be

But

if

they are two, but that which exists in consequence

of being good

is

more powerful than that which

77
consequence of not being

exists in

verse

in a greater degree unbegotten than incor-

is

ruptible.

would, however, seem, that there

It

rather one will in the

for

Demiurgus than two

the inordinate, whether

and

order,

to produce,

ginning, that which

is

it

thing which

is

wills

will to reject

without any temporal be-

and preserve

orderly,

For there

more adapted

Every

is

be prior or posterior to

arrangement without end.

order.

same

the province of the

is

it

the uni-

evil,

it

not any

is

than

to every artificer

artificer, therefore,

in

wishes to give a

proper arrangement to the work which he pro-

duces
is

to

so that order, so far as he

is

an

But

if

there

him the

object of desire.

object of desire, the appetition also

the appetition of order.

appetition

and

will,

If,

which

is

artificer,
is

one, being

however, there
are

one

directed

is

to

one
the

object of the will, there will certainly be one will

always producing prior to time that which

is

ar-

ranged, and connecting a thing of this kind for

But being

ever.

one,

possible, to distribute

bute one part of

it

it
it

is

absurd, or rather im-

and

into parts,

to divinity,

and

this the

imperfect part, but not to attribute to

part,

and

w hich
T

is

this of a

For that

to divinity, since it

has a greater power than that which

imperfect.

more

him another

more perfect nature.

more perfect pertains

to attri-

is

more

78

Argument, the Seventeenth.

The
are

following axioms, which are Aristotelic,

by a much greater

Every thing

which

is

Platonic, viz.

priority

generable,

also

is

and every thing unbegotten

ruptible,

ruptible. *

by Plato

For the former of these

in the Republic,

is

and the

cor-

incor-

is

mentioned

latter in

the

In the Republic, therefore, Socrates,

Phsedrus.

personating the Muses, says, Since every thing

which

is

generated

;T and

corruptible

is

Phsedrus] he says, since the soul

it is

is

For he shews

unbegotten, and because

unbegotten, he demonstrates that

For

ruptible.^;

these

it is

since, if

it is

corruptible will be incorruptible,

sible.

Every thing

unbegotten

for

if

also

which

is

is

corruptible

which

is

it

unbegotten, the
is

impos-

incorruptible

generable, the

will be corruptible.

also incor-

being true,

things

necessary that every thing which

should be generable

unbegotten,

is

necessarily also incorruptible.

that every principle

[in the

is

incorruptible

These things, therefore, ne-

cessarily following, if the universe is incorruptible,

* This

Heavens.
-f-

is

demonstrated by Aristotle in his Treatise on the

See Book the Second of

my

Translation of that work.

See the Eighth Book of the Republic.

J Vid. Phaedr. Art. p. 22.

79
it

is

also unbegotten

is

the source of immortal natures

the immortal

is

indestructible, as

For scarcely

Phaedo.

And

is

and
it

F but

said in the
else

be in-

not a thing of this

therefore, every thing

If,

was generated by the Demiurgus

this is indestructible,)

it is

which

indestructible,

is

which was generated by him

(for that

indeed, Cebes says, and So-

this,

crates grants.

it is

any thing

will

destructible, if the immortal

kind.j

evident from the

is

For the Demiurgus, according

above premises.
to Plato,

as

is

immortal,

also necessary that

should be unbegotten, through what

we have

demonstrated to be consequent to the two preceding axioms

generable

is

one of which

corruptible

thing ingenerable

is

that every thing

is,

but the other, that every

So

incorruptible.

that, not

only according to Aristotle, but also according

* In the original, toutuv

ur-riv.

But

it is

comma
The MS.

after
also,

avxyxvs a

evidently necessary between ro

insert kcu xytvnTov,

Ss ttfo/ttiiuv, s|

and instead of a

xmyxt

comma

after

ctiptfagTov

ora*

and

toro/xtvoiv,

s<

to

orocv

rv/v,

to

to place

conformably to the above translation.

from which Mahotius made

his translation, ap-

pears to have wanted the words xat xytvnrov.

This

is

asserted in the Timaous.

In the Original, v o /.
un

roiourov.

require, that after xOxvxtov

See

my

yoco v ti

xXXo

tin

xveoXt^ov,

u to xHxvxto*

But both the sense and the version of Mahotius

we should read

Translation of the Phaedo.

ouk

tin toioutov.

80
to Plato,

demonstrated through these two

is

it

axioms, that the world neither had a temporal gene-

For if* that which

ration, nor is corruptible.

ordinate
is

unbegotten, but that which

is

which

incorruptible, that

is

For as the ingenerable

the incorruptible to

to that

which

is

the corruptible

incorruptible, so

generable to that which

which

that

is

generable

is

generation

generable

is

is

it

is

ingenerable

is

is

that which

is

corruptible

is

to that

is

which

essentially

inordinate

but that which

is

it is

is

arranged
is

arranged

produce that which

tlie

appears to

and the

more excellent than the

is

more ex-

Hence,

if

that

incorruptible

and

without arrangement [so

and that which from the

inordinate produces that which

111

there-

ingenerable] will be more excellent than

that which

cor-

ingenerable and corruptible,

is

generable, that which

far as

is

If,

better than corruption,

than the incorruptible.

is

and as

which

corruptible, the ingenerable also will be

cellent

arranged.

so that

ruptible, so is generation to corruption.

fore,

arranged

is

to the generable, so is

is

be alternately, as that which

will

in-

without arrangement

be more excellent than that which

will

is

original, xou

me

is less

yec(>

is

arranged, will

from that which

i<rn to

f/,zv

cctccxtov, ayzvviTov.

is

more

Hut

it

to be evidently necessary to read, agreeably to the

above translation,

yoco

to'n, x . r. x.

81
excellent; in consequence of producing from* that

which
is

ingenerable and corruptible, that which

is

One

afterwards generable and incorruptible.

these, therefore, will not be ingenerable

ruptible, but the other generable

But neither

or vice versa.

that

what

is

that which

arranged

is

and incorruptible

the maker evil

from that which

is

out arrangement, the unarranged

not,

when

ranged has an existence.

Or,

ruptible

since

it

is

and cor-

so

And

not corruptible.

is

arranged

is

of

is

if

with-

not incor-

is

that which
if this

is

ar-

is

not ad-

mitted, each of these will be generable and cor-

But whether that which

ruptible.

generable, being generated

arranged

or

is

from that which

whether that which

corruptible, he

who

inordinate

is

arranged

corrupts that which

arranged, either did not properly harmonise

therefore
is

is

not good

or he corrupts that

well harmonised, and

is evil.

is

orderly

orderly

is

is

inordinate

is

is

is

is

well

it,

and

which

All these conse-

quences, however, are impossible.

which

is

Hence, that

not prior to that which

is

what

is

and therefore

it

follows, that

unbegotten, and in like manner that

also incorruptible.

it

82

Argument

the Eighteenth.

If things which always

subsist according to

sameness, and in a similar manner, alone pertain

most divine of

to the

the Politicus,

things, as Plato says in

all

if this

be the case, and

if

the

De-

miurgus ranks among the most divine of beings,

it

pertains to

same and

him

to subsist eternally after the

in a similar

But

manner.

if

he does not

rank among the most divine of things, neither

must we say that he

is

God who

has an eternal

existence, nor that he is the best of causes.

however, these things of him as

assert,

in the Timaeus.

same and

to the

to his nature.

manner,

in a similar

written

it is

A subsistence, therefore,

We

according

adapted

is

For, if that which does not exist

always should possess a subsistence according

to invariable sameness, that

which does not

always will always be the same.

which
the

is

And

if

exist

that

the best of causes does not exist invariably

same,

it

will not

things being absurd,

it

be the best.
is

But these

necessary that the best

of causes, and which exists eternally, should be

most divine and that being most

;

divine,

it

should

subsist always according to the same, and in a

similar

manner.

which thus

It

pertains,

subsists, never to

however, to that

have any variation

83
in its existence

this

for

contrary to an eter-

is

But

nally invariable sameness of subsistence.

pertains to that

which never

at

it

any time subsists

one time to cease from being

differently, never at

an effective cause, and at another to be effective

and

or at one time to be,

effective.

For

ferent times

at

another not to be

this is to subsist differently at dif-

now effective, but afterbe now effective, but to be

to be

viz.

wards not, and not

to

But that which never at

any one time is not efficient, and afterwards efficient, or now efficient, and afterwards non-efficient,
effective afterwards.

must necessarily always be an

efficient

energy, or always not be such a cause.

cause in

For there

are no other consequences besides these.

extremes

are,

to be

always non-efficient.

always

did not produce before

or,

It is,

it

efficient.

it

however, impossible that the De-

did not before,

that which does not produce again

it

other extreme, which

always non-efficient.

is

is

what

always
it

had

does not produce, unites with the

once produced, so far as

fore

it

produces, unites with that extreme, which

And

it

had once pro-

For that which produces afterwards what

so far as

are, for the

on the contrary, not

produce again that which

duced.*

to be

cause to produce that afterwards which

efficient

to

and

efficient,

But the media

For the

media between these two extremes.

They

are there-

84
miurgus being the Demiurgus, should never
time be an effective cause
to

an

artificer

to

It

is

for

it

is

who

artificer

any

not adapted

For

be always unemployed.

how can he be an
any thing

at

never produces

necessary, therefore, that the

Demiurgus should be an

efficient cause,

and that

he should always fabricate that of which he

is

the

But the Demiurgus, who always fabrimust necessarily always make the world.

efficient.

cates,

It is necessary,

therefore, that the world should

neither have a temporal beginning of being fabri-

cated, nor an end.

For,

if it

had a beginning,

would not always have been adorned

should have an end,
It is necessary,

it

and

if it

always be adorned.

will not

however, that the world should

always be adorned, because

that the

it

it

is

also necessary

Demiurgus should always adorn.

But

makes with inand he will thus

this will be the case, if he always

variable sameness of energy

make,

if

he always subsists after the same and in

a similar manner.

It is

necessary, therefore, that

the world should be a world without a beinninof

and without an end, and that

gotten and incorruptible.

urgus possesses an
sistence,

it is

it

should be unbe-

Hence,

if

the

invarible sameness

Demiof sub-

necessary that the world should be

without generation, and without corruption.

So

85
that

Plato clearly asserts this [of the Demiurgus],

if

the world also, according to him,

and

unbegotten

is

incorruptible.

the Timaeus,* that

and again

God

and

absent from the world,

is

present with

is

Politicus

says, in the

therefore, Plato

If,

it,

being

from, and afterwards present with

first

absent

(for after

it,

this

manner, says he, the universe subsisted, as

was

likely

sent with

should,

it

it)

and

if

when

it

Divinity was not pre-

Plato similarly asserts both

these things, and therefore says, that at one time

the world

changed from a disorderly

is

into

an or-

derly condition of being, but that at another time

it

passes from an orderly into an inordinate state,

assumes the helm of govern-

until Divinity again

ment
*
is

therefore, this

if,

In the Politicus Plato

by Plato,

that the universe

at

it

one time

conducted by another divine cause, receiving again an exter-

nally acquired

urgus

life,

and a renewed immortality from the Demi-

but that at another time,

government,
performs
p.

says,

asserted

is

it

proceeds by

many myriads

my

122 of

in the Timaeus,
to

when he

remits the reins of

and being thus

left for

of retrograde revolutions.

a time,

See vol.

iv.

Translation of Plato, in which the fable, of which

these words are a part,

began

itself,

it

is

is

beautifully explained from Proclus.

said

adorn the universe, he

and numbers,

fire

And

by Plato, that when the Demiurgus

first

and earth, water and

of all figured with forms

air,

which possessed in-

deed certain vestiges of the true elements, but were in every

respect so constituted as

Deity

is

absent.

it is

See vol.

likely

ii.

of

any thing

my

will be

from which

Translation of Plato.

86
is

not proper that Atticus should alone direct his

what is
Divinity, who was

attention to

said in the Timseus.

For there

at one time absent from,

is

represented as being at another time present with,

that from which he
site

that Atticus

should also

asserted in the Politicus, in

who

at one time

But

was absent.

it is

requi-

consider what

is

which the Divinity,

was present with,

is

represented as

And

absent from that with which he was present.

as through the former he produced order from that

which was

in a disorderly state, so

latter, after order,

to take place.

If,

through the

he caused a privation of order

therefore, Plato says, that both

these mutations were produced by the Demiurgus,

respecting that visible god the world, prior to the

existence of the world,

it

is

impossible that they

should have any subsistence except in our mental

conception.

For, since

Divinity always

exists

with invariable sameness, he does not say that the

world subsists differently at different times, as

if

possessing this variable subsistence through him,

which can only be asserted of partial natures

but

he says [speaking enigmatically], that the world

is

either arranged, or deprived of arrangement,

through Divinity being differently affected at

ferent times.

If,

however,

it

is

dif-

impossible that

Divinity should be thus affected, because he possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence,

it

is

87
likewise impossible that the world should have at

one time a disorderly, and at another an orderly

And

existence.

should say, that this

is

truly a

contrivance of the wisdom of Plato, by

divine

which he

from the eternal energy of Divi-

infers,

nity, that the

world

is

at

one and the same time

unbegotten and incorruptible

and assigns the

absence and presence of Divinity as fhe cause of

the order and disorder of the world.*

Divinity alone

is

the cause of the alternate order

and disorder of the world, and

him not

to

For, if

subsist, because

it is

impossible for

is

impossible for

it

Divinity to subsist differently at different times,

it

is

also

absurd to conceive an alternate sub-

sistence of order and disorder about the world.

If,

therefore.

same, he

is

Divinity

is

always invariably the

.

not at one time present with, and at

And

another absent from the world.

the case, the world

and

at

is

if this

be

not at one time arranged,

another without arrangement.

For the

presence of Divinity indeed with the world would

confer order, but his absence the privation of order

* Plato does not

mean

to insinuate

actually at one time present with,

the world, for he

is

and

by

eternally present with

invariably the same;

this, that

Divinity

is

at .another absent from,

it,

and in a manner

but in thus speaking, he only indicates

what would be the necessary consequence

of his being alternately

present with and absent from the universe.

88
on

But

it.

if

the world

was not

at

one time

arranged, nor at another was, or will be, without

arrangement,

it

was always arranged,

finite time,

and

it

will for

an

a manner, as to

become manifest even

is,

and

this Plato proclaims in

paradigm of the world

will be.

it

was from
it

exists

through

infinity,

an

and

infinite

it

dura-

both with respect to the past and the future,

that the friends of Plato should

finite

to the deaf,

As, therefore, the world will be

not proper, since Plato gives

tion,

such

and that the world always was, and

to infinity, so likewise
is

in-

time continue

infinite

And

all eternity,

if it

was arranged from an

to be arranged.

viz. that the

But

always was arranged.

make

with respect to the past, but

respect to the future

but

it

if?

it

to be

infinite

with

requisite that they

should speak conformably to the decision of their

For thus the world

master.

will possess

tion of the perpetuity of eternity

an imita-

not having only

the half, but the whole of the infinity of time.

was the thing proposed by the Deto assimilate time to eternity, and

This, however,

miurgus,

viz.

the world to eternal animal

giving

The

it

exemplar],

principal result, however, of

is

formably

by

an existence through the whole of time.

been said
world,

[its

is this,

that has

that no one, with respect to the

so pious as Plato, or
to

all

any other who, con-

him, says, that the world subsists in a

89
disorderly condition,

when

when

invariably the same, viz.

whom

the world

God.

gible
riable

Divinity

no longer

is

the Divinity [by

was fabricated]

not an intelli-

is

For a subsistence according

sameness pertains

the intelligible gods.

to

Either, therefore, both the world and the

gus are gods, or neither of them

the latter case, one of

is

a god.

is

Demiur-

And

them not being a god,

produce disorder, but the other a

which

to inva-

not invariably the same.

in

will

subsistence

And

the priva-

tion of order of the one will arise from the

want

of an invariable sameness of subsistence in the

other.

For the one

[i. e.

the world] will no other-

wise be disorderly, than because the other

Demiurgus]

not

is

with

invariable

[/. e.

sameness,

either present with or absent from the world

it is

for

necessary that the world should be entirely

similar to its maker.

only. Divinity

is

at

If,

therefore, in conception

one time present with and at

another absent from the world,

world, in conception only,

and

the

is

it

follows that the

at one time arranged,

For

at another without arrangement.

it

is

necessary that what subsists in conception only

should pertain to both

being present, the world

follows that
sent.

But

it is
if,

so that
is

from Divinity

arranged,

not arranged

in reality,

if,

[?'.

it

when he
e.

necessarily
is

not pre-

not in conception

90
only,] the universe

at one

is

another without

at

time* arranged, and

by

arrangement,

much

greater priority, Divinity will in reality be at one

time present with, and at another absent from the

For

universe.

it

not follow [absolutely], from

will

the world being arranged, or being without ar-

rangement, that Divinity

present with

it;

is

either absent from or

but the contrary will take place

so that the prior assertion will be true, to which

this

necessarily consequent.]-

is

this is impossible,

because Divinity subsists eter-

nally with invariable sameness,

sible that the

For that which

is

it

is

impos-

also

world should at one time be with-

out arrangement,

sible,

therefore,

If,

is

and at another be arranged.

consequent to what
impossible

necessarily

impos-

is

as

since,

the

dialectic laws say, the possible is consequent to

that which
is

it

is

possible for

* In the original,

both

from

the

Hence, by admitting that

possible.

the world to have been once

von

sense

of

is

erroneously omitted, as

the

passage,

and

the

is

evident

version

of

Mahotius.
-j-

By

the prior assertion, Proclus means this, that the world,

in conception only,

is

at one time

arranged, and at another

without arrangement, in consequence of the maker of

in conception only , at one time present

absent from

it.

it

being,

with, and at another

91
without arrangement,

be possible for

will also

it

it

have been arranged at a certain time, and for

to

Divinity to have been once absent from, and again

present with, the world.
is

therefore, the latter

If,

impossible, the former likewise

hence the world

is

is

was the world arranged from a

state of subsistence

always arranged, and Divinity

always present with the world.

is

impossible

for neither

And

neither

prior disorderly

was Divinity once

absent, and afterwards present,- nor will the world,

from being arranged, afterwards be without ar-

rangement. For the maker of it was not once* present with, and afterwards will be absent from

according to Plato,

if

the world

nerable and corruptible, there

is

it.

And,

necessarily ge-

an equal necessity

is

Demiurgus of the world should not rank

among the most divine of beings, though it pertains to him to have an invariable sameness of
that the

subsistence.

If,

therefore,

it

is

maker of the uni-

piously disposed towards the

verse,

it is

necessary to be

also necessary to be thus disposed to-

wards the world; or

if

we form erroneous concep-

tions about the latter, our conceptions will,

much

greater

priority,

* In the original, ovn

Mahotius
ille

be erroneous and unbe-

yeto ixuvos on vct/iuv

is

requisite to read

also

is,

conformably to this

au(n

ou

vaourn.

But

The version of
emendation, Non enim

von

it

for on 7rapwv,

by a

vaouv.

ante praeseus, postea non praesens erit.

92
coming about the former

and not only about him,

if

ah

common

to

but likewise about every thing divine.

invariable sameness of subsistence
all

divine natures,

this in all of

preserve

we

it

it is

is

For,

necessary either to preserve

them, and after the same manner to

with respect to the Demiurgus

reject this in

one of them, neither

credible in the rest.

will

or, if
it

be

CONCERNING PLACE.*
Simplicius having observed, that Proclus

acquainted with,
thought that place was a body, adds, he,

the only philosopher that he

who

is

is

axioms of Aristotle con-

therefore, admitting the

cerning place, and the fourfold division of the investigation of

it,

says

it

necessary that place

is

should be either matter or form, or the boundary

of the containing body, or an interval equal to the

space between the boundaries of the containing

body.

For, if place

that are in

it,

is

not any one of the things

nor of the things which surround

it

cannot be locally changed,

it

or about

it

sustains

however, which are in

if

nothing that

it,

is in

any mutation. The natures,

it

are form

the natures which surround

it

and matter

are the

the circumambient, and that which

is

but

boundary of

intermediate.

Proclus having demonstrated, therefore, that place

is

neither matter nor form, through the same ar-

guments

as are used

by

Aristotle,

verted the hypothesis that

it is

and having sub-

the boundary of the

containing body, from the absurdities with which

* This fragment
plicius

is

extracted from the Commentaries of Sim-

on the Physics of Aristotle,

p. 143.

94
the hypothesis
interval
to his

is

attended, infers that place

is

an

and thus he adapts the demonstration

own

opinion.

Since, however, he clearly

and concisely explains his hypothesis,

it

will per-

haps be better to hear his own words, which are

it remains, therefore, if place is neias follow
:

ther the form of that which

is

in place, nor matter,

nor the boundary of the comprehending body, that

the interval which

is

between the boundaries of the

containing body must be conceived

primary place of each body.

interval, however, of the

to

All the

whole world

mundane

will

ferent from the above-mentioned interval.

therefore,

And

if,

is

either nothing, or

indeed,

it is

be the

be difThis,

a certain thing.

it is

nothing, local motion will be

from nothing to nothing, though

according to something which ranks

all

motion

among

is

beings.

Places, likewise, which are according to nature,

will

be nothing, though every thing which subsists

conformably to nature

But

belonging to beings.
it

is

is

necessarily something
if it is

a certain thing,

entirely either incorporeal or corporeal.

however,

it is

incorporeal, an absurdity will follow

for it is necessary that place

that which

is

in place.

body, and that which

For the equal

If,

is in

is

should be equal to

But how

is it

possible for

incorporeal, to be equal

quantities,

and

in

homogeneous

quantities, as in lines with lines, superficies with

95
superficies,
is

a body,

it is

moved,

or

immovable.

moved according

sible, as

is

it.

also appeared to

Hence

Aristotle.

place which

immovable

must necesso that again

But

this

is

impos-

be to Theophrastus

Aristotle says, that a vessel

may be moved, but

vessel

however,

If,
it

to place

place will be in want of place.

a body,

if it is

any way whatever moved,

in

sarily be

and

Hence, place

But

an interval.

if it is

either

is

it

and bodies with bodies.

that place

an

is

indicating by this, that place

is

naturally immovable.
If,

however, place

is

immovable,

it is

either in-

capable of being divided by the bodies that

into
it

it,

so that

may be

air

body

will

fall

proceed through body, or

manner

divided by them, in the same

as

and water are divided by the bodies which

But

exist in them.

if,

indeed,

may be

it

divided,

the whole being cut, the parts will be

moved on

each side of the dissevered whole.

And

place will be moved, since the parts of it are

but

it

has been demonstrated that

Secondly, the parts being cut,

whither

that

part which

is

it is

first,

moved

immovable.

we must

inquire

cut proceeds

for

again there will be found another interval between

the parts of the dissevered whole, which
recipient of the divided part,

part proceeding
will

is

and

into

the

which

this

and

this

said to be in place

be the consequence to infinity.

is

Place, there-

90
an indivisible body.

fore, is

For

But

body.

all

if

in-

it is

be an immaterial or a ma-

divisible, it will either

terial

however,

If,

material,

material bodies,

it

when

is

not indivisible.

other material bodies

proceed into them, become divided by those bodies

as

when,

for instance, our bodies fall into water.

But immaterial bodies alone

are not adapted to

be divided by anything; and this from necessity.

For every immaterial body

thing which

may

impassive

is

be divided

is

but every

not impassive, since

a passion of bodies, destructive of their

division

is

union.

For of that which

is

continuous, so far as

continuous, you will not find any other passion

than

division,

which

destroys

its

continuity.

that we may collect that has

been demonstrated,
a body, immovable, indiPlace, therefore,

all

is

visible, immaterial.

But

very evident that place

all

if this
is

be the case,

it

is

more immaterial than

bodies, both than those that are moved, and

those that are immaterial in things that are moved.

Hence,
is

if light is

the most simple of these, for

fire

more incorporeal than the other elements, and

light

is

more incorporeal than

fire itself,

place will

be the most pure and genuine light which

bodies.

If,

therefore

we conceive

is

in

that there are

two spheres, one of light alone, but the other consisting of

many

bodies, and that both these are

equal to each other in bulk, but that the one

is

97
firmly established together with the centre,

that the other

is

we

inserted in this,

and

shall see the

whole world existing in place, and moved in immovable light. And this light, indeed, is, according to

itself,

imitate place, but

order that

it

immovable, in order that

moved according

is

may

to a part, in

something

possess

may

it

than

less

place.

This hypothesis
is

asserted

Republic.

and

rendered credible from what

is

by Plato,

in the [tenth

For the light which

adapted to the rainbow,

is

be place.

It

is

is

oracles respecting the fontal soul

said,

that this soul

fire, aether,

there mentioned,
said

is

also confirmed

book of the]

by him

by the Chaldean
since

For

this

there

it is

abundantly animates

and the worlds.

is

light,

the light

above the empyrean world, and

which

is

monad

prior to the triad of the

and material worlds.

This

to

is

empyrean, ethereal,

light, too,

is

the

recipient of the eternal allotments of the gods,

first

and

unfolds self-visible spectacles in itself to those that

For

are worthy to behold them.

in this light, ac-

cording to the Chaldean oracle, things without

figure

become

figured.

account called place

And

( tokos ),

type (two?) of the whole

making things which

'

perhaps

it is

on this

as being a certain

mundane body, and

as

are without interval to pos-

sess interval.

98
After this, Proclus doubts, against himself,

how

body can proceed through body, and whether

this

light

But,

inanimate, or participates of soul.

is

says he,

it is

impossible that

mate, both because

it

more excellent than the

is

animated natures that are in

oracles say that this

things.

however,

If,

movable

And he

is

should be inani-

it

it,

and because the

animated prior to other

it is

animated,

dissolves the

how

the impassivity of immaterial bodies

that which

is

is

im-

doubt from

first

material body neither resists nor

is it

for

an im-

resisted, since

resisted possesses a nature capable

of suffering by the things which resist.

it is

impassive, can

will

it

it

be divided

Nor, since

so that neither

be possible to adduce that absurd conse-

quence, that the whole will proceed through that

which

smallest

is

for if

an immaterial body

not adapted to be divided, neither will

equally with that which
will

is

smallest.

it

is

be divided

But

if this

not be the case, neither will the whole proceed

through

it.

Again, he solves the second doubt,

by saying, that this immaterial body is animated

by the fontal soul, and that it has a divine life,
and
For

essentially self-motive, but not in energy.

is

if

we admit

motive

is

that in [the rational] soul the self-

twofold, the one according to essence,

but the other according

to

energy, and

if

we

assert that the one is immovable, but the other

99
moved,* what should hinder us from asserting that
place participates of a life of this kind, and that it
lives

according to an immutable essence, but the

world

according

energy.

If,

an

to

essence

self-motive in

however, says he, you wish to see

the motion of place according to energy, you

survey

it

must

moved,

as motive of the bodies that are

and which evolve the parts of place according

interval

because they are neither able to be in

every place, nor to be present with

place according to each of

its

all

the parts of

And

parts.

an intervening medium with reference

which moves without

life,

to

indeed, so far as

For

interval.

life

it

this is

to

soul,

seems that

imparts motion, but place

being that which primarily participates of

life,

confers motion according to the parts of

and

itself,

thus peculiarly unfolds local motion, causing each

of the parts of that which

be in the whole

itself,

since

is

moved

it

is

to desire to

unable, through

the natural peculiarity of interval, to subsist in a

divided manner in the whole

itself.

For every

thing which desires to be a certain thing, but

of becoming that which

is

the object of

its

fails

wish

through a defect of nature, continues nevertheless

to aspire after that which, through imbecility,
* For the rational soul

energy.

is

eternal in essence, but temporal in

Hence, according to the former,

according to the latter,

is

it

moved.

it is

immovable

but

100
is

For

unable to obtain.

is

it

requisite, says he,

that the medium between an incorporeal and

intransitive

and a
which

life,

transitive
is

such as

that of the fontal soul,

is

and corporeal

should be a

life

He

but corporeal.

intransitive, indeed,

adds, but

life,

appears to me, that the centres of

it

the whole world, considered as one thing, are

For

fixed in this immaterial body.

if

the oracles

assert that the centres of the material world are

fixed in the aether

which

is

above

it,

we must

say,

by ascending analogously, that the centres of the

highest of the worlds are established in the light

May

of this world.

it

image of the paternal profun-

this light is the first

dity,*

and on

this

account

cause that profundity

*

The

not likewise be said, that

also

is

is

supermundane, be-

supermundane? f

paternal profundity, according to the Chaldaic Theology',

of which triads contains father ,

consists of three triads, each

power, and

intellect.

See

my

collection of the

Chaldean Oracles,

in the Classical Journal.

-j-

In addition

above-mentioned

to the

concerning place, the following

is

Damascus, the preceptor of Simplicius, a

and who laboured much in philosophy.

me

place appear to

to be

no

utility of place, therefore,

he thus writes
falling off

less

of

man most

Proclus

inquisitive,

His disquisitions on

admirable than novel.

he wishes

Every thing

opinion

the hypothesis of Damascius of

F rom

to discover its essence,

the

and

in generation, in consequence of

from a nature impartible, and without interval, both

according to essence and energy, has a twofold separation,

the one

according to essence, but the other according to energy, or passion.

101
which

according to energy,

That

also in generation,

fold

the one being connascent with essence, according to which,

essence

in a continual flux

is

which

essence, according to

also,

and motion

is

two-

but the other proceeding from

and not at-once-collected energies.

the separation, indeed, of energy

motion

is

energises differently at different

it

times, possessing extended,

And

is

immediately in want of

is

consubsistent with

it.

The

separation,

But

according to motion, becomes energetic or passive.

the separation of essence becomes likewise twofold

the one being

And

a divulsion into multitude, but the other passing into bulk.

the separation, according to magnitude and bulk, becomes

imme-

diately connected with position, in consequence of the parts falling

Position likewise

into different situations.

my

being connascent with essence, as of

ward, and the feet downward

as at

is

twofold

body, the head

the one

up-

is

but the other being adventitious,

one time I have position in a house, and at another in the

forum

and

it

is

evident that the former continues as long as

the thing exists, but that the other becomes different at different

But we properly

times.

say, that those things

have position, the

parts of which are extended, and are distant from each other.

Hence

position appears properly to belong to magnitudes,

and the

boundaries which they contain, because these are distant according to continuity.
yet, at the

But numbers, although they are separated,

same time, do not appear

to have position, because they

are not distant and extended, unless you should say that these also
receive magnitude and interval.

For

all intervals,

in consequence

of destroying a subsistence collected into one, cause that which

in them

to be placed by position, losing, as

just as, by departing

said to be

it

were, independent power;

from themselves

in their energies, they are

moved, and

in order that they

finite,

is

to be changed into another, in which also they are said

Of

to change.

may

these intervals, therefore,

not be perfectly extended to the inde-

there are collective measures

measure of some things, according

time, indeed,

to the

of others, definite multitude, which

is

being the

energy in motion

but

number, being the mea-

102
sure, according to a distinction of essence

and of others,

definite

magnitude, as a cubit, or something of this kind, according to

continuity.

Of

others, again, place

a dispersion of position.

moved

to be

in time

and motion

sence,

ticipates of being

and

position,

For we

is

the measure, according to

Hence, things that are moved are said

but they are said to have position of es-

moved.

And

that place indeed subsists about

something belonging to things situated,

in the

evident.
;

differences of place, surveyed

same manner

as the right

hand and

before and behind.

left,

But that place bounds, measures, and

tion, you may learn from hence
for we
:

though

position,

it

orderly arranges posisay, that a thing has

way what-

should be disorderly posited, in any

but a thing

is

which have position

say, that those things are in place

according to position

ever

essence itself also par-

itself, in place, so far as

and upward and downward are the

the

is

is

then said to have

its

proper convenient

when it receives its proper place, just as any tiling,

whatever it may be, proceeds into being, but then has its proper
opportune subsistence, when it exists in a becoming time.
position,

Through
tion

ward

my

good posi-

body, indeed, upward, but the foot down-

the liver in the right-hand parts, but the heart in the

middle
fore

place, therefore, every part of a thing has a

the head of

and the

eyes, through

but the back, by which

which seeing, we walk, are be-

we

carry burthens,

These, indeed, are differences through place

of an embryo, one

is

is

behind.

just as of the parts

fabricated before another, through time, and

one age orderly proceeds prior to another

nor are the Trojan

confounded with the Peloponnesian transactions

posterior are the differences of time, just as

for prior

ward, and the other four divisions are the differences of place
also Aristotle acknowledges.

The

to

as

parts of the world, therefore,

have their proper position in the whole, on account of

Hence, speaking

and

upward and down,

place.

superficially, place, simply so called , is, according

this conception , that which bounds the position of bodies

speaking of place as having a natural subsistence,

it is

but

that which

103
bounds the position according
nature , both with respect

to

to

corporeal parts , conformably to

each other and

to

the whole ,

and

the position according to the whole with respect to the parts.

as different parts of the earth

For,

and the heavens are arranged in

on account of

situations,

different

also

northern but others southern, so

place,

and some parts are

the whole heaven and the

whole earth, being parts of the world, have a convenient measure

of position, and an orderly distribution on account of place; the

former being allotted the circumference of the universe, but the

middle of

latter possessing the

coincidence to the parts of

(roTos)

and

it is

universe.

denominated from conjecture

is

rooragsiv)

it

the

(tx.

place which imparts

If,

likewise, place

rooro ru^uv, lege s* too

.

becoming place from being situated near to things con-

jectural,* as being a certain conjecture of intellectual distinction,

thus also what has been said of place will accord with this etymo-

For to images which have a conjectural subsistence, place

logy.

imparts an establishment, and a similitude to their paradigms.

For unless each of the parts of things, which are separated by interval,

was

never be similar to

its

paradigm, but every order, convenient

And, indeed,

measure, and elegant arrangement, would vanish.

if

image would

situated according to its proper place, an

you take away

place,

you

will see the disposition of bodies

extraneous and disordered, and tending to perfect indefiniteness.

For in what position

not adapted to any

will each of the parts stop,

On

are naturally moved, are

their proper position

when they

this account, therefore, things

which

may

obtain

moved

in order that they

and things which are permanent, abide in

a convenient measure of position through a love of place.

place

is

the cause of something to bodies, and to

natures, and

been

what

^re

it is

may

all

Hence

corporeal

perhaps be understood from what has

said.

It will follow,

however, from

this, that

such a place

is

neither

* Sensible objects are conjectural because the proper know,

ledge of

them belongs

to opinion.

104
the boundary of that which contains,

of order or distinction, since

which
body

exist in,
for,

it is

how

for

is

this the cause

rather defined by the things

and are comprehended by

it ?

nor yet

though some one should say that

it is

will it be

an immaterial

body, which has parts distant and different from each other,
this also will require that

which may arrange

it,

and cause

this

part to be situated in the middle, and that in the circumference.

Nor

possible that a thing of this kind can be interval

is it

for,

through the same causes, interval, in consequence of possessing

difference,

and having

its

parts differently situated, will also

require a certain convenient position.

to be the

measure of things posited, just as time

number of the motion

the

position

Place, therefore, appears

is

ventitious,

is

said to be

Since, however,

of things moved.

twofold, the one being essential, and the other adplace also

will

perfect element of that

be twofold, the one becoming the

which has

sisting according to accident.

position, but the other sub-

There

a certain difference

is also

of essential position, so far as, in a certain respect, wholes themselves,

have the proper position of their proper parts, both with

respect to each other,

and to the universe

have a proper position with reference

remaining parts.

Hence, place

also

the whole and the

becomes twofold

peculiar, belonging to individual places

defined according to position

or so far as parts

to

in the whole.

and

according

distinct subsistence of each, according to

say, that the earth

is

the one

For, as whole

twofold, the one belonging to each of the parts,

definite

but the other being

is

to the

which we

a certain whole, and not the earth only,

but also an animal and a plant, and each of the parts in these
but the other being more comprehensive, as

when we

whole world, the whole earth, and the whole

wholeness* there are proper parts

The world

is

in

like

my

and of each

manner, of place

a whole of ivholes , which wholes or wholenesses

are the celestial and elementary spheres.

to

air,

say the

Translation of the Timaeus of Plato.

See the Introduction

we

one

say, that

the convenient position of the proper parts of

is

my

a tiling, as of

parts in the

my

whole of

body

but another

the convenient position of the whole as of a part, in the place of

is

Thus, the place of the earth,

more comprehensive wholeness.

its

the place of terrestrial natures

sesses the

be deprived of

would

its

this so far as earth pos-

and

position about the middle of the universe,

the convenient position of

retain

still

For, though the earth should

middle of the universe.

in their proper whole

but

it

would not then possess

Hence,

venient position as a part of the universe.

earth were hurled upward,

and the parts which

it

it

would

middle.

also, a

if

man

but he would no longer

more

was removed from the

it

to the whole.

to things

for they do not so

the whole

suspended in the air would have the

convenient order of his proper parts

do

con-

contains would preserve their formation

have the convenient order as of a part

parts belong

its

again to the middle

fall

with respect to each other, even when

Thus,

it

proper parts

its

more

vanquished by more excellent natures

since

than wholes themselves

total,

much vanquish

And

subordinate, as they are

and

this because first

are in a greater ratio to second natures, than second to third

natures

this

being the case, though a clod of earth should have

a proper convenient position in the air, yet

ward, through a desire of that which

which

peculiar

is

from that which

connexion

is
is

common, and deprived

just as plants,

in consequence of

wholeness.

For

all

when

but

common
bodies,

of

when
its

its

divulsed

appropriate

all

their parts, yet immediately

things live on account of the one

divulsed from

wholeness.

For that

total.

being divulsed from their

through proximate wholenesses, so long

if it is

would tend down-

torn up by the roots, though

Hence, as long as every thing

animal.

it

more

every where dead and cold,

they are in complete possession of

droop,

is

proximate,

is

rooted in the world,

it lives,
it

is

common
mundane

and

is

preserved

also torn

from the

Thus, therefore, the natural tendencies of

and their permanencies in their proper

places, are pre-

served, by admitting place to be a thing of this kind.

And

the

106
local

motion of things which are moved,

is

nothing

else

than the

assumption of different positions, at different times,

which
air or

is

moved

obtains

appropriate position

its

till

the intermediate

water being divided, and receiving the position which

which

has, as long as that

also, of

the parts of air,

when moved.

The

is

The

stronger proceeds.

is

that

it

then

position,

that which a clod of earth or I receive

place to

which

change

not definitely

is

my

peculiar place, but the place of surrounding air, in a different

am

part of which I

Hence,

at different times.

moved

are

moved

are

how

being dubious

it

may

to be

moved,

let

be

us see

the philosopher Syrianus states the doubt, and gives the

which are

Some one may ask,

moved, are moved in place,

solution of it:

rather from, whence , whither.

appear to be at

not in the

first,

and, as

it

how

moved, are

since things

For they are

were, proper place of themselves

rest.

extent

its

things

not, therefore, say, that things

they were they would be at

surveyed according to

For, in short, things in place

May we

rest.

says he,

which are moved, are in place and not in place

if

things which

in place, since things in place

justly said to be at rest rather than

how

become situated

also naturally adapted to

But they are

just as

we

since

in place,

say that the sun

is

in the constellation called the Lion, because the extent of the

Lion comprehends the sun.

We

also say that a flying eagle is in

the air, and that a ship sailing with a prosperous wind

sea

for all these

have place considered in

its

with a greater latitude, but they have not a

place, as long as they are moved.

who speak about

place,

appear to

attention to this external place.

the place of the earth

universe

which

is

first

And most of
me especially

in the

and peculiar

those, indeed,
to direct their

For, on being asked, what

they reply, that

it is

is

the middle of the

the peculiar place of the universe, and of the

earth as in the universe.

of the heavens

is

extent, or assumed

On

being also asked, what

they say, that which surrounds

not, in their reply, adduce that place of the earth

convenient position to

its

parts

is

the place

but they do

which gives

and, in a similar manner, that

107
place of

tlie

heavens through which

Hence,

all

men,

that which

is

as

is

They

thing.

is

total place, is

and which

is

it,

is

also

immovable, looking to this

moved together with

abides, being peculiar to that

hensive, as body.

separate from

separate from that

considered in

the peculiar place of every thing, and which

with

is

not precedaneously the place of that

also consider place as

place,

parts are orderly arranged.

For, in reality, that which pertains

from more

in place, and

more common

its

seems, assert that place

in place.

to each particular

which

it

which

is

it.

is

its

extent.

For

co-essentiallised

But common

place

more total and compre-

108

From Olympiodorus,
It

in Aristot. Meteor, p.59.

know that

the divine Proclus,

in his Commentaries on the Timseus # of Plato,
requisite to

is

refers metals to the

lead

ascribed

is

dulness,

seven planets, and says, that

through

to Saturn,

and coldness.

composed of gold and

But electrum

[or a metal

silver] is referred to Jupiter,

through the well-tempered and

vivific

nature of

In a similar manner, also, with respect

the star.

which

to the metal

migma

weight,

its

is

migma

called

more highly valued than

is

well tempered.

on account of

Again, iron
its

on account of

gold,

Copper

is,

it

in any of the Five

-f-

From what

mixture ,

it

and

is lost,

as it

is

Venus,

also because

Book

of

not to be found

Books that are now extant.

Proclus says of this metal, called

migma

or,

appears to be the same with orichalcum , which Plato,

in the Critias or Atlanticus, says,

dour. Pliny, in Hist. Nat.

lib.

shines with a

of the earth.

who

then existed.

It

is,

fiery splen-

xxxiv. cap. 2, says, that this kind

of metal has not existed for a long time,

lawyer,

is

were, the

referred to

is

nature

as

* This extract probably formed a part of a Sixth

Proclus on the Timeeus, which

and

power and sharpness;

incisive

its florid

but the

]-

ascribed to Mars,

is

but gold to the sun, which

fountain of light.

owing

to the barrenness

however, mentioned by Martianus the

flourished in the time of

Alexander Severus, as

if it

109
Venus

near to the sun, in the same manner as

is

copper

is

through

Tin

to gold.

its

same time,

referred

is

likewise, because

ascribed to the

moon

Mercury,

and splendour, and

clearness

the moon, just as tin

to

is

Mercury

to silver.

since silver

at the

is

near to

And

silver is

when

placed

near to gold, appears to be illuminated by the

and to become more splendid, in the same

gold,

manner

From

as the

the

moon

is

illuminated by the sun.

MS. Commentary

Tenth Book of the

Proclus having

Proclus
Republic of Plato

on the
*

of

observed, that

some persons

in his time have been seen sitting; or standing;

on

the sepulchres in which they had been buried,

which, says he,

Aristeas,

is

also related

by the ancients of

Hermodorus, and Epimenides, subjoins

the following examples, the

first

of which

is

taken

from the History of Clearchus, the disciple of

Aristotle.

Cleonymus, the Athenian,

who was

fond of hearing philosophic discourses,

*

The

learned reader,

who

is

man

becom-

desirous of seeing the original

of the above Translation, will find

lation of Platos Republic.

it

in the Notes to

my

Trans-

110
ing very sorrowful

and

associates,

on the death of one of his

giving himself up

to

despair,

apparently died, and was laid out according to

custom

but his mother, as she was folding him

her embraces,

in

garment, and

taking off his

kissing him, perceived in

him a gentle breathing,

and, being extremely joyful on the occasion, de-

Cleonymus

layed his burial.

afterwards was restored to

that he saw and heard

He

state.

when he was

from certain bonds,

liberated

and narrated

life,

all

in a separate

appeared, as

that his soul

said,

a short time

in

soar from

to

if
its

body, and that having ascended above the earth,

he saw in
figure
to

it

places

all-various both

and colour, and streams of

men

and that at

region sacred to Vesta,

rivers

he came

last

for

their

unknown

to a certain

which was under the

direction of daemoniacal powers in indescribable

female forms.

The second example

machius,

who

is

flourished

from the historian Nau(says

time of our ancestors, and

who was an
the

illustrious

to

death

came

fEtolians,

of one Polycritus,

and principal man among

This Polycritus died, and re-

fEtolians.

turned

is

Proclus) in the

in

life

to

the

the

ninth
general

month

his

assembly of the

and joined with them

sultations about

after

in

their con-

what measures were

best to be

Hiero, the Ephesian, and other his-

adopted.

torians, testify the truth of this, in that account

which they sent

of transactions

to

king Anti-

oonus, and their other absent friends.

The

third

as follows

is

In

Nicopolis,

not

long since,

the same

thing happened to one

Eurynous.

This man,

who was

buried in the

and

front of the city, revived fifteen days after,

said

saw and heard many wonderful

that he

things under the earth, which he was ordered not

He

to relate.

conduct was

lived

some time

more just

after this,

revival

his

after

and his
than

before.

The

fourth

who

lonians,

is

lived near the time of the historian

Naumachius.
third

day

of Rufus, a priest of the Thessa-

This

after his

man was
death,

restored to

for

the

life

the

purpose of

performing certain sacred ceremonies, which he

had promised

and having

to perform,

fulfilled his

promise, again died.

The

fifth

and

last is of

one Philonsea,

under the reign of Philip.

She was the daughter

of Demostratus and Charite,

phipolis,

and died soon

Craterus.

month

She

after her death,

who

after her

revived,

who lived

lived in

Am-

marriage to one

however, in the sixth

and,

through her love

named Machates, who came to

Demostratus from his own country Pelle, had

of a youth

112
connexion with him privately
successively

amour,

this

length detected,

she

many

for

however,

again died

nights

being

at

previous to

which, she declared that she acted in this manner

according to the will of terrestrial daemons.

Her

dead body was seen by every one lying in her

fathers house

prior to this
to be

and on digging the place, which

had contained her body,

it

was found

empty, by those of her kindred who came

through unbelief of what had happened

thither,
to her.*'

The

truth of this narration

testified

is

both by the epistles of Hipparchus and those of

Arridasus to Philip, in which they give an ac-

count of the

affairs of

Amphipolis.

Proclus then, with his usual sagacity, observes,

concerning the cause of this phaenomenon, as

Many other of the ancients have
follows
col:

lected
died,

history of those

that

and afterwards revived

are the natural

have apparently

and among these

philosopher Democritus,

in his

concerning Hades, and that wonderful

Conotes, the familiar of Platof ; * * * for the

writings

death was not, as

of the whole

life

it

seemed, an entire desertion

of the body,

* See this instance of revivification

but a cessation,
more

fully

detailed

by

Plilegon Trallianus, in his Treatise de Mirabilibus et Longsevis.

-|-

There

two or three

is

an unfortunate chasm here in the Manuscript of

lines.

113
caused by some blow, or perhaps a wound

but the

bonds ofthe soul yet remained rooted about the marrow, and the heart contained in

empyreuma

of

acquired the

life

profundity the

this remaining, it again

and

life;

its

which had been extinguished,

in

consequence of becoming adapted to animation.

that it is possible for
Lastly, Proclus adds
:

the soul to depart from, and enter into the body,

is

him who, according

soul-attracting wand on a

evident from

used a

and who persuaded

lates in his Treatise

to Clearchus,

sleeping lad

as Clearchus

Aristotle,

on Sleep, that the soul

be separated from the body, and that

into

the body, and uses

it

as a lodging.

striking the lad with the wand, he

as

it

it

drew

re-

may

enters

For,

out, and,

were, led his soul, for the purpose of evincing

that the body

was immovable when the soul was

at a distance from

uninjured

it,

and that

it

was preserved

but the soul being again led into the

body, by means of the wand, after

its

entrance nar-

From

this circumstance,

therefore, both the spectators

and Aristotle were

rated every particular.

persuaded that the soul

is

separate from the body.

THE END.

LONDON
PRINTED BY

.1.

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ANSWER
TO

DR. GILLIESS
SfC.

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AN

ANSWER
TO

SUPPLEMENT

DR. GILLIESS

TO HIS

NEW

ANALYSIS
OP

ARISTOTLE'S AVORKS;
IN WHICH THE

UNFAITHFULNESS OF HIS TRANSLATION OF ARISTOTLES ETHICS

IS

UNFOLDED.

BY

TIIOMAS TAYLOR.
/

HjaxXriro; tyu <ri ju.= S kutuj eXhit a paver a

p' tenfcipevoi;'
Oi%* vpil vnmavi, tgij
Eif epoi aydrxTtoi; 'rricpvaici' 01 o ayci(>i9 poi

OvSii; tout uvZuj xat iraga IUperUpOvn-

Begone, ye blockheads ! Heraclitus cries,

leave my labours to the beam'd and wise ;
By wit, by knowledge, studious to be read,
I scorn the multitude, alive and dead.

DIOG. L AERT.

And

Johnson.

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..

Jiawa*u
T

.t ^

.r.

t-viaua a-.u.

xu

'

*BT

H3IJ.IT KI

,-r -

*
I

sH

f*
-ff.

_w

* i

'

.ac

ANSWER
SUPPLEMENT OF DR.

D
I

R.

GILLIES

GILLIES,

$c.

having thought proper to

attempt a confutation of the proofs

had brought forward

to the

which

public of his

not having given either the manner or the

matter of Aristotle in a work which he calls

a

translation

that

of the Ethics and Politics of

philosopher

sumed

and

to ridicule the

doctrines,
disciples,

and

to

as

he has

also pre-

most sublime of Plato's

calumniate the best of his

displaying in this attempt no less

ignorance than

illiberal invective,

comes necessary

it

now be-

that I should fully unfold to

the public the injustice which he has done

to Aristotle in that

work, and

also to the best

of the Platonists, in the Supplement to his

Analysis of Aristotles speculative works.

I shall

begin with examining what he has

advanced in

his

Supplement,
B

as preparatory

2
to the

specimens of ignorance and unfaith-

fulness
in

which

criticizing

Ethics.

may
so

will be so copiously displayed

his

In the

translation

first

of Aristotles

place, then, I think

te fairly presumed, that the

it

man who is

ignorant of the style of Aristotle in his

acroamatic writings as not

to

know

that

it

is

remarkably obscure, cannot by any means

have penetrated the depth which those writings contain.

That he did not know

this, is

abundantly evident from the following passage,

in

which,

also,

from

his inability to

correct a very obvious error in the

text of a quotation

Greek

from Simplicius, he has

made that philosopher contradict himself.

The passage I allude to is in a note to the
Supplement of

That he

his Analysis, p.

215, octavo

(Simplicius) gave into the

mode

of allegorical interpretation appears from the

following short sentence, containing the just

praise of Aristotles perspicuity
ov$ (rv u&cXncoig cuviy[icc(ri' oog
i

s%f>*lcrocvJ

t vjv

aAA

<rct(p$totv

Lib.

toov

am

nravjog

7r()osriy.Yio-,

r.cijyiyo^iMy.

O vh

av]cv Tivsg

r oov

a?Aou

Simplic.

[xv9ag

7rs^t7rs]o(cr^.ixJog

in

Procem.

lie made not any

use of fables, or dark symbols, like

some

>

philosophers before him, but preferred perspicuity to every other ornament. Strange!
that Simplicius should praise Aristotle for his
perspicuity,'

by Dr.

when,
he

Gillies,

another place quoted

in

that Aristotle

says,

was

purposely obscure in his acroamatic writings,

ut scgniorcs ab eorum

Simplic. ad Auscult. Physic,

dehortaretur.
fol.

See

*.

ii

studio repellerit et

p.

23 of the Life of

Aristotle,

prefixed to the translation of his Ethics,

Dr.

Gillies,

therefore,

octavo edition.

that

we

7rs(>nr&Tcccru.aJos

and

tor

in

It

evident,

is

passage

above

the

by
lor

should read Truman STCKryujog,

and then Simplicius

cnx(psictv acrutpziocv,

* For the sake of the learned reader, I will give the whole
passage from which Dr. Gillies has made this extract. Af%i}
is Sitj^jxsv uiv avrou tujv <rvyyQaix[iMTiuv, si; te ra e%ujteixx,
tix ra frroffxa, xai ra SiaXoyixx, xxi oXui; ra p.r) axga; xxt$eix; <J>f0v7i ovra, xai s Jf ra axcoajxaTixa, aiv xai avrrj Ecrriv i)
TtgaypaTEia, sv toi; xx^oxfxxrixoi; atrapEiav etTit^Seuts, Six
rxvrrjs tom; xQufj.oTsgov; aitox%ovop.vo;, u>; nrx Exsivrj; (lege

wxTf sxsivoi;)

fjnj

Se

ysygapdai

rr v II spray xadatpsiriv

[JjETx

AXe^avS^o; A^kttoteXei

eutToxtIeiv

tom; xxgoxaaTixoM; Tuiv Xoyaiv. tivi

aXXwv,
xoivoi

si

syu

Toi

Soxsiv.

txSe

ya

ovv

AXe^xvSqou

yey xpoTo;.

aurov

iro;

oux Ofdcu; ETroirjxa; sxSou;

yap sn

SioixopoEv ytAEi;

rwv

xa9 ov ; s^raiSeuSyjIJ.v Xoyoug, ovtoi nravlxv etovtxi

is

CooAofpjv ay txi;

7Tsf t

ra aciarx

E/xirsipiai; '

raff Savaascri SixpspEiv. avfo; txSe avTsypapEv.

(3x<riXsi AXE%av8p-ji svtpxrlsiv.

sypxpa; p.01

AcixtoteXy^

itspi ru>v

axpoa^x*

tixujv Xoyujv, oiofxsvo; Ssiv avrov; puxarlsiv ev aToppY^oi;.

qmv

auTov f xxi exSeSo/xevom; xxi

eicri

pkovoig toi; T)[xu>v

xxomtxtiv.

p.7)

exSeSo^evov f

eppoucro.

i.

e.

icSi

yap
The writings
.

cuvetoi

f Aristotle receiving a twofold division, into the exoteric.

4
,

will speak accurately

and consistently, and

the translation of the whole passage will be

follows

as

employed

neither

Aristotle

nor symbolical enigmas, like some

fables

philosophers before him, but preferred ob-

That

scurity to every other veil.

the true reading

is

this

is

likewise evident from an

ancient Latin version of Simplicius on the

Categories, printed at Venice, 1588, folio, in

which the above passage is thus translated

Verumtamen neque fabulis, neque amig-

matibus,
citis,

metaphorisque impli-

conjecturis

quemadmodum

nonnulli ante ipsum

such as the historical, and those composed

in the

form of dia-

logue; and, in short, those which do not pay attention to ex-

treme accuracy, and

into the acroamatic, to

present treatise belongs

this

being the case,

which

in his

class the

acroamatic

more
very appearance evinced they were not

writings, he studies obscurity, through this deterring the

indolent, as

if

written for

them.

Persia,

wrote

their

to

him

rity to Aristotle.

acroamatic works
doctrines in

men

Alexander, then,

which

as follows

Alexander wishing prospe-

You have not done

for in

what

we were

shall

right in publishing your

we

surpass others,

of the most excellent things than in power.

returned the following answer:

wishing prosperity.

if

the

become common to all

excel others in the knowledge

instructed

indeed would rather

after the subversion of

You wrote

To

this Aristotle

Aristotle to king .Alexander,

to

me

concerning

my

acroa-

matic works, thinking that they ought not to have been diKnow, therefore, that they are published and not
vulged.
published

Farewell/
letter

for they

can be understood by

my

auditors alone.

Simplicius adds, that, according to Plutarch, this

of Alexander refers

to the

metaphysics of Aristotle,

5
usus

est,

modo

dicendi

luto

omni

sed pro

It is

tigates the reason

mode

likewise indispu-

what immediately

tably manifest, from

this passage, in

which Simplicius

why

It

may

be

of concealing their

and

con-

knew

was the general practice of the

writers of antiquity to

who

imme-

fairly

cluded, therefore, that Dr. Gillies

it

inves-

of writing, as the learned reader

diately perceive.

fol-

Aristotle adopted this

has the original in his possession will

that

invo-

et

maxime

obscuritatem

laudavit et probavit.

lows

velamine

alio

not

earliest

employ different modes

wisdom from the

vulgar,

that Aristotle adopted for this purpose

obscurity of diction, though the former particular

well

is

known

to

every tyro in the

history of philosophy, and the latter

is

obvi-

ous to the meanest capacity.

Having premised thus much,

in the next place, to

ment.
to

In

show

p.

107,

examine
then,

proceed,

his

Supple-

he endeavours

that those supposed entities, called

by the Pythagoreans numbers, and by the

Platonists ideas,

eternal

and considered by them

as

and immutable essences, the true

causes of the universe, have not any real substantial

existence in nature, but are merely

6
fictions of fancy, created

action of

bodied

human

in

from the

fleeting

em-

thought, expressed and

language.

This, he says,

evi-

is

dent from the doctrine of Aristotle, according

to

which, definitions are the pure

fountains of science only

in

when they

originate

an accurate examination and patient com-

parison of individual objects; so that indivi-

duals have a real existence in nature

many

general names, expressing

but

individuals

of the same kind, have not any correspondent

archetypes.

To

this I

answer, that

have

my

already shown, in the Introduction to

translation

of Aristotles Metaphysics, that

Aristotle did not essentially differ

and

in the doctrine of ideas;

consistent with himself unless

that those ideas

fabricative
subsist also

which

subsist in

now

would not

he admitted
Deity with

power and unerring knowledge,

in the human soul in a manner

accommodated

to

its

nature

partial instead of universal

deprived of productive

so as to possess

knowledge,

power, and

wakened from dormant capacity

by

shall

farther observe, that the Stagirite

fie

from Plato

objects of sense.

doctrine delivered

This

by

is

into

to
to

be

be

energy

evident from the

Aristotle in

the

first

book of

his Posterior Analytics, that univer-

sal for the purpose of demonstration are superior to particulars

that demonstrations are

conversant with things more universal

from which demonstra-

that the principles

composed have

tions are

ence, and

tl

and

precedency*

a priority ot exist-

in nature to particu-

* Aristotle, in the second chapter of the

first

hook of

his

Posterior Analytics, having enumerated the three conditions of

true science; viz. 1st, that the cause of the thing must

known,

words, that the middle term of the de-

in other

or,

be

monstration must be the cause of the conclusion; 2d, that this

cause must be compared with the

know

to

it

we may

effect, so that

be the cause of the conclusion

and 3d, that

this

conclusion must have a necessary subsistence, observes as

lows: Ei roivuv trn ro

aofohix.nxyv

apstrwv,

xat

yap

ovrev;

hixvv pevov. rvXXoyirpop

aorohify;

hi

etvai,

sv.

cvpXsgrjxo;,

yvuipi^wrspa
7nrraasOa,

ofporepwv,

p.ev

yap

ai

serial

hi
orav

etvat ,
ro]v

yap EofirrarSat wv

e^eiv

ro

xai

amav

xai irpoyivcomtOfAsya ov

fjvovov

on

ij

8iapvsrpo$

ofirrvjrlai

aifohifyp e<rn,

aofohtfyv

sernv.

otporspa.

ama

i$uj[xev.

rovruiv

aXrftrj y,Ev ovv

Eofirrr/fjirjv.

havaofohixlwv, on ovx

rov

oixEtai rov

avv

xai

x.at

amtvv

xai

apyai

etrn ro poy ov otirrarar oiov

orpwnvv

e%oy aorohifyv avrovv. ro

xara

xai

ecrovrai xai

ovx sarar ov yapofoirjrsi

on ovx

avpifj.Tpo$.

xai ofcuonvv

e aXrftujv r' ivat,

yvwpi[vtvrEpw,

<rvp,rfepa.<rp,alo;.

avayxoj xai rijk

sofitrracrSai, oiov eAe/xsv

stficrnjjuojv

fol-

ama
/xev,

xai irporepa,

re,

on

sirfep

[xtj
/xij

xat
rote

ama.

rov erepov rpoofov riv %vvievai,

nv sihvai on sen. ofporspa hsern xai yvcopipvwrspx

Siyivp. ov yap ravrov, orporEpov ro\ <f>vrei, xai ifpop yaa;
tfporspov. ovh yvuipiu-ujrspov, xat yfj.iv yvwpip,wrepov.
Xsyiv
h ofpop rjjxa; p*sv ofpoTEpa xai yvcvpipuvrEpa ra tyyvrEpov ryp

aXXa

xai

ra ofoppwrepov.
itm h ofoppcvraliv [j.sv, ra xaQoXov aaXirra. syyvrxlw h, ra
xxhxxrra. xat avnxirai ravr aXXr)Xot{. i. e. If then
ai<r&>)<rtvp'

aofXcvc

orporsex xai yvajup-wrepa

'

science

is

such as

we have

established

it

to be,

it is

also ne-

and are the causes of the propositions

lars,

they prove.

If,

therefore, the causes of de-

monstrations are universal, and these uni-

versal have a precedency in nature

larsy

it

is

to

particu-

evident that individuals are not the

only things which have a real existence in

cessary that demonstrative science should consist from things

known

immediate, more

true, first,

than, prior to,

and the

causes of the conclusion: for thus they will be the proper

which is demonstrated. For there may be

a syllogism indeed without these conditions ; but there will
not be demonstration, since such a syllogism will not produce

principles of that

science.

It is

necessary, therefore, that the things from

which

demonstrative science consists should be true, because that

which is not cannot be scientifically known ; as, for instance,

commensurable with its side.

be from things first and
indemonstrable, because they will not be scientifically known
without demonstration. For to know scientifically things of
which there is demonstration, and this not from accident, is to
that the diameter of a square
It

is

is

also necessary that they should

likewise necessary

possess demonstration.

It

should be the causes

more knoivn

conclusion.
fically,

of,

is

Causes, indeed, because

when we know
They are

the cause

the causes.

than,

we

that they

and prior

then

know

to the
scienti-

and prior because they are

also previously known, not only

our understanding what

they signify,

from

but from our knowing

But things prior and more known subsist

For that which is prior to nature is not
in a twofold respect.
the same with that which is prior to us ; nor is that which is
more known to nature the same with that which is more
known to us. By things prior and more known to us, I mean
such as are nearer to sense but things simply prior and more
that they are true.

known are such as are more remote from

more

sense.

And

things

remote fro?n sens l are such as are especially universal

but such as are most near to

opposed to each other/

it

are particulars, and these are

%o

9
and

nature,

that particulars are in the order

of things subordinate to universals.

In the next place Dr. Gillies endeavours to

illustrate his

remarks by presenting the reader

with what he calls a translation of the fourteenth chapter of the seventh book of Aristoto give

Metaphysics, prudently omitting

tles

the original, at the same time that he

my

lifies

same chapter.

translation of the

That the learned reader, however,

how

vi-

may

see

he has deformed the text of Aristotle by

which neither pre-

a rambling paraphrase,
serves the

manner nor

the matter of

and the

thor, I shall give both the original

Doctors translation

Qxvsgov

sij

au-

its

xvtom t ovtoov

to rvjjo&xivov xxi Toig rag i^sxg Xsyovtnv ovcrixg TS

c

xxi

yoo^xg

ysvovg
si^v\

sv

sivxi

mov

to

too

sv

xxi txvtov too

\oyoo SvjXov
Xsyoov

TO

COV,

010V

xxi

sivou

[t-SV

OVV

7rug

sy

tov

oti' sv.

xx9xvto, TO^S

Tl

QiOOV,

%u)f>i<3 0c

TO XVT 0
%u)f>tg

x[vlx

^ia(f)o^uv.

xv^^oottio

9 iv,

sxxtsqoo.

sv

xxi

tom

xxi

Troiovcrt,

xxi

x[jox,

ovv

si

sst

si

xxi

STSgov'

i]

avTOV

yx(>

to

Tig

sidog

sx tou

yxf>

s?i

i7T7rco,

too

^is^sitri

y.sp

roc
t\toi

yxg

Xoyov

uvB^ooTTog

xvt

XXI xsyjoo^icr^svov, xvxyxyi XXI

XXI TO

ovmxg

xxi
XXL

ovmv

^ITTOVV,
*

T0

cots

Tl

xxi to ioov.

s?xi, xxi Six t

CYljAXlVSlV,

SV TOO 17T7TU, UXTTl'S^ <TV

sv

si

CXVTOO,

ov xxi yjoopig

10
J

OCVT0V
^/Tro^Of

T/f

vj

7tsov

ovkovv arrsi^a

yag xu\a

ov

aX?C

oog

(rvy.ve&Yjxog

sxsivov

sn

yap

ov

s^ai

x-ou arfjsjaiy

sxa^y.

srs^ov sv

cov

SlVai

y\

Qmov

ovcria

sn

o avSpooTi'og.

yao

ovcrioc rs

aXXov Xsyejai.

to

skocTU

sv

s^

y.r,,

si

avS^oorrog, x,ai ys'jog avrov sxsivo. x,as

oov o ocvS(>w7rog'

aXXov

y.sv

i^sa

srai,

a^a

(^ooov

ssai sxas'ov

xai

aX A
oil,

rv^fcaivsi*

Tig Tl ^COOV

ocov

sx,

(yoov.

x.ar

i^sai array] a

rovrov.

sittsiv s

kxi t5s ovn.

svi

5/7T1J

7nxvju arorra.
srrog

Tt

crvyxsirai

icrug

T0U

SI fJLtV jU-f Qs^Sl

aSvvxrov

OTV

T07T0,

vroAAa s$ai avro to

^loov

7roXv7TO^Og

aKXu

pspixjai.

STTSITU

apa vrra^si avry,

yu(>

[AVI ,

$i7roi>v
V]

TOU

XCt/

ravavria
(I

TO cdOV T0VT0

S<?Xl

cf ovcria

roov sv

avro

aovvarov ya$>.

7 oig

avrov (yvov

7roog

aKXcv

ovx.ovv ovx.

sri, sx, t ivog

(yuoig.

rrwg

x.ai

rs

oiov

>

sivai

sn

$87Ti

rovroov

on

(yoov o ovcia rovro

to

rcov

ravra

aicrB^roov

arorroorsga.

si %Y]

avro rra^ avro to

Gilliess translation

as follows

crvy.&aivsi,

aovvarov ovriog sysiv ,

ovx. s^iv disa avroov ovroog, cog

Dr.

rs

nvsg

xai
Xov

(pa<riv.

of this chapter

who

is

regard ideas as sub-

stances and separable substances

ing the more general ideas

less

With the same absurdities are

those chargeable

the

(^toov

consider-

as constituting

general included under the same

common term for example, the ideas animaU biped reaso?i, as constituting and com:

n
posing the idea man.

ideas to be

Suppose

substances, and the idea animal, for instance,

existing in

man and

two kinds must

horse

this idea in those

either be numerically

one

and the same thing, or two different things

in definition

is

it

plainly one and the same,

we mean the same thing by the word

animal when we say that men are animals,
and that horses are animals. If the idea man
for

existed as a separate being or entity,

would

it

follow of course that the ideas animal biped ,

,

composing the

reason ,

exist as separate

animal,

if it

you

beings

subsist the

man and
entity

subsists

horse

would

Farther

if

should also

same with

idea

which

yourself,

same individual entity

in

and thus the same individual

subsist

separately from itself!

one and the same idea animal

both in

man and

horse , in

biped , and in horse a quadruped ,

the

the

so that

horse in the sense in

are identically the

would

man

were precisely one and the same

man and

thing in

idea

same individual be

at

man

must not

once a biped and

quadruped, and thus the same subject be

at

once endowed with two mutually exclusive

attributes

participation

As

this

cannot happen by actual

of those attributes, so neither

12

can

it

possibly be brought about

The

mixture, or in any other way.

sition,

animal must therefore be numerically

idea

different in

many

be

by juxtapo-

man and

separate

animal for their

this idea enters

horse

entities

essential

and there must

having the idea

constituent, since

not adventitiously, but essen-

The

tially, into their respective definitions.

idea animal, therefore,

man,

horse,

whose

different

and

is

other

many,

constituting

species

or

tribes

names cannot be reciprocally

predicated of each other, because in that case

those different ideas

all

the same idea, which

is

is

would be one and

totally absurd.

It

impossible, therefore, that the idea animal

can have any substantial or separable existence, or be any thing beside what
all

is

found in

the different tribes of animals.

The

ab-

surdity of realising general terms will appear

still

more monstrous

we

descend

senses,

from species or

this

man

and composed of

Such

our

or this horse
ideas.

cannot, therefore, be any such ideas or

as those

tribes

to the individual objects of

and say that

constituted

if

is

There
entities

spoken of by some philosophers.

is

Dr. Gilliess translation of a most

abstruse passage, from a

book written by

its

13
author, as

evident, from

is

what has been

with avowed obscurity of dic-

above

stated,

tion

a book written, as Plutarch well ob-

unlearned, but for

serves, not for the

men

who have made

a proficiency in philosophic

attainments

Such a passage from such a

book, when the extreme accuracy and unex-

ampled brevity of

diction adopted

by

its

au-

thor are also taken into account, ought indis-

be translated with the utmost faith-

putably

to

fulness

and the most

few instances

will

exactness.

literal

shew how

claim the

little

translation of Dr. Gillies has to these requi-

In the

sites.

verted the
for
<c

meaning of

the very

translated,

first

who

to those

rate

essences,

make form
is

as

is

these very things that

pens

ences ,

place, he has entirely per-

literally

this,

From

first

sentence;
follows

which hap-

assert that ideas are sepa-

and

who

to consist

at

the same time

from genus and

differ-

Compare this with the

With the same
Dr. Gillies

manifest.

translation of

absurdities are those chargeable

who

regard

ideas as substances, and separable substances

ya
ou$t

fj.iroe. rot,

t^ovea

fjpis yEyfCOTTxi.

7?ay/xemi Tgo; JiSa 'rx.aAtav Kca

uiro^uy/xx.

tojj

Plutarch in Alexan. p, 66 S.

art

considering the more general ideas as constituting the less general included under the

same common

Here the reader

term.'

what

easily perceive that

Aristotle says

deduction from prior reasoning

translation of Dr. Gillies

who

but in the
else

is,

is

speaking

assert that ideas are separate es-

and accordingly he uses the words

sences,

xoa xu^is'ag,

cv<nag ts

translation of Dr.

posed

ever,

is

genuine mean-

In the next place, Aristotle

of those

ideas

something

as usual, substituted for the

ing.

will

to
as
is

ideas of

but,

Gillies,

according

he must be sup-

who

be speaking of those
separable

the

to

regard

how-

This,

substances.

very far from being the case, for the

which

Aristotle

is

here speaking are

Deity, and

natures resident in

incorporeal

perfectly separated from matter

but separa -

rable ideas are the universals inherent in

and

predicated of the multitude of sensible particulars,

which

and which

in

than abstract

Aristotle

everywhere admits,

modern language
ideas.

are

no other

Dr. Gilliess translation

of the remaining part of the sentence

is

so

very remote from the accurate meaning of

Aristotle, that it may rather be called a conceit of the

Doctors than a translation

arid

15

any one who compares

might

with the original

it

conclude that the Doctor

fairly

not the distinction between genus

knew

and

dif-

ference.

The next
lated,

is

sentence, which, literally trans-

For

man and

if

forms and animal are in

there

horse,

either

is

one and the

same, or a different animal in number,

is

entirely lost in the translation of Dr. Gillies.

This also

and

the case with the next sentence

is

in short, there

(for of the

whole of

in the

pare

manner

it

to

moderate his

my

Because

lies

so little of the matter,

there
that

none) of Aristotle

it is

in vain to

and

com-

presume,

every Greek scholar, however

skill

may

be in that language.
of this passage

translation

literal I

am

is

accused by Dr. Gil-

of having travestied Aristotle into un-

and

intelligible gibberish

cause

this

merely be-

have not made that by translation

be obvious
tended by

to
its

to

every one which was never in-

author

have been more

to

is

with the original, as must,

be obvious

faithful

it,

is

to

be so,

and because

by endeavouring
preserve the accurate meaning and mansolicitous,

ner of the original, to gain the approbation

of the wise and worthy, than to do violence

1(3

order to please the vulgar, and,

to Aristotle in

in the

language of trade, manufacture a sale-

able hook.

After this Dr, Gillies endeavours to show

that

have falsely charged him with igno-

rance, in the
has

made

full

answer

new arrangement which he

As a

of Aristotles Metaphysics.
to this, I

necessary to

state to

deem

it

merely

will be

the reader, that in criti-

cizing Dr. Gill icss arrangement of the Metaphysics,

regarded that order alone in which

those books have been transmitted to us from

the ancients

in

which order they w ere

;

first

published by Aldus, and translated into Latin

by
I

This too

Bessarion.

is

the order, which

presume every man of good sense would

suppose Dr. Gillies objected

Far otherwise.

arrangement.

to

in his

Du

new

Val, from

not understanding the Metaphysics of Aristotle,

to

had, long before Dr. Gillies presumed

alter

books

arrangement of some of the

the

and Dr.

Gillies in

making

rangement uniformly quotes

tion of

Aristotle,

Du

new

ar-

Vals edi-

and blames the order in

which the Metaphysics are there published,

as if it were the same with that adopted by
the ancients

from which circumstance

17

think

it

is

Du

that time that

from

knew

most evident thdt he

not at

Vals arrangement differs

that of the ancients.

Afterwards,

ever,

and most likely from

sions,

he appears

to

my

how-

animadver-

have discovered

his

mis-

take, but with great subtlety endeavours to

the charge of ignorance in this particular

fix

upon me.
he says
this

For

in p.

think

u
:

deep student

that the

173 of his Supplement

right to observe, that

it

in Aristotle

book published

as the twelfth

dus and Bessarion stands

Du

Vals noble edition.

however,

criticizing Dr. Gilliess

he referred

to

as the

by Al-

fourteenth in

The liberal

reader,

readily admit that in

will, I trust,

Metaphysics,

seems not aware

arrangement of the

had no right

to

suppose that

any other order than

that in

which these books were at first published

from the most ancient manuscripts, especially as Dr. Gillies does not

mention

any

in

part of his Analysis, that he alone blames the

arrangement of these books

Du

as

published by

Val.

Again, Dr.
lysis,

had

what

is

Gillies,

asserted,

in p.

99 of

his

Ana-

that the real subject of

called Aristotles Metaphysics

is

the

18
vindication of the existence and

nature of

truth against the cavils of sophists,

and those

now called

metaphysicians; and

concerning truth

this

doctrine

demonstrating

illustrated in

the being of one god, in opposition to atheists

on one hand and polytheists on

To

other.

my

tion to

physics,

this,

in p. 4-8

of the introduc-

of Aristotles Meta-

translation

replied as follows

polytheists Dr. Gillies

the

That

by

if

means men who be-

lieved in a multitude of self-existent beings

independent of each other, and of one

first

men among

the

cause, there were no such

Greeks and Romans,

who

every one

is

as

must be obvious

conversant with the writ-

ings of the heathens, and as

by Dr. Cudworth
nor

am

entertained

But

dire.

signify

is

fully evinced

in his Intellectual

System;

acquainted with any nation

an
if

opinion

by

men who

to

who

monstrous and

so

polytheists

he intends

to

believed in the existence

of divine natures the immediate progeny of

one

first

cause with which they are pro-

foundly united, Aristotle

posing

this

is

so far

from op-

doctrine in his Metaphysics, that

in the eighth chapter of the twelfth

hook

19
(Alduss edition) he demonstrates their ex-

In

istence,

It

chapter he expressly says,

necessary that cadi of the revolutions

is

of the

this

celestial orbs

should be moved by an

immoveable and eternal essence

sentially

that these essences should be as

ber as the revolving spheres

clusion of

of

AND MEN

and

many in numAnd the con-

remarkably strong

in

support

OUR ANCESTORS, says

OF GREAT ANTIQUITY, HAVE

opinion

this

he,

it is

es-

TRADITION INVOLVED IN FABLE, THAT THESE FIRST ESSENCES ARE

GODS, AND THAT THE DIVINITY COMPREHENDS THE WHOLE OF NATURE. The

LEFT US

indeed,

rest ,

is

fabulously introduced for the

purpose of persuading the multitude , enforcing

and

laws ,

the

they ascribe

man form

to

human life. For

the first essences a hubenefiting

and speak of them as resembling

other animals, and assert other things conse,

quent and similar

*

Ava.yy.fj

xnziSxt

y.ai

to

these,

but

rourwy zxxvryv Txv fogxv

xaQ' auro,

xai aiSiou ovena;. r tz

t

aiSio; oucrix rt; ovaa,

tov xivovpzv otr

Cxvzoov toivuv ,
<t(v

aiSiovs

SffWAjy-qV XlTiay

xxi to

if

among

vr* axiyyroj

Ts

yxo txv xttcxv

y.r/ovv, aifoov,

y.ai

tootz^ov

xxi to ir^OTzgov ov<na$, ovaiav avayxxiov zivat.

oti

ToaxvTas

axivyTovs
Tforejoy.

onenag

avxyy.xiov zivai, Tr v tz
t

<pv-

xvtx\, vat avzv pzyzSov;, fox t^v

20

THESE ASSERTIONS ANY ONE, SEPARATING THE REST, RETAINS ONLY THE FIRST;
VIZ. THAT THEY CONSIDERED THE FIRST
ESSENCES TO BE GODS, HE WILL THINJK
IT TO BE DIVINELY SAID
AND IT MAY BE
PROBABLY INFERRED THAT AS EVERY
ART AND PHILOSOPHY HAS BEEN INVENTED AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE, AND HA$
AGAIN PERISHED, THESE OPINIONS ALSO
OF THE ANTIENTS HAVE BEEN PRESERVED
AS RELICS TO THE PRESENT TIME.
Of
the opinions of our fathers, therefore and men
of the highest antiquity, thus much only is maTo these first essences also
nifest to us
:

he alludes

in the following beautiful passage

book

in the second

* TTagoc$e$ora.i

Se vto

te^iB'yei

0^n?% ,}
P

r,

xai ro

aXXwv

ro

7igo;

xgyertv. av&gwiroeitiei; re

nn

0 [woiov;

xv

ro nf^wrov,

on

fjcvQo'j

rfgo;

njv

ei; vo[j,ov;

yxg rovrov; , xai rwv

Xeyovn, xai rovroi ; ere^a axoXouSx

xcu rtapaifXYjnx roi; eipr^evoi; wv

fj.ov ov

ev

on Seoi re eieriv ouroi,

ryv oXyv vnv. ra $e Xoirfa fwvGixw; tj>j
uerregov,

rrt v rfeiOw rwv ifoXXwv, xai

(rufx-4>fOv

'Qwwv

Sreiov

arc the eyes of

rwv ugxsuwv xai TtxXcuwv,

xaraXeXeip^eva, roi;
ycai

As

si

n;

x w ? l<ra

'S

avro Xaoi

$sou; wovro ra,; itgwra; ovena; eivou, Seiw;

eigyjtrSxi vopuaeie,

xai xala ro eixe; roXXaxi; evgy/Mevy; si; ro

Suvarov sxourry]; xat reyv^; xcu fyiXoro^ia;, xai rcaXiv eigopcevwv, xcu

raora; rai So% a; exsivwv,

rou vvv.

>;

ij,sv

oiov

Xei^ava te^iaeawabai

ovv ralgio; Sofa, xxi y

era roarourov rpuv tpavepa [xovov.

tapa rwv 7rpwrwv,

21
the light of day, so

bats to

the intellect of

is

such things as are naturally THE MOST SPLENDID OF ALL*.

our soul

So

to

among

was

indeed,

prevalent,

doctrine

this

the antients, that even so late as the

time of the Emperor

Maximus

Commodus

the elegant

That there

Tyrius observes,

in all the earth one according law

nion, that there

ther of

asserted

and opi-

one god, the king and

and

things,

all

God, ruling
is

is

many

fa-

gods, sons of

conjunction with him.

in

is

This

by the Greek and the barbarian,

by the inhabitant

and by

of the continent,

him who dwells near the sea, by the wise and

by the unwise. And if you proceed even as
far as to the

utmost shores of the ocean, there

also there are gods, rising

and
*

setting very near to others

'f."

l<rrfsp

syzi to

tm

fjisQ

<j>ucrj

sis

rxihss,

yap

xxt

rot;

i$oi

xv sv

oravTcov

ra-acnj

Za<riXsv$

avvapyovrs; Sew.

o a<roifo$'

'i'vyyjs o

vovg rpo$

xay

siri

yv\ oaofcvvov vop,ov y.xi

rx

Xoyov,

on

xai varr#, xai eot ntoXXoi, $eov

rxvrx

Se

Y^sipairr^ xai

too wxexvO'j

psv xviayovrsf ayyyj paXx, roi;

sert. ].

oy.p,xrx rpog to fysyyos

Tfjxspav, ovfw xai rrj Tjixsrspas

(ZapZxpo; Xsysi, xai

xai

Ta twv vuxrspiSwv

fyavEpoorarx tfavrwv.

f Eva
eo;

very near to some,

o
o

eXXrjv

Xeysi,

xai

SaXarhos, *ai o xotpof

ra; rjiovag, xxxei $soi,
Ss xalxSuofXEvoi.

Dis-

22
The only reply which the Doctor makes
to all this in his

Supplement

175 )

(p.

is

the

In the chapter alluded to by

Mr. Taylor, (which is the eighth of the fourfollowing:

teenth book in

deference
the

Du Vals edition) Aristotle,

to the

antients,

opinion delivered

in

down by

and which prevailed

in

most

ages of paganism, speaks of different gods

presiding over the motions of the heavenly

But the sentence immediately pre-

bodies.

ceding

this passage,

and which Mr. Taylor

entirely omits in his refutation of

nion, maintains the unity of the

my

opi-

cause,

first

the eternal spring of motion, himself im-

This principle, on which heaven

moveable.

and earth depend,

is

one in number

as well

as essence.
Is

possible that

it

foreign from
Gillies

had

totle in

his

any reply can be more

the purpose than this

Dr.

one design of Aris-

asserted that

Metaphysics was

to

demonstrate

the being of one god in opposition to polytheists.

My

answer

to

this

most clearly

proved that Aristotle could have no such design, according to the proper

word

polytheist, or that

meaning of the

meaning which was

23
adopted by antiquity
this

evidence, and,

but in order to evade

conceal his

if possible,

ignorance, Dr. Gillies

tells bis

readers that I

have omitted a sentence, in which

Aris-

totle

maintains the unity of the

As

the existence of divine natures the pro-

if

geny of one

first

first

cause.

cause invalidated the sub-

sistence of that cause.

Surely not more so

than the existence of children subverts the

prior existence of their father.
fair will

But

this af-

be more fully unfolded in the an-

swer to the Doctors next paragraph.

The existence (says he) of divine natures,

the immediate progeny of one

cause,

with

united,

is

which

they are

first

profoundly

not asserted by the Sagirite in the

chapter alluded to by Mr. Taylor, or in any

other part of his invaluable writings.

mysterious

language,

indeed,

occurs

Such
fre-

quently in the works of Plotinus and other

eclectics,

called,

and

or

the

Aristotle

new

Platonists,

as

they are

pretended reconcilers of Plato

;

visionaries

whose wild dreams

seduced the old age and dotage of reason

under the declining empire of Rome, and

imposed on

its

childhood and imbecility

at

24
the

revival of letters in

first

modern Europe.

Ot such philosophers Mr. Taylor,

presently appear,

is

as will

not an unworthy pu-

pil.

Ihe man who,

to analyse

like Dr. Gillies,

presumes

and translate the acroamatic works

of Aristotle without having even discovered

that in these

works he

is

designedly obscure,

and that the profundity of

no

less

is

extraordinary than the brevity of his

must

diction,

also, like

Dr. Gillies, perpetu-

on subjects which are necessarily

ally

err

from

their very nature

struse.

his conceptions

The

truth

most arduous and ab-

of this observation was

never more fully displayed than in the above

paragraph, as will be

once evident from

at

the following observations

Aristotle

having

demonstrated, in the seventh chapter of the

twelfth book of his Metaphysics, that there
is

a certain eternal and immoveable essence

separated from sensibles, in the next chapter

enquires whether only one essence of this

kind *

and

in

is

this

* Tlotepov
xai

iroc'a.f,

to

i'e

/xij

be admitted or more than one

chapter
[ua,v Ssreov
yeiv.

he proves
rrjv

that

roiauryv ovtnav,

y)

there

25

many

are

such

like essences.

Now

it

we

tentively consider that Aristotle uses the

such

ro/auTjy,

on

like,

at-

word

and de-

this occasion,

monstrates that such like essences do exist,

it

will

most evidently appear that the Stagi-

rite

does admit the existence of divine na-

tures,

the immediate progeny of one

cause,

which

with

lent to similar to

by

Aristotle to

and sameness

Hence

same time
and

as

he

to

be a union

is

defined

of essence *.

demonstrates the existence

clearly asserting at the

one

that there can be but

also proves that there are

sences similar to this

follows,

equiva-

be a participation of sameness ,

cause,

first

is

like

and similitude

as Aristotle

of one

profoundly

they are

For the term such

united.

from

lirst

his

first

own

cause,

it

first

many

es-

necessarily

definition of similitude ,

that these divine essences are united to their

great producing cause.

as

it

This single instance,

shows the ignorance of Dr.

Gillies in a

strong point of view, shows also the necessity

ra re ravro jreirov^orx.- i e. Things
arc said to be similar which are passive to (or par'icipate) the
rxvrorr^ svo rr g rig env'rw eivou. i. e.
same thing. And
Sameness is a certain unity of essence. Metaphys. lib. v.
*

O ,oja

Xeysrc/x

i)

cap. 9.

26
adhering

ol

to

the most rigid accuracy in

translating the acroamatic writings of Aristotle.

In the remaining part of

Supplement there
notice, as

it

but

is

deserving of

little

shall

two or three passages,

select

Gilliess

chiefly consists of misrepresenta-

and invective.

tion

Dr.

as

most incon-

he must necessarily ad-

testible proofs that

vance absurdities

therefore only

and

who

contradictions

writes on subjects

which he does not underand who dares to calumniate where

stand,

he cannot confute.

Of

the truth of this re-

mark take the followingspecimen in p. 190

The chimeras of those visionaries (Mode:

and Nicomachus) which would now

ratus

entitle

house

their
(so

professors

unaccountable

to
to

cells

mad-

one age seem the

were adopted by the

follies

of another

whole

tribe of later Platonists,

!)

in

and nearly a

century before their times by the learned

and

sensible Plutarch,

ers of actions

vate

life.

one of the

and manners

But

this

finest paint-

in public

and

pri-

excellent writer, an exu-

berant source of instruction and entertain-

ment

to all

ages and nations, was both

a-

Pla-

27

and a

tonic philosopher

Thus, according

Dr.

to

priest of Apollo.'

Plutarch,

Gillies,

though a learned and sensible man, though

an excellent

writer,

and an exuberant source

of instruction and entertainment

and nations; yet

lived in

been

specimen

sophy

would have

these luminous days,

madhouse

absurd and insane

less

is

their philo-

(that of the later Platonists)

tain intellectual

the following

The main end of

was

to at-

union with God, and thus

see all truths at one glance in the divine

trating

thing

to

un-

Deity they mysteriously de-

derstanding.
scribe as

ages

same Plutarch, had he

this

entitled to a cell in a

No

to all

everywhere and nowhere

and sustaining

and

present,

all

pene-

things, yet in no-

ever totally unmixed;

as the unity of unities, the root of being, the

perennial

fountain

of spiritual existences

and the more irreverently they strove

in this

mystical language to exalt the Creator, the

more

material

wilder the

became

their images,

contradictions

in

and the

which they

were inextricably involved. (Supplement,

According to the sagacious and
p. 208.)
pious Dr. Gillies, therefore, that philosophy
is

contemptible whose main end

is

to attain

28
intellectual

union with deity, and

irreverent

are those conceptions of the Divinity

him

assert

be everywhere and yet no-

to

where; every where ,

with divine

illuminated
things

illuminating

as

and no where ,

light,

exempt from

fectly

which

as

all

things

being per-

the nature of the things

penetrating and sustaining

and subsisting

all

as the root of all be-

The man, however, who presumes

ing.

such conceptions

call

to

as these irreverent

is

speak Platonically) unconscious that the

(to

greatest

eye

o/xy,a)

of
is

soul

his

(to

^syi 9 ov

rvjg

blinded with ignorance and

buried in error.

In the

last

me, observes

place, Dr. Gillies, speaking of

:

Me-

If that translator of the

taphysics had been as skilful in Greek as he

is

profound in philosophy, he would not

have recommended,

as essential to the right

understanding of Aristotle, the commentary

of Alexander Aphrodisiensis.

commentary on
ists

Alexanders

the Metaphysics

now

ex-

only in a Latin version, and cannot,

therefore, afford

much

assistance to a

man

capable of reading the Greek original, and

who

wishes

countrymen

to

in

convey

its

sense clearly to his

their native tongue.

am

<29

much

very

mistaken

nonsense in

if

there

not as

is

passage as malevolence. For

this

can any thing be more absurd than

to assert

commentary of Alexander cannot

that the
afford

much

much

man

assistance to a

capable of

reading the Greek original of Aristotle, be-

now

cause

it

when

at the

exists

only in a Latin version

same time Alexander was one

of the most famous, and, except Simplicius,

the best of

And

all Aristotles interpreters.

can any thing be more malevolent than the

am

insinuation that I

because
this

availed myself of the assistance of

commentary

being able
lost

Is

Greek

not skilful in

consult the original because

it is

possible, likewise, that there

can

to

it

not

in a Latin translation,

be a greater contradiction in terms than to

suspect

my

knowledge of Greek, and yet

confess that I

For

if I

am

am

profound in philosophy?

profound in philosophy

be in that of Plato and Aristotle, since

studied and profess

no

I acquire

my

my own

translations,

translation

for,

there

have

is

did

exclusive of

no English

of any part of Aristotles works,

except his Poetics and his

more

must

Mow then

other.

profundity

it

Politics,

abstruse of Platos writings

nor of the
:

and the

30
Doctor observes, in the paragraph above

That

quoted,

Greek
their

Latin translations from the

are seldom intelligible except

assistance

scholar.

As

is

superfluous to

where

Greek

have therefore no know-

ledge whatever of any languages but English,

Latin, and Greek,

it is

evident that this pro-

fundity must have been obtained from the

And

Greek.

thus the malevolent insinua-

tion of Dr. Gillies confutes itself,

imbecile as his answers

to

my

and

is

strictures

as

and

his abuse of the Platonic philosophers.

Having therefore answered

all

those parts

of Dr. Gilliess Supplement which appeared

to

me

most deserving of notice,

I shall,

in the

next place, present the reader with speci-

mens

of the

manner

in

which he has

lated, or rather mutilated

Ethics of Aristotle.
the

first

the very

the

first

and deformed, the

I shall

chapter of the

trans-

begin, then, with

first

book, and with

sentence of that chapter, as

extreme inaccuracy with which

it

is

translated affords of itself a sufficient proof

of the Doctors

total

incapacity to translate a

uncommonly accurate and profound as Aristotle. The original is as folQpoiwg h

olo(
xoa rrfacroc
lows
ncr
writer

so

31

etpisjou.

and

Every

i. e.

in like

44

our power
a

certain

good

The

to

be

transla-

Since every art and

knowledge,

of,

in

assert the

things desire.

all

tion of Dr. Gillies

every kind

is

desire

to

hence they well

which

that

action and delibe-

which

appear

(pre-election)

xafjoc

ou

and every method,

art

to that

z(prz<j-$oa

Tccyot9ov,

manner every

tendency

rative

good

axstpwuvjo

xctKcog

to

Soxsi*

ayotSov nvog

t s xcu x^oai^trtg,

x^a^tg

as well

as all the

men, constantly
something which they call good

actions and deliberations of

aim

at

good

ys9o9og,

path

in

Aristotle,

is

every

means of acquiring a cerwhich sense it is here used

translated

word %gooapttrtg,

Aristotle himself, in cap.

be

44

things

place,

method which properly sig-

by Dr.

hind of knowledge /

place, the

first

that

or

and

tain end,

44

to,

be justly defined,
Here, in the

desire.

all

word

nifies a

by

may

in general

which
the

44

Gillies,

In the next

pre-election ,

iii.

lib. 3,

which

defines to

a deliberative tendency to or desire of

in

OUr power

(3qvXsvtixyi o(>:ftg

tuv

Dr. Gillies merely

r\

ypiv,
44

is

S/o

av

tty

translated 'by

deliberation .

the third place, the words

7txya9ov ov navi a. stytejat,

'xpocuptrig

xuKug

And,

in

axs(pnvav]o

hence they well

assert

32
C

the

good

be that which

to

are miserably perverted

all

by Dr.

Gillies,

them, good in general

translates

which

justly defined that

who

called the

who

may

be

For

desire.

all

Aristotle alludes here to Plato

goreans,

things desire,

and the Pytha-

supreme principle of

the universe rayaGov, the good , and said that

was the object of

be obvious

desire to all things, as

it

must

every tyro in the doctrines of

to

those philosophers.

Dr. Gillies, likewise, does not appear to

have had the smallest conception

sentence passes gradually from

totle in this

things
sale

more

because every

fected
is

is

by

more

an

is

art

is

art,

universal
is

method

universal than method

less

method, but not every

since

inartificial

method

more univer-

particular to things

For art

method

that Aris-

many

things are ef-

methods.

Again, action

than method: for every

a habit, but not every action

is

many things are done withAnd pre-election is more uni-

since

out method.

versal than action , because every true action

proceeds from pre-election, but

many

things

are the objects of this deliberative tendency

which

are not performed.

The

proposition,

therefore, in this sentence, always proceeds to

n
33

more

things
it

universal, just as

should be

if,

for instance,

every man, every animal,

said,

every body participates of being.

,

Again, from the following specimen, the

how

reader will see

the

It is

Dr. Gillies has preor the matter of

manner

served either the

Aristotle.

little

first

part of the second

E h

chapter of the same book.

rsXog es

ti

avro (SovKoyiStx, t u ctXhu

$ 'Six

tcajv 7T(><x:t]oov,

TOVTO,

TTUVTCt dl T SgOV CClgCiVysQcc' (tT^OSKTI

cutcaj

TLOtL

stg

ct7rsigov 9

%/

ow

xou 7rgog rov

g07T?lV

potWov

svi^viycov

tcov

vj

<

end of

wish for
things

3 iov

vj

t ctyuQov,

juxi

y\

TC^OTCU,
tov

to uqitov,

(TY.0TC0V

Siofjog

its

i.

e.

If

practical objects,

own

sake, but

on account of

S%0V Tf,
S ovtcj,

si

So^sis

Svvocyswv'

pouvsjui .

tyiv

yvucrig ocvtov ysyuXYjV

5"/,

YiOU

V civ

TYjg

TOlUVTYj

YMl yuXlTOl Ctfp^lTSKTOVlKYig.

ttoXitimi

certain

ctv slyi

XCtQocTTcg

KCCl

xsvyv xou yurcuoiv

sivoa

TV7TM yi TTZglKocCsiV CiVTO , Tl 7T0TS

XU^lCJTUTYjg,

xai

Tvyy^xvoiyzv

ctv

7TSIQOiTSOV

t ivog

tout

0(>s%iv'') SyiKov, cog

A[>

ws

yag

there

which we

we choose

this,

is

$Y)

other

and not every

thing for the sake of something else, (for

thus there would be a progression to infinity,
so that desire
if this

would be empty and vain,)

be admitted,

will be the good,

it is

and

evident that this end

that

which

is

most ex-

34

May we

cel lent.

the knowledge of

with respect

having

to

to

to

belong

of great importance

and

that,

like archers,

mark, we

shall

more

then, this be the

If,

readily

endeavour by a rude delineation

show what

or faculty

is

we want

obtain what
case, let ns

therefore, say that

it

life

this for a

not,

this

end

is,

belongs.

it

to

what science

may

indeed seem

and

It

most principal and master

to the

science, and such the political science ap-

pears to be.

passage

is

Dr. Gilliess translation of

as follows

ultimate end of

all

desirable merely in

be such an end,

this

But if there be an
human pursuit an end

(and unless there

itself,

desire,

proceeding

to infi-

nity, will terminate in a baseless vision,) this

ultimate end must be what

and of goods the

it

of

also
life

best.

serving as a butt to

direction of

to

of

to the benefit

bowmen

delineate

it

for the

Let U9

our views and actions.

therefore endeavour
first

The knowledge

must greatly contribute

;

called good,

is

carefully,

premising that the investigation of

it

be-

longs to that master science called politics.

Again, in the beginning of the fourth

chapter,

the

words

nucroc

sneily

rrgoocidtng ccyuSov nvog cgsyejoa

i. e.

yvuo-ig

xat

all

since

35

knowledge and pre-election

aspire

certain good, are translated

by Dr.

since

all

pre-election

and

is

Gillies,

our thoughts and desires aim

some kind of good

word

after

at

though the

this,

considered hy Aristotle

of such importance that he has devoted the

whole of one chapter

words,

sv

of

In the same chapter, too, the

nature.

its

to the investigation

ya^

ytou

TiXajoov

y\nrogsi

tovto xui stars'/,

Plato well doubted and investigated,

are rendered hy Dr. Gillies, Plato therei.

e.

no notice whatever being

doubted

fore

of the compliment

taken

pays

to his

which

Aristotle

venerable master.

Again, in the beginning of the thirteenth

chapter, Aristotle says,

Vss-iv

s ttsi

ipv%*/ evspys locals xoct apsjriv TtXsiav

felicity

is

cording
lies

he

results
far

sv^aipovix

i.e.

made

to

say,

hut by Dr. Gil-

since happiness

from virtuous energies, which

from

Since

a certain energy of the soul ac-

to perfect virtue
is

yi

his

real

meaning.

is

very

For Aristotle

here repeats nearly the whole of that accu-

and beautilul definition of felicity which

he had before given; viz. that it is the
rate

energy

ol

the soul according

perfect virtue in a perfect life.

to the

most

So that fe.

36
licity,

the

according to Aristotle,

is

not merely

of virtuous energies, but of the

result

energies of the most perfect virtue.

in the

same chapter,

ovTwg s^si,
toc TCZ^I

XOCl

this

CCaJ^Oc'

(BsXtIUV

be the case,

cian (the

XOCl

TVoXlTLXYj

7]

is

it

man who

fJLCcXXoV

in

capable of managing

is

to

who

the

to the

the eyes ought to have a

;

and

this

by

more honourable and excel-

lent the political

ence.

the

intends to admi-

knowledge of the whole body

how much

know

which things pertaining

remedies

if

evident that the politi-

soul subsist, just as he

nister

tOCT^lXYjg.

T'/J?

1t[UOOTSgOC

0<TU>

the reins of government) ought to

manner

sihvcci 7rug

7 ov ctpSocX^ovg &S(>!X7rSV-

Kcci

7TCCV

tuvS

si

hi r ov otoXitikov

oti

ipuxw
XOCl

(TO'vjoc,

h/jXov,

Aristotle says,

Again,

is

Compare

than the medicinal scithis

with

translation of Dr. Gillies

the

following

The

true states-

man, therefore, ought to know the mind as

much, or rather more, (because his pursuit
is still more excellent) than the physician
Here the very beautiful
does the body.
and important dogma contained
ginal,

and which

Charmides of

in the ori-

Aristotle derived

Plato,

is

translation of Dr. Gillies.

from the

entirely lost in the

The dogma

I a!-

37
lude

to

that

this:

is

he who intends

cure

to

a part ought to have an accurate knowledge

of the whole body, and that the former cannot be properly effected without the

latter.

Dr. Gillies too has destroyed by his transla-

analogy implied by Aris-

tion the beautiful

totle in this

sentence

exalted virtue, in
the

same

eye has

mean

which

felicity consists,

relation to the
to the

most

that the

whole soul

whole body.

has

that the

For the most

exalted virtue, as Aristotle shows in the tenth

book,

theoretic,

is

relation of

which has evidently the

an eye.

Again, near the end of the first book,

Aristotle says, that of the virtues some are

and others

dianoetic

moral,

Ksyo^sv

yag

and

this

uvtcvv Tag psy $ tayovjTniag , rag 5 rjBixag

division

he

also repeats in

the second book.

knowing

the beginning of

Dr. Gillies, however, not

the accurate

meaning of the word

dianoetic, translates Siavoyirncag intellectual ,

thus destroys

meaning

all

the accuracy of Aristotles

in this place,

which

is

founded on

that scientific division of the parts or

of the soul

and

made by him,

powers

particularly in his

third

book on the Soul, and alluded

many

of his other various works.

to in

For, ac-

38
cording to Aristotle, in these writings
or the dianoetic power,

is,

in

Siocvotoc,

most accurate

its

signification, that faculty of the soul

which

reasons scientifically, deriving the principles

of
is

reasoning from intellect

its

that

but

power which perceives

intellect

truth without

affirmation or negation, because

it

does not

understand by composition or division, but

simply, and with immediate vision sees the

forms of things.

See the sixth chapter of

the sixth book of his Ethics, the tenth book

of the same work, and the

third chapter of his third

There

latter part

of the

book on the Soul.

an absolute necessity therefore of

is

using the word dianoetic in translating the

acroamatic works of Aristotle, because there

is

no word

in the English language, nor per-

haps in any other language, equivalent

accurate meaning

word

cogitatioy

for

which

is

to

its

even in Latin the

the translation of

it

given by Cicero, conveys a very imperfect,

or rather

no idea whatever, of

its

primary

philosophical signification.

Farther

still,

the beginning of the second

chapter of the second book

Ett?/
e <3 iv,

ow

'/]

wcr7r?

7roc^ovcroc

ou

vr^oiy parsioc

CiKhtxi' ov

yoc^

is

ov

as follows
Sioogiocg

ei^oopiv

ti

svcKoc
5~iv

39
aX A

(nLc7f]oiA$a.

cv$zv av qv ofisXog avTYjg.

present treatise

is

i,

6t

e.

Since then the

we do

for

we may know what

late

that

that

we may become good,

it

thus translated

is

Since the present

not specu-

virtue

but

is,

since otherwise

would be attended with no

Which

ettei

not for the sake of theory,

works

like our other

ayuQoi ysvoopsQoc,

iv

benefit,

by Dr.

&c.

Gillies

not merely a

treatise is

theory, as other parts of our works (for the

inquiry
but

not

is

how

it

may

wherein virtue

consists,

be best attained, without

which the speculative knowledge of

of the smallest value) &c.

by

his ran-

translation perverts, as usual, the

not

how

since a

virtuous

mean-

For the inquiry in Ethics

ing of Aristotle.
is

not

Here the reader

will easily see, that Dr. Gillies,

dom

it is

may be best attained,

man may know this without being

but

Aristotle says,

virtue

we

speculate on this subject, as

that

we may become good

the end of this inquiry, as he elsewhere observes, not

being knowledge but action.

Again, near the end of the third chapter

of this book, Aristotle says, IL^/
TSgov asi vmi Tzyjvj yivsrca

&Xt iov

sv

t ovru.

i.

e.

<e

xca

oc^etyi

Both

art

$e to
tlou

%aXs 7ruyag

to ev

and virtue are

40
always conversant with that which
difficult, for in this there

Compare

good.

this

is

is

more

more excellent

with the version of

Dr, Gillies: But the most

difficult part^is

that best fitted for

showing the excellence of

the performer.

In

this translation,

as

the

reader will easily perceive, neither the accurate

meaning, nor any thing of the manner

of Aristotle, are preserved.

Compare

also the following passage, in the

fourth chapter of this book, with the Doctors

version.

It is

A71'ogvjcrsis

the beginning of that chapter.

rig,

meg Kcyo^sv on hi

Trgxrjovrag ^lYxiovg yivscrBxi, rx

si

yag

7r^xrjov(ri

S iyxioi

psv ^iyxix

<rw(p(>ovx cru<p^ovxg

rx ^iyuix yxi rx cie<p^ovx,

you cw(p()ovsg

oo<rm(>

y^x^xriY.01 you

p, ovctiyoc ,

roc

roc

si

r$Yi

ygxy-^xriYx you

u.ovcriYOi.

v\

sm

ouSf

yx g ygxp^xriYov

s^cy^rou

ovroog sy^i

rroivjcrcu

you xrvo rvyjr\g , you xXkov vovoBs^svav

ovv 5x1

y^x^pxriYog, sxv you

y^x^xnYOv

yui y^x^xriYoog, rovro ^ 5 i

avue y^x^^xriYviv.

i. e.

why we

men from

say that

things must

necessarily

It

for if

ro

may

r1

Yurx

ri

rare

mu-

rrjv

sv

be doubted

performing just

become

from performing temperate

rate

roov

rsyyoov

y\<Tvi

sin

just,

things,

they do such things

and

tempe-

as are just

and temperate, they are already just and tem-

41
perate

who perform

those

as

just

things

grammatical and musical are grammarians

Or may we not say

and musicians.
ther

is

this

the case with the arts

possible that a

that nei-

For

it is

man may do something gram-

matical both casually and from the suggeswill then be a

Hence he

tion of another.

grammarian, if he both does something grammatical and in a grammatical

he does

is, if

art

it

according

which he contains

doubt

why we

arises,

to the

in

translation of Dr. Gillies

manner

is

that

grammatical

The

himself.

as follows

should say that

men

acquire justice by doing just actions, or be-

come temperate by
temperance

since

observing the rules of

they perform such ac-

if

should seem

tions

and observe such

that

they must be already endowed with

those virtues

who

writes or

in the

who

rules,

it

same manner

performs according

grammar and music

rules of

grammarian and a musician.

not hold true
for a

even with respect

man may

imitation,

another

as a

is

to the

already a

But
to

man

this does

the arts

grammar merely by
by chance, or by the direction of

but

to

write

be

himself understand the

grammarian he must
art."
Here one part

42
of

which

this passage,

in the original,

evidently a question

is

made an

is

assertive sentence

the version of Dr. Gillies

in

and

in the

concluding part the meaning of Aristotle

entirely perverted.

man

For Aristotle says that

grammarian when he

then a

is

and

does something grammatical

matical manner

in a

both

gram-

but he does not merely say

grammarian he must himself un-

that to be a

derstand the art.

the art of

is

For simply

grammar

grammarian

does not

to

understand

make

man

but to be so he must do some-

thing grammatical , grammatically.

Again,

in

second

the

chapter of

third book, pre-election (7r^oou^a-ig)

where confounded

we have

every-

is

in the translation of Dr.

Gillies with election

as

the

and preference

before observed,

it

is

though,

defined by

Aristotle himself to be a deliberative tendency

to,

or desire of things in our power.

therefore the

same

preference , since a

one thing

to

shall pass

w ould
r

not

with election or

either

man may

choose or prefer

another without deliberation but

in this case his

I

It is

energy

is

on

the

to

not pre- elective.

be an endless task

fifth

to

book

for

enumerate

it

all

the inaccuracies of Dr. Gilliess translation.

43
In the fourth chapter, therefore, ot

this

Aristotle treats of corrective justice

analogy, and having shown that

middle place between

it is

loss

and

its

holds the

it

and gain, and that

the business of a judge to find this middle

term, which

illustrates
s (p* wv,

meaning

his

cox, (3(2

oti

yy,

VTTi^xu tu yS,

be-

extreme, he

lesser

as

yy, txWqXoug'

to as, jcat 7TP0(rxst(rBco tv

$yy, t Yj$

mean

an arithmetical

is

tween the greater and the

t'j)

book

follows

on

l<rou

utvo t rg act utpyigYicrSc*]

to
Jtoct

=(j5

y* wsr cA>j

cov

tw

y^"* t v,g

ccgct

v]

(2(3

cc

cc

(2

y
i. c.

aa

2-

Let there be three equal

From

bb, cc.

the line aa let there be

taken a part ae, and

the line

cc.

Let

let this part

this part also

being done, the whole line

ae by the

the line

Hence

it

will

right lines,

line c d,

surpass the

be added to

This

be cd.

dec

will surpass

and the line cf.

line b b

by the

line cd.

Dr,

dr

Gilliess translation of this passage

is

no-

-,

u
more than This plainly appears
geometry by means of a diagram !
thing

Again

take the

in

following specimen of

the Doctors translation from the beginning

of the eighth chapter of the same book
OvTCOV

5s

xSixsi

[jcev

TCOV

XXI

(tlXXlCOV

xxi

X^IXCOV

TCOV

otxv

liuxxtoorQxysi,

El^qil.EVC0V 9

excov

xvtx

Tig

orgxTjq' otxv 5s xxcov, out achxsi

ovts

aAA q Kara <rv^&E&qxog

rv y.&efcqxs hxxioig

eivxi

or^xyq^x
sxovcriov

XXI

si^cog

xxi

cv svsxx.

xxi

ov%
t

ElgqTXl,

cm

ei

yx(>

on

eivxi ,

7rxjs(>a

Tig

T7]V

xyvoa^svov

OT^X^IV

[XEV,

ovoXkx ya(> xxi

sot

tov

yivcorxsiv,

to toiovtov

5s

sstv.

S(p XVTCO

TCOV

pqT s

cor 7T

jxsv,

ov

pqTE

OVTCOV

us,

//vjrs

xxi Tivog SVSXX,

cv^&s&qxog,

ju,v?5s

/3 ict.'

hx&cov rqv %ei^x xvtov , Tvof] oi eteqov*

5s*

tcov Tix^ov tcov

OTEQl

Tig

tivx Twfjsi, xxi tivi,

Tig

7tJo^evov

XXI

XV

sxxsov, p7j xcc]x

sxcov

oy^oicog

sxovnov

5s

ayvcoov orgxTjq,

pq

sxsiveov

cototsq

A syco

orgorq.

'TT^OTE^OV

to]s

ssxi psv, x^ixq^a 5s cu5s7rw, exv y.q

ri

sxovnov

to

xxi 5 ixxio

xy.x 5s xxi x^uxq^ix

ipsysTxi'

x&ixov

coss

5s

tw sxovnoo, xxi xxovneo orav yxg

co^isxi

xhxqpx

or^xTjovnv,

xchxoig,

7]

oig yx(>

^ixxioor^xysi,

[ATI

^cov

EOT

5s

COV

vex]

ig

7J

xyvosiv,

xxi son tov ov evexx

5 7}

xvtus 5s ov,

(pvrsi

VT^XtIo^EV XXI OTXyjS^EV,

TO

tov

5s

psv xvSgusoTOg

oti

oti

5/u>/cr<9'w

cXVjV.

ivhsyjlxi

xvtus.

XyVOXjAEVOV.

7)

fX.7}

q @i& xxovnov'

vorx^yjovTusv

EidoTsg

xxi

OV&EV CUTS EXOVCTIOV , OVTS

45
axov<nov
ic

es'iv'

to

oiov

i.

a7ro3vYi<ncstv.

vj

Just and unjust actions then being those

which we have enumerated, a man acts

justly or unjustly when he does these things
voluntarily
but when he does them invo;

he neither

luntarily

except from accident

for

which happen

just.

But an unjust and

also a just

deed are

by the voluntary and the involun-

defined

when

for

to

he does those

be either just or un-

things

tary

nor justly,

acts unjustly

they are blamed

unjust action

voluntary

these deeds are

hut at the same time an

So that

then performed.

is

something unjust will indeed take place, hut

will not yet be an unjust deed unless

companied with the voluntary.

it is

ac-

But the vo-

luntary, as was before observed, takes place

when any one

does that which

knowingly, and
person

to

whom,

account he does
is

is

not ignorant

is

in his

power

neither ignorant of the

nor with what, nor on what

it

as, for

whom

he

instance,
strikes,

when he

with what

instrument, and on what account, and

he does each of
dent, nor
case, if
strike

these things, not

by compulsion,

some one, taking

another person with

when

from acci-

as

would be the

his

hand, should

it

since in this

46
he would not strike willingly, bewas not in his power to prevent it.

instance

cause
It

it

might

happen

also

was the

lather

of

struck, and the son

he was

man,

some one of the persons

or

that

similar distinction

a thing

the whole

is

struck

him by whom he was

might know indeed that

be made with respect

which

who was

he

might not know

present, but
father.

that

he was

his

must likewise
sake of

to that for the

done, and with respect to

Hence,

action.

done ignorantly, or

if

not be prevented by

him who

which

that

is

not ignorantly, could

did

or was

it,

done by him through compulsion,

is

an in-

voluntary deed.

For we knowingly both do

and are passive

to

which

either

is

In order
totle

to

also

that,

between

rives

its

it

is

necessary to

near the end of the seventh

makes a very accurate

between

For,

understand the meaning of Aris-

chapter, he
tion

none of

old age or death.

as

fully in this passage,

observe,

things,

voluntary or involuntary

instance,

such, for

many

the just

and a just deed , and

the unjust

says he,

distinc-

and an unjust

the unjust or the just de-

subsistence from nature or law

the same thing

deed.

when done

is

a just or

but
an.

47
unjust deed , and not before
prior to

this

A lutysgsi
ymi to

it

to aSiKYi^oc kou to

TO

UVTO

5c

7rgccyS rivoci,

TOUTO,

5c

0TV

tw

(pv<rct,

ST* OT^^

o^otcog

a5/%oi/

'ru^si.

vj

Ct5/>6^a

TrQCiyJj'/l,

aAA

&7rw,

to 5/x.awyoc

a5/?to)/, x.a/

yap

5 /x.o)/

5/?c,/o>'

or the unjust

the just ,

is

For

done.

is

it

5e

Imcuu^ol.

Dr. Gilliess translation of this passage

follows

consists in

as

Injustice, as applicable to actions,

what wc have now

does not belong

mitted

is

to

voluntarily

said, but

persons unless
;

for

when

be

it

com-

man

it

acts

without intention the quality of his action, as

good or bad,
to the agent,

just or unjust,

is,

in reference

merely an accessary, not spring-

ing essentially from himself, and neither en-

him

titling

blame.

to praise

him

to

unjust

is

nor subjecting

That therefore which

is

not injustice in the agent unless

mitted voluntarily; that

is,

as

it

be com-

formerly ex-

plained, unless the action, with

all

its

cir-

depend entirely on our own

power, and be performed knowingly, with
cumstances,

intention,

make
know

and without

constraint.

the act of striking parricide ,

the person

whom we

Thus,

to

we must

strike, the

nature

of the instrument with which the stroke

is

48
inflicted;

and the motive through which we

The
action must also depend entirely on our own
power for in many natural events we are

are impelled to such a horrid crime.

both agents and patients knowingly, though

not voluntarily; witness old age and death.

Here,

in

whatever

which

the

first

makes betwen

and an unjust deed

the next place no notice

lustration

no vestige

is

in this translation of the distinction

Aristotle

70 cchxci/,

place, there

adduced by

to

is

the

unjust

aW^a.

taken of the

In
il-

one man

Aristotle of

taking the hand of another and striking a

third

person with

it.

And,

in

the third

place, Aristotle says nothing about

the act of striking parricide

making

for this

is

an interpolation of the Doctor.

Entire chapters, likewise, are translated

by

Dr. Gillies with the same unskilful ness and

inaccuracy

and in these the same unpar-

donable liberty

is

everywhere taken of arro-

gantly interpolating, and rashly omitting, as

may

best serve the purposes of

random para-

Of this the following chapters are

The first is the third chapter of
instances.

P h rase.

the sixth book

'Kcthiv

A^apevoi ow

A sywpsv. evw

oig

ocvwSsv, nsgi ocutuv

ccXvjSsvei

vt

ipu%>i

tm

49
xocjotfpocvou

'turn a,

ugiS^cv'

tov

ttsvts

octto^ocvcu,

yj

crc^icc, vovg wroXyixpsi

hs9i, ts%vy], STagr]^, (plowing,

yoc^ xou h^v\ sv&syjsTcu ^lu^sv^scr^ai. 7n?vj^vi

ri

svtsvBsv pavspov ,

stiv,

ocxoXovSsiv

/xyi

t aig

ovv

hi ocx^oXoysicrBoct, xou

si

[v*sv

yag viroXotp-

7rocvrsg

ouo/otjjct/'

toou/opsvi o 7riFoc[ji9oc ^vj sv^s%s<rBui ocXXoog syjiiv, TOC

svh%ou.svoc aXXcog,
XocvBocvsi
9v\tov'

s<3 iv,

si

toc

7tocvtoc

ccftioc

toc
cT

tov Sswgsiv ysvvjTociy

s^co

s^ ccvocyx^g

q ^y\.

oc^oc'

cc'feiov

otocv

yoi (>

s;

ocvocyxvig ovtcc oc7rXoog 9

oc"/yy\tcc

cc'foicc,

STl h^CCXTYj 7T0CCT0C S'Kl^Vl^y] OOXSl SlVOCl ,

y.OC$Y\TOV.

xou

cocr7rs(>

SX

siTctyooyvig ,

vj

avocXvrixoig

<h

xou tov xoc9oXov

xocQoXov.

sicriv

ovx

sot iSYijjcYi

cc^yjsu

cc^oc

cvXXoyio'^og'

S9i

s%

h^ucrxocXicc.

psv

vj

h/j

yocg

y.sv

vj

STtocyooyv)

<rvXXoy<ry.og sx toov

crvXXoyicr^og,

oov o

STrccyooyy

S9iv s^ig ccTrohiXTixvi,

VMl TO SK IZOTOV ,

sXsyo^sv.

<rvXXoyi<ry.y.

ccpX/i S9i

xou a<pBoc^TOc

7TUCTCC

'ITQOyiVOOCrXOV.ZVOOV

sv TOig

9i to stti-

oc^oc

xou

cc^oc.

octoc

vj

psv

ccXXa

oov

oc^ot

TTgOCr-

ho^i^ojjis^oc sv TOig ocvocXvTixoig * otocv yocg oroog '7ri9svri

9

xou yvoo^i^oi
oc^yjxi,

(lege

U 9 OCTOU

S0

si

yvoo^ijjuors^oi

yocg

[jlyi

/oocTog , X.CCTOC <rvfjL&s&Yixog s^si

STTlSt YljAYig $lC*J(>l(rBoo

*)

uvtoc

oocriv

cu

yocXXov tov (tv^otsqocctsotis-vj^v.

TOV TP07V0V TOVTOV.

7rs^i
1. C.

psv ovv
*6

AS -

suming, therefore, a more elevated exor0

* The necessity of this emendation

will be at once evident
to any one who reads the second chapter of the first book of
Aristotles Posterior Analytics.
Indeed this is evident from
the words that immediately follow.

50
dium,

us again speak concerning these

let

And

those

let

soul asserts the

nying, be

prudence wisdom
,

What

number

possible

is

it

science therefore

evident,

racy on

if

is,

For we

what we know

all

which may

to

be deceived.

to

ot

But with respect

to

exist.

when

variously,

we are ignorant
The object of

scientific

knowledge, therefore,

cessity.

Hence

eternal

is

to attend

cannot admit

they are out of our view,

it

from hence

are of opinion that

subsist

whether or not thev

hypolepsis

employ accu-

to

scientifically

a various subsistence.
things

by

and not

this occasion,

similitudes.

for

will be

be necessary

it

art i science ,

viz.

intellect

the

by affirming or de-

truth,

live in

and opinion

through which

things

is

from nesuch

for all

things as are simply from necessity are eternal

and things eternal are unbegotten and

incorruptible.

Farther

still,

all

science ap-

pears to be capable of being taught, and the

object of science

But

all

learning

previously

is

is

known,

Analytics.

the object of discipline.

produced from things

as

we have

said

in

For one kind of learning

is

our
ac-

quired by induction, but another by syllogism.

And

induction indeed

is

a principle,

51

and

is

sal *,

but syllogism

Hence

sals.

which

the principle of that

is

is

univer-

composed from univer-

the principles from

which

syl-

logism consists are not derived from syllo-

known

gism.

They

tion.

Hence,

habit,

and whatever

definition in

believes in a

are

too, science

if

a demonstrative

we have added to its

our analytics. For when a mail
certain way that a thing i, and

more known

he then

is

by induc-

else

the principles of that in

are

therefore

to

which he believes

him than

possesses scientific

they are not more

the conclusion,

knowledge.

known

to

him than

For
the

conclusion, he will possess science acciden-

Let science therefore

tally.

thus de-

be

fined.

Compare
Dr. Gillies:

following
intellect.

with the following version of

this

Let these habits be the

science, prudence,

art,

In matters of opinion

five

wisdom,

we

are

li-

able to be deceived, not so in matters of sci-

ence.

The former

of whose very existence

in their nature,

may

relates to things variable

doubt, unless

when they

we

are actually

By that which is universal, Aristotle means in this place

every indemonstrable pinciple, or, in other words, every
axiom, and definition

52
perceived
things

the

latter

unalterable,

conversant about

is

necessary,

and

eternal,

incapable of being generated, exempt from

corruption

knowledge of which admits

the

not of degrees between

absolute

taught, and

known by

which

truths

may

by induction,

first

that

is

Sci-

be defined a demonstrative

habit, distinguished

we have

The

on experience.

intellect operating

ence then

be

are previously

experience or reason.

principles are acquired

by

may

teaching implies principles,

all

namely, those

science

All

certainty.

ignorance and

total

by those

ascribed to

it

properties

which

our Analytics.

in

The

principles of science must be perceived with

the clearest evidence

more evident than

unless

for

the conclusions

from them, those conclusions

science,

strictly

so

they be

called

drawn

will not

form

because their

truth does not necessarily proceed from the

truth of their premises, with

which they are

connected, not essentially, but only by w'ay

of accession or appendage.

In
ous

this translation

that, in

ever

is

the

first

of Dr. Gillies
place,

taken of the word

though, considered

as

it is

obvi-

no notice what-

v7roXyili/c,

hppolepsis,

one of the powers of

the soul,

it is

word of great importance

the philosophy of Aristotle

in

and though the

Doctor himself admits (in the introduction

to

book) that the powers of intellection

this

widely from each other

differ as

as those of

This word, however,

sensation.

is

used by

Aristotle to signify the definite assent of the

soul to the discursive energies of the dianoetic

And,

power.

next

the

in

rambling paraphrase of Dr.

place,

by the
accu-

Gillies, the

racy of Aristotles reasoning

stroyed, as must be obvious,

entirely de-

is

by comparing

it

with the original, to any one in the smallest

degree familiar with the yery

mode

scientific

of writing employed by that philosopher.

Again, the sixth chapter of the same book

is

as follows

E7T5/

ss'iv vttoXypIjis,

Sjj

xat touv

sm^vipri

avayurig ovtouv, skti

touv uTVo'&sni.T ouv non ttucrr\g S7ri9Yi[jLrig'

v)

S7ri?vjp.y}

iri ,

Trig ct^yyig

Hts TS%vri,

u7ro^siJc]ov

at

Xts

Hat
ri

vim

tov stti^yitov,

(p^ovricrig.

$r)

xai

to psv yoc

yoc

57ns">7/x>j

siriryTov,

roOia tovtouv s?i' tov yug

^/ail/tv^ojxs^a

"

iv

<ro<pta 9

xai

vovg t

si

orsgi

Kat svh%o^sva aXXoug s%stv y

5"/,

t av

crotyov

s%iv a7ro$st%iv 55

p-tfiiTroTS

pera Xoyov

Tvyypcvovcriv ovcrai tts^i tu sv&sypp.tva

aXKoug s%uv. ouJs

tts^i

xaQoXov

tts^i touv

<$ri

ra

otg aXr\^svop.sv 9

pri ev$i

x op.eva f

STris-yipy, y.ai (p^orr/cyig

tovtouv $s

p.^sp

iV ^-%STCtl

SlVtxr

X-. yco

tensjcu

VOW

bmce
c: n
scicnrp
1JLL

is
s

T /a >
f

,,v
c/ya/

tPgovrjcr tv

<ro(Lixv

f
That

Tftw

universal

mrl

r
a
definite accent
ssem to

ic
is

'V - ilL'

s>ry subsidence

-"J

h llave a ,leces '

T*

SC,ence

with

Sllbsists in

reason), his being

(he

principles

of the ohipnie
will neither
be science

dence

"*

ciples of the
objects of d
cmonstration
all science ir
01

and of

conjunction
J
0
of

SC,e ' 1Ce ,hcre

nor

nor pru-

art,

a,t aild

...

prudence are conversant

have a various
subsistenr
can wisdom oertain
P a,n ^ n
these things
ft
^
t,le province

w^^whieda
-i-veirnei

for

U
if

ic
IS

of a wise

demonstration of certain
0

erS

and
nd a'!
are;'r
never

man

th^

by Which

If'

assert the truth,'

any ,i me deceived
either
bout things which
have not or which
h ve
at

a various subsistence,
are, science,
prude ce
wisdom,

and

intellect;

tree can
jeet,

(I

and

if

have principles

for

mean by

dom, and

its

the three,
prudence
science,) it remains

conversant with
principles, or

jjhich we know

no one

ob
wis

that intellect
is

that

ii

power

the principles
of sci-

55

Compare
tion

with the following transla-

this

Since

of Dr. Gillies:

science, as above observed,

demonstrable

is

universal

and whatever

truth,

of

the object

is

and
de-

monstrable must be founded on principles,

is

it

manifest that there must be primary prin-

ciples,

which are not science any more than

they are

science, because all science

they are not

have

and variable

we

cause, as
the

highest

is

are not

demonstrable

prudence, because these

art or

contingent

things

subjects

their

for

They

prudence.

or

art

neither are they wisdom, be-

shall see hereafter,

wisdom,

wisdom, and

conversant about

is

truths susceptible of demonstration.

Since

then none of the four habits just mentioned

art,

nor prudence, nor

wisdom, can

afford those

primary principles;

and since

the habits of the understanding

neither science, nor

all

are reducible to five,

it

follows that intellect,

operating on experience,

is

the only source

from which those great and primary truths

can be supposed
Here,
is

in the

to flow.

first

place, no notice whatever

taken of the word xmoKv^ng; and, in the

next place, science

object

of science

is

confounded with

For the words

to psv

the

56
fTtTfjTov,

a7rohi>L7ov;

knowledge

entific

by Dr.

e.

i.

for the

because

monstrable

In the

last

all science

made

is

ther the text authorizes, nor his

by him

trine as delivered

in the

own doc-

second chap-

of his Posterior Analytics, which

we have

For he there expressly

already noticed.
44

to

concerning intellect which nei-

assert that

says,

de-

is

sentence, too, of

Dr. Gilliess translation, Aristotle

ter

of sci-

demonstrable , are rendered

is

Gillies,

object

that the principles of demonstration

(axioms and definitions) are by nature prior

the conclusions of which they are the

to

source

so far

is

intellect operating
tain

whence

Again

he from

on experience

(plowing
5-/V,

ovx

TlXZlTXl yV

xXK'

cticr$C(VoysQa

as follows

is

too

7ri?Yiyri

TO

SlQYjTOll'

cfy

OVK 71 7\0y0g.
vjyYjf

that

the foun-

the latter part of the eighth chap-

00<r7TS(>

is

these principles flow.

of the same book

ter

asserting,

Vj

71

Sf TOV CT%XTOV, CV

to

ov%
t 01 $

ij

yap

Ou

e <ryjx.To\>

QOOIT IKOV T010VT0V. XV-

VW* 0 [AV yufi VOUf,

ca<rBri<ri$

ou

yag

tmv

T MV OgUVy MV

OVX 7lV 7117-

ihocv,

path] yxr ixoig

* This observation was made by

me

uXh'

ax

<r%XT0Vy

long since, in p. 44

of the introduction to my translation of Aristotles Metaphysics but Dr. Gillies very prudently takes no notice of it in his
;

Supplement.

57
ya^

Tf>iywvov'

(TTYicrsTai

aicrByjcrig

q (ppovv]<ng'

That prudence
as

that

which

which
But

it is

said,

subsists

opposed

as
is

it

aviii

70\

ccAAo sidog.

not science

practical

is

c/.

SKStVYjg

is

we have

for,

vmxzi'

ycu\7\6v
1.

e.

evident

is

conversant with

is

an extreme
a thing of

to intellect

for that

this

kind.

for intellect

is

axioms)

conversant with terms or limits,

(/. e .

of which there

but prudence

is

no definition

is

conversant with that extreme, the percep-

tion of

which

but of sense.

not the province of science

is

Not, indeed, that

ble perception of things

per objects of sense, but

when we

belongs

to sense

prudence

is

Compare
different

mathe-

for figures stop

specifically different.
this

with the following transla:

Prudence

is

manifestly

from science, being the perception

of those particular

and practical truths which

admit not of demonstration

mary

last in

but that which pertains to

tion ol Dr. Gillies

employed about

is

is

This perception, however, rather

there*.

lect

of that kind, as

it is

a triangle

is

a sensi-

which are the pro-

perceive that what

matical figures

it is

principles

whereas

intel-

those general and pri-

which require not any proof.

In the chain of mental faculties intellect and

*

All figures are ultimately resolved into triangles,

T

;;

58

prudence then form the two extreme links

prudence holding the extreme of individuaand

lity,

deuce then
since

Pru^

intellect that of generalization.

it is

may

common

be called

sense,

conversant about objects of sense

but in a manner specifically different from

that in

which

the other senses are respectively

conversant about their particular objects.

Here, in the

first

place,

says respecting a triangle

Aristotle

entirely omitted,

have before observed in the introduction

as I
to

is

what

my

translation of Aristotles

Metaphysics

and, in the next place, no part of

this pas-

sage can with propriety be called a translation,

as

must be obvious even

to

the most

careless reader.

Thus much

for Dr. Gilliess translation of

the sixth book.

Without proceeding

similar inaccuracies

tice

to

no-

and deformities

his translation of the seventh book,

in

I shall

only observe, that he has entirely omitted

the four
treat

are

of pleasure

mere

because, says he,

transcripts

the Ethics to

more

chapters of this book, which

last

fully

from the

sixth

they
book of

Eudemus; and the subject is

and more philosophically ex-

plained in the tenth book of the Ethics to

Nicomachus,

Can any thing be more abn

59
surd than to omit translating these chapters

because they are

work
tion

of

which he has given no

dently designed by Aristotle

book,

this

yx.pctTS/ac
SipVjTUt)

STl)

you axpacr/af, you

YOU Tl SYCtTOV, YOU

Sc

YUYOC*

form a part of

as follows

is

X017T0V

evi-

from the concluding

as appears

sentence, which

to

transla-

were

chapters

these

Besides,

from another

transcripts

7rspi rjoovys

7TOOg ?0i

YOU

$S

ITfp/

psv

you

ow

?<u7ry\g

pSV UyCiQot OiVTUV

TTSpi <PlXlOCg ipOV[J.V.

And thus we have spoken concerning

i. e.

continence and incontinence, pleasure and

pain , what each of them
spect

some of them

now

It

and

in

Are such omissions

be

And

call

him

will

a translator

with his original

as these to

any man presume

who

to

takes such liberties

Without proceeding

to notice

worthy of reprehension
books,

re-

we speak concerning

friendship.
justified

what

good and others bad.

are

remains that

is,

I shall finish this

in

every thing

the remaining

selection

by present-

ing the reader with the original of the whole

of the seventh chapter of the tenth book, as
it is

one of the most beautiful and important

in the Ethics of Aristotle;

strong point of view

how

and

will

show

in a

Dr. Gillies has de-

formed the manner, and destroyed the accu-

60

meaning of the

rate
/

stiv

Stagirite

sv&aiyovia

y\

xaT

7ia]a TYjv Kf>ocTi9YjV' avTYj

aAA o

tcvto , sits

ti 9

Ssiov ov xai

avTO ,

tovtov svs^ysia xava

sv^atyovia. oti
Si

tovt

av

eeXviSsi

ttspi

toov

xaA oov

vovg

S>?

sv

xai Bsioov' sits

to Bsiotcctov

7iy.iv

TVjV oixsiaV a^STVjV

sirj

av

tj

TsXsia

vj

ssi Bsco^tixyi sipYirai. oy.oXoyovy.svov

ts

xjPccTisYj

yc<(> o

vovg toov sv

vovg.

ST

xai r oig tt^otspov,

sivai

<5o^sisv

ya(>

avTYj

rvvsyoog y.aXXov 9

s$~iv

ts

Bc-oo^siv

too

xai

vrsgi

c>vvay.sQa

yotf>

oioy.s9a

tc^utJslv otiovv.

vj

x.ai

svs^ysia

y\

xai toov yvoo^orv,

vjy.iv ,

rwsy i5'oiTV]'

St

t ov a^isov sits

xa] a (pvaiv $cxsi a^yjsiv xai

S*j

sits

svXoyov

a^sTYjv svsyysia,

S siy\

xai svvoiav syyiv

r,ysicrScci 9

by his translation.

ts

Si/v

vj$ ovvjv 7ra^ay.syiyfiai

a^STcoV svs^ysioov,
Soxsi yovv

y\

xafa r vjv

a-ctyiu

7]

y^i^y] Si toov xoct

tv&uiy.ovia.'

trf

o~o(piav oy.oXoyovy.svoog 657.

Savyasag v$ovag syyiv xaB agioTYjT

xai t oo (3sauy. svXoyov Si t oig si^oti

7]Sico

t vjv ayooyv\v sivai.

tjts

yaXi?

CCV

^SOJ^YjTlXYjV

TY\V

avayxaioov , xou

cro(pog ,

Xsyoy.sv/]

cyoiovg Si xai o

sxaTog.
xai

%cov
y.ov/j

av

aAA

S i avTYjv

oyoog

xca

yaXXov

oi

xoci

Xomoi
o y.sv

y.s9

cov

avfysiog, x.ai toov aXXoov

oov 9 S vvaToa Bsoo^siv'

(SsXticv

avTa^xs^ccjog.

rraoa to sior>r <rcfi. asto os toov

icooq crvvs^yovg

S o^sis

ayaozacr^ai ovosv yag> avr

t

Xou
i

nrsgi

yay5 7T0g 7 0

xsy o^Yiyr y.svcov 9

xai xa9' avTOv

cro(pog y;9

fJ.SV

'$ixat07r(>ayYl cri 9

roo(p^oov 9

o Si <ro<Qog 9

oerco

ovg

auTagxsia,

xai S ixaiog 9

S sovToa ' Toig Si ToiovTOig ixavooq

^ixaiog S snai 7rgog

TOOV

SlVj

tovvtoov

toov

av

avTYj

avT'/jg yivsjat

7roan} cov 9

vj

ttXsiov

vj

61
e\cct]ov Trsi7roiovysBu tvu^u

svSaiyovtoc sv

cr%oX >7

tyi

cyp\u(yoysv,

7roXsyovysv,

aui

ucyoXoi

Soyovclv

TCuvTsXoog' ovSitg

svzYa,

stvai .

iva

oroXmnoig

vj

tuvtu 7r^u^sig,
yui

ovv orohsyiYui,

yu uv

So^ai

7roXiyov

sivui , si

ycc%oa yui

lvoc

Toig

sv

vj

yoq0 ou^sirui to 7roXzysiv y tov TroXsystv

TravTsXwg yioa(povog Tig

TToicno ,

ysv

ou

ts

ccyuy.lv.

Ei^rjvrjv

os 7ts^i

oci

7tuucysvu^eiv

ovSe

ivu

a^STcov,

Toig 7roX<yiHoig ui svs^ystai'

Soyei

7rgx^iv,

ucypXovyiQu yu

s/ya/*

ovv rrrgscHTMwv

tcov y:-y

r v/v

Tovg (pihovg oroXsyiovg

yiyvoivTO. ss'/ Ss yui

(povoc

vj

TOV TVoXlTlYOV UCyoXog, YUI TTU OCVTOTO TTOXlTSVSC &UI,

%Si7rotovysvYj SwotsSlug yui Tiyug,
ccvtcc
7]v

yui roig vroXiTuig, sts^uv ovcuv

yui

tyjTOvysv'

yu]u

ysv

SvjXov

uSTug

t ocg

cryjvXoi yui

siciv ui^stui *

TSXoVg, S%S IV TS

ccrgvTOVf

vj

yyjYog

Syj

(3iov

yui

wo\itiy.ui

you ov

uvtui

Ss

Si* ctvrotg

uvtyiv uSsvog sCpisc^ui

OIYSIUV' UVTYj Ss CVVUV^St

uyfyooTTivov,

a7rovsyflxi,

tsXsiu

VjSoVYjV

YOU TO UVTUgYtg
cog

tcov

Svj

Ss roy vov svs^ysiu cttovSvi ts Siu<pSSiv

Soysi, SsugrjTiYvi ovcu, yui 7ru

SVSySlUV

si

7r^osypvciv'

TsXovg r ivog sfiisvTui,

v\

Tv\g TtoXiTiYVig,

ui

7rgu^soov

ys svSutyoviuv

ovcuv.

srs^av

cog

oroXsyiYui, yuXXsi you ysysdsi

gto0

TVjv

vj

YOU

Si

you ocrx

TypXwS IY.OV ^

uXXu

yuJu 7 uvjvjv svsgysiuv

svSuiyoviu uvtyi uv
tsXslqv

ovSsv

svSuiyoviug. 0 Ss TOtovTog uv

stvj

av^wTrov* 8 yu w uv$oo7rog

YOtl

yuxu-

tu>

(puivsjui

cvtu'

uvS^gottov Xuftovca

yu ursXsg
siyi

T'/jV

ssi

tcov

YSit}oov (2iog,
ssiv,

vj

tyi g

yocJz

aroo (2 icocstui.

62

*AA

jj

TWTO

TOU (TVmSsTOV, TOtTOVTOC

ti

S'f/ov

aAA)jv af>sryv.

tyjv

xai

S>j

tovtom

xcctoc

@ioy,

aurco

sv

(3iog ,

OCM$(>U7rOM

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7T0$

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GuSs

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TYj

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tov olmS^ootcimom

7r^Of

^MTjTOC

ct7raSava.Ti^iiv,

XOCTU TO

(y.^M

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Sc

Tovg TragocivowTug, avB^ui7Tivu

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(p

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octm

$/oj/ o j/okj 7r^o^ toi/

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y^yj

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xui

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X(>OCT 15 0}

UVT0d
^

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tvoKv pi.uX7.ov wrs^sysi ttu^cajm.

TOUTO,

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yap

TO

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u^pnocrsi

(pVTH, xpuTi^ov

sxaTy xui tm av&puj7ry

Sji

But

to virtue,

and

which

is

rule and

to the

xui wm

to

movm /3/cc, sittso

s v^oupiovs^dcjog.

it is

most excellent

Whether, therefore,

something

be

T/V0f

be the virtue of that

will

this

best.

intellect, or

aXXu

reasonable to suppose that

an energy according
virtue

UT07T0M OVV

an energy according

if felicity is

it is

>ca/ sxusom

x,ui y/Sitom fcr^

xuja tom

piuXiS'cn tovto av$poo7rog. ovTog ccpcc xca

i. e.

av

TOM UVTOV filCM UlfjOlTO,

fXYl

A syStM

to

S wccpst x.ca Ti^uoTYjTt

else

the leader

this

which appears

by

he
to

nature, and to

have a conception of things beautiful and

divine

or

whether

it

is

itself

divine, or the

most divine of
this,

according

all

to

our
its

parts, the

energy of

proper virtue, will he

6*3

But we have

perfect felicity.

energy
to

is

And

contemplative.

we

accord with what

For

also with truth.

parts,

energy

this

which

This energy also

for

we

to

We likewise

according

to

wisdom

is

most pleasant of

cording

to

is

most con-

more

any action what-

think that pleasure ought

be mingled with felicity

the

all

intellect

are able to contemplate

incessantly than to perform

ever.

the most

and of objects of knowledge those

conversant.

tinued

is

the best of

is

are the most excellent about

is

appears

this

before asserted, and

excellent; since intellect

our

said that this

but the energy

acknowledged
all

be

the energies ac-

Wisdom

virtue.

to

therefore ap-

pears to possess pleasures admirable both for

their purity
also

to

and

stability.

think that those

It

who

is

reasonable

possess

know-

ledge live more pleasantly than those

investigate.

That

too,

which

is

who

called self-

sufficiency, will especially subsist about the

contemplative energy.
ries of

lite,

the wise and the just

the rest of those

tues, are in

For of the necessa-

who

want

possess the

but even

man, and
moral

when they

sufficiently supplied with these, the just

is

in

vir-

are

man

want of those towards whom, and toge-

;;

64

whom, he may

ther with

manner

like

act justly

and in

the temperate and the brave

man, and each of

the

But the wise

rest.

man when alone is able to contemplate and

by how much the wiser he is by so much
;

the

more does he

haps,

when he
but

he

indeed,

contemplate better

will

has others

at the

Per-

possess this ability.

to

co-operate with

same time he

is

most

him

sufficient to

himself.

This energy alone, likewise, will

appear

be beloved for

to

nothing else

we

produced from

is

obtain something

sides the action

war

that

it

sake, for

besides con-

more

or less be-

Felicity also appears

itself.

to consist in leisure

ness that

own

But from things of a practical

templation.

nature

its

we engage

for

in busi-

we may be at leisure, and we wage

we may live in peace. The ener-

gies therefore of the political virtues consist

either in political or in military transactions

but the actions which are conversant with

these appear to be full of

indeed

is

perfectly the case with

transactions

for

no one chooses

war, or prepare for

war

employment. This

since he

a homicide

it,

to

for the sake of

would appear

who

military

should

to

wage

waging

be perfectly

make enemies

of his

65
friends for the sake of fighting

The energy

and slaughter.

too of the politician

of a busy

is

management of pubemployed in procuring domi-

nature, and, besides the

lic affairs,

is

nion and honour, or a felicity for himself

and the

citizens different

energy, which

we

also, as

from the

something

evidently investigate.

If,

political

different,

therefore, po-

and military actions surpass in beauty

litical

and magnitude

all

other virtuous actions, but

these are of a busy nature, aspire after a certain end,

sakes

own

and are not eligible for their

but the energy of intellect, which

is

contemplative, appears to excel other energies in ardor,

sides itself

sure,

and

no other end be-

to desire

if also it possesses

which increases

its

a proper plea-

energy, and has, in

addition to this, self-sufficiency, leisure and

unwearied power,

human
else

is

nature will permit, with whatever

attributed to the blessed,

to subsist

according

be the case

man when
life

so far as the condition of

for

perfect.

this will
it

to this

and appears

energy

if

such

be the perfect felicity of

receives a perfect

nothing belonging

Such a

life,

length of

to felicity

is

im-

however, will be more

excellent than that which

is

merely

human 3

66
for

man

but so

will not thus live so far as

far as

he contains

And

divine.

in himself

he

man

is

something

much as this part excels the

much does its energy surpass
as

composite so

the energy belonging to every other virtue.

therefore, intellect

If,

to

man, the

will

life

also

divine with respect

is

according

be divine with respect

Nor ought we, according

of certain persons,
fairs,

since

we

are

concerns, since
as possible

we

to

it

is

also that

each of us

lent.

It

man

dignity.
is

nature.

which

much

this part,

dominion

is

also

else.

own

That

since that

more excel-

is

life

too

all

would seem

It

this part *,

fore asserted accords with

intellect

For

would therefore be absurd

of something

* The

but as

bulk, far excels

not to choose his

for that

regard mortal

to

part.

small in

power and

obtains

af-

in order to live according

things in

which

human

should immortalize ourselves,

our most excellent

though

life.

exhortation

be wise in

are mortal

and do every thing

to

human

to

to the

men, nor

we

to intellect

for a

but the

life

which was be-

what

is

now

said

intimately allied to any naand Plato, i$

the summit of it*

true jnan, both according to Aristotle

for the essence

of every thing

is

67
tare

is

most excellent and most pleasant to

that nature;

and hence a

according

life

to in-

tellect will

be most excellent and pleasant to

man, since

this part

This

life,

therefore,

is
is

most eminently man.

also

most happy.

Dr. Gillies s translation of

follows:

this

chapter

is

as

If happiness consists in virtuous

energies the greatest

human

happiness must

consist in the exercise of the greatest virtue

man, which must be the virtue or perfection of his best part, whether this be intellect,

in

or whatever principle

command and

to

it

be, that

bear sway

is

destined

having know-

ledge of things beautiful and divine, as being

either divine
us

in

The
retic

itself,

or at least that principle

which most approximates

greatest

human

happiness then

theo-

we formerly found

investigation to be essentially inherent in

that

The

most coveted object.

the best principle in

man

its

intellect

conversant are

far the

is

energies are

the strongest, and the objects about

is

is

and intellectual, which well accords

with the properties which

by

to divinity.

which

most sublime.

it

The

energies of intellect are also the longest and

most continuous, since we can persevere in

theorizing and thinking

much

longer than in

63
performing any action whatever.
it

Pleasure,

was observed, must be an ingredient in

happiness

but contemplative wisdom

offers

pleasures the most admirable in purity and

and the pleasures of knowledge

stability,

continually increase

improvement

in

it

proportion to

in

our

certainty concerning the

sublimest truths affording

higher delight

still

in proportion to the intense efforts of intellect

by which they were

That

discovered.

which we remarked

sufficiency,

as

all-

a pro-

perty of happiness, belongs to intellectual

*

energies

more than

to

any other

for

though

the sage, as well as the moralist or the pastands in need of bodily

triot,

accommoda-

tions, yet in exerting his highest excellen-

cies

he

is

them, dependent on

not, like

for-

tune both for his objects and his instruments

for objects towards
bis virtues,

ble

him

sisted

whom

and instruments

may exercise
which may ena-

he

to effectuate his ends.

Even unas-

and alone, though perhaps better with

assistants,

he can

still

think and theorize

possessing in the energies of his

the

purest

own mind

and most independent enjoy-

ments.

These enjoyments are valuable pe-

culiarly

on

their

own

account, since they

69
terminate completely in themselves; whereas
all practical virtue has,

beside the practice

self,

some

The

tranquillity of leisure

distinct

and separate end

in view.

naturally

is

agreeable than the bustle of business

toil for

more

we

make war

the sake of quiet, and

it-

for

But the practical virtues

the sake of peace.

are most conspicuously exercised in political

and military functions, the

latter

of which

none but the most savage and sanguinary

minds would submit

to

from choice, convert-

ing friends into enemies for the mere plea-

w ith them.

sure of fighting

Politics,

too,

forms an operose and troublesome occupation,

which would not be undertaken from

the sole love of exercising political functions,

independently of distinct and separate ends

power, wealth, and honour

prosperity
citizens.

plete

to

in

one word,

ourselves, friends,

or fellow-

But intellectual energies are com-

and perfect

in themselves,

exhaustless stream
pleasure,

which

in

supplying an

of pure and
its

perennial

turn invigorates and

enlivens the energies, and thus increases and

from which

it

ynceasingly

springs; all-sufficient, peaceful,

and perma-

refines the source

nent, as far as

is

compatible with the cpndi-

70
tion

Were

humanity.

of

manency added

to

such a

unalterable perlife, its

would be more than human

a limited term,

its

happiness

but even within

be enjoyed by those

who

the perfec-

attain

of their ages and faculties; living not

tion

merely

pound

as

partners with

frail

and com-

nature, but according to the simple

and divine principle within

and

energies

virtues

them, whose
transcend

far

as

others as the intellectual substance in

they reside excels

which our frame

is

hortation,

all

which

other substances of

all

We

composed.

rot, therefore, according to

tal

may

inestimable delights

though mortal,

to

ought

the vulgar ex-

regard only mor-

things; but, as far as possible, to put on

immortality, exerting ourselves to

joys of the intellectual

according
ourselves,

bulk,

is

to the

life.

This

the

living
call

which, though seemingly small

incomparably greater

indeed

in

is

in

power and

The

intel-

the best and sovereign part of

our constitution, and therefore

properly ourselves.
prefer

is

what we

best part of

in value than all things besides.

lect

taste

any other

It

life to

is

strictly

and

absurd therefore to

our own.

above observed will apply here.

What was
The pleai

71
sure and good of each individual must con-

which

that

in

sist

The

nature.

most congenial

is

intellectual life, therefore,

be the best and happiest

intellect

that

is

Such
which,

which

man,

for

since the

Dr. Gillies, in

inaccuracy and

continual

besides

must

peculiarly himself.

is

the translation ol

is

to his

presumptuous interpolation, the manner

the original

entirely destroyed.

is

in this translation

is

any

ot

For where

vestige to be seen ot

most accurate and syllogistic method

that

which

eminently characterizes the writ-

so

ings of Aristotle

Where

is

that invincible

force of reasoning to

be discovered which

language

everywhere presents

in

Platonic

bound with

itself

(ysupsTgiKutg

geometrical

W here

avccy/aig.')

necessities

that

modest

caution with which the Stagirite in this chapter,

conformity

in

introduces the

And,

we

if

we

to

dogmas of

it

no

less

and profundity of the

felicity

is

to

philosophy?

first

unworthy the beauty

original.

suppose that

to

the

For instance,

sentence, Aristotle says,

an energy according

reasonable

cording

his

turn our attention to the matter,

shall find

in the very

general custom,

his

it is

to virtue,

If

it is

an energy ac-

most excellent virtue

and

12
this will

be the virtue of that which

Compare
16

best.'

is

with the version of Dr. Gillies

this

If happiness consists in virtuous energies,

the greatest

human

happiness must consist in

the exercise of the greatest virtue in man,

which must be the

best part.

virtue or perfection of his

Here the word

teasonable to suppose ,
Gillies

must

translated

is

svKoyov,

it

is

by Dr.

and thus the modesty of

Aristotle in this sentence

is

That the reader too may

entirely destroyed.

see

how

Dr. Gillies

has deformed the most scientific method of

reasoning adopted by Aristotle,

pafe the whole of the

first

let

him com-

sentence of the

Doctors translation with the original.

Aristotles reasoning

city

is

is

as follows

an energy according

reasonable to suppose that

If feli-

to virtue,

it is

part

The

the virtue of the best

proper virtue, will be perfect

its

felicity.

Where

to

is

this

geometric reason-

be found in the following rambling

translation

of Dr. Gillies

If happiness

consists in virtuous energies, the greatest

man

is

the energy of this part, therefore, ac-

cording to

ing

is

it

an energy ac-

cording to the most excellent virtue.

most excellent virtue

For

hu-

happiness must consist in the exercise of

73
the greatest virtue in

man, which must be the

virtue or perfection of his best part,

this

be

that

is

intellect, or

whatever principle

command and

destined to

whether
it

be,

bear sway

having knowledge of things beautiful and

divine, as being either divine
that principle in us

itself,

or at least

which most approximates

to divinity.

Again, compare the following sentence

with the version of Dr. Gillies

energy, also (says Aristotle,

of intellect)

is

i. e.

most continued

able to contemplate

more

Thi$

the energy

we

for

are

incessantly than to

But by Dr.
perform any action whatever.
Gillies he is made to say, The energies of
intellect are also the longest

and most conti-

we can persevere in theorizing

and thinking much longer than in performing any action whatever.
By this version
nuous, since

it

is

evident that Dr. Gillies had not the

%

smallest conception of

by

intellectual

energy

what

and

unfortunately deprived of
this

employment,

chapter,

is

Aristotle

that

its

as Aristotle

he

himself

possession.

For

observes in this

an energy according

and wisdom,

is

means

to

wisdom

he defines it in the sixth

book of these Ethics, is the intellectual
as

74
perception of principles and things most ho-

nourable by nature,

n^iMTajocv t

vovg

tyv<rzi,

yml

crodpim
toov

191

twv

voog

And

apy^wv.

these principles and things most honourable by

nature are the

geny,

as

is

first

evident from what

ready observed.
does

this

cause and his divine pro-

By no means,

energy consist

and thinking

for this

we have

al-

therefore,

merely theorizing

in

may

be easily accom-

by any one, and the power of per-

plished

forming

it is

not attended with the possession

of intellectual virtue.

Compare

also

translation of Dr.

the

following

Gillies

with

Wisdom, says

Aristotle, appears to possess pleasures

admir-

able both for their purity and stability.

is

the

reasonable also to think that those

It

who

more pleasantly than

Pleasure, it was
those who investigate .

possess

knowledge

live

observed (says Dr. Gillies) must be an ingredient

wisdom

in

happiness

but contemplative

offers pleasures the

in purity

and

stability,

most admirable

and the pleasures of

knowledge continually increase

tion to our improvement in it
concerning the sublimest
Still

higher delight

in

in

propor-

certainty

truths

affording

proportion to the in-

75
tense efforts of intellect

Here much

discovered.

which

Gillies,

by which they were

is

is

added hy Dr.

not only unwarranted

by

the original, hut evidently shows that the

Doctor

has

meaning.

For though

pleasures of
in

mistaken

entirely

it

Aristotle's

true

is

knowledge continually increase

proportion to our improvement in

this

is

what

not

For Aristotle says,

who

It is

pleasantly than those

who

is

indicated

possession of

For

it.

rect

as

con-

meaning.

more

live

investigate .

which sentence the nature of

energy

it

reasonable to think

knowledge

possess

yet

it

Aristotle says, nor does

tain the smallest vestige of his real

that those

that the

In

intellectual

hy the opposition of the

knowledge

to

intellectual

energy consists in di-

the investigation of

immediate vision of the

intelligible , or

the proper object of intellect, the full posses sion of

knowledge

is

previously necessary to

the exercise of this energy.

in

the

twelfth

speaking of

hook of

capable of

santly than

his

Aristotle,

Metaphysics,

intellect, expressly says

this

that

it

He, therefore, who

energizes possessing
is

Hence

energy,

him who
* EvFoysi

lives

more

investigates
Ss

sxwy

'

plea-

because

16
investigation

is

but

laborious,

intellectual

energy, from being immediate vision

attended with labour, and

is

companied with

What

therefore adds,

delight.

is

un-

necessarily ac-

Dr. Gillies

that certainty concerning

the sublimest truths affords

still

higher de-

light in proportion to the intense efforts of

by which they were discovered,

has nothing to do with the meaning of
intellect

Aristotle in this place, but

duced by the Doctor

to

is,

as usual, intro-

conceal his igno-

rance and please the vulgar.

is

it is

to

men-

modest form of expres-

tion that Aristotles

sion,

Not

reasonable to suppose (evXoyov)

by the Doctor. The

disposed to compare the re-

entirely unnoticed

reader

who

maining
this

is

part of Dr.

Gilliess translation of

chapter with the original, even

if

he

is

but moderately skilled in the philosophy of

that Dr.

Gillies every-

where deforms the matter of

the Stagirite by

Aristotle, will find

unskilful interpolations, and completely destroys the

manner , by breaking

his geometri-

cal chain of reasoning, in order,

medium

through the

of popular diction, to gratify the

public ear.

Having presented the reader with

so

many

77

specimens of deformities and inaccuracies, of

important omissions and rash interpolations,
in the translation of Dr. Gillies, I shall leave

him

judge what opinion ought

to

formed of the following assertion

of the Doctors Introduction to the

My aim

to

has

too,

omitted

would hope

to

From
is

it

is
;

be

236

book.

first

the sense of Aristotle

nothing which he says,

he

in p.

throughout , says he,

here rigidly

to

to

to

ad-

omit

say nothing ivhich

these

specimens,

nearly obvious to

every one, that in translating the abstruse or

acroamatic writings of Aristotle,
to observe the

most

literal

it is

necessary

most rigid accuracy and the

For such

exactness.

is

the preg-

nant brevity of diction, such the syllogistic

method uniformly adopted by

the Stagirite

them it is
manner than

in these works, that in translating

no

less

necessary to copy his

faithfully preserve

his

matter

since,

from

the scientific nature of the composition, the

union between the two

is

so

great that the

former cannot be neglected without essentially injuring the latter.

Similar

deformities, and equally,

rous,

might be

liess

translation of Aristotles

easily selected

nume-

from Dr. GilPolitics; but

78
the specimens which have been already ad-

duced

afford,

the Doctor

is

a sufficient proof that

trust,

very far from having fathomed

die profundity of the Stagirites mind, and

is

therefore unequal to the task of transfusing

that profundity into English.

And now,

presume, Dr. Gillies

is

by this

time furnished with a sufficient answer

following observation

reply to

iiis

my

in

to the

the conclusion

of

The nature

Strictures.

and scope, says he (p. 229 of his Supplement) of my literary labours are so totally different
it

is

from those of Mr. Taylor,

not easy to understand

could cross, or

my

why he

our roads

should step forth as

determined antagonist.

mon and

how

that

Utility,

com-

vulgar utility, above which that

sublime author proudly

or rather sole aim.

soars,

Had

translation faithfully given

was

my

great

Dr. Gillies in his

the manner and

matter of Aristotle to the best of his ability,

had he discovered by
was

his translation that

a genuine lover of truth, that

he

he was a

candidate for honest fame, and not for the

applause of the vulgar,

crossing,
to

his,

my

road, so far

would have been perfectly

and

from

parallel

should have rejoiced to find

79

him running with me the same

petitor for the

race, a

com-

same honours, and tending

to

the same goal. But perceiving that Dr. Gillies,

from having been a legitimate student

so far

of Aristotles more abstruse writings, had not

even discovered that they were composed

with studied obscurity of diction, and that,

through a presumptuous confidence in his

own

abilities,

Greek

tles

in

interpreters without being in the

degree familiar with their works,

smallest

and

he despised the best of Aristo-

consequence of

had mutilated

this

and deformed some of the noblest productions of the Stagirite, I did

as

his

indeed step forth

Such, how-

determined antagonist.

ever, being the real state of the case,

difficult to
Is

as

it

possible

understand
I

why

is

it

should do so?

could act otherwise, professing,

do, the sincerest regard for truth, and

believing

it

to be, as Plato says,

every good both

to

the source of

God and man

patiently submit to see a

Could

work presented

the English reader as a translation

to

of the

Ethics and Politics of Aristotle, in which the

sense

is

injured, and the beauty of the origi-

nal deformed, in every page

I

especially as

professed myself a student of Aristotle,

and

80
one

who had employed no common

tor

a considerable

number of

labour

years in the

study of his philosophy; gladly availing

selt,

in order to penetrate

its

depth, of every

could be obtained, and not

assistance that

scorning the labours of his

through

an

strength of

my-

confidence

unlawful

my own

best disciples,

mind, or a

in

the

desire to

gain a noble end by ignoble means.

But, after wondering that

stept forth as his

antagonist, Dr. Gillies adds,

common and

vulgar utility, above which Mr.

Taylor proudly
aim.

sole,

soars,

was his great, or rather

Dr. Gillies

afraid, that in the

human

every order of beings

a
*

sion of things

ignorant,

is

am

species, as well as in

in the universe, there

a middle, and

first,

that utility,

is

that the progres-

last,

may form one unbroken

chain,

originating from deity, and terminating in

In consequence of

matter.

one part of the

lesces

an

human

this

connexion,

species naturally coa-

through transcendency with beings of

order superior to

man

another

part

through subjection unites with the brutal

species

which

subsists as

medium between

the other

and a third

the connecting

part,

two, possesses those properties which charac-

'

81
terize

human

nature in a

manner not ex-

ceeding, but exactly commensurate to the

The

condition of humanity.
parts,

from

of a small

its

surpassing excellence, consists

number

subsists as the

which ranks

of these

first

That which

of mankind.

middle

is

numerous.

as the last in

And

gradation

is

that

com-

posed of a countless multitude,

Thick

as

autumnal leaves that strow the brooks

In Vallambrosa.

In consequence of

this

beautiful gradation

the most subordinate part of

only

to

mankind

are

be benefitted by good rulers, laws, or

become peacecommunities in which

customs, through which they

ful

members of

they

live,

the

and make a proficiency,

mus Tyrius*

as

Maxi-

well observes, not by the ac-

cession of good, but

by the diminution of

evil.

If Dr. Gillies, by professing to aim at

mon and

vulgar

utility,

com-

means an endeavour

to benefit this lowest order of the

by disseminating among them

human

race

truths of a na-

ture so arduous and sublime, that they can

only be understood by the highest classof our

species, I

* See

own, and

p. 19 of

my

glory in the confession,

translation of his Dissertations.

82
do soar above such an endeavour, be-

that I

cause

it is

but

no

is

an attempt

this

class of

But

than profane.

less idle

means by
middle

not attended with any advantage,

be useful

to

if

to

he
the

our species, (for such the

Ethics and Politics of Aristotle are calculated

to

benefit)

do good

Gillies to

by

am no

anxious than Dr.

less

to this part

of

mankind

the publication of such truths as they are

capable of understanding.
able

of the

part

very consider-

Dialogues of Plato

are

largely calculated to accomplish this end

but in translating these

have not violated

the meaning of the original in order to gratify the

and

most subordinate part of our species,

sacrificed truth to vulgar applause.

And

this brings

an apology
published

for the
to

me,

in the last place, to

manner

the world the

Plato in an English garb.

then

in

which

have

philosophy of
It is

to observe, that Plato, in

necessary

conformity with

the earliest philosophers of antiquity, deli-

vered the abstruse dogmas of his philosophy

obscurely, in order to conceal from the pro-

fane and vulgar eye certain sublime truths,

which
it

that

eye

may

fancy

can never perceive in

did so

is

it

sees,

reality.

but which

That he

abundantly evident from the

foJ-

83

lowing passages extracted from his

In his second

he says

nysius,

which

epistle, then,

According

of Arcbidemus, you say, that

ficiently demonstrated to

you

to

is

to

Dio-

the report

have not suf-

you the

respecting the nature of the

must speak

to

Epistles.

first

particulars

(god).

enigmas , that

therefore in

in case the letter should be intercepted either

may not underThe pascontents *.**

by land or sea he who reads

,

stand this part of

its

it

sage which then immediately follows

the most deeply mystical in

of Plato
will

but he

that

profound, no

it is

less

no

less

its

depth

admirable

sublime than ob-

Near the end of this

For as it appears
observes
scure.

any particulars which

scarcely

one of

the writings

who has penetrated

acknowledge

than

all

is

epistle also
to

me

he

there are

will be consi-

dered by the multitude more ridiculous than

these

nor again , any which will appear more

wonderful and enthusiastic

well born

to

those

that are

-j-.

*
Seiy^Sat

yap

xvayyovg

x.ara rov ev.eivov Xoyov, ou

veoi rvjs too

trot

aiviyy.xruv,
o

Srj

tv

jm-tj

xvrr)

rj

Kouroo

SeXrog

rj

tputreug.

ikxvujs ctitofe-

<|>pacrreov

Stj

crot

St*

Kovrov, y yrjs ev fo^ais KaSrj,

yvu.

t ly^eSov yag us spot Soxei, oux eern rouruv Kgos loos

KoXXov s xarayeXatrroregx otv.oucry.al a. oo S av Kgos TOus eopjiie
ctuy.a<j-roTeoa re Kxt fvSovnxoriv.wreoa.

84

In his seventh
follows

he observes

epistle also

Thus much, however,

say respecting

all

those

who

which

either have writ-

know
of

the objects

a,re

shall

ten or shall write, affirming that they

those things

as

my

study (whether they have heard them from

me

or from

others,

whether they have

or

them themselves) that they have

not heard any thing about these things condiscovered

formable

my

to

opinion

never have

for I

written nor ever shall write about

For a thing of

by words

and living

from a

itself,

fire will

in the soul,

And

am

in

to

me

it

were leaping

on a sudden be enkindled

and there

itself
:

nourish

But

that the particulars of

speaking could be sufficiently

nicated

to

by long

conjunction with

a light as

shortly after he adds

peared

*.

kind cannot be expressed

like other disciplines, but

familiarity,

the thing

this

them

the multitude

by writing

itself.

if it

ap-

which

commu-

or speech,

what could we accomplish more beautiful in

life than to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into
light,

so

as

to

* Plato means by
cuously about
intellect.

be obvious
this,

to all

men

that he has never written perspi-

intelligible^ or true beings, the

proper objects of

85
think, however,

would only be

some small

at

tli

an attempt of

beneficial to a few,

vestiges previously

this

kind

who Irom

demonstrated

are themselves able to discover these abstruse

But with respect

particulars.

mankind, some

will

it

to the rest ot

with a contempt

fill

elegant, and others with a lofty

by no means

and arrogant hope

that they shall

now

learn

certain excellent things*.

Plato therefore promulgated the most

As

sublime of his doctrines obscurely, in order

to

conceal them from the vulgar, but at the

same time delivered them

which contain those

translating the writings

doctrines

* Toffovfo ye

necessary to observe the most

is

it

uy Treat

sari

axrjxooreg, eir
xcx.ro.

ry

ye

ovk ouv epaov

yevrfai.

foj rav

Sofcav

trepi

7repi

yap cv$ay,ug

efcaitpvijg

oiov

rou irpayp.arog evaleiv ovSev.

aurwv eon <rvyypay.p.a,

rrepi

7rvpog

otto

opeXog ypatyai, xai

aXX

ovre

ry

avSaunroig

Xeyop.evy ayaSov,
auroi 01a p.ixoag

<pwg roig

eig

rjyovp.ai

ei p.rj

ry

evSet^eug.

yam

jg

pvot ecpaiveln

pya,

rovrou

ruv re

ftv)

eXonSog,

mg

<reu.v

p.eya

rtan irporayayeiv

eiriyeiprjoriv

nriv oXtyoig,

oiroroi

irepi

auruiv

Swaroi avevcsiv

aXXuv, rovg

tpoovyeug ovx opSug eponXysiev av ov 3ap.ri

vyrj Xvg xai

ev 1 w (3 up, y roig re avSpwiroiri

cpvcriv

rrole

Ttrfiyavlog efcafSev <pug, ev ri1

WXV

rjp.iv

p.vj

ro rtpaypaa avro, xai rou

y^opvevov avro eavro rfa rpecpet.

ei
ypairlea
ixavug eivai 1rpog rovg itoXXovg xai

xaXXiov eTteTtpxxr av

ovfte

wg aXXa p-a^xara, aXX'

erriv,

ex ttoXXtjs ovvovcnag yiyvopaevijg

o".>Ky,

yeypacporuv

cppa^eiv rouv

<

epay

ye

eyw

itavrwv

3 a<nv eiSevai tepi uv eyu critovha^u, sir

aXXuv, eiV wg eupovreg auroi, rouroug ovx

xai ypa\]/avrwv, aroi

efjLeu

scientifically, in

p.ey

xalo -

ep.p.eXoug, rovg

aria (xetiaQyolxg.

'

86
rigid

in

accuracy and the most

same manner

the

acroamatic

works of

as in

exactness,

translating the

As all his
progeny of consum-

Aristotle.

dialogues too are the

mate science, he who

presumes

literal

omit some words and interpolate

to

others, or to give

what he conceives

to

to

he

meaning of the sentences and,

short, alters the manner of Plato in order
accommodate his matter to the multi-

the general
in

them

in translating

tude,

he

who

does this will inevitably de-

stroy the profound

and obtrude

meaning of the

own rambling

his

original,

ideas

on the

reader for the scientifically accurate concep-

who

tions of Plato.

Let him

convinced of

read any of those dialogues

in

my

this

desires to

translation of Platos works, in

be

which

the substance of the Commentaries of Proclus,

Hermeas, and Olympiodorus are given

in the notes.

And
cerning

and the

here

cannot help remarking con-

most excellent

these
latter

are called,

interpreters,

Platonists in general, as

how

fully the

prophecy of

they
their

divine master has been verified in the fate of

their works.

The prophecy

contained in the

latter part

allude to

is

of the extract just

87
cited

from

observes, that the

man who

which he

in

his seventh epistle,

writes perspicu-

ously on the sublime dogmas of his philo-

sophy

will

only benefit a few

who

are able

to discover these abstruse particulars,

in others

he

but that

produce either contempt or

will

For these admirable men,

arrogant hope.

order to preserve the recondite parts of

in

their masters philosophy to posterity,

folded

all

that

is

sublime and mystic in the

doctrines of Plato into the most pleasing

admirable

by

for this

few indeed appear

and

extended period

know of none that

may be said to have

them sufficiently
advantage which they are
studied

Hence,

to afford.

served

as

the beautiful

benevolently disclosed

to

degree benefitted

in the smallest

their labours

and

For mor^than a thousand

light.

years, however, very

have been

un-

to derive all that

largely calculated

have elsewhere oblight

may

which they

be said

to

have,

hitherto unnoticed, illumined philosophy in

her desolate

retreats, like a

some venerable
tary ruins.
* Sec the
Platos

works.

lamp shining on

statue amidst dark

And

and

soli-

yet though these philo-

General Introduction

to

my

translation

of

88
sophers have been treated with such undeserved contempt

and

sophists,

by

will

pigmy

race of critics

any man undertake

to

prove, that since the age of Plato there has

much

lived a philosopher of so

profundity as

Plotinus, so learned as Porphyry, so skilled

in the deepest mysteries of theology as

who

hlichus, so acute as Syrianus, or

Jam-

has un-

folded such treasures of wisdom as Proclus

Till this at least
critics

be

is

attempted

and cease

silent,

be proved

to

this

to

translate the

racy and

my apology

to

works of Plato with such accu-

literal

exactness,

served either his

that

manner

he who attempts

it

to

would not
have pre-

or his matter; and

to translate

them with-

out diligently attending to the accurate

ing of every word,

may

and more captivating

to

to the

but his work will cease

to

will lose in faithfulness

can never compensate.

mean-

indeed compose a

book more conformable

and

Let

endeavouring

for

have been otherwise possible

that

doctrines

return from this digression.

then be

let

defame writings

to

which they have never studied, and

which they do not understand.
But

modern

taste,

vulgar reader,

be a translation,

what popularity

Let the following

-;

89

my

also

be

into

my

apology

for

having introduced

translation of Plato certain

words of Greek origin

that

as the

unusual

most ab-

Platonic philosophy

struse doctrines of the

had never before been promulgated

Eng-

in

there were no words in our language

lish,

equivalent to their accurate meaning, and

a paraphrase

that

of

them could not be

adopted, because they very frequently occur;

that to introduce

dern language
that every art

Greek terms
to

is

enrich that language

and science

derived from the Greek

phy,

as

claim

much

of words

full

and that philoso-

prior and

all arts

more

and

sci-

legitimate

to this privilege.

And now
that

have no

Dr.

Gillies,

again declaring that

personal enmity

and

is

being the mistress of

ences, has a

any mo-

into

what

whatever

to

have said against him has

been solely dictated by a love of truth, I

shall,

most probably, take

for ever.

no

less

years

my

leave of

The accomplishment

him

of a task,

arduous than glorious, will for some

occupy

call forth

my

all

my

leisure

hours,

and

most strenuous exertions

that of translating

into English

the whole

of Aristotles works, with the substance of

the commentaries of his best

Greek

interpre-

90

The completion

ters.

bour will

so fully

I shall neither

of this Herculean la-

engage

my

attention, that

have time nor inclination

to

attend to the defamation of Dr. Gillies, or

any other

writer

who

a candidate for the

is

honours of the multitude, and whose eye

not

upon

solely fixed

As

truth.

when completed, will be

manner so truly independent,

this

is

work

published in a

too,

as to be, per-

haps, without a parallel in this respect since

printing was invented,
to fear

from

invective *.

shall

have nothing
malevolent

illiberal criticism or

That

in

such an age as the pre-

sent both these should unite in opposing the

labours of a

man who

nor with any view

so far

to

neither writes for hire

sordid

emolument,

from being wonderful, that

it is

is

the ne-

cessary consequence of extreme corruption

of manners and depravity of taste

j~.

Divi-

* The reader, who is desirous of seeing perfect specimens

of such criticism and such invective, is referred to an account
of my translation of Platos works, in two fungous productions,

one of which

other

The

is

called

The Imperial Review and

the

Literary Journal.

f The hand of barbaric despotism having destroyed the

schools of the philosophers for more than twelve hundred
years, knowledge has become venal, and book-making a trade.
Science on moral and intellectual subjects has been in consequence of this entirely lost and through the attempt to make
even/ man wise in every thing all real knowledge on the sublimest
subjects of speculation has been lost.
;

91
nity,

however, has manifestly declared

in favour of

them

for

my

in

has obtained

the most noble and the most

beral patronage

gaged

undertakings

itself

has enabled me, while en-

them,

to struggle successfully

and has made

adversity;

unfavourable

situations

to the cultivation

my

in

with

highly

of the Pla-

tonic philosophy the instruments of

mulgation

li-

native tongue.

its

pro-

Relying,

therefore, with firm confidence on the con-

tinuance

which

of that support,

the strongest

impotence,
as

shall

compared with

human

aid

is

perfect

devote the remainder,

have done a considerable portion of

the former part of

posterity the

my

life,

to preserve

to

elements of the virtues and

the rules of truth, committing these to writ-

ing

for

common

advantage, as a paternal

and immortal inheritance.

FINIS.

C.

WHITTiNGHAM,

Printer,

Dean

Street,

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