February 26, 1943 G.R. No.

48446
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUIS MENESES
OZAETA, J.:
The question involved in this appeal is whether a competent court, while acquitting an
accused, may permit itself nevertheless to criticize or reprehend his acts and conduct
in connection with the transaction out of which the accusation arose.
Appellant was charged with malversation of public funds
The trial court gave the accused the benefit of the doubt.
On the 14th day after the sentence was read to the accused, the latter filed a motion praying
for the elimination from the decision the reprehension and that it constitutes a penalty which is
contrary to his acquittal.
The trial court denied the motion, whereupon the accused filed a notice of appeal from the
order of denial.
In this connection we note that on the 6th day after the sentence was read to him, the
accused filed a separate motion asking that the reservation to the Government to file a civil
action be stricken out from the decision. That first motion was denied by the court in a
separate order, from which the accused did not appeal.
In this notice of appeal, appellant stated that the appeal is based purely on questions of law
affecting the power and authority of the Court to reprimand or punish the accused, who, in this
case, has been acquitted from the criminal charge of malversation of public funds
What he questions is the authority of the trial court to make such pronouncement in a
sentence of acquittal. Hence his direct appeal to this Court "based purely on questions of
law." The burden of appellant's argument is that he neither having pleaded guilty nor having
been found guilty of the crime charged, the trial court is not empowered by law to impose a
penalty by proclaiming publicly and condemning in no uncertain terms that his conduct was
highly reprehensible; and that "conduct or even negligence is not a crime."
The pronouncement in question whereby the trial court criticizes or reprehends the acts and
conduct of the accused is not intended as a penalty, nor may it be considered as such,
because it is not embodied in the judgment or dispositive part of the decision.
But since it reflects upon and affects the accused, he has the right to question it and to move
for its elimination from the court's opinion if he thinks it is unwarranted and uncalled for, and to
appeal to a higher tribunal if his motion is denied.
The order appealed from is affirmed.

[G.R. No. L-9551. November 26, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO PAET Y VELASCO
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Alejandro Paet y Velasco was accused of a violation of Circulars Nos. 20 and 42 of the
Central Bank of the Philippines
Defendant withdrew his former plea of not guilty and to substitute therefor a plea of guilty,
which permission was granted.
Upon recommendation of the prosecution, the trial court in a decision dated June 10, 1955,
found him guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of ten (10) days
imprisonment, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (P100)
A memorandum was filed by the defendant, praying that the sum of money which had been
taken by the authorities from the said Defendant be returned to the latter as the lawful owner.
The trial court either overlooked this prayer or else did not deem it necessary to include it in
its decision. The fact is that the decision did not provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of the
aforementioned amount in favor of the government.
Thereafter, the lower court issued a resolution dated July 30, 1955, expressing the opinion
and holding that the amount of $3,140 should not be confiscated, but should be exchanged
with pesos in the Philippine currency at the Central Bank, and delivered to the accused.
The government, through the Solicitor General, is appealing from the resolution directly to this
Court.
In the first place, the confiscation or forfeiture of the above mentioned sum would be an
additional penalty and would amount to an increase of the penalty already imposed upon the
accused. To reopen the case for the purpose of increasing the penalty, as is sought in the
Governments appeal, would be placing the accused in double jeopardy, and under Rule 118,
section 2 of the Rules of Court, the Government cannot appeal in a criminal case if
the Defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.
In the second place, the record shows that at the time the appealed resolution was issued on
July 30, 1955, the decision of June 10, 1955 had already become final and no longer subject
to modification for the reason that the accused had already served the sentence, not partially
but totally.
In view of the foregoing, the appeal of the Government from the resolution is hereby
dismissed.

G.R. No. L-27935 August 16, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE JUAN L. BOCAR, Presiding Judge
of Branch XVI, Court of First Instance of Manila, and CESAR URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE
and SERAPION CLAUDIO
MAKASIAR, C.J.:
CESAR S. URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and SERAPION CLAUDIO was charged of crime of
theft
upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty"
Proceedings were had and the respondent Judge issued the dismissal of the case
Private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration"
Respondent Court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration
Whether or not respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the order
The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the respondent
Judge. Moreover, the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its evidence
formally in accordance with the Rules of Court. Verily, the prosecution was denied due
process.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction.
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
The constitutional guarantee is that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense".
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right
of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the
first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

G.R. No. L-6217 December 18, 1911

THE UNITED STATES vs. YAM TUNG WAY, alias NAM SING
CARSON, J.:
The defendant was charged with the crime of fraud or infringement of literary rights or
property
Defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty
the case was transferred to the division of that court over by the Hon. A. S. Crossfield, before
whom it was tried
the Government closed its case
the defendant moved for a dismissal on the ground that the evidence submitted on behalf of
the Government did not establish the commission of the offense charged in the information, or
of any offense defined and penalized by law. Judgment on this motion was reserved by the
court at the request of counsel for both parties, who desired to submit briefs on the legal
questions raised by the motion. Pending judgment on the motion, defendant submitted his
evidence. Subsequently, upon consideration of the motion to dismiss submitted after the
Government closed its case, and as to which judgment had been reserved, the court below
sustained the motion and discharged the defendant.
The trial court based its judgment dismissing the information and discharging the defendant
on the ground that no copyright law exists in the Philippine Islands and that the complaining
witness could have no exclusive rights in the pamphlet in question which were subject to
violation or infringement, so as to sustain a conviction under article 539 of the Penal Code. No
finding was made as to the alleged facts touching the reproduction by the defendant of the
pamphlet
of
which
ownership
is
claimed
by
the
complaining
witness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The case has been brought here by the Government in an attempt to appeal from the
judgment of the court below. We are asked to reverse that judgment and grant a new trial, on
the ground that the trial judge erred in declaring that no copyright law is in force in these
Islands. But without going into the question of the correctness of the conclusion of the law
upon which the trial judge based his action, we are all agreed that the government had no
right of appeal from the judgment entered by the court below dismissing the information and
discharging the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The allowance of an appeal by the Government would undoubtedly place the defendant twice
in jeopardy in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights, set out in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, as those provisions have been construed by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Kepner vs. United states (195 U. S.,100; 11 Phil. Rep.,
669).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Defendant was regularly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, put upon his trial by the calling of the
government's witnesses against him, and thereafter discharged by the trial court. It is true that
the court made no express finding as to whether the defendant did or did not commit the
specific acts set out in the information, and that the dismissal of the information was based on
the court's conclusion of law that there being no copyright law in force in these Islands, the
acts which it is alleged were committed by the defendant do not constitute the crime with

which he was charged, nor any other defense defined and penalized by law. But the
reasoning and authority of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Kepner vs. United States, supra, is conclusively against the right of appeal by the
government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal case after he has been
brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or whether defendant's
discharge was based upon the trial court's conclusion of law that the trial had failed for some
reason to establish the guilt of the defendant as charged.
As indication in the opinion in that case, the protection afforded by the prohibition against the
putting of any person merely against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried a
second time for the same offense. In that court expressly held that:
It follows that Military Order No. 58, as amended by Act of the Philippine Commission, No.
194, in so far as it undertakes to permit an appeal by the Government after acquittal, was
repealed by the Act of Congress of July, 1902, providing immunity from second jeopardy for
the same criminal offense.
But the reason of the opinion goes further and denies the right to the Government to procure
the several of erroneous proceedings and commence anew, save only in those cases in
which the first proceedings did not create legal jeopardy. So that, without his own consent, a
defendant who has once been brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be
again put on trial for the same offense after the first trial has terminated by a judgment
directing his discharge, whether his discharge be the result of a formal acquittal, or of a ruling
of the court upon some question of law arising at the trial.
This court has frequently held that the legal jeopardy attaches in criminal proceedings in this
jurisdiction after arraignment and plea in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the moment
when the first witness is called to the stand and interrogated and it is quite clear that the
defendant in this case having been brought to trial after arraignment and plea and all the
government's witnesses having testified on his trial, is entitled to protection against the peril of
being brought to trial for the offense with which he was charged at the trial and this whether
the rulings of the trial judge on which he based his order discharging the defendant and
dismissing the information were or were not erroneous.
What is said in the following citation from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Kepner vs.U. S., supra, and the observations of Mr. Bishop therein quoted, have a proper
place in this opinion as bearing directly on the precise point under consideration.
We are not here dealing with those statutes which give to the Government a right of review
upon the steps merely preliminary to a trial and before the accused is legally put in jeopardy,
as where a discharge is had upon motion to quash or a demurer to the indictment is sustained
before jeopardy has attached. Such statutes have been quite generally sustained in
jurisdictions which deny the right of second trial where a competent court has convicted or
acquitted the accused.
The appeal entered in this case on behalf of the Government should dismissed
with costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-26376

August 31, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant,
vs.
AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo and
T. M. Dilig for plaintiff and appellant.
Rolando de la Cuesta for defendant and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.
On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:
That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he
was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to
present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the
effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him.
And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police
authorities.
Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the
accused, the court a quorendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the
prosecution appealed therefrom.
This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9,
1965. No appellee's brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief,
the appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving
questions purely of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). And on August 5, 1966, We ordered it
docketed herein.1wph1.t
The sole assignment of error is:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED.
Appellant's contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt
with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge
and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the defendant was only allowed
to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty.
Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course
should have been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with
the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Order of trial. The plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must proceed in
the following order:
(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support of the

charges.
(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense.
(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue in question.
(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the case is
submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the attorney for
the defense must follow, and the fiscal may conclude the same. The argument by either
attorney may be oral or written, or partly written, but only the written arguments, or such
portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case.
In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only erred
in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.
This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: "The
People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy." The present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies
even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy (People v.
Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People v. De
Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960).
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. It is
settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). In the present case,
it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in
the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete selfdefense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the
effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a
new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was
not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a
quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the
appeal herein.1
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving
the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the
defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this
fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a
nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis
for a claim of former jeopardy (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary
v. Hudspeth 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below already
gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any
way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand this case to the
court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of the same court, in one of the two
other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the
defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and
judgment thereafter, No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-45151

July 24, 1936
ADOLFO O. RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO BUYSON LAMPA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and C. N.
HODGES, respondents.
DIAZ, J.:
This petition for certiorari was instituted on April 20, 1936, to annul the judgment rendered on
March 26, of the same year, by the respondent judge in criminal case No. 11213 of the Court
of First of Iloilo. It was a usury case wherein the judgment sought to be annulled acquitted the
accused, the herein respondent C. N. Hodges.
According to the petitioner, the judgment is already final as he did not appeal therefrom; but
contends, however, that it should be annulled and the trial continued as usual to enable him to
adduce "documentary and oral evidence, rebuttal or corroborative, to justify (establish) the
commission of the crime." The ground of his petition is that the respondent judge exceeded
his powers and was without jurisdiction in dismissing the case and absolving C. N. Hodges,
after the latter's petition to dismiss was denied by the former Judge Geronimo Paredes, and
in holding that the crime has prescribed, whereas, according to the petitioner, the very facts
set out in his judgment show otherwise.
Among other defenses, the respondent C. N. Hodges alleged: (1) That Marcelo Buenaflor,
and not the petitioner, was the offended party in criminal case No. 11213 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo; (2) that the respondent judge had jurisdiction to act as he did; and (3) that
the writ of certiorari prayed for is not the proper remedy.
The questioned judgment was couched in the following language:
This case is pending to receive the evidence of the accused, as the prosecution has rested its
case and the motion to dismiss filed by the counsel for the accused has been denied by the
then judge of this court, Hon. Geronimo Paredes.
When this case was called today for the continuance of the trial, counsel for the accused
renewed his motion to dismiss, alleging, among other grounds, that the action for usury has
already prescribed because the corresponding complaint was filed on May 2, 1935, that is,
after the four years fixed by law, inasmuch as the last payment was made on April 24, 1931.
The fiscal opposed the petition alleging that, while the last payment was really made on April
24, 1931, the truth, however, is that the herein accused then charged usurious interest up to
April 29, 1933.
However, after both parties had adduced their respective arguments for and against the
petition, said fiscal, with a zeal that is worthy of mention, abided by the petition and conceded
that the action has actually prescribed.
In view of the fiscal's conformity, and a simple order of dismissal not being in order herein
because the prosecution has already rested its case, the accused is acquitted from the
information and the bond filed for his temporary liberty, cancelled, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
The information filed in the case wherein the judgment just quoted was rendered, expressly
alleged that the usurious loan had been made to Marcelo Buenaflor. The petitioner is not
mentioned therein. (Exhibit A.) Under the law, no action can be prosecuted unless in the
name of the real party in interest, certiorari cases not excepted. (Sec. 114, Act No. 190;

Abendan vs. Llorente, 10 Phil., 216; Gordillo and Martinez vs. Del Rosario, 39 Phil., 829.)
In 1921, the crime of usury was penalized by a fine of not, less than P50 and not more than
P200, or by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, under Act No. 2992 which was
amended by Act No. 3998 on December 5, 1932. The amendment consisted principally in
raising the penalty to a fine of not more than P500 or to imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both. By Act No. 3326, approved on December 4, 1926, and subsequently amended
by Act No. 3763 (November 26, 1930), the prescriptive period of crimes penalized by special
acts, as the usury law, is four years. Said law provides:
Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: . . . (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; . . . .
In view of the penalty, assuming that C. N. Hodges actually committed the crime with which
he was charged when Act No. 3998 was already in force, the respondent judge undoubtedly
had jurisdiction to try the case and to render the judgment of acquittal in question. This is the
more so because when he took cognizance of said case, he did so in substitution of Judge
Geronimo Parades, who had ceased to be such, and the motion to reconsider the order
denying C. N. Hodges' motion to dismiss was presented to him personally. The reference in
his judgment to the fiscal's allegation to the effect that "the fiscal objects to the petition
alleging that, while the last payment was really made on April 24, 1931, the truth, however, is
that the herein accused then charged usurious interest up to April 29, 1933," does not imply
any pronouncement or finding of fact by the respondent judge that C. N. Hodges was in fact
usurious interest up to April 29, 1933.
But even granting that the respondent judge erred in holding that the crime had prescribed,
when in fact it had not,certiorari is not the proper remedy. This remedy has not been
established to correct errors of fact or of law, but only excesses of power or jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts, boards or officers clothed by law with judicial functions. (Sec.
217, Act No. 190; Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil., 344; Gala vs. Cui and Rodriguez, 25 Phil., 522;
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and Bantillo, 34 Phil.,
157; Mercader vs.Wislizenus, 34 Phil., 846; Oria vs. Campbell and Gutierrez Hermanos, 34
Phil., 850; De la Cruz vs. Moir, 36 Phil., 213; Marquez and Jurado vs. Revilla, 43 Phil., 274;
Santos vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 49 Phil., 398.)
What the respondent judge did, while he was acting as such in substitution of Judge
Geronimo Paredes, has been done in the legitimate exercise of a power within his jurisdiction.
A judge who substitutes for or succeeds another may reconsider the acts of the latter, if he
deems it proper, in the same way that he may reconsider his own decrees, orders, or
resolution. (Vera Moguer vs. Juan Carballo, 5 Phil., 195; Nuez vs. Low, 19 Phil., 244; Frank
& Co. vs. Clemente, 44 Phil., 30). And if in so acting he commits any error, he is not thereby
deprived of his jurisdiction of power to continue hearing the case. (Perlas vs. Concepcion, 34
Phil., 559; Government of the Philippine Islandsvs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and
Bantillo, supra.)
There is another reason for holding that in the case at hand the remedy of certiorari does not
lie. The judgment acquitting the respondent C. N. Hodges, necessarily concluded the case
charging him with usury in such a way that it can no longer be reopened for any reason
because it is forbidden by the doctrine that a person cannot be placed twice in jeopardy.
(U.S. vs. Parcon, 6 Phil., 632; Kepner vs. U.S, 195 U. S., 100; 49 Law. ed., 114; 11 Phil., 669;
U. S. vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil., 67; U. S. vs. Regala, 28 Phil., 57; U. S. vs. Kilayko, 32
Phil., 619.) That would be the necessary consequence if the petitioner's prayer in his petition
is granted.
Wherefore, it being manifest that the remedy invoked does not lie, it is hereby denied, with

costs to the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 41859 March 8, 198
9
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE PLAZA CHUA and MELCHOR AVILA
CHUA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Napoleon G. Rama for private respondents.
FERNAN, C. J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul and set aside the decision 2 of respondent Court of Appeals acquitting private
respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua of the crime of estafa.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 14, 1961, herein private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua,
father and son, were elected President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Surigao
Development Bank, a private development bank, with a capital of Pl Million, duly subscribed
and paid-up. Out of its total capitalization, P500,000.00 was subscribed by the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in accordance with Section 9 of Republic Act No. 85 as
amended; the other P500,000.00 by private stockholders, as follows:
Felipe Plaza Chua

P200,000.00

Celerina Chua

200,000.00

Lucia Limchiu

60,000.00

Melchor Avila Chua

20,000.00

Marinela G. Rama

10,000.00

Eufemio Darunday

5,000.00

Benjamin Lozada

5,000.00

TOTAL

P500,000.00 3

Pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Directors, composed of the first five above-named
stockholders and the directors-representatives of DBP, Benigno Orig and Anatolio Viray, the
capital of Pl Million was deposited with the Pacific Banking Corporation in Manila and private
respondents Felipe Plaza Chua as President and Melchor Avila Chua as Treasurer, were
authorized to sign checks and withdrawal slips to effect withdrawal from the depository
bank . 4 The Surigao Development Bank formally started operations on April 19, 1961. On the
same date, said respondents started withdrawing from the deposit various amounts by means
of checks drawn against the Pacific Banking Corporation amounting to a total of P999,000.00,
leaving a balance of Pl,000.00 5 as of June 1962.
On September 12, 1961, an examination of the books of accounts as well as the operations of
the Surigao Development Bank was conducted by the examiners of the Central Bank of the
Philippines. The examination revealed a shortage of P480,000.00 which increased to
P555,000.00 as of December 31, 1961. 6
Based on their findings, Acting Superintendent of Banks Jose S. Martinez wrote herein private

respondents, asking them to authorize the Pacific Banking Corporation to furnish the Central
Bank with the records of deposits of Surigao Development Bank together with photocopies of
the checks drawn against the latter, and further asking them for a conference regarding the
examination. Due to the refusal of private respondents to come to Manila for the conference,
the Acting Superintendent of Banks referred the matter to the Monetary Board.
On July 10, 1962, the Monetary Board passed a resolution directing private respondents to
refund and deposit with Pacific Banking Corporation the shortage of P555,000.00; to require
their permanent separation as President and Treasurer, as the case may be; to disqualify
them from being directors thereof and/or holders of such other positions therein as will enable
them again to exercise influence over the management of the affairs and operations of said
bank; and to limit the bank's activities to accepting loan re-payments and servicing of its
deposit liabilities. On August 11, 1962, the private respondents wrote the Monetary Board
denying the shortage and asking for a reconsideration of its decision.
On October 30, 1962, Resolution No. 1281 was passed by the Monetary Board denying the
request. On January 10, 1964, on application by the Central Bank, the Superintendent of
Banks was appointed receiver pendente lite of the Surigao Development Bank by the Court of
First Instance of Surigao in Civil Case No. 1582. In another order dated July 30, 1964, the
same Court directed the Pacific Banking Corporation to produce the bank statements of
deposits and withdrawals of the Surigao Development Bank, but the Central Bank could not
conduct the necessary examination due to an injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on
February 5, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 3315 which was lifted only on September 7, 1964.
On July 2, 1968, an information 7 was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th
Judicial Region, Branch V, charging herein private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and
Melchor Avila Chua with the crime of estafa, as follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised between April 1961 to December 31, 1961,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the President and
treasurer, respectively, of the Surigao Development Bank, located at Surigao, Surigao del
Norte, which is a private development bank organized under the provisions of Republic Act
2081, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Central Bank of the Philippines and the
Development Bank of the Philippines, banking institutions duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows, to wit: The said
Surigao Development Bank, as such private development bank, began operations on April 19,
1961, in Surigao, Surigao del Norte, with the said accused Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor
Avila Chua as its President and Treasurer, respectively, and by virtue of a Certificate of
Authority granted by the Monetary Board on March 29, 1961, 50% of the preferred shares
with voting rights is owned by the Development Bank of the Philippines, while the remaining
50% also in the amount of P500,000.00, is in common shares, which funds of the Surigao
Development Bank were deposited in trust with the depository bank, the Pacific Banking
Corporation, Manila, and the said accused, as such President and Treasurer, respectively, of
the said Surigao Development Bank, being then the only persons duly authorized in the
Surigao Development Bank to sign checks against, or withdraw funds from the said Surigao
Development Bank's deposit account with the Pacific Banking Corporation, withdrew and
received from the said Pacific Banking Corporation, Manila, during the aforesaid period of
time, the total sum of P555,000.00 for the purpose of turning over the said amount so
withdrawn by them to the Surigao Development Bank in Surigao, Surigao del Norte, and
under the express obligation of accounting for the same to the Central Bank and the
Development Bank of the Philippines from time to time, or upon demand, but the said
accused, once in possession of the aforesaid sum and far from complying with their

aforementioned obligation, wantonly failed and refused to do so, despite repeated demands
made upon them to that effect and the length of time that has elapsed, and with intent to
defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to their own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Central Bank and Development Bank of
the Philippines, in the aforesaid amount of P555,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.
Both accused-private respondents pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the
amount of shortage proved was P499,000.00, which represented the total unrecorded
withdrawals, arrived at by comparing the ledger of the Surigao Development Bank as against
the Statement of Account issued by the Pacific Banking Corporation.
On May 24, 1973, the trial court rendered its decision 8 finding private respondents guilty of
the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of swindling (estafa), as defined in
paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized in its 1st penalty
paragraph, without the attendance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance to modify
their liability and hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate
term ranging from twelve (12) years of prisionmayor as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the offended parties Surigao Development
Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines in the sum of P499,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Both private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 21, 1975, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision, holding that:
The private stockholders having received the refund of their investments in the total amount of
P499,000.00 and the DBP's prepared shares of P500,000.00 being fundable from the assets
of P557,350.72, it is clear that there is no damage caused to the Surigao Development Bank
or to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
It is true that the accused-appellants disposed of the amount of P499,000.00 without right or
authority, but conversion, to constitute estafa, must result in damage or prejudice to another,
capable of pecuniary estimation. 9
reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted private respondents.
We rule in the affirmative.
Section 11 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court defines the power of the appellate court on
appeals taken to it, thus:
Section 11. Power of Appellate Court on Appeal Upon appeal from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment and increase
or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial, remand the case to the Court of First Instance for
new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.
The reason behind this rule is that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records for
review in order to resolve not only questions of law but also questions of facts. The Court of
Appeals may thus re-examine and re- weigh all the evidence on record and affirm, modify or
reverse the findings of facts and conclusions of the lower court. 11 That its findings of facts or
conclusions are erroneous do not thereby deprive it of its jurisdiction over the appealed
criminal care as the mere fact that the court decides the question wrongly is utterly immaterial
to its jurisdiction. 12 Neither do these erroneous findings and conclusions render the appellate
court vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari for where the court has jurisdiction over the
case, even if its findings are not correct, they would, at most, constitute errors of law and not

an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 13

In the case at bar, the appeal of private respondents having been regularly taken to the Court
of Appeals, the appellate court was clothed with the power and authority to adjudicate upon
the rights and obligations of the parties before it. In so doing, it re-examined and re-weighed
the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that private respondents were not guilty of
the crime charged as the withdrawal of the alleged shortage was done without intent to
defraud nor was damage or prejudice caused thereby to Surigao Development Bank or the
Development Bank of the Philippines. Whether this conclusion was based merely on
speculations and conjecture, or on a misapprehension of facts and contrary to the documents
and exhibits of the case, is not for us to determine in a petition for certiorari wherein only
issues of jurisdiction may be raised. Neither can we determine whether the constructions
given by the appellate court to a document is right or wrong as errors in the appreciation of
evidence may not be reviewed by certiorari because they do not involve any jurisdictional
question. 14
The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. It is available only for these purposes and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings or conclusions. 15 The mere fact that the court
decides the question wrong is utterly immaterial to the question of its jurisdiction. 16 Thus,
assuming arguendo, that the court had committed a mistake, the error does not vitiate the
decision considering that it had jurisdiction over the case. 17 The writ ofcertiorari issues for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari cannot be legally used for any other purpose. 18 If
the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, the orders and rulings upon
all questions pertaining to the cause are orders and rulings within its jurisdiction and cannot
be corrected by certiorari. 19
Ordinarily, errors of judgment may be corrected in a timely appeal from the judgment on the
merits. Such remedy, however, is not available in the case at bar, the decision involved being
one of acquittal. An appeal therefrom by the People would run counter to the accused's
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
We discern in this petition for certiorari a subtle attempt to have us review the judgment of the
appellate court on the merits. While the petition at bar is denominated a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and the issues raised therein ostensibly dealt
with the jurisdiction of the appellate court, petitioners' attack on the appellate court's
jurisdiction is premised on the conclusions that (a) the findings of facts of the appellate court
were based on conjectures and speculations, or on misapprehension of facts and contrary to
the documents and exhibits; (b) the exhibit relied upon by the appellate court has not been
offered nor admitted in evidence during the trial; and (c) the appellate court gave to a
document a meaning contrary to its contents. But how valid and tenable these premises are
remains a question. To determine their validity would entail a review and re- evaluation of the
evidence on record as well as the procedure taken vis-a-vis the conclusions arrived at by the
appellate court; in effect, a review of the judgment of acquittal, which we cannot do in a
petition for certiorari and without violating the private respondents' constitutional right against
double jeopardy.
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines
cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." The argument
that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is
flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an
error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision.

This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter
how obvious the error may be. 20 The rule therefore, in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of
acquittal is not reviewable by a higher court, for an appeal by the government from the
judgment would put the accused in second jeopardy for the same offense. 21
People v. Velasco
homicide and frustrated homicide Requisites to successfully invoke double jeopardy (refer
to Obsania); Where an acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at
the level of the trial court or an appeal on a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the
finality-of-acquittal rule; An acquittal is final and unappealable ON THE GROUND OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY whether it happens at the trial court of before the Court of Appeals;
doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court
finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution
representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.
G.R. No. 94143 September 24, 1991
EDGAR SADIO, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIQUE, BRANCH 10, SIXTH JUDICIAL REGION,
San Jose, Antique, and BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, respondents.
Mariano R. Pefianco for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:p
Acting on a complaint to enjoin the operation of the small town lottery by the Province of
Antique, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes (PCSO), the Molitor Management Corporation
and herein petitioner Edgar Sadio, Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the Regional Trial Court
of Antique, after hearing, declared such lottery illegal and ordered MOLITOR and Sadio in
solidum to pay PCSO and the Province of Antique damages in the amount of
P25,000,000.00. 1
On the basis of this order, Sadio flied before the Municipal TriaI Court of San Jose, Antique, a
criminal complaint against Judge Maceda for issuance of an unjust interlocutory order in
violation of Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code. 2
On March 27, Judge Ma. Monina Misajon of that court dismissed the complaint, holding that
the challenged order of March 16, 1990, clearly showed, contrary to the allegations of the
complainant, that he was accorded every opportunity to present his side before the order was
issued. 3
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Sadio filed a notice of appeal, which was
approved by Judge Misajon on May 15, 1990. 4 On May 16, 1990, however, she issued an
amendatory order recalling the original order and withdrawing her earlier approval of the
notice of appeal. 5 Her reason was that the offended party had no standing to appeal from the
dismissal of a criminal complaint, this being the prerogative of the prosecutor.
Sadio's reaction was to file a petition for certiorari and mandamus to reverse Judge Misajons
order of May 16, 1990. This was dismiss by Judge Marvie R. Abraham-Singson of the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, for insufficiency in form and substance. 6 His
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
The petitioner now comes to this Court on certiorari, alleging that:
1. Judge Abraham-Singson could not motu proprio dismiss the petition for certiorari
and mandamus;
2. Under the rule on summary procedure, Judge Misajon could not legally dismiss the criminal

complaint without the counter-affidavit of the accused,

3. The offended party in a criminal case has a right to appeal if the case is dismissed; and
4. An order approving a notice of appeal can no longer be withdrawn.
The petition must fail on all counts.
On the first issue, the pertinent provision is Section 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 6. Order to answer. If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such
process, the court in which it is filed, or a judge thereof, shall issue an order requiring the
defendant or defendants to answer the petition within ten (10) days from the receipt of a copy
thereof. Such order shall be served on the defendants in such manner as the court may
direct, together with a copy of the petition, and to that effect the petitioner shag file sufficient
copies thereof.
The very first clause of this section requires that the petition be sufficient in form and
substance before further action may be taken thereon by the court. Lacking such sufficiency,
as determined by the court itself, the petition may be dismissed outright. It cannot be
overstressed that the court is not obliged to waste its time on inadequate pleadings that can
only burden its docket and impair the orderly administration of justice. We ourselves have
given short shrift to many a petition for non-compliance with the procedural requisites, for
being uninteligible or clearly without legal basis, or for some other similar shortcoming.
As correctly noted by Judge Abraham-Singson, a certified true copy of the order of May 16,
1990, was not attached to the petition, in disregard of the express requirement of Rule 65,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court. That deficiency was by itself alone adequate ground for
dismissal. Additionally, the petition merely confined itself to a recital of the material facts and
dates, followed by the legal conclusion that Judge Misajon committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the said order. No argument was adduced, no jurisprudence cited, no law
or Rule of Court invoked to support that conclusion. It is clear that the petition was also
insufficient in substance and for that additional if no less important reason deserved to be
dismissed.
On the second issue, the applicable rule is Section 10 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
reading as follows:
Sec. 10. Duty of the court. On the basis of the complaint or information and the affidavits
accompanying the same, the court shall make a preliminary determination whether to dismiss
the case outright for being patently without basis or merit, or to require further proceeding to
be taken. In the latter case, the court may set the case for immediate arraignment of an
accused under custody, and if he pleads, may render judgment forthwith. If he pleads not
guilty, and in all other cases, the court shall issue an order accompanied by copies of all
affidavits submitted by complainant, directing the defendants to appear and submit his
counter-affidavits and those of his witnesses at a specified date not later than ten (10) days
from receipt thereof.
While it is true that Judge Maceda did not submit his counter-affidavit as required in the order
of Judge Misajon dated March 23, 1990, Judge Misajon declared in her order dismissing the
criminal complaint that she had received and considered the order of Judge Maceda dated
March 23, 1990, in Civil Case No. 2405, entitled "Rolly R. Mijares v. Province of Antique, et
al." She treated this as the respondent judge's counter-affidavit required in the aforecited rule.
We agree that this was sufficient compliance with the said rule. Judge Maceda's defense
against the criminal charge was after all embodied in that order and it would have been a
useless formality to simply reproduce it as a counter-affidavit.
On the third issue, the petitioner's contention is that since he had not waived or reserved his
right to file the civil action arising from the criminal charge, his right to appeal from the civil

aspect of the case was not extinguished with the dismissal of the criminal charge. This
averment is subject to qualification.
The Court has held that acquittal in a criminal case does not bar continuation of the civil case
connected therewith where: (1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; 7 (2) the decision
contains a declaration that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil; 8 or (3) the
civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted. 9
The case at bar does not come under any of the above exceptions. The petitioner's criminal
complaint alleged that Judge Maceda had issued the interlocutory order in violation of Sadio's
right to due process under Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution. Judge Misajon declared in
her order dismissing the charge that Sadio was in fact given the opportunity to be heard and
offered testimonial and documentary evidence on February 26 and 28, 1990, "which (Judge
Maceda) considered in issuing his order of March 16, 1990." In finding that the petitioner had
not been denied due process, Judge Misajon in effect completely exonerated Judge Maceda
and thus also extinguished the civil action connected with the criminal case.
In this situation, the petitioner could not have, as a mere complaining witness, appealed the
dismissal of the criminal action even on its civil aspect only. The civil action was deemed
dismissed with the criminal action. The criminal aspect of the order could have been appealed
since double jeopardy had not yet attached because the accused had not yet been arraigned.
But only the prosecutor could have done this because he had complete direction and control
of the prosecution of the case, as we have held in several cases. 10 No appeal having been
filed by him, the order of dismissal became final and unappealable after the lapse of the
reglementary 15-day period.
The above ruling renders the fourth issue irrelevant or moot. Not having the right to appeal,
the petitioner cannot invoke his notice of appeal on April 27, 1990, or protest the withdrawal of
its approval by Judge Misajon on May 16, 1990. The notice of appeal should not have been
approved in the first place, and the recall of the order of May 16, 1990, was issued only to
rectify the error. The rectification was a valid act. In any event, neither the notice of appeal nor
its initial approval would have been effectual because of the petitioner's lack of legal standing
to prosecute the appeal.
We do not deal here with the merits of the order of Judge Maceda dated March 16, 1990,
declaring the small town lottery conducted in the Province of Antique illegal and enjoining its
continued operation. That order is still under motions for reconsideration that remain
unresolved to date. It is not challenged in this petition. We here limit ourselves to the issues
raised in the proceedings at bar as above discussed and resolved, and only to those issues.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-6247
November 27, 1953
FELINO LIM, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. HON. JOSE F. ORETA, Justice of the peace of
Caloocan, Rizal, Respondent-Appellant.
Cardenas
and
Casal
for
appellee.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for appellant.
BENGZON, J.:
The pertinent facts in this action for prohibition are described in the appellant's
brief:chanrobles virtual law library
1. On September 4, 1952, the Petitioner-Appellee Felino Lim with twenty-one others was
charged for gambling in criminal case No. 14452 before the Justice of Peace Court of
Caloocan, Rizal. That same day, the Defendants were arraigned before the RespondentAppellant and all of them pleaded guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

2. After making his plea, the Petitioner-Appellee manifested to the court that, since he had no
lawyer at the time, he was reserving his right to present evidence to prove that the sum of
P1,000 which was seized from his pocket during the gambling raid by the peace officer and
which was then in the custody of the authorities of Caloocan was not a part of the proceeds or
instrument of the Crime and for this purpose requested the court to set a day to enable him to
introduce such evidence with the assistance of counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
3. Whereupon the Respondent-Appellant rendered a decision which reads as follows:
"SENTENCEchanrobles virtual law library
All the accused in the above-entitled case upon being duly informed today of the
nature of the complaint, freely and voluntarily enter the plea of guilty as
charged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, the accused Jose Lajon and Felino Lim as maintainer and banker,
respectively, are hereby sentenced to pay each a fine of P100, and the rest as
bettors, at P50 each, in case of insolvency of the fines above imposed, to suffer
each of the said accused the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, with the
costs proportionately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The amount of P42.55 seized and presented as part of the evidence in this case, is
hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. As regard to the sum of
P1,000 which has been taken from the pocket of one of the herein accused, the
court hereby sets the hearing of this case for September 15, 1952, at 2:30 p.m., in
order to determine whether said amount should be confiscated in favor of the
government or not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is so ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Caloocan, Rizal, September 4, 1952.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
(Sgd.) Jose F. Oretachanrobles virtual law library
Justice of the Peace"
4. In compliance with the above-quoted decision, the Petitioner-Appellee immediately paid the
fine of P100 and his proportionate share of the costs imposed upon him by RespondentAppellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
5. On September 15, 1952, the Respondent-Appellant called the case for hearing in order to
pass upon the remaining question of the disposition of the said amount of P1,000, that is,
whether or not it should be decreed confiscated to the Government or returned to its lawful
owner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
6. Instead of complying with his previous commitment, however, Petitioner-Appellee through
counsel questioned during the hearing the right of Respondent-Appellant to proceed further
on grounds of double jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
7. On October 6, 1952, in view of Respondent-Appellant's insistence in hearing the case over
and above Petitioner-Appellee's opposition, a petition for prohibition was filed by the latter
against
the
former
before
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Rizal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
8. On October 25, 1952, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Honorable Bienvenido A. Tan,
presiding, granted the petition by ordering the Respondent-Appellant to desist from further
hearing the case in question. In its order granting the relifed, the court also directed the
Respondent-Appellant to issue an order for the refund of the P1,000 to PetitionerAppellee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
9. On November 5, 1952, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, in representation of the
Respondent-Appellant, filed a notice of appeal from this order of the Court of First Instance of

Rizal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In ordering the respondent to desist from further proceedings the judge a quo reasoned
thusly:chanrobles virtual law library
"In a criminal case once the decision is promulgated or once the accused is found guilty and
has paid the fine, the decision is final. In the present case the accused having already paid
the fine imposed upon them by the Justice of the Peace Court, said court has lost jurisdiction
to hear further the said case."chanrobles virtual law library
Apparently His Honor overlooed both the reservation made by the accused,and the directive
of the justice of the peace calling for a hearing on September 15, 1952, which wa part and
parcel of his sentence. And when His Honor declared "once the accused is found guilty and
has paid the fine the decision is final" he obviously meant, the decision could not be
"modified" - and that justice of the peace Oreta was attempting to "modify" his decision. Such
appears to be the petitioner's position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
However there is reason to doubt whether the decision of September 4, 1952 could be legally
considered "final". It left something to be done later, i.e., the determination of the question
whether the money should be confiscated - a proper issue in the criminal proceeding. Unless
and until that issue (expressly reserved for subsequent adjudication) was passed upon, the
judgment could not be regarded final.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
"When the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something
to be done upon the merits" it is not final (Moran, Comments Rules of Court 1952 ed. Vol. I, p.
895). For instance in an action for dissolution of a partnership the judgment dissolving the
partnership and ordering the defendant to render accounts is not final and appealable, for it
does not completely dispose of the case. (Moran op. cit. Vol. I p. 897.)chanrobles virtual law
library
Yet even if payment by the accused of the fine accorded finality to the judgment, - no appeal,
executory - he may not prevent further actuation as to the money seized in his possession
because the judgment itself reserved that point. In making payment he accepted the verdict,
together with the reservation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Had the judgment been silent on the matter, the decision of this court in U.S. vs. Hart. (24
Phil., 578) invoked by the appellee would be clearly applicable. In that case, the accused (for
gambling) pleaded guilty and were sentenced to pay a fine. They promptly paid it. Afterwards
the fiscal asked that the judgment be "modified" to dispose of the money which had been
seized, and of which he was informed only after promulgation of the decision. The judge,
modifying his decision, decreed the confiscation. Reversible error, said the Supreme
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the instance case however, the justice of the peace had not attempted to "modify" his
decision. He took further steps in consonance therewith. Although it was quite irregular, i
cannot be held that he lacked jurisdiction. This is distinguishable from the Hart precedent
wherein the judge had said nothing about confiscation in his decision imposing a fine. Here
the justice of the peace had expressly reserved the power to continue hearing the
matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In other words, the judgment of the court in U.S. vs. Hart was final, it left nothing to be done
further. Whereas in this case, the decision expressly reserved decision on the particular issue
as to disposition of the money. In the Hart case any pronouncement as to the money was a
modification of a final judgmen, unwarranted by the law on jeopardy. here the proposed
hearing was not a modification of the decision but a procedural step in furtherance
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore it was a mistake to prohibit the justice of the peace of Caloocan to further act on
the case. Judgment reversed, without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

library
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador,
JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
1 The appellee asserts there is no proof of the facts stated in this paragraph. But such facts
were alleged in the answer, and as judgment was rendered on the pleadings, they must be
deemed admitted.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO2 ELEAZAR M. MADALI,
SPO2 EUSTAQUIO V. ROGERO, and SPO1 RANDY M. RUBIO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Romblon,
Romblon finding accused-appellants Eleazar M. Madali, Eustaquio V. Rogero, and Randy M.
Rubio, all members of the Philippine National Police, guilty of the murder of Reynaldo M.
Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellants were also
ordered jointly and severally to pay the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P124,800.00
for
loss
of
earning
capacity,P150,000.00
as
moral
damages, P150,000.00 as exemplary damages, P70,000.00 as attorneys fees, P50,000.00
as expenses of litigation, and P60,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, accused-appellants preventive imprisonment was ordered credited in their favor.
The following facts are undisputed:
On February 4, 1992, at around 11 p.m., Reynaldo Abrenica and his wife Helen came
home at the house of Harry Mindo in Romblon, Romblon where Reynaldo had some
drinks. Helen went to bed ahead of her husband in their bedroom on the second floor of their
house. When Helen woke up at around 1 a.m., she found that her husband was not beside
her. She looked for him in the bathroom but could not find him there either. She turned on
the light and went to the stairs and there, on the landing of the stairs, she found her husband
lying with his head towards the wall, his left hand placed on his back and his right arm pinned
under his body.[2] He was wearing a white sleeveless undershirt (sando) with a towel over his
bare buttocks. There were feces hanging from his anus. Helen did not find any trace of blood
on the body of her husband nor in the place where it lay.[3] When she touched her husband
she found he was dead. Helen became hysterical and went outside the house for help, crying
that her husband had accidentally fallen from the stairs.[4]
After it was dressed, Reynaldos body was loaded in a jeep by neighbors Joey Salgado,
Romeo Ibal, Eduardo Galang, and Landoy Galang so that it could be taken to the
hospital. Segundo Orola, also a neighbor of the Abrenicas, was going to drive the jeep but
found that its headlights were not functioning. So his wife Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua
went to the municipal building to look for another vehicle. They found a tricycle they could
use to guide the jeep. Accused-appellant Eleazar M. Madali, who was on duty at that time,
drove the tricycle. With the tricycle ahead, the way was lighted for the jeep bearing
Reynaldo. However, Reynaldo was declared dead on arrival in the hospital. An autopsy
conducted on Reynaldos cadaver by Dr. Vladimir Villaseor of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory showed the following:
FINDINGS:
Body belongs to a fairly nourished, fairly developed previously embalmed male cadaver.
TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:
1) Swelling, fronto-parietal region, measuring 9 x 7 cm., along the anterior midline,
superimposed lacerated wound, measuring 1.3 x 0.5 cm.

2) Scalp hematoma, frontal region, measuring 8 x 6 cm., along the midsagittal line.
3) Scalp hematoma, parietal region, measuring 5 x 4.5 cm. along the midsagittal line.
4) Area of multiple abrasions, left clavicular region, measuring 7 x 5 cm., 17 cm. from
the anterior midline.
5) Abrasion, proximal 3rd of the left arm, measuring 1.5 x 0.5 cm., 3.5 cm., lateral to
its posterior midline.
6) Abrasion, proximal 3rd of the right arm, measuring 6 x 1 com., 5 cm. lateral to its
anterior midline.
7) Contusion, middle 3rd of the left thigh, measuring 6 x 3 cm., 2 cm. lateral to its
posterior midline.
8) Contusion, middle 3rd of the left thigh, measuring 6 x 6 cm., 2 cm. lateral to its
anterior midline.
9) Contusion, proximal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 6 x 4 cm., along its anterior
midline.
10) Contusion, middle 3 rd of the right thigh, measuring 3 x 2.5 cm, 6 cm. medial to its
anterior midline.
11) Abrasion, middle 3rd of the right leg, measuring 2 x 0.8 cm., 1 cm. medial to its
anterior midline.
12) Contusion, distal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 2 x 1.5 cm, 2 cm. medial to its
anterior midline.
13) Contusion, distal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 5 x 3 cm., 4 cm. medial to its
anterior midline.
14) Contusion, distal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 2 x 1.5 cm., 2 cm. medial to its
posterior midline.
15) Contusion, distal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 5 x 3 cm., 4 cm. medial to its
posterior midline.
16) Sore, right clavicular region, measuring 7 x 1 cm., 11 cm. from the anterior
midline.
17) Swelling, middle 3rd of the left arm, measuring 13 x 4 cm., 6 cm. medial to its
anterior midline.
PLEURAL, PERICARDIAL AND PERITONEAL CAVITIES:
The pleural, pericardial and peritoneal cavities are free from adhesions and fluid
accumulations.
BRAIN:
The brain is pale white in appearance with shallow sulci and gyri. There are subdural
hemorrhage noted at the anterior lobes of both cerebral hemispheres. Circle of Willis shows
minimal amount of atheromatous deposits but otherwise patent. Cut section reveals widening
of the white matter and congestion.
Microsection shows varying degrees of neuronal degeneration and focal dilated blood
vessels, lumen of which are filled by blood fluid.
Assessment: Cerebral edema and congestion.
LUNGS:
Both lungs are dark gray in color with areas of anthracosis. More pronounced at the right
upper lobe. There is crepitancy on pressure. The primary and secondary bronchi contain
minimal amount of dark reddish fluid. Serial section shows areas of focal congestion.

Microsection shows severe congestion at the alveolar capillaries and the pulmonary alveoli
are filled with eosinophilic fluid. Focal emphysema noted. Bronchial smooth muscle wall is
slightly thickened and mildly infiltrated with round cell infiltrates.
Assessment: Pulmonary edema and congestion, moderate to severe Chronic Bronchitis.
HEART:
The heart is pale reddish brown in color, enveloped in moderate amount of epicardial fats,
with multiple petechial hemorrhages noted in the surface. Cut section reveals clotted blood
embedded on both chambers. The left ventricular wall measures 1.3 cm. thick while the right
ventricular wall measures 0.5 cm. thick. Valvular leaflets are soft and pliable. Coronary artery
shows minimal amount of atheromatous deposits.
Microsection shows separation of the myocardial muscle fiber by edema and is mildly
infiltrated by round cells. Coronary arteries patent with slight thickening of its vascular wall.
Assessment: Dilatation, ventricle
Atherosclerosis - 30 40%
LIVER:
The liver is yellowish brown in color, doughy to firm in consistency. A nut-meg liver pattern on
section with focal areas of congestion.
Microsection shows focal areas of vacuolation of the hepatic cells. The sinusodial spaces are
filled with red blood cells, mildly infiltrated with mononuclear cell infiltrates.
Assessment: Fatty changes, liver, moderate
Congestion, liver
KIDNEYS:
Both kidneys are reddish brown in color. Capsules are stripped-off with difficulty, leaving a
fine granular cortical surface. Cut section reveals a well-defined cortico-medulary junction.
Microsection shows moderate to extensive acute tubular necrosis with tubular degenerations
and focal thickening of its vascular wall.
Assessment: Acute tubular necrosis
Tubular degeneration
SPLEEN:
The spleen is dark gray in color, firm and slightly wrinkled. Cut section reveals congestion.
Microsection shows congestion and hemorrhage on both the red and white pulp. Scanty
germinal follicles are noted.
Assessment: Congestion and hemorrhage, spleen
PANCREAS:
The pancreas is pale yellowish brown in color, doughy in consistency, lobulated with petechial
hemorrhages noted at the head and tail of the pancreas.
Microsection shows focal hemorrhages within the parenchyma and areas of dilated, slightly
thickened ducta filled with impessated secretions. Other areas show focus of pseudocyst
formation.
Assessment: Acute hemorrhagic Pancreatitis
There are subdural hemorrhages noted on both cerebral hemispheres.
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles consisting mostly of rice.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is Intracranial hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.[5]
On December 1, 1995, three years after the death of Reynaldo Abrenica, this case was
filed, after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, surfaced and implicated accusedappellants in the death of Reynaldo. The information against accused-appellants alleged
That in or about the early morning of February 5, 1992, in Romblon, Romblon, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating

with each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict mortal wounds upon the person of one
Reynaldo M. Abrenica thereby causing the latters death.[6]
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.
Mercy Villamor was a former bar girl at the Boulevard Music Lounge in Bagacay,
Romblon, Romblon. She worked there from June 2, 1990 to April 1992 and met accusedappellants who became her customers. She testified that accused-appellant Madali courted
her in September 1990 and became her boyfriend in November of that year. She claimed that
she had a son by Madali. The boy, named Mark Anthony, was born on November 10,
1992. Mercy claimed that Reynaldo M. Abrenica was also her customer at the night
club. Reynaldo allegedly courted her in October 1991 and became her boyfriend on
December 22, 1991, although she was still having an affair with Madali at that time.
According to Mercy, one evening in December 1991, the two men in her life met. Mercy
was at Reynaldos table at the Boulevard Music Lounge when Madali entered through the
back door. Mercy asked Madali why he was there when his wife was supposed to be in
town. Madali told her that he wanted to sleep at the music lounge and proceeded to the
second floor. Mercy then rejoined Reynaldo. When Reynaldo asked whether Madali was her
boyfriend, Mercy said Madali was the brother of the boyfriend of the owner of the night club,
Hilda Yap. According to Mercy, before Reynaldo left, they agreed to go swimming on
February 4, 1992. Mercy said she then went upstairs and lay beside Madali. When Madali
asked whether Reynaldo was her boyfriend, Mercy answered in the affirmative. Mercy told
him that she was going swimming with Reynaldo on February 4, 1992. Madali tried to
dissuade her but she was adamant.
Mercy testified that while she was walking around town on February 4, 1992, at around 9
p.m., she met Reynaldo who was on a motorcycle. She said Reynaldo apologized to her for
not going swimming with her on that day because his wife had arrived from Manila. He gave
her an envelope and told her to meet him that same night at 11:30 p.m. in his jeep then
parked outside his house. After Reynaldo left, Mercy opened the envelope and found
a P500.00 bill inside with a note saying, I love you, Mercy.
Mercy claimed that she and a friend, Mayet Espinosa (a.k.a. Leonora Orboc), who was
then pregnant, went to meet Reynaldo at 11 p.m. on that date. On their way, they met Madali,
who was in uniform and riding his motor tricycle. He asked where they were going. Mercy
said they were going home, but Madali did not believe her.
Mercy said she and Mayet then proceeded to Reynaldos house. Reynaldo was inside
his jeep. The two women then joined him inside the jeep. Mercy said that while she and
Reynaldo were talking, Mayet saw, on the jeeps side mirror, someone walking towards
them. It was accused-appellant Madali, and the two hurriedly got off the jeep and hid behind
a pile of boxes nearby. According to Mercy, Madali approached Reynaldo and asked, Pare,
kausap mo yata si Mercy. (Pal, you seem to have been talking with Mercy), to which
Reynaldo replied, Eh, ano ngayon? (So, what?). Madali then pulled his gun and hit
Reynaldo on the head with it. Madali hit Reynaldo on the head three times with his gun, as a
result of which Reynaldo fell on the ground. Mercy said accused-appellants Rogero and
Rubio, who were also in uniform, came and helped Madali carry Reynaldos body inside the
latters house. Thereafter, accused-appellants closed the door. According to Mercy, after
witnessing the incident, she and Mayet returned to the Boulevard Music Lounge.
At around 1 a.m., Madali arrived at the Boulevard Music Lounge. Mercy noticed that his
uniform was stained with blood. When she asked him why there was blood on his uniform, he
said he had run over a dog. Mercy retorted, "Nakasagasa ka ng aso o pumatay ka ng
tao? (You ran over a dog or you killed someone?) In fact, according to Mercy, when she

washed Madalis clothes, she noticed that his shoes were also stained with blood.
She said she did not report what she had seen because she was afraid for her life as
Madali had threatened her. She said that she only implicated accused-appellants in her
sworn statement on December 14, 1994[7]before the Commission on Human Rights, after
she had been informed about the Witness Protection Program of the Department of
Justice. Mercy was entered in the program only on April 15, 1995.[8]
Accused-appellants denied liability for the death of Reynaldo Abrenica. Accusedappellant Madali testified that, at about 11 p.m. of February 4, 1992, he was in his house
asleep. He set his alarm clock to 11:40 p.m. because he was on duty at the police station
from 12 midnight to 8 a.m. of the next day. He said he arrived at the station at around 11:50
p.m. and stayed for awhile with accused-appellant Rogero in the latters jeep. Rogero had the
same schedule as Madali. According to Madali, when Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua
came for assistance in bringing Reynaldo Abrenica to the hospital, he took the police motor
tricycle and went with the two to the Abrenica residence. Then, with him leading the way
because the jeeps headlights would not function, they took Reynaldo Abrenica to the
hospital.
Madali said he had the chance to talk to Reynaldos wife Helen in the hospital, and she
said that she heard the sound of something falling and thought that it was their plastic
container which fell.
Madali denied having an affair with Mercy Villamor. He stated that he only came to know
her sometime in December 1991 when he and the other accused-appellants, Rogero and
Rubio, and other policemen were introduced to her by Hilda Yap at the Boulevard Music
Lounge. Madali denied having a child by Mercy. In fact, he said, when his wife heard about
the rumor that Mercy bore him a child, his wife summoned Mercy to their house, but Mercy
said she did not spread any rumor about her having a child by Madali.
Madali likewise denied he bore the Abrenicas ill will. He said that he and his wife in fact
attended the nine-day prayers (pasiyam) for the soul of Reynaldo and, at the end of the ninth
day, they were invited by Helen to dinner together with others who had condoled with her.
Accused-appellant Rogero testified that on February 4, 1992, his tour of duty as foot
patrol and vigilante was from 12 midnight to 8 a.m. He arrived at the police station at about
11:40 p.m. in his jeep. He saw accused-appellant Rubio, whose duty as station guard and
desk officer was from 8 p.m. to 12 midnight, standing outside the station. Rogero said he
stayed in his jeep for sometime until it was time to begin his duty. He was joined by Madali
who had the same schedule of duty. When Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua arrived, Madali
attended to them. He was later asked by Madali to follow him to the Abrenica
residence. Madali left with Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua aboard the police
tricycle. According to Rogero, he woke accused-appellant Randy Rubio up and the two of
them proceeded to the Abrenica residence. Rogero said he and Rubio were told by Susan
Ybaez that Reynaldo fell from the stairs and was taken to the hospital. Rogero said he and
Rubio then proceeded to the hospital where they were told by Madali that Reynaldo fell from
the stairs. They stayed at the hospitals lobby for about two hours and then returned to their
station. Madali later followed them to the police station. According to Rogero, he took Rubio
to their headquarters and then went to the front of the post office, where he stayed until 6 a.m.
before going home.[9]
Leonora Orboc, also known as Mayet Espinosa, testified for the defense. She denied
being with Mercy Villamor when the latter met Reynaldo M. Abrenica near the latters house
on February 4, 1992. She stated that she worked from 10 p.m. of February 4, 1992 at the
cash register at the Boulevard Music Lounge. She was then nine months pregnant. She said
that she knew that Mercy was at the Boulevard Music Lounge that night because she tried to

rouse her from her sleep as many customers were looking for her, but Mercy refused to get
up. Mayet likewise denied that she witnessed the murder described by Mercy in court.[10]
On May 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) SR. POLICE OFFICER II ELEAZAR M.
MADALI, (2) SR. POLICE OFFICER II EUSTAQUIO V. ROGERO and (3) SR. POLICE
OFFICER I RANDY M. RUBIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
under the Information, dated December 1, 1995, and sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law.
These three (3) accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
deceased Reynaldo M. Abrenica the following sums, namely, (1) P50,000.00 as death
indemnity; (2) P124,800.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) P150,000.00 as
moral damages; (4) P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (5) P70,000.00 for attorneys fees
and appearance fees; (6) P50,000.00 for expenses of litigation; and (7) P60,000.00 as actual
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in their
favor to its full extent pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants assign the following errors as having been
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE DOUBTS AND
DISCREPANCIES IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING CREDIBLE THE TESTIMONIES OF TWO
PIVOTAL WITNESSES, MERCY VILLAMOR AND DR. VLADIMIR VILLASENOR.
[12]
On June 2, 1997, Atty. Reynaldo Z. Calabio filed a Notice of Appearance[13] has counsel
for complainant Helen M. Abrenica, widow of the deceased Reynaldo M. Abrenica. His
request to be allowed to appear on behalf of the complainant was denied for lack of merit.[14]
On July 16, 1997, complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief, separate from that
which the Office of the Solicitor General would file, by way of answer to the brief of accusedappellants.[15] This was likewise denied for lack of merit.[16]
On November 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion In Lieu of Appellees Brief recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants.[17] In
view of the position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, complainant filed on
December 8, 1997 a Manifestation and Motion to be Allowed to File Brief.[18] On February
13, 1998, she filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant,[19] which was noted in the
Courts resolution of March 25, 1998.
When required to comment on complainants motion for leave to file a separate brief, the
Solicitor General stated that since complainant had already filed a memorandum, there was
no further need for a brief sustaining the decision on appeal. On the other hand, complainant
stated that her memorandum had already been noted by the Court and, in the interest of a
balanced presentation of facts and the issues, the same should be considered in the
resolution of this appeal.
Rule 122, 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that (a)ny party may
appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
It has been held that the word party in the provision in question includes not only the
government and the accused but other persons as well, such as the complainant who may be
affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceedings. The complainant has an
interest in the civil liability arising from the crime, unless of course he has reserved to bring a

separate civil action to recover the civil liability.[20] Hence, in the prosecution of the offense,
the complainants role is that of a witness for the prosecution.[21] Ordinarily, the appeal of
criminal cases involves as parties only the accused, as appellants, and the State, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, as the appellee. The participation of the private
offended party would be a mere surplusage, if the State were simply to seek the affirmation of
a judgment of conviction. However, where the Office of the Solicitor General takes a contrary
position and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the complainants
right to be heard on the question of award of indemnity and damages arises. In the interest of
justice and equity and to provide perspective for this appeal, therefore, the Court hereby
allows in this case the memorandum filed by complainant which is hereby admitted as part of
the records of this appeal.
Nevertheless, after considering the records of this case, we agree with the Solicitor
General that the evidence is insufficient to sustain accused-appellants conviction and,
therefore, the decision of the trial court should be reversed and accused-appellants should be
acquitted.
First. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the supposed
eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, despite its many improbabilities and inconsistencies which
renders it doubtful.
(1) Mercy testified that, on February 4, 1992, Reynaldo Abrenica asked that, as they could
not go out because his wife had arrived from Manila, they meet instead at 11:30 p.m. in his
jeep which was parked in front of the Abrenica residence. This is incredible. If Reynaldo
allegedly called off their date because his wife was in town, why would he instead appoint a
place for their tryst right in front of his house where it was more likely they would be seen by
his wife?
(2) Mercy testified that she saw accused-appellants, who were in their uniforms, bringing
Reynaldo inside his house, Madali holding him by the nape, Rogero by the right arm, and
Rubio holding the two legs. It is inconceivable, however, that accused-appellants would do
this because they were in their uniforms and they could easily be noticed. The sight of
uniformed policemen carrying a body would attract attention.
(3) Mercy claimed that at around 1 a.m. of February 5, 1992, accused-appellant Madali
arrived at the Boulevard Music Lounge and she noticed that he had blood on his uniform and
his boots. But Helen Abrenica, another prosecution witness, testified that there was no blood
on her husbands body or on the floor or on the wall when she found him on the landing of
their staircase. Indeed, Reynaldo Abrenica never suffered any stab or incised wound, and the
theory of the prosecution was simply that he was clubbed to death.
(4) Mercy said that Reynaldos jeep was parked along Republica Street in front of his
house. The jeep was facing the pier. In the opposite direction are the market and the post
office. According to Mercy, while they were seated inside the jeep, her companion, Mayet
Espinosa, saw accused-appellant Madali on the side mirror of the vehicle. Accused-appellant
was allegedly coming from the direction of the market and the post office.
This is contrary to the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, Helen Abrenica and
the spouses Segundo and Orlene Orola, who said that the jeepney was facing the direction of
the market and the post office. In fact Helen Abrenica said that when they arrived home on
February 4, 1992, they passed through the pier so that when Reynaldo M. Abrenica parked
the vehicle it was facing in the direction of the market and the post office. This was also the
position of the vehicle when Segundo and Orlene Oroloa arrived at the Abrenica in response
to the cry for help of Helen. It was, therefore, not possible for Mayet Espinosa to have seen
accused-appellant on the side mirror of the vehicle.
At any rate, Mayet Espinosa denied that she and Mercy went to meet Reynaldo M.

Abrenica in front of his house on the night of February 4, 1992. Mayet testified for the
defense. She said that at the time and on the date in question, she was at the Boulevard
Music Lounge while Mercy was upstairs sleeping, refusing to get up despite the fact that
customers of the night club wanted to have her.
Mayets testimony is more credible. At the time of the incident she was heavy with a
child. Why should she go with Mercy who had a date with her lover? It is more probable that
she worked at the cash register in the Boulevard Music Lounge than that, as Mercy claimed,
she went with her to see the latters lover.
(5) Mercy said that at around 9 p.m. of February 4, 1992, she saw Reynaldo riding on his
motorcycle and she was told that they could not go out that night because Madalis wife was
around. This is contrary to Helen Abrenicas testimony that at that time Reynaldo was having
drinks in the house of his friend, Harry Mindo, and that they left that place at around 10:30
p.m.[22]
(6) Mercy claimed that Reynaldo was wearing shorts and was half naked when they met
inside his jeep. This is not what he had on when he was found. When he was found,
Reynaldo was wearing a white sleeveless undershirt and was naked from the waist down with
only a towel placed over his buttocks.
(7) Mercy said she saw Reynaldo being carried by accused-appellants into his
house. Reynaldo was found lying in a prone position with knees bent toward his chest and
his head facing the wall. The space in which his body was found was only 25 inches by 41
inches.[23] It was so small that if three men carried his body and dumped it there, they would
have made noise and would have been detected by the occupants of the house. So small
indeed was the space constituting the landing of the stairs that Reynaldos body had to be
crumpled so that his knees were bent toward his chest while his left hand had to be placed on
his back and his right arm pinned under his body. If accused-appellants killed Reynaldo, they
could just have left him on the street or placed him inside his jeepney. The risk of being seen
carrying the body inside the house up to the first flight of stairs to the landing where it was
found was too great.
In addition to the inconsistencies and improbabilities in her testimony, Mercys testimony
shows hedging and trimming as is clear from the following portion of the transcript of
stenographic notes:
Q - You alighted from the jeep when you saw Madali coming because you were afraid and
you wanted to hide from him, is that correct?
A - We were not afraid, if he would see us because we told him we are going home.
Q - Why did you hide?
A - Because Bebot might see us, we told him before that we are going home.
Q - That is why you hid so that you will not be seen by Madali, is that not right?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - You did not want that any portion of your body could be seen by Madali at that time?
A - I dont want because we told him we are going home.[24]
This is not the only instance where Mercy gave confused and unsure
statements. Testifying concerning the distance between the place where she and Mayet were
hiding and the place where they saw Madali allegedly hitting Reynaldo several times on the
head, Mercy said:
Q - And you were how many meters away while watching and hiding behind the kamada
of kahon?
A - It is near, from here to there.
....
Q - During the direct you answered apat (4) na dipa, 4 arms length, do you remember

that?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - As a matter of fact the Court measured the distance you pointed earlier, do you
remember that?
A - Yes, sir.
ATTY. ARIAS Continuing:
Q - And that was the distance you said apat (4) na dipa, four (4) arms length, do you
remember having stated that?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Madam Witness, you stated that in your affidavit that you are four (4) arms length
away from where the pokpoking occurred?
A - I do not know, I cannot remember.
....
ATTY. ARIAS Continuing:
Q - I am showing to you Exhibit A-2, No. 15, line 18, and I will let you refresh your
memory, at paglapit ni Bebot Madali sa kinauupoan ni Rey sa loob ng jeep (harapan ng
manibela) ay binati pa ni Bebot si Rey ng kausap mo yata si Mercy, dinig na dinig
namin ito ni Mayet sapagkat ang kinaroroonan namin ay dalawang (2) metro lamang,
do you remember having given that answer?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And you stated in the affidavit two (2) meters, dalawang (2) metro lamang?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - You know that a meter is shorter than one (1) dipa?
A - The same.
Q - So, when you said, two (2) meters that should be dalawang (2) dipa, according to
you?
A - Two (2) arms length.
Q - And you know that two (2) arms length is shorter than apat (4) na dipa?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And you now discover that what you told earlier that Madali was four (4) arms length
is not correct but only dalawang (2) metros or according to you pareho lang dalawang
(2) dipa, is that correct?
A - No, sir.[25]
....
ATTY. ARIAS continuing:
Q - All right. You saw Madali struck the victim, how far were you?
ATTY. CALABIO:
From where?
ATTY. ARIAS:
Doon sa pinagpukpukan.
A - This distance, about two (2) arms length.
ATTY. ARIAS:
I want to make of record that the witness had shown to us the distance by stretching
her two (2) arms and pointing a little bit near and later on when she looked at the
private prosecutor she changed her answer and said . . . .[26]
The inconsistencies, improbabilities, and uncertainties in Mercys testimony are many,
and they relate to material points. The suspicion cannot be helped that she was a rehearsed
witness.[27] It cannot be too often repeated that for evidence to be believed, it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible. The evidence must

be what the common experience and observation of mankind would approve of as probable
under the circumstances.[28] We cannot help noticing that, in order to go through her direct
examination, Mercy had to be asked leading questions by the private prosecutor. Contrary to
the observation of the trial court, she was not consistent on cross-examination. In fact, she
had to be cued by the prosecutor by timely manifestations. There were several instances
when she did not make sense when confronted with her conflicting statements. In her dire
attempt to explain away the irreconcilable statements in her affidavits and in her testimony in
court, she used lame and shallow excuses.
Second. This case was not filed until three years after the death of Reynaldo M.
Abrenica, and that was because Mercy Villamor came out with a claim that she saw accusedappellants kill Reynaldo. She claimed that she could not reveal earlier what she knew about
the crime because of threats made by accused-appellant Madali. However, Mercy never
explained the circumstances under which she was threatened. In fact, she admitted she only
entertained the fear that Madali would harm her if she talked about what she allegedly
knew. When asked when she was allegedly threatened, she stated that it was at 9 a.m. of
February 4, 1992. At that time, however, the incident had not yet occurred.[29]
Third. On the other hand, the testimony of Dr. Villaseor that the head injuries sustained
by Reynaldo were caused by a blunt instrument is contrary to the statement he gave before
the Office of the Ombudsman that the cause of Reynaldos death could not have been a blunt
instrument.[30] Although this statement was prepared by the investigator in the Office of the
Ombudsman, it was signed by Dr. Villaseor. Dr. Villaseor tried to explain the prior
inconsistent statement by means of the lame excuse that he failed to include some matters in
his statement because he did not then have his files with him.
Fourth. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
treachery. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.[31] In this case, Reynaldo allegedly
said Eh, ano ngayon? to Madali when the latter demanded to know whether he (Reynaldo)
was talking to Mercy. The remark was certainly provocative and Reynaldo knew that his reply
would invite a retaliation. Thus, Reynaldo could not have been surprised by Madalis alleged
attack.
In sum, the prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that the death of Reynaldo M.
Abrenica was not accidental but intentional and that accused-appellants were guilty of killing
him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Municipality of
Romblon, Romblon is REVERSED and accused-appellants Eleazar M. Madali, Eustaquio V.
Rogero, and Randy M. Rubio are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt. Consequently, they are ordered forthwith released from custody unless they are being
lawfully held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (now
Provincial Prosecutor) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in behalf of the People of the Philippines,
assailing the judgment of respondent Judge Ernesto M. Mendoza in Crim. Case No. 4264
acquitting accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, private respondent herein, of the crime of
robbery with force upon things notwithstanding his plea of guilt. Petitioner prays that
respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his judgment exonerating Magalop and, instead, to
impose upon him the proper penalty for the offense to which he pleaded guilty.
The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the storeroom of the Bukidnon National
School of Home Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked. After an on-thespot investigation, the police found themselves at a loss as to the identity of the culprit or
culprits. The value of the missing articles was estimated at P15,298.15.
Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force upon things was laid on accused Juan
Magalop y Salvacion, Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky. All three
(3) were represented by District Citizens Attorney Isidro L. Caracol. At the arraignment on 23
June 1987, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded "not guilty." The arraignment
of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not mentally well."
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court a quo conducted trial. The
prosecution presented Pat. Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as well as a clerk
and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The prosecution likewise offered in evidence colored
pictures of the ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers colored blue, a pair of long-nose
pliers colored red, and a coping saw. The last three items were said to have been recovered
by the police.
The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the case was submitted for
decision.
On 8 October 1987, respondent Judge acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who
earlier pleaded guilty to the charge. The two-paged, single-spaced judgment is quoted
hereunder for careful scrutiny and better appreciation. Thus
This is a case where three accused were allegedly responsible for forcibly taking things from
the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries.
It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of
Home Industries at Maramag, Bukidnon, on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as shown by
the testimonies of the policemen and by the keepers of the storeroom. After on the spot
investigation, the policemen were at a loss to identify the person or persons responsible
thereof.
Except for the accused Juan Magalop who pleaded guilty, the identity of the perpetrators
remained a problem. Accused Ricarte Dahilan is mentally deranged; hence the trial was
separate for accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop.
As shown by the evidence of the prosecution, some of the stolen things were in the
possession of a certain Babie Tan, consisting of two pliers and a saw, and these were all
allegedly sold to said Babie Tan who refused to testify on the matter.
The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the three accused were responsible for
stealing these three articles or tools.
Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty, it was not shown who (how?) they conspired and
helped each other in the commission of the crime charged. To the Court, the plea of Juan
Magalop was not intelligently done. In the course of the proceedings, it was not established
how Juan Magalop and Petronilo Fernandez participated in the looting. No evidence was
introduced to show that the accused sold the stolen things to Babie Tan, which the
prosecution could have proved to show that the possessors of the stolen things could have

been identified as the thief or thieves; hence, the prosecution utterly failed to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond doubt (emphasis supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop are hereby
ACQUITTED. With respect to Ricarte Dahilan, let this case be held in abeyance until he is
mentally well. 1
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us contending that
the decision of 8 October 1987 and the order of 4 November 1987 denying reconsideration
are "purely capricious and arbitrary, made for no proper reason at all and rendered without
legal authority whatsoever, thereby amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion, and curtailed the power of the state to punish criminals." 2
Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop, who was assisted by counsel, had voluntarily,
spontaneously and intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with force upon things.
Thus, the trial court had no alternative but to pronounce judgment and impose the proper
penalty.
Parenthetically, petitioner interposed no objection to the acquittal of accused Fernandez.
It may be stressed that the petition is defective since it was filed by the Provincial Fiscal and
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not by the Solicitor General. We
have already ruled in a number of cases that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines once such actions are brought before the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 3 As a matter of fact, in his Manifestation filed with
this Court on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General steered away from the case, explaining that
the petition was filed directly by the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, "without
coursing it through the OSG," as a consequence of which it should be the fiscal who should
submit the required pleadings.
Nonetheless, even if we overlook this procedural lapse and treat the case on the merits, the
petition should, just the same, be dismissed.
Petitioner would have this Court set aside the acquittal of Magalop, insisting that with his
voluntary plea of guilt, the trial court had no other recourse but to pronounce judgment and
impose the proper penalty.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with
full knowledge and understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the
information as well as the consequences of his plea.4 It is an unconditional admission of guilt
with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge
and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. 5 Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from
the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. 6
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him
accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule which
provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction
automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the plea may be considered to
convince the judge that it was intelligently made.
Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case of the prosecution against the three (3)
accused was virtually non-existent as the asported articles were found in the possession of a
certain Babie Tan and yet, quite inexplicably, the prosecution did not summon him to the
witness stand. Babie Tan could have positively identified those who sold him the stolen
articles if called to testify. Or, he could very well have been the perpetrator of the crime
himself. In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into possession of stolen

effects, the possessor is presumed to be the author of the crime of robbery. 7

Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits introduced during the trial could
breathe life into the moribund state of the case for the prosecution. While the loss of articles in
the storeroom of the BNSHI was established, there was nothing, independent of the
acknowledgment of guilt, which could link accused Magalop to the robbery. As the trial court
succinctly put it, "the plea of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done."
Admittedly, the procedure followed by respondent judge was not the normal course, as the
better procedure would have been that set forth in People v. Padernal, 8 where the court
sustained the exoneration of the accused notwithstanding his plea of guilt. In that case, in
view of the exculpatory testimony of the accused who had earlier pleaded guilty to the charge
of homicide, the trial court correctly considered the plea as withdrawn and, in its place,
ordered a plea of not guilty entered. This was not done by respondent judge. For even after
finding that the plea of Magalop was not intelligently made, Judge Mendoza proceeded to
pass judgment without requiring Magalop to plead anew to the charge. Applying the principle
laid down in the Padernal case, it can fairly be concluded that there was no standing plea at
the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal hence said acquittal was a nullity.
Be that as it may, however, in the interest of substantial justice, we cannot allow such
procedural error to prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In fairness to Magalop, outside of his improvident plea of
guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him presented or forthcoming. From the
evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which accused Magalop could have been
implicated. It is for this fundamental reason that, even pro hac vice, his acquittal must be
sustained. Interdum even it ut exceptio quae prima facie justa videtur, tamen inique noceat. It
may sometime happen that a plea which on its face seem just, nevertheless is injurious and
inequitable. It is so in this instance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
acquittal of the accused-respondent JUAN MAGALOP Y SALVACION is sustained.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61997 November 15, 1982
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES & TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioners,
vs.
ELFREN PARTISALA and HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the 2nd Branch of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, respondents.
Solicitor General for petitioner.
Antonio C. Singson for petitioner Traders Royal Bank.
Enrique Arguelles and Eugenio Original for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari. Off-hand it can be said that the petition is frivolous. It
was also filed in the wrong court -- the Court of Appeals. True the Court of Appeals
has ,'original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" (Sec. 30,
Judiciary Act, as amended) but true also is that the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction
on final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in "cases in which only errors or questions of
law are involved." (Sec. 17, Id em.) This is such a case so that the Court of Appeals had to
certify it to Us.
In Criminal Case No. 10997 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Elfren Partisala was
accused of estafa upon complaint of his employer The Traders Royal Bank. He pleaded guilty
and was forthwith "sentenced To suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of from Four (4) Years,

Two (2) Months and One (1) Day, minimum, to Six (6) Years of prision correccional,
maximum, together with all the accessory penalties provided for t)y law and to pay the costs."
He was also ordered to reimburse to the bank the amount malversed. immediately after he
was sentenced, Partisala filed an application for probation. Three weeks later, an assistant
provincial fiscal and tile private prosecutor opposed the application for probation. They argued
that Partisala can best be rehabilitated in prison and if he is set free he might commit other
crimes, There followed a reply to the opposition; a supplement to the opposition; a
memorandum to support the application; a rejoinder to the reply. So far, so good.
But before the trial judge could act on the application which appears to have attracted
attention because the Sangguniang Bayan of Calinog, Iloilo, in special session passed a
resolution wherein it "RESOLVED to manifest, as this Body do hereby manifest, the alarm and
vehement sentiment of the people of this Municipality over reprehensive conduct of Elfren
Partisala for his abstraction and misappropriation of the peoples' savings and deposits and
other funds of the Calinog Branch of the Traders Royal Bank," the Acting Provincial Fiscal no
less intervened. He sought to educate the trial judge by filing a "MOTION TO CORRECT
ERROR IN COMPUTATION OF PENALTY AND TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE PETITION FOR
PROBATION." He advanced the proposition that Partisala should have been sentenced to a
penalty higher than six years which would then make him ineligible for probation. (Sec. 9, par.
a, Probation Law, as amended.) But even the learned fiscal was not absolutely certain as to
the correct penalty. Firstly, he said the penalty "is between 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8
years." But alternatively he said that the imposable penalty can also "be in the medium period
of prision mayor, which has a range of from 8 years, I day and 1 0 years." He asked that the
sentenced imposed on Partisala be "corrected. "
Predictably, the trial judge denied the motion. He gave two reasons for the denial, namely:
1. The motion is in the nature of a motion for reconsideration. As such it should have been
filed before the sentence of the accused became final. It is elementary that a motion for
reconsideration should be based on the same grounds as those for a new trial for the two
remedies are the same. Under Rule 121, Section 1, a motion for new trial should be filed
before the finality of a conviction.
Under P.D. No. 968, the Probation Law, a convict who files a petition for probation
automatically waives his right to appeal and therefore his conviction becomes final. Therefore,
the instant motion is filed out of time.
2. The motion, if granted will place the accused in double jeopardy. (People vs. Taruc, G.R.
No. L-8229, Nov. 28, 1955; People vs. Ang Cho Kio, L-6697-6688).
A motion for reconsideration was filed but denied. In the meantime, the trial judge granted
Partisala's application for probation.
The instant petition prays that the orders of the trial judge denying the motion to correct,
denying the motion to reconsider the denial, and granting the application for probation be
annulled; that the correct penalty be imposed on Partisala; and that his application for
probation be denied.
We do not have to decide whether or not the penalty which the trial judge imposed on
Partisala is correct. For correct or not, it is a valid sentence because the trial judge had
jurisdiction to impose it. So for the reasons given by him when he denied the motion to
correct, the sentence was already beyond his reach, including this Court.
It is to be noted the Republic of the Philippines is one of the petitioners herein. The one who
signed the petition for the Republic is a mere second assistant provincial fiscal, albeit he is
the Officer-in-Charge of the Iloilo Provincial Fiscal's Office. We make it known that only the
Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
Henceforth actions filed in the name of the Republic of the Philippines if not initiated by the

Solicitor General will be summarily dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The preliminary injunction which
was issued by the Court of Appeals is hereby dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Peoplev.Madali
16 January 2001Mendoza,
J.Facts:

An appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 81 of Romblon, Romblon finding accused-appellantsguilty
of the murder of Reynaldo M. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. Thebody of
Reynaldo was found by his wife on the landing of the stairs of their house. An autopsy con-ducted by Dr.
Villaseor of the PNP Crime Laboratory yielded to the conclusion that the cause of deathis intracranial
hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.

Three years after Reynaldos death, the case was filed after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor,surfaced
and implicated the accused-appellants. Based on the testimony of this witness, the accused-appellants were
found guilty in the aforementioned decision.

The accused-appellants, in their appeal, alleged that the trial court erred in failing to resolve doubtsand
discrepancies in its findings of fact in favor of the accused and that the court erred in finding credi-ble the
testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Villaseor.

The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief separate from that which the OSG would file, byway of
an answer to the brief of accused-appellants. This motion was denied. The OSG subsequentlyfiled a
Manifestation recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. In view of the position takenby the OSG,
complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private Complainant (after filing a Manifestationand Motion to File
Brief) which was noted by the Court.
Ruling and Reasoning:

Rule 122, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from
a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It
has been held that the wordparty in the provision includes not only the government and the accused
but other persons who may be af-fected by the judgment.

The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the crime. Hence, in the prosecutionof the
offense, the complainants role is that of a witness for the prosecution.

Ordinarily, the appeal of the criminal cases involves as parties only the accused, as appellants, andthe State,
represented by the SolGen, as the appellee. The participation of the private offended partywould be a mere
surplusage if the State were simply to seek affirmation of a judgment of conviction.However, where the OSG
takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the complainants
right to be heard as regards indemnity and damages arises.

Nevertheless, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the accused-appellants conviction. Mercy Villamors testimony is riddled with inconsistencies, improbabilities and uncertainties which relate to material points.
Evidence,to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be
credible
[G.R. No. 127899. December 2, 1999]

MARILYN C. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

CORAZON T. CASTRO, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision,[1] Resolution,[2] and Supplemental Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 38522.
The facts that matter are as follows:
Petitioner issued fifty-four (54) checks in the total amount of Three Million Nine Hundred
Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Five and 10/100 (P3,989,175.10) Pesos, all of
which checks were dishonored upon presentment to the drawee bank.
On October 12, 1993, the petitioner was charged with fifty-four (54) counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) in fifty-four (54) separate Informations, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 102009 to 102062, respectively, before Branch 160 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. To the said accusations, petitioner pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. After trial, she was found guilty in a Decision promulgated on December 20,
1994, sentencing her to a total prison term of fifty-four (54) years and to pay P3,989,175.10 to
the private respondent.
Petitioner therefore, filed an application for probation, which was referred by Presiding
Judge Umali to the Probation Officer of Marikina, for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
Private respondent opposed subject application for probation on the grounds that: the
petitioner is not eligible for probation because she has been sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of fifty-four (54) years, and she failed to pay her judgment debt to the private
respondent.
On January 6, 1995, private respondent presented a Motion for a Writ of Execution,
which motion was granted by Judge Umali in an Order dated January 11, 1995. Thus, the
corresponding writ of execution issued for the implementation and satisfaction of the
monetary aspect of the said Decision. Thereafter, the sheriff prepared and signed a Notice of
Levy on Execution over several properties belonging to the petitioner.
On February 13, 1995, petitioner and her husband executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
deeding out in favor of Teodoro S. Dijamco (Mr. Dijamco) for P264,570.00 a parcel of land in
La Trinidad, Benguet (Benguet Property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T18721 (TCT No. T-18721). On the same day, the sheriff annotated the Notice of Levy on
Execution on the dorsal portion of TCT No. T-18721.
On March 29, 1995, Mr. Dijamco filed an Affidavit of Third-Party-Claim over the same
Benguet property on the strength of the said previous sale but averring already a
consideration of P3,000,000.00. Attached thereto are the checks he allegedly paid for subject
property.
On May 5, 1995, private respondent interposed a Supplemental Opposition to the
application for probation; contending that:
x x x
2. Recent developments show that the accused had been disposing and/or mortgaging her
properties in obvious attempt to negate the satisfaction of her civil liability to herein private
complainant, as evidenced by the Affidavit of Third Party Claim filed by Teodoro S. Dijamco
and the Real Estate Mortgage executed by the accused in favor of the Rural Bank of Angono,
Inc. (attached as Annexes A and B in the Comment/Opposition to the Post Sentence
Investigation Report).
3. It must be stressed that the real estate mortgage was executed by the accused in

anticipation of an unfavorable judgment and that the alleged sale the real property in favor of
Teodoro Dijamco was made after this Honorable Court had rendered judgment convicting the
accused of the crime charged and after notice of levy on execution had been annotated on
the title. Clearly, the said mortgage and sale executed by the accused constitute indirect
contempt under Sec. 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and the accused may likewise be
prosecuted criminally for the said acts.
4. Moreover, the accused is disqualified from the benefits of the aforecited Decree as she
has been sentenced to a total of fifty four (54) years of imprisonment.
5. From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the accused is not entitled to the benefits of the
probation law and that the acts enumerated constitute indirect contempt.
In the Order he issued on June 30, 1995, Judge Umali granted petitioners application for
probation for a period of six (6) years, subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:
1. Probationer shall report initially to the Chief parole and Probation Officer at Marikina
Parole & Probation Off. Hall of Justice, Marikina within seventy-two hours from receipt of the
Order granting Probation.
2. She shall, thereafter, report to her supervising probation and parole officer 2 times a
month, unless otherwise modified by the Chief Probation and Parole Officer.
3. She shall reside in #8 Jazmin, Twinsville Subd. Concepcion, Marikina and shall not
change her residence without approval of the supervising probation and parole officer or of
the Court, as the case may be.
4. She shall secure a written permit to travel outside the jurisdiction of the parole and
probation office from the chief probation officer, and from the Court if such travel exceeds
thirty (30) days.
5. She shall allow the supervising probation officer, or an authorized Volunteer Aide to visit
her place of work and home.
6. She shall meet her family responsibilities.
7. She shall devote herself to a specific employment and shall not change said employment
without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular study
or vocational training.
8. She shall refrain from associating with persons of questionable character, and shall not
commit any other offense.
9. She shall cooperate with her program of supervision, and shall satisfy any other condition
related to her rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of her liberty or incompatible with her
freedom of conscience.
10. She shall plant at least five (5) fruit bearing trees in his backyard or any government lot
as part of her rehabilitation.
11. She shall participate in the Parole and Probationers Project as clean and green project in
Marikina and attend the First Friday Mass at the Hall of Justice of Marikina.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but to no avail. Her motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Dissatisfied, the private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, questioning the grant of probation. In its
Decision[4] dated August 16, 1996, the Court of Appeals ruled thus:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Respondent Judge, Annexes A and B of the Petition are SET ASIDE. Let the records of
this case be remanded to the Court a quo. The Respondent Judge is hereby directed to issue
a warrant for the arrest of the Private Respondent.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5] of the above Decision but the
same was denied in the Resolution[6]dated January 7, 1997, holding:

Anent Private Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, We find no valid justification for a
reversal or reconsideration of our Decision. Private Respondents claim that the Petitioner is
not the proper party-in-interest to file the Petition is barren of merit. In the first place, the
Private Respondent, in her Answer/Comment and the Public Respondent, in his Comment, on
the Petition, never claimed that the Petitioner was not the proper party-in-interest to file the
Petition. More, the Solicitor General appearing for the Public Respondent has not filed any
Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision. Evidently, the Solicitor General is in accord with
our Decision.
Anent Petitioners Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order, We find the said
motion meritorious and hereby grants the same. Accordingly, the Commissioner &
Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed not to allow the departure from the Philippines
of the Private Respondent Marilyn C. Santos, married, and a resident of No. 8 Jasmin Street,
Twinville Subdivision, Marikina City, until further orders of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
In a Supplemental Resolution[7] dated January 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals elucidated
further its Resolution that the herein petitioner is the real party-in-interest, and declared that
there were no procedural lapses in the granting of private respondents petition.
Having lost the case before the Court of Appeals, petitioner has come to this Court for
relief; contending that:
I
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORAZON T. CASTRO IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
TO QUESTION THE GRANT OF PROBATION TO HEREIN PETITIONER.
II
NON-PAYMENT OF THE CIVIL LIABILITY IMPOSED ON PETITIONER IN THE DECISION
RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE REVOCATION OF
PROBATION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS MORE INTERESTED IN THE FULL SATISFACTION OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CORAZON T. CASTRO RELATIVE TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF
CASE THAN IN THE REHABILITATION OF PETITIONER AS A PROBATIONER. THIS IS
HIGHLY IMPROPER.
IV
THE GRANT OF PROBATION TO PETITIONER MARILYN C. SANTOS IS FAIT ACCOMPLI
AND SHE HAS COMPLIED WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE PROBATION GRANTED
HER.
V
THE GRANT OF PROBATION BY JUDGE UMALI TO PETITIONER UNDER THE FACTS
OBTAINING DOES NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A
HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER TO PREVENT PETITIONER FROM LEAVING THE
PHILIPPINES.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the private respondent had the personality to
bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Being the person
aggrieved by petitioners issuance of bouncing checks, private respondent has an interest in
the civil aspect of the case. It is not true that it is only the State or the People that can
prosecute the special civil action before the Court of Appeals. Private respondent may bring
such action in her own name to protect her interest in the case.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of
said complainant. (People v. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143, 153)
* *
*
In the instant case, the recourse of the complainant to the respondent Court was therefore
proper since it was brought in his own name and not in that of the People of the
Philippines. That the said proceedings benefited the People is not a reversible error. Neither
does it constitute grave abuse of discretion. xxx (De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA
501, 508)
Anent the second, third, and fifth issues, erroneous is petitioners submission that the
Court of Appeals unduly stressed petitioners non-satisfaction of her civil liability as the basis
for reversing the grant of probation to her. The proper approach to the problem, and the
Court considers the same as the pivotal issue in this case, is whether the petitioner is entitled
to probation.
The point of conflict is whether the petitioner is qualified to be granted probation. Stated
otherwise, has petitioner shown her qualifications entitling her to the grant of probation? Is
society better off with petitioner in jail or should petitioner be allowed to co-mingle with the
people, subject to some conditions, despite her criminal record?
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency
or immunity conferred by the state, which may be granted to a seemingly deserving defendant
who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense for
which he was convicted.[8] The primary objective in granting probation is the reformation of
the probationer. Courts must be meticulous enough to ensure that the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public as well as the accused be served by the grant of probation.[9]
Probation is a just privilege the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. Before
granting probation, the court must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform, together
with the demands of justice and public interest, along with other relevant circumstances.
[10] The courts are not to limit the basis of their decision to the report or recommendation of
the probation officer, which is at best only persuasive.[11]
In granting petitioners application for probation, Judge Umali ratiocinated:
Based on the report of the probation officer, accused may be granted probation (P.D. 968, as
amended) The findings of the Parole and Probation Office shows that accused is not
considered as a rescidivist [sic]; accused petitioner is not in need of correctional treatment,
but more of an individualize treatment of rehabilitation; offenses committed by accused/
petitioner is not so grave a crime that she can pose a great threat in the peace and order of
the community where she resides; and accused/petitioner is not condemned by the
community because of her cases, it can be presumed that she is still welcome to mingle with
the community and participate in any community projects.
Her failure to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability is not a ground for the denial of the
application for probation of accused. Moreover, the court had earlier issued a writ of
execution to satisfy the money judgment in an order dated January 11, 1995 and the sheriff of
this court had issued a notice of levy on execution on the properties of accused.
Foregoing considered that petition of accused for probation is hereby Granted. (Order, June
30, 1995; Rollo, p. 99)

When the aforesaid order was assailed before it, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant
of probation, on the grounds that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and
petitioner was unworthy of probation; ruling thus:
As it was, the Private Respondent had violated, with impunity, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 no
less than fifty-four (54) times to the damage and prejudice of the Petitioner in the aggregate
amount of close to P4,000,000.00. One would believe that the Private Respondent had
learned her lesson, would strive, from then on, to reform, shy away from doing and abetting
injustices to her fellowmen, make amends for her criminal misdeeds, demonstrate remorse
and concomitant determination to reform and turn a new leaf in her life, and reassume her
role as a responsible and productive member of community. On the contrary, after escaping
from the specter of imprisonment and averting the tribulations and vicissitudes of a long
prison term, by applying for and securing probation from the Respondent Judge, Private
Respondent resorted to devious chicanery and artifice to prevent Petitioner from recovering
her losses and perpetrate reprehensible if not criminal acts of falsification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Dijamco over her Benguet property, thus flaunting, once again, her
mockery and defiance of justice, foul play and unabashedly making gross misrepresentations
to the Probation Officer.
In fine, then, We find and so declare that the Respondent Judge abused his discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting probation to the Private Respondent. Accordingly,
We find and so declare that the Orders complained of, Annexes A and B of the Petition are
null and void. (Decision, p. 24; Rollo, p. 51)
The Court finds merit in the determination by the Court of Appeals that the herein
petitioner is not entitled to probation because she had displayed a devious and reprehensible
character in trying to evade the implementation of the execution against her thereby rendering
the judgment against her ineffective; as indicated by the following facts and circumstances, to
wit:
1. On February 13, 1995, petitioner disposed of her Benguet property by means of a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of Mr. Dijamco and had the deed registered in Benguet to preempt
the sheriff of the lower court from causing the Notice of Levy on Execution annotated at the
back of the title of the Benguet property.
2. The Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of Mr. Dijamco stated a consideration
of P264,570.00 when in truth and in fact, the consideration was P3,000,000.00, as stated in
the uncontested Affidavit of Third Party Claim of Mr. Dijamco and as evidenced by the
checks issued to and encashed by petitioner. By understating the price, petitioner committed
acts of falsification causing damage to the government as the latter was deprived of taxes that
should have been paid from the sale.
3. There is evidence to prove that the Deed of Absolute Sale may just have been a
simulated sale because petitioners husband, in his Affidavit of Third Party Claim dated
February 21, 1995, still claimed the property to be theirs. There is no mention whatsoever of
any sale to Mr. Dijamco.
4. Petitioner never remitted a single centavo of the proceeds of the Real Estate Mortgage
(in favor of Rural Bank of Angono,Inc.) and Deed of Absolute Sale (in favor of Mr. Dijamco)
to the private respondent. If she really had the good intentions of settling and satisfying the
judgment of the trial court, she should have at least offered a portion of said proceeds to
private respondent. Worse, she exhibited a design to compeletely evade her civil obligation
to private respondent.
5. Petitioners claim that the Benguet property actually belongs to Corazon Leano is of no
moment and could not be given credence. The documentary evidence presented in this case
overwhelmingly proves that such claim is puerile and tenuous. Primarily, the Deed of

Absolute Sale and Affidavit of Third Party Claim (filed by petitioners husband) prove their
ownership of the Benguet property.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned unerringly that petitioner has shown no remorse for
the criminal acts she committed against the private respondent. Her issuing subject fifty-four
(54) bouncing checks is a serious offense. To allow petitioner to be placed on probation
would be to depreciate the seriousness of her malefactions. Worse, instead of complying with
the orders of the trial court requiring her to pay her civil liability, she even resorted to devious
schemes to evade the execution of the judgment against her. Verily, petitioner is not the
penitent offender who is eligible for probation within legal contemplation. Her demeanor
manifested that she is incapable to be reformed and will only be a menace to society should
she be permitted to co-mingle with the public.
With respect to the fourth issue, petitioners contention that her probation is fait
accompli is equally untenable. The six (6) year period of probation which commenced on
June 30, 1995, has not yet been completed. Furthermore, even if the said period has
expired, such lapse of the period of probation does not detract from the fact that the order
granting probation was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Probation having been
improperly granted, there is no probation to speak of.
Anent the last issue, the Court rules that the issuance of a hold departure order against
the petitioner is warranted under the premises. Having displayed a criminal tendency and
propensity to evade or disobey the lawful orders of the trial court, there is indeed the need to
restrict the petitioners movements and activities so as not to render nugatory the multiple
judgments rendered against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 38522 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 94210. April 26, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO MACAPAS, TRANQUILINO
O. CALO, JR. and BELARMINO ALLOCOD, accused.
TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR. and BELARMINO ALLOCOD, accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH OF ACCUSED.
- During the pendency of his appeal, Calo died of myocardial infraction secondary to
coronary insufficiency at the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, per
the certificate of postmortem examination issued by the National Bureau of
Investigation. Pursuant to the ruling in People vs. Bayotas, the instant appeal should thus
be confined only to Allocods case.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; NOT MET IN
CASE AT BAR WHERE NOT ONE OF THE WITNESSES WAS NOT ABLE TO
IDENTIFY THE DRIVER OF THE GET-AWAY CAR. - Appellant Allocod evidently was
linked to the commission of the crime for being then the driver of Calo. The only evidence
that could provide some indication on his possible involvement in the story of the
prosecution would be a portion of the testimony of Dr. Obeita, as well as that of Maj.
Brillantes, in connection with the declaration of Dr. Obeita. Regrettably, not one of the
witnesses was able to definitively identify the driver of the get-away car. In fact, according
to Maj. De los Santos, appellant Allocod was apprehended only because he came back
to the capitol grounds. The review of this case yielded the distressing fact that both the
prosecution and defense vigorously focused the evidence and argument on the culpability
of Calo. As a result, as regards appellant Allocod, the indispensable requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt to convict an accused had all but been missed in the

process. Appellant Belarmino Allocod is acquitted for the failure of the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Right after giving his testimony as the complainant-victim in a frustrated murder case,
[1] Mariano Corvera, Sr., a former mayor of Nasipit in Agusan del Norte, was gunned down in
cold blood by Pablo Macapas, the accused, inside the courtroom of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch II, in Butuan City, then being presided over by Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos.
In due time,[2] a new charge for murder was filed against Macapas, along with his
counsel, then Mayor Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., and the latters driver, Belarmino Allocod, in an
information (docketed Criminal Case No. 3464) that read:
That on or about morning of March 10, 1988 at Capitol Building, Butuan City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating together, and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shot one Mariano Corvera, Sr., with the use of a handgun, hitting the latter on the different
parts of the body resulting to his death.
That the commission of the crime is attended with the following aggravating circumstances,
viz.:
1. That it was committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities; and
2. That it was committed in a place where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of
their duties.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code)[3]
On 08 December 1988, Executive Judge Dabalos ordered the raffle of the case and the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, without bail, against Macapas. At the same time, a bail of
P50,000.00[4] was fixed for each of Calo and Allocod.
Corveras son, Mariano Corvera, Jr., assailed before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP
No. 16383) the legality of the grant of bail to Calo and Allocod. On 31 January 1989, the Court
of Appeals[5] set aside the questioned order and directed the court a quo to resolve the
matter only after conducting the requisite hearing to determine whether or not the evidence of
guilt was strong.[6]
On 08 February 1989, Executive Judge Dabalos indorsed the case to Judge Jose Adao of
Branch 1 of the same court,[7] stating that he had therefore requested authority from this
Court for his inhibition on account of a previous lawyer-client relationship with one of the
accused. The following day, Judge Adao, noting that accused Calo and Allocod had
voluntarily surrendered themselves, placed the accused in the custody of the Provincial
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary at the detention center in Camp Rafael
Rodriguez, Libertad, Butuan City.[8]
On 24 February 1989, Judge Adao, after hearing, fixed bail in the amounts of
P100,000.00 and P60,000.00 for the provisional liberty, respectively, of Calo and Allocod.
[9] This Court, however, upon petition of the prosecution in G.R. No. 87194, issued, on 15
March 1989, an order temporarily restraining the lower court from enforcing its order of 24
February 1989 while the case was pending disposition by the Court of Appeals to which the
matter was referred.[10]Judge Adao thus directed the recommitment of Calo and Allocod at
Camp Rodriquez.[11]
On 16 May 1989, the Court of Appeals[12] ultimately dismissed the petition (CA-G.R. SP

No. 17142) on the basis of its finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
granting bail to Calo and Allocod.[13] The prosecution and private complainant Mariano
Corvera, Jr., thereupon elevated the case to this Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No.
88531). On 06 July 1989, the Court ordered the cancellation of the bail in favor of Calo and
Allocod and temporarily restrained the Court of Appeals from enforcing its resolution of 16
May 1989.[14] On 18 June 1990, through a resolution penned by Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin,
the Court granted the petition, set aside the 16th May 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals
and made permanent the temporary restraining order it had previously issued.[15]
In the meanwhile, acting on the request of Executive Judge Dabalos in Administrative
Matter No. 88-12-3478-RTC for the assignment of Criminal Case No. 3464 to another court,
this Court, on 02 February 1989, issued a resolution requiring Judge Zenaida P. Placer to
take over the case, The prosecution and complainant Mariano Corvera, Jr., however, later
moved for her inhibition on the ground that Calo was the lawyer of Judge Placers
family. Judge Placer denied the motion on the strength of her having been designated by this
Court.
Once again, the prosecution and Mariano Corvera, Jr., sought this Courts intervention
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 87932). The Solicitor General prayed
for the dismissal of the petition, stating that his Office had not authorized anyone to institute
it. On 20 July 1989, the Court held that Mariano Corvera, Jr., being the offended party, had
sufficient personality and interest to file the special civil action. On the merits of the case, the
Court ruled that, considering her past professional relationship with one of the accused and
the fact that the case was rather controversial in nature, Judge Placer should be disqualified
from hearing it. In her stead, the Court designated Judge Alfredo Lagamon of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City to try the case.[16]
Finally, on 31 March 1989, Calo and Allocod were arraigned; both pleaded not guilty to
the charge.[17]
The prosecution gave the following narration of its case.
Mariano Corvera, Sr., the town Mayor of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, used to be the vicepresident and manager of the Nasipit Integrated Arrastre Stevedoring Services, Inc.,
(NIASSI). He was replaced on 13 June 1986 by Benjamin Jaramillo, who, like Corvera, was
a stockholder of the corporation.
Corvera questioned the election of the corporate officers before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) which thereupon issued a restraining order. Atty. Tranquilino
Calo, Jr., another stockholder, received the order. Calo told Jaramillo that there was no need
to be concerned about Corveras complaint with the SEC. Later, during the conversation, Calo
was heard to have remarked, Ah, mas maayo pa tingale atong liquidahon si Anoy [Mariano
Corvera] kay samokan (Ah, it is better to liquidate Anoy because he is troublesome).[18]
On 20 November 1986, which was Jaramillos birthday and the 11th anniversary of the
founding of NIASSI, the late Mayor Pedrito Carmona of Nasipit and Calo met at Jaramillos
office. Once again, Calo threatened to liquidate Corvera.[19]
On 06 March 1988, Jaramillo received an injunction order, dated 29 February 1988, from
the SEC. The following day, 07 March 1988, Jaramillo went to NIASSI to re-assume his
position. In the afternoon, Corvera, together with Engr. Berido, Tiburcio Guno and Col.
Esparagoza (retired), went to Jaramillo s office to congratulate him. All were taken aback
when Calo, with his bodyguards, among them Macapas and Ignacio Albarrigo, banged the
door, barged in and shouted at everyone else to get out of the room. Calo pointed his finger
at Corvera and shouted, I will see you dead![20]
In the morning of 10 March 1988, during the scheduled trial in Criminal Case No. 2850,
Executive Judge Dabalos, Atty. Rosales, Corvera, Calo, court personnel Arturo Cinco and

Calixtro Berol, Fiscal Ambrosio Gallarde, and four or five spectators, including Dr. Nelson
Obeita, were in attendance. Stating that Corvera was booked for the ten oclock, a.m., flight
for Cebu, Atty. Rosales moved for the re-setting of the hearing. Calo, counsel for accused
Macapas, opposed the motion saying that he himself was scheduled to take the same flight
that morning.[21] At about 9:30 a.m., Corvera took the witness stand. Atty. Rosales noticed
that while Calo was conducting the cross-examination, he appeared agitated and tense, so
much unlike his usual calm way in court.[22]
At about ten oclock, the parties finally agreed to the resetting of the hearing to 22 April
1988. As soon as the judge banged his gavel to adjourn the proceedings, Calo stood up and
walked towards the eastern door. Macapas left ahead of Calo but Calo overtook
Macapas. Atty. Rosales himself was about to leave when he saw Macapas return to the
courtroom holding a revolver and walking in calmly. Then, all of a sudden, he pointed the gun
at Corvera. Visibly shaken, Corvera tried to open the western door of the room but it would
not budge. Unable to exit, Corvera raised his hands, saying Ayaw, ayaw, ayaw[23] (Dont,
dont, dont). Corvera tripped while retreating. He hastily stood up and grabbed a chair to
shield himself, still pleading Ayaw, ayaw.[24] Unmoved, Macapas took aim and pressed the
trigger. Corvera fell, his hands and feet shaking. Macapas drew closer to Corvera and fired
again at his victim. Macapas then turned away as calmly as when he entered the room.
Atty. Rosales tried to lift Corvera but found him too heavy. Soon four or five other persons
came in to help, and they brought Corvera down the building and from there to the
hospital. Fiscal Gallarde surfaced from under the lawyers table, pale and scared.[25]
Fernando Casinao was with the group of Corvera that morning. With them were Raul
Abao, Pacifico Larbonita and driver Oligario Barcelona. Corvera, Abao and Larbonita entered
the courtroom while Casinao remained at the lobby near the eastern door.[26]
Shortly before ten oclock, Casinao saw security men of Calo in the vicinity of the western
door.[27] He later saw Calo leave the courtroom through the eastern door. A woman who had
ascended the eastern stairs conversed with Calo for a few seconds. After the woman had
left, Macapas walked towards Calo. Calo handed over a revolver to Macapas. After receiving
the firearm, Macapas went back to the courtroom. At that moment, Calos security guards
were near the stairs while Larbonita was about a foot away to the left of Casinao.[28]
Casinao tried to follow Macapas but a person who was standing by the door pushed
Casinao back sending him to the railing. Abruptly, there was a burst of gunfire, followed by
two more gunshots. Casinao dashed in to the courtroom and, on the way, bumped on
Macapas at the eastern door. Casinao saw Corvera lying flat on his back near the western
door with his feet towards the podium. Seeing that Corvera was still alive and Atty. Rosales
unsuccessfully trying to lift him up, Casinao rushed downstairs and summoned for help to get
Corvera fast to the Santos Hospital.[29]
Pacifico Larbonita, a 63-year-old alalay of Corvera, left the courtroom at around ten
oclock that morning. He went near the eastern door, squatted a meter away from the door,
and smoked. When Calo left the courtroom, Larbonita stood up. Calo remained around two
feet away from the eastern door. A lady approached Calo and conversed with him for around
five seconds. Just as the lady was departing, Macapas came out of the courtroom and Calo
handed a gun over to him. Larbonita was unable to see where Calo got the gun. [30] Macapas
went back to the courtroom. Moments later, Larbonita heard a gunshot; then two more
gunshots rang out.[31]
Dr. Nelson Obeita, a physician of the Nasipit Lumber Company, was in the courtroom to
attend the hearing.[32] After the court had adjourned, Dr. Obeita promptly signed the
certificate of attendance and exited through the gallery entrance. Outside the courtroom, he
saw Casinao. Dr. Obeita went down the capitol building through the main entrance. He was

in the garden barely twenty meters away when he heard gunshots. He turned to look back;
moments later, he saw a man rushing down the stairs of the capitol building. The man
proceeded to a vehicle parked by the side of the provincial treasurers office. Dr. Obeita
recognized the man to be Macapas. Macapas boarded the vehicle, taking the seat to the
right of the driver.[33]
Maj. Rolando T. Brillantes, then assistant provincial commander for operations of the PCINP in Agusan del Norte, was in the office of the provincial governor at between 9:00 and
9:30, a.m., of 10 March 1989, to discuss with the governor the laborers strike in Nasipit. A
commotion outside the building was heard. Then, someone shouted that Mayor Corvera had
been shot. Maj. Brillantes went out to the balcony where he saw the car of Mayor Calo (was)
speeding away.[34]
Maj. Evacueto de los Santos, the deputy station commander and operations officer of the
Butuan Police Station, learned of the shooting incident from the radio operator. Immediately,
he boarded the police car and proceeded to the capitol building with some of his men. There,
he was met by PC Major Rolando Brillantes and PC Captain Godofredo de los Santos. While
Major de los Santos was being briefed by the two PC officers, the armored car of Calo
returned to the capitol grounds. Maj. De los Santos directed his men to apprehend the driver
and to bring him to the police station. At the police station, the driver, Allocod, denied
involvement in the incident.[35]
Sixty seven-year old Corvera sustained three gunshot wounds - one on the right arm
which hit and fractured the scapula with the bullet lodged at the trapereus muscle of the back;
another on the chest which pierced the skin, costal muscle, blood vessels and right lobe of
the lung with the bullet lodged at the sorratus anterior muscle, and the third on the abdomen
below the umbilicus piercing the abdominal muscle, the small intestines and the abdominal
aorta, subclavia vein, with the bullet lodged at the tissue above the latissimus dorsi muscle.
[36] Dr. Elsie Caballero concluded that Corvera died of shock, internal hemorrhage, (and)
multiple gunshot wound(s).[37]
Police authorities were never able to apprehend Macapas.
In his defense, Calo pictured himself to be incapable of the dastardly act.[38] Although he
was removed as a municipal judge for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law,
[39] he, nevertheless, remained to be a respected practicing lawyer.[40] He was an
undefeated candidate for mayoralty in Carmen, Agusan del Norte, and for a time headed the
mayors league of the province. He denied having given a gun to Macapas[41] or as having
had him as a bodyguard.[42]
On 16 March 1990, the trial court promulgated the herein questioned decision disposing
of the case, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR. and BELARMINO
ALLOCOD guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery and with the generic aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, and hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
On the civil liability, the two accused are hereby jointly and severally sentenced to pay to the
heirs of the late Mariano Corvera, Sr. the following:
a) P30,000.00 as death compensation;
b) P20,000.00 as reimbursement of burial expenses;
c) P100,000.00 as reimbursement of litigation expenses and attorneys fee;
d) P800,000.00 representing unrealized net income for eight (8) years;
e) P500,000.00 by way of moral damages; and
f) P 100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[43]
When their motion for the reconsideration[44] of the decision was denied,[45] Calo and
Allocod, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal to this Court.[46]
During the pendency of his appeal, Calo died of myocardial infraction secondary to
coronary insufficiency at the New Bilid Prisons Hospital in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, per the
certificate of postmortem examination issued by the National Bureau of Investigation.
[47] Pursuant to the ruling in Peoplevs. Bayotas,[48] the instant appeal should thus be
confined only to Allocods case.
Appellant Allocod evidently was linked to the commission of the crime for being then the
driver of Calo. The only evidence that could provide some indication on his possible
involvement in the story of the prosecution would be a portion of the testimony of Dr. Obeita,
as well as that of Maj. Brillantes, in connection with the declaration of Dr. Obeita. Dr. Obeita
testified:
Q. What did you do?
A. When I heard two shots, I turned my back and tried to observe what would
happen next. Later on I saw a man coming down from the stairs of the capitol, he
reached the capitol grounds, he made a few glances, left and right and
proceeded to the parked vehicle on that side of the capitol, that side of the
provincial treasurers office.
Q. You said you saw that person, who was that person?
A. Macapas.
Q. You said he went to that vehicle which was parked on that right side, what
happened after he went to that vehicle?
A. He went to the vehicle and boarded the vehicle on the right side of the driver. He
took a seat and made a motion to hide in the vehicle and they left.
Q. Who is the owner of that vehicle which was parked and which was boarded by
Pablo Macapas?
A. I presume it was owned by Atty. Calo since I often saw that vehicle being used
by Atty. Calo.[49]
For his part, Maj. Brillantes stated:
Q. When you went out to the balcony of the Provincial Governors Office, what did
you see?
A. When I went out I saw the car of Mayor Calo speeding away.
Q. To what direction?
A. Towards the highway. From the Capitol towards the direction of the DBP.
Q. And what did you do after you saw the vehicle of Atty. Calo speeding towards the
DBP?
A. I called the attention of the Central Police Station.
Q. What made you call the attention of the Central Police Station?
A. I called the Central Police Station from my hand set radio, because I saw that the
car was running very fast. It was very unusual and very suspicious. So, what was
on my mind was that it might be that the car was used by the assailant.
Q. Were you able to contact the Central Police Station?
A. Yes, sir, I was able to contact Major Evacueto delos Santos and I told him to
please intercept the car of Mayor Calo which left the Capitol Building just a few
minutes, and Major delos Santos reacted to my request.
Q. What happened after that?
A. He was able to apprehend the driver. Right then and there, he brought the driver
to the police station.

Q. What was the name of the driver?

A. I do not know the name of the driver.[50]
What might have been expected to be the clincher had come from Maj. De los Santos
who testified:
Q. Then, what did you do after being informed that ex-mayor Corvera was shot?
A. While I was informed, the armored car of Mayor Tranquilino Calo came back to
the Capitol ground.
Q. When that armored car of Atty. Tranquilino Calo came back to the Capitol ground,
what happened?
A. I was directed by Major Brillantes to apprehend the driver of the car because
they saw that that was the gate away vehicle used by the assailant.
Q. In effect did you carry out the order of this officer?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What did you do next?
A. I ordered my men to bring the car and the driver of Mayor Calo to the police
station for proper investigation.
xxx
xxx
xxx.
Q. When you went back to the police station, what did you do there, if any?
A. I looked for Allocod, the driver of the armored car of Mayor Calo.
Q. In effect did you meet Allocod there?
A. Yes, Sir, and I even asked him some questions but he denied everything.[51]
Regrettably, not one of the witnesses was able to definitively identify the driver of the getaway car. In fact, according to Maj. De los Santos, appellant Allocod was apprehended only
because he came back to the capitol grounds.
The review of this case yielded the distressing fact that both the prosecution and defense
vigorously focused the evidence and argument on the culpability of Calo. As a result, as
regards appellant Allocod, the indispensable requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt to
convict an accused had all but been missed in the process.
WHEREFORE, the case against Tranquilino T. Calo, Jr., now deceased, is hereby
dismissed. Appellant Belarmino Allocod is acquitted for the failure of the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-42010 August 31, 1976
ODELON RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, Judge, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte Branch IV,
and MARIANO NALUPTA, SR., respondents.
Castor Raval for petitioner.
Bonifacio G. Agdigos for private respondent.
ANTONIO, J.:
This petition for certiorari challenges the validity of an amendment of a judgment of conviction
after the accused had manifested in writing to the trial court the withdrawal of his appeal, with
prayer for the execution of the judgment. The antecedent facts are as follows:
On September 21, 1972, petitioner Odelon Ramos was charged with the crime of Damage to
Property with Multiple Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence before Branch IV of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, with respondent Judge presiding. 1
On October 3, 1975, after trial, a decision was rendered in said criminal case, convicting

petitioner of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Odelon Ramos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Damages with Multiple Slight Physical injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence as defined and penalized in Art. 365. par. 3, and Art. 266, par. 2, Rev.
Penal Code, in relation to Art. 26 & 48, having also in mind Art. 66 and 75 of the same code,
sentencing him to double the amount of P7,425.95 or a total of P14,851.95; to pay P2,000.00
as moral damages and finally, to pay the statutory costs. 2
The afore-mentioned decision was promulgated on October 20, 1915. After the reading
thereof, the through counsel, manifested in open court his intention to appeal and prayed, at
the same time, that the bail bond for his provisional liberty be fixed, which the court a
quo thereupon set at P16,500.00.
On the following day, October 21, 1975, petitioner filed a written manifestation "withdrawing
his intention to appeal the decision" and praying that the decision be executed. 3 This was
granted by Order of the court on the same date, thus: "Finding the manifestation reasonable,
the notice of appeal is hereby withdrawn and let the decision as Promulgated be executed." 4
Two (2) days after the withdrawal of the appeal, or on October 23, 1975, the trial Fiscal filed a
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, with a prayer that the dispositive portion
thereof be amended to read as follows;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Odelon Ramos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Damages with Multiple Slight Physical Injuries as
defined and penalized in Art. 365, par. 3, and Art. 266, par. 2, Rev. Penal Code, in relation to
Art. 26 and 48, having also in mind Art. 66 and 75 of the same code, sentencing him to a 'fine'
of double the amount of P7,425.95 or a total of P14,851.95; 'to pay Mariano Nalupta Sr., the
said amount of P14,861.95 as damages and to suffer a subsidiary personal imprisonment of
not more than six (6) months in case of insolvency (Art. 39, par. 2, R.P.C.), to pay P2,000.00
as moral damages, and finally, to pay the statutory costs.
On October 21, 1975, respondent court, asserting its power to amend and control its
processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice before the judgment
becomes final and executory, granted the motion for reconsideration, notwithstanding
opposition thereto filed by herein petitioner, and the amendment of the dispositive portion
sought by the trial Fiscal was accordingly adopted by the court.
A motion for reconsideration of the above Order seasonably filed by petitioner on November
5, 1975 was denied by respondent court "for want of merit" on November 19, 1975. Hence the
instance petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
We grant the certiorari.
The applicable provision is section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 7. Modification of judgement. A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside
by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been
perfected. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for,
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totality satisfied or served
or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. (Emphasis supplied).
It is manifest from the foregoing that, before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the trial
court has "plenary power to make, either on motion of one of the parties, or motu propio, such
amendments or alterations as it may deem best, within the frame of law, to promote the ends
of Justice. 5 Thereafter, upon its finality, the trial court is divested of all authority to amend or
alter the aforesaid judgment, except to correct clerical errors. 6
In the case at bar, it is clear that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-IV became final and
executory upon the filing of the written manifestation by the accused, withdrawing his appeal,
with prayer that the judgment in said case be executed, coupled with the approval by the

court of such withdrawal. The full import of the prayer for the execution of the judgment,
together with the clear and express withdrawal of "his intention to appeal the decision"
demonstrates the conformity of the accused to the sentence of conviction within the
intendment of the aforequoted section 7 of the Rules and, therefore, after its approval by the
Court, should have the legal effect of rendering the decision final. As we declared in a
previous case, the waives of the right to appeal by the defendant, after he has been notified of
the judgment of conviction, accompanied by a voluntary petition to be immediately committed
to prison, and the order of the court accepting such waiver and ordering defendant's
confinement therein, bring the trial court's jurisdiction to an end, and the Supreme Court
cannot order said judge, by mandamus, to reinstate defendant's right to appeal. 7
The reliance placed by respondent court upon Rule 122, section 12, appears to be inapposite
Respondent court loses sight of the fact that a judgment of conviction may become final in a
number of ways. Thus, a judgment becomes final in any of the following instances: (1) when
the period for perfecting an appeal has lapsed or (2) when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served; or (3) when the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right
to appeal. Upon the other hand, section 12 of Rule 122 expressly covers a case where,
notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the court may allow the appellant to withdraw his
appeal, provided the records of the case have not yet been transmitted to the appellate court,
in which case, upon the grant of such withdrawal, the judgment shall become final. If the
records have already been forwarded to the appellate court, only the latter court may, of
course, act on the motion for withdrawal of appeal.
Contrary to the position taken by respondents, it is not necessary for the accused to go
through the whole process of perfecting an appeal before he may expressly waive in writing
his right to appeal. As stated in People v. Rodillas,8 the judgment of conviction in a criminal
case may become final even before the expiration of the period to appeal if the accused
demonstrates his conformity in a clear and express manner to the sentence by renouncing or
waiving in writing his right to appeal therefrom.
In the case at bar, the judgment had already become final, prior to the Order of October 21,
1975. It was, therefore, beyond the authority of the trial court to amend the penalty imposed in
the aforesaid judgment.
There is no question that an accused cannot be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency to pay the fine imposed upon him when the subsidiary imprisonment is not
imposed in the judgment of conviction. 9Consequently, the inclusion in the amended decision
of the penalty imposed which cannot, after the decision has become final, be made by the trial
court. It should be noted that under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 5465, no subsidiary penalty is imposed for non-payment of (1) the reparation
of the damage caused; (2) indemnification of the consequential damages; and (3) the costs of
the proceedings.
From the conclusion that the decision in question has become final as to its criminal aspect
because the accused had waived his right to appeal on October 21, 1975, it does not
necessarily follow that the trial court, on October 21, 1975, could not order the defendant to
indemnify the offended party. Civil liability is not part of the penalty for the crime
committed. 10 It has been said that as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of
injuries the first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be
repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal
injury caused to the victim of the crime, which injury is sought to be compensated thru
indemnity, which is civil in nature. 11
Thus, it has been held that before the expiration of the fifteen-day period provided for appeal,
the trial court can order the defendant to indemnify the offended party, notwithstanding that

the judgment has become final because the accused has commenced the service of his
sentence. In explaining why the trial court did not lose jurisdiction over the civil phase of the
case, this Court, in People v. Rodriguez, 12 said:
In People vs. Ursua, 60 Phil., 252, where the defendant was found guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence and the trial court, upon motion of the prosecution, refused to enter
judgment with respect to the civil liability of the defendant for the reason that the appeal taken
by him divested the trial court of jurisdiction to pass upon the question of indemnity to the
heirs of deceased, we held:
The trial court's resolution that, because the cause had been appealed by the accused it had
lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution
nine days after the date of the judgment, is unfounded.
The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for
purposes of the civil liability of the accused (section 101, General Orders No. 58), necessarily
implies that such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the to his defense. If the
has the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the offended party
should have the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment as is
prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be made dependent on that of the accused. If
upon appeal by the accused the court altogether losses its jurisdiction over the cause, the
offended party would be deprived of his right to appeal, although fifteen days have not yet
elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the accused files his will before the expiration of said
period. Therefore, if the independently of the appeal of the accused, has jurisdiction within
fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to allow the appeal of the offended party, it also
has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in
connection with the civil liability of the accused. (Pp. 2W255.)
and reminded the can to the lower court for determination of the civil liability.
As the trial court did not lose jurisdiction over the civil phase of the case even if the defendant
had commenced the service of his sentence, no error was committed by it in ordering him to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P1,000.00 before the expiration of the 15-day
period provided for appeal. (p. 351).
We observe that the court a quo was inaccurate in the imposition of the penalty. It imposed
only a fine of double the amount of the damage to property, the multiple slight physical injuries
likewise resulting from the negligent Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to 6,
No. 1, should likewise have been imposed. 13 Article 365, paragraph 1 provides that if the
reckless imprudence resulted in an act which, had it been intentional, would have constituted
a light felony, the penalty of arrests in its maximum period shall be imposed. 13 On the other
hand, No. 1 of paragraph 6 thereof provides that if the penalty provided for the offense is
equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of the article, the penalty
next lower in degree shall be imposed, in the proper period. Article 266 penalizes the offense
of slight physical injuries with arresto menor (sub-par. 1), or arresto menor to or fine (subpars. 2 and 3), depending upon the kind thereof. If the multiple slight physical injuries which
resulted from the accused's negligent act fall within that class punishable by arrests menor,
the penalty next lower in degree, or fine, should therefore have been imposed. As the
judgment in the criminal aspect is final, such an additional penalty can no longer be imposed.
It is likewise noted that, contrary to the holding of respondent court, Article 48, which deals
with complex crime where one or both of the two crimes resulting from the single act is a light
felony. 14
With respect to the damages to be paid to the offended party, the latter is only entitled to the
actual or compensatory damages proven at the trial. It appears that the respondent court
should not have doubled the amount of damages because the value of the damages

sustained is limited to the amount of P7,425.90. As the amount is now questioned by

petitioner (Annex "F"), We hereby order its reduction to the actual amount of the damage, or
P7,425.90.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The respondent Judge is hereby directed to
issue an Order, modifying its questioned Order of October 27, 1975, in accordance with the
observation of this Court as herein above indicated. Costs against private respondent.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
August 1, 1934
G.R. No. 40198
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENEDICTO URSUA, defendant-appellant.
Villafuerte, Tible and Valer for appellant.
Ocampo & Cea and Rosendo R. Luntok for the offended party as appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, an information was filed against Benedicto
Ursua, charging him with the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. In the course of
the trial, in which the private prosecution intervened, and after the evidence had been taken,
the trial court found the following facts to be proven.
On November 17, 1934, in the municipality of Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, the
accused, who was acting as municipal president, ordered the policemen Alejandro Quiro to
ask the municipal president for the latter's revolver. When Alejandro Quiro delivered the
revolver to the accused, the latter, noticing that it was not loaded, requested the chief of police
to load it. The chief of police loaded it with four cartridges and delivered it to the accused, with
the cylinder in proper place and trigger locked. Shortly after the accused had taken the
revolver in his hands, a discharge was heard which hit Alejandro Quiro in the abdomen,
resulting in his death.
Upon these facts, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence, as charged in the information, and sentenced him to one year and one
day of prision correcional. The court, however, failed to enter judgment with respect to the civil
liability of the accused in favor of the heirs of the deceased.
The judgment of the trial court was rendered on July 8, 1933, and the accused was noticed
thereof on July 13th, on which date accused filed notice of appeal. On the 18th of the same
month, the private prosecution filed with the court a motion for reconsideration of its judgment
on the ground that it failed to make any finding relative to the civil liability of the accused and
to sentence him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The trial court, believing that,
because the accused had been appealed by the accused and said appeal had been allowed,
it had already lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of the private prosecution, denied
the said motion. The private prosecution excepted to this ruling and appealed therefrom.
In this instance, this court, in its resolution dated November 28, 1933, declared the appeal of
the accused abandoned. Therefore, the only question left to be decided is the appeal of the
private prosecution with regard to the civil liability of the accused.
The trial court's resolution that, because the cause had been appealed by the accused, it had
lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution
nine days after the date of the judgment, is unfounded.
The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for

purposes of the civil liability of the accused (section 107, General Orders, No. 58), necessarily
implies that such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his
defense. If the accused has the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of
conviction, the offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be made dependent
on that of the accused. If upon appeal by the accused the court altogether loses its jurisdiction
over the cause, the offended party would be deprived of his right to appeal, although fifteen
days have not yet elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the accused files his appeal
before the expiration of said period. Therefore, if the court, independently of the appeal of the
accused, has jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to allow the
appeal of the offended party, it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in connection with the civil liability of the
accused.
As to the rest, it was an error for the court not to have entered judgment with respect to the
civil liability of the accused (Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil., 344). Section 407 of General Orders,
No. 58 expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with respect to the
civil liability arising from the offense, if no reservation has been made to ventilate it in a
separate action.
Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for the
purpose of determining the civil liability of the accused (U. S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil., 600, 602.)
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-34666 October 30, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, MERCEDES L.
JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
ITONG AMISTAD respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether from a decision of acquittal,
the complainant in a criminal action for estafa, may appeal with respect to the civil aspect of
the case.
The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet, under an information which reads:
I N F O R MATI O N
The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal accuses ITONG AMISTAD of the crime of
Estafa penalized under Article 316 Paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about January 30, 1965, October 11, 1965, and December 23, 1965, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
(1) (January 30, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of
Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42,326 square meters of that parcel of land
described in
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 0-105
A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-203086-Amd., Civil Reservation Case No. 1, L.R.C. Civil
Reservation Record No. 211), situated in the Res. Sec. "J", City of Baguio. Bounded on the
NE., by property of Honor Kingdoms; on the SW., by Lot 2; on the W and NW., by Public land.
... containing an area of EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY THREE

(84,653) Square meters, more or less, ... in the names of spouses I tong Amistad and Luisa
Tengdan.
(2) (October 11, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of
Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42,326 square meters of the above-described parcel of land;
and
(3) (December 23, 1965) execute a supplemental deed of sale over the entire area covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 in favor of vendees Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an
which effected the issuance of two separate titles in favor of said vendees
knowing fully well and purposely withholding the information that on or about February 10,
1962, he had previously entered into an agreement with one MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to
convey to her an area of 10,000 square meters from the above-described parcel of land for
the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and had already received from her the
sum of FIVE THOUSAND ( P5,000.00) PESOS, thereby causing damage and prejudice to
said Mercedes L. Javellana in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency.
All contrary to law.
After trial, decision was rendered dated February 8, 1971, and promulgated on March 18,
1971 acquitting the accused, respondent herein, the Court holding that "the case of the
prosecution is civil in nature" and that "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt."
From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant, the petitioner herein, appealed to the Court
of Appeals insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Without awaiting the
completion of the transcript of the stenographic notes in the case, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal merely on the legal proposition that an appeal by the complainant from
a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.
The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1971, is set forth in full as follows:
This refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in
Criminal Case No. 4205, wherein the accused Itong Amistad who was prosecuted for the
crime of estafa paragraph 2, Article 316 R.P.C.), was acquitted. The decision was
promulgated on March 18, 1971 and on that same day, the complainant, through counsel,
filed a Notice of Appeal from said judgment, "insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned." Apparently the appeal was approved by the trial court, the records of the case
were elevated to this Court, and this Court required the completion of the same.
Now, while the right of the offended party to intervene in the criminal action (Section 15, Rule
110, Rules) as well as to appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is
recognized, the offended party however, cannot appeal if the accused is acquitted as matters
are (People vs. Herrera 74 Phil. 21). indeed, the trial court in acquitting the herein defendant
stated:
In the mind of the court, the case of the prosecution is civil in nature. In fact, the supervening
acts of the parties after the execution of Exhibit A until the execution of Exhibit D are clear and
unequivocal which ineluctably lead this court to believe that the guilt of the accused has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance would perforce require a new
determination of defendant's criminal liability. This cannot be done. Besides, the offended
party has the remedy of bringing a civil action independently of the criminal action.
Indeed, this question is not new. It has already been so ruled by the Supreme Court in several
cases (People vs. Flores, G.R. No. L-7523, December 18, 1957, citing People vs. Velez, 77
Phil. 1026; People vs. Benjamin Liggayu et al., No. 8224, October 31, 1955; People vs.

Joaquin Lipana 72 Phil. 166; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679 [decided under the new Rules
of Court]; Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575, 572).
Considering that the complainant is appealing from a judgment acquitting the accused in a
criminal case, her appeal should be disallowed.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed. The stenographers who were
required to submit their respective transcripts of stenographic notes in this case are hereby
excused therefrom. (pp. 6-7, Brief for the Respondent, p. 78, Rollo).
A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals was filed but was
denied on January 4, 1972. From both aforesaid Resolutions dismissing the appeal and the
order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner came to this Court on a petition
for certiorari with prayer that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and that
judgment be rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent insofar as the latter's
hability is concerned
(a) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such sum as this Court shall adjudge to rightfully
represent the value of the one hectare portion of the land involved agreed to be conveyed to
petitioner by respondent in accordance with the Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit
"A");
(b) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the expenses of litigation actually incurred by the
latter; and
(c) Ordering respondent to pay the costs of suit. (p.28, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset, is whether an appeal by the
complainant for estafa, may be allowed from a decision acquitting the accused of the crime
charged, only insofar as the latter's civil liability is concerned.
In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated, petitioner cites Section 2,
Rules 122 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Who may appeal.The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant
would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In all other cases either party may appeal from a
final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights
of the appellant. (p. 12, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
Additionally, she cites Section 3 of Rule 111, from which she quotes the following:
SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for
restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. (Rule 111, Rules
of Court in the Philippines.) (pp. 13-14, Id)
Finally, she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which reads:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. (p. 14, id).
From the aforequoted provisions, petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly

granted to her inasmuch as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, Criminal Case No. 4205 of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio and Benguet, there having been no reservation to file a separate civil action or a
waiver of the right to file one. She had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle, primarily
the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and
control of the prosecuting Fiscal. The private prosecutor presented evidence bearing on the
civil liability of the accused. In a memorandum he filed, he also discussed extensively the civil
liability of the accused, despite which, the trial court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to
the complainant.
It is this omission, as alleged by petitioner herein, that con constitutes the thrust of her first
assignment of error, the only one We feel called upon to rule on, among her three assigned
errors, the other two having relation to how the trial court evaluated the evidence, and the
extent of damages petitioner alleges to be entitled to under such evidence, which evidently
may not be passed upon in the instant proceedings, the evidence presented during the trial
not having been elevated to this Court, nor even to the Court of Appeals, at least not fully or
completely.
Confining ourselves, therefore, to the first assigned error, We find no ground to reverse the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the purely legal question of whether the petitioner, as
complainant in Criminal Case No. 4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet,
for estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting the accused, because the trial court failed
to declare the latter's civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly proven by the
evidence.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the
institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the
accused as the defendant therein, may file the appropriate responsive pleading, which may
be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the
accused is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is
required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the
criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the
offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the commission
thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability involved in the
civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved
or waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and as held
in People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense, such as from
law or contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as
expressly provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere
preponderance of evidence would warrant. Then, all the defenses available, such as
prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
complete with pre-trial after issues have been joined. Upon these considerations, it becomes
clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the rule against multiplicity of action may not
forcefully or convincingly be put forth.
In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have been cited which held that an
appeal from the dismissal of the criminal case on motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the
offended party (People vs. Lipana 72 Phil. 168; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679). In the
case of People vs. Herrera, et al., 74 Phil. 21, the accused was acquitted without the court
making any pronouncement as to his civil liability, in exactly the same manner that the Court

of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Criminal Case No. 4025, was charged with a
similar omission in the case at bar. The Supreme Court did not permit an appeal by the
offended party, the Court saying:
The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the charge and
did not make any pronouncement holding the defendant civilly liable put an end to the case,
not only by freeing the defendant from criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all liability
for damages arising from the alleged crime of malicious mischief. The offended parties not
having reserved their right to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal
covered both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107, section l (a) of the
new Rules of Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of First Instance, as intended
by the offended parties, would reopen the question of defendant's civil liability arising from the
alleged crime. And considering that such civil liability must be based on the criminal
responsibility of the defendant (art. 100, Revised Penal Code), any review or re-examination
of the question of civil liability would perforce require a new determination of defendant's
criminal liability. But another trial upon defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be held, in
view of his previous acquittal in the justice of the peace court. So the appeal from the decision
of the justice of the peace court is not authorized by law.
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought
simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from
the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall together. However, if the civil action is
reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a
separate civil action may be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of,
and not based on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then
be required.
The futility of petitioner's instant recourse becomes all too evident upon consideration of the
principles enunciated, particularly in the Herrera case, since if the civil liability recoverable in a
criminal action is one arising from the crime charged, no longer may the respondent be found
criminally liable upon a review of the evidence, after the verdict of acquittal has been handed
down by the trial court. Again, petitioner tries to show that the cases cited by the Court of
Appeals are not in point. But she has not cited one single case faintly supporting her position
as she has tried to maintain in the instant case.
Nevertheless, petitioner may not complaint, as she does of being denied due process for
disallowing her appeal. She can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could
come under the category of quasi-delict or one arising from law, contract or any other known
source of civil liability, but certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had
already been acquitted. It is but fair to require petitioner to take this course of action, not only
because she would have to pay for the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the
relief she seeks from respondent, from which she is spared in the prosecution of a criminal
case, but also for the respondent or defendant to avail of all defenses and remedies as are
open to him in a separate civil action not otherwise available in a criminal action that carries
with it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover civil liability arising
from the crime charged.
For all the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is affirmed, and the instant petition is,
accordingly, dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the
trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion
on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO
BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO
alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the
crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of
Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito
Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido,
Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and
Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting
without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means
of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall
located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and
destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and
carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or
compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy
Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen,
except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that
it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE
(5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and
another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac,
Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega,
are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in
the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended
that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to

the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and
the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated
that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall was a
violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two
(72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison
terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also
challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory
damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the
suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly
and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The
Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was
committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their
hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on record
established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual damages is
correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES
TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED
FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED,
THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN
JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS
COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS,
DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN
DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED
DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY
OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,
APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a
reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after
acquitting them from the criminal charge.

Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal
action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was
acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability
arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the
effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not
be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery
of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila
Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil.
623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116
Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not
commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over the forcible
opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting
away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed
against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious
mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these
offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under
which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious
mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by means of threats', it does not
allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature
of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages
suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R.
1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might
arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists,
and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants
have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is
deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v.
Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively
to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77
SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v.

Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can
create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from
the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced
against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types
of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence,
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for
restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the
civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
(PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil
in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby
incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does
not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not
constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the
criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the
Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the
fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred by such
a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration
would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal
case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the

commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in

the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper
accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor
intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v.
Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption
of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense
counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with
all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both
the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions
contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara
had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store
or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time
taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it
cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the
demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the
whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall
have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied
with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his
police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall
of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods
and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for
safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value
of
furniture
and
equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras
and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they
considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The
couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to
lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which
could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the

complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the
petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to
the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods
found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under the custody of
the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that
"when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law
calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the
interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify a
conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable
doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this question would be
consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and win (a)
dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-delict or other
independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party
unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage
of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or
other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil
Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based
on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore, may
not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action upon
acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise
render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and would
violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no
pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages
against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize
the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on
reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a
separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine
Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant
damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly
and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted
in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for
the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy
can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is
no statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal

and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by
side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however,
extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability
might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision
which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a
condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the
legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved
party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and
exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation
of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or
more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a
separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand
to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects
of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not
exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate,
and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a
separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-47994-97. September 24, 1986.]
LIDELIA MAXIMO, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JUDGE NICOLAS GEROCHI, JR., Judge of
the Circuit Criminal Court, 12th Judicial District, Bacolod City and CONCHITA
PANGHILASON, Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED IN THE DENIAL
ACTION DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT EXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
ACTS COMPLAINED OF. If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no
civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment. The
prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
(129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order
payment of civil damages already proved in the same case without need for a separate civil
action. This ruling was reiterated in the case of People v. Jalandoni (131 SCRA 454) where
the
accused
formally
admitted
the
amount
of
civil
damages.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The rationale behind the rule is stated in the Padilla case as
follows: "There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of
innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense
counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with
all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner Lidelia Maximo to compel
the public respondent Judge Nicolas Gerochi, Jr. to include in his judgment of acquittal in
Criminal Case Nos. CCC-XII-1067, 1073, 1074 and 1129, the civil liability which the private
respondent
Conchita
Panghilason
admitted
in
court.
On June 28, 1976, the City Fiscal of Bacolod filed with the Circuit Criminal Court, 12th Judicial
District, Bacolod City, four (4) informations for estafa against respondent Conchita
Panghilason. The informations alleged that Panghilason willfully issued four (4) checks
amounting to P35,586.00 drawn against the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in
favor of the petitioner; that the checks were dishonored for lack of funds or that her account
with said bank had been closed; and that she refused to make the necessary deposit within
three
(3)
days
from
receipt
of
notice
to
redeem
the
said
checks.
The petitioner intervened in the case through her private prosecutor on July 10, 1976.
On
December
5,
1977,
judgment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

the

respondent

judge

rendered

the

following

"Verily, for all said, the Court strongly believes that in the case at bar, the prosecution, to say
the least, failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. That, herein, it

appears that if accused had any obligation, it is simply civil in nature that could be properly
ventilated
within
the
context
of
civil
law.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and considering that the prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of accused Conchita Panghilason beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court
finds accused Conchita Panghilason NOT GUILTY of all the above-entitled four (4) criminal
information and ACQUITS her therefrom, with costs de oficio."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying "that the portion of the decision
regarding the civil liability of the accused be reconsidered and thereafter the accused who
had admitted her civil liability be ordered to pay the sum of P33,586.00 plus 12% interest from
the
filing
of
the
information." chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
This motion was denied by the court in an order dated February 20, 1978. The order stated
that the award of civil liability "would not have been a problem if the accused was convicted,
for then, this recovery of civil liability is deemed included in the offense proved, but the
question is not indubitable because the accused was acquitted in all the four (4) informations
she
was
charged
of."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The
The

petitioner,

therefore,

came

lower

to

this
court

Court

with

the

present

is

petition.
wrong.

If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the
acts
complained
of
may
be
awarded
in
the
same
judgment.
The prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v. Court of
Appeals (129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and
still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case without need for a
separate civil action. This ruling was reiterated in the case of People v. Jalandoni (131 SCRA
454) where the accused formally admitted the amount of civil damages.
The rationale behind the rule is stated in the Padilla case as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
There appears to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the
criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charge. The constitutional presumption of
innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense
counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with
all its attendant less of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The

aforementioned

case

further

declared

that:chanrob1es

virtual

1aw

library

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or

more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a
separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand
to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects
of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not
exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate,
and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a
separate
civil
action
to
be
filed.
The evidence taken in this case is summarized by the lower court as follows:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
Prosecution evidence tends to show that on January 31, 1976, Accused purchased rice from
Mrs. Maximo and paid her the amount of P11,775.00 in a form of a check which she accepted
after the accused assured her that the check was covered by sufficient funds which check
when presented encashment to the bank was dishonored for reason of "account closed."
Exhibit "A", PCIB Check No. 161478; Exhibit "A-1", signature of accused; Exhibit "B", the
return slip; Exhibit "B-1," remark "account closed;" all for Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1129;
That on February 1, 1976, Accused again purchased rice from her in the amount of
P7,000.00, and in payment for which accused issued a check dated the same day, February
1, 1976, which she accepted after the accused assured her that it was supported by sufficient
funds hence accused again was able to secure the rice in the amount of P7,000.00; that she
(accused) issued PCIB Check No. 165511, Exhibit "A" in CCC-XII-1073; that when the check
was deposited by a certain Enrique Oh to whom she indorsed the check, the same was also
dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A" the check; Exhibit "A-1," the signature
of the accused; Exhibit "B," the return slip; and Exhibit "B-1," remark "account closed;" all for
Crim.
Case
No.
CCC-XII-1073;
That on February 6, 1976, Accused again bought rice from her in the amount of P11,500.00,
and in payment of which was made in check dated the same day February 6, 1976, PCIB
Check No. 161479, which she accepted after the accused assured her that the same was
likewise supported by sufficient funds, hence, again on February 6, 1976,Accused was able to
secure rice from her in the amount of P11,500.00; that the said check when deposit (sic) by
Mr. Oh to whom she indorsed it, it was similarly dishonored for reason of "account closed,"
Exhibit "A," the check: Exhibit "A-1," the signature of the accused; Exhibit "B," the return slip;
and Exhibit "B-1," reason for return, "account closed;" all for Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1074;
Again on February 7, 1976, Accused purchased rice from her in the amount of P5,300.00 and
with the same assurance given her as the previous checks, she accepted a check which
when deposited by Mr. Oh to whom she indorsed the same, the same was dishonored for
reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A" PCIB Check No. 161490; Exhibit "A-1," signature of
accused; Exhibit "B," return ship; and Exhibit "B-1," reason of return, "closed account." All for
Crim.
Case
No.
CCC-XII-1067;
That all these sale transactions of rice occurred at the Capitol Shopping Center, Bacolod City,
and that all these checks were signed in the presence of complainant Mrs. Maximo; that
accused, despite repeated demands failed to settle the matter with her hence she was
compelled to bring the matter to the Court, and, in the process, retain the services of counsel
to which she covenanted to pay as attorneys fee for P3,000.00; that the actual total damage

incurred by Mrs. Maximo as a result of the dishonor of the checks in question summed up to
P35,500.00; that out of these four transactions, Accused merely made partial payment of
P500.00
on
December
17,
1975,
as
shown
by
Exhibit
"1."
Defense evidence, on the other hand, tends to show that accused came to know complaining
witness sometime in 1973; that it was her late husband who used to have transactions with
the latter who allowed her husband to purchase rice on credit; that she took over the business
of buying and selling rice when her husband got sick; that likewise Mrs. Maximo allowed her
to purchase rice on a 15-day credit basis; that she was allowed to issue postdated checks
dated 15 days after the actual purchase; that consequently, she purchased rice from Mrs.
Maximo weekly; that after she got the rice, she would issue a check for the previous
purchases she made, as evidenced by the checks she had issued to Mrs. Maximo, Exhibit "2"
up to Exhibit "21," although all these checks did not represent all the transactions she had
with her amounted approximately to P480,000.00; that all the checks in question involved in
the above-entitled criminal cases were all issued on January 15 and 21, 1975, and not on the
dates they appeared therein; that the check dated January 31, 1976, covered in Crim. Case
No. CCC-XII-1129 involved a transaction that transpired on January 15, 1975, and the check
was issued on January 21, 1975, and actually postdated January 31, 1975; that the check
dated February 1, 1976, in the amount of P7,000.00 was in payment of a rice transaction that
took place on January 15, 1975, and actually postdated February 1, 1975; that the check
dated February 6, 1976, was also in payment of a rice transaction that occurred on January
21, 1975, and postdated February 6, 1975; that the check dated February 7, 1976, in the
amount of P5,000.00 involved a transaction that actually transpired on January 21, 1975, and
a check was issued in payment for it on January 31, 1975, and also postdated February 7,
1975; that at the time she was not able to make the necessary deposits because her husband
was then hospitalized and she pleaded to Mrs. Maximo not to encash the checks, and the
latter consented thereto as Mrs. Maximo know that her husband was really sick, and in fact,
he later died on December 3, 1976; that consequently Mrs. Maximo brought the matter to the
PC at the PC Headquarters at Bacolod City, and they agreed before the PC that she would
pay in installment, and on December 17, 1975, she deposited the amount of P500.00 with
her, Exhibit "1," that later, Mrs. Maximo tried to collect thru the Silay Police, and again later
thru the PC, and she offered to pay up to P1,000.00 but Mrs. Maximo refused unless she
would pay P5,000.00 which she went to the PC again in the accompany (sic) of her eight-year
old girl but Mrs. Maximo was not there, and then Sgt. Villanueva asked her to initial all the
questioned checks to be dated 1976; that first she refused but later on she consented after
the assurance of Sgt. Villanueva that no case will be filed against her.
The private respondent never denied her debts or obligations to the petitioner. Her defense
was directed only towards proving the fact that the checks were issued in payment of a preexisting obligation, not that the obligation is non-existent or paid in full. We further note that
the private respondent failed to submit her answer to this petition despite several notices from
this Court. She has waived her defenses to the petition. In his answer, the trial judge justified
his refusal to award civil liability with a statement that the civil liability did not arise from any
criminal act but only from a civil contract connected to the crime. He stated in his denial of the
motion for reconsideration that the action for civil liability must be filed in a "civil court.
The foregoing argument is erroneous in view of the Padilla v. Court of Appeals and People v.
Jalandoni rulings earlier cited which are applicable to the facts of this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The order of the lower court denying the motion
for reconsideration is set aside. The private respondent Conchita Panghilason is ordered to
pay the petitioner the sum of P33,586.00 with 12% interest from July 10, 1976 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74613
February 27, 1991
SPOUSES DR. FIDEL CALALANG and DRA. MARIA GENER CALALANG, and
FERDINAND CALALANG,petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FOURTH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), and HEIRS OF
ERLINDA GRUTA,respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr., for petitioners.
Jose L. Aguilar for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse, nullify and set aside: (a) the
June 28, 1985 decision1 of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in ACG.R. No. CV 04384 entitled "Heirs of Erlinda Gruta vs. Ferdinand Calalang, et al." setting
aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 83-18019 (for damages) between the
same parties. The trial court had dismissed the case on the ground of lack of cause of action
but the Court of Appeals ordered the case to be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings; and (b) the resolution dated April 28, 1986 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:
Erlinda Gruta, 15 years old, from the province of Samar, was employed as househelper in the
household of petitioners spouses Dr. Fidel Calalang and Dra. Maria Gener Calalang and their
son Ferdinand Calalang, in Bulacan (Rollo, pp. 357; 393).
On October 31, 1981, Erlinda Gruta died of malathion poisoning. Ferdinand Calalang, son of
the spouses Calalang, who brought Erlinda first to the Calalang's Clinic and then to Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital where she died, was charged with murder for allegedly poisoning
her (Rollo, pp. 164; 393).
The case was investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Then the case was
referred to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Malolos, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation
(Rollo, p. 164).
When the parents of the deceased arrived from Samar and after obtaining the Necropsy
Report from the NBI, a complaint for Murder was filed against Ferdinand Calalang with the
Provincial Fiscal of Malolos, Bulacan. Complainant Juanita Gruta, mother of the deceased,
presented the sworn statement of Dolores Ayuste, the aunt of the deceased maid who was
summoned during the incident and who was able to see her before she died, the death
certificate and the necropsy report (Rollo, p. 393).
Respondent Ferdinand Calalang never appeared nor presented his counter affidavit, instead
his mother Maria Gener Calalang presented a counter affidavit and two affidavits of her maids
who saw the deceased take a lethal dose of malathion and the report of Pat. Bernabe ( Rollo,
p. 394).
After clarificatory questioning, the parties submitted their memoranda and later the
Investigating Fiscal Liberato Reyes dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to prove
a prima facie case of the offense charged (Rollo, Annex "F" of request, pp. 74-80).
Complainant Juanita Gruta did not file a motion for reconsideration nor appeal to the Ministry
(now Department) of Justice.

On June 8, 1983, nearly two (2) years after the death of Erlinda Gruta and over a year after
the resolution of the Assistant Fiscal dated May 27, 1982, dismissing the murder charge, a
complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against Ferdinand Calalang
impleading the spouses Calalang docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18019 in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila on the claim that they are jointly and severally liable (Rollo, Annex "A", pp. 4245; 163) for actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for moral
damages; P72,000.00 for loss of earnings; and finally P30,000.00 for attorney's fees aside
from incidental expenses of P10,000.00 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 44).
Plaintiffs, the heirs of Erlinda Gruta, Rogelio Gruta and Juanita Gruta in their own rights and
co-heirs of the late Erlinda Gruta, are all with capacity to sue and be sued and are residents
of 617 Carbajal Street, Binondo, Manila; while defendants are likewise with capacity to sue
and be sued and are residents of 41 A. Fernando St., Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where they
all may be served with summons, writs and other court processes;
Erlinda Gruta is a 15 year old girl and one of the children of Rogelio Gruta and Juanita Gruta;
Erlinda Gruta is now demise, she died on October 31, 1981 at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital
of poisoning, per necropsy report of the NBI.
Erlinda Gruta at that time of her death was a domestic helper or servant of Dra. Maria G.
Calalang, of Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, receiving a salary wage of P200.00 a month;
On October 30, 1981, she was poisoned by defendant Ferdinand Calalang, son of the other
defendants Spouses Calalang, resulting in her death on October 31, 1981;
The case was investigated by the NBI, after which the case was referred to the fiscal's office
for preliminary investigation;
Subsequently later, a case of Murder by poisoning was filed against defendant Ferdinand
Calalang with the fiscal's office of Bulacan, which was however dismissed on the alleged
ground of failure to prove a prima faciecase of the offense charged;
As a resulting consequences of the death of Erlinda Gruta, the parents and relatives suffered
actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00 more or less, resulting from
burial expenses and others;
Also as a result of the death of Erlinda Gruta, the parents and relatives suffered mental
anguish, wounded feelings, anxiety and shock and for which plaintiff demand P50,000.00 in
Moral Damages from defendants jointly and solidarily;
The parents of the late Erlinda Gruta, who received the meager salary of P200.00 a month,
lost such earning as a direct result of her untimely death, which if computed to the age of 30
years old, the parents would be deprived of at least P72,000.00 in earnings;
In prosecuting this case, plaintiffs obligated themselves to pay their lawyer the sum of P
30,000.00 contingent attorney's fee and will probably incur consequential expenses and costs
to the tune of P10,000.00 more or less.
WHEREFORE, after hearing, judgment issue:
1. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as actual
or compensatory damages;
2. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of P 50,000.00 as Moral
Damages;
3. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay P72,000.00 as loss of earnings to the
plaintiffs;
4. Ordering defendants to jointly and several pay plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 for attorney's
fee and consequential expenses and costs;
5. Praying for such other reliefs which are just and equitable under the premises. (pp. 4245, Rollo)
On August 2, 1983, petitioners filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim

(Annex "B"). As the issues were joined, petitioners submitted a Request for Admission (Annex
"C"), under Rule 26. Private respondents, however, filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Admission (p. 123, CA's Original Record) which was not resolved by the trial court.
On February 27, 1984, a preliminary hearing was conducted by the trial court on the
affirmative defenses of the defendants. Thereafter, on March 30, 1984, Hon. Judge Antonio
M. Martinez, RTC-Manila, Branch 20, issued an Order dismissing the case, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit to the prayer for dismissal of the case at bar on the ground of
lack of cause of action, based on the affirmative defenses in the answer, this complaint should
be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
(Rollo, Annex "D", p. 84)
However, on appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its decision dated June 28,
1986, reversing the order of the lower court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dismissing this case, dated March 30, 1984, is
hereby SET ASIDE and the original records are ordered remanded to the court below for
further proceedings. With costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
(Rollo, Annex "G", p. 174)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on August 1, 1985 (Rollo, Annex "H", pp.
175-201) and a resolution was rendered on April 28, 1986, denying the motion for
reconsideration (Rollo, Annex "M", pp. 241-245).
Hence, this petition.
Under Section 5, Rule 16 "Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except
improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and preliminary hearing may be
had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been Med." This is to save the expense involved in
the preparation and trial when the case can be otherwise disposed of. The preliminary
hearing should be conducted as ordinary hearings: the parties should be allowed to present
evidence and the evidence recorded (Asejo vs. Leonosa, 78 Phil. 467), except when the
affirmative defense is based on par. g., Section 1, Rule 16 "that the complaint states no cause
of action." In determining sufficiency of cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint
should be considered. (De Jesus, et al., vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365; Dimayuga vs.
Dimayuga, 96 Phil. 859).
It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action, the question submitted for determination is sufficiency of allegation in the
complaint itself. The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the
complaint itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. (Clavano vs. Genato, 80 SCRA
217). This rule applies when the only affirmative defense is the failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action. It does not apply when the grounds relied upon by way of affirmative
defenses state other matters. Thus the trial court, in the case at bar, did not commit any error
in conducting a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of herein petitioners.
The finding of IAC that there was no preliminary hearing (tsn., February 27, 1984) has no
basis that can be verified from the records. The trial court set the case for preliminary hearing
on February 27, 1984 as per Order dated February 3, 1984: and the records bear "minutes" of
the preliminary hearing conducted on February 27, 1987. The rule that the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals (formerly IAC) are entitled to great respect is not inflexible. They are
subject to some established exceptions. (Layugan vs. IAC, 167 SCRA 363). And one of these
exceptions is when judgment is based on misapprehension of facts (Castillo vs. CA., G.R. No.

48541, August 21, 1989). IAC relied solely on the statement of the Clerk of Court that "this
case was decided on the basis of pleadings, memorandum, motion for reconsideration and
opposition. No oral or documentary evidence was presented" (Decision of IAC, p. 3; Rollo,
Annex "G", p. 163) without going to the records of the case.
A perusal of the preliminary hearing indicates that the cause of action of respondents
(plaintiffs in the Civil Case) is based on the crime of murder allegedly committed by Ferdinand
Calalang.
Court
So you are basing your claim on the murder case?
Atty. Aguilar
Yes, your Honor.
(tsn., February 27,1984, p. 12)
The alleged ambiguity of the cause of action in the complaint was clarified by the admission of
the respondents' counsel. Thus, the trial court concluded:
Court
So you are basing this case on the murder case. That is what I want to make clear (in) this
case, and I wanted to have all the facts clear because your complaint, based on par. 7, states:
subsequently, later, a case of murder by poisoning was filed against defendant Ferdinand
Calalang with the fiscal's office of Bulacan, which was however dismissed on the alleged
ground of failure to prove a prima facie case of the offense charged; and then on par. 8,
states that as a resulting consequence of the death of Erlinda Gruta, her parents and relatives
suffered actual and compensatory damages to the tune of P50,000 more or less, resulting
from burial expenses and others; loss of income in the amount of P72,000 and in the total
amount more or less P220,000. So we may now have a clear case, that is whether or not it is
a murder case which lead to the filing of civil case for damages. (tsn., February 27,1984, pp.
12-13)
Since the only cause of action of the case is based on the criminal act, there is no reason to
implead the Calalang spouses. In their Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defenses, the
Calalang spouses reiterated that:
. . . the complaint does not show any legal, statutory basis as to why and under what law are
they being included as defendants since the complaint admits that Ferdinand Calalang has
the capacity to sue; the truth is he Ferdinand Calalang) is of age . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
(Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defenses, p. 1; Rollo, p. 135)
Thus, We find merit in the finding of the trial court that:
. . . There is no valid legal ground for impleading the spouses Dr. and Mrs. Maria Calalang.
The complaint shows that except for the fact that the spouses Calalang are said to be the
employer of the deceased Erlinda Gruta; and, that the other defendant Ferdinand Calalang is
their son, there is nothing in the complaint which would connect them to the untimely death of
Erlinda Gruta. . . .
It is further observed that the complaint alleges that all of the defendants (Ferdinand Calalang
and spouses Calalang) are said to have the "capacity to sue and be sued." Therefore, if
Ferdinand Calalang has the "capacity to sue and be sued," then the spouses Calalang can no
longer be held civilly liable for any of his misdeeds, if any. . . . There being no legal ground to
implead the defendants-spouses Calalang, the case against them should be dismissed.
(Order, p. 2; Rollo, Annex "D", p. 82)
A close scrutiny of the Order of Dismissal of the Regional Trial Court indicates that the
present case was not dismissed solely on the ground that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action, but also on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against
Ferdinand Calalang, upon considering the "pleadings, memorandum, motion for

reconsideration and opposition" therein.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
"every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, Revised Penal
Code). In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious
act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause
thereof (Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325)
In the case at bar, counsel for private respondents admitted that his complaint for damages is
based on the commission of the crime. Stress must be made, however, that under
circumstances, it is a fundamental rule that the facts upon which the civil liability might arise
must exist to warrant the filing of a civil action.
Thus, "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the
civil liability unlessthe Court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist." (Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 97 Phil. 672). Similarly,
"extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist." (De Mesa vs. Priela, 24 SCRA 582; par. (b), Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules
of Court)
Verily, the dismissal of this criminal case as found by IAC is only by resolution of the provincial
fiscal and does not proceed from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil case might arise did not exist, so that said case may be refiled anytime without the effect
of double jeopardy. (Rollo, p. 173). We held as early as the case of People v. Velez, 77 Phil.
1026, that the dismissal of the information or the criminal action (upon motion of the fiscal)
does not affect the right of the offended party to institute or continue the civil action already
instituted arising from the offense, because such dismissal or extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. The reason most often given for this
holding is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties. Different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two
proceedings also exist. In a criminal action the State must prove its case by evidence which
shows the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient
for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only (Ocampo vs. Jenkins,
14 Phil. 681). Therefore, the insufficiency of evidence to support a murder charge does not
imply that there is no sufficient evidence to support the civil case based on the same alleged
act.
It is highly speculative to conclude that the plaintiffs' cause of action would stand or fall on the
strength of the testimony of Dolores Ayuste who was convicted of perjury on such alleged
testimony. A decision should be based on facts not on mere speculations or beliefs.1wphi1
Finally, the trial court dismissed the case against Ferdinand Calalang motu proprio based on
the ground that there is no valid cause of action against him. This is not a ground for
dismissal of action under Rule 16; but the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.
The pleadings, memorandum and motion for reconsideration and opposition, thereto, might
show that there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand Calalang; still, the court is not
allowed by law to dismiss the case motu proprio. As long as there is a cause of action in the
complaint itself, procedural due process demands that there must be a hearing on the merits
with the complaint as "prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." (People vs. Dy, 158
SCRA 111). Therefore, the plaintiffs should be given their day in court to vindicate their claim
to the fullest.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision remanding this case to the court a quo for further
proceedings is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the case against Dr. and
Mrs. Fidel Calalang is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-112387 October 13, 1994
MANUEL P. MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, and SALVADOR H.
LAUREL, respondent.
Eriberto Ignacio for petitioner.
Laurel Law Offices for private respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
This petition for review prays for the reversal of the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated July 16, 1993 and October 25, 1993 in CA-G.R. No. 13429,
entitled "The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Manuel P. Martinez,
Accused-Appellee, and Salvador H. Laurel, Private Complainant and Appellant." What
petitioner Manuel P. Martinez actually seeks is the dismissal of the information for libel filed
against him in the Trial Court. On the basis of the facts hereunder set forth, the Court denies
his plea.
On complaint of then Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, 1 an Information dated March 23,
1990 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Manila by Assistant Prosecutor
Antonio J. Ballena, charging Manuel F. Martinez with libel arising from the allegedly
derogatory and scurrilous imputations and insinuations against Laurel contained in Martinez'
article entitled "The Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8, 1990 in his Manila Times
column Narrow Gate. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-82891 and
assigned to Branch XI.
Martinez filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation" 3 which, was denied by Judge Manuel E. Yuzon
in an Order dated June 21, 1990. 4 The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial conference
on July 31, 1990, but this setting was cancelled in view of Judge Yuzon's retirement.
On October 8, 1990, complainant Laurel filed a motion to set the case for arraignment and
pre-trial. Action on the motion was held in abeyance by the pairing judge, Hon. Gerardo
Pepito, pending assumption of duty of Judge Yuzon's successor.
In the meantime, Martinez filed a petition with the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking
review of the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel against him.
Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City Prosecutor Lourdes C. Tabanag filed before the trial court on
October 26, 1990, a motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of
Martinez' petition for review, which was granted by Judge Pepito on November 6, 1990.
On February 6, 1991, complainant Laurel attempted once more to have the case set for
arraignment and trial. No action was taken on his said motion, and a subsequent motion
dated July 16, 1991 praying for the resolution of the February 6, 1991 motion met the same
fate.
By letter dated August 16, 1991 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Manila, 5 then Acting
Justice Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III declared inter alia that while the language used in the
article may be unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable as libel,
as if embodied merely an opinion protected as a privileged communication under Article 354
of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed resolution was therefore set aside and the City
Prosecutor was directed to cause the dismissal of the information filed against Manuel F.
Martinez.
Consequently,
a
motion
to
dismiss
Criminal
Case No. 90-82891 was filed on August 26, 1991 and set for hearing on December 17, 1991.
At the hearing, upon manifestation of complainant's counsel, as private prosecutor, that he

had received no copy of the motion to dismiss, the trial court directed the case prosecutor to
furnish said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter ten (10) days to respond thereto.
It does not appear that the case prosecutor complied with the trial court's order; this
notwithstanding, said court, through Presiding Judge Roberto A. Barrios, issued on February
18, 1992 and Order 6 reading:
Before arraignment was had, the Department of Justice conducted & since concluded review
and reinvestigation of the charges, the Resolution of which is Annex "A" of the prosecution's
motion to dismiss. The prosecution's fresh stand is that "there is no sufficient evidence
against the said accused to sustain the allegation in the information." Coming as it does from
the officials having control of the prosecution and at this stage of the proceedings, and there
being no objection, the motion to dismiss is granted.
WHEREFORE, the case is dismissed. The office/officer having custody of it is directed to
forthwith release to the accused his cash bond submitted under O.R. NO. 46865.
SO ORDERED.
Complainant Laurel having sought and been denied a reconsideration of said Order, he went
to the Court of Appeals, ascribing error to the lower court in (a) recognizing the regularity and
validity of the petition for review filed by Martinez with the DOJ and the DOJ's giving due
course thereto, and (b) granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of notice thereof to
complainant Laurel, and basing said dismissal not on evidence on record but on the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice, to whom the judge completely subordinated his judgment and
whose opinion, on its face, was clearly puerile and flimsy and violated or disregarded
numerous Supreme Court decisions.
Martinez, on his part, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies from the
dismissal of a criminal case, and certainly not by the private complainant, particularly where
dismissal was at the instance of the City Prosecutor upon orders of the Department of Justice.
He contended that if any remedy was available to private complainant, it was a petition
for certiorari, not an appeal. Said motion notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals ordered
complainant to file his brief. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's Brief recommending that the Order dated February 18,
1992 of the lower court granting the prosecution's motion to dismiss, be set aside and the
case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
On July 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, issued a Resolution 7 granting the
appeal and remanding the case for arraignment of the accused and trial on the merits. The
Appellate Court ruled that private complainant had "sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against the order of dismissal before arraignment" and that the remedy of appeal
was properly available because the order of dismissal was a final order which terminated all
proceedings in the case. Quoting extensively from the People's Manifestation, the Court
found the review by then Acting Justice Secretary Bello to run counter to prevailing
jurisprudence and DOJ Circulars. It further ruled that the trial court completely abdicated its
jurisdiction in favor of the Justice Department when it dismissed the case on the mere say-so
of the prosecutor, without requiring the latter to present evidence to enable the court to arrive
at its own judgment.
Martinez sought, but failed to obtain, a reconsideration of the above Resolution. 8 Hence, the
present recourse. His arguments in support thereof do no warrant reversal of the challenged
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Appeal against the order of dismissal of February 18, 1992 was not foreclosed by the rule of
double jeopardy, said order having issued before arraignment. Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without

the express consent of the accused. 9

Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a
final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party", except when the accused
is placed thereby in double jeopardy. 10
In People vs. Guido, 11 this Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not
only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been
held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right
to demand civil liability arising from the offense. 12 The right of the offended party to file a
special civil action of prohibition andcertiorari from an order rendered in a criminal case was
likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes vs. Gopengco 13 andPeople vs. Calo,
Jr., 14 which held that "offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and
personality as 'person(s) aggrieved' to file the special civil action of prohibition
and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object . . . ." 15
In People vs. Nano 16, the Court, while declaring the petition filed before it by the private
counsel for the offended parties to be defective in form, nevertheless took cognizance thereof
in view of the gravity of error allegedly committed by the respondent judge against the
prosecution denial of due process as well as the manifestation and motion filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General praying that the petition be treated as if filed by the said office.
The same exceptional circumstances obtaining in the Nano, case justified the Court of
Appeals' taking cognizance of the appeal filed by private complainant Laurel, i.e.: denial of
due process consisting in the failure of the prosecution to furnish counsel for private
complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss despite being ordered to do so, as well as of the
Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's Brief 17 filed by the Solicitor General in the appellate
court, recommending the setting aside of the Order of the lower court dated February 18,
1992 and the remand of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.
It is not unusual for the Solicitor General to take a position adverse to the People or the
prosecution. The reason, as explained by the Court in Orbos vs. Civil Service
Commission, 18 is that as the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
the Solicitor General has the duty to "see to it that the best interest of the government is
upheld
within
the
limits
set
by
law. . . . It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally
uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position."
When that happens, as the Court observed in Orbos:
. . . the Solicitor General nevertheless manifests his opinion and recommendation to the Court
which is an invaluable aid in the disposition of the case. On some occasions he begs leave to
be excused from intervening in the case, more so, when the client had already filed its own
comment different from the stand of the Solicitor General or in a situation when he finds the
contention of a private party tenable as against that of the government or any of its agencies.
The Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of the accused in appealed criminal
cases.
The procedural recourse of appeal taken by private complainant Laurel is correct because the
order
of
dismissal
was
a
final
order.
It
finally
disposed
of the pending action so that nothing more could be done with it in the lower court. 19 In Bell
Carpets International Trading Corp. vs. Court Appeals, 20 this Court held that "(t)he remedy
against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on
appeal,
whether
of
fact,
or
of
law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. . . . (T)he

party aggrieved . . . did not have the option to substitute the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the
existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special
civil action ofcertiorari."
The rule with respect to the disposition of motions to dismiss filed by the fiscal was laid down
by the Court in Crespo vs. Mogul, 21 where it was held that:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complainant or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal even cases while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
Petitioner maintains that it is precisely in recognition of the above-cited rule that the
prosecutor left the disposition of the case to the discretion of the lower court by filing the
appropriate motion to dismiss; and that it was neither the Justice Secretary nor the fiscal who
dismissed the information, but the trial judge himself, who exercised his discretion by
approving the stand taken by the prosecution.
The fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to
observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously. Other
procedural lapses that must be pointed out are attributable to petitioner Martinez, who filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice despite the denial by Judge Yuzon of his
motion for reinvestigation, and to the Justice Secretary, who took cognizance of the petition
for review despite the fact that an information had been filed in court. But that is water under
the bridge.
What now concerns the Court here with is how the trial judge acted in relation to the motion to
dismiss. First, he granted the same without the prosecution having furnished private
complainant a copy of the motion despite having been ordered to do so, thereby effectively
depriving private complainant of his day in court.
Secondly, the dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice
that no libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the
prosecution that "there is no sufficient evidence against the said accused to sustain the
allegation in the information" and on the supposed lack of objection to the motion to dismiss,
this last premise being, however, questionable, the prosecution having failed, as observed, to
give private complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss.
In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than
the judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused.
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of
discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was
indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only
after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required ws the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the
prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent

finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of
the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In
effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do
and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling
in Crespo v. Mogul. 22
The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private complainant's right to due
process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did
not err in setting aside said dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court for
arraignment of petitioner as accused therein and for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18148
February 28, 1963
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO
CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO,
ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES,
namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special
Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question
and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958
and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist
Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his
properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all
surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena
Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the
estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and
intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in
accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the
testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her
collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to
the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own,
claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the
theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively,
set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties,
followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the
memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the
properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively

and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half
share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful
standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that
they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate
proceeding but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of
donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties, aside
from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the
donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of
his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order
declaring the donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that
is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first
category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between
spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply
with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same
Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both
projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned
in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in
the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili
and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said
properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the
executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously
raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in
the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the
donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for new
trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed
this present petition for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the
probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate
title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to
property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where one of
the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in
which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its
final determination in a separate action.2 However, we have also held that when the parties
interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a
question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass
judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661);
and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial
administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding,
provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of
Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the

testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong to the
conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband
exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the
sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon
the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void and does
not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is
contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or
broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the nojurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the
Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property
is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that
the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the
estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only
personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may
be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the
subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person
regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to
be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding
is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts
and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the
persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in
which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in
his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may
introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take
part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such
estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of
the properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the
decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings,
including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared
voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of
the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her
own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her
substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the
testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties
interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title
under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the
disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed
that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned
properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes
of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of

Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for
resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they
do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that
their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the
opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of partition
including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her
husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties
which is well within the competence of the probate court and just because of an opposition
thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the
jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the
objection are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if
the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of
ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only
did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her
deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties.
But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must
have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act
constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel.7 In the present
case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in
favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if
mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is
hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-54904 January 29, 1988
HEIRS OF TITO RILLORTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO N. FIRME, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch
IV, Bauang, La Union; and ANDREW COSTALES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
May the civil award in a criminal case be appealed by the heirs of the offended party? Of
course. May the criminal aspect of the decision be modified as a basis for the increase in the
civil award? Certainly not. Is the case at bar covered by the rule on double jeopardy or by the
exception? We shall come to that.
Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of less serious physical
injuries and sentenced to twenty days of arresto menor and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial court said the defendant could not be held liable for
homicide because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The certified cause
of death was pneumonia, and this was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which
was needlessly performed upon him. In short, the victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep
wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result of the attending physician's gross
incompetence. 1
The heirs of the deceased, herein petitioners, did not agree. Through their counsel acting
"under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision notified to them on January 23, 1980. 2 This motion was sent
by registered mail on February 2, 1980. 3 Heard on February 26, it was denied on February
28, 1980, in an order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on March 18,

1980. 4 On March 20, 1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the
signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor.5 After considering the
opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, the respondent judge dismissed the appeal on
April 14, 1980, for tardiness. 6 Both the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied on May 12, 1980. 7 The dismissal of the
appeal is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
It is clear that the notice of appeal was filed within the 15-day reglementary period. The
motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered in open court on January 23, 1980, was
filed on February 2, 1980, date of its posting by registered mail. Only ten days had elapsed
from the earlier date. The running of the period was suspended while the motion was under
study and until a copy of the order denying the same was furnished the private prosecutor on
March 18, 1980. When two days later, on March 20, the fiscal and the private prosecutor
jointly filed a notice of appeal, only 12 days of the period of appeal had been consumed. The
appeal was thus perfected on time, conformably to Rule 122, Section 6, of the Rules of Court,
reading as follows:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an
appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.
The trial court thus lost jurisdiction over the appealed case on March 20, 1980, and was
obligated to elevate the records thereof to the appellate court. Having become functus officio,
it could no longer issue the challenged orders of April 14, 1980, and May 12, 1980, dismissing
the appeal.
The question of whether or not the civil award in a criminal case may be appealed is not new
and has been resolved earlier by this Court. It is settled that this can be done by the private
prosecutor on behalf of the offended party or his successors. The adequacy of the award may
be challenged on the ground that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the injuries
sustained as a result of the offense committed by the accused, Thus, we have held that
... The offended party, be he the owner of the stolen or misappropriated property, or the owner
of the pawnshop, may appeal from the judgment of the trial court with reference to the
payment of the indemnity resulting from the commission of the offense. The pawnbrokers in
this case are deemed to have been prejudiced by the commission of the crime, because by
reason of the fact that the jewels pledged to them had been stolen they will now be deprived
of their possession without first having a declaration of indemnity for the amount of the
pledges. 8
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, this court, in its resolution dated November 28, 1933, declared the appeal of
the accused abandoned. Therefore, the only question left to be decided is the appeal of the
private prosecution with regard to the civil liability of the accused.
The trial courts resolution that, because the cause had been appealed by the accused, it had
lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution
rune days after the date of the judgment, is unfounded.
The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution and to appeal for
purpose of the civil liability of the accused (section 107, General Orders, No. 58), necessarily
implies that such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to his
defense. If the accused has the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of
conviction, the offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be made dependent
on that of the accused. 9

However, the civil indemnity may be increased only if it will not require an aggravation of the
decision in the criminal case on which it is based. In other words, the accused may not, on
appeal by the adverse party, be convicted of a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher
penalty to justify the increase in the civil indemnity. This rule is applicable in the present case.
The petitioners are urging that the civil award in the sum of only P500.00 be increased
because the accused should not have been found guilty of only less serious physical injuries
but of homicide. They are not confining themselves to the civil aspect of the challenged
decision. In their own words, their appeal involves "both the criminal aspect and the civil
liabilities in the criminal cases." 10 This is not permitted under the rule on double jeopardy. 11
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines
cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This provision is
based on the old case of Kepner v. United States, 12 where the U.S. Supreme Court,
reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that
appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the
penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. It has been
consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction.
It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less then can the
offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity.
The prohibition operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information." 13 There is no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which
the accused in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide.
But the petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting
the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and
therefore null and void. This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been
committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not
affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be
rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be.
In People v. City Court of Silay, 14 the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dimiss a
charge for falsification after the prosecution had rested, holding that the guilt of the accused
had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court disagreed. Nevertheless, it held
through Justice Munoz-Palma that "however erroneous the order of the respondent court is,
and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be
lighted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy."
We have made similar rulings in several other cases, among them People v. Hernando, 108
SCRA 121, People v. Francisco, 128 SCRA 110, and People v. Villarin, 11 SCRA 550.
The cases cited by the petitioners are not in point because they all involve not errors of
judgment but denial of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. 15 The prosecution
in each of these cases was allowed to appeal because it had not been given its day in court.
In the present case, a full trial was held and both the prosecution and the defense were
accorded the right to be heard before the judgment was reached. There is no doubt at all that
the trial court had the requisite jurisdiction to pronounce the challenged sentence. Even
assuming it was incorrect, it was certainly not invalid.
It follows that the appeal should be limited to the civil award corresponding only to the offense
found against the accused, to wit, less serious physical injuries. The award cannot be related
to the victim's death, of which the defendant has been absolved by the trial court. The
problem then is whether or not the sum of P500.00 was sufficient indemnification for the
wound which, the trial court has held, was not the proximate cause of the victim's death.

The determination of this question should normally be made by the appellate court after
examining the factual issues as originally resolved by the trial court. This would require
elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the usual
procedure and an exchange again of pleadings and arguments between the parties that will
further prolong this case. But we do not believe that such delay is necessary. We can decide
the appeal ourselves to expedite decision of this case. We have carefully studied
the pros and cons of this problem and can rule on it directly on the basis of the record before
us and in the interest of speedy justice.
Accordingly, we hold that the sum awarded by the trial court to the petitioners, for the less
serious physical injuries inflicted upon the victim and not for his death is sufficient
recompense. Therefore, the increase sought is denied.
While the Court sympathizes with the petitioners for their tragic loss, it is unable to accord
them a more satisfactory material settlement because it is limited by the findings of the trial
court and inhibitions of double jeopardy. If an error has been committed somewhere and
on this it is not necessary for us to rule that error will nonetheless not relax the application
of the salutary rule on double jeopardy. It must be, as it is here, upheld.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court dated April 14, 1980, and May 20, 1980,
are SET ASIDE. However, the appeal sought shall no longer be necessary because the
questioned civil award in the amount of P500.00 is hereby directly AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.