A HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON DIODORUS

SICULUS BOOK 15
P. J. Stylianou
CLARENDON PRESS OXFORD 1998
-iii-

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-iv

PREFACE
THE present book has its origins in an Oxford doctoral thesis which was examined as long ago as December 1981. By
the beginning of 1982 fate (as Diodorus would have put it) had taken me away from Oxford, and indeed away from
England, and into other fields of academic endeavour, and many years were to pass before I could turn serious
attention to the revision of the thesis, above all by the inclusion of the Sicilian portions (excluded in the original
thesis), and its preparation for publication. I am consoled by the fact that this lengthy gap enabled my thinking on
Diodorus to mature and that the book may be less imperfect as a consequence.
Little need be said about the importance for Greek history of the Bibliotheke Historike (or Library of History) of
Diodorus Siculus, in particular of those books of it which cover the fourth century (it emerges plainly enough, I hope, in
both the Introduction and the Commentary). The absence of detailed historical commentaries on any of these books
has long been felt. If the present study goes a little way towards filling this gap it will have served its main purpose. In
so far as the finished product is aimed at a specific category of reader, it is the undergraduate and graduate student
with Greek, as well as, of course, the professional Classical scholar and ancient historian. But I trust it may also be of
use to Greekless students armed with a translation of Book 15.
For a work of this kind naturally much needed to be consulted, in terms of both primary material (the ancient
evidence) and secondary literature. With regard to the latter, I should say that with very few exceptions I have not
made use of anything published after 1993. This is regrettable, especially in the case of major new contributions such
as M. Dreher Hegemon und Symmachoi ( 1995), but a line had to be drawn somewhere if I were ever to finish. To
have made only a hasty and partial use of the most recent books and articles would have been unfair, above all to
them.

As far as the text employed in the lemmata and in quotations

-v- from Book 15 elsewhere in the Commentary and in the Introduction is concerned, I have used both of the best
present-day texts, that of Vogel in the Teubner edition, and that of Vial in the Bud. Professor David Lewis
recommended that Vial should be used for Book 15 (CAH2 vi. 147 n. 123) and there are good reasons for so doing.
Vial's work in arranging the various manuscripts which contain Book 15 into two families, and her thorough collation of
the four principal manuscripts (P and M and their respective descendants X and F) marks a definite advance on the
limited work of Vogel in this direction (on which cf. Chamoux, p. clxi), and in many places her text is to be preferred to
that of Vogel (cf. 13. 1n.; 13. 4-5n.; 22. 2n.; 57. 1n.; 64. 1n.). In other instances, however, her judgement is less
sure and her text is less satisfactory as a result than that of Vogel (cf. 19. 4n.; 30. 3n.; 52. 3n.). Where there is
disagreement between them, therefore, arising out of variant readings or lacunae in the manuscripts, I have followed
the edition I considered more correct and given my reasons for so doing. Occasionally I have preferred other readings
(see, e.g., 52. 1; 75. 3 and nn. there). A useful outcome of Vial's work is the observation that MS F (of the fifteenth
century) represents what might aptly be described as an 'edited' text. This is seen not only in the case of the lists of
Roman magistrates (Vial, p. xxiii and n. 2; Chamoux, pp. ciiif. and civ n. 74), but elsewhere also (cf. 21. 2n.; 30. 3n.;
57. 1n.). It might be apposite to add in this connection that recourse to the great edition of Wesseling of 1746, truly a
monument to eighteenth-century scholarship, repays the effort every time. But the definitive text of Book 15 does not
yet exist. In favour of Vogel it can also be said that the Teubner text is that used in the Loeb edition of Books 1-20, the
version more generally available in the English-speaking world. It is for this reason that I draw attention in the
Commentary to instances of inaccurate or misleading translation of the Greek in this edition of Book 15. For books
other than 15, and especially for Books 16-20, I have relied on the Teubner edition, though often comparing this with
the Bud text where possible. For the fragmentary Books 21-40 I have used F. R. Walton's invaluable edition in the
Loeb. It should not be necessary to stress that the present work is not a textual commentary. My comments on the
text, therefore, are confined to instances of historical significance.
In the course of research carried on intermittently over such a
long time I have incurred many debts. The first and greatest debt I owe to the two eminent scholars who supervised
the writing of my doctoral thesis, Professor Antony Andrewes and Mr George Cawkwell. The contrasting style of the two
men, both acknowledged masters in their respective spheres, was bracing, and to move from New College (later 13
Manor Place) to University College and back was exciting and a constant stimulus. Until his death in 1990, Professor
Andrewes continued to take a keen interest in my fortunes and to urge, whenever we met, and in a succession of notes
and letters, the speedy revision and publication of the thesis. Indeed, in 1985 he very courageously even announced
its not too distant publication (in Essays Starr, 196 n. 6). All this helped to keep 'Diodorus Book 15' alive at a period
when I could spare little time for such matters. Professor George Forrest first acted as my internal examiner, but fast
became a friend and mentor, and proved a sustaining force over the years. The sad news of his death reached me
while engaged in composing this preface. Similarly I owe no less a debt of gratitude to Mr Robin Lane Fox who arrived
at New College shortly after I began my research.
It was at Professor Andrewes's request, not long before his death, that the late Professor David Lewis read the whole
unrevised thesis and commented on it fully, with the sagacity, exacting scholarship, and attention to detail he was
justly famed for. Later, and much to its profit, he also read the first draft of the section on Diodorus' sources for the
West and reciprocated by very kindly allowing me to read his chapter on Sicily between 413 and 368 BC before its
publication in CAH2 vi. Finally, Dr Simon Hornblower, with characteristic generosity and enthusiasm, boldly volunteered
to read the revised version and, a punishingly busy teaching and research schedule notwithstanding, he did so with
customary speed and efficiency, offering expert advice and saving me from many a pitfall. I am deeply in his debt. But
for him the book would have been a great deal poorer and even longer in appearing.
Other friends or colleagues who have helped in various ways, whether in discussions or in correspondence, include the
following: Professors Michael Osborne, Brian Shefton, John Lazenby, and Antony Woodman, Mr Jeremy Paterson (who
first guided me towards Diodorus as a research topic), Dr Robin Seager (my
-viiexternal examiner), Dr George Georghallides, Dr Constantine Hadjistephanou, Professor Vassos Karageorghis, Dr Ian
Carradice, Drs David Davison and Rajka Makjani, Dr Rowland Smith, and Professor David Potter.
I am especially grateful to the Chairman and Members of the Editorial Committee of the Oxford Classical and
Philosophical Monographs for accepting the book for publication and to the Craven Committee of Oxford University for
subsidizing a lengthy visit to Greece in 1977. I must also express my gratitude to the editorial staff of the Oxford
University Press for their adroit handling of the book through the various stages of production.
For his kindness, patience, and fatherly encouragement, His Eminence Archbishop Gregorios of Thyateira and Great
Britain has my heartfelt and respectful thanks.
Revision of the thesis was made possible by a generous grant awarded by the A. G. Leventis Foundation. I am most
grateful to the Foundation and its Chairman, His Excellency Constantine Leventis, for this as well as their long-standing
interest in my research.
I owe a great debt of gratitude to Sir Reo Stakis for a research grant readily awarded for another purpose, but which
also proved helpful in the final stages of publication of the present book.
On a personal level, I wish to thank my wife for her steady encouragement and never-failing support, both moral and
academic, without which, I have not the slightest doubt, this book would not exist, and to apologize to our children for
devoting so much of my time to Diodorus rather than to them.
October 1997 P. J. S

-viii-

CONTENTSAbbreviations

Maps
INTRODUCTION
1. The Character of the Bibliotheke
(a) The setting
(b) Chance and utility
(c) Style and diction
2. The General Plan and Date of Writing of the
Bibliotheke
3. The Sources
(a) The chronographer
(i) The framework
(ii) The other chronographic material: the
obvious kind
(iii) The other chronographic material: the
less obvious kind
(iv) The chronographer's errors
(b) The narrative sources
(i) Ephorus: the oikonomia
(ii) Ephorus: the sources
(iii) Ephorus: attitude to states and individuals
(iv) Ephorus: merits and defects
4. Diodorus' Methods
COMMENTARY
Appendix
Bibliography
Index of Authors and Passages Discussed
Greek Index
General Index

xi
xviii
1
1
1
3
15
17
25
25
25
31
43
45
49
84
104
110
121
132
141
552
556
581
586
587

-ix-

INTRODUCTION

"The Hellenica is for connoisseurs", writes Cawkwell in the introduction to the Penguin translation of Xenophon's
Hellenica. For different reasons Diodorus' Bibliotheke Historike is not for the uninitiated. For the cardinal fact about
Diodorus is that he was a second-rate epitomator who generally used first-rate sources. Had these survived the
Bibliotheke would have been of interest only as an example of a first-century BC work of compilation. Unfortunately,
however, the abridged historians are mostly lost and we must perforce do what we can with Diodorus. The problem is
to discover the principles that should be applied. It is imperative to know in each instance if the information is
Diodorus' or his source's; and the extent to which he has mishandled it if the latter. This introduction, therefore, aims
at an understanding, on the one hand of Diodorus himself, and on the other of the sources he used. Only then can the
evidence of the Bibliotheke be properly evaluated.

The first section is concerned with the character of the Bibliotheke: what and how
typical of its time was it? What is one to make of one of its most conspicuous
characteristics, the constant moralizing? What can we conclude from the language? The
second section looks at how and when Diodorus produced the Bibliotheke. In the third
section the sources which lie behind Book 15 are examined in detail. The fourth and
final section is concerned with Diodorus' methods.

INTRODUCTION
"The Hellenica is for connoisseurs", writes Cawkwell in the introduction to the Penguin translation of Xenophon's
Hellenica. For different reasons Diodorus' Bibliotheke Historike is not for the uninitiated. For the cardinal fact about
Diodorus is that he was a second-rate epitomator who generally used first-rate sources. Had these survived the
Bibliotheke would have been of interest only as an example of a first-century BC work of compilation. Unfortunately,
however, the abridged historians are mostly lost and we must perforce do what we can with Diodorus. The problem is
to discover the principles that should be applied. It is imperative to know in each instance if the information is
Diodorus' or his source's; and the extent to which he has mishandled it if the latter. This introduction, therefore, aims
at an understanding, on the one hand of Diodorus himself, and on the other of the sources he used. Only then can the
evidence of the Bibliotheke be properly evaluated.
The first section is concerned with the character of the Bibliotheke: what and how typical of its time was it? What is
one to make of one of its most conspicuous characteristics, the constant moralizing? What can we conclude from the
language? The second section looks at how and when Diodorus produced the Bibliotheke. In the third section the
sources which lie behind Book 15 are examined in detail. The fourth and final section is concerned with Diodorus'
methods.

1. THE CHARACTER OF THE BIBLIOTHEKE

(a) The setting
The second and first centuries BC witnessed the growth of a numerous and wealthy middle class in the towns of Italy
and Sicily; what we would today term a bourgeoisie. The conditions of peace established by Augustus were especially
favourable to
-1it. 1 There was an accompanying thirst for a smattering at least of higher learning and the booksellers of the late first
century were not slow in meeting it. 2 This is the sort of readership that Diodorus of Agyrium in Sicily aimed to reach. 3
It is possible that he was commissioned by a bookseller; or he may have been his own employer. At any rate, the lively
trade in books like the Bibliotheke may be indicated by the speed with which Diodorus worked. There was no final
revision and indeed he did not even, while writing, take the trouble to correct glaring errors of which he was aware.
Perhaps time was short. It is also perfectly possible, of course, that he simply could not be bothered (see pp. 24, 137
). This is further proof that Diodorus' prospective buyers would have cared more for the appearance of the rolls and
their general 'educational' and entertainment value than for the soundness of their historical detail. An impression of
quality had nevertheless to be maintained, for no buyer, however modest his learning, would have been interested in a
work of obviously inferior scholarship.
Diodorus, therefore, gave his work the form of a serious universal history such as that of Polybius and a strong didactic
tone calculated to appeal to a first-century reader. And the paraphrased extracts which make up the Bibliotheke derive
from some of the best ancient historians, now largely or totally lost to us, Ephorus, for example, Timaeus, Hieronymus,
Polybius, and Posidonius. Otherwise the Bibliotheke was what its title implies -- a concise history of the world for
Everyman. Hence its arrangement: the contents of each book are defined at the beginning as well as at the end, and
for the historical period the narrative is arranged annalistically. If readers desired to know what had occurred in a
particular year all they had to do was to take up the appropriate book and read under the magistrate in question. The
nature of the
____________________
1
Rostovtzeff, 1957: i. 9ff., 54ff.; Rawson, 1985: 215ff. on D.
2
Cf. Kenyon, 1951: 81ff.; Reynolds and Wilson, 1969: 22f. Though of the 1st century AD we might profitably bring
to mind Petronius' repulsive creation Trimalchio, a member of the Italian bourgeoisie, who prides himself on being
cultured and on possessing two libraries, one Greek and one Latin ( Satyricon48). Also the essay by Lucian ( 2nd
century AD), , a wealthy and vulgar man who collects masses of
books for show (I: . () ( )).That there were booksellers as a
profession in Rome at the time of D, and that money could be made from the sale of books, cf. Strabo 13 C 609.
3
Cf. Sordi, p. vii. For the few biographical facts we possess about him see Schwartz, RE v. 663; Oldfather, pp. vii f.;

Sordi, pp. v f.; Sacks, 1990: 161 ff.

-2Bibliotheke as a historical compilation is betrayed by its title and Pliny, two generations later, had no hesitation in
classing Diodorus with the compilers of handbooks ( NH Praef. 24ff.), a thriving profession in the late first century BC .
4

(b) Chance and utility

One of the more polished parts of the Bibliotheke is its general preface (I. 1-5);
naturally, for the work stood to be bought or rejected on the strength of what was said
there. The beginning is
therefore, purported to be a history of the world and its professed aim was to benefit mankind. Diodorus proceeds to
explain in what way such a work could be of use to the reader. By the examples it provides of good men earning the
praise of their fellows while wicked ones meet with public disgrace or worse, by itself always praising the first and
censuring the second, history encourages men to improve themselves and society; or at least it restrains their
impulses to do evil. It offers experience and understanding, qualities which can admittedly be gained by association
with wise and knowledgeable men, but history is far superior to them because of the great number of facts and
paradeigmata at its disposal (1. 1. 4). The more of these the better, hence the superiority of the general history over
the local. History, we are told, possesses no value in itself unless it is to instruct.
We are not concerned here with the validity of such a 'philosophy' of history. But it is important to note that it is found
throughout the Bibliotheke. The moral and didactic purpose of

____________________
Cf. Hornblower, 1981: 22ff. We may compare Pompeius Trogus, a contemporary, who also produced a historical
compilation in the guise of a unisersal history entitled Historiae Philippicae. D and Trogus appear to have made the
same claims in their general prefaces; cf. D I. 3. 2ff. and Pomp. Trog. praef. 2f.
-3-

repeated elsewhere (15. 88.1; cf. 23. 15; 30. 15; 31. 15. 1) and exemplified on numerous occasions. Divine justice (
, ) in the Bibliotheke always overtakes the arrogant, lawless, and sacrilegious (cf. 14. 63. 1f.; 14.
70. 4; 15. 48. 4; 16. 61. 1-64. 3; 21. 16. 5; 22. 11. 2). Such a conception of historical causation could not be simpler.
God or Fortune ( ) lay at the back of most things and indeed nothing delights Diodorus more than to relate
, those sudden and inexplicable changes in the circumstances of men which intrigued and fascinated
antiquity. Diodorus is in effect writing a history of surprises and reversals (cf. 15. 33. 1; 15. 54. 5; 17. 46. 6-47; 17.
66. 2, 4; 17. 108. 6; 18. 53; 19. 11. 7; 20. 13. 3; 31. 10. 2). Also very much in evidence, though Diodorus does not
spell this out as one of his aims, is what might be called the 'entertainment' element. He makes a point of relating
when he can strange customs and events ( ) for apart from their possible educational value they served as
for his readers (cf. 1. 83. 1; 2. 44. 3; 2. 47. 1; 3. 4. 1; 3. 30. 4; 17. 46. 6; 17. 63. 4; 18. 26. 2; 19. 98).
None of the above characteristics is original or unique to the Bibliotheke. On the contrary, some of these elements
went back a long way. The utilitarian view of history for instance was a commonplac, in antiquity and reached back at
least to Thucydides. 5 The idea that god or fortune intervened in human affairs had much older roots -- it is in fact a
necessary concomitant of religious belief. Xenophon in the fourth century was certainly under its sway (cf. H. 5. 4 1;
7.5 26). Still, it is a question of degree, and, thesecharacteristics became far more pronounced in late Classical And
Hellenistic historiography. A more recent element, which in fact permeates the Bibliotheke, was the sensationalist,
highly rhetorical way of writing history which Polybius roundly condemns, but cannot quite free himself from. 6
____________________
5
Thuc. I 22. 4; 2. 48. 3; cf. Romilly, in Histoire et historiens, 41 ff.; Polyb. 1. 1. 2 with Roveri, 1964: 106; Walbank,
1972: 28.
6
Walbank, 1972: 34ff. On the 'dramatic' approach to writing history see further, id., 1955: 4ff.; HCP i. 8f.;
Wiseman, 1979: 143ff.; Gabba, 1981: 52f. See also the remarks of Murray, 1972: 211. Though its roots were
much deeper, paradoxography flourished in the Hellenistic age. Leading practitioners of the genre such as
Euhemeruis, Iambulus, and Dionysius Skytobrachion are known to us because they were extensively used by D in
the early books of the Bibliotheke. Alongside genuine historical detail in the works of these Writers there stood the
fictional and the fantastic. D's readers would not in general have been able to
-4Difficulties arise when one seeks, as one must, the origins of the various moralizing and other trends in the
Bibliotheke, especially in relation to source criticism. For though Diodorus clearly subscribed to this sort of
historiography, this does not necessarily mean that he was responsible for its various manifestations in the Bibliotheke.
As far as the citation of good and bad examples for the purpose of providing ethical instruction is concerned, the fact
that it is found in different parts of the Bibliotheke induced Kunz to argue against Laqueur that its origins cannot be
pin-pointed. 7 It is a fact nevertheless that the ethical viewpoint is not propounded in precisely the same way or with

the same intensity in all the books. There is an important difference, for example, between Books 11-15 and 17-20.
(Book 16 is difficult; Ephorus ran out in the course of it: see pp. 95 ff.) The moralizing judgements on individuals in the
form of set epainoi or psogoi are characteristic of the first group and do not occur in the second; cf. 11. 11 (praise of
Leonidas and the Three Hundred); II. 38. 6 (praise of Gelon); 11. 46f. (censure of Pausanias, and praise of Aristides);
11. 58. 4ff. (praise of Themistocles); 11. 82. 1-4 (praise of Myronides) 15. 81. 1-4 (praise of Pelopidas); 15. 88 (praise
of Epaminondas). Book 17 and the narratives based on Hieronymus in Books 18-20 are quite different in this respect.
History's duty to provide moral instruction is less in evidence here. Alexander is commended for his treatment of the
Persian royal captives (17. 38. 4-7) and his great achievement is remarked on twice (17. 1. 3-5; 117. 5), but he
receives no eulogy as such. Demosthenes' death is not even noticed, but what is really surprising is that Eumenes,
whose treatment is detailed and highly favourable, is not accorded the epainos of history. The praiseworthy actions of
Eumelus of Panticapaeum are enumerated (20. 24. 4-25. 3). Ptolemy, who is no less favourably treated than Eumenes,
is said to have been delivered from the greatest dangers by the gods because of his arete, that is, his reverential
treatment of Alexander's corpse (18. 28. 3ff.). Olympias, on the other hand, got precisely what she deserved in the
end because of her cruelty and inability to bear her good fortune with moderation and humanity (19. 11. 4ff.). The
____________________
distinguish between the two and D in fact calls such narratives 'history' (5. 41. 4; 42. 4); cf. Gabba, 1981: esp.
58f.
7
Kunz, 1935: 30ff.
-5above is a substantial part of the clearly expressed moralizing in this part of the Bibliotheke. Brief remarks at the end
of a person's life seem to be preferred here; cf. 17. 46. 5 (on the Tyrians); 17. 48. 5 (on Amyntas); 19. 51.5 (on
Olympias); 20. 37. 6 (on Cleopatra); 20. 42. 5 (on Ophellas).
Books 21-40 survive only in fragments and a proper evaluation of them is thus impossible. But it is evident that
stereotype moral appraisements similar to those in Books 11-15 occurred in some at least of the books of the second
half of the Bibliotheke; cf. 23. 15 (censure of M. Atillus Regulus); 29. 18ff. (eulogies of Philopoemen, Hannibal, and
Scipio Africanus); 34/35. 33 (eulogy of P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio and his family). The praise/blame duty of
history is reiterated; Cf. 23. 15. 1; 30. 15; 31. 15. 1; 32. 26. 1; 34/35. 9; 38/39. 18. 1. 8
The most logical explanation for this lack of uniformity in the Bibliotheke is that Diodorus' sources did not all concern
themselves with the purely ethical function of history to the same degree or in the same way. Ephorus was Diodorus'
main authority for Books 11-16 (below pp. 49 f.). We shall therefore first look at Ephorus before turning to Diodorus'
other and later sources. How much of the moralizing in Diodorus is due to Ephorus? The case for the praise/blame task
of history seems clear enough.
The Evagoras of Isocrates was, as the author himself says, the first ever encomium in prose on a contemporary. 9 And
it set a pattern for imitation. It was meant to praise Evagoras as a good and valiant prince, and Isocrates puts forward
the view that such men ought to be eulogized because, being contemporaries, the truth could be employed in
composing their encomia, and also because the younger generation would thus be encouraged to emulate and even
surpass them (9. 5ff., 77). The genre proved popular. We possess Xenophon Agesilaus and we hear of encomia on
Gryllus, Mausolus, Philip, Alexander, and others. 10 The tradition that Ephorus and Theopornpus were the pupils of
Isocrates is a firm one 11 and all we know about these two, the most influential
____________________
10
Diog. Laert. 2.55; FGH 115 TT6, 8, 48; FF 255 -7; cf. Isocr. 5. 17; Blass, ii. 284.
11
FGH 70 TT 1ffff., 8, 27f.
8
The fragments are enumerated according to the Loeb edn. vols. xi and xii.
9
9. 5ff. Before this time prose encomia were on mythical persons; cf. Gorgias' as well as Isocrates' On Helen. Arist.
Rhet. 1368a, however, claims priority for an encomium on a Thessalian called Hippolochus.
-6historians of the fourth century, indicates that they incorporated Isocratean features into their historical works, in
particular the kind of moralizing which laid emphasis on praise and censure. 12 Whether Isocrates himself advocated a
certain form of historical writing remains uncertain and does not in any case concern us here. 13
For the character of Theopompus' history we have the testimony of an ancient admirer, none other than Dionysius of
Halicarnassus. It is in basic agreement with the surviving fragments. Theopompus wrote about things or
U=1F71 not just because they were entertaining, but also because they were beneficial to his readers. 14 He
wrote about the foundations of cities, the lives of kings, the customs of nations, Greek and barbarian, . . .
. And he did so voluminously, for the benefit of man. He looked into the souls of men to divine
causes which earned him the reputation of being 2, but really he was performing the duty of a surgeon. He
was always ready to reproach cities and generals for their villainous designs and unjust deeds, .
It is thus clear that for Theopompus history had a definite ethical role to play.
The tradition that Isocrates once remarked that Theopompus needed the bridle, Ephorus the spur (FGH 70 T28) is
probably not historical, but its implication seems to be that Ephorus was more restrained than Theopompus, and it
indeed appears that he did not exhibit the bitterness and propensity to cheap gossip of Theopompus. Otherwise there
cannot have been much difference between the two, and the fragments as well as the assessment of Polybius show
that the ethical character of the Bibliotheke was very much the character of Ephorus' universal history too. Polybius
states that Ephorus was . . . . . . , . . .
(12. 28. 10 = FGH 70 T23); and in fact he seems to be following
____________________

15

12

Cf. Avenarius, 1956: 157ff. Contra Sacks, 1990: 24ff., but see the present author's review, 1991: 391f.
Cf. Beck, 1964: 277ff.; Bradford Welles in Studies Caplan, 3ff.; Schepens, 1977: 100f.; Hamilton, 1979: 290ff.
14
Cf. Isocr. 2. 48f. Homer and the tragic poets successfully combined with .
15
Dion. Hal. Ad Pomp. 6. For Theopompus' improper writing see Polybius' criticism at 8. 10 (12). 1-2. On
Theopompus in general, Connor, 1968: chs. 1 and 6.
13

-7the example of Ephorus in his practice of assigning praise and blame whenever and wherever he judges it appropriate
to do so. 16 FGH 70 F42 shows the didactic, through paradeigmata, nature of Ephorus' history, while F 191, frr. 2-6, a
good instance of the sort of parekbasis praised by Polybius, proves that Ephorus, transferring Isocratean usage to the
realm of history, appraised public men morally at the end of their lives. Also that the eulogies and censures in Diodorus
Books 11-15 have their roots in Ephorus: F 191 frr. 2-6=11. 58. 4-59. 17 What of the second half of the Bibliotheke?
Diodorus based Books 28-32 on Polybius, and Polybius as we have seen was a fervent practitioner of the kind of ethical
historiography which gave public men their due. At 4. 20. 5 (=FGH 70 F8) he quotes with approval a distinction
between history and music from the general preface of Ephorus. Ephorus had probably argued that the duty of history
in contrast to music was not to thrill, but to instruct. Diodorus' eulogies of Philopoemen, Hannibal, and Scipio Africanus
are derived from Polybius and are exactly in the Ephoran form (D 29. 18ff. = Polyb. 23. 12-14). Nor did Polybius ever
fall to draw the moral lesson of history, and Diodorus must have found him fertile ground indeed; cf. D 30. 17 = Polyb.
28. 21; 18 30. 18 = Polyb. 28. 18; 32. 26. 1 = Polyb. 38. 4. 8. Occasionally Diodorus would tamper with Polybius' text
in order to render the moral lesson more prominent; cf. 31. 15 = Polyb. 30. 18 -- Diodorus repeats the praise/blame
duty of history and alters the reaction of the senate to highlight Prusias' worthlessness.
After Polybius, Posidonius formed Diodorus' main authority. It is thought that Posidonius did not bestow epainoi and
psogoi though his history did not lack an ethical side. The moralizing, it has been said, was implicit and subject to the
pragmatic concep____________________
16
Cf. 2. 56. 11f.; 6. 11. 10; 10. 21. 8; 18. 41. 1; HCP ii. 223; Avenarius, 1956: 157 ff.
17
Cf. FGH 70 T23 n. The attribution to Ephorus of P. Oxy. xiii. 1610 (F191) by its first editors, Grenfell and Hunt ( P.
Oxy. xiii. 98 ff.), has found wide support. It has been questioned by Africa, 1962: 86ff. (cf. also Milns, Vindex
Humanitatis, 56f.) and though his strictures on the editors' over-enthusiastic use of D in restoring the fragments
are not entirely unjust, the arguments of Grenfell and Hunt for Ephorus remain sufficient.
18
I cannot see that D has garbled Polybius' censure of Ptolemy Physcon as Drews, 1962: 384 n. 7 , claims.
-8tion of historiography. 19 It is noticeable, however, that Athenaeus found Posidonius very much to his taste. The
impression one gets from the fragments is of a highly sensationalist historian. 20 Whatever the truth, it would be safe
to assume that Diodorus was by this time (he had already written thirty-two books) well accustomed to applying
epainoi and psogoi, and that he did so whenever a suitable opportunity presented itself in Posidonius' narrative; cf.
34/35. 9; 34/35. 33; 38/39. 18. 1.
For the similar instances in Books 21-7 (Cf. 21. 1; 23. 15; 24. 5; 25. 10. 5; 26. 1. 3; 26. 4; 27. 6. 2. Chapters 23. 15
and 26. 24 were inspired by Polybius; see n. 21), one must again assume that Diodorus was either following the
example of his authorities or reverting to the didactic habits of Ephorus after the interval of Books 17-20. The problem
is that the sources for Books 21-7 are uncertain, with the exception of Philinus and those sections deriving from
Polybius. 21 Philinus probably provided Diodorus with his narrative of the First Punic War. 22 Unfortunately we know
very little about the character of Philinus' history. 23
Two important points ought to be stressed. First, it should be noted that the elaborate moral appraisements of Books
11-15 are really confined to Books 11 and 15. The deaths of such personages as e.g. Cimon, Pericles, and Dionysius
are passed over almost in
____________________
19
Cf. FGH iic. 160. For Posidonius the historian in general see Strasburger, 1965: 40ff.
20
This is not to ignore the warnings of Brunt, 1980: 477ff., that mere fragments can be seriously misleading as to the
character of a lost work. FGH 87 F36, however, is long enough to provide us with a genuine flavour of Posidonius'
Histories. Brunt cautions that a single long excerpt, like this one, 'might in principle be uncharacteristic. We should
get a very false impression of Thucydides, if the only substantial part of his work that survived were the stories of
Cylon, Pausanias, and Themistocles in 1. 126-38' (1980: 483). And so we should, though the analogy to draw for
F36 is not with the stories of Cylon, Pausanias, and Themistocles, but rather with the account of Cleon which is not
uncharacteristic of Thucydides. F36, the story of Athenion and the establishment of his 'tyranny' at Athens c.87,
was no digression in Posidonius, but central to his main narrative.
21
It seems best to accept that D based Books 23 and 24 on Philinus (cf. Schwartz, RE v. 688), and that he did not
begin to rely almost entirely on Polybius till Book 28 ( Schwartz, RE v. 689ff.). But he had already made at least a
partial use of Polybius. The Carthaginian Mercenary War in Book 25 is usually thought to derive from Polybius; see
Walbank, HCP i. 130f.
22
Both D 23. 15 and Polyb. 1. 35 are thought to have based their similar remarks on Atilius Regulus on Philinus; see
HCP i. 92 f.
23
In spite of La Bua, 1966: 262ff.; cf. Badian review, Riv. di filol. 96 ( 1968), 203ff. In fact Philinus may have had not
dissimilar historiographical conceptions to those of Polybius; see Walbank, 1945a: 1 ff. and esp. 10f.
-9

silence. It is difficult to believe that Ephorus did not comment formally on the passing of these men. 24 The conclusion
must, therefore, be that Diodorus, in spite of his promise at 15. 88. 1 and elsewhere, was inconsistent in this respect
as in all others. The brief remarks on Pericles (12. 46. 1) and Philistus (16. 36. 3f. may be all that is left of lengthier
Ephoran appraisements. (I am assuming here what I shall attempt to show below, i.e. that the substance of the
western narratives in Diodorus is based on Ephorus.)
Second, Diodorus was obviously free to mould the epainoi and psogoi in his own image, though the extent to which he
did so is not always possible to gauge and it should certainly not be exaggerated. Drews is unconvincing when he
argues that nearly all of the moralizing in Diodorus Books 11-15 is Diodorus' own and should not be ascribed to
Ephorus for, as we have seen, all the available evidence indicates that Ephorus was not as devoid of the moralizing
element as Drewsimagines. 25 It is an unproven assumption that 15. 88, the encomium on Epaminondas, is 'a
patchwork paragraph which Diodorus may have assembled from his reading of
Ephorus' and from elsewhere. 26 In particular, to claim that the moral qualities of the great man mentioned by
Diodorus cannot be due to Ephorus, for Ephorus can only have concerned himself with the military ability of
Epaminondas, is to misunderstand the character of Ephorus work.
The moral qualities and education of public men were very much the concern of Ephorus as of his teacher Isocrates. 27
Indeed, paideia may have been one of the unifying themes of Ephorus' universal history. It would appear that he saw
the possession of paideia or agoge by the citizens of a state, but especially by their leaders, as central to its well-being.
28
I am not, therefore, convinced that the paideia of Epaminondas which intrudes repeatedly into the Bibliotheke (10.
11. 2; 15. 39. 2; 52. 7; 16. 2. 2f.) is not an
____________________
24
Alcibiades and Agesilaus were both 'grey areas', good as well as bad, and Ephorus perhaps did not moralize on
their passing, preferring clear instances of good or bad; cf. pp. 119f.
25
1962: 386 and n. 15. Drews' view is now argued further by Sacks, 1990: 25 ff.
26
1962: 389.
27
Isocrates considered himself an educator if anything. For his proud concept that Athens was the very School of
Hellas see 4. 50; 15. 295f. Cf. too Dion. Hal. Isocr. 1. For the high occurrence of the words , , and
in Isocrates see Preuss, Index Isocrateus, s.vv.
28
See pp. 112 f. below and cf. Schepens, 1977: 116f.; Burde, 1974: 19ff.
-10Ephoran contribution, and there is in fact firm evidence that it is. Strabo 9 C 400f. ( FGH 70 F119) tells us that while
Ephorus praised Boeotia for its natural advantages, he had nothing good to say about the Boeotian leaders, for these
men generally lacked agoge and paideia and thus limited the success their country could have enjoyed. The short-lived
exception was Epaminondas and in

same opinion is expressed in Diodorus 15. 79. 2 and 88. 4.

29

Nothing could be clearer regarding the Ephoran viewpoint. When of course Diodorus makes Epaminondas and Conon
contemporaries, while Agesilaus is said to have lived a little earlier (15. 88. 2; but see n. there), we should see this as
one of Diodorus' frequent blunders, as when Plato and Aristotle are assigned to the pentecontaetia (12. 1. 5). But
these typically Diodoran confusions should not be seen as proof that the substance of what is being said does not
derive from Ephorus. We should rather see 12. 1-2. 1 and 15. 88 as botched summaries of Ephoran encomia on Athens
and Epaminondas respectively. Greek (primarily Attic) learning praised at 12. 1. 4f. was a theme to which Ephorus
must have returned again and again, and at 15. 76. 4 we appear to have the remnants of such an instance (see n.
there).
It was seen above that throughout the Bibliotheke divine justice is active in punishing wrongdoing and it is not
unreasonable to assume that this reflects Diodorus' own personal beliefs. This should not, however, be taken to mean
that instances of this in the Bibliotheke did not originate in some form in the sources. Whenever checks can be applied,
the unwisdom of drawing too sharp a distinction between Diodorus and his sources is seen again and again. While it is
true that in Polybius, for example, C
____________________
29
Thus also Arist. Rhet. 1398b; Justin 6. 8. 1-3 and Nepos, Epam. 10. 4. And see Polyb. 6. 43. 4ff.; Plut. Pel. 4; Mor.
864d. The Boeotians were proverbially dullwitted and it may well have occurred to many in the educated circles in
Athens and elsewhere to associate the 'flash in the pan' Theban hegemony with the meteoric careers of
Epaminondas (who had received philosophical training) and Pelopidas. It is not unlikely that Callisthenes was one of
these, though the Aristotle passage does not prove it; nor does it prove that Ephorus borrowed his interpretation
from Callisthenes (as was suggested to me by Simon Hornblower in a letter dated 21 Oct. 1995).
-11 is very rarely mentioned as dealing out retribution, yet Polybius did not really distinguish between
and (nor did Diodorus, it would appear), and many instances are to be found in his history of Tyche
punishing wrongdoing and sacrilege, instances adopted to a greater or lesser extent by Diodorus. 30 In the case of
Ephorus too, it would seem, the gods did not often miss their chance to intervene benevolently in human affairs,
punishing the wicked and profane and rewarding the good. Strabo 9 C 422. provides a particularly good example not
only of this aspect of Ephorus, but also of his tendency to rationalize myths and of the high regard in which he held the
Delphic oracle. It was in the course of his discussion of the origins and nature of the Spartan constitution (commonly
ascribed to an oracular response) that Ephorus stated the view (one with which Xenophon would have agreed
wholeheartedly) that a person lacking in proper respect of the gods () was most unlikely to be just in his
dealings with men (7. 12. 7).

The account of the Sacred War in Book 30 of the Histories was of course written by Demophilus, but there is every
reason to suppose that the minds of father and son worked in the same way in this respect. A major theme of that
account was the sacrilegious conduct of the Phocian leaders, their families, followers, and allies; and the divine
punishment which befell them all: 16. 14. 3; 16. 61-4; FGH 70 F96 (Athenaeus). Athenaeus' quotation from
Demophilus leaves the fate of the wives of the Phocian leaders incomplete and should not be taken to represent all
that could have been found in Book 30 on the subject. The wives' ultimate fate is given by Diodorus (16. 64. 2). There
is no need, therefore, to suppose 31 that Diodorus, in this instance at least, having decided that his source did not go
far enough, turned to an alternative source which drove the moral lesson home fully. In contrast to this, Ephorus and
Demophilus stressed the good fortune of Philip who had championed the Delphic oracle (16. 1. 4; 16. 64. 3). Widely
held at the time, this point of view is well and eloquently put by Aeschines in his speech Against Ctesiphon (132ff.),
delivered in 330. The attitude of Ephorus to the gods and the supernatural is further illustrated by his treatment of the
earthquakes and tidal waves which struck the coast of Achaea in 373.
____________________
30
Cf. HCP i. e.g. 20f., 20 n. 6, 93, 147.
31
As does Drews, 1962: 390f.
-12While not neglecting to cite the natural explanations of the catastrophe of the physicists, it is clear from Diodorus'
account that he was himself inclined to accept a religious interpretation (15. 48f.). Ephorus' piety nevertheless, as
befitted a pupil of Isocrates, was guided by paideia. Mere superstition he seems to have abhorred, as shown by
Diodorus' comments on Epaminondas' handling of the omens prior to the battle of Leuctra (15. 52ff.).
A particular problem is the assessment of the incidence of Tyche in Ephorus and its relation to Diodorus. The Ephoran
fragments are of no help. Only once does the word occur (F63) and then its meaning is that of an accidental
happening. But Tyche, viewed as an agent or cause outside human control, whether personal (providence, fate) or
impersonal, 32 can hardly have been absent from Ephorus. It figures very significantly in Isocrates 33 and Demosthenes
34
and it was certainly a characteristic of Theopompus (see p. 7 ). It must, therefore, have been present in Ephorus
too. The difficulty is to distinguish between those Tyche references which are Ephoran and those which are Diodoran.
The term, it is true, occurs throughout the Bibliotheke and may thus reflect Diodorus' own thinking. But it is clear that
in many, if not indeed most, instances Diodorus did not initiate, but merely adopted the opinion of his sources. The
unaccountability of Tyche at 12. 62. 6, for example, obviously derives from Thucydides (4. 12. 3) through Ephorus. As
far as the books which are not based on Ephorus are concerned, it is evident that Tyche is very much an integral part
of the narrative of Book 17, 35 and it should logically be attributed to the source or sources 'used for that book.
Similarly, it is frequently the case that the action of Tyche in Books 18-20 can be traced back to Diodorus' sources with
some confidence. For example, there is no reason why Hieronymus should not be credited with the references to Tyche
at 18. 8. 7; 18.
____________________
32
The definitions are those in the Liddell and Scott Lexicon. Both meanings are well attested in Classical writers and
in Hellenistic writers they are of course ubiquitous.
33
Cf. 6. 47, the instability of human fortunes because of Tyche. Cf. too the many other instances of Tyche in
Isocrates in Preuss, Index Isocrateus, s.v.
34
Cf. Preuss, Index Demosthenicus, s.v.
35
At 6. 3; 20. 1; 29. 4; 31. 6; 35. 7; 38. 5; 46. 2; 46. 6-47; 59. 7; 66. 2, 4; 69. 6; 101. 2; 107. 2; 108. 6; 116. 1.
There are a number of 'ordinary' uses of Tyche too in the sense of the verb , e.g. at 13. 5;94. 3; 115. 6.
Cf. Sinclair, 1963: 41f. on Tyche in Book 17.
-13-

13. 4; 18. 20. 1; 41. 6; 42. 1; 53. 7; and 67. 4. Sections 59. 4-60. 1 seem to be an instance where Diodorus
elaborated Hieronymus. 36
Let us look specifically at Book 15. There are seven instances of Tyche, at 33. 1; 33. 3; 54. 5; 63. 1; 63. 2; 82. 6
and 84. 2. Also one of at 74. 4 and one of at 80. 3. The is mentioned in
connection with the death of Dionysius. Ch. 74 may not, however, derive from Ephorus, but from Timaeus (see p.
84 ). What of 33. 1ff.? It is quite possible that Ephorus, in putting into the mouth of Agesilaus an excuse as to
why the king had not attacked the strong allied positions, included a reference to the workings of Tyche. But the
sententious statement at 33. 3, + +
, is likely to be an addition by Diodorus to highlight the moral point. At 54. 5 we are told that
Jason persuaded the Spartans and the Thebans to respect + and conclude a truce.
Something similar is stated by Xenophon (H. 6. 4. 23) so that we may assume that the mutability of the human
condition was mentioned in this context by Diodorus' source. The tone of 63. 1f. is eulogistic and quite consistent
with what Ephorus would have written on the Spartan appeal and the Athenian decision to help. Athens enjoyed a
reputation for always helping the weak and needy which her panegyrists never failed to mention (63. 2n.), and
certainly Ephorus would not have failed to do so when opportunity arose. The references to Tyche are simple and
straightforward (cf. Isocr. 5. 44; X. H. 6. 5. 45), and they may well have occurred in the Ephoran text. The two
references at 82. 6 and 84. 2 are likewise simple and unadorned and are paralleled in Polyb. 9. 8. 13 where,
however, Polybius cannot resist adding his own comment on the unpredictability of Tyche.
+, he says, meaning Callisthenes and Ephorus. Callisthenes was probably the one who blamed Tyche
for the failure of Epaminondas. Ephorus adopted this explanation and thus it found its way into the Bibliotheke
(see also 82. 6n.).
As a general rule, therefore, we should suspect wordy expositions of the power of Tyche. But there is no reason
why we should reject as non-Ephoran simple and to-the-point references to Tyche such as those found in
Isocrates (see n. 33.

____________________
36
Hornblower, 1981: 106 and passim, agrees that Tyche played a part in the Histories of Hieronymus though
she thinks that he 'perhaps gave less prominence' to its role than Polybius.
-14-

c) Style and diction

In a fundamental study J. Palm has shown that Diodorus' late Hellenistic Greek has stamped itself on the entire work
independently of the sources used. 37 This does not nevertheless mean that the language of the sources has been
totally obliterated. Far from it. Diodorus did not abridge uniformly and systematically. Sometimes he copied from a
source verbatim; more frequently he paraphrased (see p. 132 ). But even when paraphrasing Diodorus was not beyond
being influenced by the diction of his sources. At times, when struck by a word or phrase, he would retain it.
at 45. 1 is almost certainly Ephoran, as is at 82. 6 (cf.n. ad loc.) and at 90.
1, 3. Similarly, the description of Sparta as at 15. 65. 1 and 81. 2. 38 Much of the Ephoran terminology is
retained too; see 19. 2 n.; 34. 4n. One might further point to the proximity in language sometimes exhibited between
Diodorus, Polybius, and Plutarch, certainly the result of the use of a common source (see p. 105 ). On the other hand
he would sometimes replace obscure terms with more up-to-date ones intelligible to his readers. Section 62. 2 may be
one such case (but see n. ad loc) and cf. 22. 2n. and 54. 5-56n. for instances of Diodorus both retaining Ephoran
terminology and substituting his own.
In spite of Photius' praise 39 Diodorus' is not an attractive style. The empty and inept rhetoric and the poverty of
vocabulary are its most irritating characteristics. It is an almost formulaic way of writing. Embassies, military
preparations, campaigns, battles, sieges are related repeatedly, but with little variation in their description. Diodorus is
not interested in an event per se, but only in what that event can offer by way of moral instruction or entertainment.
Hence it does not really matter to him if that event is narrated in very much the same way as other events. One
Diodoran battle, for example, is very much like another. They are frequently described as or -certainly not Ephoran words 40 for they are found throughout the Bibliotheke; cf. 11. 7. 1 11. 12. 6; 11. 32. 2; 12. 6.
2; 15. 3. 6; 16. 86. 2; 18. 14. 3; 18. 44. 4;
____________________
37
Palm, 1955; see also Hornblower, 1981: 263ff. and cf. Chamoux, pp. lxix ff.
38
Cf. ML no. 95; Lys. 33. 7.
39
Bibliotheke cod. 70, Bud edn., R. Henry, i. 103.
40
As Jacoby thought: FGH iic. 12.
-1519. 83. 4; 19. 89. 2; 20. 87. 3; 20. 89. 2. 41 They often begin with trumpets sounding the charge; cf. 15. 55. 3; 85. 3;
17. 33. 4; 19-30. 1; 41. 3. There is almost always a high point when victory hangs in the balance and can go either
way. Then something occurs, the death of a general or the intensified efforts of his opponents, and the issue is
decided; cf. at random 15. 3. 6; 15. 17. 1; 16. 4. 5ff.; 16. 12. 3ff.; 16. 86. 2f.; 17. 11. 4ff.; 17. 33. 6ff.; 18. 32. 1;
19. 41. 3-42; 19. 83f. 42 The height of absurdity is reached when the Athenian fiasco before the walls of Amphipolis in
422 is given this treatment, both sides being said to have fought +, the battle being to begin with,
and both leaders exhibiting (12. 74. 1f.)! This surely cannot be Ephorus.
Many of the words and phrases, often mere clichs, making up Diodorus' descriptions are monotonously similar if not
precisely the same. Successful statesmen and generals, for instance, are invariably described as in or
and ; cf., again at random, 15. 16. 2; 15. 21. 1; 15. 29. 2; 15. 56. 3; 16. 18. 1; 16. 48. 2;
16. 65. 2; 17. 7. 2; 18. 13. 6. When they fall in battle they do so + or +; cf.
15. 17. 1; 15. 21. 2; 15. 55. 3; 16. 48. 5; 16. 63. 1; 17. 63. 4; 18. 15. 3. These and countless other such expressions
are so stereotyped that they are meaningless in themselves.
Such repetitive language of course facilitated the task of an epitomator, though historical accuracy could suffer in the
process. To give some examples, Diodorus is inaccurate when he says that the Spartans Cleombrotus in
371 and Polytropus in 370 (51. 4; 62. 1; see nn.). But in this way he saves himself the trouble of explaining the
precise circumstances of the events. Of course, we should not treat every instance of as hiding further
detail. at 45. 4 and 46. 3 (cf. 46. 2 ) means just that. Also, Diodorus is very fond of the adverb
which he uses frequently, even when inappropriate in the context; cf. 13. 19. 4; 47. 4; 52. 1; 61. 2; 63. 4;
15. 21. 2; 25. 4; 26. 2; 36. 1f.; 52. 2; 20. 31. 5. Some of these instances are factual; others are not. (For two more
examples of Diodoran usage see p. 133.)
It might be worth noticing one or two characteristics of Diodorus' poor, epitomator's style. The heavy reliance on
adverbs
____________________
41
FGH 70 F191 proves that the expression is not Ephoran; see pp. 132 f.
42
Barber, 1935: 143f. and Meister, 1975: 74, ascribe these standardized descriptions to Ephorus. F191 (see previous
n.) proves otherwise.
-16-

is one such. There are, for example, no less than ten in 15. 1, while the short chapter 26 contains eight. Another
trait of a poor stylist is the inept way of introducing persons and places into a narrative, though this could also be
the result of careless abridgement of his sources; cf. 11. 64. 4 -- Ithome is now named when earlier, in 64. 1, it
was simply referred to as ; 12. 39. 1 -- Pericles is now called formally 'son of Xanthippus' after he
has been mentioned several times in the previous sections; 15. 91. 5 -Mithrobarzanes is given his name when in
91. 2 he was introduced as the nameless of Datames; cf. 15. 34. 3f. -- Pollis' ethnikon and title are
repeated. 43
In the preface to Book 20 Diodorus inveighs against those historians who weighed down their works with long
speeches. And in point of fact the Bibliotheke is largely free from this ancient historiographical device. But not
entirely so for Diodorus decided to include speeches when the situation demanded it (20. 2. 1), though his criteria
when he does do so defy comprehension. At 13. 52. 2 he describes the speech of the Spartan envoy Endius as
brief and laconic; + , he says. On the other hand the speeches
at Syracuse three years earlier are considerably longer (13. 20ff.). A small number of speeches are found
elsewhere too, for example, at 13. 102 and 14. 65ff. There are none in Book 15.

2. THE GENERAL PLAN AND DATE OF WRITING

OF THE BIBLIOTHEKE
At. 1. 4. 6-5. 1 Diodorus gives an outline of the whole work as it stood at its completion. It consisted of forty
books. The first six dealt with the period before the Trojan War. The following eleven were a universal history
from the Trojan War to the death of Alexander, and the remaining twenty-three gave an account of all subsequent
events down to the beginning of Caesar's Gallic War which fell in the first year of the 180th Olympiad when
Herodes
____________________
43
We may compare the new fragment of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (P), Koenen, 1976: 70ff. (=McKechnie and
Kern, 30, 32) lines 10, 17f., 23f., 47. P was not noted for his style (cf. Bruce, 18ff.;McKechnie and Kern,
22ff.). Of course such instances might also be explained as the result of D's careless abridgement of his
source; cf. e.g. 14. 32. 4 -- the Three Thousand suddenly drop into the narrative, D having previously
neglected to mention them.
-17-

was archon at Athens (60/59 BC). In order to make his historical compilation readily serviceable to the readership he
was aiming for, it was Diodorus' express intention to provide it with a firm chronological framework (1. 3. 2, 8). He
therefore informs the reader that whereas he made no attempt to fix accurately events before the Trojan War,
(1. 5. 1), he followed Apollodorus in assigning 80 years to
the period from the Trojan War to the Return of the Heraclids and 328 years to the 1st Olympiad, reckoning the dates
by the reigns of the Spartan kings. From the 1st Olympiad to the start of the Gallic War, the limit of his work, he
calculated 730 years. Thus the entire Bibliotheke, he tells us, embraced 1,138 years, + +
+ + (1. 5. 1). Something is seriously amiss here, as 730 years from the 1st
Olympiad give us 46/5 and not 60/59 BC; nor can the figure 730 alone be wrong because of the sum
80+328+730=1138. And yet twice Diodorus insists that his work closed with the beginning of the Gallic War (1. 4. 7;
1. 5. 1), and in fact the surviving fragments run out with the late 60s. We may, therefore, accept his statement that,
as it stood completed, the Bibliotheke reached down to the year 60/59 BC, and reject his figures as mistaken in some
way. And the mistake is certainly Diodorus'. But this bears directly on the date of writing and the original (and
unfulfilled) scope of the Bibliotheke. There are a number of significant passages:
1. Sections 3. 38. 2f.; 5. 21. 2; 5. 22. 1: Diodorus accompanies references to Caesar's achievements in Britain with
the undertaking to relate these when he comes to deal with Caesar's deeds. Taken together with the figures in 1. 5. 1,
this all but proves that Diodorus' original intention had been to bring his narrative down to the year 46/5 when Caesar
can be said to have rounded off his deeds with the final battle of the civil war. And if that was the original intention
then clearly Diodorus cannot have begun writing before that date. 44 It has been suggested nevertheless that Diodorus
was at work on the Bibliotheke at least as early as 56 BC. At 1. 44. 1 (cf. 1. 46. 7) Diodorus says that he visited Egypt
in the 180th Olympiad (60/59-57/6 BC) when Ptolemy the New Dionysus (Ptolemy XI, 80-51 BC) was king. And a little
further on, in computing the various periods of foreign as well as native rule in Egypt, he states that the Macedonians,
the last of the foreign
____________________
44
Rubincam, 1987: 325, 327, argues similarly.
-18-

rulers, ruled for 276 years (1. 44. 4). The 276 years are consequently subtracted from 331/0 BC, the year
Alexander captured Egypt according to Diodorus, and the resulting date, 56/5 BC (counting inclusively), is taken

as proof that Book I was already being written in that year. 45 But this cannot be. How could Diodorus start writing
in the 50s and intend to bring his history down to 46/5 BC? 46 The problem of 1. 44. 4 disappears if we ignore the
precise figure of 276 years and appreciate that the computations in 1. 44 are not done down to a specific year of
any significance, but to the 180th Olympiad when Diodorus visited Egypt. That is all. There is no hint that he was
writing at that time. As he puts it, 'they say that the country has been ruled by men for almost 5,000 years down
to the 180th Olympiad during which we visited Egypt when Ptolemy the so-called New Dionysus was king' (1. 44.
1). Sixty-nine Olympiads intervened (reckoning inclusively) between the 112th Olympiad when Alexander
conquered Egypt and the 180th, i.e. 276 years. It was, of course, misleading of Diodorus, as well as unnecessary,
to translate the sixty-nine Olympiads into years. As it happens, the figure of 5,000 years itself is that of the
original chronology of his source (almost certainly Hecataeus) which Diodorus has neglected to bring up to date, 47
in the same way that he neglected to correct the figures in 1. 5. 1. 48
2. Sections 1. 4. 7; 4. 19. 2; 5. 21. 2; 5. 25. 4; 32. 27. 1, 3: The deification of Julius Caesar is mentioned. The
wording seems to point to the official recognition of Caesar as a god by the senate on 1 January 42 BC. (He
gained the eponymia of god for his arete: 32. 27. 3.) The first passage comes from the general preface which
Diodorus wrote and appended to Book 1 of the Bibliotheke at the work's completion. The rest of the passages, on
the other hand, are part of the narratives of Books 4, 5, and 32. At 3. 38. 2 Diodorus mentions Caesar, but not
his deification. This has therefore been
____________________
45
Oldfather, p. ix; cf. Burton, 40 n. 3.
46
Burton indeed sees this, but because of her insistence that Book 1 was being written as early as 56 she
creates considerable difficulties for herself: 40 f.
47
Murray, 1970: 145 n. 3: cf. n. 139.
48
Oldfather, p. viii, seems correct that D was in Egypt in the first year of the 180th Ol. On the other hand there
is no reason to assume that the Roman citizen killed by a mob was connected with a Roman embassy, or
indeed that there was a Roman embassy at all in Egypt at the time: + + +
+ (1. 83. 8) need not mean an embassy. And, pace Sacks, 1990: 165, (1. 83. 9) could be of a
short duration.
-19-

taken by some as an indication that Books 1, 2, and 3 were written before Caesar's deification and the rest of the
Bibliotheke after that date. 49 It would be nice if we could rely on this observation because it would provide us with a
terminus ante quem as well as a terminus post quem for the writing of the Bibliotheke. Unfortunately for the view
Caesar is also mentioned at 5. 22. 1 without being called a god. Diodorus is inconsistent if he is anything and we
should not make too much of 3. 38. 2. Those who would have Diodorus writing the early books at least in the 50s (see
above) need to prove that the passages in question are all later additions, added perhaps at the time the Bibliotheke
was being revised. 50 Not only is there no such proof, but the indications are that Diodorus never did revise his work
(witness e.g. the inappropriate figures discussed above and see pp. 137 ff.).
3. Section 12. 26. 1: Diodorus refers to the rostra which had 'at that time' (+ . . . ) stood in front of the Curia.
As these were removed by Caesar c. 45 BC, Book 12 must have been written some years after that date. 51
4. Section 16. 7. 1: the Roman colony at Tauromenium mentioned here was almost certainly sent out in 36 BC.

52

5. Sections 13. 35. 3 and 16. 70. 6: in the first passage Diodorus says that Diocles' laws remained in force in many
Sicilian cities until the time all the Siceliots were granted Roman citizenship. In the second, that the amphipoly (an
eponymous magistracy) retained its importance at Syracuse for more than 300 years, from 343/2 when it was
instituted by Timoleon, until the Romansn shared their citizenship with the Siceliots, which was the time the
Bibliotheke was being written. It would appear then that Diodorus is not here referring to the grant of ius Latii to the
communities of Sicily by Caesar ( Cicero, Ad Atticum 14. 12. 1), but to a full enfranchisement by Sextus Pompeius
after 43 BC. 53 The references thus provide us with a terminus post quem for Books 13 and 16 ( 43 BC), though not
with a terminus ante quem, 54 even if we accept
____________________
49
Cf. Sartori, 1983: 547; accepted by Sacks, 1990: 171, who, however, points out that Caesar was being called a
god from the day of his funeral. If so, this would push the terminus back to spring 44.
50
Thus e.g. Burton, 41 n. 1, though referring only to 5. 21. 2 and 5. 25. 4.
51
Cf. Casevitz, p. xi n. 1.
52
Cf. Rubincam, 1985: 521 f.
53
Sacks, 1990: 207ff.
54
As Sacks, 1990: 162 n. 6, 208, thinks.
-20that Augustus in 36 Bc deprived all or most Sicilians of their recently gained citizenship: in 13. 35. 3 and 16. 70. 6
Diodorus is concerned not with the fortunes of the Roman franchise in Sicily, but with those of the laws of Diocles and
the Syracusan amphipoly.
The above evidence leads to the conclusion that Diodorus began writing some time in the late 40s at the earliest, with
the initial intention of bringing his work down to 46/5. How long did the project last? The claims at 1. 4. 1, often
treated with more respect than they deserve, are not to be countenanced, even if a large part of the thirty-year period
were assigned to preparation. 55 The Bibliotheke is entirely derivative and Diodorus' methods slipshod, so much so that
the work could have been dashed off in a very few years. A superior writer like Dio Cassius wrote eighty books in
twelve years: 72. 23. 5. 56

A closely related question concerns the point at which Diodorus decided to stop with the year 60/59, contrary to his
original intention, and the reason for so doing. Sacks develops rather an interesting theory. 57 The abandonment of the
initial terminal date of 46/5, he thinks, was not fortuitous, but forced on Diodorus, a 'Greek migr' living in Rome who
'venerated Caesar', but 'had reason to abhor Caesar's nephew', 58 by a deteriorating political climate. Long before he
reached it, Diodorus had judged it unwise to treat the contentious period of 60-46 BC. Argued at length the thesis
appears unnecessarily contrived and oversubtle for a writer of the level of Diodorus, even if we agreed with Sacks that
the decision to stop with 60/59 was taken well in advance of it. And this does not quite follow from 32. 27. 3 where
Diodorus attached to his description of the destruction of Corinth in 146 a eulogy of Caesar apropos of his later
rebuilding of the city. Sacks
____________________
55
Cf., most recently, Chamoux, p. xxxiii. Similarly Sacks, 1990: 161 ff. , following Rubincam, 1987: 324 ff.,
envisages D as engaged in 'research' from 60/59 down to 46/5 and then as settling in Rome and writing until c.30
when the Bibliotheke was published. And see p. 77 : D 'spent years of research in Alexandria, possibly working in
the Great Library'! What, in any case, is the evidence that he began writing in 46/5?
56
Though ten years are also said to have been spent on gathering the necessary material. Nicolaus of Damascus, a
contemporary of D, may have taken no more than ten years to write his massive universal history of 144 books:
Wachsmuth, 1895: 105. But Nicolaus' dates are rather uncertain: Jacoby, FGH iic. 231.
57
1990: 160ff., esp. 172ff. Cf. also Rubincam, 1987: 327ff.
58
1990: 183.
-21-

insists 59 that the account of the actual refoundation of Corinth was the correct place for such a eulogy and
concludes that Diodorus must already have decided to go no further than 60/59. Perhaps, but as Diodorus never
intended to take his narrative down to 44 when Caesar was assassinated (and epainoi in Diodorus commonly come
at the end of a man's life: see pp. 5 ff.) any suitable point might do. Similar eulogistic comments which precede a
person's death and serve to herald a fuller treatment of the subject further on are not unknown in the Bibliotheke,
though generally Diodorus concludes his remarks with a promise to return to the matter in due course (cf. 15. 39;
16. 1. 3-6; 65. 9). Such a statement would not of course have been relevant to the purpose of the Byzantine
excerptor who may therefore have omitted it. Why, in any case, should a fervent admirer of Caesar hesitate to
describe his achievements, as he had promised (almost certainly several years after Caesar's death), in a Rome
dominated by the dictator's nephew? The real reason why Diodorus decided to stop with 60/59 may be a great deal
simpler. 60 It may well be that his chronographer ran out and at the same time he could not procure an account of
contemporary events suited to his methods and purposes. It may even be that he had decided on forty for his
number of books (see below), and having miscalculated (not for the first time: see p. 24 ) the length of one or more
of those dealing with events in the first century, he decided to bring the work to an end with 60/59, as convenient a
closing point as any. Such mundane reasons are far from impossible in the case of Diodorus. 61
The annalistic history of Books 11-40 presumably began when Diodorus had enough dated events at his disposal to
make such a system practicable. That, however, is not likely to have been the case before the beginning of the
series of Athenian archons. For the interval between the return of the Heraclids and the 1st Olympiad Diodorus
claims to have reckoned by the reigns of the Spartan kings (cf. FGH244 F63b, 64). From the 1st Olympiad to the
beginning of the archon series, the list of Olympiads would have sufficed for his purposes (cf. 2. 32. 3). When
necessary, with the aid of the chronographer, he would doubtless have resorted to
____________________
59
1990: 175 f.
60
Cf. also Stylianou, 1991: 394f.
61
For various other suggestions see Schwartz, RE v. 665; Oldfather, i, pp. xviii f.; Perl, 1957: 6f.; Laqueur, 1958:
285ff.; Burton, 39ff.
-22-

reckoning by intervals from an epochal event, the Trojan War in his case. Indeed, he is not averse to using this method
in later books too (cf. 14. 2. 4; 19. 1. 10; 20. 2. 3). Certainly Diodorus' annalistic system began before Book 10 (see
10. 3. 1 -- Pythagoras' floruit is dated by archon Thericles and the 61st Olympiad) and Book 9 may have been in that
form in its entirety, to judge from the contents (Athenian sixth-century history, Croesus, Cyrus the Great, etc.). Book
8, however, can only have been so in part. It covered the Messenian Wars, some early tyrants, foundations, etc.
Diodorus may have commented on his system as it was gradually introduced -- first the Olympiads, then the archons,
and finally the consuls.
Having decided on the overall plan Diodorus would then have turned his attention to the subject matter of the
individual books; not necessarily all forty at once, and one might even question that Diodorus made up his mind on
forty books from the beginning. But that is not at all unlikely. He may have adopted the number forty from Polybius
whose work he tried to imitate in other respects. 62 To facilitate his task he must have divided the great length of time
he had to cover into periods. That was only sensible. At 1. 4. 6f. he tells us that the Bibliotheke was divided into three
major parts and this must be what he planned in broad outline at the outset. Certainly the hexad of pre-Trojan deeds,
three Greek and three barbarian, represents his original plan. He must also have divided the period from the Trojan
War to the death of Alexander, and that from the latter event to the end of the work, into smaller, more manageable
units, though we can only guess what these were and how many books he assigned to each. The relevant statements
he makes at various points are only of limited help as they refer to what has already been written and not to his
original intentions. Nevertheless, it would be very surprising if Diodorus departed significantly from the original plan.
From the anticipatory remarks found scattered throughout the Bibliotheke it is evident that Diodorus must have read, if
only superficially, most of his sources, both the narrative and the chronographic, before he began writing. 63 In
addition he had his

____________________
62
Cf. Walbank, 1945b: 41; Hornblower, 1981: 25. His attempt to present his accounts in a year-by-year, region-byregion, form was probably borrowed from Polybius.
63
There are a great many of these remarks scattered throughout the Bibliotheke; see now Rubincam, 1989: 39 ff. To
her tabulation on p. 56 add 16. 50. 8.
-23- own knowledge, however deficient, of the past. It would not, therefore, have been particularly difficult to decide in
advance, almost certainly with the aid of the chronographer, on the number of books for each period and even on their
contents. For some of the books these would have been immediately obvious, for example, +
(360-336) naturally belonged in one book, as did + + (336-323). The period from the Peace of
Antalcidas (certainly a landmark and the beginning of Callisthenes' Hellenica) to the reign of Philip would readily
suggest another. The less obvious books would in the end be defined by the more obvious ones.
This method of working would have made for some inflexibility, but that would not have worried Diodorus; his
framework constructed, the narrative material would simply have to fit it. Certainly on a number of occasions Diodorus
explains that he cannot deal even with important events at length as that would destroy the symmetry of his work (cf.
1. 8. 10; 1. 29. 6; 2. 31. 10; 8. 12. 15). This does not constitute evidence for the above hypothesis and unfortunately
there is no such evidence to be had. 64 However, it seems most probable that Diodorus decided on the number of
books from the beginning and even on the specific contents of many of these books though obviously he was able to
introduce modifications as he went along if necessary. For example, it appears that the fact that the pentecontaetia is
split between two books, 11 and 12, is due to Diodorus' having run into difficulties with the size of Book 10 (see p. 104
). The same is true of Book 13. Diodorus had intended to conclude with the beginning of Dionysius' Second
Carthaginian War, that is, with the year 398, and he said so at 13. 1. 3. As, however, Book 13 grew to a length beyond
that of the average book, he decided to finish instead with the end of the Peloponnesian War in Greece and the end of
the First Carthaginian War in Sicily. Yet he did not hesitate to lie that the original intention had been fulfilled (13. 114.
3). The fact that this concluding paragraph is worded differently from all the others (almost as if by way of an apology)
indicates that Diodorus was aware of the inconsistency. 65
____________________
64
D occasionally refers back to books, twice by number too (at 16. 46. 5; 20. 57. 6), but almost never ahead (the
one exception is 11. 90. 4); but then neither does Polybius who certainly revised his work. See Rubincam, 1989.
65
Cf. + at 13. 114. 3 with + at 11. 92. 5; 12. 84. 4; 14.
117. 9; etc.; see Laqueur, 1958: 282. I cannot, however,
-24-

It should be noted that Diodorus is always anxious to define his books at the beginning and usually at the end of
each too. For the historical period he was able to do so exactly: Book 10 ended with the year previous to Xerxes'
crossing from Asia to Europe (11. 1. 1). Book 11 began with the year of Xerxes' invasion of Greece when Calliades
was archon at Athens and the 75th Olympiad was celebrated (11. 1. 1-2) and ended in the year before Cimon's
campaign against Cyprus (11. 1. 1; 92. 5; 12. 2. 3), and so on. These dated events were of course derived from
the chronographer. 66

3. THE SOURCES
(i) The framework

(a) The chronographer

The most obvious indication that Diodorus used a chronographic source is the series of Athenian archons, Roman
consuls, and Olympiads which provides a chronological framework for the Bibliotheke. The archons and Olympiads
quite evidently derive from a Greek chronographic source based ultimately on the system of Eratosthenes and
Apollodorus. 67 What though is the origin of the colleges of Roman magistrates and indeed of the rest of the
Roman material? The amount of this in Book 15 is so insignificant that it might as well be dealt with here as a
whole. It is not impossible that Diodorus found the colleges in a Greek chronographer, perhaps even in the very
same Greek chronographer he used for everything else. The Chronica of Castor of Rhodes is the obvious
candidate, 68 especially as the work very conveniently reached down to 61/60 BC. Schwartz objects that
____________________
agree with his complicated explanation, 281 ff., based on D's misuse of different sources. I see the
contradiction as evidence that the Bibliotheke was not revised. See also the preface to Book 17 (another large
book) where D says that at the same time as the deeds of Alexander he intends to relate
+ + , something he did not do, as he must have
been aware; see further p. 137.
66
Cf. Perl, 1957: 8 ff.
67
Though far from being infallible (see pp. 45 ff.), the general reliability of D's chronographer is recognized by
scholars; cf. Schwartz, RE v. 669; Hornblower, 1982a: 39 and n. 18.
68
As many have thought; cf. Perl, 1957: 141 n. 4.
-25-

Diodorus cannot have been aware of the Chronica because in 40. 8 he states that he did not fix the dates of events
prior to the Trojan War, since there existed no chronological record of them. 69 Castor, of course, had worked out such
a chronological system. However, the text of 40. 8 (an excerpt from a Constantinian collection) breaks off in midsentence. At 1. 5. 1, on the other hand, where Diodorus makes the very same point, he goes on to complete the

sentence by adding that for the period before the Trojan War there existed no trustworthy () chronology.
What does seem to exclude the possibility that Diodorus used the Chronica is something else. In Diodorus Athenian
and Roman magistrates are correlated in such a way that consuls enter into office during the year of the archon to
whom they correspond and not, as it has sometimes been thought, six months before it began. 70 Thus Euthydemus
the archon of 431/0 corresponds to the consuls of 430. 71 Castor, by contrast, appears to have equated the archon
year 61/0 with the consul year 61. 72
In fact, the peculiarities of the fasti in the Bibliotheke are best explained on the supposition that Diodorus extracted
this information from a list of chief Roman magistrates and then himself proceeded to introduce it into the framework
of archons and Olympiads of his Greek chronographer on the basis of well-known synchronisms. 73 One might further
accept the view that the fasti derive from a different source from the passages on Roman history. 74 The latter vary
from brief notices which give every appearance of deriving from a chronographer -- they are almost always at the end
of a year's narrative (cf. 11. 37. 7; 11. 40. 5; 53. 6; 68. 8; 12. 30. 6; 12. 34. 5; 12. 37. 1; 13. 6. 8; 42. 6; 14. 11. 6;
14. 34. 7; 43. 5; 15. 27. 4; 15. 35. 3; 47. 8) -- to fairly lengthy sections which clearly originated in a narrative source
(cf. 12. 24. 2-25; 64. 1-3; 14. 113-117. 7). In three instances Roman notices are sandwiched between what appear to
be Greek chronographic entries (16. 31. 7; 16. 36. 4; 45. 8). There are none at all in Books 17 and
____________________
69
RE v. 665.
70
Perl, 1957: 4 and n. 2.
71
And not 431. This invalidates Meyer's solution of D's muddle over the beginning of the Peloponnesian War,
Forschungen, ii. 504, followed by Gomme, HCT i. 4.
72
FGH 250 F5; Perl, 1957: 4f., 141f.; Cassola, ANRW ii. 30. 1. 743f. Contra Beloch, RG107ff.
73
Schwartz, RE v. 665; Perl, 1957: 83 f., 151 ff.
74
Perl, 1957: esp. 123 ff., 137f.; Cassola, ANRW ii. 30. 1. 739ff.
-2618. In Books 19 and 20 Roman affairs are related regularly, almost every year, and in relative detail.
It is thus possible to surmise that (a) Diodorus used consular fasti; (b) his Greek chronographer included brief notices
on Roman history and, of course, synchronisms (with e.g. the Sack of Rome); and (c) Diodorus in addition employed a
Romann historical handbook of some description, a narrative history perhaps, from which he extracted detail when he
so chose. 75
The main distinguishing features of the fash in Diodorus are as follows. As a general comment it is a fact that the
colleges are far less well preserved in Diodorus than, say, in Livy or the Fasti Capitolini (FC). The colleges are
frequently incomplete and the names corrupt 76 as a result of careless handling, and Diodorus himself, though the
main, is not the only culprit as shown by the serious differences in this respect between MS P and MS M. 77 More
specifically, for the years 386/5-382/1 Diodorus repeats the colleges of 391/90-387/6 (394-390 V (Varronian). In 15.
75. 1 (367/6) he mentions a year of anarchy which is in stark contrast to the five-year anarchy (solitudo
magistratuum) spoken of by Livy (6. 35. 10) and noticed in the FC (375-371 V). The college of 367 V is passed over
and the four 'dictator-years' which feature in the FC (333, 324, 309, and 301 V) are unknown to him, as also to Livy. 78
As it is fairly evident that all existing fasti have a common origin, 79 the various differences between them, when not
due to negligence or plain error, should be seen as the outcome of attempts to overcome certain difficulties of which
the chief was the need to accommodate the lists to synchronisms known from Greek sources. 80 It is then possible to
hypothesize that the repetition of the five colleges at the beginning of Book 15 was merely a device employed (possibly
by Diodorus himself) for the purpose of raising the college of magistrates in whose year Rome was known to have been
sacked by the Gauls to meet the year (387/6) in which this event had been dated by Greek historians. 81 The additional
years of
____________________
75
These conclusions are drawn primarily from and for Books 11-20.
76
This is readily shown by comparison with Broughton, MRR i. 89 ff. and CAH2, vii. 2. 629ff.; cf. Beloch, RG253 ff.;
Perl, 1957: 31 ff., 90ff.
77
Cf. Vial, p. xi n. 1 and see also nn. in the commentary.
78
Perl, 1957: 107ff.
79
Beloch, RG4ff.; and for the consular tribunes in D and Livy, see Drummond, 1978: 80ff.
80
Cf. Stuart Jones, CAH1 vii. 321 f.
81
Pinsent, 975: 10; Cornell, CAH2vii. 2. 348 f.; Cassola, ANRW ii. 30. 1. 735 ff.
-27-

anarchy and the 'dictator-years' were alternative means of achieving the same objective, and the Varronian
system appears to have resulted from the adoption of both devices. 82 It is not impossible that the fasti used by
Diodorus (like those used by Livy) did indicate a five-year period of anarchy, but that Diodorus erroneously
reduced this to one year, in the same way that he mistakenly overlooked the college of 367 V. His repetition of
the colleges of 394-390 V, therefore, may have been by way of compensating for this. 83
From 444 V until 391 V intermittently, and from 391 V until 367 V continuously, the consulship was replaced by
colleges of consular tribunes. 84 The latter, unbroken sequence of consular tribunes is dated 383/2-364/3 in
Diodorus, whose list is often in serious disagreement (mainly regarding the number of these annual magistrates)
with that of Livy and the FC. For a detailed treatment of the matter the reader is referred to the work of
Drummond. 85 His findings are cited in the commentary whenever applicable. His general conclusion, however, is
worth stating here. Wherever fewer names are given by Diodorus than Livy and the FC the fault seems to lie with
Diodorus and his copyists, and the additional names in Livy and the FC should not, therefore, be suspected as
interpolations. 86 It is also interesting to observe that down to c.395 V the figure Diodorus gives, as is his habit,
for the total number of annual magistrates before he names them is generally in agreement with the number of

names cited by Livy and the FC, though Diodorus himself may go on to name fewer tribunes. After c.395 V,
however, it is usually the case that the figure and the number of names subsequently cited are in agreement,
though often lower than the number of magistrates given by Livy and the FC. In addition, after c. 390 V Diodorus
seems to have taken greater care in reproducing the names on his Jist. 87 No explanation suggests itself for these
oddities except the obvious one, that Diodorus was inconsistent here as everywhere.
____________________
82
Cf. Cornell, CAH2 vii. 2. 349; and see Perl, 1957: 106ff. and Werner, 1963: 173 ff. for the time-gap between
the Varronian chronology and D's Roman dates.
83
Cf. Perl, 1957: 113f.
84
Designated military tribunes with consular powers in the sources. For the nature and functions of the consular
tribunate cf. Drummond, CAH2 vii. 2. 193 ff.
85
1980; cf. 1978: 87ff.
86
A tendency so to view them goes back to Mommsen, Forschungen, ii. 224ff., and is still to be seen in studies
such as Pinsent, 1975.
87
Drummond, 1980: 58f.
-28-

The commonest and simplest way in which the archon is given is + +. This accounts for 118 of
the 175 instances in Books 11-20 and it may well represent the formula of the chronographic source itself. 88
Frequently, however, this simple formula is rendered more elaborate and the elaboration, one assumes, is Diodorus'
own. When the simple formula is used a year's narrative is usually sealed with the phrase + +
+ or some such phrase (for a more sophisticated example cf. 11. 26. 8). The more elaborate
archon formulae on the other hand combine both functions of closing one year and introducing the next one. There
does not appear to be any logical pattern in these variations. They are undoubtedly conscious and due to Diodorus'
desire to vary his style, but on the whole he seems to have acted at random. An interesting break in his practice
occurs at 13. 38.1 when for the rest of Book 13 and the whole of Book 14 the simple formula is shunned and the less
simple one used. The simple formula reappears with a vengeance at the beginning of Book 15.
What is important about the Roman formulae is the verb and consequently they exhibit a little more variety than the
archon formulae. The simplest and most popular formula is ++ . This occurs 76 times.
also dominates the formulae introducing the tribunes. There are 21 such cases in all which thus gives us
97 instances of . Two other forms of the same verb are found with some frequency - and
. The total is therefore 130, well over half the number of surviving year formulae. Other verbs occurring
are (in descending order of frequency): , , , , , +,
, +, , +, , . What was said about the archon formulae applies here too: no
pattern is to be observed in the formulae variations with one possible exception which broadly corresponds with that
noticed in the archon formulae. The simple form does not occur at all in Book 14. Instead we have in this book an
unparalleled number, eight in all, of verb variations often in succession.
____________________
88
On the analogy of the Atthides which began each year very simply with the archon; cf. Jacoby, 1949: 90, 94ff.
Admittedly D does not supply the archon's demotic, with the single exception of the famous Demetrius of Phalerum
(20. 27. 1). In this he resembles the Parian Chronicle. For the testimony available for the Athenian archons see
Hicks and Hill, pp. 314 ff.; Develin.
-29Little need be said about the formulae introducing the Olympiads except to note that they exhibit less variation than
the archon and consul formulae, and that the formula of the three successive Olympiads of 408, 404, and 400 is
varied.
As we have said, the formulae variations were certainly the result of a conscious effort by Diodorus to enhance his
style. It is interesting nevertheless that within the section covering the period 411/10-387/6 he consistently takes
more pains than usual with the year formulae. Even more interesting is that, with the exception of the historiographical
notices, the few literary entries in the surviving Bibliotheke are confined almost entirely to the years 406/5-397/6. This
brief burst of literary chronology, therefore, seems to correspond to the rest of the pattern. It may all be the result of a
simple coincidence helped along by Diodorus' haphazard method of working; or an external stimulus may have been at
work. 89 Whatever the reason, one is led to assume that Diodorus occasionally felt the urge to be less monotonous with
his formulae. Sometimes, as at 13. 38. 1-14. 1 10. 1, he sustained the urge better than at other times.
It is necessary to look briefly at the names in the year formulae. How accurate are they? Diodorus' archon list
compares quite favourably with other such lists, with, for example, the Parian Chronicle (see the references in n. 88).
Any mistakes are not in the order of names, but in their form or spelling. As the list was intended to be of practical
use, that is, the name of each archon was meant to 'fix' a particular year and it did not really matter whether it was
historically correct or not, the great majority, if not all, of the mistakes, one suspects, are not due to Diodorus; he
either inherited them or they were committed after him by copyists. Even so the number of serious mistakes is small,
about twelve altogether. For example, the archon for 469/8 is Apsephion, not Phaion or Phaidon; for 458/7 Habron,
not Bion; for 436/5 Lysimachus, not Nausimachus. Another twenty-one or so are less serious. For instance, Diodorus
has Callias for Calleas ( 377/6) and Chariandrus for Charisandrus ( 376/5). Some fourteen names we
____________________
89
The switch from Ephorus to Timaeus at the conclusion of the Sicilian expedition? Pinsent, 1975: 10 n. 5, is not
quite right: the change in the formula introducing the Roman magistrates at the beginning of Book 15 (the simple
form is resumed) is rather the tail-end of something which began earlier and does not, therefore, indicate a change
of source, whether chronographic or narrative, at this point.

-30know from Diodorus alone. Of these only 'Akatestorides' ( 474/3) is certainly wrong; it should be 'Akestorides'.
The position with the Olympic stadion victors appears similar to that of the archons though the absence of ample,
reliable, and independent (in particular epigraphic) evidence makes it difficult to check Diodorus' accuracy, for usually
he is only competing against writers such as Africanus and Pausanias, and against papyrus fragments of later
chronographic works. But the divergences are on the whole insignificant. Diodorus, for example, gives Scamandrios for
the victor of 476 while P. Oxy. 222 and Dion. Hal. 9. 18 give Scamandros.
(ii) The other chronographic material: the obvious kind
In addition to the year formulae Diodorus borrowed other information from the chronographer. The provenance of
much of this is unmistakable and it falls into four classes. These are, in order of importance: (1) notices on the reigns
of kings and tyrants (the kinglists), (2) literary chronology, (3) notices on the beginnings and ends of wars, (4)
foundations of cities. Most of this information, and especially the kinglists and the literary notices, is given in small
groups, often at the beginning (immediately after the year formula) or, more frequently, at the end of a year's
narrative; occasionally in the middle (cf. 15. 9. 2; 93. 1; 16. 63. 2). There is usually no mistaking the nature of this
material for it stands out by its formulae, arrangement, and subject matter. In most instances, therefore, there is a
clear break with the narrative. When, however, the formulae do not occur and the subject matter is the same, it is
difficult to separate chronographic material from narrative. This is infrequently the case with the kinglists and the
literary chronology, more frequently so with the notices on wars, while the foundations are given mostly in the
narrative. We shall therefore concern ourselves mainly with the kinglists; the literary notices and those on wars will
receive less attention and the foundations none. We may begin by looking at the formulae of these entries.
First the kinglists. This is the biggest group and it provides us with information on the reigns of rulers of a number of
states, Greek as well as barbarian. It is more complete for some states, less so for others. A typical entry has the
form: 'A, ruler of B, died
-31- after X years of rule. C succeeded him and ruled for Y years' (cf. 13. 75. 1; 15. 60. 4). Often, though, more detail
is volunteered, such as the cause of a ruler's death (14. 89. 2; 15. 23. 2); the relationship between successor and the
person succeeded (cf. 14. 89. 1); other circumstances (cf. 15. 93. 1; 16. 36. 3). Thus the formulae themselves are
uniform throughout, differing only in the amount of detail they offer.
What is interesting about the literary chronology is that the great majority of notices concern historians. The number of
entries on poets and philosophers is small, just nine, and their quality poor. In contrast, for the period from 477 to 354
the Parian Chronicle contains no fewer than eighteen notices, almost all on poets; and this is a very brief chronicle on
stone. Clearly, though, the composer of the chronicle had a predilection for verse; he has nothing to say about
historians. Diodorus' interests were reversed. As a 'historian' himself he paid special attention to historiographical
chronology; the rest of the literary notices he largely ignored or lumped together indifferently. Witness, for example,
14. 46. 6. Ctesias receives separate and accurate treatment while a number of dithyrambists are thrown together, the
last one even losing his ethnikon (cf. the Parian Chronicle 65, 68, 69). But with that Diodorus felt he had discharged
his duty to verse chronology with which he could not generally be bothered. As with the kinglists, the formulae of the
notices on historians are fairly uniform. The fullest entry will supply the name of the historian, his provenance, the
subject of his work, how many years he covered, and in how many books. The entries, it may be noted, correspond to
the beginnings and ends of the histories.
The kinglists
For the specific purposes of Book 15 our main concern is with the Macedonian, Spartan, and Persian kinglists. 90 But
first some general remarks are necessary. For the principles governing the kinglists Ed. Meyer's masterly study 91 is
still fundamental. The kinglists in Diodorus have gone through several stages and at each of these mistakes are likely
to have crept in. As a simple list of local
____________________
90
The kinglists are conveniently assembled by Schwartz, RE v. 666 ff., though he has mysteriously overlooked the
Macedonian kings. For the Pheraean tyrants, Dionysius, and Clearchus of Heraclea see 60. 5 n.; 73. 5 n.; 81. 5 n.
91
Forschungen, ii. 440-53.
-32-

rulers, related to the local calendar, the individual list was subject to the pressures of local politics though these
would only have made it untrue to history; it would still have been continuous and self-consistent. Different Greek
states laboured under different calendars and when the various lists came to be incorporated into date-tables
based on a universally accepted system of chronology, the Olympiads and Athenian archons for the Classical and
Hellenistic periods, discrepancies arose. The errors arising from the different year-systems apart, mistakes were
also made when distributing the dates into the sort of handbook Diodorus used because of the misreading or the
corruption of names, faulty calculation, etc. And then of course Diodorus was not above blundering when using
the handbook, and neither were the copyists to whose efforts we owe our text of Diodorus.
Our first task should be to reconstruct the original, selfconsistent lists. Only then can their historical evaluation,
that is, their relation to real events, begin. As the lists are continuous we must reckon exclusively (by simple
subtraction). We should also bear in mind that the lengths given for the reigns are likely to have departed less
from those in the original lists than the dates for their beginnings and ends.

The Macedonian list

400/399 (14. 37. 6)

Archelaus II
7/Orestes/Aeropus
II 6.

395/4 (14. 84. 6)

Aeropus II
6/Pausanias 1.

394/3 (14. 89. 2)

Pausanias
1/Amyntas III 24.

393/2 (14. 92. 3f.)

Amyntas loses
kingdom, but
regains it
shortly afterwards
and rules for 24
years.
Some say that
Argaeus ruled for
2 years and
then Amyntas
returned.

370/69 (15. 60. 3)

Amyntas III
24/Alexander II 1.

368/7 (15. 71. 1)

Alexander I
I/Ptolemy Alorites
3 (see 71. 1n.).

365/4 (15. 77. 5)

Ptolemy Alorites
3/Perdiccas III 5.

(360/59 (16. 1. 3)

Philip II 24.)

(336/5 (16. 95. 1)

Philip II 24.)

(335/4 (17. 1. 4)

Alexander III 12.)

(324/3 (17. 117. 5)

Alexander III 12.

7.)

The bracketed entries may not derive from the chronographer; they are in the narrative. The seven years for
Archelaus is a mis-

-33-

take by a copyist; it should be seventeen. 92 Archelaus is said to have been killed accidentally while his son Orestes
was murdered by Aeropus. Aeropus himself died from natural causes, but his son Pausanias was murdered by
Amyntas, the father of Philip. I shall ignore the two entries on Alexander's successors; figures are given at 18. 36. 7
and 19. 11. 5, but they do not appear to be chronographic entries and they make no contribution to the solution of the
problems presented by the list.
It was said above that in reconstructing the original lists the figures for the reigns should be treated with less suspicion
than the dates for their beginnings and ends. At any rate this is certainly the case for Diodorus' Macedonian list. The 6,
1, 24, 1, 3, 5, and 24 years given for Aeropus, Pausanias, Amyntas, Alexander, Ptolemy, Perdiccas, and Philip add up
to 64 and this is indeed the period from 400/ 399, Archelaus' death, to 336/5, Philip's death. The difficulties in
Diodorus, therefore, arise from the fact that some of the transition years have been incorrectly dated. Specifically, the
transition years of Aeropus/ Pausanias, Pausanias/ Amyntas, and Amyntas/ Alexander have been displaced, moved
back, by a year. Aeropus did not die in 395/4 under archon Diophantus, but in the following year under Eubulides, for
he was still alive when Agesilaus marched through Macedonia at the end of July or the beginning of August 394 (see
below). This has caused the following entry, the murder of Pausanias after a year's rule and accession of Amyntas, to
be moved back too; these events belong in 393/2 and not 394/3. Twenty-four years, the reign of Amyntas, from 393/2
bring us down to 369/8 and not 370/69 as Diodorus says. Alexander reigned for one year and was murdered and
succeeded by Ptolemy in 368/7. This date is given correctly by Diodorus. The displacement, therefore, stops with the
Amyntas/ Alexander transition year.
What caused the displacement? The answer probably lies in the method the chronographer employed in distributing
the available information in his date-table. The Macedonian list he had was presumably one of names and dates in
sequence (cf. the list at D 7. 15), the latter perhaps given according to the Macedonian calendar. But he would also
have been in possession of certain synchronisms with well-known Greek dates; for example, that
____________________
92
All the MSS give seven. Eusebius 1. 227 (Schoene) gives the 'correct' 17; see Beloch, GG iii. 2. 50.
-34-

Archelaus was killed in the year of Socrates' death or that Aeropus died in the year of the battle of Cnidus. 93 He
fitted the kings into his handbook sometimes by using the synchronisms and/or the converted Macedonian dates,
94
and sometimes by reckoning by their reigns as indeed he did in the case of the Spartan kings (see below). Now
the battle of Cnidus was fought under Eubulides, 394/3 (Lysias 19. 28). Diodorus, however, places it under
Diophantus, 395/4, and 14. 84. 7, a chronographic entry, perhaps explains why he did so. Theopompus, he tells
us, brought his Hellenica to an end with this year and the battle of Cnidus, having covered seventeen years; he
began where Thueydides left off, that is, at the battle of Cynossema and 411/10 (13. 42. 5). Obviously the
chronographer reckoned inclusively and seventeen years from 41/10 (archons Mnasilochus and Theopompus)
gave him 395/4 (archon Diophantus). He had likewise reckoned inclusively the years covered by Thucydides'
history: twenty-two, from 432/1 to 411/10 (12. 37.2; 71.2). The chronographer, therefore, wrongly dated the
end of Theopompus' Hellenica and the battle of Cnidus to 395/4. The death of Aeropus may have been associated
with this battle (14. 84. 6f.) and thus it too, as well as the accession of Pausanias, was placed under 395/4. He
dated the following four events, the murder of Pausanias, accession of Amyntas, death of Amyntas, and accession
of Alexander, by reckoning by the reigns of Pausanias and Amyntas, one and twenty-four years respectively, and
all of these, therefore, are one year too high. 95 It would seem, however, that he dated the murder of Alexander
not by his reign of one year which would have given him 369/8, but by a definite date he possessed and perhaps
a synchronism too -- Alexander was murdered in the same year that Dionysius died, the year of archon
Nausigenes, 368/7. 96 The displacement thus stood rectified.
That Aeropus' death was displaced by a year was suggested by Beloch 97 and accepted by Geyer. 98 Both,
however, blamed Diodorus for it and neither realized its full implications. Beloch, preoccupied with the necessity,
as he saw it, to have Pelopidas
____________________
93
Cf. Swoboda, 1883:17 ff., on the synchronistic character of D's chronographer.
94
'Equated' is perhaps the correct word to use. The equation would be with the archon or Olympiad year system.
95
The expulsion of Amyntas too (one year later?); see Syncellus 500 and 19.2n.
96
Cf. the Parlan Chronicle 73 which puts the two events in the same year; so does D of course.
97
GG iii. 2. 55f.
98
1930: 108.
-35-

visit Macedonia and treat with Alexander in the summer of 369, insisted on 370 as the year of Amyntas' death. He
therefore shortened Amyntas' overall reign to twenty-two years, from 392 to 370. 99 Geyer followed suit, but allowed
Amyntas to reign from 393 to 370. 100 Hammond 101 is critical of Beloch: 'The error of Beloch was to reckon exclusively
in year-units . . . but if we count inclusively and make 400/399 common to Archelaus and Aeropus, then six years is
correct.' This nevertheless is to miss the whole point about the lists. While historiographical notices and notices on
wars are sometimes reckoned inclusively, sometimes exclusively, the kinglists, as was said above, were designed to be
continuous and inclusive reckoning is therefore out of the question. Doubtless the process of balancing the lists had
involved some pushing and shoving. The difficulties facing the chronographer (for example, the different and not
always reconcilable calendars) made this inevitable, but the end-result must have been a consistent and continuous
series of reigns. The problem with Diodorus' list is simply one of 'mechanical' displacement.

By reckoning inclusively Hammond accepts 395/4 as the year of Aeropus' death and sees no contradiction with
Polyaen.2. 1. 17 where a confrontation between Agesilaus and Aeropus in the summer of 394 is related. 'The point
which is best attested is that Aeropus died of disease in 395/4 (D.S. 14. 84. 6), and right at the end of that year
because he was outwitted by Agesilaus a month or two before the eclipse of the sun on 14 August 394 (Polyaen. 2. 1.
17 and 4. 4. 3; X. HG. 4. 3. 10).' But X. Ag. 2. 1 says that Agesilaus covered the distance from the Hellespont to
Boeotia in under a month (cf. Nepos, Ages. 4. 4: 'in thirty days'). I see no reason to disbelieve this as do Beloch 102
and Hammond. 103 He stood poised on the Boeotian frontier on 14 August. He must, therefore, have been traversing
Macedonia two weeks earlier at the most, at the very end of July and beginning of August when Eubulides had already
assumed the archonship for 394/3. 104 Another line of argument is
____________________
100
1930: 110. Likewise Cloch, 1960: 104 ff.
101
1979 : 168 and n. 2.
102
iii. 2. 217.
103
1979: 168 and n. 2.
104
Travelling by land the Peloponnesian reinforcements to Potidaea in 432 clearly reached Thrace from Corinth in
some two weeks, three at the most: Thuc. 1. 59-60.
99
GG iii. 2. 56 ff.
-36-

even more conclusive. When Agesilaus reached Amphipolis and consequently before he entered Macedonia and
confronted Aeropus, he was met by Dercylidas fresh from the Peloponnese and bearing news of the Spartan
victory near Corinth (X. H. 4. 3. 1). The battle was fought under Eubulides (Tod 105 -- the Dexileos monument
). Aeropus, therefore, survived the beginning of Eubulides' archonship by several weeks at the very least.

105

We may conclude that Diodorus' Macedonian list should be corrected by moving down the death of
Aeropus/accession of Pausanias, as well as the next three entries, by one year. Thus reconstructed the list
satisfies the needs of history too. Its data appear basically sound. Those of the other chronographic lists, which
are substantially in agreement, 106 being less tidy and thus perhaps closer in some respects to the historical
realities, should be used to elucidate and supplement Diodorus. 107 To date the death of Amyntas in 369/8 cannot
unfortunately help us decide between the chronologies of Niese and Beloch for the 360s (see p. 449 ). For the
question whether Amyntas was expelled once or twice and when, see 19. 2n.
The Spartan list: the Agiads

408/7 (13. 75. 1)

Pleistoanax
50/Pausanias
14.

394/3 (14. 89. 1)

Pausanias
14/Agesipolis I
14.

380/79 (15. 23. 2.)

Agesipolis I
14/Cleombrotus
I 9.

370/69 (15. 60. 4)

Agesipolis II
1/Cleomenes II
34.

309/8 (20. 29. 1)

Cleomenes II
60. 10/
+ 44.

____________________
105
I am not convinced by Beloch, GG iii. 2. 217 f. (followed by Jacoby, FGH iiiB Suppl. p. 156 ad 324 F47) that
'Nemea' was fought at the close of the year of Diophantus ( 395/4). Dexileos was killed C under archon
Eubulides like the rest of the cavalrymen shown on Tod 104. signifies the great battle fought
between the rivers Nemea and Rachiani in the coastal plain much nearer to Corinth than Nemea ( Pritchett,
1965-85: ii. 73 if.). The 'battle of Corinth' is therefore more correct than the 'battle of Nemea'. It was known

in Athens as the 'battle of Corinth' (Andoc. 3. 18, 22; X. Ag. 7. 5; Demosth. 20. 52; Plato, Menex. 245e; Lys.
16. 15). I doubt if even as much as a month separated Corinth from Coronea; see Lys. 16. 16 +
+.
106
Once we know how to read them. For example, the two years of Argaeus (or one according to the Canon and
three according to the Exc. Barb.) should be included in the twenty-four of Amyntas. Amyntas or
Amyntas II, the pretender mentioned by Arist. Pol. 1311b, and given one year by the lists, 'reigned'
concurrently with Pausanias.
107
Orestes, for example, ruled for a few years before he was murdered by Aeropus, the total of both reigns
amounting to six years, and this is what we find in D. Aeropus presumably had reckoned his reign from the
death of Archelaus.
-37-

As we can see the Agiad list is virtually complete for the fourth century. The deaths in battle of Leonidas and
Cleombrotus are mentioned in the narrative at 11. 10.4 (480/79) and 15. 55. 5 (371/0). The accession and death of
Pleistarchus and the accession of Pleistoanax are not recorded. The figure 34 for Cleomenes at 15. 60. 4 is corrupt and
should be ignored. Also corrupt is the name of Cleomenes' successor; it should read + +.
Acrotatus was a son of Cleomenes (19. 70. 4; Plut. Agis 3. 6f.).
But problems do remain, one in particular. It is impossible that Pausanias was exiled as late as 394/3. The battle of
Corinth was fought very early in that year and Agesipolis was already king (p. 37 ; X. H. 4. 2. 9). Most probably
Pausanias was tried immediately after his return from Boeotia in the summer of 395 (X. H. 3. 5. 25) and thus 395/4 is
the best date for his exile. Meyer, therefore, 108 puts forward the suggestion that at Sparta, as in Babylon, 109 the less
common system was followed of reckoning the year during which a king died as his last and the following year as the
first of his successor. When the chronographers later utilized the local Spartan lists, unaware of the Spartan system,
they assumed that a king's first year was also the year of his predecessor's death. Meyer consequently suggests that
all Diodorus' dates for the Spartan kings ought to be pushed back by a year. Pausanias, therefore, fled and was
condemned in 395/4 -- which is correct.
One point, not spelled out by Meyer, requires elucidation. Between the beginning of the Attic official year on the new
moon following the summer solstice, and that of Sparta on the new moon after. the autumn equinox, there existed a
gap of some three months. During this time events would belong to different Attic and Spartan years. Chronographers
would on the whole equate the two systems without concerning themselves about the gap. This three-month gap is the
reason why the death of Agesipolis I and accession of Cleombrotus, the death of Cleombrotus and accession of
Agesipolis II, the death of Agesipolis II and accession of Cleomenes are all dated correctly in Diodorus' list under
380/79, ( 371/0), 370/69; they occurred during it. Reckoned by Spartan years they happened in 381/0, 372/1, 371/0.
The exile of Pausanias on the other hand took place in 395/4 by either system, for if it belonged in the Spartan year
396/5 then the year in Diodorus
____________________
108
Forschungen, ii. 503, 511.
109
Ibid. 448.
-38would have been 395/4 (the correct year), while in fact it is 394/3. The presence of both correct and incorrect (they
are out by a year) dates in Diodorus serves as an indication of the soundness of Meyer's rule. The Agiad dates should,
therefore, be reconstructed in accordance with his rule; see his table. 110 One correction: Leonidas was killed in the
year of Calliades, 480/79, but in the Spartan year 481/0, so that Pleistarchus reigned for twenty-two and not twentyone years.
The Spartan list: the Eurypontids

476/5 (11. 48. 2)

Leotychidas
22/Archidamus
II 42.

434/3 (12. 35. 4)

Archidamus II
42/Agis II 27.

346/5 (16. 63. 2)

Archidamus III
23/Agis III 15.

338/7 (16. 88. 4)

Archidamus III
23/Agis III 9.

330/29 (17. 63. 4)

Agis III 9.

As we can see the Eurypontid list is in rather a sorry state. The last of the entries appears to be the remnant only of a
chronographic formula; it has been assimilated into the narrative. The third comes from a digression and its proper
place in the list is not therefore known. The end of the reign of Agis I I is not noticed, nor the accession of Agesilaus.
Agesilaus' death is mentioned in the narrative at 15. 93. 6 (362/1) with no figures given and as a result the accession
of Archidamus III is missing too. While the lengths of the reigns given are correct (with the exception of the figures for
Agis III), the reigns themselves have been seriously displaced; those of the fifth century at any rate, for those of the
fourth cannot be evaluated as there are hardly any.
Demaratus, the predecessor of Leotychidas, appears to have been deposed in 491/0 and the twenty-two years of
Leotychidas bring his exile down to 469/8. 111 There is thus a dislocation of seven years which has been carried forward
to Archidamus II and Agis II. Archidamus II died sometime between the summer of 428 and early 426 and not in
434/3 (as the evidence of Thuc. 3. 1. 1;
____________________
110
Ibid. 510f.
111
Rather than his death ( ibid. 507f. ) for his 22 years are unlikely to include his years in exile. The 14 years of
Pausanias (13. 75. 1; 14. 89. 1) certainly do not include his long years in exile. On the other hand, Pleistoanax's 50
years certainly do include the exile years, but since these were in the middle his case cannot form a parallel. The
year 469/8 is not necessarily too late for the Thessalian expedition and the king's exile. For a discussion see
Gomme, HCT i.406f.
-39-

26. 2; 89. 1, as well as of Diodorus himself, 12. 42. 6; 47. 1; 89. 1, proves). And Agis II cannot of course have
died in 407/6 (434/3 minus 27) for he survived the Peloponnesian War by several years. What caused the
dislocation? Perhaps a confusion between the respective archons for 476/5 () and 469/8 (AHLP/ -- FIKM). This attractive suggestion was first made by Krger and restated by Andrewes: 112 the
exile/death of Leotychidas really belongs in 469/8, but Diodorus, misled by the Phaidon of 476/5, placed the
event under the earlier year. The real name of the archon for 469/8 appears to have been Apsephion (on the
evidence of the "Parian Chronicle"56; Plut. Cim. 8. 8; Diog. Laert. 2. 44), but this makes no difference for it must
have been corrupted to Phaion/Phaidon by the time Diodorus' chronographic source was composed, or rather it
was so corrupted in one branch of the transmission of the Athenian archon list; the branch which reached
Diodorus. If this be not the case then the Krger/ Andrewes suggestion collapses. Where I would disagree with
Andrewes 113 is in the assumption that Diodorus is responsible for the confusion of the date of Leotychidas' death.
If we look at 11. 48 we see that everything else in that chapter is in order, beginning with the year formula. And
the entry on Leotychidas is sandwiched between the year formula and the entry on Anaxilas of Rhegium. The
mistake, therefore, must have already stood in Diodorus' handbook.
One can say more. If the error is Diodorus', why did he repeat it at 12. 35. 4 (434/3)? Neither of the archons for
428/6 could possibly be confused with the archon for 434/3, not even by Diodorus. No, but perhaps he reckoned
by Archidamus' forty-two years from 476/5 which of course gave him 434/3. Yes, but if he placed Leotychidas'
death/ Archidamus' accession by the archon why did he not place Archidamus' death/Agis' accession by the
archon too? And vice versa: if he entered the latter by Archidamus' reign why did he not enter the former by
Leotychidas' reign also? In any case, how could he place Archidamus' death/Agis' accession by Archidamus' length
of reign? Diodorus presumably worked with his chronographic handbook before him. He would complete a year's
account before proceeding to the next. He could not possibly, therefore, have moved forward by forty-two years
to
____________________
112
In White, 1964: 145 n. 21.
113
And Smart, 1967: 136; Gomme, HCT i. 53, and many others.
-40place Archidamus' death/Agis' accession. I conclude that the mistake was not made by Diodorus, but was already
present in the chronographic source. This provides us with an interesting glimpse into the working method of the
chronographer. It would appear that he distributed the Spartan kings sometimes by the archons and sometimes
by their reigns. 114 We have seen that he followed a similar method in fitting the Macedonian kings into his
handbook. It is possible that the muddle arose long before Leotychidas, perhaps in matching up the archon and
ephor lists, and that we are only witnessing its tail-end here.
At the other end of the list the main problem is the two figures for the reign of Agis III; 15 years at 16. 63. 2 and
9 years at 16. 88. 4 and 17. 63. 4. The latter figure, twice repeated, is probably the 'correct' one, that is, it is the
figure which stood in the original list. 115 It is not easy to account for the mistaken figure 15. Meyer 116 thought
that the mistake was caused because Diodorus' source for 16. 63. 2 assumed that Archidamus III died in 346/5
straight after the Sacred War. While his son's reign was extended from nine to fifteen years to cover this
eventuality, Archidamus' reign was for some reason, which Meyer did not explain, left at twenty-three years.
Meyer further believed that this discrepancy of 8 years (346/5 minus 338/7) carries on right through all of
Diodorus' Eurypontid dates and that it therefore explains the fifth-century displacement too. He reconstructed the

list accordingly. 117 Fortunately for Meyer the dates of Agesilaus are missing and consequently his hypothesis
cannot be tested. In any case he failed to take into account the fact that 16. 63. 2 is part of a digression and was
not necessarily under 346/5 originally. That rather invalidates his theory which depends on the year 346/5. A
suggestion made earlier by Volquardsen, 118 which sees the tangle as Diodorus' own handiwork, seems more
plausible and may well be correct. After concluding the story of the Sacred War (under 346/5) Diodorus
____________________
114
This is essential if Andrewes' suggestion is to stand, though the suggestion cannot invalidate the working
method of the chronographer here proposed if it is proved incorrect.
115
To obtain nine, however, we have to reckon inclusively which we said we must not do with the kinglists. Thus
either 338/7 or 330/29 or both are wrong. Megalopolis certainly was not fought as late as 330/29; cf. de Ste
Croix, 1972: 376f.; Bosworth, 1975: 27ff.
116
Forschungen, ii. 506.
117
Ibid. 507.
118
1868: 22.
-41-

turned aside to relate the fate of the various groups of people who had profaned Delphi. The death in battle of
Archidamus was part of that story and it is possible that Diodorus, mistakenly assuming that this occurred in 346/5,
attempted to 'correct' the chronographer, with unfortunate results.
This being the position it would be pointless to attempt a reconstruction of the Eurypontid list on the Meyer analogy.
The real dates of the kings of course are another matter.
The Persian list

465/4 (11. 69. 6)

Xerxes more
than
20/Artaxerxes
I 40.

425/4 (12. 64. 1)

Artaxerxes I
40/Xerxes 1.

424/3 (12. 71. 1)

Xerxes 1 (
2
months)/
Sogdianos 7
months/Darius
II 19.

405/4 (13. 108. 1)

Darius II
19/Artaxerxes
II 43.

362/1 (15. 93. 1)

Artaxerxes II
43/Artaxerxes
III Ochus 23.

(335/4 (17. 5. 3-6. 2)

A summary
from
Artaxerxes III
to Darius
III.)

The death of Darius III is mentioned in the narrative; no figures are given. The summary at 17. 5. 3-6. 2 derives from
the narrative and not the chronographic source. 119

Little need be said about the list as a whole except to remark that it compares very favourably with the various other
lists 120 and the evidence of the Babylonian tablets. 121 The death of Artaxerxes I and the accession of Darius II involve
certain complications. At 12. 64. 1 (425/4) we are told that Artaxerxes died having ruled for forty years; Xerxes
succeeded and ruled for one year. At 12. 71. 1 (424/3) the chronographer says that Xerxes died after a rule of one
year, but adds a variant: + , + ,
+ . + + + . The variant was true to history, whereas in a conventional kinglist
which was meant to be of practical use Sogdianos could be omitted and the whole year given to Xerxes -perhaps
because the latter was in office on a new year's day? 122 Of greater relevance here are the accession and death of
Artaxerxes II, especially the latter which is a problem in Diodorus.
____________________
119
Cf. Meyer, Forschungen, ii. 488.
120
See the tables ibid. 457 and 493.
121
Parker and Dubberstein, 1956: 17 ff.
122
On all this see Stolper, 1983: 223 ff.
-42

According to Diodorus Darius II died in the year of archon Alexias (405/4) a little after the surrender of Athens. It
is impossible to ascertain whether this information is a deduction by Diodorus from the fact that the death of
Darius II was entered immediately after the entry on the fall of Athens in his handbook, or whether it is the
considered opinion of the chronographer himself. If the former, it is next to worthless as an indication of the
approximate time of the year of the king's death; if the latter, it deserves a little more respect. A Babylonian
document of Darius II dated 17 September 405 records a receipt of rent due for the period covering the
nineteenth year of Darius and the first of Artaxerxes II. 123 And we know that the Babylonian year 404/3 is
Artaxerxes' first year. Consequently his accession year ran from April 405 to April 404. As the Athenian surrender
may have taken place as early as March 404, 124 Diodorus' comment may in fact be correct. The year 405/4 as
that of transition is therefore correct. Diodorus gives Artaxerxes 43 years and places his death in 362/1. He gives
his successor Ochus 23 years. Thus the latter's murder falls in 339/8 and this is about right; cf. the summary at
17. 5. 3-6. 2. Also correct is the sum 43 + 23 = 66; and 66 is the number of years from 405/4 to 339/8. As the
figure 43 is repeated twice, and as Diodorus' statements are internally consistent, we may accept that these data
are the chronographer's own. Yet Artaxerxe II died not in 362/1, but between late November 359 and April 358.
125
He reigned for 46, not 43 years. The other lists are equally wrong though they give different figures. It is no
longer possible to discover the source of error, but it is certainly older than Diodorus. 126
(iii)The other chronographic material: the less obvious kind
There is a tendency to view Diodorus' chronographer as little more than a list of annual magistrates and
Olympiads. All the evidence, however, points to a fairly detailed handbook which, on the Greek side at any rate,
traced its descent back to Eratosthenes' Chronographiai and Apollodorus' Chronica. On the form and considerable
contents of the latter we have the testimony of ps.____________________
123
See Joanns, Textes conomiques babyloniens rcents, 103 ( 1982), no. 34 (2/ VI/19).
124
HCT iv. 12.
125
Parker and Dubberstein, 1956: 19.
126
Meyer, Forschungen, ii. 489, 496f. as well as his table p. 493.
-43Scymnus, Orb. descr. 16 (= FGH 244 (Apollod.) T2). It is borne out by the fragments; cf. especially FF3, 13, 26,
44, 45. For the kind of information chronographers included in their Chronica cf. also FGH 245 F1 and 246 F1.
Diodorus' chronographer would not have been radically different from the Chronicon of Oxyrhynchus (P. Oxy.12 =
FGH 255) or the Olympiades of Phlegon of Tralles, FGH 257 (see in particular F12 from the Library of Photius) or
P. Oxy. 2082 = FGH 257a. The information these last two supplied was not negligible and Diodorus'
chronographer compares favourably with them.
We have seen that the obvious chronographic entries have to do with kinglists, literary chronology, the beginnings
and ends of wars, and the foundations of cities (p. 31 ). A great many of these are accompanied by circumstantial
detail. Less obvious chronographic notices concern such events as campaigns, battles, the capture of cities,
treaties, etc. These are usually not to be distinguished from the narrative, they are part of it, though occasionally
their nature is not to be mistaken; cf. 11. 86. 1 (the five-year truce between Athens and the Peloponnesians 127 );
14. 11. 1 (the murder of Alcibiades). Book 16 is particularly fruitful perhaps because Diodorus, deserted by
Ephorus in the course of it, had to rely more heavily on the chronographer; cf. 16. 31. 6-7; 34. 3-4; 36. 2-5; 45.
7-9; 52. 9-10; 74. 1-2. 128 The presence of such material in the chronographer is in any case demanded by the
fact that Diodorus did manage to fit the narrative sources he summarized into his annalistic scheme with a
modicum of success. He could not have done so if his handbook had not the range and detail of, say, Phlegon
Olymplades. 129 In searching for the hidden chronographic material there is perhaps one means by which some of
them can be distinguished. At 12. 69. 1 we read: 0 +03C0
+ . One wonders whether a sub____________________
127
Cf. Meiggs, 1972: 453f.
128
Most of these are acknowledged as chronographic entries by Schwartz, RE v. 668 (though cf. Hammond,
1937b: 90 f.). Many of them are of course kinglists, but I refer to the brief notices of campaigns and treaties
which accompany them.
129
The significance of the chronographer in the Bibliotheke is seriously underestimated in some recent attempts
to redeem D the historian. For instance, he is all but unmentioned in Sanders, 1987: 110 ff.; Sacks, 1990 ;

and Chamoux. Much of the credit given to D (e.g. for erudition and organizational ability) really belongs to the
chronographer. Such an approach to the subject marks a retrograde step in Diodoran studies.
-44stantial proportion of such instances, and there are a great many throughout the Bibliotheke, 130 are not in fact
chronographic entries which have been made to introduce narratives. Thucydides certainly did not begin his
account of the Delium campaign thus (4. 76), and neither did Ephorus, we may assume. One may then hazard a
guess that the chronographic entry ran: + , and
Diodorus has linked it to his abridged narrative by the ubiquitous expression . There are
other very likely cases; cf. 12. 8. 1; 12. 9. 1; 12. 30. 2; 12. 38. 1; 15. 5. 1; 15. 20. 1; 15. 25. 1, to mention but
a few. Of course not every such instance need represent a chronographic notice. 131 They should all be treated
individually on their merits.
(iv) The chronographer's errors
Though fairly reliable the chronographer is by no means always right. 132 A number of chronological blunders in
the Bibliotheke were certainly committed by him and not by Diodorus, a fact not always recognized. We have
already seen that the chronographer is responsible for the dislocation of the Macedonian and Spartan kinglists
(pp. 34 f.). And at 11. 86. 1 the five-year truce between Athens and the Peloponnesians is noted, by the
chronographer, under 454/3 which must be wrong. 133 We may now look at the vexed question of the misdating of
the beginnings and ends of wars.
At 12. 37. 2 under 432/1 a chronographic entry correctly informs us that Thucydides began his history of the
Peloponnesian War with this year. 134 Yet the outbreak of the war, the attack on Plataea, comes under
Euthydemus, 431/0, headed by the statement: . . . . . .
+ + . . . +. We should see this as a chronographic entry which
Diodorus has utilized to head the narrative of this year (see above).
____________________
130
Cf. McDougall, s.vv.
131
Cf. 12. 59.3=Thuc. 3. 92. 1.
132
Cf. e.g. Hornblower, 1990a: 74.
133
Cf. Meiggs, 1972: 454.
134
Correctly, pace Gomme, HCT i. 52 n. 4. Thucydides did begin with 432/1. His famous +
system was not applied before this date -Thuc. 2. 1.
-45-

The incorrect dating of the beginning of the war is thus due to the chronographer. How did it come about? We see that
both the Peace of Nicias (12. 74. 6) and the conclusion of the war (13. 107. 5) are dated correctly, and equally correct
are the lengths given for the war as a whole, twenty-seven years, and for the Archidamian war, ten years. The error,
therefore, may have arisen by the chronographer reckoning backwards from the end of the war or from the Peace of
Nicias. In trying to make sense of such confusions we should distinguish between historiographical entries and notices
on wars. The two were probably worked out and introduced into the handbook separately. Similarly, at 14. 86. 6
(394/3) we are told, by the chronographer presumably, that the war now begun, called the Corinthian, lasted for eight
years. In fact the war began in the previous year and Diodorus himself relates the formation of the anti-Spartan
alliance and the battle of Corinth under 395/4 (14. 82. The war called the 'Boeotian' at 14. 81. 3 (under 396/5) is not a
mistake for the Corinthian War, but must refer to the fighting in Boeotia). The Corinthian War was ended by the King's
Peace in 387/6, and the chronographer may have hit on 394/3 by inclusive reckoning of the eight years from the
Peace. At 15. 25. 1, a probable chronographic notice (see above), the Boeotian War is dated as beginning in 378/7. No
figure for its duration is given. In reality the war broke out in 379/8. As in the case of the previous two examples, we
may surmise that 378/7 is the result of the chronographer reckoning backwards from the conclusion of the war. The
three years of the Social War are likewise correct if we reckon inclusively; it began in 358/7 and ended in 356/5 (16. 7.
3; 22. 2. The four years given at 16. 22. 2 is probably a mistake).
Diodorus' dates for the Sacred War are a more formidable problem and they may or may not be amenable to
explanation along similar lines. This is because of the difficulty, one ancient scholars, no less than modern ones, may
have experienced too, of deciding what events precisely constituted the beginning and what the end of the war. At 16.
14. 3-5 (under archon Agathocles, 357/ 6) three historiographical notices inform us that: (a) Demophilus, the son of
Ephorus, narrated the Sacred War which his father omitted, beginning with this year, which saw the capture of Delphi
and the pillage of the oracle by Philomelus. The war lasted
the sacred treasure. (b) Callisthenes concluded his Hellenica with the capture of the sanctuary and the lawless action
of Philomelus (cf. 14. 117. 8), and (c) Diyllus began his history with the pillage of the temple. The Sacred War itself (
), on the other hand, is clearly marked by two chronographic notices, its beginning at 16. 23. 1
(under archon Callistratus, 355/4) where it is given nine years (note that the phrase links the
entry to the narrative), and its end at 16. 59. 1 (under archon Archias, 346/5); here it is said to have lasted for ten
years (again, we may note the link-phrase ). Duris too thought the war had lasted for ten years,
adding that it was brought to an end in the tenth (FGH 76 F2), and so did Aeschines, a contemporary (2. 131; 3. 148).
There is no serious problem with the figures nine and ten, the result it would seem, of both inclusive and exclusive
reckoning.
Now it is probable, as often thought, that Diodorus' information is in basic agreement with historical reality. If that is
so, there is nothing more to say except to remark that the chronographer has done his job as well as we know he can:
the Phocians captured Delphi in the course of the Attic year 357/6 (spring/early summer 356), but the political
circumstances were such (the continuing Social War and the attitude of Thessaly) that the Amphictyons did not
officially declare war against them until 355/4; and the war was officially ended by the meeting of the Amphictyons

which passed sentence on the Phocians and appointed Philip to preside over the celebration of the Pythia held shortly
afterwards (Attic year 346/5). The eleven years of war at 16. 14. 3, it would seem, are meant to include the whole
sequence, from the capture of Delphi until the punishment of the Phocians. Diodorus, of course, as is his way (see p.
135 ), does not only include the Amphictyonic meeting and the Pythian festival under 346/5 (and headed by the
chronographic entry about the ending of the Sacred War: 16. 59. 1), which is correct, but also the last actions of the
war which led to the agreement between Philip and Phalaecus and the surrender of the Phocians, which is wrong.
These events took place in the first half of 346 under archon Themistocles (347/6). Immediately after mentioning the
surrender of the Phocians Diodorus adds (from Demophilus) that Philip had thereby concluded the Sacred War (16. 59.
4). There was, therefore, something of a conflict about this point between his historiographer and his chrono-47-

grapher. Not so, however, about the time the Sacred War was declared. If this event is told under 354/3 (16. 28.
4), whereas the chronographic entry about the beginning of the war is under 355/4, this is because of the way
Diodorus has distributed the summarized narrative of Demophilus.
The main scholarly controversy concerns the date the Amphictyons declared war. According to Diodorus'
chronographic source, as we have seen, this happened in 355/4 and many scholars concur. Others disagree. In
their view the epigraphical evidence from Delphi shows that the Sacred War was declared a year earlier, in
autumn/early winter 356 (archon Elpines, 356/5). 135 If this is right, the likely explanation for the chronographer's
error is that, as in the cases cited earlier, he counted back from 346/5 and therefore gave 355/4 as the year the
war was declared. The historiographical entries at 16. 14. 3-5, on the other hand, as commonly agreed, correctly
mark the date of the seizure of Delphi (thus also Paus. 10. 2. 3) with which Callisthenes concluded his Hellenica
and Demophilus and Diyllus commenced their coverage of the war.
Finally, a blunder very probably committed by the chronographer, 136 though in this case no likely explanations
are forthcoming. In Diodorus the K+ are recounted under the four successive years 439/8-436/5. These
dates are wrong; they are too high by some three years. 137 However, there can be little doubt that the
responsibility for the original mistake, the date of the outbreak of hostilities, which caused Diodorus to distribute
the Ephoran narrative under the wrong years, lies with the chronographer:
+ + , we read at 12. 30. 2
(439/8). This may be accepted as a chronographic source with some confidence. The cause of the error cannot be
known, but it is interesting that the five-year truce between Athens and
____________________
135
See, most recently, Buckler, 1989: 148ff., a refinement of an older view (see e.g. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 264ff.).
Buckler's analysis of the evidence of D is unsatisfactory, 1989: 155f. Not only does he not distinguish between
different kinds of chronographic entry (he lists them together as though they were all of the same sort), but
he seems unaware of the role and nature of the chronographer in D. For the chronology which puts the
emphasis on D's testimony, by no means undermined by the evidence of epigraphy, see Hammond, 1937a:
54ff.; Griffith, 1979: 227 ; Hornblower, 1983: 246f.
136
"Pace" Gomme, HCT i. 198, who sets the blame squarely on D's shoulders.
137
Gomme, HCT i. 196 ff.
-48Sparta is likewise dated too high by three years (11. 86. 1). Perhaps both events were wrongly reckoned from the
same point -- the end of the Peloponnesian War? (At 13. 8. 8 (414/3) the Decelean War is given twelve years
instead of nine, another three-year discrepancy.)

(b) The narrative sources

The 'traditional' position is that Diodorus generally relied on one main authority at a time. First established by
Volquardsen in a pioneering study published in 1868, the principle is currently under attack though in the view of
the present writer it remains unshaken in its essentials. The principle rests securely on the simple fact that
whenever he can be checked, that is, by comparing his text against those of surviving sources, it can easily be
demonstrated that Diodorus tended to follow closely one source for as long as possible. That being the case, it is
but sensible to assume that that was his usual method -- unless it can be proved otherwise. 138 Those who argue
for the use of a multiplicity of sources, always and as a matter of course, also tend to regard Diodorus as
something more than a mere epitomizer and an incompetent one at that. 139 What follows presupposes the
correctness of the 'traditional' view.
As far as the Greek and Persian narratives of Books 11-15 (16) are concerned there is very wide agreement that
Diodorus epitomized Ephorus. This was firmly established long ago and requires no detailed argumentation. 140
The evidence is impressive:
____________________
138
Cf. Hornblower, 1981: 19ff. and see further below on D's methods.
139
The most recent and sustained attempt to 'rehabilitate' D (Sacks, 1990) cannot be deemed a success; cf.
Stylianou, 1991. It should be stressed that the conception of D as a noteworthy writer capable of synthesizing
accounts out of a variety of sources has not been proved for any section of the Bibliotheke, not even for Book
1, in spite of claims to the contrary, e.g. by Burton, 1 ff. Cf. Murray, 1975: 214f. Murray's point is well taken
that if the composition of the account of Egypt in Book 1 'was the work of Diodorus himself, then he must be
acclaimed one of the great historians of the Hellenistic period' ( 1975: 215). Schwartz, RE v. 670ff., Jacoby,
RE vii. 2750ff.; id., FGH 264 F25 n., and Murray, 1970: 144ff.; id., 1972: 207; 1975: 214ff., appear quite
correct that, as in other books, so in Book 1 D relied on one main source (Hecataeus of Abdera in this

instance). The addition of material from a second source (chapters 37-41 probably derive from Agatharchides
who was himself employed as a main source elsewhere in the Bibliotheke), and D's own comments
interspersed here and there, do not invalidate the thesis.
140
By Cauer, 1847; quardsen, 1868: 52ff.; Collman, 1869; Holzapfel, 1879; Schwartz, RE v. 663 ff.
-49(1) the agreement in tone and structure of Books 11-15 (16), standing, as they do, in sharp contrast to Books 1820; 141 (2) the mention by Diodorus of Aeolis and/or Cyme, the home-town of Ephorus, more frequently than their
importance seems to warrant. 142 (3) Above all, there is the striking agreement between the fragments of Ephorus
and the corresponding passages in Diodorus. On the other hand, the extent to which Diodorus employed other,
'secondary', sources to supplement Ephorus is a thorny question. We have seen that a fair amount of the
moralizing is Diodorus' own rather than Ephorus' (pp. 3 ff.). And it would appear that some of the factual
information too (apart from the chronographic material) did not originate with Ephorus. For example, 12. 38
should not be assigned to Ephorus. When Diodorus says that he has given Ephorus' aitiai of the Peloponnesian
War (12. 41. 1), we should understand him to mean chapters 39 and 40. 143 The anecdotal stories about
Myronides and Tolmides at 11. 81. 4f. and 11. 84. 2-5 may derive from a biographical handbook of the kind he
occasionally employed for the history of the West (cf. Polyaen. 1. 35; 3. 3 and see below), and the same may
perhaps be true of 15. 44 (but see n. there). Otherwise my inclination is to minimize Diodorus' reliance on sources
other than Ephorus. This is in any case a reasonable assumption to make for an epitomator like Diodorus.
The quest for Diodorus' sources for the history of the Greek West, by contrast, is considerably more complicated
and still highly controversial. As it is necessary to adopt some kind of position, an examination of the matter is
unavoidable. Diodorus, of course, was himself a western Greek writing, one supposes, primarily with a western
readership in mind, and he might consequently have been disposed to take greater pains here than with the
history of other regions. We should also expect him to volunteer more of his own knowledge and that seems to be
the
____________________
141
On which see Hornblower, Cauer, 22ff.
142
On the propensity of Ephorus to push Cyme to the fore at every conceivable opportunity: FGH 70 F236. The
nature of the references too is significant; see e.g. 11. 36. 5f; 11. 37. 1; and Burn, 1984: 550f.
143
I therefore agree with Jacoby, FGH 70 F196n. But cf. Meyer, Forschungen, ii. 329ff. and Schwartz, RE v. 680,
who argue otherwise. Sections 38. 2-4 give a ludicrous tale, different both in tone and content from 39-40
(these two chapters are in line with Plut. Per. 30ff.), as Schwartz himself admits. Perhaps 38. 2-4 was
borrowed from a Hellenistic handbook of political stratagems and awkwardly attached to Ephorus' summarized
aitiai by means of the last sentence of 38. 4.
-50-

case. 144 This, however, should be balanced against the fact just noted that Diodorus was an epitomator, one of
limited abilities too, and as such he would always seek to simplify his task. His sources should not, therefore, be
multiplied unnecessarily, especially within single narratives. His usual method, as we have seen, was to rely on
one of the standard works at a time, and I see no reason at all for supposing that he abandoned this method for
the western narratives. The obvious sources indicated are Ephorus and Timaeus. All the same, down to at least
357/6 he had Ephorus' western narratives ready to hand, sometimes (perhaps even always) in the same books as
the eastern narratives and with the connections between the two highlighted (see pp. 89 ff.), and good evidence
is required before suspecting an alternative source. 145 This may serve as a principle. It may be apposite to stress
at this
____________________
144
Cf. 13. 35; 13. 90. 5-7; 14. 16. 3-4; 14. 95. 4-5; 16. 70. 6; 16. 82. 4-5; 16. 83. 2-3. Also n. 163 below. Most
of this material seems to be D's own, seeking either to 'improve' his sources or to highlight his native town of
Agyrium.
145
For most scholars, Ephorus and Timaeus are the only serious candidates here. Volquardsen, 1868, held that
Timaeus was responsible for almost all of D's western narratives in Books 11-16. Schwartz, RE v. 681, 685ff.,
endorsed Volquardsen's thesis in a modified form which admitted a greater use of Ephorus, for instance in
Book 15. Others who consider Timaeus as the main source, supplemented to a greater or lesser degree by
Ephorus, are Barber, 1935: 160ff., Stroheker, 1958: 11ff., Meister, 1967, and now Pearson, 1987. In fact
Pearson has all but returned to Volquardsen's position. Laqueur, RE via. 1082ff., on the other hand,
considered that the framework of D's western history was Ephoran, but with the very frequent interspersion of
passages lifted from Timaeus. A more sensible version of Laqueur's view is that of Jacoby, FGH iiib (text) 529,
541f., which sees Ephorus as the main, and Timaeus as the secondary, source. See also Lewis, CAH2 vi. 121.
Caven too, 1990: 2ff., sees Ephorus as basic though reinforced with information from Timaeus, Philistus
(directly), and from many other sources as well. His description of D as a kind of Pliny, indefatigably gathering
material from all directions, is not of course one I can share. Sanders, 1981: 394ff., 1987, who also believes
that D consulted a wide variety of sources, proceeds on the principle that Philistus was the main source for the
Dionysian narratives (though not for Book 15), but used directly by D and not through the means of Ephorus
or Timaeus. This view seems to me misconceived and based on a series of mostly erroneous assumptions (see
pp. 63, 70 and cf. nn. 165, 174, 178, 179, 194, 198).
It is worth mentioning the work carried out in the Istituto di Storia Antica of Palermo by E. Manni and his
pupils. The 'Palermo School', as it were, set itself the task of ascertaining the sources of D and, more
generally, of re-evaluating the Greek historians of Sicily. Its findings can be followed in the local journal
Kokalos. But one should first read Walbank's penetrating assessment, 1968-9: 476ff. Walbank all but destroys
the 'School's' chief tenet that for the Sicilian narratives in Books 8-24 D followed an intermediary source, the
Sicelica of Silenus of Caleacte ( FGH175), a most obscure figure who possibly never even wrote a history of
Sicily.
-51
point that because of Diodorus' erratic ways no worthwhile pattern is discernible from the incidence of named
fragments. All the same, it does indeed appear to be the case that named fragments occur when Diodorus is
taking greater pains (which he does do from time to time); and they are mostly the outcome of a clash between
the sources he is using, whether between the chronographer and the narrative source (e.g. at 14. 11. 1; 15. 60.
5), or between narrative source and narrative source (e.g. at 13. 54. 5); or occasionally when Diodorus is
impressed by his source making a show of something (e.g. at 13. 41. 3). But even here we must be careful:
Hieronymus, for instance, is not cited once as a source, and yet clearly Diodorus made a better job of
abbreviating him than Ephorus. I suspect that he did not encounter any contradictions in Books 18-20.
Most scholars regard 11. 20-6 either as a continuous series of excerpts from Timaeus, 146 or as an abridgement of
Ephorus to which nevertheless material from Timaeus was introduced, 147 or as a combination of Ephorus,
Timaeus, and at least one other source. 148 In accordance with the principle we have set, the question to be asked
is, is there anything in these chapters which could not come from Ephorus?
A major argument of those who credit Timaeus with the chapters is the highly favourable, indeed eulogistic,
treatment of Gelon, and the elevation of the victory over Carthage to the level of that over Persia. But why should
that be surprising in Ephorus? The very concept of an alliance between Persia and Carthage, such as described by
Ephorus, suggests the belief that what was accomplished by the western Greeks was no less significant than the
repulse of Xerxes. This, after all, is how Pindar saw it, and the scholion ad Pythia I146 ( FGH 70 F186) shows that
Ephorus concurred: by his defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera Gelon freed not only Sicily, 'but also the whole of
Greece'.
It is true that Polybius, in a well-known passage, censures Timaeus for wildly exaggerating the achievements of
the Siceliots (12. 26b), but the strictures, justified one supposes, are not quite borne out by Diodorus' text.
Diodorus' praise of Gelon is
____________________
146
e.g. Jacoby, FGH 70 F186n.; Meister, 1967: 42f.; Pearson, 1987: 132ff.; Walbank, 1989/90: 41ff.; Ameling,
1993: 26ff.
147
Laqueur, RE via. 1083ff.
148
Cf. Brown, 1952: 346ff.
-52-

admittedly extravagant, but not to an extent that a fourth-century panhellenist from Asia Minor like Ephorus would find
objectionable. The claim at 11. 22. 6 that no one before Gelon, so far as memory served, had employed such a
stratagem, or achieved such signal success, against the barbarians, is paralleled, for example, by what is claimed for

Cimon and the victory at the river Eurymedon in 11. 61. 149 In fact, far from pointing to Timaeus, 11. 22. 5-24. I
seems to reveal the pen of Ephorus. It may be compared to 11. 11; 11. 46. 1-3; 11. 58. 4-59. These are the sort of
comments one should expect from him. The comparison between Gelon and the other Greek leaders, much to the
former's advantage, is not incompatible with Ephorus. On the contrary, he seems to have liked such contrasts which he
used to enhance any moral points he tried to make (cf. e.g. 11. 59. 1-2). In any case, why should not someone like
Ephorus, writing a century and a half after the events, declare, after looking at the facts available, that of all the
wartime Greek leaders Gelon was the most successful (which is true), and his victory at Himera more decisive than
Salamis and Plataea (which is equally true). It is noticeable nevertheless that 11. 23 begins with the information that
many historians have compared the Siceliot victory with those in Greece, but they have not all arrived at the same
conclusions. Ephorus, therefore, may have been less unequivocal than Diodorus. On the other hand, the opinion that
virtue and benevolence in a ruler were the best means of ensuring the goodwill of his subjects, is an Ephoran
commonplace (see pp. 112 ff.). We should not of course blame Ephorus for the statement that Gelon 'grew old' in the
exercise of his rule. This is just Diodorus.

The synchronism between Himera and Thermopylae (11. 24. 1) is often thought to have
been invented by Timaeus, but this is unwarranted. Herodotus of course reports a
synchronism between Himera and Salamis (7. 166), and the earlier dating of Himera in
Diodorus may indeed represent an attempt (surely Siceliot) to enhance the glory of
Gelon and Sicily. But Timaeus was neither the earliest nor the only Siceliot patriot, and
it is likely that Ephorus found the synchronism in the Siceliot sources he employed, in
Antiochus, for example, or in Philistus. At any rate, ____________________
149

See esp. 11. 61. 7. Pearson, 1987: 137, considers the story of Gelon's stratagem preposterous, and therefore
Timaean in origin. But the stratagem said to have been used by Cimon at the Eurymedon may strike one as equally
preposterous.

- admittedly extravagant, but not to an extent that a fourth-century panhellenist from Asia Minor like Ephorus would
find objectionable. The claim at 11. 22. 6 that no one before Gelon, so far as memory served, had employed such a
stratagem, or achieved such signal success, against the barbarians, is paralleled, for example, by what is claimed for
Cimon and the victory at the river Eurymedon in 11. 61. 149 In fact, far from pointing to Timaeus, 11. 22. 5-24. I
seems to reveal the pen of Ephorus. It may be compared to 11. 11; 11. 46. 1-3; 11. 58. 4-59. These are the sort of
comments one should expect from him. The comparison between Gelon and the other Greek leaders, much to the
former's advantage, is not incompatible with Ephorus. On the contrary, he seems to have liked such contrasts which he
used to enhance any moral points he tried to make (cf. e.g. 11. 59. 1-2). In any case, why should not someone like
Ephorus, writing a century and a half after the events, declare, after looking at the facts available, that of all the
wartime Greek leaders Gelon was the most successful (which is true), and his victory at Himera more decisive than
Salamis and Plataea (which is equally true). It is noticeable nevertheless that 11. 23 begins with the information that
many historians have compared the Siceliot victory with those in Greece, but they have not all arrived at the same
conclusions. Ephorus, therefore, may have been less unequivocal than Diodorus. On the other hand, the opinion that
virtue and benevolence in a ruler were the best means of ensuring the goodwill of his subjects, is an Ephoran
commonplace (see pp. 112 ff.). We should not of course blame Ephorus for the statement that Gelon 'grew old' in the
exercise of his rule. This is just Diodorus.
The synchronism between Himera and Thermopylae (11. 24. 1) is often thought to have been invented by Timaeus,
but this is unwarranted. Herodotus of course reports a synchronism between Himera and Salamis (7. 166), and the
earlier dating of Himera in Diodorus may indeed represent an attempt (surely Siceliot) to enhance the glory of Gelon
and Sicily. But Timaeus was neither the earliest nor the only Siceliot patriot, and it is likely that Ephorus found the
synchronism in the Siceliot sources he employed, in Antiochus, for example, or in Philistus. At any rate,
____________________
149
See esp. 11. 61. 7. Pearson, 1987: 137, considers the story of Gelon's stratagem preposterous, and therefore
Timaean in origin. But the stratagem said to have been used by Cimon at the Eurymedon may strike one as equally
preposterous.
-53
it is evident from the scholion ad Pindar, "Pythia" I 146 ( FGH 70 F186) that Ephorus, unlike Herodotus,
accepted the story (the same story presumably which Diodorus might have related if he had so chosen; cf. 11. 26. 4)
that Gelon had every intention of helping the Greeks, and was in fact on the point of doing so, but was prevented by
the Carthaginian invasion. Furthermore, the statement that by his victory Gelon freed not only Sicily 'but also the
whole of Greece' does perhaps carry the additional implication that Ephorus dated Himera before Salamis: not only was
the battle of Himera of equal importance with Salamis and Plataea, but by being won first, as Diodorus explains, it
inspired the mainland Greeks to win their own battles (11. 23. 2), thus ensuring the salvation of Greece.
And there are two other points which seem to declare Ephorus as the source behind these chapters. First, and the
synchronism between Himera and Thermopylae apart, there is the pairing of the two battles as
+ (11. 24. 1). This instantly brings to mind 11. 11. 2 from the encomium of Leonidas and his
men (certainly Ephoran): + + + +
+ . Second, it is a great deal easier to believe that Ephorus rather than
Timaeus is responsible for the statement that Themistocles, 'having been driven out from the whole of Greece, took
refuge with Xerxes, his greatest enemy' (11. 23. 3). We know from Plutarch (Them. 27. 1-2) that Ephorus was one of
those historians (the majority) who brought Themistocles to the court of Xerxes. Thucydides and Charon of Lampsacus,
on the other hand, said that Xerxes was already dead and Artaxerxes on the throne when Themistocles went up to
Susa. Plutarch himself was of the opinion that Thucydides' dating agreed best with the existing chronological records.
It is rather unlikely, therefore, that Timaeus, no mean chronographer himself ( FGH566 T10, 11), would have followed

Ephorus, a historian he criticized for inaccuracies ( FGH 566 F110) and the popular tradition rather than Thucydides
and Charon.
Some other features of Diodorus' narrative of the campaign and battle of Himera which have been held to point to
Timaeus, or at least away from Ephorus, are the following. 150
____________________
150
It is not possible here to deal with all the arguments which been advanced in this connection. The weakest ones are
those based on language; e.g
-541.

At 11. 20. 3 it is said that while Hamilcar marched against Himera, his fleet escorted him by sailing along the
coast. This is seen as one of several imaginary elements which amount to a 'fantastic' account, which can only be
Timaean. 151 But there is nothing 'fantastic' or specifically Timaean in this. There are plenty of instances in
ancient history of such close co-operation between land and sea forces. See, from Diodorus for example, from
indubitably non-Timaean contexts, 11. 77. 1; 14. 21. 2; 15. 41. 4; 18. 12. 2; 20. 73. 2; 20. 76. 6.
2.
Brown, though rightly dismissive of Laqueur's 'scissors and paste' theory, nevertheless proceeds to identify at
least two different sources in the account of Himera. 152 He considers a source, which he calls the 'Amilkon'
source, as responsible for 20. 1-21. 3, and a second source, the 'Amilkas' source, as responsible for 21. 3-22. 3.
At 22. 4 Diodorus, he thinks, returns to the first source. The second source is more 'theatrical' in character than
the first. 'An improbable device like that of the intercepted messenger suggests an armchair historian', and
therefore it 'may well be Timaeus'. 153 But, apart from the unlikelihood that a compiler like Diodorus would
change source in mid-narrative, (a) the narrative forms a unity, the same details occurring in the sections he
attributes to different sources; for instance, the and the ; (b) the variation
between 'Amilkon' and 'Amilkas' is hardly significant. Even if we could presume that Ephorus and Timaeus were
consistent in the form of name they gave, one perhaps preferring 'Amilkon' and the other 'Amilkas', the truth is
that no pattern can be deduced from Diodorus. At 11. 20. 1, for example, where the Teubner text prints
'Amilkona', MS P has 'Imilkona'. And in Book 13, chapters 80-91, Diodorus sometimes writes 'Imilkon' and
sometimes 'Imilkas'. As we shall see these chapters are based on Timaeus. 154
____________________
Pearson, 1987: 137 n. 52, quotes the phrase + + , from 11. 22. 3,
and opines that 'variations of this . . . occur in other Timaean passages of Diodorus, 14. 73. 3, 20. 67. 2'. I would
question the Timaean origin of either passage, especially of the first (see below), but as it happens the very same
phrase is employed by D at 20. 48. 7, most certainly not a Timaean passage; and cf. 18. 22. 5.
151
Meyer, GdA iv. 1 ( 1944 edn.), 376 f.; Pearson, 1987: 136.
152
1952: 347ff.
153
1952:353.
154
Brown, 1952:353 n. 83, advances the additional argument that 'the + source prefers not to repeat the
proper name. Instead we find + (20. 2) or
-553.

It has been said that the claim at 11. 24. 4 that the Carthaginians feared an invasion of Africa by Gelon could
only have been made in the light of Agathocles' campaigns, and that it therefore points to Timaeus. 155 This is
not an inevitable conclusion. The attempt by Dorieus, foiled by Carthage, to found a colony on the Libyan coast
c.514 was a well-known fact; and Herodotus (7. 158. 2) represents Gelon as having entertained a plan to free
the region known as the 'Emporia' in the Syrtes from Carthaginian control. 156
4.
The scenes of deep mourning at Carthage on receipt of the news of the catastrophe at Himera have been seen as
an example of the 'tragic' school of writing history which characterizes thirdcentury historiography -- Timaeus,
therefore, rather than Ephorus. We may agree that pathos must have figured heavily in the writings of Timaeus,
but Ephorus' Histories cannot have been entirely devoid of the dramatic element (cf. 13. 102; 14. 5. 1-4); and
Diodorus of course can be relied on to have enhanced whatever he found in his source, whenever the spirit so
moved him.
5.
Chapter 25 has been universally attributed to Timaeus, entirely on the basis of 13. 81. 4-84. 6 which is certainly
from Timaeus. 157 The attribution should be queried. In 11. 25 Diodorus describes the public works constructed
by the large number of prisoners captured by Acragas in 480. In 13. 81ff., on the other hand, we have a
comprehensive description of the wealth and grandeur of Acragas in 406. Some of the detail is common to both,
especially the dimensions of the artificial lake, but that is hardly surprising if Ephorus and Timaeus employed the
same sources, Philistus in particular; and of course the Histories of Ephorus were available to Timaeus.
6.
The epithets , , and with which Gelon is said to have been acclaimed by the Syracusans
(11. 26. 6) are
____________________
(20. 5). Usually his name is merely assumed as the subject of the verb. This suggests different authorship even if
the form + crept in by scribal error.' But this is to carry source criticism to ludicrous lengths. In ch. 20
only Hamilcar is involved and hence the proper name does not have to be repeated; not so in 21. 4f. where Gelon
and Hamilcar alternate.
155
Brown, 1952: 350.
156
Polyb. 1. 82. 6; Dunbabin, 1948: 412. Cf. Talbert, : 196.
157
Cf. e.g. Meister, 1967: 43. Jacoby, FGH566 F26 n., asks us to 'vergleichen' the two passages, 11. 25 and 13. 81. 484. 6, the latter of which he accepts as Timaean, and goes no further.
-56
taken by some to betray Timaeus and the Hellenistic age. 158 It is true that such epithets were a commonplace
after Alexander, but their use in the Classical period is well attested. Demosthenes, for example, a contemporary
of Ephorus, reviles the Thebans and the Thessalians because , , + +
(De corona 43); and cf. Plut. Pel. 12. 7: the Theban liberators in 379/8 were hailed as and +
by the populace. As for , there can be no doubt that Gelon and the other Deinomenids were often
addressed by this title (cf. Pindar, Ol. 1. 23; Pyth. 1. 60; 3. 70; Herod. 7. 161. 1). Whether the title belonged to

them officially

159

is another question, one not crucial to our present purpose.

I see no good reason, therefore, for denying that in 11. 20-6 we have the remnants of an Ephoran narrative which has
been subjected to the usual 'tender mercies' of Diodorus. On the other hand, there is some reason for believing that
Timaeus was his source for the Sicelica in Book 10, at least for the events which led up to the Perso-Carthaginian
treaty (the historicity of which Timaeus undoubtedly accepted) and the invasion of Sicily. He tells us at the beginning
of Book 11 (11. 1. 1) that he concluded Book 10 with the year previous to that of Xerxes' invasion of Europe, and with
the demegoriai delivered at the congress at Corinth about the proposed alliance between Gelon and the Greeks.
Fragments only survive from these demegoriai (10. 34), but they do read very much like the irrelevant, rhetorical
platitudes that Polybius censures Timaeus for in Book 12. 160
____________________
158
They sound 'emphatically and oddly hellenistic' according to Hornblower who nevertheless thinks that D 'himself
probably added the titles . . . in the same way he regularly gives his early Egyptian pharaohs the hellenistic royal
virtues' ( 1983: 48). But it has never really been doubted that D's sources for Book 1 were Hellenistic; cf. n. 139.
Rutter, 1993: 176 ff., argues similarly with Hornblower. He futher suggests that the story of the crowning of
Damarete by the Carthaginians related at 11. 26. 3 (and indeed D's portrait of Gelon and Damarete in general) is
(1) D's own contribution and (2) unhistorical. Nevertheless, to concede the correctness of the second point (and I
do not, at least not on the grounds advanced by Rutter) does not prove the first. Likewise Zahrnt, 1993: 353ff.,
also dismisses D's account of the campaign of Himera and of the events of the year 480 in the West as largely
tendentious and worthless though he blames Philistus and Timaeus for this.
159
As Oost argues, 1976: 224ff. He is less convincing when he proposes the same for the Dionysii: see n. ad 15. 74.
5.
160
The speeches of Nicolaus, Gylippus, and Theodorus are very different in this respect (see below). Surprisingly, 10.
34 escapes the attention of Pearson both in his book, 1987, and in his article, 1986.
-57All the same, though Timaeus represented not only that envoys were sent by the Greeks to Gelon (10. 33 -- the
version we find in Herodotus), but also that Gelon sent envoys to Corinth offering his help (Polyb. 12. 26b. 1-2), a
version of events clearly more favourable to the tyrant, we are not justified in concluding 161 that the latter was an
invention to be found in Timaeus, but not in Ephorus. As we have seen, FGH 70 F186 is proof that Ephorus took a
highly favourable view of Gelon; and what does + + + in
the fragment exactly mean?
We turn our attention now to Diodorus' account of western history down to the end of the great Athenian expedition in
413. We may at once concede that 12. 12-21 (the lawgivers Charondas and Zaleucus) cannot possibly derive from
either Ephorus or Timaeus. 162 It is likely that Diodorus lifted this from some sort of Hellenistic handbook. 163 There is
also near-unanimous agreement that 11. 48. 3-8 (the rivalry between Hiero and Polyzelus) and the narratives of the
Athenian expeditions against Sicily, with the exception of the speeches of Nicolaus and Gylippus, are based on
Ephorus. 164 Otherwise, the preponderance of scholarly opinion is that for this period Diodorus relied mostly on
Timaeus. However, none of the arguments advanced convinces. Obviously, I cannot here attempt to refute these
arguments in detail. Nor is it in fact necessary. For while the major part of this material does not admittedly allow itself
to be assigned to the pen of either Ephorus or Timaeus, there are sections which seem to indicate Ephorus, whereas
nothing really suggests Timaeus. 165
____________________
161
With Jacoby, FGH566 F94 n.
162
Schwartz, RE v. 685. Both lived much earlier than the 5th century ( FGH 70 F139; Arist. Pol. 2. 1274a-b) while
Timaeus actually denied the existence of Zaleucus ( FGH566 F130). And 12. 20, compared with Strabo 6 C 260,
further shows that the chapters cannot derive from Ephorus.
163
11. 89, the digression on the deities known as the Palici, which Meister, 1967: 51, and Pearson, 1987: 141,
confidently attribute to Timaeus, I would credit to D himself. For one thing, the many stoas and lodgings (11. 89.
8) cannot have existed in the first half of the 3rd century BC.
164
Schwartz, RE v. 686, following Volquardsen, 1868: 90, is in a minority in believing that FGH 566 F93 completes and
makes intelligible 11. 48. 3-8, and that the latter, therefore, is Timaean in origin.
165
In attributing 11. 67-8 (the downfall of the tyranny at Syracuse) to Timaeus, Meister, 1967: 47, points to the
statement that the Syracusan rebels occupied + . . . (11. 68. 1). This,
he thinks, can only derive from Timaeus because Ephorus erroneously considered , or , to have
-58
In addition to 11. 48. 3-8 and the accounts of the Athenian expeditions, I would see the hand of Ephorus in the
following. The contrast drawn between good and bad rulers in 11. 53 and 11. 66-8, the bad rulers causing their own
downfall by the harshness of their rule, seems to point to Ephorus. We may compare especially 11. 68. 7 with 15. 1. 3.
Chapter 11. 68 leads on to 11. 72-3 and 76 -- the mercenary revolt at Syracuse which involved the rest of Greek
Sicily, and the general settlement which followed. The analysis given of the staseis and tarachai is quite consistent with
the aims and character of Ephorus' Histories (see pp. 127 f.). The same is even more true of 11. 86-7, where 11. 87. 1
bears strong resemblance to 11. 55. 2; and the praise of the (11. 87. 5) is Ephoran
mainstream philosophy. The trial of Ducetius (11. 92. 2-4) also argues strongly for Ephorus. It is quite likely that
Diodorus' source provided a pair of speeches at this point, one in defence of Ducetius by a representative of the
+ , 166 and one against him by a demagogue. But speeches or not, the passage
corresponds closely to 13. 19. 4 ff. and the speeches of Nicolaus and Gylippus (13. 20 ff) which, in my view, are
almost certainly from Ephorus (see below). Finally, there is 12. 26. This panoramic view of most of the
____________________
been an island, as FGH 70 F66 proves. Sanders too, 1987: 72, who is concerned to show that Ephorus did not use
Philistus' , thinks that this 'is clearly indicated by his error in detail in referring to the Syracusan
suburb of Tyche as an island . . . an error unlikely to have stemmed from . . . Philistus'. But F66, from Stephanus

Byzantius, cannot be right as it stands: s.v. T + . + (12th)

T . Apart from the improbability that Ephorus would consider Tyche an island, Stephanus
generally quotes from one or more authors by way of proof of his claim; and his claim here is that Tyche was a
polis. The quotation from Ephorus, therefore, must be garbled or corrupt (as in F76). It is possible of course that
Ephorus also mentioned an island which bore the name Tychia.
It is far from certain that Palice (11. 88. 6; 90. 1) and Trinacia (12. 29. 2-4) are one and the same city, as Meister,
1967: 51 f., and others believe, and that therefore two different sources, Timaeus and Ephorus respectively, are
indicated.
166
+ + + , + , was the main
argument used. Pearson, 1987: 141 f., who of course thinks that this is Timaeus writing, sees proof of it in Polybius
12. 14. In the process of chiding Timaeus, Polybius comments that the main consideration of sensible men when
planning to avenge themselves on their enemies is not so much what their enemies deserve to suffer, but how they
themselves ought to act. Polybius, Pearson believes, is reminding Timaeus of what he had written earlier, in his
account of the career of Ducetius. But Polybius does not say that, and Pearson's argument is therefore circular. In
fact the advice is a rhetorical commonplace; cf. Thuc. 3. 44.
-59
Mediterranean world at peace is more likely perhaps to have been conceived by the mind of a universal historian like
Ephorus who was concerned with war and peace and the circumstances which gave rise to them (cf. pp. 110 ff.).
Diodorus nevertheless must have derived 12. 26. 1 from the handbook on Roman history he employed. To this he
joined his none-too-competent abbreviation (12. 26. 2-4) of the relevant Ephoran chapter.Pearson discusses in
extenso the speeches in Timaeus, 167 with special reference (naturally) to what Polybius says about them in Book 12 as
well as to the speeches of Nicolaus, Gylippus, and Theodorus in Diodorus. He identifies the speeches of Theodorus (14.
65 ff.) and Nicolaus (13. 20 ff.) as Timaean, while that of Gylippus (13. 28 ff.) may be either Ephoran or Timaean. His
main argument is that Polybius' criticisms are fully illustrated by the speeches of Nicolaus and Theodorus. Needless to
say, there is here a strong element of subjectivity, not least on the part of Polybius himself -- some of his complaints
against Timaeus would hold equally well against Thucydides (the fact, for example, that he crammed into his speeches
more arguments than could possibly be used on an actual occasion: Polyb. 12. 25i). It may be conceded nevertheless
that Timaeus' speeches were probably more trite and banal than those in other leading historians. However, by
contrast with 10. 34 (see above), nothing is found in the speeches of Nicolaus and Theodorus to justify Polybius'
criticism. We shall return to the speech of Theodorus later. Meanwhile the following further points argue for the
Ephoran origin not only of the speech of Nicolaus, but of that of Gylippus too: 168
1. The speeches of Nicolaus and Gylippus clearly form a set; the second answers the first, point for point. So, if
Diodorus adapted the first from Ephorus, he must have adapted the second from the same source also.
2. To judge from Plutarch, Nicias29, the role assigned to Gylippus by Timaeus was totally different from that
given to him in Diodorus. Ephorus is therefore indicated as Diodorus' source. 169
3. At 13. 30. 3, in the speech of Gylippus, it is claimed that the
____________________
167
1987: 145 ff.; 1986: 305 ff.
168
We should always bear in mind what Schwartz, RE v. 681, points out, that D transformed the speeches stylistically,
as indeed he did, with greater or lesser success, most material culled from his sources.
169
Cf. Barber, 1935: 165.
-60-

Athenians had taken a decision to destroy Syracuse and Selinus, selling their populations as slaves, and to
impose a phoros on the rest of Sicily (cf. 13. 29. 4; 13. 30. 3). First stated at 13. 2. 6 in the narrative
(which is of course Ephoran in origin) as a secret agreement between the generals and the boule, this
almost certainly unhistorical element must have been borrowed by Ephorus from a Siceliot source, probably
Philistus. 170
4. The occasion for the speech of the old man Nicolaus is admittedly a little theatrical, but that is not
surprising in an author like Ephorus; cf. 11. 50. 6 and 13. 102. 1 ff. In fact the speeches of Nicolaus and
Gylippus give every impression of being a deliberate imitation by Ephorus of the twin speeches of Cleon and
Diodotus in Thucydides. 171
5. The strong Isocratean touches in the speech of Nicolaus were well noted by Schwartz who correctly
surmised that they pointed to Ephorus. 172
With respect to the western accounts, therefore, in Books 11, 12, and 13 down to the end of the great Athenian
expedition, none of the arguments which have been adduced for the use of Timaeus, whether as the main or even
as a secondary source, convinces; whereas, as we have seen, there are many reasons, more or less sound, for
detecting Ephorus. This does not of course exclude the possibility that an occasional detail from Timaeus was
introduced (as happened later -- see below). But as neither Ephorus nor Timaeus survives, the extent to which
this happened is impossible to estimate.
We noted earlier (pp. 29 f.) that for the period between about 411 and 387 Diodorus took greater pains over the
phrasing of the formulae with which he opens each year's narrative. And we suggested that a possible explanation
for that might be sought in a change of source at this point, to wit, in his having taken up again Timaeus as his
main source for western history. Whether that is so or not, there can be no doubt that Timaeus was indeed
Diodorus'
____________________
170
Meister, 1967: 62, who rightly assigns to Ephorus the narrative of the great expedition, nevertheless selects a
couple of items, including this one, and suggests that they derive from Timaeus. But this is the kind of
unwarranted assumption which makes nonsense of source criticism. If an account is admitted to be based on
source A, good evidence is required before any part of it is attributed to source B; and Meister advances no
such evidence.

171
172

Cf. Pesely, 1985: 320 f.

RE v. 681.
-61-

source for the Carthaginian invasions of 409 and 406. It is noticeable that the various narratives, though separated as
usual by accounts of mainland Greek and eastern affairs, display unity and internal cohesion. For example, 13. 54. 1
clearly carries on from 13. 44. 6, 13. 75. 2 from 13. 63. 6, 13. 80. 1 from 13. 62. 6, 13. 96. 5 from 13. 91. 1, and 13.
108. 2 from 13. 96. 5. On the other hand, the recurrence of the sort of detail (for instance, the Campanian
mercenaries mentioned at 13. 44. 1, 13. 62. 5, and 13. 80. 4) which in different circumstances might be explained by
the supposition of a single source at work is not applicable here because the same sources (above all Philistus)
provided the factual basis for both Ephorus and Timaeus. 173 The proof that Timaeus is in fact the source responsible
for this lies in the figures for the Carthaginian forces we find embedded in the narrative of the campaigns. 174 Timaeus
gives the size of the invading Carthaginian army in 409 as 100,000 men (13. 54. 5). These were joined by 20,000
Sicels and Sicans (13. 59. 6). And it is precisely this army of 120,000 that we meet operating against Himera (13. 59.
6; 13. 60. 3). The Carthaginian navy on this occasion amounted to 60 triremes and 1,500 merchantmen. Diodorus
does not attribute these figures to either Ephorus or Timaeus, but if we concede that the account as a whole is
Timaean there is a prima facie case for the naval figures being his too (and see below).
In 406 the Carthaginians again had at their disposal 120,000 men, according to Timaeus (13. 80. 5). Their navy this
time numbered some 1,000 merchantmen and 90 triremes. Though
____________________
173
This needs to be qualified, especially in the case of Timaeus-- see text below. Both Ephorus and Timaeus must
have used historical writings other than that of Philistus: Ephorus at D 14. 8. 4 ff. did not, for instance, follow
Philistus (cf. Plut. Dion 35. 6 f.); and Polycritus of Mende reached D 13. 83. 3 through Timaeus. Other possibilities
are Hermeias of Methymna ( FGH558), Athanas of Syracuse ( FGH562), and Timonides of Leucas ( FGH561).
Whether Theopompus on Sicily could have been available to Ephorus (as he certainly was to Timaeus) is a moot
point. Historical compositions apart, a great deal of material of all sorts must have existed in Athens in the second
half of the 4th century, written as well as oral, and largely hostile to the memory of the tyrants. The role of the
comic stage and the Academy in both generating and disseminating such material was probably significant (
Stroheker, 1958: 18 ff., esp. 23 f.; cf. Caven, 1990: 222 ff.; Sanders, 1987: 1 ff.).
174
The significance of these numbers was seen by Schwartz, RE v. 685, though not by Sanders, who insists that all
that can be deduced from such fragments 'relates precisely to the immediate material to which they allude' (1987:
111). But fragments such as these are a great deal more important when (as here) they can be shown to underpin
the narrative.
-62
Diodorus does not attribute the latter information to Timaeus, the same comment applies as for the fleet of 409. Once
more we see that the army of the account of the campaign of 406 is that of Timaeus (13. 85. 1; 13. 87. 1). By itself
the evidence of the numbers suffices for the attribution of the account to Timaeus. But there is more. As generally
recognized, 175 the lengthy description of the wealth of Acragas (13. 81. 4-84. 6) unquestionably derives from
Timaeus; not only is Timaeus quoted twice in the course of it, but it partly tallies with another Timaean fragment from
Aelian ( FGH566 F26). Timaeus is also referred to at 13. 85. 3, in the narrative. In the light of all this, it would be
illogical to credit Diodorus with all of the pathos in 13. 89. 176
Two questions demand answers. The first concerns the origin of the discrepant Ephoran numbers for the Carthaginian
army (at 13. 54. 5, 13. 60. 5, and 13. 80. 5) which accompany those from Timaeus. Did Diodorus find these in
Timaeus, 177 or did he consult his copy of Ephorus? The second alternative is much to be preferred. For one thing, if the
presence of the Ephoran numbers is really the result of Timaeus' criticism of them, why is there not a single reference
to Philistus in this connection? As a matter of fact Philistus, unlike Ephorus and Timaeus, is never cited for historical
detail of any kind by Diodorus, and this circumstance is a further argument that Diodorus did not use him directly. 178
It would thus appear that when Ephorus and Timaeus are cited together, whether in Book 13 or in Book 14 (see
below), that is because they were both consulted on the point in question. A good
____________________
175
cf. e.g. Jacoby, FGH566 F 26 n.
176
Meister, 1967: 76 ff., and Pearson, 1987: 152 ff., employ a great many more arguments in favour of Timaeus, but
few of these are plausible.
177
As pro-Timaeus 'fundamentalists' like Pearson, 1987: 152 and n. 93, propose.
178
Philistus on the origin of the Sicans at 5. 6. 1 is clearly derived from Timaeus. Contra Sanders (see n. 145). The
fact that Philistus is mentioned five times in the Bibliotheke as a historian (perhaps six: 23. 17. 1) is no evidence of
course that D was acquainted at first hand with his work. Three of these references, as it happens, are
chronographic notices and it was established long ago, what is in any case evident, that mere mention in the
chronographer does not mean that the historian mentioned was used by D ( Volquardsen, 1868). It is surprising,
therefore, to find Sanders claiming just that: 1987: 110, 117, 141. And on p. 121 he suggests that the fact that D
at 16. 71. 3 'refers to a specific part of the Philippica (of Theopompus), the Sicilian excursus, certainly suggests
Diodorus' direct acquaintance with the work'. Chamoux, pp. xxiii ff., seems to be similarly in error (while his
comments on p. xxii on German scholars of the 19th century in general and on Schwartz in particular are
inaccurate and unfair). That D did not use Philistus directly, but through Ephorus and Timaeus, see p. 70 and nn.
165, 174, 179, 194, 198.
-63illustration of how Diodorus worked is provided by 13. 60. 5 and 13. 87. 1. In the first instance Ephorus was consulted
and he is therefore cited alongside Timaeus, the latter's figure as usual being a great deal more restrained than that of

the former. In the second instance Diodorus it seems did not bother to check up and cite Ephorus' figure and only the
low, Timaean figure is given, unassigned this time.
The second question concerns the absence of discrepant Carthaginian naval figures, whether by Ephorus (in Bk. 13) or
Timaeus (in Bk. 14). It should not be assumed from this that the two historians gave the same numbers. The truth
must be that Diodorus, erratic as always, simply did not take the trouble to note the divergence. Ephorus' numbers, by
the way, are exactly in line with those he gives for Persian armies and are therefore his own. 179 Timaeus' numbers on
the other hand were probably taken unchanged from Philistus. (Xenophon's interpolator seems to have got his Sicilian
facts from either Philistus or Timaeus.)
If then Timaeus was Diodorus' main source for the western events of these years, did he continue so using him, or did
he at some point forsake him for Ephorus? An important passage to note here is 13. 90. 5-7. Amongst the objects
plundered from Acragas in 406 Diodorus includes the famous bull of Phalaris (13. 90. 4). This he does in direct contrast
to Timaeus who seems to have denied that such a thing had ever existed at Acragas. In a manner strongly reminiscent
of Polybius (12. 25) Diodorus goes on to censure Timaeus who, while making a great show of accuracy, was proved, in
the case of the bull, to be merely improvising. Timaeus' bitter criticism of his predecessors is thus rendered even more
inexcusable. Authors, Diodorus opines, ought to be forgiven for errors committed in good faith. If, on the other hand,
the misrepresentations are deliberate then they deserve to be censured; , he concludes, +
+ . The conclusion is obviously inappropriate to the
case in point, that is, Timaeus'
____________________
179
See pp. 130 ff. This is overlooked by Caven, 1990: 31 f., who therefore surmises that Ephorus' figures derive from
Philistus. On the other hand, Timaeus' numbers, he thinks, being 'more modest . . . probably represent
"corrections" of Ephorus rather than figures taken from a source other than Philistus'. Conversely, and rightly,
Sanders, 1987: 72, infers that Timaeus' figures are those of Philistus. But he is wrong to see the differences
between Ephorus' and Timaeus' figures as further evidence that Ephorus did not use Philistus (see n. 194).
-64-

views on the bull of Phalaris. So how did it come to be here and what does it signify?
At 21. 17. 1-3 Diodorus once again digresses for the purpose of rebuking Timaeus, this time for his grossly unfair
treatment of Agathocles. Timaeus allowed personal enmity ( ) so to distort his vision as
a historian that his account of the deeds of Agathocles was quite unacceptable. This does not necessarily mean
that Diodorus shunned Timaeus altogether as a source for the life and times of Agathocles. 180 On the other hand,
21. 17. 1-3 must be allowed a great deal more weight than Pearson allows it, who merely takes it to indicate that
for his narrative of Agathocles Diodorus employed Timaeus, but took the trouble to moderate the anti-Agathocles
bias. On the whole I tend to agree with Schwartz that Duris was Diodorus' main authority for Agathocles though
with the occasional reference to Timaeus. 181 Can 13. 90. 5-7 be taken to imply something similar?
There can be little doubt that both passages, 13. 90. 5-7 and 21. 17. 1-3, were inspired by Diodorus' reading of
Polybius Book 12. 182 We need not suppose that Timaeus mentioned the bull of Phalaris in connection with the
sack of Acragas. But whether he did or not it seems evident that Diodorus turned to Polybius Book 12 again at
this point and reread a number of chapters, including those which discussed Timaeus' treatment of the bull of
Phalaris and Agathocles. What else can he have found in these chapters?
Most of Book 12 of Polybius is unfortunately lost to us. We cannot be certain of the correct sequence of all the
surviving fragments which, moreover, may not be fully representative of the original contents of the book. From
12. 24. 3 f. we learn that Timaeus had branded Dionysius as an effeminate, 183 and Polybius may well have had
more to say about Timaeus' one-sided account of the tyranny of Dionysius. That Timaeus, in contrast to Ephorus,
was bitterly hostile to the tyrant is sometimes questioned. 184 It seems to me, however, that there are sufficient
____________________
180
Pearson, 1987: 227 ff.
181
RE v. 687 f. P. Oxy. 2399 (possibly Duris -- accepted as such in Lustrum, 21 ( 1978)) lends support to this
view -- see Turner comments, P. Oxy. xxiv. 99 ff.
182
On D, Polybius, and the bull of Phalaris see Walbank, HCP ii. 380 ff.; Schepens, 1978: 117 ff.
183
On Dionysius' interest in textiles cf. 14. 109. 1; Jacobsthal, 1938: 205 f.
184
e. g. by Caven, 1990: 3, 231 f. (arguing against Stroheker, 1958: 16 ff.). Lewis adopts an agnostic position:
'there is no real reason for supposing that one was more
-65indications for supposing just that. Timaeus was not called Epitimaios for no good reason (whereas nothing
remotely similar was ever said of Ephorus) and Momigliano makes the additional point that many of the victims of
Timaeus' vitriolic attacks were either pro-Macedonians or supporters of despotic governments. In his opinion,
Timaeus' hostility towards Aristotle stemmed from a political motive; in other words, it was due to the
philosopher's collaboration with Macedonia. 185 But why should that have annoyed Timaeus? The answer of course
lies in Timaeus' Sicilian background and experiences. Timaeus' city of Tauromenium was destroyed by Agathocles
and Timaeus was forced to flee to Athens; hence his complete misrepresentation of the reign of Agathocles
against which Polybius (12. 15) and Diodorus (21. 17. 1-3) protest. The gross vilification of Demochares, a
nephew of Demosthenes, which so shocked Polybius (12. 13 f.), may well have been provoked, in the view of
Momigliano, 186 by some opinion of Agathocles in Demochares' historical work which Timaeus construed as
favourable.

Of course, the destruction of Tauromenium. by Agathocles was only the tail-end of a story which began nearly a
century earlier. In 403 Dionysius I had utterly destroyed the city of Naxos, whence Timaeus' family apparently
hailed, selling its entire population as slaves (14. 15. 2). If Andromachus (Timaeus' father) did not suffer this fate,
because he had not yet been born perhaps, his father (Timaeus' grandfather) must have done. When in 358/7
Andromachus gathered together the remnants of the Naxians and founded (or refounded -- see 14. 59. 1-2)
Tauromenium (16. 7. 1), he almost certainly did so against the wishes of Dionysius 11. 187 Timaeus was not the
man either to forgive such sins against his family or, conversely, to overlook favours done to them. What
Marcellinus says cannot be the entire truth, but he may well have a point when he suggests that Timaeus praised
Timoleon above measure because he allowed Andromachus to continue as tyrant at Tauromenium. The intense
hatred Timaeus must have felt against
____________________
hostile to Dionysius than the other': CAH2 vi. 123. On the contrary, Sanders, 1987: 79 ff., seems perfectly
correct in arguing that Timaeus was violently hostile to Dionysius.
185
Momigliano, Essays, 46.
186
Ibid., 47.
187
Timaeus' hostility to Dionysius is also indicated by the fragments: FGH566 FF29, 105.
-66the Dionysii, and the contrast in this respect between him and Ephorus, are made quite clear by the comments of
Plutarch in Dion 35. 6-36. 2, which passage recounts the death of Philistus and the way this event was treated by
Ephorus, Timonides, and Timaeus. Taking as a pretext Philistus' zeal for, and loyalty to, the rule of the Dionysii,
Timaeus, Plutarch says, filled his work with insults and defamatory 'comments against him. The violence of
Timaeus' language against a leading supporter and the 'official' historian of the tyrants (incomprehensible, if
Timaeus did not hate them) evokes Plutarch's condemnation: it is forgivable in those who lived and suffered
under the tyranny to exhibit such bitterness, but later historians ought to moderate their language. Timaeus had
not of course experienced the tyranny of the Dionysii, but, as we have seen, his parents and grandparents had.
If Timaeus went too far, so did Ephorus, according to Plutarch ( Dion 36. 3-4), though in the opposite direction:
he dared praise Philistus. Plutarch does not explain as well as he might, but Ephorus' praise seems to have been
not just for Philistus' abilities as a historian, but also for the loyalty, disinterestedness, and perhaps even patriotic
motives (as Philistus himself claimed?) with which he served both Dionysii. It is quite possible that Ephorus, as
was his habit (pp. 6 ff.), accorded Philistus a set epainos, the gist of which survives in Diodorus' account of his
death (16. 16. 3 f.) where he is described as the and of all the philoi of the two tyrants.
We are in no way justified in deducing from all this that Ephorus' account was favourable to the elder tyrant, but
it must surely have been fairer than that of Timaeus. Timaeus would not have written as he did about Philistus
had he not been actuated by hatred against the Dionysii. Nor would Ephorus have praised Philistus' abilities and
character if his viewpoint was not more detached than that of Timaeus. 188
So what kind of history of the Dionysii did Timaeus write? Commenting on Timaeus' account of the reign of
Agathocles Polybius accuses him of deliberately leaving out all the good things and including only the bad ones
(12. 15. 10 f.; cf. D 21. 17. 2), obviously with the aim of showing the dynast in the worst
____________________
188
Having made an Italiot of Ephorus, presumably because he supposes Cyme, his home-city, to be the city in
Italy with the same name, Caven proceeds to surmise that Ephorus 'would have had his own reasons . . . for
disliking Dionysius' (1990: 3). This mistaken conjecture intrudes several times in Caven's book: pp. 65, 142,
146, 187.
-67
possible light. In all probability the elder Dionysius did not fare any better in Timaeus' hands. And this is where
the qualification as to Timaeus' use of Philistus I mentioned earlier comes in. If Timaeus' hatred of Dionysius is
granted, we must inevitably conclude that he is unlikely to have borrowed from Philistus material to the tyrant's
credit. 189 When such material is therefore found in Diodorus it must have reached him through Ephorus rather
than Timaeus.
Ephorus himself was concerned with virtuous conduct, not least in public life (see pp. 112 f.). The various
references to Dionysius in Isocrates may serve as an indication of Ephorus' own attitude. For Isocrates, Dionysius
was an upstart who, having stopped at nothing in pursuit of power, succeeded in making himself the most
powerful Greek ruler of his time ( Philip65; Nicocles23; Archid. 44 f.). Still, democrat of the old school though he
was, Isocrates might not have disapproved, if Dionysius had employed his power, however unjustly gained and
maintained, to serve the interests of Hellenism. This he could not be said to have done in any consistent manner.
On the contrary, he had collaborated with Sparta to the detriment of those interests. 190 Not inconsistent with this
view of Dionysius is that presented by Diodorus at 14. 2. 2: though the most fortunate of rulers Dionysius, like his
close allies the Spartans whose rule was equally harsh and unjust, was hated by his subjects against whom he
had constantly to be on his guard. Section 14. 2. 2 comes from the preface to Book 14 which appears to be an
adaptation of an Ephoran preface (see p. 101 ). This less hostile, more objective estimate of Dionysius as a man
and as a tyrant is found in other writers too, 191 and it may well derive from Ephorus. 192
Whether or not there was in Polybius Book 12 criticism of Timaeus' unfair treatment of Dionysius, the last
sentence in Diodorus 13. 90. 7, about historians missing the truth when they choose to flatter or denigrate
because of hostility, is a signal that
____________________
189
Sanders, 1987: e.g. 81, 131; Cf. Caven, 1990: 2.
190
Paneg. 126; Peace99. Isocrates' short-lived interest in Dionysius as a panhellenic leader (Letter 1) does not

alter this opinion.

E.g. the portraits of the tyrant found in Nepos ( Dion1 f.; De reg. 2. 2) and Cicero ( Tusc. disp. 5. 57 ff.),
though much of the account in Cicero of the inordinate lengths to which Dionysius went to guard himself
against assassination is likely to derive from elsewhere. Nepos, De reg. 2. 2, in particular is very close indeed
to the impression of Dionysius one derives from D's account.
192
Cf. FGH556 F40n.
191

-68
Diodorus was aware of Timaeus' propensity to distort events when his personal feelings were involved. 193 He was
about to embark on his account of Dionysius and, had he been a more competent writer, he might have tried
combining Ephorus and Timaeus, using the narrative of the former to temper the more extreme features of that of
the latter. Certainly, what we read in Diodorus, though by no means sympathetic to Dionysius, cannot, in my
view, be a simple abridgement of Timaeus. We may be reasonably certain that Timaeus' account was
unrelentingly hostile. In fact, Diodorus being Diodorus, what he did do, I think, was to lay aside Timaeus and take
up Ephorus again as his main authority. In any case, that Book 14, which holds the major part of the story of
Dionysius, is based on Ephorus, is indicated by quite a body of evidence.
1. The estimate of Dionysius, of his character and actions, is not, as we have just seen, what we should expect
from Timaeus. It is the portrait of a dynamic and resourceful, albeit unscrupulous tyrant, objectively drawn, warts
and all. His one and only concern was how to safeguard and expand his rule. To achieve this aim he hesitated at
nothing. This was the opinion of Isocrates (see above), and Ephorus evidently shared it. All of Dionysius' virtues
and vices stemmed from this one desire. But of vices, the lust for power and the cruelty and suspicion which this
could engender apart, virtually the only one we come across in the pages of Diodorus is an unseemly (for a ruler)
predilection for the composition of bad verse. There is no hint of effeminacy (with which Timaeus had charged the
tyrant: Polyb. 12. 24. 3 f.), cowardice, or sexual promiscuity; quite the contrary. The energy, bravery, astuteness,
and even, on occasion, a certain nobility of character of Dionysius are shown by many passages some of which
almost amount to an aristeia of the tyrant. 194 In several instances the sources which lie
____________________
193
The claim at 21. 17. 1 that Timaeus showed very high regard for historical truth in the rest of his work, though
not when he came to relate the deeds of Agathocles, is an incautious overstatement. It is belied by 13. 90. 57, Plut. Dion 36. 1-2, and some at least of Polybius' criticism in Book 12.
194
We may compare, for instance, 14. 18. 4; 14. 18. 6f.; 14. 42. 1 f.; 14. 44.3; 14. 45.2; 14. 73. 2; 14.88. 2 ff.;
14. 100. 3 ff. In 14. 73.2 it is claimed that in 396 he was just as eager to destroy the enemy fleet as the
Syracusans. It is in such passages that the hand of Philistus shows through most clearly. The surviving
fragments are not very helpful, but cf. FGH 556 F28 with 14. 41-3.
The general grounds on which Sanders, 1987: 71 f., denies use of Philistus to Ephorus are tenuous in the
extreme (why should Ephorus have eschewed 'the
-69behind the narrative chiefly Philistus through Ephorus) plainly seek to exonerate him from any responsibility for
military disasters. 195 The general impression one derives is that Dionysius was not by nature a cruel man -unless circumstances demanded it, in which case he was second to none in this respect. With one notable
exception, when he unwisely let his desire for revenge Let the better of him (14. 112), he appears as a pragmatist
and a man well in control of himself, able to show either mercy or severity as his policy demanded (14. 9. 5 ff.;
14. 14. 8; 14. 41. 1; 14. 45. 1). Such an account of Dionysius, let it be said again, cannot be described as friendly
and in places it is positively hostile. Philistus' account, on the other hand, must have been consistently well
disposed to the tyrant, if not indeed eulogistic; see 16. 16. 3-4; Plut. Dion 36 (cf. Paus. 1. 13. 9); Pel. 34. 1;
Dion. Hal. Ad Pomp.5 (+00F3 +03BD ). Consideration
of these texts excludes the possibility of Philistus' being Diodorus' direct source. 196 If Diodorus' record of
Dionysius is both favourable and unfavourable the obvious source indicated surely is Ephorus, not Philistus and
certainly not Timaeus.
Naturally enough, the one part of Book 14 where there is unremitting and not entirely fair criticism of Dionysius
and his policies is the speech of Theodorus (14. 65 ff.). There, Dionysius is accused by one of his political enemies
of cruelty, treason, incompetence, impiety, and cowardice. This is the kind of hostile tradition that Timaeus would
have inherited from his family and further elaborated. All the same, the speech is unlikely to have
____________________
uvre of a Thucydidean historian like Philistus' on Dionysius (p. 71) when he did not object to using
Thucydides in his entirety or the Oxyrhynchus historian?), while the positive evidence he adduces to prove it
(p. 72) is unsustainable (see p. 63 and nn. 165, 174, 179, 198).
195
For the costly failure to capture Segesta in 396, Leptines, if anyone, was to blame (14.53.5; 54. 2 f.). For the
serious defeat in the naval battle off Catane in the same year, Leptines was definitely to blame, we are told,
having failed to follow his brother's instructions (14. 59. 7; 60. 2). The decision not to meet the Carthaginians
in the field after the naval defeat, but to return to Syracuse, was taken by the tyrant following the advice of
his philoi and it was the right decision it seems, in the circumstances, the implication being that the Sicilian
Greeks were wrong to desert the tyrant because of it (14. 61. 1-3). The same Sicilian Greeks had been
anxious to fight earlier near Segesta and again the text goes out of its way to point out that Dionysius was
wiser in shunning a battle (14. 55. 5). Finally, in the campaign of 392, the Syracusans appear in a bad light
while Dionysius is shown to be correct in his assessment of the strategy required (14. 96. 1-2).
196
As maintained by Sanders, 1987: esp. 11 off.
-70-

originated with Timaeus, as many suppose. 197 It is very much of a piece with the narrative, 198 and that is based on
Ephorus, not Timaeus. The difference between Ephorus and Timaeus is not that the former totally ignored the hostile
tradition. Clearly he did not. But, being dispassionate about the subject, he was able to treat the tyrant more
equitably. 199
2. The oikonomia of Book 16 of Ephorus (as well as of the following books perhaps) may have appealed to Diodorus.
Con____________________
197
e.g. Laqueur, RE via. 1142; Meister, 1967: 93; Pearson, 1987: 179 ('the speech . . . must be taken almost word
for word from Timaeus'!); id., 1986: 350 ff. One of Pearson's arguments for Timaeus (1987: 180) is that the
speech and its circumstances are entirely fictitious. Thus also Caven, 1990: 115, who nevertheless believes that
the speech 'is much more likely to have come from a collection of rhetorical exercises . . . unless . . . it is a product
of Diodorus' own pen'. According to Pearson, the delivery of such a speech would never have been allowed. But
apart from the obvious retort that this does not necessarily exclude Ephorus, the circumstances of Syracuse and its
tyrant in 396 were quite exceptional. The moment was one of deep crisis and the citizenry, as Theodorus points
out, were armed and in the company of potentially sympathetic allies (14. 67. 2 f.). What better time for agitation
against Dionysius? By good fortune we have the fragmentary description of a very similar episode at Syracuse in
310 (P. Oxy. 2399), possibly from the pen of Duris (see n. 181). It is obvious that his information is derived from
partisans of Agathocles. All the same, it is conceded that Diognetus, the agitator, spoke at length and with some
effect before being removed.
198
198 That the speech is an integral part of the surrounding narrative is obvious even from a cursory reading; cf. e.g.
14. 45. 5 with 64. 4; 67. 3; 70. 1; and 14. 41. 1 with 68. 4. Clearly there are untruths in the speech, but these are
understandable either as the rhetorical exaggerations (e.g. 66. 1, 4) or the deliberate distortions of a political
enemy. Still, the inconsistency between, say, 61. 4 and 68. 6 f. may well be due to the fact that what D gives at
either, or indeed both, places may not represent all of the detail (and reasoning) available in his source. It is also
worth noticing the connection between chs. 14. 10 and 14. 70 and the speech itself, all three pointing to Ephorus
as the underlying source. Unconvincingly, Sanders (1987: 134 ff.) assigns the speech, along with the rest of the
Dionysian narratives in D, directly to Philistus. The historian, he suggests, had thereby sought to expose the
dishonesty and incompetence of the leader of Syracusan resistance to the tyrant and the unrealistic nature of the
policies which he advocated (1987: 139), and this may be the reason why D, contrary to his custom, decided to
include the speech (1987: 140). But the speech gives no such impression and Sanders' claims could only be upheld
if we ignored 14. 70 (and 14. 10) wherein the true feelings of D's source about the tyranny of Dionysius are given.
199
Pearson, 1987: 183 (in line with Stroheker, 1958: 79), considers 14. 75. 1-4 (the agreement between Himilco and
Dionysius, and the motive ascribed to the latter) a 'highly improbable story', and its source can therefore be
identified 'fairly confidently' as Timaeus. But whatever the degree of historical truth ( Caven, 1990: 118, accepts
the compact as authentic), there is no reason why such a story could not have been narrated by Ephorus. Pearson
further queries whether 300 sacks of money could have been carried into the acropolis unnoticed ( 1987: 183 n.
86). By land that would of course have been impossible, though not by sea.
-71
trary to what is almost a communis opinio, Ephorus did not as a matter of principle treat the western narratives in
isolation, in separate books (pp. 89 ff.). Moreover, one of his aims as a universal historian was to highlight the
connections between events and developments in different parts of the Mediterranean. The preface of Book 14 of
Diodorus was fashioned out of the preface to Book 16 of Ephorus. 200 It stresses the moralizing viewpoint that all men,
but especially those in authority, ought not to commit evil deeds if they want to escape the censure of history.
+ , says Diodorus (as Ephorus must have done though probably more subtly),
+ + + + + (14. 1. 3). The three examples chosen are the
rule of the Thirty at Athens, the Spartan experiment with empire, and the successful, but unjust and cruel, tyranny of
Dionysius. Diodorus, therefore, must have found Ephorus' account ideal almost in every respect, not only in what was
said, but also in the arrangement of the material -- barring of course the difficulty arising out of the fact that the work
of Ephorus, unlike that of Polybius, was not a year-by-year account.
A good example of the means by which Ephorus linked appropriate narratives, Hellenica with Sicelica in this instance,
is provided by 14. 10. The chapter is of undoubted Ephoran origin and it serves as proof that one source is responsible
for both eastern and western accounts in Book 14. It bears close relationship with Isocrates, On the Peace 99 and
Paneg. 126. The collaboration between Sparta, who was making a bid for empire at the time, and Dionysius is
emphasized and condemned by both. Ephorus in fact provided information highly discreditable to Sparta. In the
immediate aftermath of the revolt of 404 which all but toppled Dionysius, and while the tyrant must have felt very
insecure, a Spartan officer called Aristos was dispatched to Syracuse, +
, + ' + . Acting as a sort of agent provocateur he betrayed
those who had trusted in him ( ) and delivered them up to Dionysius. In this way the rule of
the tyrant was strengthened though Sparta was disgraced thereby (14. 10. 2 f.). Very much the same thing is said to
have happened in 396 when the then Spartan commander sent
____________________
200
This incidentally shows that the Ephoran book began with the year 404.
-72-

to aid Dionysius and Syracuse against Carthage betrayed the hopes of the Syracusans ( +
), and earned curses for his country (14. 70. 1-3). 201 Feeling more secure as a result of Aristos'
treachery, Dionysius proceeded to disarm the Syracusans. He then built a second wall round the acropolis (14. 10.
4). The building of the first wall is described at 14. 7. 2. Ephorus is therefore indicated as the source for all of
these narratives.
3. The numbers for the Carthaginian forces in the account of the campaign of 397/6 seem to be those of Ephorus.

To begin with we may observe that the statement at 14. 54. 4, K +

, + + , fits Ephorus' figures better than those
of Timaeus, considering the size of Dionysius' force (14. 47. 7). As far as the numbers given for the land forces
are concerned, there is no real problem: 14. 76. :2, in the narrative, is possible only if Ephorus' figures are
followed. 202 And we may compare 14. 62. 3, also in the narrative, where it is said that the army consisted of
300,000 men, , the latter remark surely Diodorus' who may have recollected that Timaeus
gave a different figure. On the other hand, there is something very seriously wrong with the numbers for (as well
as the description of) the Carthaginian navy, as these stand in the text of Diodorus: 203
14. 54. 5: the Carthaginian armada consisted of 400 long ships and more than 6oo other ships which transported
the provisions, the engines of war, and the rest of the supplies. 14. 56. 1: Himilco was anxious to capture
Messene because of its good harbour which could receive all of his ships ( + ), +
. 14. 59. 7: in the sea battle off Catane the Greeks were greatly outnumbered. + (i. e. the
Carthaginians) + + + , , +
.
____________________
201
201 The difference in the form of the name, Aristos at 14. 10. 2, but Aretes at 14. 70. 3, is of no significance.
202
Cf. Schwartz, RE v. 685.
203
As is not generally appreciated. Caven, for example, 1990: 107ff., does not seem to be aware of the problem.
-73-

14. 62. 2: the Carthaginian fleet which entered the Great Harbour of Syracuse consisted of 250 (the reading of
text is corrupt, 204 almost certainly involving a lacuna between and .
It is extremely suspicious that only 600 transports are said to have accompanied 400 warships and such a vast land
force. We may compare 11. 20. 2: 200 warships, but more than 3,000 merchantmen; 13. 54. 1: 60 warships, but 1,
500 merchantmen; and 13. 80. 5-7: 90 warships, but more than 1,000 merchant vessels. While it is impossible to iron
out all difficulties, it seems reasonably safe to accept the following:
i.
The figures and at 14. 62. 2 are probably sound though it appears that they have been
transposed. The accompanying statement that the great harbour of Syracuse was completely filled by the enemy
fleet certainly argues for thousands of ships.
ii.
The 400 long ships at 14. 54. 5 (at the beginning of the campaign) are reduced to 250 at 14. 62. 2, perhaps as a
result of losses in the battle off Catane and the stationing of a strong squadron at Messene (cf. 14. 56. 1).
iii.
There is a group of ships which stands apart from the long ships and the merchantmen. It numbers 'more than
500' at 14. 62.
2. It is perfectly obvious that something was said about it at this point which has dropped out of the text: '(lacuna)
+ .' Or perhaps: '(lacuna) (corrupt), + +
.' What can we say about this group? Two things. First, when Dionysius and the Syracusans attacked the
Carthaginian naval station near Dascon, they found, and set fire to, 40 penteconters in addition to merchantmen and
some triremes (14. 73. 2). Penteconters were warships equipped with 50 oars and, of course, a bronze ram. Like
triremes, they could also be used as transports. Second, at the battle off Catane the Carthaginians, as we have seen,
had no less than 500 ships, 'including the merchantmen and the other oared ships which had bronze rams'. So says
Diodorus, but without making sense. It
____________________
204
This is universally acknowledged; see the app. crit. of the Teubner edn.
-74

would appear that he badly telescoped his source. At the beginning of the campaign the Carthaginians had 400 long ships
(triremes certainly), and the figure of 500 here must have corresponded to a different class of long ships in Diodorus'
source, penteconters and, perhaps, triaconters, which had been serving as transports.
We may now proceed to surmise that at 14. 54. 5 Diodorus gives the number of front-line long ships (400), as well as the number
of the other oared ships which nevertheless served as transports (more than 600), but has neglected to mention the
merchantmen. These, on the basis of 14. 62. 2, must have numbered about 2,000. And the total force, therefore, amounted to
some 3,000 craft. At 14. 56. 1 he mentions only the second group. The discrepancy between the 600 at 14. 54. 5 and 14. 56. 1,
and the 500 at 14. 59. 7 and 14. 62. 2 may be due to Himilco having left a part of his fleet at Messene. Doubtless Philistus'
detailed account made all this clear. It is not very likely that Ephorus confused this information, but it is quite likely that, once
again (see above), he exaggerated the figures. The incomplete and corrupt details we meet in Diodorus must be his own
handiwork as well as that of the copyists. 205
Thus the Carthaginian naval numbers in Book 14 are those of Ephorus, while those at 13. 54. 1 and 13. 80. 5-7, being more
modest, betray Timaeus -- to whom we have assigned the corresponding narrative.
4. One feature that is frequently assigned to Timaeus with some confidence is the description of the catastrophe which struck the
Carthaginian army besieging Syracuse in 396, and in particular the claim that it was divine retribution for its sacrilegious acts (14.
63. 1-2; 14. 76-7). 206 But the reasons advanced lack cogency. For example, it must be the case that the account of Ephorus
(much more than that of Timaeus) was based largely on that of Philistus; and not only for hard facts, one must suppose, but for
much of the interpretation of less 'sensitive' issues which did not affect his particular view of Dionysius. At many points (see
above) Diodorus' narrative bears the strong imprint of a contemporary witness who participated in the events. The vivid account

of the siege of
____________________
205
205 I do not, therefore, agree with Schwartz, RE v. 685, that the numbers at 14. 56. 1 and 14. 59. 7 are incompatible with
those at 14. 54. 5, and that this circumstance points away from Ephorus.
206
Cf. Meister, 1967: 103.
-75
Syracuse in 396, including the detailed description of the plague, can have originated in no other source but Philistus. And it would
be perverse to deny him the attribution of the pestilence to a divine agency, a punishment meted out to the Carthaginians
of Thucydides. That Philistus believed in the intervention of the gods in human affairs,
because of their sacrilegious conduct.
and that he exemplified this in his Sicelica, is proved by the fragments (cf. FGH 556 FF57, 58).
This was the sort of account Ephorus found in Philistus and which he shaped to suit his purposes. Like Philistus, Ephorus did not
exclude the supernatural from historical causation (see pp. 12 f.). Chapter 14. 76 reads very much like a Diodoran rendering of an
Ephoran (Polyb. 12. 28. 10). We have seen that the figure of 150,000 Carthaginian dead from the plague (14.
76. 2) can only derive from Ephorus. Also, the explanation offered for the revolt of the Libyans against Carthage (14. 77. 1) and
the figure given for the rebel army (14. 77. 3) are more likely to have originated with Ephorus than Timaeus.
5. Additional sundry grounds can be adduced in favour of Ephorus. For example, what is said about the origin of the name of
Tauromenium at 14. 59. 2 (Cf. 14. 87. 4) cannot derive from' Timaeus. 207 And the opinion expressed at 14. 100. 1 seems to be
that of Ephorus: in his campaign of 39o Dionysius decided to begin by capturing Rhegion because he considered the city to be the
of Italy. Relying on Diodorus' choice of vocabulary can be a dangerous occupation, but perhaps not in this
instance. At 14. 98. 3, in an undoubted Ephoran context, we are told that the Great King decided to declare war on Evagoras
because of the strategic position of Cyprus and her naval strength, whereby it was in a position to + + .
Such a use of + and is not found anywhere else in Diodorus. 208
6. Might it still not be possible, however, to maintain (with e.g.
____________________
207
The chronographic entry at 16. 7. 1 probably does. Pearson, 1987: 177, nevertheless contrives to see Timaeus'
"unmistakeable signature . . . in the etymology of Tauromenium" at 14. 5 9.2.
208
The meaning of at 20. 84. 1 is quite different.
-76-

Laqueur) that though there is demonstrably a lot of Ephorus in Book 14 there may also be a fair amount of Timaeus? In my
view this is excluded by the unity and consistency in tone and detail of the Dionysian account. Sordi 209 nevertheless claims
that she can distinguish in Diodorus' account of the relations between Dionysius and the Itallots 'due racconti distinti e
paralleli', 210 one deriving from Ephorus and the other from Timaeus. The result of a simultaneous and clumsy use of the two
historians (one of them, Timaeus, a noted chronologist and the other not) was a whole series of duplicated or not entirely
consistent narratives which seriously disfigure Diodorus' account of the reign of Dionysius and its chronology. From the many
arguments she advances, she selects for special emphasis the following: (i) the 'undoubted existence' of the 'doublets' of the
embassy to the Olympic Games and the failed epigamia of the tyrant with Rhegion; (ii) the 'clear contradictions' between 14.
go and 14. 95 about the presence in Sicily of the Carthaginian commander Mago; and (iii) above all, the significant
differences she perceives in tone and tendency in the various chapters on Dionysius which must point to different points of
view and therefore to different sources. 211 This is all wholly unconvincing:
i.
The second mention of the Olympic embassy at 15. 7. 2 is not a 'doublet' and need not come from a different source
from 14. 109 (see below). The same is true of the epigamia. At 14. 107. 3(under 388/7) Diodorus says that Dionysius
wished to punish the Rhegians because of an insult. For at the time he had approached the city with the offer of a
marriage alliance, it is said () that the demos of Rhegion replied they could only grant him the daughter of the
public executioner. In 14. 44. 4 f. (under 398/7), on the other hand, where the incident is related in its proper context,
it is merely said that the Rhegians, having discussed the matter in assembly, simply turned down Dionysius' request to
be granted a Rhegian bride. Sordi accounts for this 'inconsistency' by assigning 14. 107 to Timaeus and 14. 44-6 to
Ephorus. But the insult connected with the rejection of the offer of epigamia is also mentioned in 14. 106. I which
clearly carries on from 14. 105, a chapter Sordi rightly agrees in attributing to Ephorus. Ephorus, it is to be presumed,
doubtless reflecting contemporary opinion, saw Dionysius' refusal to be reconciled with Rhegion after his great
____________________
209
1992: 51 ff.
210
Ibid. 61.
211
Ibid. 62.
-77-

ii.
iii.

victory at Eleporus when he came to terms with the Italiot League as stemming from a private grudge of this sort; and so
he mentioned now (14. 106. 1; 107. 3 f.) what he had had no reason to mention earlier.
The only thing that is perfectly clear about 14. 90 and 14. 95 is that they relate not one (as Sordi) but two quite distinct
events. There is nothing even mildly surprising in what is said about Mago: he had initially been stationed in Sicily in a
defensive capacity (14. 90. 2), but was later put in command of the expeditionary force there (14. 95. 1.).
In my view Sordi seriously underestimates the amount of criticism of Dionysius that Ephorus incorporated in his work (see
above). I quite agree, and have argued so, that Timaeus was as hostile to Dionysius as he was to Agathocles, 212 but such
intense and unqualified hatred is nowhere to be met in Diodorus' account, with the exception of the speech of Theodorus
(on which see above).

What then of Book 15? The main fact about the western material in Book 15 is its sketchy and generally unsatisfactory nature.
And'yet Dionysius was as active in the period 386-367 as before. The usual explanation offered for this circumstance is that the
account of Philistus was much briefer for these years as a result of his exile in the mid-380s. As he was the major source for
Dionysius, the accounts of the later writers who relied on him could not but reflect his dearth of detail; and inevitably that of
Diodorus too, whether he followed Timaeus 213 or Ephorus in the main 214 or some other source. 215
As far as the supposedly impoverished state of Philistus' narrative of the second half of the reign of Dionysius is concerned, the
truth is that it is a hypothesis incapable of proof. Thucydides, the historian Philistus emulated, was only marginally affected by his
____________________
212
Ibid. 64.
213
Volquardsen, 1868: 103ff.
214
Schwartz, RE v. 68 1 f.; Meister, 1967: 100 ff.
215
Barber, 1935: 168 f., is sceptical that either Timaeus or Ephorus were used and is inclined to leave the question open.
Likewise Sanders, 1987: 119 ff., 143 ff.; id., 1988: 54 ff. Hammond, 1938: 144, opts for Theopompus. As far as the latter is
concerned, compelling evidence is necessary, which Hammond fails to supply, before supposing that D suddenly, and for no
apparent reason, abandoned both Ephorus and Timaeus for Theopompus. From this it follows that the sceptical position is out
of place here. If we are reasonably certain of the sources for Books 11-14, why should 15 form an exception?
-78
exile, and not in terms of the quantity he produced. Certainly Thurii, the city to which Philistus went as an exile according to
Diodorus (15. 7. 4, but see n. ad loc.), was well placed for plenty of information to reach him. 216 In fact it is probably the case
that Diodorus himself is to blame for the sorry nature of Sicelica in Book 15. Caven, on the other hand, who rightly exonerates
Philistus, Ephorus and Timaeus, nevertheless blames not Diodorus himself, but 'the transmission of Diodorus' text'. 217 Specifically,
he cannot believe that Diodorus is responsible for the very brief and unsatisfactory description of the important Third Carthaginian
War in chapters 15-17. In his opinion Diodorus' account of this war was, to begin with, as adequate as those of the first and
second wars against Carthage, but then 'at some remote point in the stemma of a sadly corrupt . . . archetype from which our
extant manuscripts derive, 218 the passages dealing with the third Punic War were . . . collected together [his italics] in order to
provide a single connected narrative of this war [for dramatic reasons, Caven suggests] . . . The section of Diodorus' book
containing this connected account . . . was subsequently lost, and the resultant gap in the history of the decade was filled by a
clumsy epitome . . . Certainly as regards their whole manner and style, chapters 15 to 17 read like an epitome, rather than a
continuation of Diodorus' own narrative.' 219
____________________
216
Cf. also Caven, 1990: 186, who further points out that Ephorus and Timaeus could have obtained information from elsewhere if
Philistus failed them. See further n. 173. Sanders, 1987: 45 f., draws attention to the fact that according to FGH 556 F28 the
great preparations of the tyrant for war against Carthage in 398 were related in Book 8 of the Sicelica, and deduces from this
that the war must have taken up the next two books also, so that of the four books (8-11) of the first three dealt
with the period 405-396 and the fourth, very briefly and unsatisfactorily, with the rest of Dionysius' career. Such a top-heavy
view of the is unwarranted. A less extreme and more acceptable position is that of Stroheker, 1958: 192., which
assigns Book 9 alone to the great war. It should be noted, however, that FF30-2 from Book 8 mention Libyan nations and places
and should therefore correspond either to D 14. 54. 4-6 or to 14. 77. It is thus not impossible that the whole of the first war
against Carthage was narrated in Book 8. Besides, we know that Philistus accorded Dionysius' funeral detailed treatment (FF28,
40b), and this was at a time when, according to Plut. Dion 11. 4 ff. (which Sanders accepts), Philistus was still in exile. If he
could obtain information about the tyrant's funeral why not about other aspects of his rule?
217
1990: 186.
218
He refers to Vogel's comments in the introduction to the Teubner edn. (vol. i, p. xxi) about the early corruption of the
manuscript tradition. But Vogel is talking about simple textual corruption, not about what Caven proposes.
219
1990: 188. Caven thinks that 15. 24. 1-3 provides support for his thesis; but see pp. 82 f.
-79

This is an extraordinary theory, and it is unconvincing. On the contrary, chapters 15-17 read very much like a Diodoran epitome.
We have seen (pp. 9 f.) that one of the main characteristics of Diodorus the epitomator is his lack of consistency. Sometimes he
lets us know that he has abbreviated his source more severely than usual: for instance, at 13. 104. 8. And at. 15. 15. 3 he
informs us that he has deliberately omitted most of the detail of the warfare in Italy and Sicily. The Fourth (and last) Carthaginian
War (ch. 73) is equally briefly told, but there is no suggestion there of an epitome of Diodorus' epitome. It is salutary to recall that
Hellenica in Book 15 do not fare any better than Sicelica -- witness, for example, the single sentence on the Spartan treatment of
Phlius (15. 19. 3). And yet we know that Ephorus dealt with Greek affairs of this period in no less than seven books. What might
we not assume about the scale and scope of this part of Ephorus' work if Diodorus Book 15 was all the evidence we had! But
whatever the truth of the matter, on its own this circumstance is hardly indicative of any particular source. Ephorus must have
been briefer on Sicily than Timaeus, though very much more detailed than Diodorus. 220 Nor can anything be concluded vis--vis
source criticism from the fact that there are no named fragments in Book 15 (see pp. 51 f.).
Turning now to the material itself, the question to ask once again is whether there is anything which suggests that Diodorus had
turned to a source other than Ephorus.
Under the year 386/5, and sandwiched between mainland Greek and eastern affairs, we have two chapters on Dionysius. What
these purport to give us is a picture of the tyrant at home, as it were, of how he spent his time when not on campaign. The
chapters are largely taken up with Dionysius' literary concerns, namely his great fondness for writing poetry and with the
problems this created. Such stuff lends itself to anecdote and the anecdotal nature of the chapters is obvious. Isocrates provides
evidence ( Archid. 44 f.) that the truth about the tyrant became confused with legend while the tyrant still lived. And Ephorus. was
just as likely as Timaeus to include such material in his Histories, if only in the

____________________
220
I cannot, therefore, go along with the view of Lewis, CAH2 vi. 121, 123, that the poor state of Sicelica in Book 15 is due to the
fact that D no longer used Timaeus, but relied entirely on Ephorus. This is seriously to underestimate D's ability to butcher his
sources.
-80form of a digression. Chapters 6 and 7 in fact give every impression of deriving from an Ephoran narrative 'chunk' of this kind.
It is of crucial importance to note the statement at the beginning of chapter 6: relieved of the wars with Carthage, Dionysius
enjoyed plenty of peace and leisure. And so he turned to the writing of poetry. Now, the peace treaty with the Carthaginians was
concluded in 392, 221 and therefore the only safe chronological conclusion to draw for the events in chapters 6 and 7 is that they
come after that date, and not necessarily under or after 386/5, as some suppose, though two of these events (Plato's visit and the
exile of Philistus and Leptines) can be dated a little more closely. 222 This observation invalidates the argument of Schwartz that
there is a stark contrast between 15. 7. 2 and 14. 109, pointing to two different sources. 223 In fact there is no contradiction. In a
general discussion of Dionysius' literary pursuits, Ephorus briefly repeated the well-known tale of the discomfiture of Dionysius'
embassy to the Olympic Games of 388. Only this time he connected the tale with the court intrigues which resulted in the exile of
Philistus and Leptines. The latter was deprived of his naval command in 390/89 (14. 102. 3) and may have been exiled at the
same time or, more likely (see 7. 3 n.), shortly afterwards. The favourable terms in which these two are described is a further
argument that Ephorus rather than Timaeus is the source here. 224
Under the years 385/4 and 384/3 we have five consecutive chapters of western history, 13-17. Nothing in these chapters is
inconsistent with Ephoran origin. The only possible objection is the statement at 15. 13. 5 that Dionysius surrounded Syracuse
with a defensive wall. This has been seen as a restatement of the information given at 14. 18 (under 402/1), and therefore as
indicating different sources. 225 The conclusion is unsound. First of all,
____________________
221
Beloch, GG iii. 2. 370; Berve, Tyrannis, i. 233.
222
15. 7. 1 and 15. 7. 3 nn.; cf Stroheker, 1958: 233 n. 43.
223
RE v. 681 f. As he assigns 14. 109 to Timaeus, he is inclined to see Ephorus as responsible for 15. 7. 2. In this he is followed
by Meister, 1967: 99 f. (a 'doublet' resulting from the use of two different sources). That the two passages are incompatible is
a generally held view; cf. Barber, 1935: 168; Vial, p. x; Sanders, 1988: 56 f. For Lewis too, CAH2 vi. 139 n. 82, 15. 7. 2 is 'a
partial doublet' of 14. 109. See further ad loc.
224
By contrast, the Plato incident is of no significance vis--vis the sources, pace Sanders, 1988: 56.
225
Meister, 1967: 101, considers Ephorus responsible for 15. 13. 5, and Timaeus for 14. 18.
-81-

there would of course be nothing surprising in one and the same source, whether consciously or unconsciously,
repeating the same thing. But in fact it is not obvious that what is given at 15. 13. 5. is the same as what is described
at 14. 18 and 14. 42. 5. Some of the detail at 15. 13. 5 is clearly new (the gymnasia and the temples), and the safest
interpretation of the section perhaps is that at this point Ephorus discussed Dionysius' building activity in general, both
that which had preceded the war with Carthage and that which followed it (see n. ad loc.). The words which open the
section, + (the lacuna is perhaps best placed before +; see ad loc.), inescapably
remind one of the beginning of chapter 6: enjoying a great deal of leisure after the treaty with Carthage in 392
Dionysius devoted himself to poetry. And not only to poetry, but, to judge from 15. 13, to architecture at home as well
as to the foundation of colonies in the Adriatic.
The summary of the war against Carthage of 383 betrays no animosity against Dionysius. Quite the contrary.
Dionysius, but especially his brother Leptines, are credited with great bravery. It is true that this may be due to
Diodorus' style, to some extent. But at the very least it suggests that there was no hostility in the account he followed.
Also, Dionysius' demand that the Carthaginians should retire from the cities of Sicily, a demand which they considered
'grievous and haughty' (15. 15. 4-16. 1), does not quite square with Timaeus' known attitude. It harmonizes well, on
the other hand, with Ephorus' policy of reporting what was to Dionysius' credit (as here) no less than what was to his
discredit, as, for example, at 14. 75. 3. 226
Chapter 15. 24 (under 379/8) is the next to deal with western affairs. Meister considers the section 15. 24. 3 as
certainly Timaean -- a which struck Carthage and which was averted with difficulty after the deity
had been propitiated by sacrifices. On the other hand he assigns the previous section, 15.
____________________
226
Meister, 1967: 102, 104, is amongst those who see a contradiction between the two passages, such as would arise
out of two different sources having been used. But a historian could claim that in 396 Dionysius did not consider it
to be in his interest to destroy Carthaginian power totally; and the same historian could maintain that at a later
date the tyrant demanded that Carthage should evacuate all Sicily. On the other hand, we have no reason to
suppose that Ephorus was fairer to the Carthaginians than Timaeus. Meister, 1967: 105, is misled by 15. 17. 5 into
assuming this. But he overlooks 15. 16. 1! On Ephorus' attitude to barbarians see pp. 114 f.
-8224. 2, to Ephorus -- a straightforward mention of an outbreak of the plague in Carthage as a result of which the
Libyans and the island of Sardinia revolted. These reversals, that is, the epidemic and the revolts, encouraged
Dionysius to declare war on Carthage, according to 15. 73. 1 (under 368/7). Between 15. 24. 3 and 15. 73. 1 there are
no sections on western history. Meister joins 15. 73. 1 directly on to 15. 24. 2 and considers 15. 24. 3 an insertion
from Timaeus, a secondary source for Book 15. To this conclusion he is led not only by the contents of 15. 24. 3, but
also by the contradiction he perceives between 15. 24. 2 and 15. 73. 1, on the one hand, and 15. 24. 3, on the other:
according to the latter, the plague and the revolt of the Carthaginian allies had come to an end long before the last war

of Dionysius against Carthage in 368. By contrast, 15. 73. 1 claims that it was the pestilence and the rebellion which
induced Dionysius to go to war. Yet 15. 24 is under 379/8 while 15. 73 is under 368/7. Such a chronological
inexactitude highlights once again the difficulties Diodorus faced when using Ephorus. 227
The last point may readily be granted, to the extent at least that Diodorus failed, and not for the first time, to
appreciate the timescale of the account he abbreviated: the plague and the rebellion may have begun in 379/8, but are
likely to have continued for a number of years; and Dionysius may have begun preparing for war before 368. 228 We
notice in any case that the epidemic and the rebellion are described as 'having taken place' (+) when
Dionysius decided to go to war (15. 73. 1. See n. ad 15. 1.) Chronological oddities are no reason for denying 15. 24. 3
to Ephorus. The alleged quick conclusion of the revolt is very likely due to compression by Diodorus of his source. Nor
can the supernatural element be held to indicate Timaeus rather than Ephorus (see above and pp. 12 f.). What should
be noted, on the other hand, is the fact that 15. 24. 2 and 15. 24. 3 clearly form part of the same narrative: the
plague and the revolts break out in 15. 24. 2 and are brought under control in 15. 24. 3.
After that we must wait until 15. 73-4 (under 368/7) for western history. Chapter 15. 73 briefly traces the course of
the last war of Dionysius against Carthage and concludes with the bare report of the tyrant's death. The detail about
the length of his reign and that
____________________
227
Meister, 1967: 103.
228
This is not exactly Meister's view. But see further ad 15. 1.
-83-

of his son who succeeded him was clearly taken from the chronographic source. Otherwise 15. 73 may be credited
to Ephorus. And to Ephorus should also be assigned 15. 74. 5, the tone of which bears no malice towards the
Dionysii; quite the opposite.
Sections 15. 74. 1-4 are a different matter. The four sections are of course a digression, and in Diodorus the
phrase introducing them ( ) sometimes marks a change of source too (cf. 12. 11. 4; 15. 44. 1; and
12. 38. 1 for a similar phrase). And this seems to be the case here. 15. 74. 1-4 can hardly derive from Ephorus. It
would appear that, wanting to add some spice to the story of Dionysius at this point, Diodorus turned to his
alternative source, Timaeus. The story is certainly slanderous enough to qualify for Timaean authorship. 229
In Book 16, chapters 5, 6, 9-13, and 16-20 could be fairly described as an aristeia of Dion. They clearly form a
single narrative, evidently from the same source. In 16. 5 (under 359/8) we are taken back in time in a review of
the first years of the tyranny of Dionysius II. There then follows the story of how Dion succeeded in freeing
Syracuse from the tyrant. The story stops at the high point of Dion's career (16. 20. 6 -- under 356/5), after
which nothing more is said about him, or about the West, until 16. 31. 7 (under 354/3), when a chronographic
entry informs us of the murder of Dion. We can only guess why Diodorus did not expand on the entry though it
does appear likely that Ephorus did not continue his western narrative beyond the year 356 (see p. 97 ). At any
rate, the assumption that Ephorus is the source which lies behind these chapters seems confirmed by the manner
in which Philistus' death is reported (16. 16. 3 f.): see pp. 66 f.
(i) Ephorus: the Oikonomia.
We saw above that Diodorus relied on Ephorus for his accounts of mainland Greek and Persian history. Also, that
the same author very probably provided Diodorus with the chief part of his western narratives. We may feel
reasonably confident in addition about the way Diodorus worked, employing one main narrative source at a time
(p. 49 ). His text then can be used in conjunction with the testimonia and fragments assembled by Jacoby to
obtain
____________________
229
Cf. Laqueur, RE via. 1150. The arguments Meister, 1967: 104, Sanders, 1988: 56 f., and Caven, 1990: 3,
advance against this are not insurmountable.
-84a reasonably clear idea of the kind of historian Ephorus was, that is to say of the scope and quality of the
Histories. 230
Sometime about the middle of the fourth century an important innovation was introduced (perhaps by Ephorus
himself) to the writing of lengthy prose works, not least of histories; the division into books of the various logoi or
narratives. As we see the new method practised by Ephorus and Theopompus, their histories were not merely
divided into books, but each book carried a proem or preface (16. 76. 5=FGH 70 T 10 ). The primary task of the
preface was to define the book (or books) following (see below), but both Ephorus and Theopompus also used it
as a device for, inter alia, publicizing their historiographical aims and techniques and, inevitably, criticizing other
writers. The procedure of dividing historical compositions into books will in turn have necessitated the numbering
of these books and we should have no hesitation in accepting the known numeration of Ephorus' lost books as
Ephorus' own. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Ephorus also named his books and the title ' Europe' which
Strabo assigns to Book 4 (FGH 70 F 42 ; cf. FF 30 and 33) should probably be attributed to the work of Alexandrian
scholars. 231
Crucial for the quest for Ephorus' oikonomia is Diodorus' statement at 5. 1. 4 that Ephorus + . . .
. This is a little vague and it has been variously interpreted, but its natural
meaning is that within each book the praxeis were distributed according to their genos. Chapter 5. 1 seems to

have been patterned on a preface by Ephorus, one which discussed and sought to justify his method. Diodorus,
doubtless echoing Ephorus, stresses the importance to a historian of the correct arrangement (oikonomia) of his
material. Style and experience, toil and diligence are fine and justly deserving of praise, but they should not
exempt a historian from censure if he has failed to give to his work a proper oikonomia (5. 1. 1-2. The rather
irrelevant comment at this point (5. 1. 3) about Timaeus having earned his nickname of Epitimaios because of his
lengthy and out-of-place censures is Diodorus' own). Ephorus, on the other hand, in writing a general history,
succeeded not only with his style, but also with his oikonomia. Diodorus himself
____________________
230
The possibilities as well as the limitations in this sort of investigation are well delineated by Brunt, 1980.
231
Cf. FGH iic. 27, 48 ff.
-85claims to have been persuaded that Ephorus' kata genos arrangement was the best and that he would
therefore adopt it and hold to it as far as possible (5. 1. 4). But what defined a genos? Diodorus' immediate
application of the principle was a reductio ad absurdum. He decided to call the book in hand (the fifth)
nesiotike and to deal in it with all the islands. But to lump together such different places as Crete and Britain
simply because they were islands made little sense in the circumstances, and Diodorus in fact quickly
disregarded the original intention (5. 24. 1) by also including in Book 5 accounts of Gaul and Spain. 232
Earlier, at 1. 9. 5, in a section where Ephorus is mentioned, Diodorus, very probably expressing an Ephoran
idea, defines Greek and barbarian history as of different gene and undertakes to treat them separately.
This argues for the thematic unity of each book, or group of books, and from what Diodorus says and does
elsewhere too, as well as from the fragments of Ephorus, the nature of arrangement kata genos emerges
even more clearly. It was intended, it would appear, to be an improvement above all on the annalistic method
of Thucydides and the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. This is stated plainly in 16. 1, another preface
modelled on one by Ephorus (see below and p. 101 ). As a pioneer in this respect Ephorus would no doubt
have felt the need to explain the merits of his method to the reader on more than one occasion. Historians,
we are told, ought as far as possible to include in their books the praxeis of kings or cities autoteleis, that is,
complete in themselves, from beginning to end. For half-finished (hemiteleis) praxeis interfere with the
expectations of the reader and are not as easy to remember or as intelligible (16. 1. 1-2). Three centuries
later Dionysius of Halicarnassus, without acknowledging Ephorus, criticized Thucydides' oikonomia along very
similar lines ( Thuc. 9). It is important to appreciate that praxeis is the key word in the passage and
Diodorus' (or rather Ephorus') exhortatiori clearly is that praxeis of cities or kings should be included in books
complete. He is not suggesting that the entire careers of kings should be included in single books though
that, naturally, would depend
____________________
232
For the writing of works on islands in the Hellenistic period see Gabba, 1981: 55 ff. In 5. 1-2. 1, however,
D is concerned with a technical aspect of historiography, and his chief inducement for the decision to
devote a book to islands was the oikonomia of Ephorus' work. Gabba in any case is wrong that Book 5 is
taken up entirely with the histories of islands (1981: 56).
-86on the importance of the king concerned and the amount of material available to the historian as
well as, of course, the scale of his work. But the emphasis, it must be repeated, is on praxeis: the
individual praxeis should not be split between books. It was Diodorus' intention to narrate all of
Philip's praxeis in one book (16. 1. 3). 233 Ephorus cannot have intended to do so. The sheer number
and magnitude of them and Ephorus' detailed treatment of his own time excluded that if nothing
else did.
Of course, at every level geography was an important factor (though not the only one -- see below)
in determining the grouping together of the praxeis, and certainly at the highest level the kata
genos approach involved, as Jacoby has suggested, the apportionment of the various narratives
among the major areas -- Greece, the East, the West, and (after 360) Macedonia. 234 In Thucydides'
relatively restricted scheme of a monograph on a single war the management of the material was no
less geographic, the narrator needing to move from one area of conflict to another. The wider
canvas of a history of the world would have made the distribution of the material into Hellenica,
Sicelica, Persica, and, later, Macedonica unavoidable. Such histories flourished in the
fourth century and Ephorus' main task had been to bring them together within the framework of a
single composition. We know, for example, that he used the Persica of Ctesias, the Sicelica of
Philistus, and the Hellenica of Callisthenes and the Oxyrhynchus historian (see below). Traces of this
sort of arrangement in Ephorus seem to survive in three passages in Diodorus, at 11. 20. 1, 16. 5.
1, and 16. 64. 3. All three are normal transition formulae which Diodorus regularly employs when
switching from one area to another, but unusual because of the expression +
which occurs in them. In the first and third instances the switch is from Europe ( Greece) to Sicily,
while in the second the narrative is transferred from Macedonia to Sicily. Greek and Macedonian
praxeis are therefore deemed to be of a different genos from Siceliot ones. But we still need to know
what Ephorus did
____________________
233
If any part of the preface to Book 16 is to be assigned to Ephorus then 16. 1. 1-2 surely deserves
first consideration. Section 16. 1. 3, especially the first sentence, is certainly D speaking. We
must not use 16. 1. 3 to interpret 16. 1. 1-2.
234
FGH iic. 26. For arguments about Ephorus' oikonomia not dissimilar to those advanced here see
Vannicelli, 1987: 165 ff. The present section was completed before I saw Vannicelli's paper, and

its core formed part of my Oxford doctoral thesis of 1981.

-87within these broad gene or categories. Strabo (13 C 623 = FGH 70 F 236 ) mentions a criticism levelled at
Ephorus that + + . . . + ''
K + + . This rather points to a region by region arrangement of the
praxeis on a broadly synchronistic approach ( ). In what way then did his
disposition of events differ from that of Thucydides? We get our answer by looking at what he made of
the history of the fifth and fourth centuries.
One tendency, as we see clearly in Diodorus, was to group events around some prominent individual or
theme and to allow the resulting narrative to run on until it formed a praxis autoteles. The time-span
thus covered varied and might be quite lengthy. The books on the fifth century covered fairly long
periods and narratives would naturally tend to extend over quite a few years. Many books on the fourth
century, on the other hand, were taken up with shorter periods, some covering no more than two years
(see below). Inevitably the praxeis autoteleis would also be of a shorter time-span. For the
Peloponnesian War down to 411 Ephorus of course relied heavily on Thucydides and the way he
rearranged the latter's text sheds ample light on his method. For example, the siege and surrender of
Potidaea are narrated in six consecutive sections in Diodorus (12. 46. 2-7). In other words they are
made into one episode. In Thucydides on the other hand they form two (2. 58, 70). Similarly, the
Athenian involvement in the West in the Archidamian War which is spread over three years and three
books in Thucydides (3. 86, 88, 90, 115; 4. 24 f., 48. 6; 58 ff.; 5. 4. 2 ff.), is made into one story in
Diodorus, 12. 53-54. 7 (under 427/6). We may further compare 12. 55 (Mytilene), 12. 56 (Plataea), 12.
58 (the plague). Also, we note how at 12. 60 ff. and 12. 65 the actions of, respectively, Demosthenes
and Nicias have been taken out of their correct chronological setting in Thucydides and grouped together
to form single narratives. 235
For the pentekontaetia Ephorus did not rely entirely or even primarily on Thucydides' brief account and
the alternative sources he employed are lost in any case. All the same, Diodorus' text leaves us in no
doubt that Ephorus' oikonomia here was the same as what we have just seen. For instance, 11. 54-9
(under 471/0)
____________________
235
Drews, 1963: 245 ff., is thus certainly wrong in thinking that Ephorus adapted himself to Thucydides'
annalistic pattern.
-88-

gives us the whole of Themistocles' later career, from his ostracism until his death in Persia, complete with a typically
Ephoran assessment of the man at the end. Chapters 11. 60-2 (under 470/69) are an aristeia of Cimon, from the
capture of Eion until the battle of Eurymedon. In the same way, 11. 81-3 (under 457/6) is an aristeia of Myronides,
and 11. 84 (under 456/5) of Tolmides. The unmistakable clue in the case of Myronides is the Athenian expedition to
Thessaly of the mid-450s. According to Thucydides, who does not name the Athenian general in command, this took
place a couple of years after the battle of Oenophyta and in his narrative it is separated from that campaign by other
events (1. 111. 1-2). In Diodorus, on the other hand, the leadership of the expedition is assigned to Myronides and the
expedition is tacked on to the campaign which led to the victory at Oenophyta and the subjection of Locris and Phocis;
and the narrative is concluded with the return of Myronides to Athens in glory (11. 83. 3-4).
For the fourth century, apart from the fragments of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, no source employed by Ephorus
survives, but Ephoran narratives of the same sort as before are still detectable in Diodorus here and there. For
example, we have the various Persian narratives (i. e. the Cypriot War (14. 98. 1-4; 15. 2-4; 15. 8-11), the campaigns
against Egypt (15. 29. 1-4; 15. 41-4; 16. 40. 3-51), the Great Satrap Revolt (15. 90-3), etc.), the Spartan attack on
Mantinea (15. 5; 15. 12), the Olynthian War and related topics (15. 19-23), the foundation and early years of the
Second Athenian Confederacy (15. 28. 2-5; 15. 29. 5-30) (and see also the analysis of Book 15 below, pp. 98 ff.).
Of course, it does not follow from the fact that geography was central to the kata genos arrangement, that the main
gene, i.e. Hellenica, Persica, etc., were assigned separate books. It was Jacoby's contention, one widely shared, 236
that each of the Ephoran books was restricted to just one of the major areas. This is not quite right. Not only is it not
supported by 5. 1. 4 (see above), but there is not the slightest evidence that Ephorus took pains to treat Persian
affairs, for example, in separate books from Greek affairs. What evidence there is points in the other direction. FGH 70
F76, referring to the early stages of the Cypriot War, comes from Book
____________________
236
Cf. Drews, 1963: 244ff.; id., 1976: 497; Meister, 1971,: 506ff.; Schepens, 1977: 115f.
-89-

19 and Book 19 also dealt with Greek affairs. 237 Similarly FGH70 FF64, 65, and 191 (from Book 11) also show
that Persica and Hellenica were narrated in the same books. Persian history in any case was not treated with the
same thoroughness and consistency by Greek historians as Greek history. Even Ephorus' famous universal history
was still primarily the history of the city-states of the Greek mainland. 238 One would guess, and this is supported
by the contents of Diodorus Books 11-16, that most, if not all, of the Persian narrative in Ephorus concerned

events which were of immediate interest to Greece. The Persian narratives were few compared to the Greek ones.
They occurred in sizeable 'chunks' here and there. But there was no connected history of Persia as such, only a
series of events which bore directly on Greek history, and my contention is that these were juxtaposed with the
Greek events to which they were related.
What of western affairs? These were largely independent from those of mainland Greece and it would not be
surprising if Ephorus, like Theopompus in the Philippica (16. 71. 3), assigned them their own books. This is in fact
the common scholarly view and the numbered fragments are supposed to support it. As far as Ephorus' account of
the fifth and fourth centuries is concerned we have only one fragment from Book 12, two from Book 16, three
from Book 28, and one from Book 29. As all of these are thought to refer to the West, all four books are usually
given over to western affairs. 239 The view is almost certainly wrong, in part at least. The first fragment from Book
16, F68, is undoubtedly from a western narrative. It corresponds to 14. 9. 9 (under 404 BC ). F69, on the other
hand, is at first glance mysterious. 'bezieht sich vielleicht auf die Karthager oder ihre libyschen hilfstruppen' is
Jacoby's only comment. 240 Jacoby, of course, hampered by his theory of separate books assigned to the various
geographic regions, was at a serious disadvantage -- it is not possible to relate F69 to any known event of
western history at this time. However, once we are prepared to overlook the theory, two notorious and
____________________
237
It should be mentioned that the book number of the fragment is not beyond dispute. It is either or +, see
Reid, 1974: 124 n. 3. But this changes nothing, for again Book 18 contained Greek history.
238
Cf. Mioni, 1949: 23.
239
FGH iic. 26; Barber, 1935: 41ff., 173f.
240
FGH iic. 57.
-90interlinked episodes from Spartan history come readily to mind. The fragment could refer to either of them or
indeed to both.
F69 is a scholion on Hom. Od. 3. 214-15. In addressing Telemachus, Nestor, who is apprised of the problems the
young prince is facing at home, enquires if the hostile attitude of the people of Ithaca is due to the utterance of a
god. The scholiast comments that on many occasions kings were put aside by their subjects ( -- the
same verb as used by Plutarch in the quotation below) in obedience to oracles; and adds that in Book 16 Ephorus
narrates about the gods. The text of the scholion is not free of problems, but there can be little doubt that
Ephorus had spoken about oracular responses and the removal of kings. What springs to mind immediately is the
foiling of the boy Leotychidas by Agesilaus and Lysander -- an oracle was involved in that instance and a prince
was actually put aside.
The second episode concerns Lysander's alleged attempt to undermine the constitutional position of the twin royal
houses of Sparta. The best and most detailed account of the attempt is that of Plutarch in his Lysander, who
attributes his information to Ephorus. 241 Briefly, the story is as follows. Not willing to resume the station of a
private citizen after the Peloponnesian War, Lysander conceived a plan to reform the office of king at Sparta so
that it would be open to all Heraclids, perhaps even to all Spartiates (+ +
+ + + -- 24. 5). The most effective way of achieving his aim, he
realized, was by first bringing to bear on the Spartans the fear of the gods in the form of suitable oracular
responses (25. 2). There then follows the unsuccessful attempt to suborn the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Zeus
Ammon. 242
____________________
241
Impossibly Plutarch sets the conspiracy in 395, after Lysander's return from Asia (24ff.). This is obviously
wrong as shown by: (1) Plutarch's own evidence: 20. 6-8 (Cf. 24. 2); (2) D 14. 13 (under 403/2),which is set
in the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian War (cf. Nepos, Lys. 3. 1); (3) the fact that Lysander would
probably not have had enough time in 395/4 to hatch such a complicated plot (if historical, of course), as
Grote points out (ix. 334 n. 1).
242
The nameless 'historian and philosopher' at 25. 5 is probably not Ephorus, though not because of the
appellation 'philosopher' which worries some commentators (e.g. Flacelire and Chambry, Bud edn. of text,
161f. and ad loc.). For Strabo, 1C1, Ephorus was a philosopher no less than a historian. But Smits, in his
edition of the Lysander ( Amsterdam, 1939), appears correct in arguing that Plutarch at 25. 5 is explicitly
supplementing Ephorus. However, whether Ephorus is responsible for the story within a story or someone
else, the argument put forward here is not affected.
Book 16, then, included both Hellenica and Sicelica, just as Books 11 and 19 contained both Hellenica and Persica.
Jacoby's thesis, therefore, of separate books for the different regions, always and as a matter of course, becomes
unsustainable. Attention was drawn earlier to the expression + which Diodorus three times
uses when switching from Greek or Macedonian events to Siceliot ones. This is further evidence that praxeis of
different gene could, and often did, occur in the same books, for otherwise there would have been no need for
Ephorus (if the expression, as it seems probable, goes back to him) to stress that he was moving from one genos
to another. 243 It is true, of course, that Books 4 and 5 of Ephorus, which formed a geographical preparation,
concentrated the first on Europe and the second on Asia. However, to assign one book to Europe and another to
Asia in this instance is one thing; assiduously to distribute the historical narratives of the various areas into
different books as a matter of principle, quite another, and we have seen that the evidence tells against it. I would
maintain on the contrary that the Greek, Persian, Siceliot, and (later) Macedonian narratives could, and often did,
occur side by side or rather alternatively in the Ephoran books just as they do in those of Diodorus.
What, however, determined the extent and nature of the juxtaposition of the various narratives in a book or
group of books? Was it a random process or was there a purpose to it? Of course, the amount of information
available to Ephorus was an important factor, as was the fact that he was more interested in some areas than
others. It is not surprising, therefore, that as a rule Greek metropolitan affairs took the lion's share of space.
Books 23-5, for example, dealing in great detail with the 360s, were probably pure Hellenica. By contrast it is to

be strongly doubted whether any books were reserved for Persia alone. But the deciding factor here surely was
the theme of each book or group of books, for there cannot be any doubt that Ephorus aimed at the thematic
unity of his books. We have seen that he had pioneered the division of historical works into books, each an
identifiable unit with a preface. The remnants of some of these prefaces in Diodorus are illuminating. The preface
to Diodorus Book 12, the full version of which must have headed Ephoran Book 11, shows that the latter
____________________
243
Drews, on the other hand, 1976: 497f., thinks that the expression puts Jacoby's thesis beyond any doubt.
-92concentrated on the pentecontaetia. The Persica narratives in it (see above) were pertinent to this theme. The
preface to Diodorus Book 14 was based on the preface to Book 16 of Ephorus. Its central theme was the initial
period of the Spartan hegemony and its evil consequences, one of which was the buttressing of the tyranny of
Dionysius I. Hellenica in this instance, therefore, and the corresponding portions of Sicelica were narrated in the
same books, one of which certainly was Book 16 (see above). Books 28 and 29, on the other hand, seem from the
fragments 244 to have dealt exclusively with Sicilian matters, with the later career of Dionysius I from a point
which cannot be determined, and with those of Dionysius II and Dion until the latter's defeat of Nypsius in 356/5.
Thus Ephorus' method was flexible and made to serve the themes he wanted to emphasize. Whether Macedonica
were also treated separately at some stage is a matter best considered in connection with the problem of the
ending of Ephorus' work. It would be helpful to look first at the contents of the books of the Histories which
treated the fourth century. 245
Persica apart, Books 18 and 19 certainly dealt with Greek affairs, with the Spartan adventure in Asia Minor and
the Corinthian War ( FF71-8). So did Book 20 (F79, the dioikismos of Mantinea), Book 21 (F80, the naval battle
off Naxos), and Books 23-5 (FF81-5, the Theban hegemony). We have no fragments from Book 22. The only
fragment from Book 26 mentions a town in Egypt. The fragments from Book 27 refer to Philip's warfare in Paeonia
and Thrace (FF87, 88). Books 28 and 29, as we have seen, dealt with Sicilian affairs from at least 385 to 358
(FF89-92), and Book 30, composed by Ephorus' son Demophilus, narrated the Sacred War (FF93-6; 16. 14. 3).
We may proceed to look at the contents of these books in greater detail.
The outbreak of the Corinthian War clearly delimited Books 18 and 19 as is indeed indicated by the fragments.
Equally, the King's Peace stood between Books 19 and 20. At the end of 19 or at the beginning of 20? Dressler
assigned it to the end of 19, 246 Jacoby to
____________________
244
FF89-92. It is worth emphasizing that the number and nature of the fragments are such as to allow no
certainty.
245
I am assuming that all book references are correct, something about which we cannot be certain in every
single case; see, for instance, n. 237.
246
In his pioneering work now rendered seriously out of date by Jacoby collection of fragments, 1873: 22f., 25
(XXI printed wrongly for XIX).
-93the beginning of 20, 247 while Barber, like Dressler, places it at the end of 109. 248 It may be of some significance
that Diodorus himself deals with the Peace at the end of his Book 14 and makes a fresh start in 15 with the postPeace events, for it is probable that he was following Ephorus' arrangement here. (The preface to Book 15 could
add some support, see below.) But the best argument for the Dressler suggestion is the fact that the Peace forms
an excellent ending, but a poor beginning. F78 from Book 19 possibly refers to the peace negotiations, the final
terms of which recognized Clazomenae as belonging to the Great King. Would Ephorus have ended Book 19 at this
point and left the conclusion of the Peace to the beginning of Book 20? It does not seem likely. 249
One fragment survives from Book 21, F8o, 250 and none from Book 22 so that it is difficult to decide on the end of
20 and the beginning and end of 21. All we have to go on is Diodorus' arrangement of his material and the
knowledge that important events would have been selected by Ephorus to stand between his books. There are
two such here: the liberation of Thebes and the battle of Leuctra. Dressler's analysis of Diodorus Book 15 251 is
useful in helping us to reach a decision. Dressler perceived that 15. 25. 1 smacks of a fresh beginning and we can
take this a step further. At 15. 23. 2-3 (380/79) the surrender of Olynthus is related, and 15. 23. 3-5 is a review
of Spartan strength at this juncture. This point, therefore, would make a natural finale for Ephorus Book 20. There
then follows a gap as far as Greek affairs are concerned. Chapter 24 (379/8) deals with western affairs. And then
a new chapter in Greek history is opened with 15. 25. 1. It is not unreasonable to accept that we have here the
beginning of Ephorus Book 21. The gap at 15. 24 could be of some significance. Ephorus we may assume began
with the outbreak of the Boeotian War, but naturally went back a little to cover its origins and deal with the
____________________
247
FGH iie. 28.
248
1935: 34.
249
Callisthenes' Hellenica, a major source for Ephorus, cannot help. According to 14. 117. 8 Callisthenes began
his Hellenica with the year of the King's Peace. But it appears that Book 1 was introductory, the detailed
narrative beginning with Book 2 and the liberation of Thebes. In Book 1 he perhaps outlined the political
situation of the early 4th century comparing it to that of the 5th, especially in relation to Persia, and the King's
Peace would have been related in that context; cf. Jacoby, RE x. 1690, 1694ff.; FGH iid. 416f.
250
Not available to Dressler who based his investigation on Mller's collection of fragments.
251
1873: 23f.
-94-

to have found the outbreak of the war under Nausinicus in his chronographer, and hence placed the whole
episode under that year. He was left with a vacant year in his annalistic system between the end of Ephorus Book
20, 380/79, and the beginning of Book 21, 378/7 as the chronographer saw it, and this year he filled with western
events. Section 24. 1 looks like a chronographic entry (see pp. 201 f.) to which Diodorus attached 24. 2-3,
probably an abbreviated Ephoran chapter from Book 28.
For the end of Book 21 Dressler's judgement again appears sound. The Common Peace of 372/1 could well have
marked its end. Besides, if Book 21 began with 378 it could hardly have gone on to include Leuctra. At any rate it
came down to at least 376 (F80). Book 22. then, from which no fragments survive, dealt with Leuctra and the
events which followed the Theban victory. Book 23 certainly included the second invasion of the Peloponnese
(FF81, 82), and it concluded with spring/summer 367, if indeed Book 24 (F84) covered the period from spring 367
till summer 365 (see 75-76 n.). Book 25 commenced with summer 365 and finished with the battle of Mantinea
(F85). 252 F83 from Book 23 is interesting. The only likely context for it is Epaminondas' naval venture in 364 (79.
1 n.). Yet that can hardly have been related in Book 23. It is possible, however, that during his second invasion of
the Peloponnese Epaminondas handed some territory over to one of the Boeotian allies (cf. 57. 1 n.; 75. 2 n.) and
Ephorus in an aside commented on a similar action in 364.
The contents of Books 26 and 27 are controversial and bear directly not only on the oikonomia of Ephorus, but
also on the thorny question of the end of the Histories. At 16. 76. 5 (341/0) Diodorus states, and the statement is
from the chronographer, that Ephorus . Before that, at 16.
14. 3 (357/6), another chronographic entry informs us that Demophilus, the son of Ephorus, wrote up in one book
the history of the Sacred War which was omitted by his father, beginning with the capture of Delphi by the
Phocians. It is clear from this, as well as from the fact that the continuing siege of Perinthus is a most
inappropriate point at which to conclude a universal history, that Ephorus had been forced (by old age? Sickness?)
to make a somewhat abrupt end of his work. The
____________________
252
FGH iic. 28.
-95original plan (pp. 110 ff.) remained unfulfilled. Still, the query remains: by what path was the year 341/0
reached? Book 30 of the published work was the account of the Sacred War by Demophilus ( "FGH"70 T9b; FF93
ff.). If we are right to assume (see above) that Books 28 and 29 were taken up entirely with the West then the
year 341/0 must have been reached either by Book 26 or by Book 27. But what did these books contain? Jacoby
assigns Book 27 to Philip, or rather Macedonica, and allows it to reach 341/0 and be incomplete at the time of its
publication. 253 Jacoby keeps an open mind about the contents of Book 26: Greek history after Mantinea or the
East. Barber is more definite; he fills Book 26 with Persian history from the revolt of Evagoras down to the death
of Artaxerxes II or even later. 254 Hammond, on the other hand, thinks 255 that Book 26 treated Persian affairs
down to the siege of Perinthus and was complete, while Book 27 included not just Macedonian affairs, but Greek
affairs also, and broke off with 357/6, after which Diodorus' coverage of Philip becomes scanty, and was,
therefore, incomplete. Hammond sees proof for his hypothesis in 16. 14. 5, a chronographic entry stating that
Diyllus of Athens began his history with the year 357/6 and wrote twentysix books of Greek and Sicilian affairs;
and in 16. 76. 6, another chronographic entry under 341/0, which states that Diyllus began his second syntaxis
from where Ephorus left off and included the deeds of the Greeks and the barbarians till the death of Philip. By
subtracting the second entry from the first Hammond deduces that Ephorus brought his Persian history down to
341/0, but his Greek and Sicilian narratives stopped with 358/7. 256
The immediate objection to Hammond is that the siege of Perinthus is related from the Macedonian point of view.
257
In any case, the event could hardly come under Persica. To the Persians the event was only of marginal
importance; not so to Philip. Nor are the entries on Diyllus as straightforward as Hammond imagines. He assumes
that the entry at 16. 14. 5 refers to the first
____________________
253
FGH iic. 29f., followed by Barber, 1935: 39f.
254
1935: 38f. Barber is definitely wrong about the revolt of Evagoras: its beginning came in Book 19: F76 and
above pp. 89 f.
255
1937b: 85ff.
256
In this he is followed by Sordi, pp. xiif., without reservations, and by Drews, 1963: 255 n. 33, with
reservations.
257
So Drews, 1963: 254, too. It must be admitted, however, that this is not a conclusive objection; cf. e.g. 11. 1.
3ff., where the Greek and Persian viewpoints alternate within the same narrative.
-96syntaxis. The unlikely result of such a hypothesis is that Diyllus covered the sixteen years from 357/6 to 341/0
(the first syntaxis) in no less than twenty-six books! But twenty-six clearly refers to the number of books of the
whole work of Diyllus which seems to have reached down to the year 297/6. 258 The entry at 16. 14. 5 is
confused. 259 On the other hand Hammond is surely correct about one point at least. Diyllus began with the year
357/6 presumably because he wished to cover what Ephorus had not. What was that? Sicelica and Hellenica in
general, thinks Hammond, including Macedonica. As far as Sicelica is concerned there are indications that Ephorus
did not proceed beyond 357/6 (see p. 84 ). On the other hand, Diodorus is explicit that of Hellenica only the
Sacred War was omitted (16. 14. 3). 260 We have no reason for supposing that other Greek events and the
achievements of Philip between 357 and 341 were not related. Indeed it is perfectly possible that aspects of the
Sacred War were touched on too. But the narratives in Diodorus of, for example, the Social War (16. 7. 3-4; 16.
21-22. 2), the Olynthian War (16. 53-5), the rebellion of Artabazus (16. 34. 1-2), Philip's attack on Methone (16.
34. 4-5), and the war between Argos and Sparta (16. 39. 1-7) may well be based on Ephorus. 261 There were
definitely Persica in Book 26 (the one surviving fragment refers to an Egyptian city: F86) and Macedonica in Book
27 (the two fragments from this book mention a Paeonian town and a Thracian tribe: FF87, 88). It is certainly

possible that, as Laqueur suggested, 262 Book 27 related the consolidation of Philip's power in the north till the
renewed outbreak of hostilities with Athens during the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium. That would indeed
amount to a group of praxeis autoteleis on a theme and be entirely consistent with Ephorus' method. We cannot,
however, be sure that there were no Persica in 27 and no Macedonica in 26; and Hellenica (e.g. Athenian
activities in the Aegean) may well have figured in both books. That too would not
____________________
258
21. 5; FGH iic. 113. The exact number in the MSS at 21. 5 is uncertain. It could be 25, 26, or 27.
259
As Jacoby appreciated, though he let the difficulty stand: FGH iic. 112. The book number in FGH73 (Diyllus) Fi
(=Athen. 4. 41) seems to me to require emendation to .
260
It might be objected that Demophilus had already written about that. Demophilus, however, dealt with the ten
years of the war in just one book. Perhaps Diyllus wanted to do it greater justice.
261
Hammond's arguments to the contrary are unconvincing: 1937b: 83f.
262
1911: 336ff.
-97-

have been inconsistent with Ephorus' method. At any rate, we can be reasonably confident that the siege of Perinthus,
related from Philip's point of view, was reached in Book 27, which book was probably finished. 263 On the other hand,
Ephorus' original plan (pp. 110 ff.) cannot have been thereby completed. The story Ephorus never told was only partly
narrated in Book 30 by Demophiluss.
The above conclusions on the nature of Ephorus' oikonomia receive some support from an analysis of the structure of
the first half of Diodorus Book 15. Sections 15. 1. 1-5 probably reproduce the substance of a general Ephoran preface
relating to the period 386-362 which was thus meant to serve as an introduction to six books of Ephorus, 20-5 (see
further below). Book 20 contained both Greek and Persian narratives. Did Ephorus keep the two entirely separate,
finishing one completely before beginning the other, or did he integrate the two to a certain extent thus fulfilling the
demands of cause and effect? Either might be thought to be in accord with his oikonomia, though in fact the second
happens to be true of Book 20. As we have seen, the early stages of the Cypriot War which broke out c.390 and drew
to its close in the late 380s were narrated in Book 19 (on the Corinthian War), but its highpoint and conclusion
reasonably enough were told in Book 20 which covered the years 386-379. The Ephoran narrative has left traces in
Diodorus. One such is at 15. 5. 1-3 which so obviously marks a fresh beginning after the end of the narrative of the
conclusion of the King's Peace. + + + + + . . .
. A condemnatory outline of the Spartan policy of the years 386-379 follows, possibly deriving from
an Ephoran 'secondary' proem specific to Book 20 (see below), and then immediately upon this the reasons for the
Spartan attack on Mantinea and the attack itself (15. 5. 3-5). It would appear, therefore, that Ephorus began Book 20
With Greek affairs. The gist of 15. 5. 1-3 is repeated at 15. 19. 1 and this passage, another beginning, which precedes
the outbreak of the Olynthian War, also provides an indication that the Greek narrative was not continuous, but that
something intervened between
____________________
263
It is interesting to observe that Pompeius Trogus, surely under the influence of Ephorus, whether direct or indirect,
also narrated the siege of Perinthus from the Macedonian viewpoint and made it stand between his Books 8 and 9:
prol. lib. 8 and 9. On Trogus' sources cf. Schanz and Hosius, ii. 324.
-98-

Mantinea and Olynthus -- the Cypriot War it seems. Resumed now from the previous book, the war ran perhaps
without interruption to its conclusion. It must have formed a long and complicated account with few chronological
indications 264 and this was probably one of the reasons for Diodorus' confusion (2-4 n.). The war ended in 380
and after its conclusion Ephorus turned aside to relate the revolt of Glos and the trial and acquittal of Tiribazus.
These events seem to belong to 384 and 383; at any rate they were over by early 382 at the latest (2-4 n.). What
should be noted is that Ephorus saw a close connection between the revolts in Asia against the King and the
actions of Sparta in Greece, a connection which he spotlighted by the arrangement of his material. It would
appear that Sparta had not given up her dreams of conquest in Asia Minor even after the King's Peace. She had
given her blessing to Glos' attempt to establish a power base in Ionia against the King, perhaps hoping for a
chance to intervene if the attempt proved successful (9. 4 n.). At the collapse of the revolt, however, Sparta
renounced her Asian designs and concentrated on Greece (15. 19. 1).
Ephorus consequently seems to have begun Book 20 with Greek affairs (Mantinea), switched to Persian affairs
(the Cypriot War), and then returned and stayed with Greek affairs till the end of the
____________________
264
Unlike his oikonomia, Ephorus' chronology has received little attention; cf. Jacoby, FGH iic. 27; Burde, 1974:
102 f. It is usually dismissed with the comment that it cannot have been much in evidence in his work. This
appears roughly correct though an examination of D shows that Ephorus cannot have been worse in this
respect than, say, Xenophon. There are quite a few chronological indications in D Books 11-16, the great
majority of them from Ephoran contexts. Many of them can be shown to derive from Ephorus' sources; cf. D
12. 47. 3 = Thuc. 2. 79. 2; 12. 51. 2=2. 101. 5; 12. 52. 1=3. 1. 1; 12. 81. 4=5. 83. 1; 13. 8. 7=7. 16. 2-17.
1. 12. 81. 5-82. 1 is an adaptation of Thucydides; cf. 5. 81. 2. But as in the case of the numbers (p. 129 )
Ephorus had access to information other than that of Thucydides; cf. 11. 78. 4; 12. 80. 3. The relation
between Ephorus and the Oxyrhynchus historian (P) was no doubt similar. We know that P followed
Thucydides' chronological system (cf. Bruce, 8 f.). We can safely assume, therefore, that the observation of
the seasons, summers and winters, in D in connection with campaigns is derived from P; see 13. 49. 2; 14.
17. 12; 14. 35. 7; 14. 38. 3; 14. 79. 3. There is also some more straightforward chronological information
which probably derives from P too; see 13. 64. 7; 14. 38. 3; 14. 38. 5; 14. 80. 8. Book 15 offers a number of
chronological references: 5. 3; 12. 1; 41. 2; 41. 4; 43. 4; 65. 2; 67. 1; 70. 1; 94. 1; cf. 30. 3; 34. 1. The

fragments of Ephorus are disappointing. The nearest we get to chronology is with FF207, 218. Thus the
conclusion must be that there was probably not enough chronological detail of the right kind in Ephorus to
facilitate D's annalistic task. Ephorus' primary concern was with presenting 'complete in themselves' narratives
in a broadly synchronistic order.
-99book. But even this latter narrative cannot have flown uniformly for Ephorus had to deal with the capture of the
Cadmea at some stage. This Spartan outrage did not bring up the rear because of 15. 23. 3-5 -- the surrender of
Olynthus and review of Spartan power (i.e. the end of Book 20). Nor did it come at the head of the renewed
Greek narrative after the Cypriot War because of 15. 19. 1-2 -- the beginning of the Olynthian War. That the
Theban account was somewhat independent in Ephorus from the Olynthian War is shown by 15. 20. 1-2: a new
beginning was made stressing the reasons for the Spartan coup de main. Diodorus' muddle over Phlius further
illustrates Ephorus' method. The suppression of Phlius receives but one sentence in Diodorus and it is sandwiched
between the beginning of the Olynthian War and a report of a confrontation between Agesilaus and Agesipolis
over foreign policy. All of these are under 383/2. But Phlius was not attacked till 380. Ephorus presumably had
dealt with this phase of Spartan aggression and aggrandizement en bloc, analysing the origins of the Olynthian
War, commenting on internal Spartan politics, and digressing to include the subjection of Phlius. Diodorus
abridged all this as best as he could and placed it under 383/2. No less informative is the next Persian narrative in
Book 15: 29. 1-4 (under 377/6). Scholars generally attach no special significance to the position of these four
sections, but assume that Diodorus must have misplaced them quite irrationally. Diodorus' poor oikonomia will
not, however, do as an explanation here. The year 377/6 is a very full one, no less than eleven chapters long.
Diodorus, therefore, must have had a reason for placing these sections under 377/6. Either one of the events
mentioned (the last perhaps, Iphicrates' dispatch to Pharnabazus) belongs in that year and was so shown in the
chronographer, or Ephorus inserted a Persian narrative at this point. The second possibility is surely the correct
one. After relating the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy and the Spartan change of policy towards
their allies, and just before the raid of Sphodrias which dramatically hastened the outbreak of hostilities, Ephorus
it seems paused to bring his eastern affairs up to date. We may note that the theme of the newfound Spartan
philanthropia towards their allies and their military preparations which concludes chapter 28 is resumed again
later at 31. 1. What we therefore appear to have at 15. 29. 1-4 is a very much condensed Ephoran review of
Persian affairs covering
-100-

several years from before the death of Acoris till the dispatch of Iphicrates probably in 380/79 (41 1 n.). In carelessly
abridging his source Diodorus has missed the point at which Acoris died and was succeeded by Nectanebos. All these
events, Greek and Persian, were in Book 21 of the Histories.
The story of the Egyptian campaign is resumed at 41. 1 and concluded in four chapters, 41-4 (374/3). Between 29. 4
and 41 there intervenes a series of Greek narratives. Section 34. 3 ( + . . . +
+ .) shows that Ephorus dealt first with the war on land before turning to the naval war. The King played a
part in the Peace of 375, one of his motives being the wish to enlist mercenaries for the war against Egypt (38. 1). The
narrative of the Peace concluded, therefore, Ephorus turned aside to relate the Persian campaign against Egypt. He
then returned to Greek affairs. Again, all of these events were included in the same Ephoran Book, 21 or perhaps 22
(see pp. 94 f.).
The prefaces: an original feature of Ephorus' Histories, as we have seen, was the preface which accompanied each of
his thirty books. 265 Laqueur, in a detailed study of Diodorus' prefaces, 266 argued that those to Books 4-16 and 20
were adapted from Ephorus, while the rest were concocted by Diodorus himself after the manner of Ephorus. Kunz, 267
after subjecting the prefaces to a thorough analysis, concluded that the differences which the prefaces exhibit between
themselves, and the fact that those to the later Books, 21 ff. (ignored by Laqueur), are not dissimilar to the others, but
cannot be based on Ephorus, show that it is erroneous to consider all the prefaces as having a common source. All the
same she fully endorsed Laqueur's view that Ephorus is the source for the prefaces to Books 11-15, and this is
generally accepted. 268 The derivation of the prefaces to the following books, on the other hand, remains a matter of
controversy and this is especially so for Book 16. However, as the comments on the kata genos arrangement of
historical works and the praise of Philip are very probably Ephoran in origin, the substance of the preface can hardly be
denied him (see also pp. 86 f.).
The preface to Book 15 is a censure of the Spartans well in line
____________________
265
16. 76. 5; Barber, 1935: 68 ff.
266
1911: 161 ff.
267
1935.
268
See e.g. Andrewes, Essays Starr, 190; Stylianou, 1991: 389 ff.
-101with Diodorus' declared aim of praising the good and censuring the bad. After the restatement of this principle (1. 1),
the epitimesis of Sparta begins in earnest (1. 2-5). The preface ends with the usual link-paragraph (1. 6). Diodorus'
comments on the downfall of Sparta were no doubt commonplace by the first century BC. But that does not mean that
they did not originate in the fourth century and with the school of Isocrates of which Ephorus was a famous product.
269
The censure of Sparta at 15. 1. 1-5 most appropriately applies to the period 386-362, that is, from the beginning of
Spartan misdeeds following the King's Peace under which the Spartans had sworn to respect the autonomy of the
cities, to the battle of Mantinea which confirmed the verdict of Leuctra and irrevocably deprived Sparta of her former
leading position. The statement of Sparta's misbehaviour is repeated elsewhere, first and foremost at 15. 5. 1-3. By
way of explaining the Spartan attack on Mantinea, and concerning the attitude and actions of the Spartans, Diodorus
writes (I paraphrase): the Spartans soon found the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas unacceptable and returned to their

bad old ways of wishing to dominate Greece. They stirred up strife in the cities and this gave them the excuse to
intervene. They first of all enslaved the weaker cities and then turned their attention to the more important ones.
Now, it seems obvious that the above is not a description of Spartan policy and actions in any one year, but it applies
rather to the whole period 386-379. The beginning of the Spartan drive was marked clearly enough by the attack on
Mantinea. The gist of 15. 5. 1-3 is found also at 15. 9. 5 and 15. 19. 1 (cf. 15. 19. 4). What is one to make of these
passages? The most acceptable explanation is that 15. 5. 1-3 is the remnant of a lengthy, rhetorical condemnation of
Spartan misdeeds in the period 386-379 which Ephorus added to Book 20, probably in the form of a preface (cf. 5. 2-3
n.). No doubt he was glad to return to this theme every time an opportunity presented itself -- further infringements
by Sparta of the autonomy clause -- and 15. 9. 5 and 15. 19. 1 may be all that is left of such occasions. The
culmination of the Spartan policy of aggression was reached after the subjection of Olynthus and before the Theban
coup d'tat of winter 379/8 when Greece lay at Sparta's
____________________
269
See n. 11. For the correspondence between D and Isocrates cf. Volquardsen, 1868: 49 ff.; Barber, 1935: 75 ff. and
app. VIII. On Ephorus and the decline of Sparta see pp. 113 f.
-102-

feet; and that was also the end of Book 20 of Ephorus, indicated, as has already been argued, by 15. 23. 3-5.
Incorporated in the beginning of Diodorus Book 15, therefore, are the remnants of two Ephoran censures of
Sparta; a general one applying to the period 386-362, and a particular one referring to the period 386-379. The
second is very likely the preface to Ephorus Book 20. What of the first? There seems to be only one possible
answer. Such a comprehensive censure of Sparta reasonably belongs at the beginning of Spartan misdeeds
following the King's Peace, that is, in 386/5 and Ephorus Book 20. Thus Book 20 appears to have possessed a
general preface which was relevant to the next five books also, 21-5, and pertinent to the years 386-362; and a
particular one specific to Book 20 which castigated Spartan misbehaviour in the years 386-379 and which,
following upon the general preface, introduced the narrative -- Mantinea. In Diodorus the two are separated by
Persian narrative presumably because the chronographic entry on Mantinea came after that on the invasion of
Cyprus. 270
There is an interesting analogy between the preface to Book 15 of Diodorus and that to Book 12. A comment on
the unpredictability and mutability of the human condition, 12. 1. 1 is, like 15. 1. 1, what Diodorus exemplifies
with the rest of the preface. The striking fact about this preface is that although Book 12 begins with the year
450/49, its preface would suit a book dealing with the pentecontaetia; cf. especially 12. 1. 4:
+ (the Persian invasion) + .
The artistic achievements of that time are referred to, Pheidias mentioned by name, as are also the great men of
Athens, Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Myronides, 'and many others' for really 12. 1-2 is a eulogy of
Athens, though not just the Athens of the pentecontaetia for at 12. 1. 5 the great Athenian philosophers are
remarked, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and of the orators, Pericles and Isocrates 'and his pupils'. It would
appear, therefore, that 12. 1-2 is an incompetently abridged preface of Ephorus to the book
____________________
270
Laqueur, 1911: 333 n. 2 would assign the original of D 15. 1 to Ephorus Book 25, but this cannot be; cf. 15. 1.
2, + , + + . . . . Jacoby, FGH iic. 28,
rather more plausibly, to Book 21 or Books 21-5. But Book 21, as we have seen, began with 378 and the
Boeotian War, and I would consider it more probable, therefore, that the preface which D cannibalized
introduced Books 20-5.
-103-

which narrated the pentecontaetia. 271 But this preface clearly extolled Athenian achievements of both the fifth and
fourth centuries down to the time of Ephorus, a pupil of Isocrates; naturally, as Athenian greatness was generally
thought to have begun after the Persian Wars and as a direct consequence of that momentous event. 272 Like the
preface to Book 20, the present preface was not meant to serve the book to which it was attached alone. 273 It would
seem that Diodorus miscalculated with the arrangement of his material and was unable to fit the Persian Wars into one
book as Ephorus presumably did. He was thus forced to break up the pentecontaetia. This is quite probably the reason
why Book 11 lacks a preface: its beginning fell in the middle of an Ephoran book. 274 But Diodorus could not resist the
appeal of the Ephoran preface to the book on the pentecontaetia; he abridged it and used it to head his own Book 12.
All the same he was aware of its incongruity; hence the explanatory remark at 12. 2. 2:
, + .
(ii) Ephorus: the sources
For the history of the fourth century Ephorus used a multiplicity of sources, written (including the occasional
inscription: FGH 70 FF122, 199) as well as oral. It should be noted at the outset that though certainly aware of the
works of Xenophon he appears not to have used the Hellenica (to any significant degree at least; but see 23. 3-4 n.)
and to have made only partial use of the Anabasis. 275 His use of Callisthenes' Hellenica on the other hand can hardly
be in doubt. Completed by 335 the Hellenica (it covered the years 386-357) was thus available to Ephorus. 276
According to a quota____________________
271
Probably Book 11. The lack of fragments makes the definition of Books 10, 11, and 13-15 highly problematical.
272
Thuc. 1. 118. 2 with HCT ad loc. and cf. Isocr. 6. 42 f.
273
Barber, 1935: 69 cannot be right.

274

Though Laqueur, 1911: 166, thinks that the preface to Book 11 has been lost. Book 13 carries no proper preface
either, again it would seem because its beginning did not coincide with an Ephoran beginning.
275
Cf. Barber, 1935: 126 f. Westlake, Studies, 260 ff., thinks that the Anabasis was not used at all.
276
FGH iic. 24; Barber, 1935: 131 ff. For the probable dates of composition of the Histories see the text below. On
Callisthenes' Hellenica in general cf. Pearson, 1960: 29 ff.
-104tion from Porphyry in Eusebius ( FGH 70 T 17) Ephorus plagiarized Daimachus, Callisthenes, and Anaximenes. Ephorus'
use, if not plagiarism, 277 of Callisthenes is corroborated by a comparison of a number of passages in Diodorus with
fragments of Callisthenes or with passages in authors whose authority was Callisthenes. It can be shown that in
addition to plain facts Ephorus was not averse to borrowing his source's diction, terminology and even, on occasion,
historical interpretation (see 20. 2 n.; 43. 4 n.; 48. 1 n.; 50. 2-3 n.; 82. 5 n.; 82. 6 n.). The digression on Messenian
history (66. 2-6 ) was probably inspired by a similar digression in Callisthenes. 278 But Ephorus used much else
besides. In explaining the earthquake and comet of 373/2, for instance, he combined Callisthenes with Heraclides of
Pontus and Democritus (48. 1 n.; 50. 2-3 n.). And the similarities and differences between Diodorus' account of the
Mantinean campaign of 362 and those of our other sources (not Xenophon) are partly explained by the fact that
Ephorus used material other than that derived from Callisthenes (82. 5-84. 2 n.). His use of Callisthenes is further
indicated by a comparison of Diodorus' accounts of Pelopidas' actions in Thessaly and Macedon with the relevant
chapters in Plutarch Pelopidas. There are substantial similarities between the two even in language (67. 3 n.; 67. 3-4
n.). Westlake 279 explains these as due to a common source employed by Ephorus and Plutarch; he cautiously suggests
Callisthenes and the suggestion is plausible. It is at any rate difficult to offer a better candidate and Sordi, 280
therefore, accepts Callisthenes more confidently. The discrepancies between Diodorus and Plutarch on the other hand
are easily explained by the fact that both Ephorus and Plutarch were able enough writers to supplement Callisthenes
from other sources as well as introduce views of their own.
Porphyry's statement that Ephorus drew material from Daimachus and Anaximenes is difficult to prove. We may accept
that he used them for some part of the Histories, but further investigation is unfruitful. The first part of Anaximenes'
Hellenica dealt with Greek and barbarian history from the very beginning down to 362 in only twelve books. Ephorus
cannot, therefore, have
____________________
277
Cf. Cavaignac, 1932: 156.
278
Cf. Barber, 1935: 132 f.
279
1939: 11 ff.
280
1958: 193 ff.
-105extracted much detail from it (76. 4 n.; 89. 3 and n.). About Daimachus we know next to nothing. 281 We cannot even
be certain that he dealt with fourth-century history at all (cf. 75. 2 n.). The assumption that Ephorus used the writings
of the Boeotians Dionysodorus and Anaxis for his account of the Theban hegemony remains unfounded as the dates of
these two historians escape us and virtually nothing survives of their works (95. 4 n.).
The difficulty of pin-pointing such sources does not of course mean that they did not exist. We know that for the
pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War he supplemented Thucydides in various ways, 282 and a great deal more
information must have been available to him for the years after the King's Peace. The various local histories which
grew in number as the fourth century wore on are an obvious candidate, especially those of Athens, the Atthides. The
publication dates of the Atthides of Cleidemus, Androtion, and Phanodemus 283 make it possible for Ephorus to have
used all three or at least that of Androtion, a fellow pupil of Isocrates, certainly for his later books. Little can be said
about other local histories he must have consulted. 284 Ephorus himself wrote a local history of his home city, Cyme,
entitled + (70 FF1, 97-103), and it is evident that he possessed a considerable body of information about the
history and traditions of Cyme (see 2. 2 n.; 18. 2-4 n.). Political pamphlets and essays would have been readily
available to him, 285 and his own knowledge of the fourth century would have been augmented by the circle of
Isocrates which included some of the most famous Athenian (and indeed Greek) generals and statesmen of the day.
Whether he used Theopompus' Hellenica is a question which Jacoby leaves open, 286 but it is not totally impossible,
especially if the Hellenica were indeed published before 335. 287 It is in any case certain that he used
____________________
281
FGH65; J. Trevett, CQ 40 ( 1990), 416 f.
282
Cf. HCT iv. 68, 106. He clearly made much use of Hellanicus -- compare FGH 70 F117 with 4 F188 -- though not
uncritically; cf. Strabo 8 C 366 (5. 5) = FGH 70 F118, where we see Ephorus using the pamphlet of King Pausanias
of Sparta on the laws of Lycurgus to 'correct' Hellanicus. For writers before Thucydides see Dion. Hal. On Thue. 5.
283
FGH iiib. Suppl. 57 ff., 103, 173.
284
Jacoby has collected all the known local histories: FGH iii. 580 ff. Often no more than titles survive. Cf. his
discussion of the genre, 1909: 109 ff.
285
FGH iic. 31.
286
Ibid.
287
Cf. Momigliano, 1935: 180 ff.
-106the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia for the period 411-394 (or 387).
Messenian history see 66. 2-6 n.

288

For the kind of information available to him on

For Ephorus' sources for western history see pp. 53 ff. The sources for eastern history present even more formidable
problems of Quellenforschung. A line should be drawn between internal Persian history and events in the
Mediterranean provinces of the Persian empire. Apart from occurring not far from Greece the latter invariably involved

large numbers of Greek mercenaries and it was consequently easier for a Greek historian to acquaint himself with their
details. For example, thousands of Greek mercenaries participated in the struggle between Persia and Egypt; they
were employed by both sides. 289 The campaign of 374/3 is related from Iphicrates' point of view. It reads in fact very
much like an apologia (Iphicrates' own?) as well as a eulogy of the Athenian general (15. 41 ff.). Ephorus would not
have had much trouble in collecting that kind of information in Athens. Hence the relative detail and reliability of the
account. He drew some of his detail from Callisthenes (43. 4 n.), but he doubtless possessed other information too.
Thousands of Greeks took part in Ochus' reconquest of Cyprus, Phoenicia, and Egypt in the 340s. Amongst the
generals were Phocion of Athens, Lacrates of Thebes, and the brothers Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes. Diodorus'
narrative is again detailed and it gives the impression of being accurate. It is very probable that Ephorus based his
account not on any written sources (none perhaps was yet available), but on oral information. The Great Satrap Revolt
is a little more difficult. While information on events in western Asia Minor could have been obtained without undue
hardship, it is less easy to see how Ephorus could have acquainted himself with Datames' exploits in Cappadocia
though we do hear that Datames employed mercenaries (91. 2 ff. But were they Greeks?) as did one of his
adversaries, Autophradates, according to Nepos, Dat. 8. 2, who specifies them as Greek. 290 Even more difficult is the
trial of Tiribazus (15. 10 f.). How could a Greek
____________________
288
Depending on the date at which the Oxyrhynchus historian ended his work, which is not certain; cf. Bruce, 4;
Breitenbach, RE Suppl. 12. 402. For a number of reasons (cf. p. 215 ) I have a slight preference for 394.
289
Many of these were Athenians; cf. Hicks and Hill, no. 122. For Greek mercenaries in the east in general cf. Parke
1933: 57 ff., 105 ff.
290
Cf. Parke, 1933: 107.
-107historian learn, and learn accurately, of what went on at the Persiany court? We are told that Tiribazus appealed to 'all
the Greeks present' (15. 10. 2). We are reminded of Clearchus' presence at the trial of Orontas before Cyrus in 401 (
X. An.1. 6. 5 ff). Should we then envisage a link, direct or indirect, between one of these Greeks and Ephorus? If
Ephorus did not derive this kind of information orally then he must have used some other author.
Jacoby 291 denies that he used the Persica of Dinon of Colophon. He followed Ctesias and not Dinon (or Xenophon) in
giving Artaxerxes 400,000 troops at Cunaxa (14. 22. 2; Plut. Artox. 13. 3), and his account of the death of Cyrus
seems to be a combination of Xenophon, Ctesias, and some other source which brought into focus the role of
Tissaphernes (14. 23 f. A local Cymaean tradition about Tissaphernes?). Dinon's epic tale was not used. Dinon had said
that Conon had not been put to death by the Persians, but had escaped, perhaps aided by Tiribazus ( FGH690 F18 =
Nepos, Conon9. 5. 2). We do not know what Ephorus' version was, but Diodorus makes the comment that Conon was
arrested and punished, whatever that implies (14. 85. 4; 15. 43. 5). 292 Dinon had said that Ochus sacrificed the
sacred bull Apis after his reconquest of Egypt ( FGH690 F21). Diodorus does not mention this. Would he have left out
such a glaring example of sacrilege if he had found it in Ephorus? Still, none of the above proves that Ephorus did not
use Dinon elsewhere. It is a fact of some significance that the story of Tiribazus, specifically the Cadusian war and the
trial, can only be followed by a combination of Diodorus and Plutarch's Artoxerxes. Now, Tiribazus plays an important
part in Plutarch. He figures in chapter 5 (at a hunt), in chapter 7 (he urges the King to fight in 401), in chapter 10 (he
provides the King with another horse at Cunaxa), in chapter 25 (he extricates the King from Cadusia), and in chapters
27 ff. (he conspires against the King and is killed). Chapter 10 is Dinon's version of the death of Cyrus, as Plutarch tells
us. It is probable, therefore, that Tiribazus' prominent role in the Artoxerxes is due to Dinon whose Persica was used
extensively by Plutarch for this life. He is cited no less than seven times. It is equally probable that Dinon is behind the
romantic elements in Diodorus 15. 10 f. -- the trial of Tiribazus. Some of
____________________
291
FGH iic. 31.
292
Cf. Swoboda, RE xi. 1332.
-108-

these details are immediately suspicious: the skins of the corrupt judges stretched on the judicial benches (10. 1 - obviously an adaptation of Herod. 5.25); Tiribazus' slaying of the two lions and rescue of the King (10. 3); the
nicely balanced verdicts of the three judges. (11. 1). This is precisely the sort of romantic fiction we meet in
Plutarch too. This does not mean that the entire account of the trial should be dismissed. 293 We may accept the
kernel of 15. 10f. as factual: that Tiribazus was tried after some delay occasioned by the Cadusian campaign,
acquitted, and reinstated to his former honours while Orontes suffered an eclipse at the conclusion of the Cypriot
War. The unsuccessful negotiations between Euagoras and Tiribazus, Orontes' charges against the latter, and the
terms of the settlement would gradually have become known in Cyprus and Greece. It would not have been
difficult for an imaginative mind to reconstruct the trial adding the romantic touches we have noted.
Ephorus may also have used the Persica of his compatriot Heraclides though this was a very brief work (Diog.
Laert. 5. 94) and it seems to have been based on Ctesias and Dinon. 294 The precise dates of Dinon and Heraclides
are a problem. Jacoby raises a question over the respective floruit of c.360-330 and c.350 which he gives them,
295
but that cannot exclude the possibility that Ephorus used them (see below for his dates). In conclusion it is
worth noticing that apart from the well-known Persica there was a considerable eastern 'tradition' available in
antiquity ( FGH696 Anhang) written as well as oral. When Xenophon (An. 1. 8. 29) gives alternative versions of
Artapates' death ( . . . +) he is not referring to written, but to oral sources; that was what he
had heard at the time or later; cf. An. 1. 2. 12,14; 1. 4. 5; 1. 6. 11; 1. 10. 2; 4. 3. 2. We may note especially 2.
1. 17: + + + . The Greeks who served in Persia
disseminated much information, true and false.
____________________
293
Stevenson, Achaemenid History, ii. 3 1 f., considers the trial in D (the whole of which she assigns to Dinon) to

be 'pure invention'.
Drews, 1973: 202 n. 127.
295
FGH689 and 690.
294

-109(iii) Ephorus: attitude to states and individuals

The didactic, ethical nature of Ephorus' work (pp. 6 ff.) inevitably conditioned his attitude to states and individuals
and his interpretation of the wider political background of the fourth century. If we had some idea about when
approximately he wrote we might be able to deduce something more not only about his purpose in writing a
universal history, but also about the slant he gave to it. There are a number of indications which, when taken
together with the little information we have about his life and circumstances, point to the late 330s and 320s as
the time of composition:
FGH 70 F223 (= Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 139. 3): Ephorus reckoned 735 years from the return of the Heraclids (his
starting point: 4. 1. 3; 16. 76. 5) to the crossing of Alexander into Asia, i.e. 335/4. Considering that no Ephoran
narrative went beyond 341/0 and that some even stopped with 357/6, the most likely place for such a calculation
was the general preface where Ephorus presumably announced his aim and explained his procedure. (16. 76. 5
seems inconsistent with F223, but see 15. 1. 3 n.) The very fact that Ephorus perceived the period from the
return of the Heraclids to the crossing of Alexander into Asia as an era shows that he was writing at a time when
Alexander's actions in Asia had become irreversible, i.e. after c. 330. Indeed, it would appear from this that his
original intention had been to carry his history down to this epochal point. 296
FGH 70 F 119 (= Strabo 9 C. 401 (2. 2)): in the opinion of Ephorus the Thebans were not suited for the
hegemony of Greece as was shown by the fact that they lost it, having only just gained it, immediately
Epaminondas was dead. This part of the Histories, 297 therefore, was written not just after 362 and the battle of
Mantinea, when the political and military situation was as yet unclear, but after 346, when Philip and not Thebes
concluded the
____________________
296
In F223 Clement is not saying that Ephorus 'brought his work down . . . to 334' as Barber, 1935: 171, wrongly
supposes. That of course would be incorrect. Barber's scepticism about the fragment (1935: 8f.) seems
arbitrary. Clement obviously did not invent the information and even if the numeral were suspected of
corruption, the statement still stands, 'until the year of Euaenetus in which, they say, Alexander crossed to
Asia'. But it is not in fact difficult to reconcile Clement with D: 1. 3 n.
297
Whether from Book 2, as Jacoby, FGH IIC. 24, or from one of Books 22-5, as Milns, Vindex Humanitatis, 48.
-110-

Phocian War, and indeed after 338 and the battle of Chaeronea even.

298

FGH 70 F217 (=Tertullian, De an. 46): Philip's dream which signified the future greatness of Alexander. Book 27,
therefore, in which presumably the dream was related (pp. 95 ff.), must have been written after c. 330.
FGH 70 F221 (= Plut. Tim. 4 and Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 135. 1): it would appear that Ephorus was aware of Timoleon's
later achievement in Sicily when writing about Corinthian politics of the mid-360s, probably in Book 24 (cf. F84). That
book, therefore, cannot have been written earlier that the early 330s.
Several passages in Diodorus are also relevant:
15. 88. 4: not only did Thebes lose the hegemony of Greece following the death of Epaminondas, but because of the
unwisdom of her leaders she was in the end destroyed. This bears close affinity to F119 (see above). It comes from the
epainos on Epaminondas and it can be assigned to Ephorus Book 25 with a fair degree of confidence: post-335,
therefore.
16. 1. 5: there is no reason at all why 16. 1. 3-5 should not be assigned to Ephorus, a eulogistic assessment of Philip
which, as was Ephorus' way (see p. 123 ), anticipated the narration of the king's praxeis. Section 5 points to a post331/o date for Book 26 or 27 (pp. 95 ff.).
16. 14. 2: the favour Philip carried with the Thessalians stood Alexander in good stead -- if this was taken from Book
27 then that book was subsequent to 330.
16. 56. 7: even if + were taken to be an addition by Diodorus himself, it seems most likely
that it was occasioned by Demophilus' comparison of the amount of treasure looted from Delphi by the Phocians with
that captured by Alexander in Persia, that is, again a date post-330 is indicated for Book 30.
16. 64. 1: the fate of Athens at the hands of Antipater in 322 is clearly implied: Book 30 was, therefore, written after
that date and it is reasonable to believe that Demophilus undertook the completion of the Histories very soon after
Ephorus stopped writing.
____________________
298
As Milns, Vindex Humanitatis, 48, suggests.

-111-

Finally, there is the fact that for Books 20 ff. Ephorus had Callisthenes' Hellenica available to him (see p. 104 ), a
work written between c.343 and 335. 299
By contrast with all these termini post quos there is not a single terminus ante quem. Barber 300 proposes F121 (=
Strabo 9 C 426 f. (4. 7)) as one. There Ephorus 'in speaking of Naupactus, puts it under Locrian control: after 338
It fell into the hands of the Aetolians'. Barber, therefore, concludes that the book from which the fragment derives
(either 2 or 3) must have been written before that date. 301 But nothing of the sort can be deduced from F121 and
Barber's construction, 302 whereby Ephorus began writing in the early 350s and, producing about one book a year,
stopped writing c.330, thereby becomes impossible to sustain. Similarly Jacoby considers Ephorus to have been a
slow worker who wrote his twenty-nine books (the thirtieth being that of his son) between c. 350 and c. 330. 303
The evidence looked at above seems rather to favour the view that the Histories were planned and composed in
the late 330s and 320s. 304 If so, Ephorus' stimulus for undertaking the composition of a universal history should
be sought in the unification of Greece under Macedon and the panhellenic war against Persia planned by Philip and
launched by Alexander. Hence, as has already been suggested, the 735 years calculated by Ephorus from the
return of the Heraclids until the crossing of Alexander, a descendant of Heracles on his father's side, into Asia
(F223) may indeed represent the intended (and unfulfilled) timespan of the Histories. Neither Philip, nor
Alexander, nor proMacedonian men of letters like Isocrates, ever tired of stressing the Heraclid ancestry of the
Macedonian royal house.
Writing late in the fourth century Ephorus could look back over the fifth and fourth centuries which had seen both
the glory and the shame of the city-states of Greece. Unlike Xenophon who gave up in despair at the reigning
chaos, Ephorus sought to explain and by explaining to instruct: virtuous and upright conduct in public life,
whether within a state or in its relations with other states,
____________________
299
Jacoby, FGH iic. 24.
300
Following Jacoby, ibid.
301
1935: 12.
302
1935: 12f.
303
FGH iie. 24 f.
304
304 Niese, 1909: 170 ff., is thus on the right lines though he goes too far in proposing that the whole work
may not have been written till after Alexander's death.
-112-

engendered by education (paideza or agoge) and respect for the gods (eusebeta); that was his entirely conventional
solution, one shared by most of his contemporaries. We have already observed the central role that education and
piety played in Ephorus (pp. 10 ff.). The case of the rise and fall of Sparta furnished him with his best example and it is
evident that he gave it considerable space. The story, as recovered from Diodorus and the fragments, goes like this:
the rigorous Lycurgan agoge, which put the emphasis on manliness () and concord (), made Sparta the
leading state in Greece. These twin virtues were achieved through a moderate and frugal way of living. So long as the
agoge was maintained Sparta retained her hegemonic position. The hegemony was lost and Sparta herself almost
destroyed when the Lycurgan laws were set aside, one by one, and the Spartans chose instead a life. of luxury ()
and laziness (), having allowed themselves to be corrupted by coined money and wealth, the direct result of
the acquisition of the arche of the sea. The first chance of acquiring the hegemony of the sea in the 470s was wisely
not taken up. Seventy years later, however, when Athens collapsed, her Aegean dominions passed on to Sparta. Not
only did this corrupt the state internally, but it led to a grossly arrogant and tyrannous conduct where her allies were
concerned. The widespread hatred thus generated proved Sparta's undoing. 305
Not surprisingly, Isocrates had earlier given the very same explanation (On the Peace 95 ff.): seduced by empire the
Spartans abandoned their ancestral customs and became unjust, indolent, lawless, money-loving, contemptuous of
their allies, greedy for the possessions of others, and unconcerned about oaths and the terms of treaties, that is,
impious. Their crimes against their fellow
____________________
305
Cf. 7. 12; 11. 50; 14. 2. 1; 14. 10; 15. 1. 2-4; 15. 5; 15. 19. 4; etc.; Plut. Lys. 17; FGH 70 F149 = Strabo 10 C
480 (4. 16); Polyb. 6. 46. 6; 48, 2-5 (almost certainly from Ephorus: Walbank, HCP i. 732, 734). I fall to see the
basis for Sacks' assertion that Ephorus gave moral decadence alone as the cause of Sparta's downfall, and that the
mistreatment of the allies, which we find in D as a reason, is D's own explanation: 1990: 49. In fact, Ephorus must
have given both reasons and indeed they go together, leading to tyrannical conduct, as D tells of Pausanias,
the victor of Plataea (11. 44. 3-6; 46), comments which are undoubtedly derived from Ephorus. Pausanias' fate
was seen as a harbinger of Sparta's own. And see the view of Isocrates in the text below. The fact that Ephorus
may (we do not know) have given hedonism and luxurious living alone as the reason for the decline of Miletus (
FGH70 F183; cf. D 8. 20, of which Sacks, 1990: 48f., misses the point) is no argument that that is as far as he
went in the case of Sparta also.
-113-

Greeks were many and their misconduct did not cease until they had brought upon themselves the defeat at
Leuctra. The opinion of some of his contemporaries notwithstanding, Isocrates was convinced that it was not the
disaster at Leuctra that was responsible for the downfall of Sparta, but that both resulted from the hatred of allies
who had been mistreated for many years ( ibid. 100 ; cf. also Panath. 56). Xenophon, in his old age at least (H. 5.

4. 1; 6. 4. 2f.; Lac. Pol. 14), and Theopompus (ap. Plut. Lys. 17) held views not dissimilar to these.

306

It is often said that Ephorus was strongly biased in favour of Athens and against Sparta while he viewed Thebes
impartially or even with admiration. 307 An examination of the fragments and Diodorus Books 11-16 does not quite
support this belief. What emerges is that Ephorus' main bias, as has been argued, was in favour of virtue whoever
exhibited it, state or individual. This apart he was, as befitted a pupil of Isocrates, an ardent admirer of Athens
and a panhellenist. Indeed, a high regard for the past glories of Athens and panhellenism were to some extent
identified in Isocratean circles. 308
Ephorus' panhellenism is best shown by his treatment of nonGreeks when in contact with Greeks, especially on
campaign. Witness, for example, 11. 77: the Egyptians appear in a bad light vis-O-vis their Greek allies
(Athenians in this instance). Noteworthy also is the emphasis he laid on the importance of Greek soldiers to Persia
and Egypt; cf. 15. 29; 15. 38. 1; 15. 41-4: Pharnabazus failed because he did not follow the advice of
____________________
306
Tuplin's important study of Hellenica 2. 3. 11-7. 5. 27 ( 1993) is a valuable reminder that, lover of Sparta and
ardent admirer of Agesilaus though he undoubtedly was, the mature Xenophon entertained grave misgivings
about Spartan foreign policy, not least about the conclusion of the King's Peace and the way this was used by
Sparta in pursuit of hegemony. Nevertheless, in my view, Tuplin goes too far in maintaining that Xenophon
shows no bias whatever in favour of Sparta in Hellenica, that he does not, in other words, write as a
philolacon. This seems to be rather an extreme position, not fully supported by his detailed analysis of the
text. On the contrary, what Tuplin succeeds in doing, it seems to me, what is in any case obvious from the
text itself, is that Xenophon was a disappointed philolacon, but a philolacon none the less. Instances of this
are noted in the commentary wherever appropriate. At the same time attention is drawn to the difference in
viewpoint of Xenophon and D (Ephorus) with regard to Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. See e.g. at 19. 3n.; 33. 56 n.; 34. 1-2 n.; 34. 2nn.; 38. 1n.; 47. 5-6n.; 55-56n.; 63. 1-2n.
307
Cf. Barber, 1935: 84ff.; Westlake, 1939: 16ff.; Shrimpton, 1971: 310ff.
308
Cf. Jaeger, Paideza, iii. 71 ff.
-114Iphicrates (41. 2 n.; 43. 1-2 n.); 15. 92 f. (92. 3 n.): Tachos came to grief because he ignored the counsel of
Agesilaus; 16. 44ff. Sections 16. 47. 7-48. 2 are particularly illuminating: King Nectanebos met with disaster
because he allowed his earlier success against Persia to go to his head, not realizing that he owed it all to
Diophantus the Athenian and Lamius the Spartan; and 16. 49. 2-6 and 49. 7-50. 6 are interesting comments on
the affinity between Greek mercenaries serving different barbarian masters. 309
The ethical purpose of the Histories necessitated a degree of detachment and, his admiration for Athens apart,
Ephorus could be termed apolitical. The struggle between democrats and oligarchs was as intense in the fourth
century as in the fifth, but Ephorus remained uncommitted. Democrats were censured no less than oligarchs; cf.
15. 5. 2 and 40. 1-2: the behaviour of the democratic parties was far from praiseworthy.
Ephorus' deep admiration for Athens is obvious; when praise was due it was invariably bestowed while censure,
though by no means absent from the pages of Diodorus, was very much the exception. This was no political bias
as such, but rather the esteem of a man of letters for the cultural and artistic centre of Greece. 310 Indeed,
Ephorus' sentiments are voiced often enough by modern scholars too. Such a viewpoint inevitably involved a less
than fair treatment of Sparta, Athens' great enemy for three generations. Ephorus genuinely considered Athens a
virtuous state which had benefited Greece. Sparta, on the other hand, especially at the height of her power, he
saw as a self-centred state which had, with one notable exception, harmed Greece. 311 His use of pro-Athenian
sources (above p. 106 ) would have encouraged such an attitude. There are instances where his account was
falsified in Athens' favour. The falsification was not his, but one may censure Ephorus for not being sufficiently
astute, or not caring enough, to question his sources. One suspects that as such pro-Athenian accounts coincided
with his own beliefs he was content to accept them.
Many examples can be cited. The Athenian contribution to the fight against Persia is more than emphasized as is
also Spartan selfishness and jealousy; cf. 11. 15. 3; 11. 27. 2-28. 1; 11. 30. 2ff.
____________________
309
This was a point of view shared by Isocrates; cf. 4. 125, 134ff.; 5. 90ff.
310
Cf. Jacoby, 1049: 130.
311
Cf. Isocr, 4. 103 ff,; 12. 53 ff. Again, this is an opinion many a modern scholar would agree with; cf. e.g.
Forrest, 1980: esp. 95, 152f.
-115-

(11. 30. 6 +!); 11. 33. 1. The pentecontaetia was the Athenian golden age and
Ephorus' narrative was suitably eulogistic. Overcoming Spartan suspicions and opposition the Athenians fortified their
city (11. 39 f.) and under the leadership of their great men Themistocles and Aristides founded their naval hegemony
(11. 41 ff.). Significantly Ephorus made the most of the Spartan share in the downfall of Themistocles and played down
the Athenian part (11. 54ff.). The Spartans acted out of spite against Athens (11. 54. 2; 55. 5f.). Luckily we possess
Thucydides' version (1. 135 ff.). We may compare especially 11. 56. 2-4 (the Spartans chased Themistocles from
Greece) with Thuc. 1. 136-137. 2 (the Spartans and Athenians were anxious to capture Themistocles). In the 450s
Athens was fighting a war on two fronts and Ephorus was not slow to praise; cf. 11. 77. 3 ff.; 11. 80. 6 (the battle of
Tanagra was . This certainly reflects Athenian traditions; cf. Plato, Menex. 242a. Thuc. 1. 108. 1, on the
other hand, says that the Spartans were victorious); 11. 82; 11. 85. 2; 12. 1-2. 1 (in effect a eulogy of Athens; see p.
103 ); 12. 2. 1 (the Persians are forced to leave the Greeks of Asia free ); 12. 3. 1 ( Athens fights Persia
+ + +); 12. 4. 4-6 (the famous Peace of Callias of which fourth-century Athenians
were so proud); 12. 26. 2 (the Peace of Callias contrasted with that made by Sparta in 387/6; cf. Isocr. 4. 115 ff.).

For the Peloponnesian War Ephorus relied heavily on Thucydides and perhaps as a result the corresponding narrative in
Diodorus is less eulogistic. The Plataean incident which led to the outbreak of war seems to have been given a proPlataean slant. It is said that the Thebans killed and captured many people outside Plataea, +
+ (12. 41. 7). Thuc. 2. 5. 7, however, is explicit that the Thebans departed from Plataean
territory . Worse, according to Diodorus the Plataeans gave up their Theban prisoners as they had
promised; but we know from Thuc. 2. 5. 7 that in fact they killed them. The assembly of the Syracusan demos to
decide the fate of the Athenian captives in 413 presented Ephorus with an opportunity to eulogize Athens. The speech
of Nicolaus 312 is pure Athenian
____________________
312
D extracted the speech of Nicolaus from Ephorus (see p. 60 ). Of course he added his own elements, including the
singularly inept use of the term at 13. 24. 2. His source perhaps had written
. This is not to deny that Ephorus used .
-116-

panegyric in places (cf. 13. 25. 1-3; 26. 2-27. 2) and in some of its statements it strongly agrees with Ephoran
fragments and passages of Isocrates; cf. 26. 2-3 with FF31 and 42; 26. 2-3 with Isocr. 4. 28-30, 38 ff., 54ff.; 27.
1. with Isocr. 4.50 ( Athens the school of Hellas).
The first half of the fourth century belonged first to Sparta and then to Thebes, and Athens received less
attention, but Ephorus praised whenever he could. The Athenian demos is twice commended for its moral qualities
(15. 46. 6; 63. 2). More striking was Ephorus' assertion, which probably originated in the circle of Isocrates, that
Athens had in the 370s saved Greece from a conspiracy of Sparta, Dionysius, and Persia (47. 2-4, 7n.). Moreover,
it is to be noted that many events are related from the Athenian point of view and in a way calculated to enhance
Athens and Athenians; cf. 15. 32. 5-33. 4 ( Chabrias saves the Thebans in 378); 47. 5f. ( Ctesicles saves Corcyra
in 373/2); 69. 2ff. ( Chabrias saves Corinth in 368).
Explicit criticism of Athens there is, but very little. In 11.70. 1-4 it is explained that heavy-handed Athenian
behaviour caused revolts. In 12. 75. 2, 4 (cf. 15. 38. 4) both Athens and Sparta are said to wish to enslave
Greece and they are accused of pleonexia, though no comment is offered shortly afterwards (12. 76. 3) on the
destruction of Scione. We do not unfortunately know what Ephorus said about the treatment meted out to Melos
for Diodorus appears to have dealt with the relevant Ephoran narrative in one sentence (12. 80. 5). In 13. 102. 5
the Athenian demos is censured for unjustly executing the generals who won Arginusae. At 15. 23. 4 and 15. 29.
8 it is admitted in retrospect that Athens had been unpopular because of the cleruchies. It is very likely that
Ephorus had commented on this earlier and that Diodorus overlooked it. And at 16. 57; 64. 1 Athens is criticized,
admittedly by Demophilus (but see p. 12 ), for impiety.
By contrast Sparta is severely and repeatedly criticized for her selfish policies which in the end brought about her
downfall. In addition to the instances cited above, cf. 12. 67. 3-5; 14. 2. 1; 14.
____________________
The term occurs in at least nine other places in Books 12-15: 12. 37. 2; 12. 74. 6; 12. 75. 1; 12. 81. 5; 13.
107. 5; 14. 2. 4; 14. 10. 1; 14. 13. 1; 15. 35. 2. Of these, with the exception of 12. 81. 5, the first six cases
seem to be from the chronographic source or to be inspired by it. Section 12. 81. 5 and the last three
instances, on the other hand, may well be Ephoran.
-1176; 14. 10. 1-3; 14. 44. 2; 14. 70. 2f. (the Spartans arranged Greece to their advantage and then strengthened
the tyranny of Dionysius). It is to be noted that Lysander was acting under orders when he set up the harmosts,
decarchies and other oligarchies (14. 13. 1). Ephorus, therefore, had probably argued against the view that
Lysander alone was to blame; 14. 11. 2; 14. 19. 4; cf. 14. 21. 2 (the Spartans helped Cyrus for their own selfish
interests. X. H. 3. 1. 1 ascribes the Spartan involvement to a sense of honour); 14. 17. 6, 1 1; 14. 70. 1-3; 15. 1;
15. 5; 15. 19. 1, 4; 15. 20. 2; 15. 23. 5; 15. 28. 2; 15. 29. 6. Sparta is not always censured, however, and this
proves that Ephorus was not anti-Spartan as such. What he castigated was Spartan policy vis--vis Greece and,
as he considered that Athens generally acted in the interest of Greece, Spartan opposition to Athens. When
nevertheless Sparta behaved virtuously then he praised; cf. 11. 4. 4; 1 1. 9. 2; 1 1. 1 1; 11. 74. 5; 15. 30. 3-4;
15. 65. 1-5. Scathing enough prior to 387, criticism of Sparta, which naturally reaches a crescendo in the account
of the years 387/6-379, subsides after this time and essentially stops with Leuctra. The one exception after that is
16. 57. 1, 4, the impiety of Sparta in connection with the Phocian War, as Demophilus saw it in Book 30. 313
As far as Thebes is concerned Ephorus appears uncommitted. The Thebans were men of brawn rather than brains
(20. 1 n.). If we perceive a sympathy in the pages of Diodorus that is because Thebes was the victim of
imperialist Sparta. He obviously admired Pelopidas and Epaminondas, especially the latter whose paideia enabled
Thebes to gain the hegemony of Greece for a while (pp. 10 f. and below).
The treatment of individuals followed the same lines. The decisive factor was not their nationality, but their
character and conduct. Good men were praised, bad censured, the greatest amongst them with an epainos or
Psogos at the end of their lives (pp. 5 ff). Amongst Spartans, for example, Brasidas is treated favourably (12. 43.
2 f.; 62. 1 ff.; 67 f.; 74) as is Callicratidas (13. 76. 2; 98. 1 f.; 99. 5). There is no condemnation of Lysander
himself which may seem surprising, but then Ephorus chose to see him as the tool of the Spartan government
(see above). Amongst
____________________
313
I see no inconsistency in Ephorus' treatment of Sparta or a change of tone so severe as to require Westlake's
assumption of the clumsy use of different sources by Ephorus: 1986: 263 ff.

-118-

Athenians the Thirty are condemned (14. 2. 1) as is Chares (15. 95. 3), while Theramenes and Timotheus are praised
(14. 3. 6-5. 4; 15. 36. 6). Amongst Thessalians Jason is admired (15. 57. 2; 60. 1f., 5) while Alexander is censured
(15. 61. 2f.). For the Siceliots see pp. 52 ff. A closer look at the treatment of some of the leading figures of the period
covered by Diodorus Book 15 agrees with the above analysis of the Ephoran viewpoint. We may begin with Agesilaus.
We have seen that Sparta was roundly condemned for her policies in Greece after the King's Peace.

(15. 5. 1), the Spartans exploited the Peace and enslaved Greece

anew. The motive force behind this policy is soon revealed: Agesilaus, being by nature b in
contrast to his colleague Agesipolis, aimed at the Greece (15. 19. 4). Yet Agesilaus is not explicitly
condemned. It would appear that Ephorus was in two minds about him. 314 On the one hand he abhorred his policies in
Greece, while on the other he could not but admire his energy and considerable military ability. We may note
especially 15. 31. 3f. where Agesilaus' renown as a soldier is acknowledged, and 88. 2 where in the epainos on
Epaminondas, he is the only Spartan mentioned; cf. also 92. 2. The account of Agesilaus' campaigns in Asia Minor is
instructive. The king was clearly striking a blow for Greece then. Yet Athens was ranged against Sparta at the time and
an Athenian, Conon, the father of none other than Timotheus, employed Persian money and ships to smash Sparta's
naval power. The defeated and killed Spartan admiral was Agesilaus' brotherin-law (X. H. 3. 4. 29). While Ephorus,
therefore, followed the example of his source, the Oxyrhynchus historian, and gave a good account of the military
achievements of Agesilaus, he appears to have been unwilling to see the campaigns as a Greek national effort. The fact
that the Oxyrhynchus historian (P) repeatedly refers to Agesilaus' soldiers as 'Greeks' (11. 3ff.; 12. 1ff.; 13. 1; 14.
____________________
314
As Plutarch was who both praises and censures Agesilaus. The praise is for actions in the interest of Greece; the
censure, for his oppressive policy vis--vis his fellow Greeks, in particular the Thebans. It is unnecessary,
therefore, to postulate, at any rate on this basis alone, two sources in the Agesilaus, one pro- and the other antiSpartan (as Westlake, 1939: 20). We may compare Isocrates' ambivalent attitude to Sparta; cf. Bradford Welles,
Studies Caplan, 23. With even less justification Westlake perceives glaring inconsistencies in Ephorus' treatment of
Agesilaus, as in his treatment of Sparta (see previous n.), which he explains in the same way.
-119-

2; 21. 2; 22. 3) while Diodorus calls them 'Lacedaemonians' (14. 80. 1, 5) is surely of some significance. 315 It
should be said in this context that Ephorus, reacting perhaps to popular Athenian opinion (re), did not consider
Cnidus as either a Greek or an Athenian victory (15. 35. 2).
The great men of Thebes were more straightforward. The build-up of Theban power in the 370s and 360s was a
major theme in Ephorus, and he explained the short-lived Theban hegemony as due to the brilliance of
Epaminondas. The way in which Epaminondas' arete and paideia overcame all difficulties on the road to
hegemony is stressed several times in Diodorus. At 38. 3 the Thebans are encouraged by Epaminondas to stand
fast against Spartan pressure to dissolve their Confederacy,
; cf. 39. 2f.; 50. 6; 52. 2-7 (his paideia overcomes the superstitious fears of the masses); 53. 4 and 54.
4 (he does the same with the soldiers); 55f. (he wins Leuctra for Thebes). The hegemony lasted for as long as
Epaminondas was alive to guide it wisely and humanely; cf. 57. 1 (he saves Orchomenus from destruction); 66
(he resurrects Messenia); 69. 1 n. (he saves the Boeotian exiles); 72. 1 (he spares the Spartans); 78. 4-79. 2 (he
persuades the Boeotians to challenge Athens at sea); and cf. his epainos, 88, 316 especially 88. 4.
Pelopidas lacked Epaminondas' paideia, but he was brave and patriotic. He is seen as the imitator of Epaminondas
who tried to do in the north what Epaminondas did in the Peloponnese (71. 2). It should be stressed at this point
that Ephorus did not ascribe panhellenic aims to the two Thebans. To Ephorus Thebes was simply the successor of
Sparta as hegemon in Greece (cf. 88. 4; F119), but with this important difference: she treated the Greeks rather
better, at least when guided by Epaminondas and Pelopidas. Otherwise Ephorus made it very clear that what
Pelopidas and Epaminondas did in Thessaly and the Peloponnese they did as patriotic Thebans; see 67. 3f.; 71. 2;
79. 1f.; 81. 1. The same is said by Nepos, Pel. 51, who used Ephorus directly or indirectly, while Isocrates,
naturally, puts the matter much more strongly:
____________________
315
Pace Walker, 1913: 55. P occasionally refers to them as 'Peloponnesians'; but 'Peloponnesians and their allies'
(21. 2; 22. 1), whereas D uses just 'Lacedaemonians' (once 'Greeks':14. 80. 6).
316
A more elaborate affair than normally (as preserved in D at least), as Vial, 111 n. 1, rightly observes.
-120-

2o (5. 53). Diodorus (Ephorus) is very different in this respect

from Plutarch. The latter (he was of course a Boeotian) emphasizes that Pelopidas' intervention in Thessaly was
disinterested, his motive being love of freedom (Pel.31. 6; 33. 9; 34. 7). 317 The case of Magnesia and Achaea Phthiotis
in 364 is a striking example of this difference between Ephorus and Plutarch. According to Diodorus 80. 6 these areas
were handed over to Boeotia (see n. ad loc.). Plut. Pel. 35. 3, on the other hand, says that they were set free.
(iv) Ephorus: merits and defects

Ephorus has not found much favour with modern scholars. Schwartz 318 and Laqueur 319 thought very little of him while
Jacoby treated him as a mere compiler, albeit one on a large scale -- a writer of little originality except for his
oikonomia. 320 More recently Schepens, in a notable study, has sought to defend him against some of the more serious
accusations levelled against him. 321 On the whole his picture of Ephorus seems more balanced and more believable
than the usual one.
As far as flaws go there is first the obvious criticism that a didactic historian will not be an entirely objective one and
there is considerable truth in this. We have already seen that the proAthenian sources he used led him astray
sometimes, and Ephorus could be charged with not being critical enough of his sources (p. 115 and 12. 1n.). The
ethical aim he set himself was largely to blame for this. If the version of an event he met in a source did not contradict
the moral point he wanted to make, and it might even be that it enhanced it, Ephorus was inclined to accept it and
search no further. This is reminiscent of Isocrates' use of history as a servant of paideia. 322 On the other hand, there is
no evidence that
____________________
317
Whether these sentiments in Plutarch should be traced back to Callisthenes is a thorny question. Sordi, 1958:
194ff., vigorously argues that they should: Callisthenes saw Epaminondas and Pelopidas as champions of freedom
and panhellenism. Likewise, Momigliano, 1934a: 196. This is likely, though it cannot be proved. But there are no
grounds for ascribing pro-Theban bias as such to Callisthenes.
318
RE vi.1ff.
319
1911: 161ff., 321ff.
320
FGH iic. 22ff.
321
1977: 97ff.
322
See the references cited in n.13.
-121he falsified facts; he merely opted for the version which exemplified virtuous conduct or suited his particular viewpoint
best. 323 The one definite, and understandable, exception concerns his undoubted inflation of numbers for barbarian
armaments (see below). The famous Peace of Callias is a case in point. Unlike Callisthenes who interpreted it as a tacit
understanding between Athens and Persia and not as a formal peace treaty (FGH 124 F16), and Theopompus who
dismissed it as another instance of Athenian falsification of history (FGH 115 FF153, 154), Ephorus wholeheartedly
accepted the full Athenian version of a formal treaty which, unlike the Spartan Peace of Antalcidas in 387/6, left Greek
Asia free and rid the Aegean of Persian warships (12. 3. 1; 12. 4. 4-6; 12. 26. 2). Such a version satisfied both his love
of Athens and his panhellenism. Luckily for him he was right about this and Callisthenes and Theopompus wrong. He
appears equally correct, against Aristotle ( Poetics 1459a) and his modern adherents, 324 that Persia and Carthage
were in close touch in 480. But whatever the truth of the matter there is not even a hint of a suspicion that he
invented the story. It was part of the historical tradition he inherited and as a Greek patriot he was glad to pass it on.
It is of course true that often his interpretation of the evidence and the theories he built on it, left much to be desired.
It is quite possible, for instance, that he is the source behind Polyb. 13. 3. 2-4 and Strabo 10 C 448 (1. 12). In which
case the only sensible conclusion to draw is that Ephorus, working like scholars in all ages, brought together different
strands of evidence, including an archaic inscription of doubtful authenticity (very probably cited in a local history), and
constructed the theory of an archaic ban on missile weapons. Such a ban fitted in well with Ephorus' ethical and
panhellenic ideas. It is probably unhistorical, but that Ephorus invented the documentary evidence 325 is not to be
credited. On the other hand, it is not to his credit that, though he must have been perfectly well aware of what
Thucydides had said about the circumstances of Themistocles' flight to Persia, he chose to give the popular version
(11. 56ff.; Plut. Them. 27. 1), doubtless because it was more dramatic and contrasted even more sharply the
respective treatment of the great man by Athens and the Great
____________________
323
Cf. Schepens, 1977: 114f.
324
e.g. Meister, 1970a: 607ff.
325
The inscription -- thus Wheeler, 1987: 157ff.
-122-

King. Such shortcomings deprive Ephorus of a place amongst the very foremost Greek historians.
Didacticism, however, was the rule rather than the exception with ancient historians and ancient critics did not
hold this aspect of Ephorus against him. On the contrary, Polybius praised Ephorus for his and
(12. 28. 10 = T23). See also Polyb. 5. 33. 2; 6. 45. 1 and Strabo1. 1. 1; 8 C 332 (1. 1); 9 C
422 (3. 11); 10 C 465 (3. 5) for praise of Ephorus as a historian. What did offend on the other hand was Ephorus'
style. The ancient pronouncements are agreed that it was flat and repetitive. According to Dio Chrysostom,
Ephorus wrote a great deal, but boringly (18. 10 = T25), and Polybius elsewhere states that he did not vary his
vocabulary (6. 45. 10 = F148; cf. also TT22, 24, 28, and 29). The few surviving verbatim quotations seem to bear
this out. 326 To what extent was Ephorus one of the first 'rhetorical' historians? Some ancient remarks provide a
hint while Diodorus and F191 furnish due confirmation.
Ephorus, as we have seen (p. 101 ), was one of the first if not the first historian to employ the preface.
Theopompus, who also used prefaces, is censured by Dionysius of Halicarnassus for employing these to praise
himself and attack other historians (Ant. Rom. 1. 1. 1 = FGH 115 F24); and Photius considered the prefaces of
Ephorus and Theopompus very similar (FGH 70 F7: 3+ ). Many of
Ephorus' personal comments, therefore, which Polybius admired, would have been made in the prefaces, not only
those to books (FF8, 9, 110, 111), but also those he habitually appended to narratives within books. 327 Diodorus'
own prefaces which he patterned upon Ephorus support this (pp. 101 ff.). But Ephorus' work was interspersed in
addition with epainoi and psogoi, digressions of all sorts and speeches (cf. T21), and the remnants of many of
these survive in the Bibliotheke. Such occasions would have provided Ephorus with the opportunity to indulge his
and in as rhetorically polished a manner as possible. His narrative on the other

hand seems to have been generally straightforward and unadorned. As Barber puts it: 'The encomia, prefaces and
____________________
326
Cf. FF9, 20, 21, 31b, 47, 63, 90, 191 and Kalischek's detailed analysis, 1913: 64ff., as well as Barber,
1935:80f., 148ff. One of the less appealing characteristics was a predilection for the superlative degree; cf.
FF9, 90, 191 frr. 4-5.
327
Andrewes in Essays Starr,189ff.
-123-

speeches rose like peaks above the plain of a dull and uninspiring narrative.' 328 F191 corroborates this. Frr. 2-5, the
epainos on Themistocles, are rhetorical in tone while frr. 6ff., the narrative, are not. The embellishments in the
corresponding Diodorus narrative are Diodorus' own (pp. 132 f.).
Closely related to the question of style is Schwartz's accusation that Ephorus regularly duplicated parts of his narrative
as a literary artifice. 329 But none of the Diodoran passages he cites is decisive. On the contrary, while one may
concede that Ephorus' language was repetitive there is not the slightest evidence that he manipulated the facts
contrary to truth for the purpose of artistic effect. 330 Barber, who defends Ephorus against Schwartz's charge,
nevertheless makes one exception -- the battle narratives were standardized rhetorical exercises. 331 Yet this is
seriously to underestimate the extent to which Diodorus could impose his own language on his sources. Such
expressions as , , etc. are Diodoran not Ephoran (pp. 15 ff.).
The night attacks at 11. 10. 1; 11. 30. 2; 11. 61. 2-7; 11. 80. 3-6, a dramatic device according to Barber, may not be
unhistorical, especially the last two instances, and Ephorus in any case derived this information from a source or
sources he used in addition to Herodotus and Thucydides. With respect to the night fighting at Thermopylae (11. 10. 1)
it is to be noted that the Spartan hoplites were apparently familiar with movement in darkness: X. Lac. Pol. 5. 7; Plut.
Lye. 12. 14.
We know nothing about Ephorus' personal circumstances and he may well have lacked military experience. All the
same, he appears to have rendered the campaigns and battles of his sources fairly adequately. Blunders in Diodorus,
where they can be checked, are usually shown to be Diodorus' and not Ephorus'. 332 Polybius specifically criticizes
Ephorus' description of the battle of Mantinea in 362 as being untenable (12. 25f 3-5). It is clear, however, both from
what Polybius says and from Diodorus, that Ephorus collected a great deal of information about the battle, and that he
conscientiously tried to make sense of it. The result may
____________________
328
1935: 152.
329
RE vi.15. Meister, 1982: 28ff. is in full agreement.
330
See Barber, 1935: 139f.; Stylianou, 1989a: 359f.
331
1935: 140ff.
332
Cf. pp. 386f., 395f.; Stylianou, 1989a: 353ff.
-124- not have been as unsatisfactory as Polybius claims (85. 2n.). For Ephorus' interest in sieges and siege
techniques see 26. 4n. and 34. 4n.
On the other hand Polybius praises Ephorus' sea battles. The two he mentions, Cnidus in 394 and Salamis (in Cyprus)
in 385, are too briefly related in Diodorus to enable us to evaluate Polybius'judgement. Just how much Polybius himself
knew about naval matters is another question. 333 But there is other evidence which shows that his praise was not
entirely unwarranted. What is certain is that Polybius was not praising the sort of rhetorical generalities we usually
encounter in Diodorus. Ephorus' naval battles were more detailed, containing
(Polyb. 12. 25f 2). The same state of affairs obtains elsewhere in Diodorus; for example, at 12. 33. 4 (battle
of Sybota) and 12. 48 ( Phormio's victories), where only the bare bones of Thucydides' original accounts remain.
Ephorus must have made better use of his sources as is shown whenever Diodorus chooses to retain more detail. A
good example is 13. 10. 3. The explanation offered there seems nicely to supplement that of Thuc. 7. 36: the prows of
the Syracusan ships were not merely stronger, but also lower and thus more effective against Athenian triremes with
weaker and higher prows. The battles of the Decelean War are instances of the basic soundness of Diodorus as
opposed to Xenophon which is now widely recognized. 334 These are the kind of descriptions Polybius admired.
Admittedly Ephorus owed his facts to the Oxyrhynchus historian for the battles down to 394 (or perhaps 387: see n.
288); but not for the action off Cypriot Salamis which Polybius cites as an instance of an admirable account of a sea
battle.
The charge that he exhibited undue local patriotism was levelled against Ephorus in antiquity (FGH 70 F236) and it
seems substantiated by the number of times Cyme is mentioned in Diodorus (p. 50 ). It is not the case that Ephorus
fabricated evidence in order to glorify his native city. Everything in Diodorus about Cyme is historical in the sense that
it was part of the local Cymaean tradition (2. 2n.; 18. 2-4n.). But the inclusion of a story such as that in
____________________
333
Cf. HCP ii. 393.
334
For example, the actions off Cyzicus and Notium; cf. Bruce, 35ff.; Littman, 1968: 265ff.; Breitenbach, 1971:
152ff.; Lanzillotta, 1975: 135ff.; Andrewes, 1982: 15ff. But cf. Westlake, Studies, 224ff., for a more even-handed
approach.
-125-

15. 18 in a universal history was rather inappropriate. Ephorus nevertheless was not unique amongst universal
historians in being inordinately proud of the city of his birth. 335
The merits of Ephorus are obvious enough even from the meagre fragments and Diodorus' text. It is true, as we
have seen, that he was not political in the sense that, say, Thucydides was, and he certainly lacked the latter's
acute political acumen. Ephorus' chief concern was with ethical conduct. But this should not be taken to mean
indifference to political issues as such or to historical causation. We have also seen that he set himself the task of
explaining why states rose and fell and specifically why Greece had failed in the end, and for this mere moral
generalities (which of course he did not eschew) did not suffice. For one thing, as a universal historian of some
ability (for which he elicits the praise of Polybius: 5. 33. 2) clearly he took care to bring out the connections
between events and political developments in different parts of the Mediterranean. Some of these still survive in
Diodorus; for example, the Perso-Carthaginian treaty of 480 (11. 1. 4f.), the symbiosis of Sparta and Dionysius
(14. 10; 44. 2; 70. 1-3), and the fact that the inability of the Great King to bring the Phoenician navy into play in
411 was due to problems he was facing in the Levant (13. 46. 6). This factor was either unknown to Thucydides
or he underestimated its importance. 336
Books 11-15 of the Bibliotheke are often compared with Books 18-20, and Ephorus is blamed for the much poorer
state of the former group -- his unfortunate oikonomia, we are told, presented Diodorus with insurmountable
problems. There is truth in this though the comparison is not entirely fair. Books 18-20 cover only twenty-two
years. Hieronymus, like Thucydides, wrote contemporary history -- an account of the wars of the Successors in
which he was himself a participant. His theme was fairly simple and straightforward compared with what Ephorus
undertook to synthesize. Books 11-15, by contrast, cover 120 years. Book 15 alone covers twenty-six. This latter
period was dealt with by Ephorus, let us recall, in no less than six books, without counting the western narratives.
As a rule, the more severe the abbreviation, the greater the ability required and Diodorus had little of that as it
was. We get a better idea, therefore, of the quality of Ephorus' narrative whenever Diodorus gives more detail. A
good example is
____________________
335
Cf. Burde, 1974: 115ff.
336
HCT v. 290.
-126-

the account of Dionysius' preparations for declaring war against Carthage in 398 (14. 41ff.). The assignment and
analysis of motives is particularly well done. At 14. 41. 1 we have Dionysius' true motives (according to Ephorus) for
declaring war; they are those of an active and ambitious tyrant. When everything is ready Dionysius convenes and
addresses the Syracusan assembly 14. 45. 2-4). Almost certainly Ephorus included a speech at this point and Diodorus
has rendered the oratio recta into a brief oratio obliqua. But the essence of the speech, one trusts, is preserved and it
gives us the public declarations of Dionysius which, as Ephorus had intended, do not quite tally with his true motives at
14. 41. 1. Again, in giving their assent to Dionysius' proposal for war, the Syracusan citizens had their own agenda
(14. 45. 5) and this is taken up again later, at 14. 64. 4, and leads naturally on to the attempted revolution of 396 and
the speech of Theodorus which Diodorus this time reproduces (14. 65ff.). The speech, a call to freedom by the
Syracusan political opposition, is ably crafted and fits well into the rest of the narrative, as does the one by Nicolaus at
13. 20ff., and as the one by Hetoimaridas at 11. 50. 6, which Diodorus has not retained, must also have done. The
contrast between 14. 41ff. and the bare bones (or less) given at 15. 15ff. and 15. 73 is striking and Diodorus,
certainly, is responsible for this (see pp. 78 ff.).
On a general level Ephorus offered a more complete and coherent picture of the contemporary Greek world than
Xenophon and the loss of the books dealing with the fourth century is particularly unfortunate, as even Gomme
conceded who had as low an opinion of Ephorus as Schwartz and Jacoby. 337 We could hardly begin to understand
certain fourth-century aspects but for Ephorus. The Common Peace, for instance. Ephorus gave this central aspect of
fourth-century politics a great deal of attention. 338 Unlike Xenophon who gives a very insufficient picture of the nature
and significance of the Common Peace, Ephorus appears to have grasped it fully. Furthermore he tried to explain why
it failed. A major cause of disruption was the ever present strife between democrats and oligarchs. The product of this
strife, the political exile, and the envy and fear which the leading states felt against each other, guaranteed that no
treaty could last for long; cf.
____________________
337
HCT i. 45 and n. 3.
338
Cf. Martin 1944: 27ff.; Ryder, 1965: pp. xivff.
-127-

15. 5. 1-3; 20. 1; 25. 1; 26. 1; 40; 45; 77. 1-2; 94. 1. The malady was so deep-seated that in one instance
Ephorus aptly described the existing situation not as koine eirene but as koine anarchia (45. 1). All this does not
suggest a politically naive historian.
The Second Athenian Confederacy is another such instance. Xenophon ignored it totally. Ephorus, on the other
hand, gave a full account of its origins and development. The accuracy of his information is striking even in
Diodorus' severe and clumsy epitome (15. 28. 3; 29. 7f. and nn.). The rise of Thebes with the corresponding
decline of Sparta and the Theban hegemony took up no less than six books (pp. 94 f.). This part of the Histories,
therefore, must have been extremely detailed. Again and again Diodorus supplies vital information omitted by
Xenophon (cf. 34. 3n.; 45. 4n.; 76. 3n.). We form an idea of the kind of detail Ephorus gave from the fragments
and Diodorus' epitome; cf. F76 = 14. 98. 2; F81 and 69. 1n.; F82; F83 and 79. 1n.; F84 and 75. 2n.; F86; 7576n.; 81. 1-4n. One might add that Ephorus, in contrast to Xenophon, cared enough to make it clear that there
was, after 378, a Boeotian Confederacy (28. 1nn.); and of course he gave what Xenophon should have given, but

did not, an account of the reorganization of the Peloponnesian League (15. 31. 1-2).
For the factual basis of all this material Ephorus, of course, relied extensively, though by no means exclusively, on
written sources and we have seen that occasionally he borrowed their opinions too (p. 105 ). The charge,
however, that he was no more than a compiler is undeserved and indeed inappropriate. Given the task he set
himself, heavy dependence on the work of others, predecessors as well as contemporaries, was inevitable. 339 It is
perfectly clear nevertheless that he bent whatever he borrowed to his purpose and that in the absence of written
sources he was well able to synthesize narratives from oral sources. The account of the reconquest of Phoenicia,
Cyprus and Egypt in the 340s is impressive even in Diodorus (16. 40 ff.) An unusual feature in Ephorus appears to
have been an interest in literary history. There is at any rate a passage in Diodorus (15. 76. 4) which seems to
derive from an Ephoran literary digression (see n. ad loc.).
As the matter has a direct bearing on the kind of historian he
____________________
339
Cf. Schepens, 1977: 102ff.
-128-

was it would be appropriate in this context to examine the numbers in Ephorus, that is, the numbers in Diodorus'
narratives of Books 11-16 which are based on him. Ephorus derived this information from the various sources he
employed, both written and oral, but it is clear that he felt free to manipulate it to suit his aims and the results of this
manipulation are not in general to his credit. The numbers are usually to do with army and navy strengths and
casualties. Greek and barbarian figures were arrived at differently and they should be considered separately. 340 For
those of the Siceliots and Carthaginians see pp. 62 ff., 73 ff.
The Greek numbers. Such an inquiry is bound to be untidy. And the starting point must inevitably be Thucydides as the
only surviving original source for Diodorus (Ephorus) apart from the Oxyrhynchus historian. Meiggs has compared the
numbers in Diodorus with those in Thucydides and has concluded that they are substantially those of Thucydides. 341
Most of the differences (minor ones at that) are due to Ephorus' wish to appear independent from his source. Two such
cases may be mentioned, not commented on by Meiggs. First, the Boeotian infantry at Delium in 424 numbered 7,000
hoplites, more than 10,000 light-armed, and 500 peltasts, according to Thuc. 4. 93. 3, that is, more than 17,500. In
Diodorus this is rendered as 0 (12. 69. 3). Second, in reviewing the
Athenian resources at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Ephorus gave 12,000 front-line and 17,000 reserve
hoplites (12. 40. 4) while Thucydides gives 13,000 front-line and 16,000 reserve hoplites (2. 13. 6). The total, 29,000,
is the same for both and it indicates that Thucydides was Ephorus' source. There are, however, a number of instances
where Ephorus supplied information additional to that of Thucydides and some of these include figures; cf. 12. 54.
5;70. 1;73. 3;77. 4;80. 4;13. 38. 5. Such instances apart, it remains true that most of Diodorus' numbers for the
pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War down to 411 are basically those of Thucydides and are reliable in so far as
Thucydides' figures are reliable.
Similar results would almost certainly have been obtained from
____________________
340
Some allowance should be made for the vulnerability of numbers to corruption, observable in the MSS of D every
now and then; cf. e.g. Vogel's app. crit., ii. 252. Such numerals as ', M', and N' are particularly liable to
corruption. But the problem should not be exaggerated: Develin, 1990.
341
1972: 447ff.
-129-

a comparison of Diodorus with the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (P), had not the latter been so imperfectly preserved.
The numbers are the same at 13. 65. 1f. = P 1. 1; 13. 71. 2, 4 = P 4; 14. 79. 8 = P 9. 2 (though after severe
restoration). P 11.3(= Diodorus 14. 80. 1) is too fragmentary for any conclusions to be drawn. 342 The difference
at 14. 80. 2 (1,400 soldiers) = P 11. 4 (? hoplites, . . . 7 light-armed) is again perhaps due to Ephorus'
wish to appear independent of his source. The 600/6,000 difference at 14. 80. 4 = P 11. 6 is the result of
corruption rather than exaggeration.
The numbers in Book 15 appear generally sound though they cannot always be checked. Obvious exaggerations
there are: e.g. the claim that at Tegyra the Thebans faced and defeated twice as many Spartans (37. 1; a proBoeotian source is certainly responsible); and the Lacedaernonian losses at Leuctra which are given as 4,000 (a
pro-Boeotian source may again be at work).
The barbarian numbers. It is not surprising that Greek writers in general exaggerated the strength of non-Greek
armaments; that of armies, wildly so. Figures for fleets are usually more manageable. Ephorus was no exception.
A frequent figure given for Persian armies is 300,000 (cf. 11. 74. 1; 12. 3. 2; 15.2. 1; 16. 40. 6; X. An. 1. 4. 5; 7.
12). It would not have occurred to many ancient writers that such an incredible figure would have been
impossible on logistical grounds alone. Not many ancient writers would have been aware that there is a difference
between the number of men in a populous state capable of bearing arms, and putting all these men in the field at
the same time. Thus, it often happened that fairly trustworthy figures for a state's military resources, the total
numbers of cavalry and infantry, for example, were translated into mammoth expeditionary forces. Sections 2. 5.
3-7 and chapter 25. 13 are instructive. 343 Greeks would look at their own numbers, then consider the vast
expanse of Asia and multiply accordingly. The circumstance that the same or similar figures are given for both
Persian and Carthaginian armies (see pp. 62 f.) rather spoils the rationale that they have any basis in fact.

____________________
342
But see Bruce, 78f.
343

25. 13 goes back to Fabius. For a proper use of the Roman see Polyb. 2. 24 with HCP i. 196ff.
Three hundred thousand for the citizenry of Sybaris (12. 9. 2) is of course an absurdly inflated figure even for
a reputedly fabulously wealthy Italiot city in the 6th century; but note its even more absurd conversion into an
expeditionary force (12. 9. 5). If Ephorus is responsible for this information he must have had different
standards for archaic times.
-130-

On the other hand a case could be made for the factual basis of the number 300 for Persian navies which recurs in
Diodorus in both fifth- and fourth-century contexts (at 12. 3. 2;13. 38. 4;13. 41. 4;13. 42. 4;13. 46. 6;15. 2. 1;15.
41. 3;16. 22. 2;16. 40. 6). As a rough estimate of the potential naval strength of the Great King 300 is a priori not
impossible when compared with Greek fleets. After the loss of Ionia in 479 Persia relied almost entirely on Cyprus and
Phoenicia for her fleets, and fairly reliable evidence shows that these two areas could, in an all-out effort, supply the
King with a fleet not far short (if at all) of 300 triremes. Conon's fleet in 394 numbered go triremes, 80 Phoenician and
10 Cilician (14. 79. 8;83. 4). In the 380s Evagoras of Salamis eventually had 150 triremes, 130 Cypriot and 20 Tyrian
(15. 2. 4;3. 4). Arrian tells us that in 333/2 the Phoenician cities of Aradus, Byblus, and Sidon had so triremes in
operation with the Persian fleet while the Cypriot kings joined Alexander with 120 (An. 2. 20. 1, 3); Diodorus adds that
the Tyrian fleet was so strong at the time (17. 41. 1). The sum of these last figures comes close to the reported
strength of Memnon's fleet, 300 (17. 29. 2), though Arrian says it numbered 400 (1. 18. 5). At any rate Alexander did
not consider it wise to risk battle with his 160 (An. I. 18. 4).
As an estimate, therefore, of the full Persian (i.e. Cypriot and Phoenician) fleet, 300 seems reasonable. In practice,
however, royal fleets usually fell far short of that figure. In 397/6 Herodas of Syracuse witnessed the preparation of a
royal fleet in Phoenicia to be used against Sparta. He heard that the order was for 300 triremes to be manned (X. H. 3.
4. 1). It may thus be that 300 was the official Persian estimate of the potential of Cyprus and Phoenicia. In the event,
however, the fleet which defeated the Spartans at Cnidus numbered only some ninety triremes (14. 79. 8;83. 4). It
should be further noted that when Herodas reported at Sparta what he had heard and seen, Lysander was of the
opinion that the Greek fleet would be superior to the Persian (X. H. 3. 4. 2). Hard-headed Greeks like Lysander were
under no illusions as to the true naval strength of Persia. We may further compare Thucydides' figure of 147 triremes
for the royal fleet which came as far as Aspendus in 411 (8. 87. 3). 344 Thucydides is emphatic about the number
though he does make Tissaphernes
____________________
344
Isocr. 16. 18 gives 90 ships, perhaps a confusion with Conon's Phoenician fleet in 394.
-131-

say that fewer ships had been collected than the King had ordered (8. 87. 5). Ephorus nevertheless was no
Thucydides and he should be criticized for repeatedly supplying the figure 300 as the actual operational strength
of Persian fleets. Doubtless in many instances no reliable information could be obtained and Ephorus may have
felt justified in giving the usual top estimate. On the other hand he must have come across Thucydides' figure for
the fleet of 411; yet he opted for the usual estimate of 300. Perhaps he reasoned that Thucydides' figure was half
the Persian fleet and as a panhellenist he felt no qualms about doubling it. And perhaps the fleet which defeated
the Spartans at Cnidus was only given its true (and low) strength because of Conon's (and Athens') involvement.

4. DIODORUS' METHODS
That the Bibliotheke is so obviously a work of compilation, one hastily and incompetently carried out, can be
illustrated abundantly and it has in fact already been demonstrated. The present section is concerned with
bringing this central aspect of Diodoran studies, that is, the use and misuse of the sources, into an even sharper
focus. We may begin by comparing P. Oxy. xiii. 1610, an extensive Ephoran fragment (F191 -- see n. 17), with
the relevant part of the Bibliotheke. The correspondence is impressive, the differences being inept rhetorical
flourishes, omissions, misconceptions, and confusions on the part of Diodorus. He will sometimes stay very close
to the language of his source, but usually he will paraphrase (p. 15 ). The epainos on Themistocles, for example,
seems to have been repeated almost verbatim in places (frr. 3-5 = 11. 59. 3). Note in fr. 6 Ephorus' plain
statement that he is returning to his narrative which Diodorus expands to the following pompous declaration:
2 +0+ + +, ' 1 ++
+ 5 (11. 59. 4). This is very characteristic and easily
spotted. If we look further at fr. 6 and compare it with 11. 60. 1-2 we notice that Diodorus is three times as long,
but only with verbiage. 09 in the fragment becomes 9 in Diodorus and 1+ becomes
02. A similar fate befalls frr. 9+10+53. The plain 7 2 9 of the fragment
assumes the usual proportions of a Diodoran
-132-

action: 0 0+ 6 + (11. 60. 6). The

'hundred' of the papyrus becomes 'more than a hundred' in Diodorus, surely a rhetorical exaggeration and not out of
respect for Thucydides. 345
Two important observations to be made are that + in fr. 6, which is correct, becomes 9
92 at 11. 60. 1, which is not. This is because Diodorus was ignorant of the Athenian constitution. He assumed
that generals were elected for specific campaigns.

346

Further, 02 in the same section is a favourite

expression of Diodorus. It would seem that whenever the strength of a force was not stated in his source (as it is not
in fr. 6), Diodorus made up for it with this or a similar phrase (cf. 11. 65. 3;11. 71. 4;11. 78. 2, 4;12. 4. 1;12. 7. 1;12.
42. 3;12. 47. 1;15. 19. 3;15. 21. 1). The omission of whole episodes (e.g. the recovery of the bones of Theseus -- fr.
7) is highly instructive; Diodorus did not abridge uniformly -- he would extract and abridge. The rate at which he did so
doubtless varied depending on the amount of narrative available and his own choice. The rules he followed, if any, in
abbreviating his sources are impenetrable. It is undoubtedly true to say that if an account in Diodorus is full, the
corresponding source must have been at least as detailed. The reverse, however, it should be emphasized, does not
necessarily hold. No less instructive, and indeed this is a characteristic trait of Diodorus, is his tendency to muddle
even moderately complicated accounts in his sources. In this instance he has contrived to remove the naval action of
the battle of Eurymedon to Cyprus. 347
Too little of Ephorus survives to carry this investigation further, but if that were possible the results would certainly be
the same. For instance, a verbatim quotation from Ephorus by Stephanus Byzantius (F76) is repeated word for word by
Diodorus except that he drops the adverb . 348 A comparison of Diodorus with other writers he employed such as
Agatharchides, Polybius, and Posidonius produces similar results. Diodorus' own utterances,
____________________
345
Grenfell and Hunt, P. Oxy. xiii. 122. Frr. 9+10+53 are restored somewhat differently by Rubincam, 976: 357ff.
346
Cf. 12. 7. 1;12. 27. 1;12. 81. 2;15. 29. 7;15. 47. 4. For 12. 7. 1 and 12. 27. 1 see Thuc. I. 114. 1; 116. 1 and cf.
Jacoby, 1949: 306 n. 37.
347
Certainly Ephorus is not to be blamed for this: Stylianou, 1989a: 353ff. It is most unlikely that is the
correct reading in frr. 9+10+53 of FGH 70 F191 (= P. Oxy. xiii. 1610): Stylianou, 1989a: 359ff.
348
I would not attach any historical significance to 4 as does Reid, 1974: 134.
-133-

which are often in evidence, and which are largely of a moralizing or a procedural nature, hardly amount to a
'philosophy of history' and they do not earn him promotion to the rank of an original writer; nor do the blunders
which generally ensue whenever he attempts to innovate. It would be unnecessary to enter upon such an
investigation here, especially as this has been recently done, and done well, by J. Horriblower. 349 A good example
(taken at random), not cited by Hornblower, is Diodorus25. 2-5 which corresponds with Polybius 1. 65-88. It can
be seen that Diodorus has followed Polybius very closely, even reproducing the latter's didactic statements and
moralizing reflections, often word for word; cf. e.g. 25. 4. 2 = Polyb. 1. 84. 5-6;25. 5. 1 = Polyb. 1. 84. 10;25. 5.
2 = Polyb. 1. 86. 7;25. 5. 3 = Polyb. 1. 88. 3. On Diodorus and Polybius see also p. 8.
It might be helpful if Diodorus' misuse of his sources were examined more closely under the following three
headings of omissions, chronological peculiarities, and general vagaries.
Omissions. Diodorus' unsystematic and injudicious method of extracting from his sources has resulted in many
and often serious omissions. Accounts are frequently telescoped or left incomplete and. important information
passed over. It would serve little purpose to list all such instances, even those in Book 15 (they are noted in the
commentary), especially as we cannot be certain in every single case that the omission is Diodorus' and not the
source's. Two major omissions in Book 15 concern the Peace at Athens in 371 (pp. 408 ff.); and the years 367/5
are sketchy in the extreme (75-76n.). For instances of telescoped narratives cf. 15. 29. 1-4 (the point at which
Acoris died is missed); 32. In. (the description of the Spartan army); 34. 2n. (the second invasion of Boeotia in
377); 36. 5 n. (Corcyra omitted from Timotheus' successes); 77. 4n. (the Arcadian successes in 365/4). For
incomplete accounts cf. 14. 84. 1f. (the best part of the battle of Coronea is not related); 15. 32. 3ff. (only one
episode of the 378 invasion of Boeotia is given); 15. 34. 1f. (only the end of the second invasion is related); 15.
34. 3 (the preliminaries to the naval events of 376 are ignored).
____________________
349
1981: 27 ff. Contrast Sacks, 1990: e.g. 83 ff. As a defence of D against extreme views of Quellenforschung
(rarely held these days in any case) Sacks' case is fair enough, as far as it goes, even though most of the
points he advances are small beer which cannot really be proved either way. Hornblower's analysis and
conclusions remain essentially indisputable.
-134-

The narrative sources were not alone to suffer at the hands of Diodorus; the chronographer suffered equally as the
sorry state of the kinglists shows (pp. 32 ff.). Diodorus neglected much material supplied by the chronographic
handbook (p. 32 ). It is worth pointing out that the years 452/1 (archon Chaerephanes) and 321/19 (archons
Archippus I and Neaechmus) are missing along with all the usual chronographic material (the annual magistrates).
There is no reason to suspect lacunae. In the first case it is possible that the year was simply overlooked by Diodorus;
or even that he found nothing in it to expand and therefore ignored it. For the second case Goukowsky has suggested
that Diodorus was confused by the fact that the archon for 318/7 was also called Archippus. 350 A more probable
explanation, however, is that Diodorus, by consulting the chronographer, realized that his narrative had moved ahead,
way past the point at which the year of archon Philocles (322/1) should have been concluded and that of Archippus I
begun. His solution, not untypical of the man, was to skip the chronographic information mentioned.
Errors in chronology. Diodorus' method of working, as well as the fact that the chronographer was not infallible, are
responsible for the chronological muddles which characterize the Bibliotheke. We have already looked at the kind of
errors for which the chronographer is to blame (pp. 45 ff.). We may now look at Diodorus' own mistakes. The inept
combination of narrative histories and chronographic source is sufficient to explain many of them. Diodorus would
attach an abridged portion of narrative which included an event he found in his chronographic source to that archonyear under which the event was placed in the chronographer. If the latter had done his job well then that event would
be correctly dated; but the rest of the events in the narrative might not be. Depending on the position of the dated
event and the timespan of the summarized narrative, they might be misdated by several years, either too low or too
high or both. The following cases are typical.

Chapters 15. 28-35 are a long, condensed version of Ephorus' account of the three years which followed the liberation
of Thebes. They deal with the restoration of the Boeotian Confederacy, the foundation and expansion of the Second
Athenian Confederacy,
____________________
350
Bud edn. of D 18 (1978), p. xxvi.
-135the raid of Sphodrias, the outbreak of war, Agesilaus' invasions of Boeotia, and the war at sea. All these events are
placed under 377/6. It is clear that the narrative straddles this date. It trails behind it to begin with, but by the end it
has actually moved ahead -- the battle of Naxos was fought in September 376 (34. 3 n.). The same is true of 15. 41-7,
which deals with the Persian expedition against Egypt, the renewed war in Greece, the destruction of Thespiae and
Plataea, and the whole episode of the siege of Corcyra. The year 374/3 is correct for the first of these events, but not
for the rest; 15. 47. 7 belongs in summer 372. Such runaway narratives are generally halted and the chronology
rectified by the next event Diodorus dates from the chronographer. Thus Diodorus is continually in and out of trouble
with his chronology.
There are many examples of such muddles. Under 471/0, for example, Diodorus deals with the ostracism of
Thernistocles, his sojourn in Argos, his flight to Persia, and eventual death; under the following year, with Cimon's
operations in the Hellespont, the Aegean, and the eastern Mediterranean. Both sets of events required a number of
years to run their course. Again in Book 15, under 383/2 there occur the origins and beginning of the Olynthian War,
the subjection of Phlius, and internal Spartan politics. Phlius, nevertheless, was not attacked till 380 (19-23n.); and the
whole of the Great Satrap Revolt is related under 362/1. Clearly the oikonomia of Ephorus must bear part at least of
the blame for many of these confusions. Even a painstaking epitomator, and Diodorus took few pains, might have run
into trouble in trying to give Ephorus' Histories an annalistic form. When, however, Diodorus followed a source which
used a year-by-year system, his chronology was less unsatisfactory. 351
Other chronological curiosities are the result of Diodorus' own arrangement of his material, an arrangement often
dictated by the necessity of fitting together the historical accounts of different regions while keeping to a strictly
annalistic system. For example, the otherwise continuous narrative of the Sacred War in Book 16 is interrupted for
three whole years, 351-348, by Persian affairs, and for a fourth, 348/7, by Philip's siege and capture of Olynthus. This
does not of course mean that the Thebans and Phocians remained inactive meanwhile. Likewise, the Greek narrative is
____________________
351
This is the case with Hieronymus; see Hornblower, 1981: 34.
-136interrupted at 11. 48-9 by western affairs though 11. 50. 1 makes it clear that there was no such interruption in
reality. Occasionally happy results ensued. It is not impossible that Mantinea figured twice in the chronographer, the
beginning of the siege under 386/5, and its conclusion under 385/4. But it is not unlikely that Diodorus, using his
initiative, and noticing perhaps in his source a statement to the effect that M . . .
... ... + (15. 12. 1), split the Ephoran narrative in two. That enabled him to
cover all three major areas in succession for both 386/5 and 385/4. The single chronographic entry perhaps was under
386/5, and 15. 5. 1, ... , may be all that is left of it (pp. 44 f.). At any
rate Diodorus' arrangement coincided with the historical reality for the Mantinean War seems indeed to have begun in
summer of 385 under archon Mystichides and to have finished in the following winter under Dexitheus (12. 1 n.).
General vagaries. A mixture of incompetence, lack of care, and ignorance is responsible for the vagaries which abound
in the Bibliotheke. Many of these we have already met. Laqueur 352 examines a large number of anacolutha and other
defects. It is impossible, however, to agree with his explanation that these are caused by the regular use of two or
more narrative sources for the same account. Of course Diodorus did occasionally supplement the narrative source he
was following with information from an alternative source (p. 50 ); and he not infrequently included his own
commonplace reflections (pp. 3 ff.). But many of the instances cited by Laqueur are more simply explained as the
result of a desultory and even haphazard use of one source. Diodorus would often not take care to smooth out the
grammar of the extracts he joined together; hence the anacolutha. We might add 15. 70. 2 to Laqueur's list -- the
passive makes little sense in the context (see n. ad loc.). The anacolutha in fact are a good indication
not only of Diodorus' slipshod methods, but also of the fact that he did not revise his work. 353
____________________
352
1958: 257ff.
353
Other defects listed by Laqueur have an even simpler explanation. For example, 12. 3. 2, V
{ } , is surely an instance of the copyist's eye jumping from the first mention of
Artabazus to the second. And at 15. 41. 3 where the MSS read "Artabazos" instead of "Tharnabazos" we should see
a manuscript corruption rather than an insertion from an additional source as Laqueur, 1958: 273, implausibly
suggests. On the other
-137-

A complete list of Diodorus' blunders would be of a very respectable length. I confine myself to giving some
representative examples with special, though not exclusive, reference to Book 15. The most serious confusions in
Book 15 concern the Peace of 375 from which the Thebans are said to have been excluded (ch. 38); the assertion
that Timotheus was immediately reinstated to the generalship in 373 and that he sailed to Corcyra with Iphicrates
(ch. 47); and the campaign and battle of Leuctra (chs. 51-6). All three are discussed in the commentary. A kind
of error to beware of is the confusion of a pair of names; cf. 12. 78. 1-2 (Troezen for Epidaurus); 13. 36. 5;37.

4f.;38. 4f. etc. (Pharnabazus for Tissaphernes. In fact the latter is not mentioned at all in Book 13); 13. 64. 1
(Thrasybulus for Thrasyllus); 15. 19. 3 (Phoebidas for Eudamidas); 15. 59. 1 (Tegean for Mantinean. He gets it
right at 15. 62. 2); 15. 82. 1 (Mantineans for Tegeans); 15. 93. 2 (Tachos for Nectanebos). For sheer careless
blunders cf. 12. 35. 4 and 12. 42. 6 Archidamus is killed off in 434 and then resurrected in 431 -- see pp. 39 f.);
12. 63. 3 (the Spartans on Sphacteria are starved into surrender in 425); 12. 72. 3 (he places Antandrus on
Lesbos, though this may be the result of abridgement); 15. 36. 4 (Chabrias is murdered in Thrace in 376/5; see
n. there); 15. 77. 4 (the Hill of Cronus at Olympia becomes a polis).
The well-known doublets result from an injudicious combination of chronographic source and narrative source; cf.
16. 31. 6=16. 34. 4-5; 16. 34. 3=16. 39. 4; or of narrative source and narrative source; cf. 12. 19. 1 f. = 13. 33.
2f.; or of the same section of a narrative source being summarized twice; cf. 13. 34. 1-3=13. 36. 1-5. I do not,
however, consider either 15. 27. 4 and 15. 33. 5-6 or 15. 38. 3 and 15. 50. 4 to be doublets (see 27. 4 n.;38.339n.). A peculiar feature in Diodorus is that he is apt to deviate from other sources in the form of proper names,
though to be fair it is not always clear whether the fault lies with him or with his source or with a copyist; cf.
(13. 106. 9f.) = (FGH 70 F193; Thuc. 6. 93. 2; cf. HCT iv ad loc.);
(14. 97. 3) = (X. H. 4. 8. 20); (15. 29. 5f.)= (29. 5 n.);
(15. 30. 3)=' (30. 3n.); ' (15. 84. 2) = ' (FGH 70 F85; X. Poroi 3. 7).
____________________
hand, an awareness of D's propensity to write nonsensical Greek does not dispose one to perceive lacunae and
textual corruption wherever the text is defective in some way. Cf. e.g. 14. 16. 5 where the editors'
suggestions may be misdirected.
-138-

Most of the above, of course, were errors of omission rather than commission though the second category is well
represented too and both together set the seal on Diodorus as a historical compiler of low stature. To obviate the
charge of carelessness and incompetence, once the Bibliotheke was completed, Diodorus claimed that some of the
books had been pirated and published +00FB . These he
disowned, but in order, he says, to safeguard the integrity of his work he proceeds to give a brief summary of the
contents of the Bibliotheke (40. 8). He does the same in the general preface which again, as he emphasizes (1. 4. 6),
was written after the completion of the work (1. 4. 6-5. 2); and he repeats his wish to protect both the reader and the
Bibliotheke from book pirates (1. 5. 2). The apologia is transparent. Even if what he says is true, it is not obvious why
the general plan of the work he gives should help the reader distinguish between the official, and supposedly revised,
books and the pirated and unrevised ones -- unless the contents of the pirated books were different and this we cannot
know. At any rate, what we have undoubtedly corresponds to what he says and, therefore, clearly our text of the
Bibliotheke, in all its sorry state, must be the 'corrected' one. There is in fact no evidence either for pirated books or
for a revision of the Bibliotheke. Quite the contrary. All the indications are that any revision was of the most
perfunctory nature. 345
____________________
345
The variant drafts of the same material in Book 1 pointed out by Murray, whether in the same or in different MSS (
1970: 170), constitute no such evidence though some are inclined so to see them (e.g. Sacks, 1990: 173 n. 60).
Perhaps the same explanation applies there as for 13. 34. 1-3 = 13. 36. 1-5 (see text above on doublets).
-139-

COMMENTARY
1 . The preface
For D's prefaces in general and this preface in particular see pp. 101ff. For the scope and origins of the praise/blame
function of history in the Bibliotheke see pp. 5ff.
1. 2. : cf. 11. 82. 3; 15. 33. 3; 15. 50. 2; 15. 56. 3. The rhetoric doubtless goes back to
Ephorus, but D's inept handling has distorted the meaning. Both and have approximately the
same meaning and D's use of them was motivated by a desire for stylistic variation. The Spartans lost their hegemony
at Leuctra, not Mantinea, though Mantinea ensured that Spartan power was broken for good, and this presumably was
the point made by Ephorus; cf. Strabo 9 C 414 who probably reflects Ephorus (9 C 422). is inappropriate in
the context of 362 and Mantinea. The Spartan defeat at Leuctra was a great surprise (even to the Thebans) and it
shocked Greece (cf. X. H. 6. 3. 20; 6. 4. 20; Plut. Ages. 29. 1). But the Spartans at Mantinea were just another
contingent and their defeat hardly caused a stir -- Epaminondas' death did.
1. 3-5. For Ephorus and the decline of Sparta see pp. 113 f.
1. 3. : cf. 50. 2 and 7. 12. 8 where Wesseling emends the to (cf. Jacoby, FGH iic. 86).
For Ephorus the Spartan hegemony began with the reforms of Lycurgus and ended with Leuctra; see, in addition to D,
Strabo 8 C 365f.=FGH 70 F118. Ephorus, therefore, dated Lycurgus to C.870. The same approximate date may be
obtained by another consideration. Clement of Alexandria says that Ephorus calculated 735 years from the Return of
the Heraclids to the year of archon Euaenetus (335/4) when Alexander crossed into Asia (F223). He thus dated the
Return to 1070/69. D, on the other hand, says that Ephorus covered 750 years from the Return of the Heraclids to the
siege of Perinthus in 341/0 when he concluded the Histories (16. 76. 5). This would place the Return in 1090. The
difference is small and it can be eliminated if we accept Jacoby's emendation of
-141-

D's number to 730 (N' is emended to : FGH iic. 101f.). Now, Ephorus considered Lycurgus to have lived in the
sixth generation after Procles (F149. 18), i.e. some 200 years after the Return, reckoning 30 years to a
generation. Thus his floruit is c.870; cf. Barber, 1935: 171f; Burde, 1974: 102. According to Ephorus, therefore,
some 700 years intervened between the Return of the Heraclids and Leuctra, and this is Isocrates' figure too (6.
12; 8. 95; 12. 204).
1. 6. The usual link-paragraph; see p. 25. Wesseling's emendation < > + +
on the basis of 12. 2. 2 is probably correct. The meaning could hardly be in doubt in any case as D
always uses some such statement in introducing his link-paragraph.
: from the chronographer. Under archon Theodotus (387/6) D's chronographer
noticed the conclusion of the King's Peace, the capture of Rhegion by Dionysius, and the Sack of Rome by the
Gauls, and D arranged his narrative accordingly (14. 110ff.). Polybius dates the same three events seemingly in
the same year which, however, he does not fix by citing a magistrate or even the appropriate Olympiad year.
Instead he defines the year in question as being the nineteenth after the battle of Aegospotami and the sixteenth
before the battle of Leuctra (1. 6. 1-2). Using Olympiad years and reckoning inclusively, 387/6 is obtained
(Walbank, HCP i. 46f.). There can be little doubt that the synchronism of the three events (probably going back
ultimately to Philistus; cf. the discussion of Werner, 1963: 69ff.) is correct. On the chronology of Dionysius'
activities in the south of Italy see further 7. 2n.

Archon Mystichides, 386/5

2. 1. : repetition of the college (394 V) cited at 14. 97. 1 (391/90); see p. 27. In reality only two
tribunes are given, M. Furius and C. Aemilius, the Kal here (not at 14. 97. 1) probably being someone's
(presumably not D's) attempt to harmonize the figure of three with the actual number of names given; cf. Unger,
Jahrb. f. class. Philol. ( 1981), 494. At 14. 97. 1 the 'edited' text of MS F (see Preface) adds a third name, K
O, not known to Livy who otherwise gives a full college of six tribunes (5. 26. 1-2). M. Furius and C.
Aemilius are first and third in Livy's list,
-142the second being L. Furius. It is easy to see how the second Furius was omitted, and omitted early in this
particular tradition of the fasti: Drummond, 1980: 61 and n. 21; CAH2 vii. 2. 636; cf. also Perl, 1957: 79, 103
and, for the odd name in MS F, Pinsent, 1975: 30 n. 35.

2-4. The invasion of Cyprus

The background and beginning of the war were given at 14. 98. 1-4 (under 391/o) and at 14. 110. 5 (under
387/6) it was noted that with the conclusion of the Peace of Antalcidas the King was free to attack Evagoras. The
invasion of Cyprus is now related. The chronology of the Cypriot War is a well-known problem and it must be dealt
with first. For an account of the origins of the war and of Evagoras in general see Stylianou, 1989b: 458ff.
The chronology
The difficulty lies chiefly in the contradictory nature of the evidence. At 15. 9. 2 (under 385/4) D states that the
Cypriot War lasted for almost ten years, but that most of the time was spent on preparations. The actual fighting
spread over no more than two years (but see ad loc.) and these were 'at the end' ( . Oldfather
translates 'in all' and Vial en tout, but 'at the end' is supported by 15. 31. 2, ; cf. Philostr. VS 2. 11,
12, 13). He dates the invasion itself under 386/5. The decision of the King to suppress Evagoras on the other
hand is set under 391/0 (14. 98. 3f.), a mere six years earlier. Then there is Isocrates. In the Evagoras he says
that the war lasted for ten years (9. 64) while in the Panegyricus he represents the siege of Salamis as still in
progress at the time of writing and adds that the King had already wasted six years in trying to subdue Evagoras
(4. 135, 141). The problem is to decide when the Panegyricus was written and this can only be done from the
internal evidence of the speech itself.
Section 126 provides the key: K , 'O
. The siege of Phlius was the most recent of the three events mentioned. It began in spring 380 and
it lasted for some twenty months (19-23 n.). The spring of 380, therefore, is a terminus post quem for the
speech. The Olympic festival of high summer 380 provides an approximate terminus ante quem, for the speech
must surely have
-143been completed by then if, as generally (and probably correctly) thought, it was composed for that occasion.
Mathieu, 1938: 5, would date its publication between July and September 380. It is true that no specific evidence
links the speech with the festival, but Tuplin's rejection of the association, 1983: 181f., is due to the fact that it
does not fit his calculations either for the length of the war or for its ending, which he dates in late winter 381/0.
This may be a little too early, I think. Nor should we insist, as he does, 1983: 178ff., on fitting exactly between
c.390 and 380 the ten years the war is said to have lasted.
There is no need to suppose that the essay was first published in 384, and that it was inadequately revised and
redistributed in 380, the passages on Cyprus belonging to the first edition, those on the Cadmea, Olynthus, and
Phlius to the second (as Reid, 1974: 141f.). Whatever the value of the ancient claims that Isocrates worked on

the speech for many years ( Plut. Mor. 837f; Dion. Hal. 208; ps.-Longinus
4. 2f.; Quintilian 10. 4. 4) Beloch is probably correct that no matter how long it took Isocrates to complete the
speech he would have taken the trouble to remove all anachronisms at the time of publication ( GG iii. 2. 227). At
any rate, Isocrates' testimony that Salamis was being besieged at the same time as Olynthus and Phlius receives
strong support from Theopompus and the Egyptian kinglists.
The sequence of events in Book 12 of Theopompus' Philippica is not entirely clear from the outline of its contents
by Photius, but it is plain that according to Theopompus the Cypriot War did not reach its end till after Nectanebos
I had assumed the kingship in Egypt ( FGH 115 F103. 10f.). We know that civil strife which lasted for several
months followed Acoris' death, and that by the end of that Nectanebos was in control of the whole of Egypt
(Kienitz, 1953: 88f., 173ff., 178ff.). Kienitz places the transition period, Acoris-Nepherites II-Nectanebos I, in the
summer months of 380 because he is under the spell of Beloch's view that Cyprus was not invaded till 381. In
reality Acoris' death and Nectanebos' accession may belong as early as 382 or as late as 380 (thus rightly Tuplin,
1983: 185f.) or even 379, if the pre-Kienitz chronology is followed (cf. e.g. Bickermann, 1934: 77ff.), though this
is less likely. They cannot certainly be as early as 385/4 as Reid's chronology would necessitate (see below). That
would be totally irreconcilable with the Greek as well as the Egyptian evi-144-

dence. (For a discussion of the latter see Kienitz, 1953: 178ff.; Johnson, 1974: 1ff.) We see, therefore, that the
testimonies of Isocrates and Theopompus combine to bring the final stage of the Cypriot War down to the close of the
380s. What then of the evidence of D? Before we deal with this it will be necessary to look at what modern scholars
have made of the problem.
Two broad groups can be distinguished, those who accept D's date of 386/5 for the invasion, and those who do not.
Most notable amongst the first is Judeich, 1892: 119ff., who is followed by, e.g., Miller, RE xviii. 1. 1165, Lenschau, RE
xix. 2. 1847, and more recently Ruzicka, 1983. (Ruzicka's suggestions are very close to some of the views put forward
here about Persia and the Cypriot War. It is therefore necessary to state that my views are the same as those included
in my Oxford doctoral thesis which was submitted in 1981.) For Shrimpton, 1991, see the end of this n. Judeich further
accepts 391/0 as correct for the beginning of the war and 381/0 for its end. He does not, however, see the statement
(9. 2) as indicating the last two years of the war (see above), but merely 386 and 385. He is
then left with the task of accounting for the years 384-381. This he does by suggesting that the King repudiated the
treaty concluded between Orontes and Evagoras, replaced the former with Tiribazus who had meanwhile been
acquitted, and peace was eventually made by the latter in 381. Unfortunately for Judeich his solution is unsupported
by any hard evidence. Reid proposal, 1974: 123ff. (a revival of Engel, 1841: 7ff.), that the war began perhaps as early
as 394/3, and that, therefore, 386/4 are indeed its last two years and D is correct, is wrong because she rather
arbitrarily dismisses Isocrates (as Ruzicka, 1983: 106 n. 6, also points out) and overlooks Theopompus and the
Egyptian evidence.
Beloch, GG iii. 2. 226 ff., leads the second and dominant group. He is followed by e.g. Meyer, GdA v. 312; Swoboda,
RE vi. 1. 825f.; ibid. vii. 1. 1432; Cary, CAH1 vi. 58; Spyridakis, 1935: 63 n. 1; Hill, 1940: 140 n. 2; Meloni, 1950:
321 and n. 3; Kienitz, 1953: 82ff., 82 n. 2, 85 n. 2; Osborne, 1973: 522ff. (who, however, thinks that 'the actual
operations against Evagoras, despite the apparent indications in Diodorus' account, probably began in about 383 BC);
Burn, CHI 369; Sealey, 1993: 47.
Beloch understands the statement (9. 2) to mean that the war was only
fought in
-145-

earnest in its last two years. If then the war began in 391/0, and this is about right as we shall see, and ended
c.380, then obviously the last two years were not 386/5 and 385/4, but 381 and 380. Isocr. 4. 140 is the only
source for an unsuccessful expedition mounted against Egypt by Abrocomas, Pharnabazus, and Tithraustes which
lasted no less than three years. This event, Beloch thinks, belongs immediately after the King's Peace because
Isocrates says that it preceded the attack on Evagoras, and also because Chabrias, who is generally thought to
have held the command on the Egyptian side, is said to have gone to Egypt after having served in Cyprus (
Demosth. 20. 76). We know from X. H. 5. 1. 10 that Chabrias was sent to Cyprus in the year of Antalcidas'
nauarchy (388/7) and he presumably remained there till the conclusion of the Peace forced him to leave and take
service in Egypt under Acoris. Beloch consequently assigns this particular Persian attack on Egypt to the years
385-383. There then occurred the invasion of Cyprus in 381 and the Cypriot War was finally concluded in the late
summer of 380 after the Olympic festival or at least after the publication of Isocrates' Panegyricus. Having failed
to mention the campaign against Egypt D erroneously moved up the two closing years of the Cypriot War to
386/5 and 385/4.
Beloch's chronology appears satisfactory at first glance, but on closer examination it seems to create as many
problems as it solves. It is important to realize that D's evidence derives partly from the chronographer and partly
from Ephorus, and that he himself may have manipulated the information with perhaps infelicitous results. The
chronographer is to be seen first and indubitably at 15. 1. 6 -- the statement that the capture of Rhegion by
Dionysius (and of Rome by the Gauls) occurred in the year before the Persian campaign against Evagoras signifies
only one thing: D saw the two events entered under successive years in the chronographer and decided to
conclude Book 14 with the first and to begin Book 15 with the second; hence 15. 2. 1 (under 386/5):
'A. . . E. . . , which may in substance be the chronographic
entry. This observation is of considerable significance for the chronology and weighty evidence to the contrary is
required before the date of 386/5 for the expedition is set aside. Secondly, 15. 9. 2, K
,


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, is probably from the chronographer, in part at least. Its position in the middle of the narrative is
rather unusual, though by no means unique. D presumably, coming to the end of the war, consulted his handbook and
entered the relevant chronographic information at this point. He did the same at 15. 93. 1 (see n. ad loc.). It is a fair
guess that the chronographer placed the ending of the war under 381/0 and that he said nothing more than that it had
lasted for almost ten years. D then, who had just abridged from Ephorus under the successive years 386/5 and 385/4
the entire course of the war from the invasion of the island until Evagoras' capitulation, may have added the comment
about the war being fought continuously for no more than two years at its very end. For a similar instance of possible
Diodoran improvisation see 16. 63. 2 and pp. 41 f. If we could be sure that this is what happened the difficulties
surrounding the chronology of the war would disappear forthwith. The possibility remains, however, that the
chronographer (who was not infallible: pp. 45 ff.) is responsible for all the detail in 15. 9. 2 as well as for setting the
ending of the war under 385/4. It is worth noticing that both Hieronymus and Syncellus misdate Evagoras' rebellion
(Helm edn. 119; Schoene edn. ii. 110).
The narrative of the war derives from Ephorus. It is found in four places: 14. 98. 1-4 (under 391/0); 14. 110. 5 (under
387/6); 15. 2-4 (under 386/5); 15. 8-9. 2 (under 385/4). The war had certain consequences and these are related at
15. 9. 3-11 and 18. It is possible that Ephorus gave no precise dates either for the beginning or for the end or indeed
for any event of the war. Nevertheless, the detail he supplied is invaluable for the chronology. The passage 14. 98. 1-4
deals with the background to the war and its declaration. It reaches back as far as c.415/4 when Evagoras regained
Salamis (Stylianou, 1989b: 458ff.) and it comes down to the time when Hecatomnus of Caria was ordered to fight
against Evagoras. The placing of this narrative under 391/0 is probably due to the chronographer rather than to any
sequence of abridged Ephoran material (F76 owes its present position to Jacoby. The origins and outbreak of the
Cypriot War could have been related in any number of places in Book 19). It seems to be correct for the beginning of
the war, as this was marked, on the one hand, by the order to Hecatomnus and Autophradates of Lydia to campaign
against Evagoras (and these two were only appointed to their
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satrapies following the failure of the proposed Peace of 392/1: FGH 115 F103. 4; 328 F149; 90. 3n.), and on the
other, by the dispatch to Cyprus of the first of three Athenian naval squadrons (Stylianou, 1988).
Section 14. 110. 5 (under 387/6), on the other hand, undoubtedly retains its original position in the sequence of
Ephoran narrative-with the Peace of Antalcidas in effect, we are told, the King immediately turned his attention to
the Cypriot War and made preparations to crush Evagoras. Unless, therefore, there is evidence to the contrary we
should keep the invasion as close in date to 387/6 as possible. Not only is there no such evidence, but the
chronographer, as we have seen, by setting the invasion under 386/5, confirms Ephorus. What is more, the
following sections contain information which further supports a mid-380s date for the invasion.
In deciding to revolt Glos, the Persian admiral, formed alliances with Acoris of Egypt and with Sparta (15. 9. 4 and
nn.). After his murder (he must have moved to Ionia by then: 9. 4n.) his successor Tachos continued along the
same lines of trying to elicit Egyptian and Spartan support against Persia. He did not long outlive Glos and the last
sentence of ch. 18 runs: 'A . And in the
following chapter it is explained that after the deaths of Glos and Tachos the Spartans gave up their plans for new
conquests in Asia and concentrated on Greece. They shortly afterwards moved against Olynthus -- summer 382.
Both chs. 18 and 19 are under 383/2.
It would be reckless not to pay attention to what D (i.e. Ephorus) says. The revolts of Glos and Tachos were over
by early 382 at the latest and hence the whole sequence of events, from the invasion of Cyprus to the death of
Tachos, should be placed earlier than that date. How long did this sequence take to run its course? It is highly
probable that D has telescoped the later stages of the war. The events which he dates to 386/5 and 385/4,
perhaps under the guidance of the chronographer (see above), may have taken considerably longer than two
years. What is more, the narrative does not flow uniformly in terms of either time or geography. After concluding
the Cypriot War at 15. 9. 2 D goes back in time to recount the revolt of Glos; and the scene gradually shifts from
Cyprus to Ionia. The shift in chronology and geo-148satrapies following the failure of the proposed Peace of 392/1: FGH 115 F103. 4; 328 F149; 90. 3n.), and on the
other, by the dispatch to Cyprus of the first of three Athenian naval squadrons (Stylianou, 1988).
Section 14. 110. 5 (under 387/6), on the other hand, undoubtedly retains its original position in the sequence of
Ephoran narrative-with the Peace of Antalcidas in effect, we are told, the King immediately turned his attention to
the Cypriot War and made preparations to crush Evagoras. Unless, therefore, there is evidence to the contrary we
should keep the invasion as close in date to 387/6 as possible. Not only is there no such evidence, but the
chronographer, as we have seen, by setting the invasion under 386/5, confirms Ephorus. What is more, the
following sections contain information which further supports a mid-380s date for the invasion.
In deciding to revolt Glos, the Persian admiral, formed alliances with Acoris of Egypt and with Sparta (15. 9. 4 and
nn.). After his murder (he must have moved to Ionia by then: 9. 4n.) his successor Tachos continued along the
same lines of trying to elicit Egyptian and Spartan support against Persia. He did not long outlive Glos and the last
sentence of ch. 18 runs: 'A . And in the
following chapter it is explained that after the deaths of Glos and Tachos the Spartans gave up their plans for new

conquests in Asia and concentrated on Greece. They shortly afterwards moved against Olynthus -- summer 382.
Both chs. 18 and 19 are under 383/2.
It would be reckless not to pay attention to what D (i.e. Ephorus) says. The revolts of Glos and Tachos were over
by early 382 at the latest and hence the whole sequence of events, from the invasion of Cyprus to the death of
Tachos, should be placed earlier than that date. How long did this sequence take to run its course? It is highly
probable that D has telescoped the later stages of the war. The events which he dates to 386/5 and 385/4,
perhaps under the guidance of the chronographer (see above), may have taken considerably longer than two
years. What is more, the narrative does not flow uniformly in terms of either time or geography. After concluding
the Cypriot War at 15. 9. 2 D goes back in time to recount the revolt of Glos; and the scene gradually shifts from
Cyprus to Ionia. The shift in chronology and geo-148have gone up to the King already by 389 (the year Thrasybulus sailed out: Stylianou, 1988: 467ff., esp. 470 n.
33); which would have left him with plenty of time to marry and campaign against Egypt. Besides, the
preparations may have been well under way by the time Pharnabazus joined the other two commanders. It would
appear that Abrocomas had been put in charge of operations against Egypt as early as 401 (X. An. 1. 4. 3, 5; 2.
1. 14). In fact, what we know about Chabrias' activities in Egypt tends to exclude the second half of the 380s as
the time of the attack on Egypt.
Chabrias may have been in Egypt continuously from 386 till 380/79 when he was recalled (cf. 29. 2n.), but there
is no evidence to connect him with the repulse of a Persian invasion. (Thus also Ruzicka, 1983: 106 n. 7.)
Demosth. 20.76, ' ' ' YU=1FF3, is imprecise and does not have
to mean anything more than that Chabrias served well in both Cyprus and Egypt. In Cyprus we are told that he
helped Evagoras to subdue the island ( Nepos, Chabr. 2. 2; cf. X. H. 5. 1. 10). In Egypt he may well have helped
Nectanebos establish himself as king, and that had perhaps involved sufficient fighting to justify Demosthenes'
expression ( Nepos, Chabr. 2. 1; Kienitz, 1953: 88f.). Again, though Nepos, Chabr. 2, is useless chronologically, it
makes no mention of a Persian campaign against Egypt at the time of Chabrias' sojourn there. Consequently
Kienitz, 1953: 85, is largely conjectural. Indeed, his dismissal of the view that this particular Persian attack
belongs before 386, on the ground that such a placing is inconsistent with the known dates of Chabrias (1953: 85
n. 2), is simply begging the question for as we have said nothing in the sources connects Chabrias with the defeat
of a Persian expedition. And we might also consider the following. When Pharnabazus began preparing for a
second attempt on Egypt he lost no time in confronting Athens with the terms of the King's Peace and demanding
the recall of Chabrias (29. 2n.). Now Chabrias presumably was in Egypt between 385 and 383 and if those are the
years of the first attempt ( Beloch, GG iii. 2. 228f.; Shrimpton, 1991: 1ff..) why did Pharnabazus not remonstrate
with Athens then and demand Chabrias' recall?
Somewhat firmer evidence is provided by D 15. 29. 1-4 which passage, we have argued (p. 100 ), is a condensed
Ephoran review of what had been happening in Egypt from before the death of
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Acoris, probably from the King's Peace even, down to the dis-

2). He was recalled and he did not therefore have to face a Persian attack. All he did in Egypt was to prepare.
Arguments from silence are of course dangerous. All the same it is a little difficult to believe that had Chabrias
achieved such a notable victory against Persia in Egypt, all the sources, Isocrates, D, Nepos, and especially
Demosthenes at 20. 76, would have failed to mention it.
The oikonomia of Book 12 of Theopompus as summarized by Photius ( FGH 115 F103) provides an additional argument
in favour of D's date. After relating the beginning of the Cypriot War (103. 4), Theopornpus commented on the effect
of the King's Peace on the situation; the King was now free to concentrate his forces against Evagoras. This is precisely
what Ephorus said too (14. 110. 5). This particular narrative of Theopompus reached down to at least the naval defeat
of Evagoras (103. 5-6). Then, and the sequence here is similar to that in D, Theopompus turned his attention to the
Greek mainland where he noted that, while Athens adhered to the terms of the Peace, Sparta did not (103. 7). One
cannot but relate this statement to D 15. 5 (cf. Jacoby, FGH iid. 373). One of the Spartan victims was Mantinea. The
Mantineans had appealed to Athens, but their appeal was refused, the Athenians being unwilling to act contrary to the
Common Peace (15. 5. 5 and n.). Theopompus went on to describe how the King's Peace had been concluded. He then
returned to the Cypriot War and related it to its end. D's arrangement is broadly the same. Now Mantinea was attacked
in 385 (5. 1n.) and we see that Theopompus placed the invasion of Cyprus before it.
Last, but not least, it is surely of some significance that one of the two Persian commanders was Tiribazus, the satrap
of Ionia and the man in charge of negotiations with Greece (90. 3n.). The result of these negotiations was the King's
Peace in 387/6 from which Cyprus was specifically excluded. And Tiribazus' army and navy came from Ionia (see
further 2. 2n.). The year 386/5 is therefore a much better date for the attack on Evagoras than 381.
The war ended not earlier than spring/summer 380. The evidence of Isocrates (and Theopompus) is decisive on this
point. While the chronographer therefore is very probably correct about
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the date of the invasion, either he or D (see above) is certainly wrong that the war was concluded in 385/4 after two
years of continuous fighting. On the other hand Isocrates is partly wrong too -Tiribazus was not in Cyprus in 381/o; this is contradicted by Ephorus, as we have seen. The following chronology is
therefore proposed.
Phase 1 can easily have required several months. We do not know how long the armada spent in Cilicia, but conditions
there may have enforced a fairly lengthy stay (2. 2n.). And then Evagoras' pirate campaign, the famine at the Persian
camp, the mutiny and its suppression, and the improvement of the supply situation may have taken up the rest of the
campaigning season of 385 so that the naval battle may well belong to the summer of 384. Then followed the Persian
concentration at Citium and the beginning of the siege of Salamis which cannot have been very effective. Tiribazus had
gone up to the King after the battle and he cannot have returned before some, say, three to four months had elapsed.
Thus clearly a winter, that of 384/3, should be envisaged at stage 9. The money Tiribazus had brought with him and
his own presence made a difference and Evagoras found the siege actively pursued on his return from Egypt. I would
see stages 11, 12, 13, and 14 as belonging to 383 with early 382 as the absolute lowest limit. Thus phase 15, treated
very briefly by D, must have endured for a considerable time. Phase 17 belongs last because of 10. 2 -- the war had
already been concluded.In a recent paper (1991: 1ff.) Shrimpton dates both the invasion of Cyprus and that of Egypt
in 387/6 immediately after the conclusion of the King's Peace and argues that strategic considerations demanded the
simultaneity of the two campaigns. While I agree, and have argued so, that the attack on Evagoras followed on the
conclusion of the King's Peace, I cannot go along with the rest of Shrimpton's suggestions:
(1) The year 387/6 for the invasion of Cyprus flatly contradicts the chronographer whose dating, we have
suggested, deserves
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respect. Also, by setting both the sailing of the expedition and the naval action in the first half of the
campaigning season of 386 Shrimpton leaves too little time for the sequence of events in 15. 2. 2-3-4.
(ii) The sources are silent about a campaign against Egypt in the 38os. The only source which is not (Isocr.
4. 140f.) dates it before the invasion of Cyprus. Shrimpton adduces Justin 6. 6 as evidence for an attack on
Egypt after the King's Peace. But Justin 6. 6 seems rather to correspond to D 15. 38 and to refer to the
Peace of 375.
(iii) Shrimpton's analysis of the strategy required for a successful campaign against Egypt cannot be faulted
and one sees such a strategy being put to good use in the 340s (as Shrimpton explains). The obvious retort,
however, is that the campaign of the 380s did after all fail. All the same, by dating the campaign before the
King's Peace we do not necessarily impugn the strategic sense of the Persian high command. For Shrimpton
has overlooked the attempt to deal with Evagoras earlier by Autophradates and Hecatomnus and which may
have been intended to precede the assault on Egypt or even to be simultaneous with it.
2. 1. . . . : it is possible that the King had begun preparations of his own (as
opposed to those of Autophradates and Hecatomnus in the west) right at the start of the war (14. 98. 4), but that
these had progressed in a desultory fashion. Something is clearly amiss at 14. 98. 4.
+ . As it stands with as the subject of
and and taken to refer to Hecatomnus, the sentence makes no sense. It cannot be that
'Hecatomnus traversed the cities of the upper satrapies and crossed over to Cyprus in strong force' (thus
Oldfather)! The King must be the subject of and indeed all the MSS read ( is due to
Dindorf). It is possible that there is a lacuna either between 2 and + or, more
likely, between the latter and U. As for the subject of , whatever that is, it cannot be
Hecatomnus, and perhaps the infinitive 2 stood in the text originally, denoting intent. I would see
+ + as a reference to those mentioned in this section, 2. 1, which were now about to cross into
Cyprus from Cilicia. Frustratingly lengthy
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Persian preparations are not unknown in the 4th century (cf. 41. 2n.). Reid's suggestion (1974: 136) that Ephorus had
looked ahead to the campaign which was eventually launched at this point in his narrative, and that D confused the
reference, is perfectly possible of course. See also Hornblower, 1982a: 37 n. 10.
2 ... +: there can be little doubt that the army is monstrously exaggerated. Not so the navy.
Evagoras eventually possessed 200 triremes and he may still have been outnumbered. But see pp. 130 ff.
2. 2. + : the MSS disagree over the exact form of the name; cf. Vial, 5 and 121. OGIS391, 392 refer
to him as ++; see 391n. Orontes, the son of Artasouras the King's 'Eye' at Cunaxa ( Plut. "Artox". 12. 1 with
OGIS264, 391, 392), had a long and eventful career stretching from the end of the 5th century to at least the Great
Satrap Revolt. See Osborne, 1973: 515ff. and n. 34 for his family and early career. His high status and the favour he
carried with Artaxerxes are attested by the fact that he was given a daughter of the King in marriage (X. An. 2. 4. 8;
3. 4. 13; OGIS391, 392).
2+: what was Tiribazus' precise position? He is here said to have been in command of the
fleet and there is no hint that he was in any way superior to Orontes. At 3. 2 however Glos is said to be the
+2, a statement repeated at 3. 6, + + + + + (cf. 9. 3; 18. 1). This
would leave Tiribazus redundant but for 8. 2 where he is reintroduced (he had been away to the King) as
+. In that position he began his negotiations with Evagoras. One's immediate impression is that there had
been a command reshuffle at some time and Spyridakis, 1935: 66, suggests that Tiribazus' appointment to the
supreme command was subsequent to the naval victory and the result of his visit to the King. Osborne, 1973: 526 n.
59, objects that 'it is unlikely that one of the two should not have held the overall command from the outset' and adds
that 'of the coins minted in Cilicia for this campaign none have been found bearing Orontes' name, whereas a number
have been found with Tiribazus' name'. Nevertheless, we hear of other Persian campaigns which were not conducted

under an overall commander. For example, Datis and Artaphernes in 490 appear to have been equal, and Isocrates (4.
140) mentions Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazus, but does not specify
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an overall commander though admittedly his authority is poor in this instance. But at the Granicus in 334 the
Persians had no commander-in-chief ( Arrian, An. 1. 12. 8). Memnon was appointed so later ( ibid. 1. 20. 3 ; 2. 1.
1). Fear of revolts must have been the main reason for avoiding single commands and only when the military
necessities demanded it, i.e. after the dual or multiple commands had failed, would a single or overall command
be risked. Thus after Tithraustes, Pharnabazus, and Abrocomas had failed in Egypt we find Pharnabazus
seemingly in single command (15. 29. 3; 41. 1-2), and Datames was made the chief commander in turn following
Pharnabazus' lack of success (but see 29. 3n.). Memnon too was appointed commander-in-chief in the west at a
time of crisis.
Thus one could plausibly maintain that on meeting the King Tiribazus had explained the earlier reverses in the
campaign as the result of ineffective leadership due to the dual command. (It would seem that he was just the
man to speak his mind, cf. Plut. Artox. 24. 2.) Convinced, Artaxerxes sent him down with 2,000 talents and the
supreme command. The evidence of the coins is not against this. Those bearing Tiribazus' name (perhaps all of
them) may have been minted after Tiribazus' return.
To argue entirely from D's terminology is dangerous for it is certainly defective. If Tiribazus was in overall
command from the beginning why is he only referred to as + at 2. 2? And is this
not contradicted by 3. 2, 6 where Glos is termed a nauarch? A way out is to assume that Orontes and Tiribazus
were originally appointed joint and equal +. As Tiribazus already had a fleet in the Aegean his command
was specified as naval, while Orontes' command obviously had to be of the land forces; he was in his inland
province of Armenia or at the court at the time of his appointment. (The circumstances were similar perhaps to
those of Autophradates appointed and Hecatomnus appointed in 391/o: FGH 115 (Theop.)
F103. 4.) In fact, both of them recruited naval as well as land forces (see below) and while still in Ionia Tiribazus
had probably appointed Glos nauarch of his fleet. The title stuck and it is in this light that we should see 3. 2, 6
perhaps. After Tiribazus' return as supreme commander, Glos was quite likely appointed to command the entire
naval force and, again, his later title may be reflected in the terms at 3. 2, 6. It is possible that local tradition at
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Cyme knew him as 'Glos, the Persian admiral in the Cypriot War' (18. 1. For Ephorus' local Cymaean sources see p.
106 ). So Ephorus himself may not have been very clear about the exact line of command. Section 14. 35. 3 (under
400/399), where Glos is introduced as the man who + +
2l+serves as additional warning that we must be very careful with the terminology in D. Just how much
responsibility should be laid at Ephorus' door is an issue which cannot be decided. Aeneas Tacticus, writing about the
middle of the 4th century, refers to Glos as 'the King's nauarch' (31-35).
For the MSS variants of Tiribazus' name see Vial, 122; Meloni, 1950: 292 n. 1. For the career of Tiribazus, Schaefer,
RE via. 1. 1430ff.; Meloni, 1950: 292ff. Tiribazus had almost certainly been a subordinate of Orontes in Armenia in
401/0 ( Osborne, 1973: 518f.) and the combination of the two in this instance, whether Tiribazus was in overall
command from the beginning or not, was potentially explosive. Tiribazus' appointment is hardly surprising in view of
his key and successful role in the manuvres and negotiations which imposed the King's Peace on Greece (X. H. 5. 1.
25ff.).
+ 2+: a stock phrase; cf. 11. 40. 4; 12. 20. 1; 12. 42. 8; 12. 43. 3; 15. 7. 1; 15. 35. 2;
15. 36. 6; 15. 71 7; 16. 14. 1; 18. 36. 6. But Tiribazus must have been the man of the moment. For D's language see
pp. 15 ff.
+ 2io+ :why in Ionia? For three possible reasons. First, the fleet used by Sparta and Persia in 388/7
to force Athens to consent to the King's Peace (X. H. 5. 1. 25ff.) probably formed the kernel of the fleet which sailed
against Evagoras. Secondly, Greek mercenaries were by now a regular feature of Persian armies and Ionia was the
most convenient area for their recruitment. The Peace would have facilitated this as did its first renewal in 375 (38. 1).
Thirdly, Cilicia and Phoenicia, which under normal circumstances would have formed the natural centre for the
gathering of a Persian naval force, are said to have been largely in revolt though the extent to which this was so is
impossible to gauge: 2. 4; Isocr. 4. 161; 9. 62. But should Isocrates be exaggerating, the first two reasons are enough
to explain why the expedition set out from Ionia. Similarly in 391/0 Caria and Lydia were assigned the task of crushing
Evagoras ( FGH 115 (Theop.) F103. 4), and in the late 350s Idrieus of Caria was ordered to gather together an army
and
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a navy and invade Cyprus (16. 42. 5ff.). In both instances Cyprus and a part of Phoenicia were in revolt.
All the same, D has certainly misrepresented the situation. The entire Persian army and fleet cannot have
collected at Cyme and Phocaea before setting out, but only the Greek mercenary corps and a substantial part of
the navy. These sailed out under Tiribazus and reached Cilicia where they were met by Orontes with the Persian
army proper and doubtless a Phoenician naval contingent. The size of the Persian fleet was considerable and could
not all come from Ionia (2. 1n.). These latter forces should be seen as the result of the preparations begun in
391/0 (14. 98. 4. Armenia was one of the upper satrapies). The Greek element in the Persian armament is
stressed by Isocr. 4. 135; cf. 124; Polyaen. 7. 20.

Why at Phocaea and Cyme? At first glance one suspects another instance of Ephorus allowing his local patriotism
to pervert historical truth (see pp. 125 f.). Suspicion is heightened by the mention of Phocaea and Cyme at 11. 2.
3 -- Xerxes ordered his fleet to assemble at Phocaea and Cyme prior to the crossing of the Hellespont, and at 13.
100. 4 -- after the battle of Arginusae the coastline of Cyme and Phocaea was filled with corpses and wrecks.
These statements are not corroborated by any other source and modern commentators have tended to disbelieve
them. Unnecessarily though, as Samuel, 1968: 379ff., shows. Cyme and Phocaea were situated on the coast
almost directly west of Sardis, Xerxes' base before he set out for Greece. They were at the head of the large bay
of Smyrna and Clazomenae. The latter was one of the two islands (the other being of course Cyprus) demanded
and obtained by the King in 387/6 (X. H. 5. 1. 31), and the reasons were undoubtedly military, as Ruzicka
stresses (1983: 107f.). There is no difficulty therefore in accepting that both in 480 and in 386/5 the Persian fleet
assembled at Cyme and Phocaea. The question whether Ephesus was in Persian hands at this time ( Beloch, GG
iii. 1. 97 n. 3; cf. Meloni, 1950: 314f.) is irrelevant. Cyme and Phocaea and their immediate neighbourhood were
more than sufficient for the purpose of assembling a fleet. +: here they met up with Orontes and the
other 'half' of the force (see previous n. This point is generally missed by scholars who assume that Orontes and
Tiribazus set out together from Ionia). How long did they stay? If Cilicia was really mostly in
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revolt as Isocrates represents (4.161;9.62) then the Persians' primary task would have been the subjection of as much
of the area as would enable it to be safely used as a base of operations. This task was almost certainly carried out at
this time (cf. Hill, 1940: 137 and n.3), pace Osborne, 1973:527:'the failure to hold a secure base in Cilicia at the
outset led to a crisis over provisions soon after the troops arrived in Cyprus.' The crisis in question had different
causes, see 3. 1n. The Persian presence in Cilicia is illustrated by coins issued at mints at Issus, Mallus, Soli, and
Tarsus, many with Tiribazus' name in Aramaic; see Head, 1911: 722, 724, 728, 730; Hill, 1940: 137 and n. 3;
Osborne, 1973: 527 and n. 65.
. . . : this stage of the war is in total darkness. It is possible that Soli, Amathus, and
Citium were still holding out against Evagoras (2. 4n.; 14. 98. 2=FGH 70 F76. The of the fragment is certainly a
corruption: Hill, 1940:132 n. 2; Reid, 1974: 124ff.) and that the Persians headed for one or all of them. (On Citium see
further 3. 4 and n.) It is reasonable to assume that after the Persians had secured a base on the island, and as
Evagoras avoided a battle, they began to dislodge from his hold city after city with the aim of isolating Salamis. Their
progress was interrupted for a while by Evagoras' tactics (see below). We may compare Demetrius' campaign of 306.
Having sailed from the Aegean he made for Cilicia where he augmented his force, as the Persians had done, with ships
and men before crossing into Cyprus and landing on the coast of the Carpass peninsula: 20. 47. 1f.

2. 3-4. Evagoras' resources

2. 3. '. . . : Acoris of the 29th dynasty was king from c.394/3 till 382/0 (see 2-4n.). His
alliance with Evagoras cannot be closely dated but it probably belongs before 386; cf. FGH 115 (Theop.) F103. 1, 13.
All of these alliances were aimed against Persia: Svt 237. Acoris had also allied himself with Athens (Svt 236) as had
Evagoras (Svt 234); cf. Stylianou, 1988: 469ff.
: D usage, see p. 133.
'E . . . : Hecatomnus of Caria and Autophradates of Lydia had been ordered at the outbreak of the
war to begin hostilities against Evagoras (14. 98. 3; FGH 115 (Theop.) F 103. 4)
-159F103. 4). Little if anything had been achieved, probably because Hecatomnus was already in secret league with
Evagoras. The reason why Hecatomnus should want Evagoras to succeed is not hard to find. He was himself a native
dynast, but ruling only because the King suffered him to do so. Ideally he would want to be free. The more thorns in
the side of Persia, therefore, the better. For Hecatomnus see Judeich, 1892: 233ff.; Bckisch, 1969: 133ff., but
especially Hornblower, 1982 a. Also now Ruzicka, 1992: 15ff. : from our other
sources we may mention the cities of Cilicia (Isocr. 4. 161; 9. 62) and perhaps Pisidia (FGH 115 (Theop.) F103. 13).
Isocr. 4. 161f. is at pains to demonstrate that the Mediterranean provinces of Persia were festering with revolt. But if
there was any specific information in Ephorus D's generalization has rendered it irrecoverable.
2. 4. : cf. Isocr. 9. 62. Some Cypriot cities may still have been holding out; see Stylianou, 1989b:
471ff.
T: Isocr. 9. 62; Stylianou, 1989b: 473.
: two inscriptions of Acoris, Evagoras' ally, have been found at Sidon and Ace: Stern, 1982: 254, 255
fig. 380, 278 n. 20.
+. . . : the trireme figures are uncorroborated, but they are quite credible; see p. 131. Isocr. 4. 141 is
doubtless an exaggeration and in any case Evagoras had by then been defeated and was under siege. We do not know
whether the troops which had gone out with Chabrias (X. H. 5. 5. 1. 10; cf. Demosth. 20. 76) were withdrawn at the
conclusion of the King's Peace. There are hints that Athenian officers serving in Cyprus may have strongly disapproved
of their city's acceptance of the King's Peace and consequent abandonment of Evagoras: Lysias19. 7; Harpocr. s.v.
X; Meyer, GdA v. 265; Beloch, GG iii. 1. 141; Hill, 1940: 134f. and 135 n. I; Stylianou, 1988: 463 ff.

 + 'A 3: the MSS read + which is clearly unacceptable and hence corrupt. '+ is
Rhodoman's emendation (accepted by both Vogel and Vial). Sievers emended B from FGH 115 (Theop.) F103.
1 (cf. 18. 20. 3). But Barca or Barce in Cyrene appears to have been a republic at this time (cf. Sethe, RE iii. I. 20;
Hill, 1940: 136 n. 3). Two points are clear: Evagoras' ally was a king, and he sent troops. At 13. 46. 6 (under 410/9) D
refers to a king, + '+ who along with a king of Egypt was said to .
Sections 13. 46. 6
-160and 15. 2. 4 probably refer to the same person: Stylianou, 1989b: 462 n. 401, 473.
: see 2. 3nn.
3. 1. + : cf. 3. 43. 5; 15. 95. 14; 16. 5. 3; 82. 3. What type of warship was meant we cannot
say. Burn, CHI369, conjectures that the piratical raids may have been carried out by Pisidians. Whatever the truth,
Evagoras succeeded in severing the Persian supply lines. The ensuing famine caused a mutiny at the enemy camp
which was only suppressed with difficulty. The entire Persian fleet now sailed back to Cilicia and brought over enough
foodstuff to last them for a considerable while; cf. Hill, 1940: 137. The reference to the supplying of the Persian army
is of some interest, but this use of the word is fairly common in D and in contexts from different sources; see
McDougall s.v.
3. 2. ++. . . +: The MSS read + and + here and at 3. 6, but + and + at 9. 3. The emendation
Glo/Glos is Wesselings' (cf. Vial's n. on p. 122 ). Glos was a son of Tamos, an officer of Cyrus, and had himself served
Cyrus (14. 19. 5f.; 14. 35. 3ff.; X. An. 1. 4. 2; 1. 4. 16; 2. 1. 3). Glos' own name appears to be Carian (cf. Beloch, GG
iii. I. 99 n. I) and was himself perhaps regarded as a Carian (Athen. 6. 256c -- if this is the same person), though his
father, according to X. An. 1. 4. 2, was an Egyptian from Ephesus (cf. HCT v. 74). Polyaen. 7. 20 may refer to the
present mutiny. Athen. 6. 256c is quoting Clearchus of Soli, a Cypriot: + + +
. It would appear that Glos made quite an impression locally to be remembered two generations later, but
the statement is entirely mysterious. See 2. 2 n.
3. 4. . . . : see 2. 4 and n.
: '(as the royal fleet) was sailing past (or along) on its way to Citium.' It seems that we should envisage
the Persian fleet as sailing by Salamis in the direction of Citium when suddenly Evagoras sailed out and attacked.
Where had the Persians been? Somewhere on the north coast of the island, we may guess, or the Carpass peninsula,
or the neighbourhood of Salamis itself, for had they been at, say, Soli or Amathus, they would have reached Citium
from the west.
What was the status of Citium at this juncture? Were the Persians sailing to a friendly city or to a hostile one to capture
it?
-161-

If the latter were the case then Evagoras' naval attack was perhaps in defence of the city. But this is not a
necessary conclusion. The theory of Babelon, 1893: pp. cxxxif., that Demonicus, son of Hipponicus, to whom
Isocrates' first essay is addressed, ruled Citium at this time is now known to be false; the coins on which it was
based belong to Lapethos (cf. Jenkins, 1972: 135). Nor can our passage by itself prove that Citium was on the
Persian side at this time (as Beloch, GG iii. 2. 228), though this is the more likely assumption. After all, we do
know that Evagoras did not quite succeed in conquering the whole of Cyprus (2. 4), and Citium was the strongest
non-Greek city on the island. At 4. 1 it is said that ++
. is the reading of MSS P and X. M and F, on the other hand, read (Vial, app. crit.
She prints like Vogel). If we could be sure that this was the correct reading we might venture the following
reconstruction of the Persian moves. Both their army and fleet were stationed at Citium some time prior to the
battle. The fleet then sailed out on some operation or other. On its return, as it sailed past Salamis, it was
attacked by Evagoras. After the battle both Persian fleet and army were again together at Citium.

3. 5-6. The sea battle

For the date see the discussion above. Isocr. 4. 141 and FGH 115 (Theop.) F103. 6 refer to the battle without
adding any detail, and the detail which Ephorus undoubtedly gave has been omitted by D (see p. 125 ). All the
same, brief though D is, his account is sensible enough. Evagoras gained an initial advantage because his own
triremes were in line of battle whereas the enemy's were not, and also because while his own men were
psychologically prepared for the fight, his opponents had been taken by surprise. Once, however, Evagoras'
impetus had been spent, Glos counterattacked and carried the day.
3. 5. . . . + : 'with the triremes in close order.' Cf. 13. 9. 6; 13. 40. 1; 13. 71. 4; 14. 83. 6.
3. 6. : certainly a D expression, see p. 15. : D frequently uses in the
descriptions of land battles; cf. 15. 55. 4; 15. 86. 5; 17. 11. 4; and McDougall s.v. He seems to mean chiefly the
weight of a formation, be it infantry,
-162-

cavalry, or elephants, in particular the pressure exerted by a dense array of men or horses. At Leuctra, for example,
the sheer mass of the Theban phalanx pushed the thinner Spartan line right off the field and caused it to disintegrate
(15. 55. 4 and Appendix). cannot obviously mean the same in a naval engagement, for a ship could not add its
weight to that of the friendly ship fighting before it. It must rather refer to the order and cohesion of a powerful battle
formation which made its onslaught invincible. Evagoras' fleet must have become disorganized eventually and Glos,
attacking in close order, gained a victory; cf. 20. 52. 3 (the sea battle off Salamis in 306), .
We should also see the word as conveying the notion of a steadfast and purposeful attacking movement, whether in
the context of a land or a naval engagement.
4. 1. []: see 3. 4n.
: 'they were besieging' or 'they were endeavouring to destroy' the city. Either is a possible (though not the
usual) meaning of the word.
4. 2. : cf. Isocr. 9. 60:
(). He means the total expenses in the war. If the figure is exaggerated it cannot be so by much
considering the length of the war as a whole and of the siege in particular. The 2,000 talents brought down by
Tiribazus were probably spent very quickly in back pay and in the unsuccessful operations against the city in 383.
+ . . . : the action, a minor one involving only a part of the Persian force, was perhaps
fought on the coast somewhere between Salamis and Citium where the Persian army was possibly stationed already.
See 3. 4n.; cf. Stylianou, 1989b: 477 n. 450.
4. 3. : omnes codices. The emendation is Wesseling's, confirmed by Isocr. 9. 62 and FGH 115
(Theop.) F103. 12. Cf. Tod 194: , the later king of the same dynasty.
: on returning Evagoras found the siege energetically pursued (8. 1). But at this moment it seems, and
with Tiribazus away (4. 2), the siege was not a close one.
-163-

5. The Spartan attack on Mantinea

5. 1. : the synchronism is correct. Sparta moved against Mantinea in the summer of 385
under Mystichides (386/5); see p. 137 and D's statement at 5. 3 that the Spartans
, which likewise argues for 385. The King's Peace was concluded between late 387 and early 386; cf.
Beloch, GG iii. 2. 225f.
+. . . +: the Spartans and their supporters of course saw things very differently; see
below ad 5. 2-3. : for this link-phrase see pp. 44 f. The chronographic entry on Mantinea would thus
have come under Mystichides.
: the King's Peace of the previous year, 387/6 (14. 110. 2-4). On the term itself, which D doubtless
derived from Ephorus, see Martin, 1944: 13ff.; Ryder, 1965: pp. xiff. Though sometimes so stated, Ephorus' use of the
term in connection with the Peace of 387/6 was neither anachronistic (see Andoc. 3. 17) nor necessarily inappropriate.
But this depends on the meaning attached to the word koine in the context of the Peace, a matter still occasioning
debate. On the one hand the evidence clearly points to the universality of the agreement. Its failed precursor of 392 is
described by Andocides (the conference at Sparta) as koine eirene and eleutheria for all the Greeks, in which they
would all be able to share fully (3. 17); while the proposals earlier put to Tiribazus, the King's general at Sardis, by
Antalcidas again encompassed the total of Greece and the Aegean (X. H. 4. 8. 14). There is no reason for supposing
that the scope of the settlement was narrowed by 387. On the contrary, the unbiased reader of the King's edict in
Xenophon (H. 5. 1.31) would assume nothing less than that the law the King was laying down concerned all states, be
they islands or cities on the Asian and European mainlands; see H. 5. 4. 1; 6. 3. 9; 6. 3. 12. Cf. the freer rendering in
D of the same edict which adds to (14. 110. 3) and Svt 248 lines 6ff.; 257 lines 9ff. Also Isocr. 4.
176; 14. 5, 10, 12 (there was no difference in this respect between the Peace of 387/6 and its renewal in 375).
It is perfectly true of course that in the edict (H. 5. 1. 31) refers to the two sides in the war (as Lewis
stresses: 1977: 147). To conclude from this, however, that the Peace was imposed only on the combatants in the war
( Badian, Georgica, 39, 43f.) is not
-164-

quite consistent with the evidence, including that of the edict itself. (Cf. Sealey, 1993: 13.) The reason surely why
, the two sides in the conflict, was chosen for inclusion in the edict, is because clearly the Peace could
only be seriously threatened by one or the other of the two great alliance systems at war at the moment
( ). On the other hand it is indubitably the case that many states did not
participate in the Peace. The answer would seem to be that whereas the Peace was indeed koine in theory, open
to all Greeks, in practice participation depended (a) on whether a state was willing to abide by the terms of the
Peace and to take the oaths, and (b) on whether the King and the leading states participating (Sparta really in
387/6) did not object to that state's inclusion. (Cf. Clark, 1990: 61ff., 67.) We have examples of both categories.
In fact, the contention that the King's Peace was confined to those actively involved in the Corinthian War (e.g.
Badian, Georgica, 39, 43f.) seems to rest on the text of Xenophon alone. Badian is impressed by H. 5. 1. 35, the

statement that the peace the King sent down marked the first peace between the Spartans and the Athenians and
their allies after the war which followed the demolition of the walls of Athens. And so it did; the Corinthian War
was ended by the King's Peace. But is this any reason for curtailing the scope of the Peace? After all, Xenophon
('our best source' for the Peace in Badian's view) also chooses to represent the renewal of the Peace in 375 as a
bilateral affair between Athens and Sparta and does not even bother to mention the involvement of the King (H.
6. 2. 1). Nor does the fact that Xenophon, a master at putting the emphasis where it suited him, never breathes a
word about the Peace and the autonomy clause in connection with Spartan attacks on other states between the
conclusion of the Peace and the capture of the Cadmea, prove that other 4th-century sources which do are wrong
(see 5. 2-3 n.). For a correct view cf. Cartledge, 1987: e.g. at 242f., 259.
. . .: turning now to the contents of the Peace, there was clearly more to it than the
royal edict quoted by Xenophon. The question is how much more? The subject has been extensively debated, the
evidence being so equivocal as to allow a minimalist view as well as one which sees the treaty as a more
comprehensive document comprising a number of specific clauses. See e.g. the discussions by Momigliano,
1934b: 482ff.;
-165Hampl, 1938: esp. 8ff.; Wilcken, 1941: 12ff.; Accame, 1941: 1ff.; Martin, 1944: 20ff.; id., 1949: 127ff.; Ryder,
1965: 34ff., 122f.; Cawkwell, 1973b: 52ff.; id., 1981 a: 69ff.; Sinclair, 1978: 29ff.; Cartledge, 1987: 196ff.;
Clark, 1990: 47ff., esp. 56ff.; Badian, Georgica, esp. 35ff. Most of the relevant texts are conveniently assembled
in Svt 242. Here I am concerned only with those aspects of the Peace which bear directly on D both here and at
15. 29-7.
The affirmation of the autonomy of all Greek states, with the exception of those claimed by Persia, was at the
very heart of the Peace. It was what the King had commanded and the question to settle is whether the autonomy
clause was defined in any way. Was, for example, the withdrawal of the garrisons mentioned here by D stipulated
in the Peace, or was it merely the natural result of the implementation of an unadorned autonomy clause (as
Ryder, 1965: 123; Sinclair, 1978: 31)? D's language seems to point to the first, but there is better evidence.
Writing in 355 Isocrates proposed that Athens should return to the treaty made with the King and the Spartans
which ordered ' + + +
(8. 16). It is illogical to see this as a reference to the Peace of 375 alone ( Ryder, 1965: 122). Isocrates
must surely mean all three Peaces, the original King's Peace of 387/6 as well as its two renewals in 375 and
372/1. Though the renewals differed from the original Peace in some important respects, they cannot have
differed in this respect and that is why Isocrates is not specific ( Cawkwell, 1973b: 52 n. 3; id., 1981a: 73). That
the third clause, + , was part of the first Peace is shown by Isocr. 4. 177f. (rightly
interpreted by Cawkwell, 1981a: 72) and by other evidence (Justin 6. 6. 1; Svt 257=Tod 123 lines 11f.; Martin
1944: 26; Ryder, 1965: 122; cf. Sinclair, 1978: 29f.). It might further be noted that in the opinion of Philochorus
the Peace of 375 resembled () that of 387/6 (FGH 328 F151). It would not be unreasonable
therefore to assume that the provision for the removal of garrisons from the cities, which undoubtedly
accompanied the Peaces of 375 and 372/1 (15. 38. 1f.; X. H. 6. 3. 18), was first made in 387/6.
There was, we know, a demobilization clause in 372/1 (X. H. 6. 3. 18) and the similar language Xenophon
employs at H. 5. 1. 35 could be interpreted as a reference to such a clause in 387/6 (as
-166Cawkwell argues. Contra Sinclair, 1978: 31ff.). Cawkwell's further proposals, however, that the Peace also
prohibited the later redeployment of forces, naval forces especially, and that Athens in particular could not launch
or augment her navy, seem most unlikely: Clark, 1990. Cf. Plato, Menex. 245e: ++ (i.e.
404) .
Perhaps the most intractable aspects of the King's Peace concern a possible sanctions clause and Sparta's role in
first enforcing the Peace and in upholding it subsequently. The following four inferences seem to me to conform
well not only with the information of D, but also with the rest of the evidence: (a) in 387/6 the King was the
guarantor of the Peace while Sparta saw to its implementation. (b) The King's role went further than the initial
acceptance of the terms (otherwise why should Athens be at pains to make it very clear that, for example, her
alliance with Chios (Svt 248=Tod 118) did not contravene the Peace?) as did that of Sparta. (c) Sparta certainly
acted as the prostates of the King's Peace and its autonomy clause, as Xenophon makes perfectly plain (H. 5. 1.
32, 36). Whether she was so formally or merely appointed herself to that position (with the tacit approval of
Persia) might be thought to make little practical difference. In fact, there is no reason why Sparta's prostasia,
however expressed ( Cawkwell, 1981a: 77 n. 31, might not have been made explicit in the treaty document. (d)
The Greek states in general were not obliged to aid the victims of aggression unless they wished to do so (
+ + : X. H. 5. 1. 31; cf. D 14. 110. 3 and see Cawkwell, 1981a: 76ff.). There was no
symmachia in other words. The members of the Peloponnesian League of course were obliged to follow Sparta
wherever she led them (cf. de Ste Croix, 1972: 108ff.), a position in glaring contradiction to the autonomy clause
as contemporaries saw (X. H. 6. 3. 7f.). There is support for the above view in the case of Mantinea in 385. It
would appear that as the prostates of the Peace Sparta invoked the Peace and its autonomy clause against
Mantinea. At any rate, Athens' response to an appeal for help from Mantinea, that she did not wish to
, cannot be interpreted in any other way (15. 5. 5 and n.). The action Sparta took against
Thebes in 382 is equally consistent with such an interpretation (5. 2-3 n.). For the use Sparta made of the
autonomy clause in the years 386-379 see 5. 2-3 n.
-167-

The position was similar in 375 and 372/1. Action against violators of the Peace was voluntary, not obligatory. The
explicitness at X. H. 6. 3. 18 (372/1), . . . ++ , was directed against the
Spartan habit of forcing unwilling allies to campaign against states accused of alleged breaches of the Peace (X. H. 6.
3. 7f.). But in spite of the clause the Spartans persisted in their habit as the rejection of Prothous' proposal shows (X.

H. 6. 4. 2f.). In 375 Athens joined Sparta as a co-prostates of the Peace with the sea as her special concern (38. 4n.).
Along with Sparta she could now call for action against states contravening the Peace. That such action was voluntary
is indicated by Isocrates' Plataicus. Unlike Cleiteles in 370/69 (X. H. 6. 5. 37) the Plataeans did not claim that Athens
was under any obligation to help them. Plataicus 42ff. especially shows that it was up to the individual state whether it
moved against an aggressor or not. The Peace of 371/0 at Athens was different. The participants swore to aid, as a
matter of course, any wronged city which was party to the Peace. The Second Athenian Confederacy was now the
pattern; see 57. 1n.
It is not very likely that there was an exiles clause in the Peace though the possibility cannot be totally excluded (
Cawkwell, 1973b: 59 n. 1; id., 1981a: 80ff.). On the Peace see also 19. 1n. : for the concept of autonomy
see Bickerman, 1958: 313ff.; Ostwald, 1982; Cartledge, 1987: 249f.; Sealey, 1993: 241ff.
+ : for Ephorus' censure of Sparta see pp. 113, 117 f.
: though is used here to describe the Spartan supremacy (as something which the Spartans
had had before the King's Peace and the loss of which they regretted) and (probably) at 19. 4, is the more
frequent term occurring; cf. 14. 10. 1; 15. 1. 2, 3, 5; 15. 19. 1; 15. 23. 3ff.; 15. 40. 1. is used here as
appropriate to the censure of Sparta. Ephorus probably did not consider hegemony as wrong in itself, but only its
improper use; see pp. 112 ff.
5. 2-3. + : it is argued in the Introduction (pp. 102 f.) that what we have
here is a description, and condemnation, of Spartan policy in the period 386-379. In lifting it out of Ephorus D seems
to have garbled it somewhat. We are told that the way the Spartans went about regaining their former dominance was
by inciting civil strife within the cities with
-168-

the help of their supporters. A smaller group of cities is then distinguished which actually provided Sparta with
plausible grounds for intervention. The cities, having recovered their autonomy, came under the control of
'democratic' regimes ( : see 40. 4n.) which proceeded to exact revenge from those who had been in
charge at the time of the Spartan hegemony, banishing many of them. Their case was taken up by Sparta and in
restoring them by force she enslaved again the cities concerned, first the weaker ones, but afterwards also the
stronger, having kept the common peace for less than two years. And D proceeds to narrate the attack on
Mantinea. But the last statement about the enslavement of the cities ought surely to apply to all the cities and not
merely to those of the smaller group which provided Sparta with grounds for interference. What is more, it is
likely that Ephorus illustrated his rhetoric with examples which D omitted. It is not easy, therefore, to find
instances to fit this generalized castigation. It cannot apply to Olynthus, as far as we can see, while Thebes and
Mantinea could only be said to fit the wider group of cities (though see below); and Phlius is difficult because the
friends of Sparta there were exiled long before the Peace (X. H. 4. 4. 15). But there is more to the passage.
An important element is the reference to the autonomy clause which, as D says, was used in some cities against
the pro-Spartan factions. It is not impossible that, faced with the Spartan demands (X. H. 5. 2. 9. Later an
ultimatum: H. 5. 3. 15) to receive back their exiles, the Phliasians appealed to the autonomy clause. Certainly the
Spartan actions against Phlius and the other cities were seen as contraventions of the Peace by contemporaries
(cf. Isocr. 4. 126, 176; 8. 100; Svt 257 lines 9 ff.), including Xenophon himself ( Tuplin, 1993: 87 ff. But
Xenophon's view of Spartan policy was ambivalent: see p. 114 n. 306). Pace Badian, Georgica, 44 and n. 39, H.
5. 4. 1 is no evidence that Xenophon did not, in his heart at least, recognize any breaches of the Peace earlier
than the capture of the Cadmea. But Cadmea was such a blatant instance that even he could not refrain from
openly condemning it; and of course it was the Thebans, virtually single-handed, who 'punished' the Spartans for
their misdeeds. D's brief mention of the subjection of Phlius (19. 3) comes immediately before his statement that
Agesipolis, in direct opposition to Agesilaus, objected to current Spartan policies which went contrary to the
-169-

Peace terms. Sparta, Agesipolis is said to have stressed, was engaged in enslaving the Greek cities in spite of the fact
that in the general settlement she had taken an oath to preserve their autonomy (19. 4). Yet D speaks of a number of
cities where the pattern he outlines was repeated. Can any examples be found?
The substance of the present passage is repeated at 9. 5 and 19. 1, and almost identical opinions are expressed at 40.
1 f. (under 375/4; cf. n. ad loc.) and 45. 2 (under 374/3). Thus according to D (Ephorus) both the Peace of 387/6 and
its renewal in 375 were followed by staseis in many cities which gave Sparta the chance to intervene, the difference
being that on the second occasion Athens was no longer a mere observer, but actively opposed Sparta (45 ff.).

and + (but see n. there), for when Timotheus sailed into the Ionian sea in 375 Zacynthus was in the hands of the
pro-Spartan party and the exiles who flocked to him were democrats. One is therefore drawn to conclude that the
sentence before the lacuna should be linked with 5. 2 (and 19. 1). It is precisely the same process which is recounted
and in very much the same language. Under the aegis of the autonomy clause the pro-Athenian Zacynthian demos it
seems expelled the pro-Spartan oligarchs who nevertheless returned, perhaps with Spartan help and under the same
pretext of autonomy, and in their turn expelled the democrats. These events may therefore be placed in the period
386-379. Can any other candidates be found?
Speaking of the months after Agesilaus' first invasion of Boeotia in 378 Xenophon made the comment that, just as at
Thebes, proSpartan regimes had been installed (by Sparta) in all the cities of Boeotia so that in these cities too the

friends of Sparta needed help (H. 5. 4. 46). It would be unreasonable to suppose that Xenophon is referring only to the
time following the liberation of Thebes. Oligarchies could not possibly have been set up in all the cities of Boeotia in a
matter of months. A longer period should be envisaged. Now, the Boeotian cities had been detached from Thebes in
387/6 as a result of the Peace, and it would appear that Sparta exploited the internal conflicts which ensued, helping
her own supporters, expelling the democrats, and even installing
-170-

garrisons in a number of places. Plataea was restored and garrisoned at this time too (X. H. 5. 4. 10; Plut. Pel.
25. 8; Paus. 9. 1. 4; Glotz and Cohen, iii. 105; Sinclair, 1978: 38 f. and n. 36).
We do not hear of actual conflict at Thebes, but there must have been latent strife at the very least, considering
the intense enmity which existed between Ismenias and Leontiades and their respective parties (Plut. Pel.5; cf.
Hack, 1978: 210 ff.). If the report that the capture of the Cadmea in 382 was the result of a plot on the part of
Sparta is credited, then we must surmise that Leontiades and his associates had visited that city some time
before the event, made their request (the idea had probably originated with them), and worked out the details of
the undertaking. Xenophon (H. 5. 2. 25 ff.) represents the outrage as having occurred on the spur of the
moment, but his own narrative hints to the contrary (20. 2n.). This is not to suggest that the matter was openly
debated in the assembly and a vote taken to that effect (Xenophon denies thisH. 5. 2. 32 -- and he must be
right). The plot would have been laid with the dominant faction at Sparta ( Agesilaus' surely). Did they have any
legitimate grounds for acting thus against Thebes? It is possible that they had two such grounds. First, Thebes
may have been accused of contravening the Peace. Sparta had declared war on the Chalcidian Confederacy, quite
likely on the basis of the autonomy clause (19. 3 n.; Cawkwell, 1973b: 53; Sinclair, 1978: 37; Cartledge, 1987:
270. Contra Badian, Georgica, 430. Yet the faction of Ismenias at Thebes, which held the upper hand at the
moment, was contemplating an alliance with Olynthus and had had it proclaimed that no Theban should join the
Spartan expedition against Olynthus (X. H. 5. 2. 27, 34ss). As the prostates of the Peace (whether formally so or
not: 5. 1 n.), therefore, Sparta may have had valid grounds for taking action though not for continuing to occupy
the Cadmea ( Cawkwell, 1973b: 53 n. 3; id., 1981a: 78 f.). Second, the intervention may have been justified by
reference to the duties of a member of the Peloponnesian League. The return of Thebes to the Spartan alliance
after the King's Peace has been questioned (e.g. by Buckler, 1980b: 179 ff. and Cawkwell, 1981a: 78 ff. The case
for Boeotian membership before 395 is less in dispute; cf. de Ste Croix, 1972: 335 ff.). Isocrates nevertheless is
explicit that at the conclusion of the Corinthian War the Thebans + + +
++ (14. 27). And in the next section he says that the Thebans actually swore to
-171follow Sparta against Athens ( + + ' + + + ). One is tempted
to see in this the oath members of the Spartan alliance took to follow the Spartans wherever they led them (cf. de
Ste Croix, 1972: 108). The return of the proSpartan oligarchic exiles in 386 which had been demanded by
Agesilaus (X. Ag. 2. 21) may have counterbalanced and even checked the anti-Spartan democratic faction of
Ismenias and Androcleidas for a while; Thebes joined Sparta again. This perfectly explains the presence of Theban
troops before Mantinea in 385 (Plut. Pel. 4. 5-8; Paus. 9. 13. 1). Plutarch in fact says that the Thebans and
Spartans were still at this time 'friends and allies'. Cawkwell, 1981a: 78 f., prefers to see the Theban presence at
Mantinea as the result of a 'volunteers' sanctions clause in the Peace. 'Perhaps these [Thebans] who were sent
were "volunteers", including Epaminondas and Pelopidas eager for experience in war' (1981a: 79 n. 33). He may
well have a point about the clause (5. 1 n.), but the rest of the suggestion is difficult to credit. It is easier to
believe that the two men (and Pelopidas was already in all likelihood a prominent member of the anti-Spartan
party of Ismenias and Androcleidas: Plut. Pel. 5. 1) were called up to serve in a contingent officially sent to the
Peloponnese in fulfilment of Theban symmachic obligations.
An indication of the change of policy at Thebes after the Peace is to be seen perhaps in the destruction of the
stele bearing the treaty of alliance between Athens and Boeotia which was concluded in 395 ( Svt 223 =Tod 101).
The accuser of Evander in summer 382 charges Thrasybulus of Collytus with having caused a revolution in Boeotia
which cost Athens the Boeotian alliance (Lys. 26. 23). Schweigert, 1939: 1 ff., dates the abrogation of the alliance
between 386 and winter 383. One might further note that Isocrates remains consistent. Even after the liberation
of Thebes, he says, the Thebans were ready to be Sparta's slaves and an embassy of theirs to Sparta promised
+ + + (14. 29). I take this to mean that they were willing to
remain within the Spartan alliance (but see 28. 1 n.). Lastly, there is Buckler's assertion that there is not even a
faint whisper in the philolacon Xenophon that the Thebans were breaking their oath to Sparta by opposing her war
efforts against Olynthus and that Thebes consequently cannot have been the ally of Sparta at this time (1980b:
179 ff.). This is a fair point at first glance until one
-172-

notices that in his speech to the Spartan assembly Leontiades does not distinguish between Theban behaviour before
and after the Peace (X. H. 5. 2. 33 ff.). Thebes, he says, has been consistently hostile to Sparta since the end of the
Peloponnesian War. Yet nobody would deny that Thebes was Sparta's ally then. In the eyes of Sparta, therefore, the
Thebans may have been doubly guilty. They opposed Spartan efforts against Olynthus and they were thus accountable
under the King's Peace; and their behaviour was not that of loyal members of the Peloponnesian League. The charge of
warmongering levelled against Ismenias by Leontiades points to the King's Peace ( + : X. H. 5. 2.
30); but the trial of Ismenias before judges from Sparta and the allies, and the charge of Medism and treason, seem to
point to the Peloponnesian League (X. H. 5. 2. 35f.).
A better case can be made for the use of the autonomy clause against Mantinea. There is no evidence for actual stasis
at Mantinea before the Spartan attack. Xenophon tells us that the could not refrain from attacking their
democratic enemies at the city's surrender (H. 5. 2. 6) and so it is possible that these people had appealed to Sparta.
Indeed it is even possible that some of them had been in exile and only returned when the city capitulated. More
significantly, D says that Athens turned down the Mantinean appeal for help not wishing to
(5. 5). And Polybius adds that the Spartans claimed to have done no wrong in breaking up Mantinea (4. 27.

6). It would appear, therefore, that Sparta justified her action by reference to the autonomy clause. To Spartan minds
(and Xenophon's too, though cf. Tuplin, 1993: 90 and also p. 114 n. 306) real autonomy was not achieved at Mantinea
until after the + and other democratic 'riff-raff had been expelled, the connection with Argos thus
severed, and the city undergone dioikismos (X. H. 5. 2. 6f.). This is consistent with, and sheds some light on, D's
otherwise mysterious statement that the Spartans attacked Mantinea because they + +
+ U0311 + + (5. 3). It is likely that Mantinea had taken the autonomy clause to
mean that she could move even further away from Sparta (for her hostile attitude during the Corinthian War see X. H.
4. 5. 18; 5. 2. 2) and closer to Argos if she so chose. This is precisely what she did after Leuctra (cf. X. H. 6. 5. 3). The
might also refer to territorial expansion. As in the 5th century Mantinea may have
-173been subjecting the neighbouring towns. All the more justification therefore for Spartan action on the basis of the
autonomy clause. (For Mantinean empire-building in the 5th century see Andrewes, HCT iv. 31 f. and for Sparta and
Mantinea in general, Cartledge, 1987: 257 ff.)
Nor is this all. An Attic decree ( IG ii2 33) names Ecphantus and other Thasian exiles as honoured with ateleia: +
+ + ' 'A + + M + . The mention of
the Mantineans dates the decree in or after 385/4. ( Pouilloux, 1954: 199 ff., is in a minority in arguing for a much
earlier date.) In 390 Ecphantus and his pro-Athenian party had expelled a Spartan garrison and Thasos had joined
Athens ( Dem. 20. 59). Cf. Osborne, 1981-3: ii. 49f., 52. It would not be surprising if Sparta had had a hand in the
exile of these men. There is in any case other evidence for Spartan interference in the Aegean. Sometime between
summer 382 and winter 379 the Spartan officer Herippidas ejected Jason's man Neogenes from Hestiaea in north
Euboea and restored to the people their freedom, ( + ? 30. 3 nn.). At the same time or
a little later the neighbouring islands, including Sciathus and Peparethus, were won over for they are said to have been
under Sparta in 378 (30. 5 and n.). A little earlier Athens, it appears, withdrew from Delos, perhaps after having been
threatened by Sparta with the autonomy clause ( Sinclair, 1978: 43 f.
D's broad condemnation, therefore, seems justified (cf. Rice, 1974: 165 f.). Most of the detail is lost to us of course,
but there is enough to show that Sparta took full advantage of the provisions of the King's Peace to arrange Greece in
her interest. The interventions in both Epirus and Macedon in 385/4 are a good indication of how far the arm of Sparta
reached in these years (15. 13. 2f.; 19. 2n.).
5. 3. + . . . + : compared with Thebes and Olynthus
Mantinea could be described as + , but D is writing loosely and the statement should not be pressed (see
previous n.). There can be little doubt, however, that we are meant to associate the attack on Mantinea with the
beginning of Sparta's misuse of the Peace less than two years after its conclusion. Hence the attack took place in the
second year after the conclusion of the Peace. See 5. 1n. + + + : there are textual
problems here,
-174-

but the meaning is not in doubt. Mantinea is thus joined with Thebes as an object for Spartan jealousy and
suspicion because of her populousness and bravery (Cf. 20. 1). Xenophon explains that Sparta was anxious to
deal with those of her allies whose loyalty during the war had not been wholehearted (H. 5. 2. 1). This is correct,
as is Ephorus' explanation that Sparta was not prepared to allow democratic Mantinea to grow too strong and
independent at her own doorstep. For a discussion of the population of Mantinea see S. and H. Hodkinson, 198 1:
27 1 ff.
5. 4. + . . . : according to Xenophon the Mantineans were only asked to demolish their walls
as proof of their loyalty. Upon their refusal to comply, the Spartans moved against them (H. 5. 2. 1 ff.)
. . . : this is Ephorus' number ( FGH 7o F79) and Strabo 8 C 337 (almost
certainly deriving from Ephorus) comments M + ' 'A . Xenophon
on the other hand says that Mantinea was broken up into four separate villages, + (H.5. 2. 7). According
to Pausanias (8. 8. 9) some of the Mantineans were allowed to remain on the site of the city while the rest were
dispatched to their former villages. It is possible, therefore, that the site of the city was one of the old + .
Xenophon's + might thus be reconciled with the rest of our authorities on the assumption that he was
confused by the fact that four groups of Mantineans were expelled to the countryside, overlooking a fifth group
which remained behind. But see the discussion of S. and H. Hodkinson , 1981: 261 ff. ; cf. Tuplin, 1993: 90 n. 10.
: under the command of Agesipolis; X. H. 5. 2. 3; Plut. Pel. 4. 8; cf. Cartledge, 1987: 260. D
does not mention this, the result perhaps of too severe an abridgement of his source. It is not inconceivable
nevertheless that Ephorus, having portrayed Agesipolis as a champion of Greek autonomy against Agesilaus (19.
4), thought it better to omit the fact that the young king had commanded vigorously against Mantinea (cf. 12. 1
and 19. 4 nn.).
5. 5. M + . . . : Mantinea may well have based her appeal on the autonomy clause
(5. 2-3 n.). I agree with Seager, 1974: 40, and Sinclair, 1978: 38, that whatever the legal points involved, the
Athenian decision not to help was based on the sober calculation that nothing could be done.
-175 . . . : neither D nor Xenophon mentions what Plutarch and Pausanias do. Paus. 8. 8. 7 says
that Agesipolis defeated the Mantineans in battle before laying siege to their city; and Plut. Pel. 4. 5-8 and Paus.
9. 13. 1 relate that during the battle Pelopidas was severely wounded and saved by Epaminondas. It emerges

therefore that a Theban contingent accompanied Agesipolis (5. 2-3 n.). The silence of Ephorus (if it is not in fact D
who has skipped over the event) and Xenophon may be explained by different motives. While Xenophon never
went out of his way to mention the two Thebans, Ephorus might have been reluctant to inform his readers that
the later champions of Arcadian and Messenian autonomy had earlier distinguished themselves in the service of
Sparta. According to Polyaen. 2. 25 the Spartan allies sympathized with and helped the Mantineans.
+ + : cf. 77. 1 (after the Peace Of 366/5) and 94. 1 (after the Peace of 362). Writing in
the late 330s and 320S Ephorus could look back over the past two generations as a sequence of peace
settlements which had failed to work (see pp. 110 ff.). The first Common Peace failed because the Spartans
exploited it to serve their own interests. Thus the attack on Mantinea was the first in a series of Spartan outrages
which eventually led to a fresh outbreak of general war in 378.

6-7. Dionysius at home

On the nature of these chapters and on the relative dates of the events related see 7. 2 n.
6. 1. : Snell, TGF i. 240 ff.; Sanders, 1987: 2 and n. 7. In general on matters cultural to do with
Dionysius cf. Loicq-Berger, 1967: 138ff., 226ff. And for the tyrant's interest in music, id., Revue belge de
philologie et d'histoire, 44 ( 1966), 12 ff.
6. 2-5. : of Cythera, a leading composer of dithyrambs: Page, PMG nos. 814-35. He died in 380/79
according to the Marmor Parium. The anecdote of how the poet displeased the tyrant and ended up in the
infamous Quarries of Syracuse is related (with variations) by many writers: Lucian, Adv. Indoct.15; Cicero, Ad.
Att. 4. 6. 2; Athen. 1. 6e; Aelian, VH 12. 44; Plut. Mor. 334c, 471e; Schol. Aristoph. Plutus290; Suida s.v.
. On the tyrant and Philoxenus see Sanders, 1987: 15 ff., who rightly
-176stresses the political, anti-Dionysius character of the anecdote. On the , Drgemller, 1969: 18 and 110.
7. 1. Plato's first (and perhaps only; cf. e.g. Finley, 1979: 91 ff.) visit to Sicily, the historicity of which there is no
reason to doubt, including the sequel, that is, the selling of Plato into slavery, whether at Syracuse (as D here; cf.
Nepos, Dion 2. 2f.) or on Aegina (Plut. Dion4f.; Diog. Laert. 3. 18 ff.). Some scholars doubt what the sources
unanimously affirm, that Dionysius had ordered this: Porter, 1943: 45 ff.; id., Dion, 52 ff.; Stroheker, 1952:
235f.; id., 1958: 104f. Caven, 1990: 168f., even doubts that philosopher and tyrant even met, let alone
quarrelled. For the evidence see Berve, Tyrannis, ii. 653f. For a general discussion cf. LoicqBerger , 1967: 146ff.,
292 ff.; Sordi, 1979: 2013ff. For the impact of Dionysius and Plato on each other cf. Sanders, 1987: esp. 5 ff., 13
ff., 21 ff., who further points to the way their relations were shaped by the politics of the day. Also Lewis, CAH2
vi. 154 f.
As far as the date of the journey is concerned, the Seventh Platonic Epistle tells us that Plato was about 40 years
old at the time ( 324a). The year 388/7 is therefore indicated. In any case, the Corinthian War was still being
fought (Aegina was hostile: Plut. Dion 5. 7). For what it is worth, Olympiodorus, Vita Plat. 5, says that the person
who bought Plato, one Anniceris from Libya, was on his way to Elis to compete in the Olympic Games, presumably
those of summer 388. (Cf. Stroheker, 1958: 100 and 216 n. 85. Contra Caven, 1990: 260 n. 15.) :
i.e. the connection is not chronological.
7. 2. . . . : the theoria to the Olympic Games of 388. Following Ephorus, D related
its fortunes in 14. 109 (under 388/7), in the correct chronological context (the siege of Rhegion), and he now
briefly returns to it in a different context and to serve a different purpose. The two passages do not therefore
present problems, either in chronology or source criticism (pp. 80 f.). Yet some are of the opinion that Dionysius'
famous embassy was sent to the festival of 384 and not to that of 388, basing themselves principally on Lysias 33
(Olympiacus), which D associates with the embassy (at 14. 109 and not at 15. 7. 2% and which they prefer to
date in 384. Grote argued the case at length, but none of his reasons is compelling (x. 103 n. 2.; xi. 48 n. 1; cf.
Stroheker, 1958: 234 n. 43. Lewis, CAH2 vi. 149 n. 82, on
-177the other hand, cautiously accepts Grote). Can we really envisage an Athenian metic delivering such a blast
against the Great King at Olympia in the summer of 384? Would not the speech have amounted to incitement to
break the King's Peace? The whole tenor of the speech seems to fit a time before the conclusion of the Peace and
indeed before Antalcidas came down from Susa and the position in the Aegean changed dramatically. And cf.
section 6, + . Section 7 may seem a little surprising for 388, but
would Lysias have dared return to Athens if he had expressed such sentiments about Sparta in 384?
Admittedly the speech cannot be dated decisively from internal evidence; nor, apart from D, is there any other
evidence to help us. Section 15. 7. 2 does not provide a date. What we can reasonably deduce from 14. 107 ff.,
on the other hand, is that the summer in which the 98th Olympiad was celebrated, i.e. that of 388, was also the
summer in which Dionysius launched his final assault against Rhegion. And this was the Olympic festival to which
the notable embassy was sent and in the course of which the oration of Lysias was delivered (14. 108. 6-109).
Pace Stroheker, 1958: 222 n. 52, this is the crucial synchronism to note. It is not impossible that the embassy
merited mention in D's chronographer. But whether it did or not, it would appear that 14. 109 figured in his
narrative source, embedded in the narrative of the siege of Rhegion (14. 108. 6-109. 1: +
. . . + ' + ): 388, therefore, rather than 384. + + at
14. 107. 4 should be credited to the narrative source also (cf. 13. 82. 7; 15. 5. 3), rather than to D himself (as
Lewis, CAH2 vi. 147 n. 119, suggests). It is part of a passage analysing Dionysius' motives. The battle of Eleporus

then and the treaty with Rhegion (14. 103-6) should come under 389, the beginning of the actual siege of
Rhegion in summer 388, under archon Pyrgion ( 388/7), but perhaps a little before the Olympic festival, and the
capitulation of the city almost a year later (14. 111. 1), in 387/6, under archon Theodotus (14. 111; 15. 1. 6 n.;
Polyb. 1. 6. 1 f. with HCP i ad loc.). These dates (cf. Meyer, GdA v. 128 ff.) seem to me to be more consistent
with the evidence than the 'low' chronology worked out by Beloch ( GG iii. 2. 366ff.) and accepted by Stroheker (
1958: 114 ff.). Sordi's proposed chronology is eccentric (1992: 64 ff.). It dislocates the synchronism of the siege
of Rhegion
-178with the King's Peace and th e Sack of Rome, and it depends on unacceptable source criticism (see pp. 77 f.).
7. 3-4. The reason for the brief repetition of the story of the fiasco of the embassy to the 98th Olympic festival
now becomes apparent: Dionysius' acute disappointment, D's source would have us believe, led to serious
problems at court for which he was entirely to blame.
7. 3. OMEGA XI : see the discussion in Caven, 1990: 169 ff.,
convincing in its conclusions, except for the chronology. Following D's arrangement (and in line with most other
scholars; cf. Jacoby, FGH556 (text) 497) Caven is inclined to date the conspiracy, or Dionysius' reaction to the
belief that there was a conspiracy (the view in D), in 386/5. It has already been argued (pp. 80 f.) that the events
in chs. 6 and 7 are set in the period after the peace treaty of 392, though a little more can be said about the date
of the visit to Sicily of Plato (see above) and the exile of Philistus and Leptines. The latter cannot have fallen into
disfavour before 390/89 (14. 102. 3) and the 'conspiracy' itself may also post-date the Olympic festival of 388, if
D's source is correct in seeing a connection between the two. Cf. also Sanders, 1987: 54ff.
: FGH 556 TT with Jacoby's commentary; above p. 67. Cf. Zoepffel, 1965 ; Sanders, 1987: 43ff.;
Pearson, 1987: 19ff. A: on Dionysius' family and family connections see Beloch, GG iii. 2.
102ff.; Stroheker, 1958: passim; Sartori, 1966: 3ff.; Berve, i Tyrannis, i. 249 f.; ii. 651 f.; Sanders, 1987: i
passim; Lewis, CAH2 vi. 151 ff.
7. 4. . . . : the exile of Philistus and Leptines involves intractable problems because of the
contradictory nature of the evidence. D seems to be saying that Philistus and Leptines were exiled at the same
time and on the same charges. And he is certainly saying that they went to Thurii, but that later () they
were reconciled to Dionysius, at the tyrant's own request, and returned to Syracuse, Leptines going on to marry a
daughter of his brother. D is in fact the only evidence for the exile of Leptines though there are indications that all
had not been well between the brothers (14. 102. 3; 17. in.; Aeneas Tact. 10. 21 f.; Plut. Dion 9. 5). At any rate,
Leptines was certainly back at Syracuse and in favour again by the time the battle of Cronium was fought (15. 17.
1) though we do not of course know
-179when exactly that was (15. 1 n.). The problem then is the length of Philistus' exile because Plutarch is categorical
that he did not return to Syracuse until after the death of Dionysius. Also that he went somewhere in the Adriatic
or Epirus and there composed most of his history (Dion 11. 6f.; Mor. 605c; cf. Nepos, Dion3. 2). There are
various ways of getting round these difficulties (see Jacoby, FGH556 (text) 497 f.; Stroheker, 1958: 227 n. 116),
but it is all too possible that D misread his source. . . . ALPHA: this must be Dicaeosyne,
Dionysius' daughter by Doris the Locrian ( Beloch, GG iii. 2. 104, by a process of elimination).

Archon Dexitheus, 385/4

8. 1. : repetition of the college (393 V) cited at 14. 99. 1 (390/89) except that there the nomen of
the second consul is missing, though MS F adds K instead; see Livy 5. 29. 2; CAH2 vii. 2. 636; Perl, 1957:
79, 103; "Introduction" pp. 27f.

8-11. The conclusion of the Cypriot War

8. 1. SI :for the chronology see 2-4n. : Acoris had clearly decided that
he would be backing a lost cause with resources he could hardly afford; cf. Kienitz, 1953: 87.
: Tiribazus' return and the 2,000 talents had made a difference (4. 2 and n.).
8.2. : see 2. 2 n.
8. 2-3. : the negotiations broke down because Tiribazus insisted that Evagoras should
obey the Great King 'as a slave his master' while Evagoras would only obey 'as one king another'. Grote saw this
as a mere point of honour and suspected its historical truth because of Isocrates' failure to mention it when it
would have been grist to his mill (x. 31 f. and 32 n. 1). Hill, 1940: 138f., thinks that more than a mere point of
honour may have been involved and suggests that Isocrates' silence indicates that the unacceptable condition was
imposed by Tiribazus on his own authority with the object of wrecking the negotiations; it did not form part of the
official terms. He concedes that its precise meaning escapes us. More relevantly Spyridakis,
-1801935: 66, saw the matter as one to do not with empty words and honour, but with the future legal status of

Evagoras; 'seiner kniglichen freien Entschliessung' was at issue. Spyridakis might have used the term
'autonomy', for that is what Evagoras was holding out for, as Meloni, 1950: 332, recognizes. Against Spyridakis,
Martin, 1963: 230ff., concludes that the dispute was purely verbal and Osborne follows suit: 'As for the point itself
. . . it hardly amounts to much in real terms, since it merely defined specifically and realistically the relationship
that being a client king of the Persian Empire usually implied . . . The concession made by Orontes was hardly
other than a purely verbal amelioration of Evagoras' position' ( 1973: 530). As he therefore sees the dispute as
lacking in substance, Osborne surmises that something deeper and more sinister must have been afoot (see next
n.). The correct explanation to my mind is that of Spyridakis and Meloni as further elucidated by Chaumont,
1972: 187f. D's term should be seen as corresponding to the term bandaka used in Persian official
language to designate satraps and other high functionaries ( 1972: 187 n. 4. On the evidence of Darius' Behistun
inscription where Badaka or Bandaka occurs several times; see Kent, 1950: 121 col. ii line 30; 122 lines 49f.; 125
col. iii lines 13, 31; 126 lines 56, 85; etc.).
As a bandaka Evagoras would have relinquished his autonomy and on his death his kingdom would have reverted
to the Great King who might or might not have chosen to allow Evagoras' sons to succeed their father. Salamis
would have become a Persian royal estate to be disposed of as the King pleased. Orontes' later concession,
therefore, was a substantial one: Evagoras was to remain an autonomous vassal of the King, paying tribute, but
otherwise his own master. We may compare Tithraustes' proposal to Agesilaus in 395 that the Greek cities of Asia
remain autonomous but tributary (X. H. 3. 4. 25; cf. Lewis, 1977: 122ff.). Isocrates at 9. 63 seems to be making
the same point and he is not, therefore, as silent on the point as Grote and Hill suppose him to be:
8. 3-4. : according to D Orontes conspired against Tiribazus alone.
Theopompus,
-181-

on the other hand (as reported by Photius), represented a collusion between Orontes and Evagoras, though we should
not suppose that Evagoras actually participated in the arrest of Tiribazus: ,
, ' 'O (FGH 115 15 103. 9).
Theopompus' assertion, in so far as he has not been misunderstood by Photius, is that Evagoras was the originator of
the plot while its execution was left to Orontes. In what way could Tiribazus have conspired against Evagoras? We can
only guess. But if it were in Tiribazus' power to allow Evagoras to remain an autonomous vassal, as Orontes later did,
and he refused, insisting on the condition, then Theopompus may have interpreted this as a
conspiracy, especially as Tiribazus was perhaps known to be ill disposed towards Evagoras, the friend of Conon and
Athens (Tiribazus had favoured Sparta in the Corinthian War, even going so far as to arrest Conon: X. H. 4. 8. 15 ff.).
What could Evagoras hope to gain by the removal of Tiribazus? Clearly better terms. He may even have thought that
he stood a chance of restoring his position; Orontes had proved himself ineffective in Tiribazus' absence. What did
Orontes stand to gain? Obviously the supreme command. He may well have resented the pre-eminence of Tiribazus
(Cf. 2. 2 n.).
It should be sufficient to have outlined the possible motives of the three men. Further speculation on the basis of our
meagre evidence would be useless. Osborne, 1973: 528ff., exhaustively, and not always convincingly, considers all the
different possibilities. This is partly because of his conviction that the unacceptable condition lacked real substance and
was a mere pretext for not effecting an agreement. Once the importance of the u and
alternative is granted, however, it becomes perfectly clear why Evagoras should choose to hold out and even plot to
have Tiribazus removed.
The charges laid against Tiribazus could hardly have been bettered and were well calculated to 'suggest to Artaxerxes
that he had a second Cyrus on his hands' (Osborne, 1973: 534, though surely not one aiming for the throne: 10. 2 n.).
They were all the more potent as there was more than a grain of truth in them. The siege was indeed protracted and
so were the negotiations. And he was known to be well disposed towards Sparta (10. 2; X. H. 4. 8. 15 ff.). And the
troops favoured him more than Orontes. This last
-182constituted the most serious charge. For Tiribazus' defence see 10. 2 nn.
8. 5. : cf. Plut. Mor. 168e; Polyaen. 7. 14. 1.
: according to Strabo 11 C 508 their home was in northern Media; cf. Steph. Byz. s.v.:
U. Most of what we know about them is connected with Persian attempts to subdue
them. They were first conquered by Cyrus it seems (2. 33. 6), but subsequently rose in revolt. At the time of his death
in 405/4 Darius II had been campaigning against them (X. H. 2. 1. 13) and on this occasion Artaxerxes II had to come
to none too honourable terms with them in order to extricate his battered army from their territory if, as generally
thought (cf. e. g. Syme, 1988: 139), Plut. Artox. 24f. should be connected with this war. Sekunda, however, 1988:
38f., makes a good case that Plutarch refers to another Cadusian campaign which took place in the late 370s, the
same campaign mentioned in the prologue of Book 10 of Pompeius Trogus. Sekunda is also right of course in
identifying the campaign in which Datames first distinguished himself ( Nepos, Dat. 1) with the first of these wars (
1988: 38). On the other hand he is wrong to date this, as well as all the events narrated by D in 15. 8-11, in 385/4,
simply because that is D's apparent date for them. D's text is rather more complicated than that (above pp. 143 ff.).
The Cadusians were eventually suppressed by Ochus and they are found serving against Alexander (17. 6. 1; Justin
10. 3. 2 ff.; cf. Arrian, An. 3. 8. 4; 3. 11. 3). For their hardihood and warlike spirit cf. X. Cyr. 5. 2. 25; Strabo II C 523
f. See Pragek, 1906-10: 1. 47, 127 f.; Meier, RE Suppl. vii. 316 f.; Olmstead, 1948: 371, 401, 424, 490; Syme, 1988:

137ff. ...7: 'the trial was postponed'. We cannot know how long the campaign against the
Cadusians lasted.
9. 1. . . . : the revolt of Glos must have taken place at this time; see 9. 3-4 nn.
' 7 : why did the fighting continue after the arrest of Tiribazus? If Evagoras had no hand in
the plot, no explanations are necessary; on assuming the supreme command Orontes tried to succeed where Tiribazus
had failed. But if Evagoras and Orontes had plotted together as Theopompus
-183-

suggests (FGH 115 F103. 9), then it would seem that either their co-operation went no further than the downfall
of Tiribazus, or that one of them (or perhaps both) went back on his word once Tiribazus was out of the way.
This last stage of the war appears to have lasted for some three years (2-4n.) though it is treated summarily by
D. Orontes' attempts to bring Evagoras to heel were severely embarrassed to begin with by the revolt of Glos who
sailed off with what must have been a considerable part of the fleet. Then he may well have been hampered by a
shortage of funds; and he does not appear to have been very popular with the troops, partly perhaps because
their pay was not forthcoming (cf. Isocr. 4. 153), and partly because they felt aggrieved at the arrest of Tiribazus.
At any rate Orontes was in the end forced to grant Evagoras the terms which Tiribazus had refused. And these
were in fact the final terms, the settlement which the Great King ratified. Judeich's intricate reconstruction of the
end of the war (2-4 n.) is unnecessary.
9. 2. : MS M (and its derivative and 'edited' F) reads . Our other major MS P, on the other hand,
reads (and its derivative X ).The number may therefore be corrupt.
9. 3. A jump back in time takes place here, from 380 to 383; see 2-4 n. and next n.
9. 4. : he must in fact have moved to Ionia (18. 1). Judeich's assertion that Glos was murdered before
he rose in open revolt is unwarranted ( 1892: 130, accepted by Swoboda, RE vii. 1432; Hill, 1940: 139; Kienitz,
1953: 88). It is clear from 18. 1 that Glos did revolt (7 TAU )and the sentence
refers to his plan to fight against the King in conjunction with Sparta and Egypt. His
murder occurred in Ionia. Cf. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 98f.
: Acoris was probably dead by the summer of 380 at the very latest (2-4 n.). Thus hardly enough time is
left for all the events of the Cypriot War if the invasion of the island is dated in 381. Beloch, therefore, who
furthermore dates Glos' revolt after the war in 379, assumes that D is mistaken. The alliance, he suggests, was
with Nectanebos, not Acoris (GG iii. 1. 99. Likewise Hill, 1940: 139 n. 5; Kienitz, 1953: 89). This is both arbitrary
and unnecessary and it amounts to tampering with the evidence in order to make it fit the theory. It is much
better to accept an earlier date for both the invasion and the revolt of Glos.
-184-

: was such an alliance concluded and when? Those scholars who have accorded the alliance
a few words (it is ignored by most, even by Bengtson in Svt) have on the whole accepted it as historical, in particular
Beloch, GG iii. 1. 99; cf. Judeich, 1892: 190; Meyer, GdA v. 314f.; Hill, 1940: 139. There is obviously no way of
deciding conclusively and one might choose to maintain (with e.g. Lewis, 1977: 58 n. 59) that there is no more
substance to it than mere rumour. However, such an alliance was not at all unlikely at this time.
There is first of all the question of chronology, though to contest that any one time between 385 and 379 was more
appropriate for the alliance, as Ryder, 1963a: 105 ff., does, is to set off on the wrong foot. In fact Ryder's article is an
example of how not to approach such problems. His greatest handicap is his acceptance of Beloch's date, 380/79, for
the revolt of Glos. He then attempts to make a case that this date is more suitable for an alliance between Sparta and
Glos than '384, when the first Spartan act of aggression since the King's Peace, the attack on Mantinea, had hardly
begun' (1963a: 106). The revolt and murder of Glos nevertheless belong probably in 383 or at least not later than
early 382 (previous n. and 2-4n.). D's narrative of the Cypriot War is likely to be telescoped so that the fact that he
places the revolt and alliance under 385/4 is of no great significance. Ryder is aware of D's tendency to place a series
of events into a single year to which not all may belong. Yet he accepts 385/4 as the date to be derived from D's text
and proceeds to argue its unsuitability. In fact, enough appears to have been happening in Greece by 384 (5. 2-3 n.)
to invalidate Ryder's objection.
Equally, Ryder's main thesis fails to convince because his method of dealing with D's evidence is inconsistent. Beloch
(GG iii. 1. 99) suggests that as Sparta was being fairly successful in Greece in 379, she was prepared to ally herself
with Glos and try to regain her old power in Asia Minor. Ryder objects that on the evidence of D the Spartans were not
interested in Asia Minor, but saw the alliance as a means of strengthening their position in Greece (1963a: 107). But
this is to misrepresent 9. 4f. It is true that Glos promised to help Sparta regain her position of hegemony in Greece
(which, by the way, she had on an even more secure basis in 379 than 384 -- an additional argument against 379 as
the year of Glos' revolt and the present alliance), but that was only a
-185side issue. D's (Ephorus') claim is that the alliance was aimed against the King. The Spartans were having second
thoughts about the surrender of Greek Asia to the King and, sensitive to Greek criticism of their action, were eager to
involve themselves again in Asia Minor. We may believe or disbelieve, but we cannot deny that that is what D says.

The probable date of the alliance between Sparta and Glos therefore is 383, early 382 at the very latest. It is not
inconceivable that Sparta, or, more accurately, the dominant group in Sparta (that of Agesilaus), should contemplate
new commitments in Asia Minor at this time. Greece lay at Sparta's feet once more as in 404, and many Spartans may
have thought that the King had served his purpose by making this possible. Agesilaus' position vis--vis the King's
Peace is not entirely clear (cf. Cawkwell, 1976a: 68 ff.). In 396 he had gone forth as a new Agamemnon to fight the
barbarian and free Greek Asia. The task was interrupted by the outbreak of war in Greece. But there is no reason to
assume that he discarded his dream. He had promised to the Greeks of Asia to return once Greece was quiet (X. H. 4.
2. 3). The proposals of Glos who possessed a strong fleet (an indispensable instrument of overseas empire as
Agesilaus discovered to his own cost in 394), and who seemed to have ample funds (9. 3), may have seemed
attractive and opportune and not to be rejected. Still, the question remains whether we should be speaking of an
alliance, a firm commitment, or a mere understanding between the two sides. Whatever it was it was probably done
secretly. It would not have been in the Spartans' nature or interests to advertise the fact until they were ready to act.
They never did because both Glos and his successor, Tachos, were murdered (18. 1 f.). Similarly in 401 Sparta had
supported Cyrus wholeheartedly, but not openly (14. 19. 4f.; 14. 21. if.; X. H. 3. 1. 1).
9. 5. 7: Cf. 15. 10. 2 and 15. 19. 4 where is likewise used to describe the fate suffered by
the Greeks of Asia under the King's Peace. All three instances recall Isocr. 4. 122, 141.
-186-

10-11. The trial of Tiribazus

It is impossible to discover exactly how much of this account is historical. In general the question concerns
Ephorus' sources for 4th-century eastern history, a thorny problem; see pp. 107 ff.
10. 1. : Herodotus' evidence argues for a permanent body of royal judges (3. 14. 5; 3. 31. 3; 5. 25;
7. 194. 1; cf. Plut. Artox. 29. 8-12; Aelian, VH 1. 34; Ctesias, FGH688 F27; Amm. Marc. 23. 6. 82). Their number
was perhaps indefinite; cf. Meyer, GdA iv. 1. 30f.; Lewis, 1977: 23. X. An. 1. 6. 4 probably represents an
improvisation by the rebel Cyrus. For non-Greek sources mentioning royal judges and for a brief discussion of this
obscure subject see Tuplin, Coinage and Administration, 119 f. For Persian concern with justice, see Ehtcham,
1946: 77 ff.; Frye, 1962: 104 ff. 10. 2. 77. . . : There is clearly a lacuna here (as first
perceived by Estienne) which renders an exact emendation of the text impossible. But the sense of the passage is
easily recoverable from the context: Tiribazus defended himself against the charge of collusion with Evagoras by
pointing out that his own terms had been tougher than those granted Evagoras by Orontes. 7. . .
: the King's death, the revolt were successful. But is it at all credible that Tiribazus (who was not of royal
blood), if indeed traitorous, was hoping to supplant the King, and that such an unlikely charge could therefore
have been brought against him? Many years later he did plot against the King's life, but under very different
circumstances ( Plut. Artox. 27 ff.). Perhaps the later occasion conditioned the present one. If there was any truth
in the charge then Tiribazus was probably aiming at an independent command in the west. He did not at any rate
deny that he had sent to Delphi. While the evidence for enquiries about victory in war is plentiful, the evidence for
enquiries about revolts and the like is not, and it is partly unhistorical; cf. Parke and Wormell, 1956: i, nos. 70,
139, 201, 204, 327 (a response was obtained though both the enquiry and the response are probably
unhistorical), 395, 414. Thus, and in spite of Plut. Mor. 378d ( + 7
, 7 ), there is no reason why Tiribazus could not have obtained a response
if he enquired about his chance of success if he revolted; and of course he could have phrased his enquiry
differently, but still with the same intention in
-187

mind. Cf. Parke and Wormell, 1956: i. 212; Fontenrose, 1978: 266 (H73).
: Tiribazus had favoured Sparta in 392 and was later instrumental in enforcing the King's Peace
which worked in the interests of both Sparta and Persia (X. H. 4. 8. 15 ff.; 5. 1. 25ff.). Such a charge against Tiribazus
would have been especially effective because of Artaxerxes' deep suspicion of Sparta, the result of her support for
Cyrus (cf. Osborne, 1973: 535). According to Dinon the King considered the Spartans to be the most shameless of all
mankind (FGH 690 Fig).
7. . . : see 9. 5 n.
10. 3-11. 1. The historicity of these sections is discussed in the "Introduction", pp. 107 ff.
10. 3. 7 : the King in this instance was in danger of being killed (as was the younger Cyrus at
X. An. 1. 9. 6); hence the gratitude shown to Tiribazus for saving him (and to the anonymous would-be rescuer in the
Anabasis). FGH 688 (Ctesias) F14. 43 is perhaps different in that the King on that occasion did not consider himself to
be in danger.
11. 1. We may compare Herod. 1. 137. 1.
11. 2. . . . : he was probably deprived of his province of Armenia. At any rate when he
reappears in history he is said to be satrap of Mysia (90. 3 and n.).

12. The dioikismos of Mantinea

12. 1. . . . :the summer of 385 and the following winter; see 5. 1 n. and p.
137. Cf. Paus. 8. 8. 7: the siege was of short duration.
. . . : an obvious exaggeration. Mantinea was actively hostile to Sparta
in the years 421-418 and passively so in the Corinthian War (X. H. 4. 5. 18; 5. 2. 2). What is said is far truer of Tegea
(Herod. 9. 28. 3; Thuc. 5. 67. 1; X. H. 4. 2. 19). The object of the exaggeration was to heighten Sparta's dastardly
deed in attacking a loyal ally. It is possible that Ephorus derived this information from an antiSpartan source. (For his
sources see pp. 104 ff.) Or it may be that someone, Ephorus himself or a source, was guilty of an anachronism; the
Spartans and Mantineans drew closer together later in the
-188-

4th century. They fought side by side as allies at the second battle of Mantinea in 362 (85. 2), and were still allied
in 352 and even as late as 331 against Alexander (16.39.3; Aesch. 3. 165; Beloch, GG iii. 1. 480f., 646).
: X. H. 5. 2. 4 says that the river did not flow beside the city, but through
it, and this seems correct. In any case at the rebuilding of the city after Leuctra the Mantineans, having learned
their lesson (X. H. 5. 2. 7), caused the river to flow round the walls. Thus Ephorus (or his source) may have
argued back from the topography of the city in his own day; cf. Underhill ad 5. 2. 4. Pausanias says very much
the same as D: (8. 8. 7); cf. Frazer ad loc. and
Fougres, 1898: 418ff., 433. Vial, 125, wrongly states that Pausanias agrees with Xenophon on this against D;
and Fougres's assertion ( 1898: 420 n. 1) that D has confused the present action with that of Agis in 418 is
unnecessary and almost certainly wrong. D at any rate omits the latter, and the two episodes are quite different.
On this occasion the Spartans dammed the river flowing by the city (D and Pausanias), or through it (Xenophon),
and turned it against the walls. For Agis' different stratagem in 418 see Thuc. 5. 65. 4 with Gomme's and
Andrewes' nn. in HCT iv. 97f. and v. 457f. as well as Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 41ff. The river no longer exists (the
present-day Fidhias is not to be identified with it) and clearly conditions in the Mantinean plain must have been
quite different in antiquity ( Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 44; S. and H. Hodkinson, 1981: 266ff.). Pritchett's statement
that the siege took place in the spring does not follow, however, for if there was more water in the plain in
antiquity, autumn or winter would do as well; and D does say that the river was greatly increased from the rains
(not melting snows). This rather indicates the autumn or winter seasons. And see n. above.
D, who does not mention Agesipolis, ascribes the stratagem to the Spartans in general (cf. 5. 4n.). Both
Xenophon and Pausanias on the other hand attribute the plan to the young king (cf. H. 5. 2. 4: (Agesipolis)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ). The view that the
attack on Mantinea was planned by Agesilaus and that an unwilling Agesipolis was saddled with its execution (
Smith, 1954: 275ff.; Rice, 1974: 166ff.; cf. Cartledge, 1987: 259f.; Tuplin, 1993: 89,
-189-

93) is unconvincing. Most, if not all, Spartans may have felt that democratic Mantinea needed to be taught a lesson,
and Agesipolis could hardly have been more vigorous or acted with greater determination; cf. Polyaen. 2. 25 and see
12. 2n. Xenophon's treatment of Cleombrotus is quite different. He never fails to mention that king's alleged incapacity
as a general.
12. 2. : cf. X. H. 5. 2. 5.
. . . : this might at first glance belie the opinion that Ephorus had castigated the
dioikismos of Mantinea. But it is possible that the original statement was ironic and directed at those defenders of the
Spartan action (e.g. X. H. 5. 2. 7) who claimed that the dioikismos was no chastisement, but a benefit to the
Mantineans; cf. Polyb. 4. 27. 6. Though not the severest of punishments, dioikismos was punishment enough for a
Greek. We may note the concluding sentence of the chapter: PI,
,
Xenophon adds that sixty and democratic leaders were expelled at the city's surrender, and again
Agesipolis' behaviour with regard to these men does not support the view (12. 1 n.) that the young king acted as the
unwilling tool of Agesilaus. The exiled leaders had feared execution. But then Pausanias intervened and persuaded his
son to allow the men a safe passage out of the city (X. H. 5. 2. 6). It is clear that Agesipolis had full powers to deal
with the men as he pleased (the dioikismos was the decision of the 'Lacedaemonians' whatever that means,
presumably the assembly), and the impression one forms from Xenophon is that the young king would have acted
differently, either because he did not like the Mantinean democrats or because he could not have cared less, had not
his father intervened. Or he might have done nothing and allowed the oligarchs to butcher their enemies. In saving the
democrats, therefore, Agesipolis was probably doing his father a favour. In any case, we cannot be certain that
Agesilaus would not have spared these men had he been in command. He is not known to have been a cruel man; on
the contrary, cf. X. H. 5. 4. 55; Ag. 1. 21f. The case of the Theban Ismenias was rather different. No difference of
opinion between Agesilaus and Agesipolis is to be seen in the instance of Mantinea at any rate. But see 19. 4n. for the
tradition that Agesipolis espoused Greek autonomy.
-190-

Some of the exiled democrats found refuge in Athens: 5. 2-3 n. and cf. Osborne, 1981-3: ii. 51f.
U=1F00 : see 5. 4 n.

13. 1-4; 14. 1-2. Dionysius and the Adriatic

These passages are as important for an estimate of Dionysius' policy in this area as they are problematic. The
evident lacuna at 13. 5, plainly of considerable length, and the difficulty about the identity of the place or places
named in 13. 4 and 14. 2 do not help; and it may also be that, as so very often, D's use of his sources has been
maladroit, though the degree to which that is so is lessened somewhat if the text is emended in the manner
indicated by Stroheker (see below). For the context and chronology see pp. 81f.; 7. 2n.; 13. 4-5 n.
13. 1. ... : for the names see Beaumont, 1936: 203f.; Sanders, 1987: 44.
. . . , : thus Vial, following Stroheker. Vogel and all other
editors by contrast put the comma after and print the reading of MSS X and F. The building of
the cities is thus entirely subordinated to the plan of gaining control of the Ionian poros (the Straits of Otranto)
and the further alleged intention of sacking Delphi; and the initial statement about the decision to send out
colonies to the Adriatic is in this way left isolated and mysterious. Stroheker's emendation (he prefers the reading
of MS A (Parisinus Coislinianus) which is nearest to the reading of the oldest and principal MSS P and M:
1958: 120f., 224 n. 78) makes better sense of the text (see Vial, 18 n. I): Dionysius had two aims and they were
connected to some extent. He did not simply want to control the Straits of Otranto, but he also intended to plant
colonies in the Adriatic Sea. Some attempt is then made in D (the miserable remains of what must have been an
adequate account in Ephorus) to define the two aims, the first in 13. 1-3 and the second in 13. 4. Still, D's credit
is not thereby saved for to his mind clearly (though surely not to that of his source), as the narrative goes on to
show, Dionysius' actions in the Adriatic, Illyria, and Epirus were determined by an intention to plunder Delphi.
. . . : most commentators rightly dismiss this as nonsense. Nor does either the text or
common sense
-191warrant the view of many that Delphi is a mistake for Dodona, and that it is that sanctuary which Dionysius
planned to pillage. Ephorus is likely to have presented the story as a rumour ( or ), very much as
Xenophon does that of Jason and Delphi (H. 6. 4. 30). Not surprisingly, there is a tradition (which reaches absurd
lengths with Cic. De nat. deorum 3. 34) that Dionysius was not very respectful of gods and their temples, but
there is no good evidence that he robbed Greek (as opposed to barbarian: 15. 14. 3f.) temples (cf. Caven,
1990164). On the contrary, it is perfectly clear that Dionysius went to considerable lengths to establish and
maintain good relations with the major Greek sanctuaries (cf. 14. 109; 16. 57. 2f:, Tod 113 Lines 9ff.).
: Estienne's correction (printed by Vogel) of the MSS (retained by Vial, 125 n., rightly perhaps)
is demanded by the syntax.
13.2. . . . : Svt 247. The alliance was probably connected with the
foundation of the colony (or colonies) mentioned at 13. 4. If so, it must have antedated the attack on Epirus by
several years (13. 4n.). What Illyrians were these? Several separate tribes or nations are mentioned by the
ancient geographers in southern Illyria. Were they all independent kingdoms or did they already at this date form
a single state, as they certainly did after the middle of the 3rd century? The latter is the view of Papazoglou,
1965: 143ff. Contra Hammond, 1966: 239ff. For a compromise (and perhaps correct) view see P. Carlier in
L'Illyrie mridionale 1987, 39ff. On the Illyrians in general see Wilkes, 1992: esp. 91ff. (citing all the sources and
extensive bibliography).
13. 2-3. : though the Illyrians were in the end defeated and expelled with Spartan
help, it is not necessary to assume (with e.g. Woodhead, 1970: 505) that Alcetas was expelled with them. It is
perfectly possible that he made his peace with his people and as a consequence restored to the throne with the
consent of Sparta. If so, he must have made a volte-face at some stage because by the mid-370s he is the ally of
Athens (36. 5 and n.). As far as IG ii2 101, is concerned, an Attic decree of the year 373/2 in honour of a certain
Alcetas, son of Leptines, of Syracuse, its circumstances remain quite obscure and it may well have nothing to do
with the Epirot king ( Woodhead, 1970: 505 f.).
-19213.3. : the reading of all the MSS, rightly retained by Vial; see her n. p. 126.
: see 5. 2-3 n.
13. 4. . . . : FGH 70 F89. Foundations of cities were of particular interest to Ephorus. Pharos is
modern Hvar, the island off the coast of Croatia. The actual settlement was probably at Stari Grad: Princeton
Encyclopedia, s.v.; cf. Cibin, 1919: 125. We have no other date for the foundation, but D's date, 385/4, is
generally accepted and though it may not derive from the chronographer it must be approximately right because
of the wider context in which the foundation is set.
: rather more is implied by way of help to the Parians than is suggested by
Beaumont ( 1936: 203) and Woodhead ( 1970: 512). Indeed, it is not impossible that Dionysius contributed
colonists to the new foundation. In any case, the connection with Syracuse was remembered many years later:
Cibin, 1991: 125ff.
13. 4-5. : Dionysius, we thus learn, had founded a colony in the Adriatic 'not many
years before' (i. e. the foundation of Pharos). Setting out from this colony he proceeded to do something else in
the Adriatic which escapes us because of the lacuna. When the text resumes we are back in Syracuse and with

Dionysius' various projects there. So far there is general agreement. The problems start when we try to identify
the colony founded, to provide it with a date, and to determine what else was done in the Adriatic. As far as the
date is concerned, a date circa 401 ( Vanotti, 1991: 107ff.) is not impossible, but one after the treaty with
Carthage in 392/1, when Dionysius became involved in Italy, is altogether more likely (cf. Stroheker, 1958: 223).
What of the place? MS M gives its name (in the accusative) as , MSS P and X as . When shortly
afterwards the Parian colonists were attacked by the neighbouring Illyrians they were assisted by Dionysius'
eparchos of a city the MSS call (in the dative) (PX) or (M): 14.2. Are these one and the same place or
two different places? And which? Many scholars are of the opinion that in both passages D is speaking of the same
city though they disagree about its identity. Evans, for example, in Freeman, iv. 223ff., and Beloch, GG iii. 1. 118
n. 2, thought that the place in question is Issa, modern Vis, the island with the excellent harbour south-west of
Pharos ( Fraser in L'Illyrie mridionale 1993, 169 n.
-19317, is inclined to agree). Beaumont, on the other hand, 1936: 202 f., Woodhead, 1970: 507f., and Braccesi,
1977: 226ff., opt for Lissos, modern Lesh (Alessia) at the mouth of the river Drin in northern Albania.
Other scholars by contrast believe that the reference at 13. 4 is to Lissos while that at 14. 2 is to Issa: Casson,
1926: 316; Stroheker, 1958: 122ff.; Hammond, Princeton Encyclopedia, s.v. Lissos. I agree with Vial that,
palaeographically speaking, Lissos should be read at 13. 4 and Issa at 14. 2. One problem with this is that
archaeology does not seem to support the first reading: the pottery at Lissos is Hellenistic or later and the earliest
of the fortification walls seems to date to the late 4th century and to be of native Illyrian construction ( Prendi and
Zheku, 1971: 35ff.; cf. Fraser in L'Illyrie mridionale 1993, 169 n. 17 and 174 (comment by N. Ceka). Contra
Beaumont, 1952: 69, 72). This, however, is hardly decisive. Dionysius' foundation may have been on a small
scale and of short duration and therefore difficult to trace on the ground. For the site and its importance see
Caesar, BC 3. 26-7; Polyb. 8. 13-15; Fluss, RE xiii, s.v. Lissos (2) 731ff.; May, 1946: 54ff.; Walbank, HCP ii. 90f.
Why would Dionysius want to plant a settlement at Lissos? Beaumont suggests that the chief aim of the colony
was the control of the Straits of Otranto (1936: 203). But Lissos by itself could not have accomplished that (cf.
Evans, in Freeman, iv. 223 f.). Woodhead's suggestion is even less compelling: 'Its most evident suitability was as
a point of contact with Dionysius' Illyrian allies, through which the supply of arms could be channelled to them for
the intended invasion of Epirus to the south' (1970: 507). But Dionysius did not need to found a colony for that,
and one in such a locality too. Woodhead, of course, goes on to suggest that 'although Lissus was "occupied", and
could thus be described as a "colony", it is likely that its usefulness came to an end with the failure of the Epirot
scheme' ( ibid.). But D says nothing of the kind.
D in fact does not connect Lissos itself with the Illyrian invasion of Epirus. Nor does he claim that this colony alone
was meant to achieve control of the Straits or anything else. What he says, as we have seen (13. 1 n.), is that
cities (in the plural) were to be founded in the Adriatic, both for the purpose of appropriating the Straits and so
that the ships of the tyrant would be provided with
-194harbours. The plan therefore envisaged a string or network of coastal settlements and it was launched it seems
with the planting of Lissos. The unfortunate lacuna at this point prevents us from knowing what else Dionysius
had gone on to do from Lissos, but it is very probable (as Stroheker, 1958: 123f., argues) that the missing text
told of the planting of a Syracusan colony on the island of Issa and the installation there of an eparch; information
that recurs at 14. 2. Whether anything else was mentioned is a great deal more doubtful -- which does not of
course mean that Dionysius did not expand further in the Adriatic. General probability and certain other
indications argue that he did.
In the mid-320s Athens founded a colony and a naval station somewhere in the Adriatic. The purpose, we are told
explicitly (Tod 200 lines 2.17ff.), was so that Athens would have her own permament commerce and supply of
corn from the area, while by the establishment of a naval base the Etruscan pirates would be kept at bay. Athens
had been having problems with pirates in the Adriatic, an area clearly of great importance to her, and had been
taking measures to protect her shipping, since at least the mid330S (Syll. 962 lines 277ff. Cf. Dinarchus fr. XII
Conomis; Hyperides fr. 8, Burtt). That Dionysius had similar concerns to these in the Adriatic fifty years earlier
can, in my view, be taken as certain. When the younger Dionysius founded two cities in Apulia in the early 350s
his aim, we are told, was to safeguard the Straits of Otranto against pirates whose activities were keeping
merchant shipping out of the Adriatic (16. 5. 3; cf. 16. 10. 2). There can be no doubt that the younger Dionysius
was following the policy of his father in this. A conception of the plans for, and actions in, the Ionian poros and
the Adriatic Sea of the Dionysii such as that of Evans (Freeman, iv. 220ff.) and Stroheker ( 1958: 120ff.; cf. also
Caven, 1990: 149ff.) is to my mind a great deal more credible and in accord with the evidence than Woodhead's
'nihilistic' view which reduces everything to 'a brief and unhappy meddling by proxy in the affairs of Molossia, a
short-lived naval station at an unpromising coastal site on the fringes of Illyria, and a helping hand on two
occasions for a group of colonists from Paros' (1970: 512.). Beaumont is less negative, but he limits Dionysius'
interests to Lissos and the Straits of Otranto (1936: 202f.).
The extent of Dionysius' achievement in the Adriatic is another matter. That Issa was a Syracusan foundation of
the time of
-195-

Dionysius is a common enough view and Fraser has recently advanced impressive new evidence in support of it by his
study of the onomasticon of Syll. 141, the 'foundation' document of Kerkyra Melaina (Korcula), the island east of Issa (
L'Illyrie mridionale 1993, 170ff.). Inter alia, this interesting inscription lists the names of some 245 Issaeans who
founded Kerkyra c.300 Bc. Contrary to what other scholars have thought Fraser, with the authority of his monumental

Lexicon of Greek Personal Names (LGPN) behind him, is now in a position to say that the names in the inscription are
good Doric and West Greek names. Furthermore, the formal division of the large number of persons listed into the
three Dorian tribes (which makes Syll. 141 a remarkable and indeed unique document) suggests to Fraser that Issa
was an officially sanctioned and planned Syracusan foundation. This, he thinks, took place in the middle of the 4th
century or earlier. Important though this is for future study of the ethnography of Syracuse in the first half of the 4th
century (as Fraser points out), for our present purpose it seems to me that Fraser's findings constitute weighty
evidence for the Dionysii having founded Issa. As Syracuse and Greek Sicily in general rapidly deteriorated after c.357,
such a colony must have been sent out before that date, most likely by Dionysius I.
Of other possible sites in the Adriatic Adria near the mouth of the Po is the most likely to have been refounded by
Dionysius, or at least strengthened with the sending of more colonists (cf. Evans, in Freeman, iv. 226f.; Stroheker,
1958: 125; contra Beaumont, 1936: 202, but his objections are weak). Ancona in Picenum is said by Strabo (5 C 241)
to have been founded by Syracusans fleeing the rule of Dionysius. There is no need to reject this (as Beloch, GG iii. 1.
119 n. 2, does; see also Stroheker, 1958: 125). On the other hand, Dionysius could have taken over the city at a later
stage as, for example, he took over Aetna in Sicily (14. 7. 7; 9. 6-8; 14. 2).
Finally, that Philistus participated to some extent in Dionysius' activities in the Adriatic is likely enough. To suppose,
however, that his role was a major one and that consequently Dionysius' colonizing enterprises ceased after Philistus'
exile (cf. Gitti, 1952a: 161ff.; id., 1952b: 225ff.; Sanders, 1987: 44) goes beyond the evidence. If Dionysius showed
no further interest in the Adriatic after the late 38os (and we do not really know if that is the case)
-196-

one might as well blame the outbreak of the Third Carthaginian War in 383/2 for that.
13. 5. It is generally acknowledged that there is an extensive lacuna at this point, either before (Vial) or after
(Vogel) . : see pp. 81 f. The details and chronology of Dionysius' varied building
activity at Syracuse largely escape us with the exception of the north wall of Epipolai, the building of which prior
to the declaration of war against Carthage in 398 is well and accurately described in D 14. 18. 2ff. See
Drgemller, 1969: 98ff. Also Lawrence, 1946: 99ff.; id., 1979: 117.

Archon Dieitrephes, 38413

14. 1. : thus all the MSS and Dion. Hal. Epist. ad Amm. 1. 5. Inscriptions, however, give
and this must be the correct form of the name. The corruption clearly occurred early. Develin, 219.
: repetition of the college (392 V) given at 14. 103. 1 (389/8). Cf. Livy 5. 31. 2; CAH2 Vii. 2. 636; Perl,
1957: 79, 103.
: Dicon, a famous runner, was from Caulonia in Magna Graecia. That city had been razed to
the ground by Dionysius in 389, its free inhabitants transferred to Syracuse (14. 106. 3). Dicon's change of
ethnic, therefore, was due to this fact and not to bribery as Paus. 6. 3. 11 says.
14. 2. +: see 13. 4-5 n. On Issa see KP s.v.; Fraser in L'Illyrie mgridionale 1993, 168; Kirigin in Greek
Colonists, 292ff.

14. 3-4. The raid against Etruria

14. 3. : our knowledge of the economic aspect of Dionysius' rule is little short of
lamentable. The few stray remarks in the sources do not even allow us to ask the right questions: ps.-Arist. Econ.
2. 1349a 14-135Oa5; 1353b 20-6. See the discussions by Evans in Freeman, iv. 230ff.; Andreades, 1933: 105ff.;
Bullock, 1930: 260ff.; Stroheker, 1958: 161ff.; and on the tyrant's coinage, Kraay and Hirmer, 1966: 280f.,
287ff.; Kraay, 1976: 231ff.; Boehringer in Studies Thompson, 9ff. That Dionysius should be short of money is not
surprising when one considers his many activities, some of which were definitely extravagant (cf. 14.
-197-

109), as befitted a Sicilian tyrant. All the same, the major drain on his resources stemmed from his main
preoccupation, the struggle against Carthage. In fact, by raiding Etruria Dionysius was probably trying to kill two birds
with one stone -- he was punishing allies of Carthage whose piratical raids were notorious and at the same time he
intended to use any loot he secured to finance a new war against Carthage (end of section 4 and 15. 1). But even this
perhaps falls short of the true explanation of Dionysius' actions in the area (below).
: according to Polyaen. 5. 2. 21 Dionysius had at his disposal not 60 but 100 triremes (thus also
ps-Arist. Econ. 2. 1349b) and a number of horse-transports in addition. Dionysius' force, therefore, was significant, as
is evident also in D from the fact that Dionysius went on after looting the temple to defeat the militia of Caere. See
Caven, 1990: 191.
. . . + : the depredations of Etruscan pirates were real enough as the Athenians, for one, knew
very well (13. 4-5 n.). The fact, however, that Dionysius plundered the sanctuary, coupled with a hostile, antiDionysius tradition which Ephorus did not entirely eschew (see pp. 68 ff.), suffice to explain the motive given here. But
it is less than fair to Dionysius. Whether under tyrants or free, the struggle of Syracuse, the leading western Greek

city, with the Etruscans had gone on for at least a century. In 474 Hiero defeated the Etruscans in a naval battle off
Cumae in Italy. Just over twenty years later the Syracusans, in two successive campaigns, aimed against the piratical
activities of the Etruscans, or so we are told, ravaged the coast of Etruria and the islands of Corsica and Elba, both
belonging to the Etruscans, even capturing the latter. Much loot and a great many prisoners were taken (cf. Pindar,
Pyth. 1; D 11. 51= ML 29; D 11. 88. 4-5). In this instance, Strabo mentions the looting of the temple by Dionysius,
but adds that the tyrant was sailing to Corsica at the time (5 C 226). This in fact was the time of the Gallic incursion
into Italy and the aftermath of the sack of Rome, a fast-rising city on the periphery of Etruria and probably allied with
Caere (Agylla -- see below). And since the 6th century Etruria (including Caere and Rome) had been friendly to (indeed
allied with) Carthage and antagonistic to Greeks: Herod. 1. 166; Arist. Pol. 3. 1280a; Polyb. 3. 22 with HCP 1. 339ff.
The Punic and Etruscan gold inscriptions found at Pyrgi, the harbour of Caere(below), in
-198-

1964 (they date from c-500) further testify to this: Heurgon, 1966: 1 ff.; M. G. G. Amadasi, Le iscrizioni fenicie e
puniche delle colonie in Occidente = Studi Semitici, 28 ( 1967), 159f.; Werner, 1974: 263ff.; Pallottino, 1975: 90.
For the alliance between Rome and Caere and the close relations between the two see also Cornell in CAH2 vii. 2.
313ff.
Justin (20. 5. 4-6) claims that envoys from the Gauls, 'qui ante menses Romam incederant', approached
Dionysius who was engaged in war against the Italiots (the detail is hopelessly entangled) and concluded an
alliance clearly aimed against their common enemies. When all this is considered together, and a few more hints
in the ancient writers added (D 5. 13. 3f.; 14. 117. 7; Ptol. Geogr. 3. 2. 4; Strabo 5 C 220; Arist. Pol. 1. 1259a),
it does not appear improbable that Dionysius had an 'agenda' in the Tyrrhenian Sea not so dissimilar to what he
was aiming for in the Adriatic: Momigliano, Studia et documenta historiae et iuris, 5 (1939), 389f.; Stroheker,
1958: 128f.; Sordi, 1960: 62ff., 86; Toynbee, 1965: 24f.; Ogilvie, 1976: 159ff.; Braccesi, 1977: 203.
: ps.- Arist. Econ. 2. 1349b and Polyaen. 5. 2. 21 ascribe the sanctuary to Leucothea. Aelian, VH1.
20, joins Apollo with Leucothea. Strabo 5 C 226, on the other hand, speaks of Eilethyia. + . . . :
Agylla, according to Strabo, was the older name of Caere, the only Etruscan city to dedicate a treasury at Delphi
(5 C 220). Pyrgi was Caere's port (Strabo 5 C 226). For both places see Princeton Encyclopedia, s.vv.
: Polyaenus (5. 2. 21) says that 500 talents of coined metal were taken by
Dionysius himself, but 1,000 talents of gold and many more of silver were removed by his soldiers.

Archon Phanostratus, 383/2

15. 1. : the college (391 V) cited at 14. 107. 1 (388/7), but with considerable variation; cf. Vial ad
loc. and p. 127. The full list of six (not four) tribunes is given by Livy 5. 32. 1. For an explanation of what went
wrong with D's list see Drummond, 1980: 60f.; cf. CAH2 vii. 2. 636; Perl, 1957: 79, 103; Pinsent, 1975: 46 n. 53.
-199-

15-17. The Third Carthaginian War

15. 1. : as was his wont, D abbreviated an autoteles account of Ephorus (and the abbreviation here
appears to be more severe than usual; see p. 80 ), which evidently covered a number of years, and set it under the
archon in question, presumably because a particular episode in the account was noticed in the chronographic source
under archon Phanostratus: the outbreak of the war and/or the invasion of Sicily by Mago. That the war cannot have
been fought to its conclusion in a single year is apparent from some of the details given in 15. 15-17 as well as from
the chronographic entry (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 374) at 15. 24. 1: in 379/8 the Carthaginians sent an expedition to Italy
and restored Hipponium. Clearly then the war was still being fought in this year (contra e.g. Hans, 1983: 69), but for
how much longer? The usual chronology followed is that of Beloch who dates the two great battles which decided the
war to 375 and the peace to 374 ( GG iii. 2. 376f.). He finds support for this arrangement in the fact that when Alcidas
was dispatched to Corcyra the Spartans put it about that the squadron was heading for Sicily (15. 46. 2, under 374/3).
In Beloch's view this can only have taken place in the aftermath of Dionysius' defeat at Cronium when the tyrant must
have been in severe difficulties ( GG iii. 2. 376). Meyer, on the other hand ( GdA v. 169), prefers to date the end of the
war in 376/5 so as to coincide with the termination of the Sicelica of Hermeias of Methymna (15. 37. 3). Beloch ( GG
iii. 2. 377f.) rejects this, as does Stroheker (1958: 232 n. 30).
The truth is we do not know when the war was concluded and 15. 46. 2 is no evidence that it continued until 374, even
if Alcidas' squadron was ultimately aimed for Sicily. If we accept, as is generally done (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 377; Huss,
1985: 140), D's date of 383/2 for its outbreak, there is no reason why Cabala and Cronium could not have been fought
and peace made in, say, 378 (thus also Walbank, HCP ii. 495, but without argumentation), the year following the
Carthaginian expedition to Italy (15. 24. 1), or soon thereafter. D dates to 379/8 the outbreak of a serious epidemic at
Carthage and a revolt of her subjects (15. 24. 2-3), after ( ) the refoundation of Hipponium. These two
sections present problems which have been variously tackled by
-200scholars. How do they relate to D's account of Dionysius' Third and Fourth Carthaginian Wars?
At 15. 73. 1 (under 368/7) we are told that Dionysius was encouraged to start yet another war (the fourth and last)
against the Carthaginians because he saw they were in a bad state,
. Obviously the plague and the accompanying revolt are those recounted in

15.24.2-3 (under 379/8). It is equally obvious to Beloch that the plague cannot have lasted for ten years and that
Dionysius would not have waited till the rebellion of the Carthaginian subjects was at an end before launching his
attack. He finds support for this in Justin 20. 5. 10-11 where it is said that Dionysius was forced to return to Sicily from
Italy by the arrival in the island of the Carthaginians, 'qui reparato exercitu bellum, quod lue' (Beloch is right to retain
the reading of all the MSS against some editors, including Seel, who see 'lue' as an interpolation from 19. 2. 7)
'deseruerant, auctis viribus repetebant'. The Carthaginian general was Hanno and Beloch is doubtless correct that what
we have here is the beginning of the Fourth Carthaginian War, in the course of which (as is clear from both D and
Justin) Dionysius died. Beloch then points to the prologue to Book 20 from which we learn that the deeds in Africa of
Hanno the Great took place after the death of Dionysius. These deeds, Beloch concludes, must be connected with the
resubjugation of the Libyans. It follows that the epidemic broke out not in 379/8, but C.369/8, and that D was wrong
to set it, as well as the revolt which it occasioned, under 379/8 ( GG iii. 2. 375f.). Stroheker, by contrast, prefers not
to disturb D's date, but to use it to explain why the Third Carthaginian War dragged on till the mid-370s: the
Carthaginian war effort had been paralysed as a result of the plague and the ensuing revolt and it was not until c.375
that they could intervene effectively in Sicily (1958: 132).
The problem with Stroheker's solution (a fatal one in my view) is that both D and Justin connect the epidemic and the
rebellion not with the Third but with the Fourth Carthaginian War. Beloch's arrangement is thus much to be preferred
though perhaps not in its entirety. I see no reason for supposing that D attached 15. 24. 2-3 to 15. 24. 1 because of a
relevant notice in the chronographer. This is not impossible, but it is more likely that (see pp. 940, finding himself
somewhat embarrassed about what to
-201-

include under archon Nicon, he abridged Ephorus' account of the plague and of the other problems which troubled
Carthage in the period between her last two wars against Dionysius, and linked this to the chronographic entry on
the restoration of Hipponium with the vague phrase . Certainly at 15. 73. 1 D writes of the plague
and the revolt of the Libyans as past events () when Dionysius declared war; of the revolt, but not of
its suppression which, according to Justin (prol. 20) and certain hints in 15. 73 (see nn. there), was still in the
future. All the same, it is still possible that the epidemic broke out much earlier than Beloch allows, as early even
as 378 or 377, and this might explain why the Carthaginians did not follow up their victory at Cronium, but
preferred to come to terms instead (15. 17. 5).
+ : Ephorus clearly considered Dionysius responsible not only for the present war, but
also for the previous one, as well as for the last to be fought against Carthage by the tyrant: 14. 41. 1-2; 15. 73.
1. It is to be noted, however, that Carthage and the Italiots made common cause and that the first blow seems to
have been struck by Carthage, which landed troops in Sicily and Italy. Dionysius reacted by taking the field
himself; cf. Meyer, GdA v. 165f. By contrast with 14. 41. 1-2 and 45. 2-5, neither Dionysius' motives nor his
public declarations are stated here. For Ephorus' view of the tyrant see pp. 68 ff.
. . . : the purpose and nature of Carthaginian involvement in western Sicily have
attracted considerable attention. That it was some form of arche or imperium already at this time seems to be
beyond question. All the ancient writers and most modern scholars are agreed on this, though the absence of
detailed information allows divergent views. D reserves the term epikrateia (realm or dominion) for the respective
Greek (Syracusan) and Carthaginian zones in Sicily (see McDougall s.v., though other terms are also used, e.g.
chra: 73. 2), a word which undoubtedly goes back to Philistus through Ephorus and Timaeus. This and the terms
of the treaties concluded between Carthage and Dionysius (13. 114. 1; 14. 96. 3f.; 15. 17. 5; cf. 13. 59. 3; 14.
65. 2), which also go back to Philistus, leave little doubt that real control was exercised by Carthage in her own
interest and that it was not merely a matter of bilateral alliances, more or less equal, between Carthage and the
cities in the area. The word used here also points to the fact that the cities in question were acknow-202ledged (by Dionysius) as belonging to Carthage. For discussions and further bibliography see Roussel, 1970:
54ff.; Whittaker in Imperialism, 59ff. (unduly sceptical in my view); Hans, 1983: 119ff.; Huss, 1985: 467ff., esp.
472f.; KOKALOS 28-9 ( 1982-3), 127ff. For the Carthaginians in Sicily, Tusa, 1988: 186ff.
: presumably not the Punic communities; cf. Stroheker, 1958: 131; Hans, 1983:
70; Huss, 1985: 137f.; Caven, 1990: 192.
15. 2. + : Wesseling's emendation for the MSS is necessitated by the context. It was a
clever manuvre to embroil Dionysius in a war on two fronts; cf. Stroheker, 1958: 132. The Italiots involved
presumably were the Italiot League, founded (or refounded or perhaps simply extended: Polyb. 2. 39. 6 with HCP
ad loc.) in 392/1 by way of a defence against Dionysius (14. 91. 1; cf. 14. 101. 1). If the League was disbanded
in 389 by Dionysius following his victory at Eleporus as a prerequisite of the peace he granted to the Italiots (14.
105. 4), then what we find now must be a resurgence of the League achieved with Carthaginian support, the
same support which saw the restoration of Hipponium shortly afterwards (15. 24. 1). In fact, it is not certain that
Dionysius demanded the termination of the League in 389, and its ending by the tyrant and the neighbouring
barbarians mentioned by Polybius (2. 39. 7) may well refer to the time of the capture of Croton (the leading city
of the League: 14. 103. 4) by Dionysius a few years later (see below). An Italiot League, however, was in
existence again soon afterwards it seems, centred this time on Taras and Heraclea. (Cf. Brauer, 1983: 55f.)
Whether this League was a rump of the earlier one or a new creation (as Polyb. 2. 39. 7 would seem to demand)
is impossible to say. + + : the usual shorthand for Carthaginian military preparations involving
citizen troops as well as large numbers of mercenaries.
. . . : i. e. Mago, one of two (or possibly more at this stage?) sufetes, was chosen to
command the campaign; see Huss, 1985: 458ff.; but cf. Scullard, CAH2 vii. 2. 487, 490; Lewis, CAH2 vi. 128 and
n. 40; Ameling, 1993: 80ff., 90ff. All three scholars incline to the view that sufetes and kings are not to be

identified. Institutions and offices at Carthage are a crux. See Ameling, 1993, especially 67ff., for a recent
discussion (citing earlier contributions). It seems clear from the present passage (cf.
-203-

13. 43. 5 and 13. 54. 1 with Ameling, 1993: go n. 116) that, at this stage at any rate, the king did not ex officio
command the state's forces.
+: the vagueness of the statement is an indication of the severity of D's abridgement of
his source (p. 80 ). For Carthaginian land and naval armaments cf. Scullard, CAH2 vii. 2. 493ff.; Ameling, 1993:
190ff., 210ff.
15. 3. + : see previous n. We hear nothing about any of these 'many' battles and struggles
in Sicily, but we know something about Dionysius' activities in Italy. While a seaborne attack on Thurii proved
unsuccessful ( Aelian, VH12. 61), he managed to capture Croton ( Dion. Hal. Ant.20. 7. 3; Livy 24. 3. 8. Croton in
Justin 20. 5. 1-3 is really Rhegion) and the pan-Italiot sanctuary of Hera at Lacinium near Croton ( ps.-Arist. Mirab.
auscult. 838a; Athen. 12. 541a-b); cf. Stroheker, 1958: 132; Caven, 1990: 189, 193f. The capture of Croton perhaps
took place in 379/8 if the figure given by Dion. Hal. Ant. 20. 7. 3 can be trusted. Whether the treaty between Dionysius
and Carthage also provided for the future status of south Italy is a question which cannot be answered.
: the place is otherwise unknown; cf. Holm, Geschichte, i. 86, ii. 142; Ziegler, RE x. 1394. For
intelligent guesswork see Manni, 1981: 39, 82.
. . . + . . . : the figures are on a par with that given for the Siceliot dead in the following
battle (15. 17. 4). None can be checked. They point to Ephorus as the source (pp. 62 ff.).
. . . +: cf. Polyaen. 6. 16. 1, .
15. 4. : Polyaen. 6. 16. 1 says the same. Dionysius' demand of the Carthaginians is
presumably factual and reported by Ephorus (from Philistus) rather than Timaeus; see p. 82.
16. 1. + : cf. FGH 70 F7;'; and for Ephorus' likely attitude to the Carthaginians and nonGreeks in general, pp. 114 f.
16. 1-3. + + : similarly Polyaenus 6. 16. 1: (whatever
they might be, though clearly they were with the army and acting now alone,
-204Mago having been killed) + + . But from this point on Polyaenus' information
diverges from that of D. The latter represents that the Carthaginians asked for a few days' truce to consult their home
authorities. This having been granted them, they buried Mago, elected his son to his position, and under his leadership
they so revitalized their army that when the truce was over they inflicted a crushing defeat on Dionysius. The account
is quite impossible. The Carthaginians could not have done any of these things while still
6+. In any case, D's own narrative shows that when fighting resumed the two combatants were no
longer at Cabala. In abbreviating his source D clearly missed at least one vital step. Polyaenus is less unsatisfactory in
this respect in that he provides for the removal of the Carthaginian camp to the coast with Dionysius' consent. Less
unsatisfactory, but no less problematic for, as Caven, 1990: 197, correctly observes, it is most unlikely that in the
circumstances Dionysius would have allowed the Carthaginians to escape. What probably happened was somewhat
along the lines indicated by Caven ( 1990: 198): the Carthaginians managed to escape during a truce (see below) and
the battle of Cronium which they won came months later and was the outcome of another campaign. D (not some
nameless epitomizer as Caven maintains: pp. 79 f.) telescoped the account of his source and produced one campaign
out of two.
16. 1. + : these surely are the authorities back in Carthage and not those in the cities in the
Carthaginian part of Sicily, as Whittaker in Imperialism, 297 n. 9, is inclined to believe; cf. Stroheker, 1958: 133;
Huss, 1985: 139; Caven, 1990: 197.
: this truce according to Caven (1990: 197) was only for the purpose of burying their dead. But both D and
Polyaenus are insistent that terms for a settlement were discussed, that the Carthaginians pretended to go along with
Dionysius' demands, and that the latter was deceived as a consequence. Some relaxation of vigilance on the part of
Dionysius would better explain the fact that the battered Carthaginian army managed to escape.
16. 2. + : Himilco seems to have been his name: Polyaen. 5. 10. 5; cf. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 124 n. 1.
16. 3. + + : for what may have taken place in the interval between the two
battles (which must have been considerably longer than a few days' truce: above)
-205-

Polyaen. 5. 10. 5 (perhaps also 6. 16. 3) gives us some idea; cf. Caven, 1990: 198f.
K: a town it would seem (Polyaen. 5. 10. 5), though possibly a mountain (D 3. 61. 3), or
both. Whatever it was it is a fair guess that it was in western Sicily, in the vicinity of Panormus; cf. Stroheker,
1958: 232 n. 28; Manni, 1981: 84; Caven, 1990: 198f.
17. 1. : see 15. 7. 3f. and nn. Dionysius and Leptines had not always seen eye to eye and there
existed a hostile tradition that the tyrant had either engineered his brother's death (Plut. Mor. 338b = De fort.
Alex. 2. 5) or had not tried to prevent it ( Aelian, VH13. 45). D (Ephorus) will have none of it.
17. 4. . . . : see 15. 3 n. : modern Palermo; cf. KP s.v. no. 3; Princeton
Encyclopedia, s.v.
17. 5. : SVt261. The third and last reported treaty between Dionysius and Carthage.
The brief and vague way in which D describes these agreements presents problems. In the present agreement the
two parties were to have + + . The meaning of this seems to be that Dionysius and the
Carthaginians would continue to hold what they held as of right () before the war broke out, i.e. according
to the terms of the previous settlement of 392 ( Svt233). The Carthaginians would have been especially anxious
to stop Dionysius from 'poaching' in their territory once peace was made (cf. 15. 15. 1-2). The one exception
() to the terms of 392 was that the Carthaginians (they were after all the victors in this war) would now
receive Selinus (both the city and its land) and of the territory of Acragas that part which reached as far as the
river called the Halycus. The clear implication of this is that in 392 Dionysius did not concede to Carthage either
Silenus or any part of Acragantine territory. From which it equally clearly follows not only that the clause in the
treaty of 405 about Selinus, Acragas, Himera, Gela, and Camarina remaining unwalled and under the obligation of
paying photos to Carthage (13. 114. 1; Svt210) was revoked in 392, but also that these places were added to the
territory of Dionysius. The difficulty with this is that nothing of the kind is said in 14. 96. 4 (the treaty of 392).
What D in fact says there is that the Sicels and Tauromenium were recognized as
-206-

belonging to Dionysius, but that otherwise that treaty resembled the one of 405. It has seemed highly unlikely to most
scholars that the stipulation about the Greek cities of western Sicily in the treaty of 405 was retained in that of 392. In
all likelihood what happened was that in summarizing his source D, typically enough, missed a statement to the effect
that the five cities were handed over to Dionysius. The explicit statement here about Selinus and Acragas can have no
other interpretation (cf. Meyer, GdA v. 120f.; Beloch, GG iii. 1. 581 and n. 4; Stroheker, 1958: 82ff.; Finley, 1979:
82f.). Some scholars disagree ( Hans, 1983: 121ff.; Caven, 1990: 200; Lewis, CAH2 vi. 145f.), but their arguments
are not compelling, least of all the suggestion (Caven and Lewis) that the western Siceliot cities were no longer of any
real importance to be a bone of contention. This is not what one concludes from D's text, from, e.g., 14. 41, 14. 46,
and, of course, the terms of the present treaty. Sordi's ingenious suggestion (1980: 23ff.) that the reference to the
'previous peace' at 14. 96. 4 is not to that of 405, but to one concluded in 399/8 which Timaeus (assumed by Sordi to
be D's source) concealed, is not supported by any solid evidence, least of all by that of D. For yet another attempt to
save the credit of D and of his immediate source, be that Ephorus or Timaeus, and to blame Dionysius himself (his
censorship) or his historian ( Philistus), see Zahrnt, 1988: 209ff.
Another difficulty concerns the identity of the river Halycus, especially in view of the fact that both D (16. 82. 3) and
Plutarch ( Tim. 34) when describing the treaty between Timoleon and Carthage refer to the river which was to mark
the frontier between the Carthaginian and the Greek areas as Lycus. The majority view is that Lycus was probably a
mistake for Halycus, the latter being the modern river Platani west of Agrigento (Acragas), at the mouth of which was
situated Heraclea Minoa (cf. Svt261 with the bibliography cited). Navarra, however, 1964: 70ff., has argued that Lycus
and Halycus were different rivers, the first to be identified with the river Platani and the second with the river Salso
east of Acragas. This is accepted by Hans, 1982: 211ff.; 1983: 122. Now (and in this at least Hans may be correct), as
the fact that only a part of the Acragantine chora was ceded to Carthage demands that the river mentioned in our
treaty be located to the west of Acragas, she proposes that be substituted for + in the text of D ( 1982:
216 ; 1983: 229 n. 36).
-207D neglects to give the northern limit of the Carthaginian epikrateia. It is quite possible that Himera was surrendered to
Carthage and its chora formed the eastern border of Carthaginian territory in the north ( Stroheker, 1958: 135).
. . . : a heavy indemnity by any account and we may well believe, as Grote pointed out long ago (xi
(1853), 59 and n. 2), that Dionysius paid it off by annual instalments, thus justifying Plato's statement that the tyrant
became tributary to Carthage. And we might also associate ps.-Arist. Mirab. auscult. 838a and Athen. 12. 541a-b (the
story of the precious mantle looted by Dionysius from the temple of Hera at Lacinium near Croton and 'sold' to the
Carthaginians) with Dionysius' efforts to pay off this large sum.

18. The end of the revolt in Asia Minor and the

contest for Leuce
The year 383/2 is about correct for these events (2-4n.) though the contest may be somewhat later. D perhaps found
the foundation of Leuce in his chronographer under Phanostratus and consequently placed this particular Ephoran
narrative here.

18. 1. + . . . : see 2. 2 and 9. 4nn. : a relative, perhaps a son, of Glos; see

Beloch, GG iii. 1. 99 n. 1; Meyer, RE iva. 1996. The name survived in Ionia; see Meyer, ibid.
: Leuce or Leucae west of Smyrna by the mouth of the river Hermus; Strabo 14 C 646; Burchner, RE xii. 2209;
Treidler, KP 3. 594. Cf. Judeich, 1892: 191; Ramsay, 1890: 206; Jones, 1971: 33. It is possible that Leuce was a
refoundation: IG i3 260 (453/2) viii line 8.
18. 2. + : Tachos appears not to have survived Glos by more than a few
months.
18. 2-4. : having related the revolt of Glos and Tachos, Ephorus turned aside to tell of the
dispute between Clazomenae and Cyme, his native city, over Leuce. The issue was unimportant and not particularly
relevant, though Ephorus could hardly have invented the story. His source doubtless was local Cymaean tradition; see
p. 106 ; Samuel, 1968: 375ff. The gist of the story is substantiated by the fact that the coinage of Leuce bears the
swan type characteristic of the best Clazomenaean coins
-208of this period ( Head, 1911: 568, 581. And see P. Kinns in L'Or perse, 184f.). Interestingly Clazomenae won, not
Cyme!
18. 2. : see Tod, 1913: 95; Fontenrose, 1978: 249 (H15), 16, 38, 212; Parker in Crux, 309f.
(discussing the 'whimsical' procedure described here by D); Hornblower, 1991 ad Thuc. 1. 28. 2.
18. 4. : M and F. 'Anticipation'. See RE xxiii. 1. 817.

19-23. The Olynthian War

The chronology

No chronology of the Olynthian War can be entirely gentle with Xenophon's account and one must be prepared to
perform some surgery. But the chronological indications in the Hellenica, D's evidence, and a morsel or two of
information from elsewhere allow us to construct a system which is quite satisfactory as a whole though only
approximate in some of its detail. I differ from Beloch, GG iii. 2. 231 ff., in several respects.
The Cadmea was captured in the summer of 382 when the festival of the Thesmophoria was being celebrated at
Thebes (X. H. 5. 2. 29) and the Pythian Games were being held (Aristid. 19. 258 Dind.). The Pythian festival was held
in the local month of Boukatios which corresponded in part to the second Attic month of Metageitnion (Aug./Sept.).
The Thesmophoria were celebrated in the autumn in most Greek states, but Delos and Thebes were exceptions. There
they were celebrated in the summer (cf. Nilsson, 1906: 316f.). D placed the event under Evander (382/1), probably by
using his chronographic source. Shortly before the capture of the Cadmea the Peloponnesian League voted to intervene
in the Chalcidice and Eudamidas was dispatched north with the first levy of Peloponnesian troops (X. H. 5. 2. 20 ff.). D
placed this under Phanostratus (383/2) (19. 3. The passage is confused; see ad loc.). Thus between Eudamidas' arrival
in the Chalcidice and the capture of the Cadmea, both events belonging to summer 382, Evander succeeded
Phanostratus as archon at Athens. The Cadmea therefore was captured most probably in the month of August 382 (cf.
Beloch, GG iii. 2. 232f.). X. H. 5. 2. 29, , confirms
the season.
-209-

The capture of the Cadmea doubtless overshadowed the Olynthian War for a while. The Spartans had to decide
what to do. There followed the trial of Ismenias before a court in which all the allies, great and small, were
represented (X. H. 5. 2. 35). We could hardly allow less than a month for these proceedings. Then Teleutias set
out with his 10,000. He did not hurry (X. H. 5. 2. 38) and he probably took a month or so to reach his destination.
After the first clash with the Olynthians, before which he had refrained from burning the crops and cutting down
the trees (X. H. 5. 2. 39), Xenophon comments, (X. H. 5. 2. 43).
There is no way therefore that this can be the summer of 382; it must be the summer of 381. The winter of 382/1
intervened between the trial of Ismenias and the departure of Teleutias for the north.
At the beginning of the following spring (380: X. H. 5. 3. 1), Derdas achieved his notable victory over the
Olynthian cavalry, and some time afterwards ( ) Teleutias was defeated and killed (X. H.
5. 3. 3-6). Agesipolis was now sent out (X. H. 5. 3. 8 f.). On his arrival he (late spring/ early
summer 380: X. H. 5. 3. 18), captured Torone, and soon died ( July/Aug. 380: X. H. 5. 3. 19).
Soon after Agesipolis' departure from Sparta, Agesilaus invested Phlius (X. H. 5. 3. 10ff.). The siege lasted twenty
months (X. H. 5. 3. 25) and finished, as well as that of Olynthus, in the autumn before the liberation of Thebes in
midwinter 379/8. Olynthus was invested by Polybiades, Agesipolis' successor (23. 2f.; X. H. 5. 3. 20, 26). The
contemporaneity of the two sieges is shown also by Isocr. 4. 126. The chronographic entry on the death of
Agesipolis is under Pytheas in D ( 380/79: 23. 2), which is almost certainly correct (pp. 37 ff.), while his march
north and arrival in the Chalcidice are under Demophilus ( 381/0: 22. 2). The events may then be arranged thus:

382 Summer (archon Phanostratus)

Eudamidas
to Olynthus.

382 (August) (archon Evander)

Capture of
the
Cadmea.

381 Spring

Teleutias to
Olynthus.

380 Spring

(archon
Demophilus)
Teleutias
killed.

380 Spring

Agesipolis to
Olynthus.

380 Spring

Siege of
Phlius
begins.

380 Summer (archon Pytheas)

Death of
Agesipolis.

-210-

19. 1. . . . : see p. 99 and 9. 4n. : Laqueur, 1958: 268f., proposes that D

added this here from his additional source, Ephorus (!), from which he derived the story of the contest between Cyme
and Clazomenae. The result was a falsification of the facts since 'hatte natrlich dieser Tod des Tachos auf die
lakedaimonische Politik keinen Einfluss, wie es infolge des Einschubs erscheinen knnte' ( 1958: 269). I have already
argued against the hypothesis that D habitually interwove two or more narrative sources (p. 49 ). Nor is there
anything necessarily unhistorical in 19. 1. Tachos succeeded to the affairs of Glos ( :
18. 1). If the Spartans were prepared to co-operate with Glos (9. 4n.), why not with Tachos?
: see 5. 2-3 and n. there.
. . . : this could be seen as additional (though admittedly weak) evidence that the King
was an actual participant in the King's Peace, something for which there is good epigraphic evidence (Svt 248 (=Tod
118) line 11), and not outside and above it (as Martin, 1944: 13ff.; Badian, 1987: 27; id., Georgica, 25ff.). See also
38. 2n.
19. 2. : Swoboda, 1883: 1ff., and Beloch, GG iii. 2. 57 f., thought that 14. 92. 3-4
(under 393/2) and the present passage represented a doublet. This view was modified by Geyer, 1930: 111ff., who,
while insisting that there was but one Illyrian invasion and one land donation, those of 14. 92. 3-4, yet saw 15. 19. 2
not as a doublet, but as a conscious repetition by D of the earlier event as a way of introducing the Spartan
intervention in the Chalcidice. Geyer's interpretation was taken up and a little further by Ellis, 1969: 1 ff., and De
Salvo, 1972: 114 ff. Hammond, 1979: 172ff. , on the other hand, not only rejects the doublet theory, but also the view
that any part of 19. 2 looks back to 14. 92. 3-4 and 393/2. He believes in two different invasions, each accompanied
by a 'gift' of land (see n. below) to the Olynthians. I would agree with Hammond though not with absolute confidence.
But the evidence, such as it is, seems to argue for two Illyrian invasions of Macedonia during the reign of Amyntas III.
-211-

The first invasion occurred shortly after Amyntas' accession to the throne (14. 92. 3-4). He was forced to flee,
though not before he presented Olynthus with . He was returned to Macedonia by the
Thessalians after a while ( ), though the chronographer gave an alternative view. 'Some say
that after the expulsion of Amyntas the Macedonians were ruled by Argaeus for two years, and that it was after
that time that Amyntas recovered the kingship.' We may then assume with Hammond ( 1979: 173 ) that on
regaining the throne Amyntas received back his territory from the Olynthians. The surviving treaty between the
king and the Chalcidians (Svt 231 = Tod 111) may date from this time. For the invading Illyrians and their king,
Philip's later opponent Bardylis perhaps, see Hammond, 1979: 172 ; id., 1966: 243, 248 f., and the bibliography
cited at 13. 2 n. It may well be that, as Hammond, 1979: 172, 175, says, Argaeus was a puppet king installed by
the Illyrians. We know that in 385/4 the exiled Alcetas returned to Epirus through their agency (15. 13. 2-3 and
n.).
The second invasion took place some time prior to the Spartan involvement in the north. Section 19. 2 is
introductory, but there is no need to assume that it looks back to 393/2. There is a possible context for it other
than the late 390s. As we have just seen, sometime in 385/4 the Illyrians invaded Molossis in strength and had to
be expelled by Sparta. One might then reasonably hypothesize that about this time the Illyrians broke into
Macedonia also. As before, Amyntas had to hand over part of his land to Olynthus and flee, though this time he
showed a little more spirit and initiative. Isocr. 6. 46 must refer to this occasion, for Sparta could not surely have
sent help to Macedonia in the late 390s at the height of the Corinthian War when she had been driven off the seas
sistently mistranslated, e.g. by Geyer, 1930: 115; Cloch,
and bottled up in the Peloponnese. As Isocrates
1960: 110; Ellis, 1969: 4; Hammond, 1979: 174, sometimes with ludicrous results as attempts are made to
locate the said and the
-212place of origin of the force Amyntas sent for. But means 'from here' and Archidamus is saying that
Amyntas sent to us, Spartans, for help, and he got it, and very effective it was too.)
The question to ask then is whether the Spartan help is to be identified with any of the forces dispatched against
Olynthus in 382 and afterwards. Xenophon says that when Sparta moved against Olynthus Amyntas was in a
sorry state (X. H. 5. 2. 12 f., 38), and one might see this as corresponding to Isocr. 6. 46. Alternatively one might
infer that a Spartan army had helped Amyntas shortly before this time against the Illyrians only, as Isocrates
says, and at the same time perhaps as the Spartan intervention in Epirus, with the result that the king recovered
most of his territory, but not of course the area he had given to Olynthus. Section 19. 2,
, is an exaggeration, as would be Isocr. 6. 46, , if our second alternative were
preferred. Section 19. 2 is an introductory outline and the statement is no evidence against
the present interpretation. Amyntas did not recover his throne unaided (as Hammond suggests, 1979: 174, who
has misunderstood Isocrates), but was helped by Sparta to do so. But once war broke out between Amyntas and
Olynthus we can expect that the Olynthians won even more territory than originally ceded, including the
Macedonian capital Pella (X. H. 5. 2. 13).
It should be stressed that the evidence is of so equivocal a nature that Geyer's view remains possible. On the
other hand there is no difficulty in believing in two Illyrian invasions. The Illyrian menace was more or less
permanent in the first half of the 4th century, and a combination of D and Isocrates seems to argue for a second
invasion about the middle of the 380s. + : the precise relationship between Olynthus and
the Chalcidians is an old problem. Was it a unitary state or a confederation of some kind based on Olynthus? And
when did it originate? Cf. the discussions by Harrison, 1912: 93ff., 165ff.; West, 1918: 14ff.; Busolt, GS ii.
1501ff.; Hampl, 1935: 177ff.; Kahrstedt, 1936: 416ff.; Robinson, Olynthus, ix. 113ff.; Gomme, HCT i. 203 ff.;
Larsen, 1955: 42ff.; id., 1968: 58ff.; Zahrnt, 1971: 49 ff.
The problem has been rendered more acute by the contrast between the literary sources, mostly those of the 4th
century, on the one hand, and the testimony of the inscriptions and coins, on
-213the other. The question cannot be treated fully here, but I find Larsen's view the most sensible and closest to the
evidence. He accepts that the Chalcidian state was a confederacy. Hampl's espousal of the unitary state theory
(he is followed by Kahrstedt and Robinson) lacks weight, while an inscription discovered in 1934 near Olynthus
which records the alliance between Philip II and the Chalcidians (concluded in 357/6: Svt 308 = Tod 158),
explicitly refers to of the Confederacy (line 3). And we may compare the reference to the
koinon of the Chalcidians in Svt 231 (= Tod 111) line 12, the alliance between Amyntas III and the Confederacy.
Xenophon's evidence too rather argues for a confederacy. He contrasts (sharing of citizenship) with
, and With (H. 5. 2. 12, 14). Zahrnt
accommodates both views. At its inception in 432 the state was probably a unitary one, an 'Einheitsstaat' (1971:
49ff.). At the beginning of the 4th century, however, Olynthus took the initiative and the Chalcidian Confederacy
was born (1971: 80 ff.). On the form of government of the Confederacy, cf. Larsen, 1968: 75ff.
Can D contribute to the discussion? One's first impression is that D (Ephorus) uses 'Olynthians' and 'Chalcidians'
indiscriminately, but on further reflection one sees that Ephorus' terminology follows that of his sources. In Book
12 D consistently refers to the 'Chalcidians' rather than to the 'Olynthians' and this is in fact Thucydides' own
usage as a comparison of the relevant passages shows: 12. 42. 5 = Thuc. 2. 9. 4; 12. 46. 7 = Thuc. 2. 58. 1; 12.
50. 3, 7; 51. 2 = Thuc. 2. 95-101; 12. 67. 2 = Thuc. 4. 78 ff. There is one exception which, if anything, proves
the rule. At 12. 47. 3 D speaks of the Olynthians helping the Bottiaeans against Athens while Thucydides says,
correctly, that the troops from Olynthus were Chalcidian. The difference hardly requires explanation. In rewriting
Thucydides, Ephorus opted for the popular, 4th century terminology here. Thucydides himself twice uses
'Olynthians' at 5. 3. 4 and 5. 39. 1 (as well as at 5. 18. 5. For the possible reasons cf. Gomme, HCT i. 204 and nn.

1 and 4); cf. D 12. 77. 5.

From 14. 92. 3 ( 393/2) D invariably refers to 'Olynthians' and this is in line with almost all 4th-century writers.
Theopompus, exceptionally, frequently uses 'Chalcidians'. No special significance should be attached to this usage.
The situation is similar to
-214-

that of Thebes and Boeotia. Xenophon regularly writes 'Thebans' when 'Boeotians' would have been more correct. D
uses both terms (28. 1 n.; cf. further Kahrstedt, 1936: 424 n. 42). The reason for this is that although technically
there were 'Boeotians' and not 'Thebans' when the Boeotian Confederacy was in existence, everyone knew that Thebes
controlled the Confederacy. The 4thcentury nomenclature reflects reality not constitutional niceties. The break in
terminology in D occurs at 14. 82. 3 ( 395/4) where for the last time the X + are mentioned in
connection with the anti-Spartan alliance. Not long after that, at 14. 92. 3 ( 393/2), the 'Olynthians' replace the
'Chalcidians' for good (the exception is 16. 52. 9 where the reference is probably only geographical). Again, it would be
wrong to attach any weight to the change in terminology at this point and seek a corresponding change in the political
circumstances of the Chalcidians (as Zahrnt, 1971: 82ff, is inclined to do). The reference to the 'Chalcidians' at 14. 82.
3 is likely to derive from the Oxyrhynchus historian who perhaps ended his work with the year 394 and was one of
Ephorus' sources (p. 107 ). Like Thucydides the Oxyrhynchus historian was accurate and painstaking. For the rest of
the Histories Ephorus presumably employed the popular term 'Olynthians'.
: it is not necessary to view this as an indication of Ephorus' attitude to Macedonia. It should rather be
seen perhaps within the context of his criticism of Spartan behaviour after the King's Peace. The Macedonian king had
presented the land to the Chalcidians of his own volition and the Spartans had no business supporting him against the
Confederacy. See following nn.
probably the same as the at 14. 92. 3 and to be identified perhaps with the area round
Lete and Lake Bolbe given to the Chalcidians by Perdiccas in 432 for the duration of the war against Athens (Thuc. 1.
58. 2; Hammond, 1979: 172 ). Amyntas' 'gift' presumably was to be returned after the Illyrians had been expelled.
19. 3. : thus according to Ephorus the Spartans intervened in the
Chalcidice to help Amyntas against Greek Olynthus; cf., similarly, Isocr. 4. 126. Xenophon paints a different picture:
the Spartans marched north not to bring succour to any Macedonian, but in defence of the autonomy of the Greek
cities of Acanthus and Apollonia, and in
-215-

their own defence of course, before the Chalcidians grew too powerful and posed a threat to Spartan supremacy
in northern Greece (X. H. 5. 2. 12 ff. This is seen by Tuplin, 1993: 94 ff., but understated somewhat in line with
the main thrust of his argument: see p. 114 n. 306). The two accounts should be combined. All three, Amyntas,
Acanthus, and Apollonia, appealed to Sparta and Sparta responded because she felt threatened by the
Confederacy, especially if the Chalcidians were to ally themselves with Thebes and Athens (X. H. 5. 2. 15). But
while the Spartans and their friends claimed they were defending the freedom and autonomy of the Greek cities
(Xenophon), their critics said they were serving their own interests and those of the Macedonian king against
Greeks (Ephorus, Isocrates). Amyntas may not have been a party to the King's Peace, though Aristid. Panath. 282
Dind. hardly proves that, pace Cawkwell, 1973b: 53 n. 3; id., 1976a: 77 n. 56. What is given there by Aristides is
the line-up of non-Greek powers on the side of Sparta in the struggle to cut the Athenian corn supply at the
Hellespont in 387. Though a Greek, Dionysius was essentially an outsider to mainland and Aegean politics and his
help to Sparta (X. H. 5. 1. 28) was in return for services rendered by Sparta in the past (cf. 14. 10. 2f.; 44; 63.
4; 70. 2f.; Plut. Lys. 2. 7 f.). He cannot have been a party to the Peace, and neither can Seuthes. The latter had,
it seems, been aiding Antalcidas and Tiribazus, while Hebryzelmis of the Odrysian Thracians, a rival of Seuthes,
had been supporting Athens, to judge from the honorary decree praising Hebryzelmis passed under Mystichides (
386/5: Tod 117). The Chalcidians had sided with Athens6 and Thebes against Sparta in 395 (14. 82. 3; Isaeus 5.
46) and their Confederacy had, in theory at least, been dissolved by the King's Peace.
: a Diodoran expression, see p. 133.
: no Spartiates as such were sent out, but the Lacedaemonian contingent would have consisted of
perioikoi, neodamodeis, and, perhaps, Sciritans; cf. X. H. 5. 2. 24. D uses and denote troops
from Lacedaemonia in general, no matter what their status; cf. 14. 36. 1; 15. 62. 1 (probably wrongly, see n.
there); 63. 1. Xenophon does the same; cf. H. 4. 4. 19; 5. 3. 25; 6. 4. 26.
: is probably a Diodoran rhetorical touch (p. 133). The decision was that each ally should send
its contingent
-216for a total force of 10,000, (X. H. 5. 2. 20), evidently an established division (onethird?) of the total field force of the League; cf. 11. 79. 5=Thuc. 1. 107. 2: 1,500 Lacedaemonians and 10,000
allies; X. H. 3. 4. 2=Ag. 1. 7: (one-fifth?). Xenophon also says that
any state which so wished could send money instead of men (H. 5. 2. 21). This appears to have been something
new in the Peloponnesian League. But see 31. 1-2 n.
: D is almost certainly confused here. The Spartans did not give Phoebidas the 10,000 troops they had
voted for, and Phoebidas did not use these to capture the Cadmea before 'he went off on his own business' (20.

2). Nor did they then replace him with his brother Eudamidas giving the latter 3,000 hoplites and (sending him
out to fight against Olynthus' (20. 3). The result of this confusion is that Teleutias is left with no troops apart from
the vague (21. 1). The correct order of events is given by Xenophon (H. 5. 2. 20 ff.). The
congress of the allies voted to dispatch . As this required time to be collected (it
marched out eventually under Teleutias), Eudamidas was sent north at once with 2,000 troops from
Lacedaemonia. But even his force fell short of what had been decided and on departing Eudamidas requested of
the ephors that the remainder of his troops be brought north by his brother Phoebidas. It was this body of troops
which captured the Cadmea. But though D is confused, he supplies one important piece of information. He says
that Eudamidas was given 3,000 troops. This must be the force voted for as a temporary measure before
Teleutias could arrive with the 10,000. Xenophon says that Eudamidas departed with 2,000, but with more to
follow under his brother. One may then deduce that Phoebidas occupied the Cadmea with 1,000 Peloponnesian
troops.
Cawkwell, 1976a: 77 n. 58, finds the splitting in two of the advance force surprising and suspects that perhaps
Xenophon has got his details wrong. But the surprise diminishes when we consider that even 3,000 Laconian and
other Peloponnesian troops would have required some time to muster. For Cawkwell wrongly assumes that it was
the 2,000 Laconian troops that were divided in two. The Acanthian envoys had requested a temporary force
, , ( H. 5. 2. 23). The Spartans and the allies
consented and Eudamidas
-217-

was sent off at once with 2,000 neodamodeis, perioikoi, and Sciritans ( H. 5. 2. 24). Phoebidas then must have led out
primarily the contingents , the allies, once these were ready. It is true that may be ambiguous
in 5th- and 4th-century writers. It mostly refers to the allies, but it is sometimes used of the perioikic cities (cf. HCT iv.
73 f.; de Ste Croix, 1972: 345 f.). There can be little doubt, however, that the allies are meant here. The proceedings
are in the congress of the allies, and the mentioned in the previous three sections ( H. 5. 2. 20-2) are obviously
those of the allies.
The surprise at the splitting in two of the advance force diminishes even further if we accept D's (Ephorus') perfectly
credible claim that the Cadmea was captured as a result of a Spartan conspiracy. It may well be that Agesilaus and his
group had seized this opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. Eudamidas of course had to proceed north without
any delay. A Spartan presence in the Chalcidice was essential and urgent ( X. H. 5. 2. 23). But it is possible that
Phoebidas was never meant to go beyond Thebes; that his declared destination, Olynthus, was simply meant to cover
his real objective, Thebes (see further 20. 2 n.). It is interesting to observe that the troops which occupied the Cadmea
were apparently non-Lacedaemonian. There is nothing unlikely in this. Sphodrias did after all march against the
Piraeus with allied and mercenary troops ( X. H. 5. 4. 15 and 29. 6n.).
+ : D is consistent in that the alliance against the Chalcidians was between Sparta and
Amyntas; see 19. 3 and n.; 20. 3 and 21. 1. Though Xenophon, as we have seen (above), prefers to stress the appeal
to Sparta of Acanthus and Apollonia, it emerges from his narrative that war was raging at this time between Amyntas
and the Chalcidians and that the latter were winning ( H. 5. 2. 13). P. Oxy. i. 13, which purports to be a letter to a
Macedonian king, might, if historical, constitute further evidence that the alliance sought between Olynthus and Thebes
(X. H. 5. 2. 15, 34) was aimed against Amyntas in the first instance though doubtless its character would have been
anti-Spartan; the Chalcidians might be seeking additional muscle against Macedonia, but the Thebans only cared for
support against Sparta.
-218-

19. 3. The attack on Phlius

. . . : and this is all D has to say about the attack on Phlius which in any
case took place two years later (19-23 n.). For the events at Phlius see X. H. 5. 2. 8-10;5. 3. 10-17;5. 3. 21-5
with Tuplin, 1993: 90ff. Legon, 1967: 324 ff., argues that Phlius was democratic till its suppression by Agesilaus
when an oligarchy was established, and this is the general view. Thompson, on the other hand, 1970: 224 ff.,
sounds a note of caution: Phlius may not have been democratic, and Agesilaus did not necessarily impose an
oligarchy at the city's surrender. However, that constitutional questions were indeed the issue at Phlius, and that
an oligarchic regime replaced a democracy, thus justifying D's claim that Phlius was forced to submit to Sparta,
see Cartledge, 1987: 262 ff., 372.
+ : is this just a Diodoran clich? Xenophon certainly does not mention a battle; but then
neither does he mention the fighting before Mantinea in 385 (5. 5 n.).

19. 4. Agesilaus and Agesipolis

+ : Meyer, GdA v. 294, considers this an Ephoran exaggeration and indeed
one's first reaction is to distrust such antitheses, a penchant it seems of Ephorus (pp. 118 ff.). There was certainly
a tradition which viewed Agesilaus as the villain responsible for all Spartan misdeeds, while his contemporary
Agiad kings were invested with just and pacific natures; cf. Polyb. 9. 23. 7 (he contrasts Cleombrotus, the brother
and successor of Agesipolis, with Agesilaus); Plut. Ages.35. 5; (Maximus of Tyre 35. 8c is obscure and probably
corrupt; but see Tuplin, 1979: 356). And the exiled Pausanias may have been making the same point when he
had it proclaimed of his son on a memorial he raised to him at Delphi that 'E ' ' (Tod 120).
Ephorus appears to have been influenced by this tradition. It would be as erroneous to reject the tradition out of
hand as to credit it fully. The facts indicate that each incident should be treated separately; and that while there

was probably enmity between Cleombrotus and Agesilaus, the latter and Agesipolis seem to have liked each
other, their disagreement (not to be exaggerated) stemming only out of differences over foreign
-219policy (X. H. 5. 3. 20; Plut. Ages. 20. 7-9. And cf. Xenophon's telling comment at H. 4. 7. 5 that the two kings
competed with each other in prowess much as athletes do in the pentathlon).
There was no disagreement as far as we can see between the two kings in the cases of Mantinea and Olynthus
(12. 1n.;22. 2 n.). The capture of the Cadmea, we are told (X. H. 5. 2. 32; Plut. Ages. 23. 6), provoked a great
deal of anger at Sparta, but only because Phoebidas had acted without orders. But there was general
acquiescence once it was realized that the action was in the Spartan interest. Agesipolis may have been critical to
begin with, and he may in fact have pressed for Phoebidas' trial and fine (cf. Plut. Ages. 23. 6). But there is no
reason to suppose that he opposed the continued occupation of the Cadmea which was so obviously beneficial to
Spartan interests in central Greece and to the successful prosecution of the war in the north. Phlius was different
and it is in fact the only certain instance of a difference of opinion between the kings. Unlike Mantinea, Phlius had
not been disloyal in the Corinthian War and Agesipolis, championing the existing government (probably a
democracy; see above), may have pressed that reasonably loyal allies, whatever their constitution, ought not to
be interfered with.
. . . : see 9. 5 n. + + . . . :
the text has its problems here, but whether we follow Vogel or Vial (who misprints twice and gives an
inadequate app. crit.) the difference in meaning is nil.
: 'active', 'efficacious'. Also said of Agesilaus at 31. 4 and 33. 1, and of others elsewhere (11. 81.
5;11. 88. 6;17. 16. 2; 19. 4. 3; 19. 71. 4). A vivid though unusual adjective, more properly a medical term; cf.
Hornblower, 1981: 279 n. 21. Agesilaus is and in contrast to the and
Agesipolis. Cartledge, 1987: 270, 418, not inappropriately translates 'interventionist'. For D's stereotyped
language of personal description see pp. 15 ff. : see 5. 1 n.
-220-

Archon Evander, 382/I

20. 1. + : + (MSS PX ) rather than M+ (MSS MF ): Demosth. 24. 138. About
the man see Lysias 26; Sealey, 1993:17f.; Develin, 220.
+ : repetition, with some variations, of the college (390 V) cited at 14. 110. 1 (387/6), the college of
the year of the Sack of Rome; see pp. 27 f. Though he correctly states that six tribunes were elected he names
only four. For the complete college see Livy 5.36. 11; 5.35.5; CAH2 vii. 2. 636. And for an explanation for the
omissions in D, Drummond, 1980: 58f. MS F, as often, adds names not to be found in the other MSS or in other
fasti; Vial ad loc. and p. 129 ; Perl, 1957: 79, 103.

20. 1-3. The capture of the Cadmea

20. 1. . . . : the date is correct (19-23 n.). This is perhaps the chronographic entry (pp. 44
f.).
+ : Cf. 11. 82. 3;15. 26. 1;15. 39. 1;15. 50. 5;17. 11. 4; and 15. 5. 3 (and n. there).
Another example of D's stereotyped and repetitious way of writing; which is not to deny that Ephorus had
expressed a similar opinion. On the contrary, Boeotian prowess was very much an Ephoran theme ( Andrewes,
Essays Starr, 191; see also p. 324 ).
. . . : a common enough metaphor. At 14. 82. 4 he says the same of Sparta vis--vis
the Peloponnese; cf. ML 95(c) (Lacedaemon, the acropolis of Greece); Athen. 13. 573e ( Corinth, the acropolis of
Greece); Eurip. Orest. 1094 (Delphi, the acropolis of Phocis).
20. 2. . . . : the charge that the Spartans conspired to seize the Cadmea is perfectly
plausible (5. 2-3 n.). Since the Kina's Peace and the restoration of the Theban exiles when Thebes had for a while
performed her duties as a loyal member of the Peloponnesian League (5. 2-3 n.), the pro-Spartan faction had
been losing ground and now (summer 382) Thebes was poised once more, as in 395, to challenge Sparta.
Certainly there were rumours of an impending alliance between Thebes and the Chalcidians (X. H. 5. 2. 15). No
wonder the Spartans were worried. Agesilaus was suspected at the time of having been behind the plot (Plut.
Ages. 23. 6-24. 2) and indeed it may be
-221doubted whether Phoebidas would have dared to act thus against Thebes without the support of some powerful
group at Sparta; and we know that he was Agesilaus' man (X. H. 5. 4. 41; Cawkwell, 1976a: 77f. and n. 59;
Cartledge, 1987: 143f., 156, 373). Then there is, as we have seen, the splitting in two of the advance force
against Olynthus and the possibility that Phoebidas' contingent was aimed at Thebes from the start (19. 3 n.). In
addition, there is the fact that Phoebidas found himself outside Thebes on the day of the Thesmophoria when the
Cadmea was in the charge of the women. A coincidence? Perhaps, but under the circumstances one may
reasonably suspect not. Perhaps the Theban delegates who attended the congress of allies at Sparta (X. H. 5. 2.

11) were Leontiades and his friends, the anti-Spartan faction of Ismenias having boycotted the proceedings. The
occasion would have been ideal for the hatching of a plot. And the timing could not have been better. It might be
thought that Phoebidas' very presence at Thebes constitutes yet another suspicious circumstance. Thebes is not
on the direct route north. But Ismenlas and his supporters did not regard his presence with suspicion and were
caught off their guard. Phoebidas therefore must have had a valid reason for being at Thebes. I would see that
reason as the collection of the Theban contingent against Olynthus-in vain, for a public proclamation forbade any
Theban to follow him (X. H. 5. 2. 27). Not that that mattered; Phoebidas was after the Cadmea, not Theban
troops. (Cawkwell's suggestion, 1981a: 78f., that the Theban contribution against Olynthus was on the basis of
the sanctions clause in the King's Peace is not impossible.)
: this is a little awkward in D as he has only just explained what Phoebidas' command was
(19. 3). In Ephorus' lengthier accounts on the other hand it may not have been so.
+ + : a rhetorical exaggeration or did the Thebans resist? Neither X. H. 5. 2. 30 ff. nor Plut. Pel.
5; Ages. 23, speak of any fighting. Cf. in general Grote, x. 78ff.
: X. H. 5. 2. 31 agrees and adds that they fled to Athens. The Aristides scholiast, quoting Androtion,
speaks of 400 Theban exiles at Athens (iii. 278 Dind. = FGH 324 F 50 and see Jacoby's n. ad loc.); cf. Isocr. 14.
28; Nepos, Pel. 2. 1. Many of these are listed in IG ii2 37 (+addenda) and IG ii2 245, as having been awarded
ateleia and isoteleia. See Walbank, 1982: 268 n. 19 and cf. Plut. Pel. 7. 1 and Aristides, Panath.283 Dind.
-222 . . . : cf. Polyb, 4. 27. 4; Plut. Mor. 576a; Nepos, Pel. 1. 3. Plut. Pel. 6. 1 says that
Phoebidas was fined the very high sum of 100,000 drachmas, precisely the same fine that Agis was threatened
with in 418 (Thuc. 5. 63. 2), and Pleistoanax actually fined in 446 according to Ephorus ( FGH 70 F 193. Ephorus
in fact said 15 talents which may be a rounding of 162/3 Aeginetan talents, that is, 100,000 Aeginetan drachmas:
Lewis, 1977: 39 n. 82). At 27. 3 D says that one of the three men who surrendered the Cadmea was fined so
much money that he could not pay it, and it may well be that such large fines were often meant to ruin a man (or
group) politically or force him into exile. The trouble is we know very little about this aspect of Spartan life. The
famous restriction on owning coined silver or gold which was reaffirmed in 404 (Plut. Lys. 17) appears to have
been circumvented by many Spartans, both before this date (cf. Michell, 1952: 298ff.; MacDowell, 1986a: 119),
and after it. Andrewes' suggestion ( HCT iv. 90) that the kings, at any rate, were exempt from it may be correct;
and of course the state itself had a treasury, certainly after 404. Plato, Alc. 1. 122e-123b, speaks of the mass of
gold and silver in Sparta and the great wealth of the kings. And Posidonius had said ( FGH 87 F48c) that
Spartans, forbidden by law from keeping either gold or silver, were in the habit of depositing them with the
neighbouring Arcadians. The statement finds confirmation in a 5th-century inscription from Tegea (IG v. ii.
159=Buck, 1955: 267 no. 70). The document is in fact a deposit 'account' by a certain Xuthias, son of
Philachaeus, almost certainly a well-connected Spartan. The place of deposit was the temple of Athena Alea.
Xuthias' total deposit amounted to 400 minae of silver, just under 7 talents, a considerable sum. Phoebidas' fine,
therefore, may well have been paid, perhaps with the help of Agesilaus (cf. Cartledge, 1987: 156). At any rate
four years later he is still prominent at Sparta and still within Agesilaus' circle (X. H. 5. 4. 41). Dicaearchus'
statement (ap. Athen. 4. 141c; cf. Plut. Lyc. 12. 3) that each Spartan contributed to his mess lo Aeginetan obols
is difficult to reconcile with the provision against owning coined silver; unless the latter had become a dead letter
by the 4th century; cf. X. Lac. Pol. 14. 32. See the comments of David, 1981: 5ff.; Cawkwell, 1983: 396;
Cartledge, 1987: 88f.
Xenophon says nothing about a trial or a fine though Agesilaus'
-223-

cynically utilitarian comment (H. 5. 2. 32) would imply that, at the time of Leontiades' arrival at Sparta, Phoebidas was
being tried or at least that the trial was imminent. The verbal proximity between D and Polyb. 4. 27. 4 suggests a
common source; either Ephorus or, more likely, Callisthenes who was used by both Ephorus and Polybius.
20. 3. : as was seen (19. 3 n.) D has confused the order of events and the two brothers.

20. 3-21. The Olynthian War continued

21. 1. + : D will not deviate from the view that Sparta was helping the Macedonian king against
Olynthus (19. 3 and n.; 20. 3).
: for this Diodoran clich, used twice in this section, see p. 133. For the military strength of
Olynthus see X. H. 5. 2. 14 where the figure 800 (hoplites) should be emended to, perhaps, 4,000 or even 8,000 (
Cartledge, 1987: 269). Demosth. 19. 263 is confused and inaccurate rhetoric.
U=1F79 +' : he was certainly admired by Xenophon; cf. H. 4. 4. 19;4. 8. 23 f.;5. 1.
2. ff.;5. 2. 37 ff. The quick temper which caused his death is nevertheless criticized: 5. 3. 7.
21. 2. : this is but the briefest outline of Teleutias' warfare in the Chalcidice, for the details of
which see X. H. 5. 2. 37 ff. But sketchy though it is, the usual Diodoran insipid embellishments of battle scenes still
occur.

 : the reading of the 'edited' MS F. MSS PMX, on the other hand, read . It is likely that D wrote
and F corrected.
: the facts still emerge from D's severe abridgement of his source. There was first an indecisive
battle ( . . . ) which is to be identified with that fought before Olynthus in early summer
381 (X. H. 5. 2. 39-43). Some time later ( +' ) there followed another battle and this is the second battle
before Olynthus (spring 380) which cost Teleutias his life (X. H. 5. 3. 3-6).
. . . : Xenophon gives only the number of peltasts under Tlemonidas killed, 'more than a hundred',
but he does say that in the final rout a great many fell (X. H. 5. 3. 4, 6). Still, the figure of 1, 200 may represent
Teleutias' total losses.
-224-

21. 3. It is clear from X. H. 5. 3. 8f. too that the Spartans now decided to make a major effort and win the war.

Archon Demophilus, 381/0

22. 1. + : CAH2 vii. 2. 636 (389 V). Unusually D does not here give a figure for the total number of
tribunes in the college. If the between and is deleted (following Rhodoman), we have
seven names in all (Vial, 28), which makes this college unique in D. It is possible nevertheless that the number of
names originally given in the fasti employed by D was eight, being a contraction of
+ , both of which are given by Livy (6. 1. 8); see Drummond, 1980: 65
and n. 38. Livy himself gives the usual number of six and the difference between him and D is that the latter
includes two more magistrates, L. Papirius and M. Furius. In this and other instances where D names more
tribunes than Livy or gives different names, Drummond's opinion is that Livy's colleges are more trustworthy, D's
discrepant information being the result not so much of interpolation as of confusion and contamination with other
years ( 1980: 65ff.). It is noteworthy, as Drummond points out ( 1980: 71), that D's two additional names
reappear in the college of 384 V. MS F adds K after ; but cf. Drummond, 1980: 65 n. 39.

22. 2. The Olynthian War continued

: as Agesilaus in 396, Agesipolis was given a staff of thirty Spartiates. In addition to the
Lacedaemonian and allied troops ordered out, he was followed by large numbers of volunteers: perioikoi,
trophimoi, nothoi, as well as contingents from the allies and cavalry from Thessaly, +
(X. H. 5. 3. 8f.). There is not the slightest evidence to support Smith's assertion ( 1954: 279f. Also,
though with greater circumspection, Cartledge, 1987: 226, 271) that the command was thrust by Agesilaus upon
an unwilling Agesipolis who was then sent north 'suitably hedged about' by the thirty Spartiates. On the contrary,
it is evident that the young king intended to imitate, and if possible surpass, his older colleague. Witness his
invasion of the Argolid in 388 (X. H. 4. 7. 5). Xenophon's description of
-225-

Agesipolis' Olynthian campaign is very brief, but the energy with which it was pursued is plain enough. There is nothing
sinister about the thirty advisers. It may be noted that Agesilaus was accompanied for a second time by such a body
when he went to Egypt in 361 (Plut. Ages. 36. 6).
Nor is the composition of the volunteer force evidence that the young king 'enjoyed a great popularity among the
depressed classes at Sparta and among the allies' because he stood up to Agesilaus who was responsible for the
oppressive Spartan policies ( Smith, 1954: 279f.). Why should Agesipolis be popular with the depressed classes at
Sparta? What these people would have wished for, political equality with the homoioi, Agesipolis could not, would not,
give them. One suspects (and this is probably how Xenophon saw it too) that the enthusiasm of these people was due
to the joys and benefits to be derived from a great campaign in the north under one of their kings. The motivation of
the nonLaconian volunteers can be explained quite satisfactorily as due to personal considerations. They wanted to
become known to the king, as Xenophon says. Many no doubt hoped to be rewarded for their services (as Xenophon
had been). Cawkwell explains the volunteers otherwise ( 1981 ae: 78 f.).
: see p. 133. Xenophon gives no figures either.
. . . : a Diodorism, see p. 16. Unger's emendation (printed by Vogel though not by
Vial) has no MSS support and is unnecessary.
+ : the surviving Peloponnesian troops were in fact quartered in the various allied cities (X. H. 5. 3. 6).
The term, meaning fortified camp, is Hellenistic. Ephorus could not have used it.
: Cf. X. H. 5. 3. 18 f.

Archon Pytheas, 380/79

23. 1. : in agreement with Livy 6. 4. 7; CAH2 vii. 2. 636 (388 V).

23. 2. . . . : a chronographic entry. For the Spartan kinglists, see pp. 37 ff.
-226-

23. 2-3. The Olynthian Way concluded

23. 2. : he may well have been the son of the ephor Naucleidas (whose own father was called
Polybiadas) who in 404/3 accompanied Pausanias to Athens and supported him against Lysander (X. H. 2. 4. 36;
Athen. 12. 55 od; Aelian, VH 14. 7). But we should not read too much into this. Polybiadas' appointment was not
necessarily political, and it is no proof that Agesipolis' circle was dominant in Sparta at this time. Nor is it safe to
speculate (as Smith, 1954: 279 f., and Rice, 1974: 177 f., do; cf. also Cartledge, 1987: 270 that Agesilaus had
either contested the Olynthian command or had it thrust on Agesipolis (see n. above).
23. 3. : X. H. 5. 3. 26 is as brief as D. Polybiadas confined the Olynthians to their city and
besieged them until they asked for terms.
. . . : cf. X. H. 5. 3. 26:
+ + +. The standard oath sworn by members of the Peloponnesian
League ( de Ste Croix, 1972: 108 f. with SEG xxvi. 461 = ML 67 addenda. For further discussion and partial
modification of de Ste Croix's view see Pistorius, 1985: 78 ff.). The Spartans do not appear to have insisted on
the complete dissolution of the Chalcidian Confederacy. Zahrnt, 1971: 91 ff., believes, perhaps rightly, that even
after 379 there remained a Chalcidian state, shrunk to little more than Olynthus, the original 'Einheitsstaat' which
had created the Confederacy in the 390S (19. 2 n.). Certainly, the continuing Chalcidian coinage is an argument
that something remained, whether a nucleus Chalcidian state or a reduced Confederacy. For the same argues also
the designation [] [] on the stele of the decree of Aristoteles ( Svt257 (=Tod 123) B lines 5 f.)
which marked their entry into the Athenian Confederacy in the mid-370s. In the same context too probably
belongs Svt 250 (=Tod I 19), an alliance between Athens and the Chalcidians of Thrace ( West, 1918: 108 and n.
2, 125 n. 13; Accame, 1941: 87 ff.; Lewis, 1954: 33), which should therefore be the treaty which accompanied
the entry of the Chalcidians into the Athenian Confederacy. The cities detached from the Chalcidian Confederacy
will have entered the Spartan alliance individually; see next n.
The surrender of Olynthus was followed it would seem by
-227intense coining activity as the state tried to make good the deprivations inflicted on it by four years of war. Now
for the first time the names of magistrates appear on the coins, with 'Asclepiodorus' leading the series. Robinson's
explanation that this was a measure aimed at certifying the solvency of the state and continuing worth of the
Chalcidian coinage is almost certainly correct ( Olynthus, ix. 156ff. Robinson's series requires some slight
modifications; see Clement, 1970)
. . . + : former members of the Confederacy and other cities in the area.
See 31. 2: the tenth division of the reorganized Peloponnesian League consisted of the +.

23. 3-5. Spartan power at its height

23. 3-4. + : see X. H. 5. 3. 27 for very similar comments on Spartan
power at this time, made at this very point of the surrender of Olynthus. 'The reason for this convergence of
judgement is . . . that both historians (Ephorus and Xenophon) have in mind the forthcoming peripeteia of the
Theban counter-revolution' ( Tuplin, 1993: 87). No doubt, but this would also appear to be an instance where
Ephorus used Xenophon. The states mentioned are given in the same sequence ( Thebes, Corinth, Argos, Athens)
and the same opinions are expressed about them.
23. 3. : the Spartan hegemony lasted from 404 till 371 and in that time, it was commonly
said, the Spartans had ruled both land and sea; cf. Demosth. 19. 264;Isocr. 5. 47;7. 7; Plut. Pel. 2. 10;6. 2; 13.
7.
23. 4. : presumably an Ephoran comment on the Athenian habit of sending out settlers to the
territory of their subjects, in particular of those that had been suppressed after a revolt (cf. Thuc. 1. 114. 3;2. 70.
4;3. 34. 4;50. 2). This was in the 5th century, but it had not been forgotten abroad especially as people in Athens
still dreamed of regaining their former overseas possessions (cf. Andoc. 3. 15, 36), so much so that assurances
had to be given in 377 (29. 8 and n.; Isocr. 14. 44; Svt 257 (=Tod 123) lines 25 ff.).
U=1F79 . . . : this is rather intriguing. Perhaps what Ephorus had meant was that the
Spartans with their alliance, which was at its most at this moment, far out-228-

numbered any other state or group of states in Greece. And of course the Spartans were professional soldiers in
constant training. It is possible, however, that there is a reference here to the reorganization of the Peloponnesian
League which was completed by summer 378; see 31. 1-2n.

23. 5. U03C439A : the close connection between Sparta and Dionysius is too well known to
require extensive documentation (cf. pp. 68 ff., 216). After the King's Peace when Sparta ruled with the backing of
Persia, the unholy triad of the King, the tyrant and Sparta was denounced by the critics of Spartan rule; cf. Isocr. 4.
126; and see 47. 2-4, 7n. is careless Diodoran rhetoric; Ephorus will have phrased things better.

Archon Nicon, 379/8

24. 1. 'P : This is 387 V; cf. CAH2 vii. 2. 637. Six tribunes promised and six named. Livy's college by contrast
consists of only five (6. 5. 7) though 'almost certainly a sixth has been lost' ( Drummond, 1980: 65 and n. 37). If D's
is the same as Cn. Sergius then D and Livy have three names in common ( Drummond, 1980: 65 and n.
37). See 22. 1n.

24. 1-3. Western affairs

For these sections see pp. 82 f. and 15. 1 n.
24. 1 : see 14. 107. 2 for the fate of Hipponium.
24. 2. . . . : for the African subjects of Carthage see Gsell, ii. 287ff.; Huss, 1985: 469ff.; Warmington, 1969:
55ff.; Ameling, 1993: 210ff. . . . : for Carthage and Sardinia see Barreca, 1968: 74ff.; id.,
1971: 7ff.; id., 1974; Moscati, 1966: 215ff.; id., 1968; Whittaker in Imperialism, 68f., 72f.; Huss, 1985: 473.
24. 3. : doubtless of children: 20. 14. 4-7; Warmington, 1969: 147ff.; Stager, 1980: 1ff.; Scullard, CAH2 vii. 2.
514f.; Lipinski, 1988: 151ff.
-229-

Archon Nausinicus, 378/7

25. 1. 'P : 386 V; cf. CAH2 vii. 2. 637. Four tribunes are announced and four given, two short of Livy's six (6.
6. 3); see Drummond, 1980: 61f. and pp. 27f.

25-27. The liberation of Thebes

25. 1. . . . : D's date is 'out', too low, by a year. The mistake is probably due to the fact that the
sentence represents the chronographic entry to which D attached the Ephoran narrative by means of the frequently
occurring phrase ; see p. 135. It is evident from these chapters that Ephorus began Book 21 of the
Histories with an account of the liberation of Thebes (pp. 94 f.). Thebes was freed in midwinter 379/8. The time of the
year is obtained from X. H. 5. 4. 4 and Plut. Pel. 24. 2; 25. 2; cf. X. H. 5. 4. 14; Plut. Pel. 9. 2; Mor. 596c; Kallet-Marx,
1985: 135f. and nn. 35 and 36. The year itself is derived by working backwards from the summer of 375 when
Timotheus operated in the Ionian Sea and won over Corcyra, Acarnania, and Cephallenia (X. H. 5. 4. 64). The decree
introducing these states to the Athenian Confederacy is firmly dated to the autumn of 375 (Svt 262=Tod 126). In the
previous year, 376, Cleombrotus had failed to invade Boeotia, and 377 and 378 are the respective years of Agesilaus'
successive invasions of Boeotia (X. H. 5. 4. 35ff., 47ff., 59, 63). Therefore 379/8 is the winter of the coup. Cf. Beloch,
GG iii. 2. 234.
: for Ephorus' attitude to Sparta and Thebes see pp. 117 f. . . . : see 20. 2n.
: '[the exiles] secured the support of the Athenians' (Sherman); 'avec l'aide d'Athnes'
(Vial). This appears correct, the absence of + notwithstanding. A possible alternative 'and with the support of
some Athenians' is unlikely because of the omission of + vel. sim. But even the first translation may represent
in brief summary a version of the early stages of the liberation which is in broad agreement with that of Xenophon, H.
5. 4. 2f. (Grote, x. 124 n. 1. Burnett, 1962: 15 and Kallet-Marx, 1985: 141 n. 57 seem to have missed this information
in D). D is so brief and vague that we would not be justified in assuming (with Rice, 1975: 100) that the timing
envisaged for the
-230-

Athenian help is different from that of Xenophon. Nor of course can we tell whether Ephorus considered this initial
help to have been given officially or unofficially. It is generally thought that the inference to be drawn from
Xenophon is that the help was unofficial, but, as Kallet-Marx argues ( 1985: 141 ff.), this is not at all certain. That
some Athenians were privy to the plot and helped the returning exiles, whether officially or unofficially, is also
stated by Dinarchus 1. 38 and implied by Plut. Pel. 14. 1, but only X. H. 5. 4. 9 gives any detail. For the close
rapport between the Theban exiles and the anti-Spartan group in Athens cf. Aristid. Panath. 283 Dind. The precise
involvement of Athens in the later stages of the liberation is even more problematical (see below).
25. 2. + U=1F73 : the fullest description of the coup is in Plut. De genio and Pel. 7ff., both of
which differ in some respects from X. H. 5. 4. 2ff. (on which cf. Tuplin, 1993: 147f.), and indeed from each other.
But considering the nature of the event, the secrecy required before it, and the boastful elaborations of the
conspirators following its success, especially as they competed for power (cf. Plut. Pel. 25. 5), what is remarkable

is not the differences, but the fact that Xenophon's and Plutarch's accounts are materially the same. Nepos, Pel.
2-3, agrees closely with Plutarch and doubtless derives from the same original source. Polyaen. 2. 3. 1; 2. 4. 3;
and the scholion ad Aristid. Panath. 279 Dind. give garbled and partly fictitious versions of the coup. Cf. Westlake,
1939: 21f. J. de Voto attempts a reconstruction in Daidalicon: Studies in Memory of R. V. Schoder, ed. R. F.
Sutton ( Wauconda, Ill., 1989), 101ff. Borthwick, 1976: 148ff., suggests that the representation on the amphora
of Panagjurischte ( -JHS94 ( 1974), pls. 4f.) refers to the Theban liberation, especially as described in Plutarch;
but cf. Buckler, 1980a: 286f.
25. 3-27. 3. D's account of what followed is diametrically opposed to that of Xenophon. D represents a fairly
lengthy siege of the Cadmea lasting for no less than a week and including vigorous fighting (even after the
rhetoric has been stripped away) with the participation of a strong and official Athenian expeditionary force. The
Athenian aim, we are explicitly told, in wanting to free Thebes, was to repay a debt of gratitude and at the same
time to have the Boeotians on their side in the struggle against Sparta (0 5. 26. 1). Xenophon's account is far
simpler. There was Athenian involvement, but small-scale though perhaps not unofficial (see n.
-231-

above); two strategoi with a body of troops reached Thebes shortly after the coup and in time for the assault on the
Cadmea. The garrison of the latter surrendered almost immediately after hardly any fighting. The expedition of
Cleombrotus was not meant to relieve the Cadmea for its garrison had already surrendered when the king set out from
Sparta (H. 5. 4. 9 ff.)
Plutarch in the Pelopidas appears to have used Xenophon to a certain extent, but the narrative in both the Pelopidas
and the De genio reflects mostly the version followed by Ephorus, a version which goes back to at least 373/2 to judge
from Isocr. 14. 29. Though Plutarch does not explicitly mention an Athenian vote to succour Thebes, his statement,
('), at Pel. 14. 1 (cf. 15. 1) might be taken to imply it. Like D too he
describes a lengthy and arduous siege of the Cadmea with the Thebans battling against time to free the acropolis
before the arrival of the Spartan army. Similarly he agrees with D that there were three Spartans in command on the
Cadmea and that they were tried and condemned (but see 27. 3n.).
The Ephoran version receives its strongest support from Dinarchus 1. 38f. (dated mid-320s). There the speaker in no
uncertain terms relates that apart from the initial help to the returning exiles which resulted in the liberation of Thebes,
the Athenian assembly voted on the proposal of Cephalus to assist the Thebans in force;

+ U=+1F75 . This is closely echoed by

Aristid. Panath. 179 Dind.; 38. 486 Dind.; cf. schol. Aesch. 2. 117. Aristid. Panath. 283 f. Dind., is quite explicit: there
was first the winter expedition which freed the Cadmea followed later by the campaign against Agesilaus.
Scholarly opinion is divided over the issue with a majority leaning towards Xenophon. Some attempt a reconciliation of
D and Xenophon: see Grote, x. 124 n. 1, who produced seemingly irrefutable arguments in favour of Xenophon;
Schaefer, 1885-7: i. 16; Stern, 1884: 44ff.; Fabricius, 1893: 448ff.; Beloch, GG iii. i. 144ff.; Marshall, 1905: 12f.;
Judeich, 1927: 171ff.; Accame, 1941: 18ff.; Burnett, 1962: 15f.; Cawkwell, 1973b: 56f.; Seager, 1974: 45f.; Rice,
1975: 95ff.; Sinclair, 1978: 42; Kallet-Marx, 1985. In fact the two accounts are irreconcilable. One must choose
between them. It is felt by most scholars that as Xenophon is the more
-232reliable of the two, his version should be accepted and that of D, Dinarchus, and Aristides (and Plutarch and Isocrates)
rejected as being no more than an understandable confusion: D's 5,000 Athenians marched to the aid of Thebes in the
summer of 378 at the time of Agesilaus' invasion, and not six months earlier (Grote's suggestion followed by many
including Burnett and Rice). It is considered inconceivable that Xenophon could not have known of such a major
expedition. However, it is not perhaps the case that Xenophon was not aware of the midwinter march to Thebes. It is
simply that he chose to ignore an action which he would have ascribed to the influence of the at Athens
(cf. H. 5. 4. 34). Does he not after all fall to inform us of the Athenian participation in the operations against Agesilaus
in the summer when Chabrias employed his famous tactic? And only his accidental mention of Chabrias at H. 5. 4. 54
betrays the fact that the Athenians were again fighting alongside the Thebans in 377, for the second successive
season. These are hardly less serious failings.
There is in addition an apparent inconsistency in Xenophon's account which should put us on our guard. Xenophon
represents Cleombrotus' expedition as aimed at Thebes and not at relieving the Cadmea for the latter fell, according to
him, before Cleombrotus set out (H. 5. 4. 13). Yet he says ( ibid. ) that the Spartans put to death the harmost who
had surrendered the Cadmea and had not waited for the relief force. What relief force is that? The sent for to
Thespiae and Plataea (H. 5. 4. 10) which either had not materialized (Thespiae) or had failed to get through (Plataea)?
One cannot help suspecting that the at H. 5. 4. 13 is none other than Cleombrotus' army which would have
arrived in time had the Cadmea garrison held out for two or three days longer, as D and Plutarch tell us. Also, the
indecision of Cleombrotus which draws Xenophon's criticism (H. 5. 4. 15f.) rather indicates that the king had set out
with one specific order -to relieve the Cadmea. But as that had already surrendered when he entered Boeotia, he was
left in effect without a definite objective. His soldiers cannot have been alone in wondering whether or not a state of
war existed between Sparta and Thebes (H. 5. 4. 16). Better sense is made if Plutarch's information is brought into
play at this stage. On reaching Corinth (or Megara; see 27. 3n.) Cleombrotus was met by the retreating Cadmea
garrison. He
-233thought it better (and safer?) to proceed, but he no longer had a definite goal and it is likely that the authorities in
Sparta were equally uncertain for a while as to what action to take.

Thus D ought not to be dismissed on the strength of Xenophon's far from reliable testimony. As to whether an
Athenian expedition to Thebes at this moment is credible or not, it must be admitted that none of the objections
advanced against it is compelling. Grote's criticism that such an Athenian undertaking 'would have been the most
flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities against Sparta' (x. 124 n. 1; followed by Rice, 1975: 109 n. 34)
is weak: the Athenian people would on the contrary have considered their action as helping to rectify an obvious
breach of the King's Peace, the continued occupation of the Cadmea by Sparta. The expedition could hardly be
construed as a declaration of war against Sparta, and Sparta did not construe it as such. Burnett's objections (1962:
15f.) are equally unsound; see Cawkwell refutation, 1973b: 57 n. 2. Nor can the argument stand ( Rice, 1975: 102)
that the Athenians could not have voted to march to Boeotia on such short notice and risk encountering a Spartan
army there. Is that not precisely what they did in 395 (X. H. 3. 5. 7ff.)? Not only is D's version not implausible,
therefore, but it is also self-consistent. No less than a week would have been required for a message to reach Sparta
from Thebes and for Cleombrotus to gather an army and reach the Isthmus; and we are told in fact that the Cadmea
held out for as long as possible and was only starved into surrender (cf. Dinarch. 1. 39).
The evidence of Dinarchus and Aristides may appear rather dubious at first sight. Dinarchus is clearly boasting and
Schaefer for one felt justified in dismissing Aristides as high-flown rhetorical exaggerations in praise of Athens. There
are inaccuracies too. It is not possible, for example, that the Theban exiles were granted Athenian citizenship, but only
ateleia or isoteleia (IG ii2 37+ addenda; IG ii2 245; cf. Plut. Pel. 7. 1). These criticisms nevertheless fail to detract
from the value of their explicit testimony, especially as the same testimony is found in D (Ephorus) and Plutarch and
echoed in Isocrates. The charge that the Ephoran version is another instance of the fiction-making power of Athenian
propaganda cannot be refuted. We have seen, however, that an Athenian expedition to free the Cadmea is not in itself
improbable, and in the absence of a statement to the contrary (Xenophon does not
-234-

contradict, he is merely silent), there is no logical reason why the Ephoran version should not be allowed to stand.
Two points require comment. First, Xenophon's statement that Chabrias guarded the road to Boeotia via
Eleutherae and Cleombrotus consequently was forced to take II (H. 5. 4. 14). The view
that Chabrias' objective was to keep Cleombrotus out of Attica (cf. Grote, x. 130) should be dismissed without
further ado for he could not have done so by holding Eleutherae, and it is not what Xenophon says he was there
to do. Clearly he was guarding a main, perhaps the main, road from the Megarid into Boeotia. Hammond, 1954:
103ff., argues that the main road from the Peloponnese to Boeotia ran from the Isthmus to Khani Derveni, to
Ayios Vasilios, to Kriekouki in Boeotia (nr. ancient Erythrae) -- see his fig. 1. Cf. Ober, 1985: 118 ff. After Ayios
Vasilios it passed through the Attic territory of Oenoe and Eleutherae. According to Hammond, this is the shortest
and easiest of all the routes into Boeotia and it must have been practicable for wheeled vehicles throughout its
length (cf. Pritchett, 1957: 16ff.; id., 1965-85: i. 119f.). While over Cithaeron, and while still on the Megarian
side, this road is joined by a track which climbs steeply from Plataea. This is the route Cleombrotus must have
taken when he found the main road blocked by Chabrias at Eleutherae, Hammond suggests (1954: 113f.).
Cawkwell, 1973b: 57f., believes that 'Chabrias was covering the direct route to Thebes to prevent the Spartans,
as part of Athens' formal help to the Thebans' (i.e. Demophon's army), from invading Boeotia, and that
consequently D's version is to be preferred to that of Xenophon. Kallet-Marx, 1985: 143f., who prefers Xenophon
to D on this point, sees Chabrias' mission as part of a 'coordinated (Athenian-Theban) defense on the Kithairon'
and as a further indication that the action of the two generals did not lack official support. Unfortunately,
however, Chabrias' presence at Eleutherae cannot be used as proof for either version, for quite independently of
any connection with what was or was not happening at Thebes at the moment, Chabrias served a purpose by
being where he was: the main road passed through Eleutherae and Eleutherae was Attic territory. Why should the
Athenians have allowed the Spartans to traverse their territory to attack the Thebans? Let them take another (and
more difficult)
-235route. Also, if the two generals had indeed acted unofficially in the Theban affair, Athens may have feared equally
'unofficial' reprisals by Cleombrotus' troops on their way to Boeotia. Hence Chabrias' presence at Eleutherae (cf.
Sinclair, 1978: 42f.).
Second, there is the condemnation of the two Athenian generals, seemingly a formidable obstacle in the path of
Ephorus' version (cf. e.g. Burnett, 1962: 16). But again this incident can add weight to neither version. If the
generals acted unofficially the legal reason for their condemnation will have been that they acted without due
authorization by the state in a way thought (at least at the time of the trials) to have endangered it. All Greek
states, and Athens especially, were ever sensitive about their generals acting independently and they always
exercised a tight control over them (cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 61. 2; Pritchett, 1971-91: ii. 29ff.). But as most such trials
were political in character we may guess that they belong to that uneasy period ( Cawkwell, 1973b: 58ff.) when
Athens was unsure about how to proceed. Their condemnation therefore does not prove that they had not taken
the trouble to secure the consent of the boule and their fellow generals; cf. KalletMarx , 1985: 144f.
25. 3. + : Plutarch gives the same figure, Pel. 12. 4; De genio 586e; 598f.
Parke, 1927: 162ff., finds this excessive for a mere garrison. He points out that Callibius had only 700 men in
Athens in 404/3 and proposes that the Cadmea garrison had been augmented by another force in winter quarters
(see 27. 3n.). The Cadmea nevertheless is a far bigger area than the Athenian acropolis and less defensible, and
in any case the Spartans may have learned from their earlier experience. With the help of the pro-Spartan faction,
1, 500 men ought to have been able to keep Thebes in subjection and had they intervened on the night of the
coup the outcome would probably have been very different; cf. X. H. 5. 4. 10f.; Plut. Pel. 12. 4; De genio 598e-f.
The three commanders may not have been condemned just for surrendering the Cadmea, but for their earlier
timidity too. : a popular expression with D. Cf. 15. 32. 4; 32. 6; 69. 2; 69. 3; 18. 15. 6; 17. 4;
45. 1; 20. 29. 8; 44. 5; McDougall's.v. Literally it means 'from commanding places on the right'; cf. X. An. 4. 8.
2. As the right-hand side was the unshielded side, an attack from that direction was particularly dangerous. The

expression, however, came to mean simply

-236-

(ground or place lying above one' (cf. X. An. 3. 4. 37; 5. 7. 31) which thus gave one the advantage, and this is how it
is used by D.
25. 4. : a reference probably to Sparta's position as hegemon in Greece, or perhaps to her prostasia of
the Peace (5. 1n.), or both (they coincided); see Plut. Ages. 28. 6, ()
'E + (in 371 before Leuctra), and cf. Herod. 6. 72 with Plut. Them.
20. 1, + , for the force Sparta led to Thessaly in the 470s against the Aleuadae who had medized.
Sparta had most of Greece on her side (or rather under her) and could further threaten Thebes with the King's Peace,
perhaps in the name of Greece (cf. 38. 2: ' E 50. 4: U=1F11 U=1F51 +
).
U=1F51: they may also have appealed to the autonomy clause in the King's Peace; cf. Isocr. 14. 24.
: not strictly correct. The Thebans protected and aided the Athenian exiles, but they did not
join Thrasybulus' force in 404/3: 14. 32. 1; X. H. 2. 4. 2; Plut. Pel. 6. 5; Justin 5. 9. 4ff.
26. 1. U=0144 + : see 25. 3-27. 3n. Ephorus' estimate of Athenian attitudes at this time is
different from that of Xenophon.
. . . : cf. 20. 1n.
26. 2. + : Vater suggested that this could be the same man as the Demades (or Demeas) of the schol.
Aristid. Panath. 284 Dind. (cf. Schaefer, 1885-7: i. 20 n. 1; PA 3693; Develin, 222). If that is so then Demophon (or
Demades or Demeas) may have marched out to Boeotia twice in 378, on the first occasion to help free the Cadmea
and on the second with Chabrias to resist Agesilaus' invasion.
: he would have been a general already. For D's ignorance of the mechanics of the Athenian
system and his misleading language when dealing with such matters, see p. 133. The annual election of generals in the
4th century was held after the sixth prytany ( Arist. Ath. Pol. 44. 4) though this does not
necessarily indicate the seventh prytany; see Meritt, 1970: 277f.; Rhodes, CAAP ad loc.
. . . : in the summer of 378 the Athenians helped with 5,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry (32. 2),
but this is no
-237-

argument against D's account as Burnett, 1962: 15 supposes; cf. Cawkwell, 1973b: 57 n. 2.
: D uses and in a non-technical sense, 'to enlist' or 'raise a levy', and for all kinds
of states; cf. 11. 1. 5; 11. 48. 4; 11. 84. 4; 13. 2. 2; 13. 44. 6; 13. 97. 1; 13. 109. 1.; 14. 44. 2; 15. 15. 2; 15.
52. 2; 15. 61. 4; 16. 28. 1; 16. 73.3; 17. 39. 3. A discussion of the Athenian is therefore unnecessary.
(For which see HCT iv. 264, 295; Andrewes in Studies McGregor 1 ff.; Rhodes, CAAP 327, 566f.)
26. 4. . . . : if we subtract the Athenian force (as Bruce, 162, omits to do) we are left with
7,000 Boeotian hoplites and more than 1,500 cavalry. The number of hoplites is credible enough. It compares well
with other figures for Boeotian contingents. At Delion in 424 there were 7,000 hoplites (Thuc. 4. 93. 3). At
Mantinea in 418, 5,000 (Thuc. 5. 57. 2). At Nemea in 394, 5,000 (the Orchomenians were absent: X. H. 4. 2. 17).
Seven thousand took part in the second invasion of the Peloponnese in 368 (15. 68. 1), and 8,000 were sent to
rescue Pelopidas in the same year (15. 71. 3). We may believe D that many from the other Boeotian cities hurried
to help free the Cadmea, and as Thebans of the older age-groups would have joined in too (whereas they would
not have been included in an expedition), the 7,000 figure is not unreasonable, though one would not of course
expect all Boeotians to have helped Thebes.
The 1,500 cavalry, however, seems inflated. According to Hell. Oxy. 16. 4, each of the eleven districts of Boeotia
provided 100 cavalry thus making a force of 1,100, and the historian is speaking of the older Confederacy (447387/6) which was wealthier and more populous perhaps than later Boeotia. The relevant cavalry figures for the
campaigns mentioned above are 1,000, 500, 800, 600, 600. Thus even allowing for the fact that this was a home
operation and that older 'knights' might have participated, D's figure seems exaggerated. It is possible that a
different figure stood in the text originally and that is a dittography. The cavalry was not meant to
assault the Cadmea of course, but to operate against Cleombrotus if he arrived before the citadel fell.
For the Boeotian army, see Salmon, 1953: 347ff.
. . . : the expression and variants occur many times, almost always in the description of
sieges. See e.g. 12. 61. 3
-238-

(425); 13. 55. 5; 56. 4; 56. 8; 59. 7 (409); 13. 64. 7 (409); 16. 74. 2, 5 (341); 17. 12. 2 (335); 17. 22. 1 (334);
17. 24. 4 (334); 17. 67. 5 (330); 17. 85. 6 (327); 18. 13. 1 (323); 18. 34. 4 (321); 20. 45. 7 (307); 20. 88. 8
(305). These narratives are based on no less than five different sources. Did all five independently use the
expression or did D find it in one of them and make it his own? It has been suggested that sieges pursued in this
fashion, by dividing one's force and attacking in relays, while not unknown to 5thcentury Greeks, were first used
to advantage by the Carthaginians at the siege of Selinus in 409, to judge from D's information and the fact that
his use of the clich begins in earnest with that event. The Carthaginians possessed both the necessary manpower
and disregard for life to make such a tactic worthwhile (see Sinclair, 1966: 249ff.; Garlan, 1974: 159ff.). The
chapters dealing with the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily derive from Timaeus who in turn based himself on
Philistus (pp. 61 ff.). It is possible, therefore, that the clich had its origin in the latter author. The problem with
this suggestion is the statement, presumably Ephorus' own, that Xerxes' troops were accustomed to fight +
+ (11. 8. 2). It would therefore appear that in Ephorus' opinion large barbarian armies fought in this
fashion. But perhaps this is an idea he borrowed from Philistus who had, after all, observed the Carthaginians in
action at first hand. The important point to be determined is whether D, once having enriched his vocabulary from
whatever source or sources with this formula, proceeded to use it indiscriminately whether the facts of a
particular case and the language of his sources demanded it or not. This is all too possible and the simpler
expressions be + + and + +0311 + are used fairly indiscriminately
in the description of sieges; cf. e.g. 12. 47. 2 with Thuc. 2. 75ff.; 12. 55. 5 with Thuc. 3. 18. 4f.; 12. 72. 3 with
Thuc. 4. 75. 1; 12. 72. 9 with Thuc. 4. 131. 3. In none of these instances is + + justified by
Thucydides' language. Whether Ephorus' language justified its use, or whether indeed Ephorus himself used it, or
something similar, is impossible to say.
All the same, the more elaborate formula seems to be different. At any rate at no instance can it be proved that
the use of the phrase + + was not necessitated by the details of the siege, as far as these can be
discovered. Specifically, and if we except the Carthaginian and Macedonian siege operations (where the use of
-239-

the tactic requires no proof), 'in relays' does not seem inappropriate to the remaining examples which involve Greeks.
In the case of Pylos (12. 61. 3) Thucydides himself says that the Peloponnesian warships attacked in relays. He does
not use the term + + , but Ephorus, it would seem, did and clearly that was a correct rendition of
Thucydides' description. For the capture of Pylos in 409 X. H. 1. 2. 18 gives no detail whatsoever. But the Spartans
were in a hurry to capture the place before it was relieved from Athens (13. 64. 6) and it is probable that they were
prepared to sustain heavier than usual casualties by attacking in continuous waves.
Similarly, in the instance of the Cadmea, there is no good reason to deny that the expression + + +
+ + + was justified by the facts and therefore that it was employed by Ephorus. We may
compare Plut. Pel. 13. 1 + . . . + + , being anxious to capture the
citadel before the arrival of the Spartan army. Given that it was a race against time, what else could the Thebans have
done but divide their forces and attack on a wide front (Plutarch) and in successive waves (D), hoping to exhaust the
besieged and force them to surrender? It was a time when they could well forsake the normal Greek reluctance to
sacrifice citizen troops in steady assaults on the walls in order to gain their objective quickly. There is in fact a good
example of how D (Ephorus) might or might not substitute the formula for an expression which meant the same thing.
written + instead of + , 'in turn' (for this
At 15. 83. 4 in describing Epaminondas' sudden
use of + cf. 13. 108. 7f.;; Thuc. 4. 26. 3).
Sinclair, therefore, is not at all persuasive when he argues ( 1966: 255) that this aspect of the siege, however
expressed, was not in Ephorus 'since precise military details of this kind are hardly to be associated with Ephorus'. On
the contrary, Ephorus appears to have been very much interested in matters of this sort; see pp. 124f. and 34. 4n.
27. 2. + . . . : it is argued above (19. 3n.) that the Cadmea was captured by allied
troops under
-240-

Spartan command and we now see that the garrison continued to be composed mostly of allies. This would have
added a touch of legality to the occupation.
. . . : it may be significant of Ephorus' attitude that D, like Plutarch, does not mention
the butchery which ensued (X. H. 5. 4. 12). Or the silence may be the result of D's abridgement.
27. 3. . . . : they were under the command of Cleombrotus ( X. H. 5. 4. 14ff.; Plut.
Pel. 13. 2). Plut. Pel. 13. 2 says that the retreating garrison was met by the advancing Cleombrotus at Megara (or
Corinth acc. to De genio598f). Thus the siege of the Cadmea must have lasted for at least a week. Dinarch1. 39
13 on the other
says , but from the arrival of the Athenians on the scene; see 25. 3-27. 3 n.
hand mentions but one harmost at Thebes who was executed for surrendering the Cadmea. Parke, 1927: 159ff.,
accepts the testimony of Plutarch and D and proceeds to find roles for the three harmosts. Lysanoridas, he thinks,
was in charge of the Cadmea while Herippidas held an independent command against the further expansion of
Jason of Pherae. This is not warranted by the evidence. We may concur that there were three Spartan
commanders, two of whom were executed, Herippidas and Arcesus, and the third, Lysanoridas, heavily fined (he
had been away at the time: De genio578a). But Xenophon is more likely to be correct that there was but one
harmost (cf. Stern, 1884: 58 n. 1). The other two officers would have been the second and third in command. We
may compare Thuc. 4. 38. 1 (cf. 3. 100. 2; 109. 1. Arnold ad 3. 100. 2 and 4. 38. 1 explains correctly) and Plut.

De genio576a, .
A fragment of Theopompus (FGH 115 F240) speaks of unsavoury actions at Sparta in connection with the
condemnation of Lysanoridas, with Agesilaus playing none too edifying a part, and this may be a reason for
Xenophon's unsatisfactory brevity here. The harmost is unnamed, a sure sign that his memory was
anathematized in Agesilaus' circle (cf. Cawkwell's introduction to the Penguin translation of the Hellenica and his
nn. ad 4. 5. 11; 5.
-2414. 13). Cf. 25. 3n. For the heavy fine which forced Lysanoridas to flee, see 20. 2n.
27.4 + + . . . : if this is the unsuccessful Theban attack on Thespiae in autumn or winter
378 which is related at 33. 5 f. then D is guilty of a doublet here. Cawkwell, 1973b: 55, considers this an instance
of overlapping narrative due to D's method of epitomizing portions of Ephorus and using them to fill out his
chronological scale. In fact he finds three overlapping narratives in this part of Book 15. 'Chapters 25 to 27
recount Theban affairs from the liberation in midwinter 379/8 down to the Theban failure to take Thespiae in
winter 378/7. Chapters 28 to 30 recount the history of the Second Athenian Confederacy from its foundation in
378 to its expansion in the summer campaign of Chabrias in 377. Chapters 31 to 35 recount the Spartan military
offensive against Thebes from 378 to 375. The first and third narratives both recount the Theban attack on
Thespiae (27. 4 and 33. 5). The second and third both recount the Spartan reaction to the events of early 378.'
The reference is to 28. 4 and 31. 1.
This, though not totally incorrect, is too schematic and inflexible a way of treating D's text. Chs. 25 to 28 narrate
the liberation of Thebes, the creation of the new Boeotian Confederacy and the Second Athenian Confederacy and
(in a digression: 28. 2-3n.) the first steps of the latter, and finish with the Spartan reaction (28. 4-5). The time by
now is the spring of 378. There then follows a review of Oriental history from the King's Peace to the present time
(29. 1-4 and see p. 100 ), which splits the Greek narrative in two. At 29. 5 the Greek narrative is resumed with
the raid of Sphodrias, the outbreak of war, and the further progress of the Athenian Confederacy down to summer
377 (30. 5). Section 31. 1 carries on where 28. 5 left off. The Spartan approaches to their allies are now
beginning to bear some fruit and we are told what the Spartan + + . . .
(28. 5) amounted to (31. 1-2). There is no question therefore of a doublet though clearly there is a chronological
overlap of at least one year between 30. 5 and 31. 1. Nor is it easy to conceive of 27. 4 and 33. 5f. as an instance
of overlapping narrative for how could Ephorus have reached the winter of 378/7 (the attack on Thespiae) from
the winter of 379/8 (the liberation of Thebes)? Surely by way of the very events which Cawkwell assigns to the
second and third Ephoran narratives he traces in D's text. And as
-242in fact D does not omit these events, we cannot speak of a telescoped narrative at 27. 3-4 as we can at e.g. 77.
4.
A different explanation is therefore required for 27. 4 and the simplest and most obvious is that Thespiae was
attacked twice. Before withdrawing from Boeotia in midwinter 379/8 Cleombrotus installed Sphodrias as harmost
at Thespiae. He left with him one-third of the relief force and money to hire mercenaries with (X. H. 5. 4. 15). His
orders were to receive and help + + + ( Plut. Pel. 14. 3). We may add that
Thespiae was strategically placed for the campaigns against Thebes which the Thebans knew were bound to
come. The city was made the centre of his operations by Agesilaus in the summer campaign of 378 (X. H. 5. 4.
38, 41). There is no difficulty therefore in envisaging two Theban attempts to capture Thespiae. The
circumstances of the two are quite different. The first occurred immediately after the withdrawal of Cleombrotus
and the departure of the Athenians as D says (27. 4). The Thebans in fact may have been anxious to launch an
attack before Sphodrias had used his money and considerably increased his force. He is said to have had some
10,000 men when he marched against the Piraeus in the spring (29. 6). We hear too that Agesilaus rebuilt or
strengthened the fortifications of Thespiae in the summer of 378 (X. H. 5. 4. 41. We should not perhaps allow
its full force; see 46. 6n.). Was that a need made obvious by the winter attack? The second attempt
occurred in autumn or winter 378 when Phoebidas was harmost (33. 5f.; X. H. 5. 4. 42ff.). Buckler too, 1979: 54,
56, accepts D's two attacks, as does Tuplin, 1993: 158 n. 35, but without argumentation. And see also KalletMarx, 1985: 133 n. 29.

27. 4. A chronographic notice

+ + : perhaps from the Greek chronographer; see pp. 25 ff. Wesseling,
not believing that Sardinia could possibly have formed a Roman objective at this time, proposed replacing it in the
text with Satricum, a place in Latium some 30 miles south of Rome which did as a matter of fact receive a Roman
colony in the 4th century (385 V: Livy 6. 16. 6; cf. CAH2 vii. 2. 280, 316). Some are inclined to agree (cf. Perl,
1957: 127; Didu, 1972: 310ff.). But whatever the precise motive
-243and timing might have been, a Roman colony to Sardinia at approximately this time is far from impossible: see
14. 3n.; CAH2 vii. 2. 315.

rchon Callias, 377/6

28. 1. ' + + : 385 V; cf. CAH2, vii. 2. 637. Four tribunes are announced and four seem to have been

named though the MSS are even more unsatisfactory here than elsewhere. If K is a corruption of L.
Quinctius (Vial, 131) then three of D's names correspond with names in Livy 6. 11. 1 where five tribunes are cited
-- six if Broughton is correct in restoring Cn. Sergius to the text: MRR i. 101f. See pp. 27 f. and Drummond,
1980: 61f.

28. 1. The restoration of the Boeotian Confederacy

. . . : D therefore places the refoundation of the Boeotian Confederacy early in 378, a
date supported by Plut. Pel. 13. 1 where it is said that Pelopidas was elected Boeotarch with Melon and Charon
the day after the coup, while at 14. 2 Plutarch says that, at the time of the raid of Sphodrias (spring 378),
Pelopidas was Boeotarch with Gorgidas, and at Ages. 24. 6 he names Pelopidas and Melon as Boeotarchs at this
time. The reinstitution of the Boeotarchy implies the refoundation of the Confederacy, or at least the intention to
refound it. Such an early date for the restoration of the Confederacy has not found unanimous acceptance though
none of the arguments against D and Plutarch is compelling.
Beloch, for instance ( GG iii. 1. 145 n. 2), rejects Plutarch's claim that Boetarchs were elected on the morrow of
the coup because of Isocrates' statement (14. 29) that soon after the liberation the Thebans tried to come to an
agreement with Sparta: + + ' + + + ,
+ + + + . This Beloch takes to mean that the
new regime was promising to abide by the terms of the King's Peace which would presumably have excluded the
restoration of the Confederacy. It was not Boeotarchs, therefore, but polemarchs that were elected. Beloch's
argument will hardly bear examination. First, what does Isocrates mean? Were the Thebans really promising to
confine their actions within the terms
-244-

of the Peace? And how would Thebans in general view those terms anyhow? In 382 Ismenias and his faction did not
hesitate to challenge Sparta's call for action against the Olynthians who were flouting the autonomy clause by any
account. In 373 they captured and destroyed Plataea + (the renewal of 375: Isocr. 14. 1 and passim).
Nor did they dissolve the Boeotian Confederacy as they had promised to do at the conclusion of peace in 375. The
Confederacy was clearly in existence before the outbreak of war in 373 (38. 3n.). For a telling comment on how the
Thebans regarded or rather disregarded the King's Peace in the 370s we may compare Paus. 9. 1. 4f.: while the
Plataeans declared that the Peace still held, the Thebans maintained that + + +0315
+ + + (cf. Isocr. 14.
24). I therefore take Isocr. 14. 29 merely to mean that the Thebans were offering to remain within the Peloponnesian
League (5. 2-3n.). Second, to argue as Beloch does is to oversimplify what must have been a complicated political
situation after the liberation. While many Thebans may have counselled patience, can it be excluded as a possibility
that men like Pelopidas urged a vigorous policy of opposition to Sparta and took the first step towards the restoration
of the Confederacy by the election of Boeotarchs? Third, it is possible that a reason why Sparta rejected the Theban
offer was because the Boeotarchy had been resurrected with all that that office implied (cf. Accame, 1941: 26).
Cawkwell, 1972: 275, accepts Beloch and adds that 'the morning after the murder of the polemarchs was no moment
to engage in constitutional discussions. Boeotarchy meant Boeotia, and the Boeotia of the 370s and the 360s was not
the Boeotia described in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. . . All that would take time.' This is true, but no one would propose
that the constitution and machinery of the new Confederacy were worked out in a day. The election of Boeotarchs in
the exhilaration of the moment on the other hand would have taken little time and even less planning. Certainly 28. 1
can easily accommodate two to three months (it is meant to coincide with the beginnings of the Second Athenian
Confederacy: 28. 2ff.), time enough for constitutional deliberations.
Cawkwell further objects ( 1972: 276) that the restoration of the Confederacy would mean that there would no longer
be a state
-245-

called Thebes; it would be replaced by 'Boiotoi'. 'The whole point was in the name.' (He does not of course mean
that Thebes ceased to exist as a state, but only that the Thebans styled themselves 'Boiotoi' in future; Buckler,
1979: 57, misunderstands.) Yet it was the 'Thebans' who joined the Athenian Confederacy (29. 7) and they are
shown as such on Svt 257 = Tod 123 (date spring 377). Hence, he concludes, the refoundation of the
Confederacy must be after this date. The objection is unsound. The Confederacy was certainly in existence by the
late 370s yet the 'Thebans' alone were members of the Athenian Confederacy. Their name was not erased from
Svt 257=Tod 123 and replaced by 'Boiotoi', and the reasons for this are obvious: the Second Athenian
Confederacy stood for the autonomy and freedom of its members. Athens could hardly openly concede Theban
claims to Boeotia. But it was politic to condone and condone she did, though sometimes with a guilty conscience it
would seem (the Thebans justified their Confederacy as being in the interests of Athens and her allies: Isocr. 14.
21, 24ff., 33, 38). The embassy to Thebes voted for in the spring of 377 (Svt 257=Tod 123 lines 72ff.), which was
to persuade the Thebans + , should probably be seen as an Athenian attempt to
moderate Theban actions in Boeotia ( pace Burnett, 1962: 13; cf. Cawkwell, 1973b: 48f.). The fact therefore that
the Thebans alone were introduced to the Athenian Confederacy is no comment whatever on what Thebes was or
was not doing in Boeotia.
The sequence of events in D which Cawkwell notices but dismisses (1972: 276) is instructive of how Ephorus
viewed the events of winter and spring 378. The close causal links are still there in D's account: the revolution at
Thebes (25-7), the failure of Sparta to reimpose her will (28. 1), the birth of both the Boeotian and Athenian
Confederacies (28. 1ff.; cf. Busolt, 1873-5: 679ff.). It might be worth noting the / construction at 28. 1f.
The first introduces the revival of the Boeotian Confederacy, the second the foundation of the Athenian

Confederacy.
The matter of Pelopidas' Boeotarchies can in no way be used as evidence here, pace Bersanetti, 1949: 89ff., who
argues in favour of the restoration of the Boeotarchy in 378, and Cawkwell who opts for 377. Against the latter it
may be mentioned that the tradition in Plutarch that Pelopidas was a member of the first college of Boeotarchs
may be false ( Fuscagni, 1972: 415ff.).
-246There is no reason, therefore, to reject D's testimony that early in 378 the Boeotians set the foundations of a new
Confederacy. This differed significantly from the old. The heart of the new Confederacy was a popular assembly
meeting at Thebes and open to the citizens of all Boeotian cities (see n. below). The Boeotians and Thebans who
together besieged the Cadmea were in effect the embryo assembly of the new Confederacy. D is explicit (28. 1):
the Boeotians, encouraged by the Spartan failure to restore the situation, collected together and formed a
'common alliance'. These were the Boeotian people in arms, fresh from their success over the Cadmea garrison
and Cleombrotus. Sordi, 1973: 82ff., rightly stresses the military character of the Boeotian federal assembly, a
character to be traced back to the events of winter 379/8. Xenophon himself says (H. 5. 4. 46) that the demoi of
the neighbouring cities kept departing for Thebes at the time of the second (27. 4n.) attack on Thespiae in
autumn 378. While some of these demol will have fled to Thebes before 382 (and been expelled at the capture of
the Cadmea: 5. 2-3n.), others should be identified with the Boeotians who hastened to help free the Cadmea and
who remained to form the nucleus of the federal assembly. Xenophon's "dark but pregnant words" ( Cawkwell,
1972: 276), + + + + (H. 5. 4. 46), should not be pressed
too far. Xenophon sees this 'rekindling' in military terms: with Phoebidas killed, the Thebans carried their attacks
further afield. In any case why should the defeat of Phoebidas have originated the Confederacy? It was hardly
more important than the check the great Agesilaus and his powerful army had received in the summer of 378, or
the liberation of Thebes and the failure of Cleombrotus. (Cf. Buckler, 1979: 50ff., who also argues in favour of D
and Plutarch.)
The new Confederacy was marked by a new federal coinage; cf. Head, 1911: 351f.; Hill, 1906: 69ff.; Kraay,
1976: 113. : as in the case of Olynthus and the Chalcidic Confederacy (19. 2n.), D is not always consistent
and correct in his use of the terms 'Thebans' and 'Boeotians' and for the same reasons. He is correct in the use of
'Boeotians' here and at 67. 3f; 80. 2; 82. 3; 16. 25. 1; 28. 3; 84. 5; 85. 3 -- all important passages for our
understanding of the new Confederacy. He is wrong at 46. 6 (the decisions were 'Boeotian' not 'Theban') and 94.
2. Often the two terms are interchangeable and for stylistic reasons it would seem;
-247cf. 32. 3f.; 62. 3f.; 71. 2. We should see Ephorus behind most of this usage.
: the precise nature of the new Confederacy is a crux. Was it a unitary state, a synoikismos of
Boeotia, or a federal state? is too vague a term, but it does not argue for a unitary state or a
synoikismos but rather for a federation. The same term is used at 57. 1 where the Thebans are said to have
forced the Orchomenians to join + (Vial's emendation). Elsewhere D refers to the
Confederacy as , a union or community of states (38. 3f.; 50. 4; 70. 2), which does not necessarily
imply the subjection of Boeotia to Thebes ( as Larsen thinks, 1968: 177 n. 1), for D uses the same term to
describe not only the 5th-century Boeotian Confederacy (12. 41. 3) and the Delian League (11. 78. 4), but also
the 4th-century Arcadian Confederacy (59. 1; cf. X. H. 7. 4. 12). Busolt, GS ii. 1426ff., argues for a 'Bundesstaat'
(for earlier views see n. 2 on 1426). So does Larsen, 1968: 176ff., and Buckler, 1980a: 18ff. Sordi, on the other
hand, 1973: 79ff., esp. 89-91 (following in the footsteps of Thiel, 1926: 19ff.), argues that the Confederacy
cannot be defined as a sympoliteia, that is, a federal state. We are dealing rather with a synoikismos. After all,
was it not dioikismos that the Thebans were threatened with in 371 ( Plut. Pel. 20. 1)? Her reasoning seems
unsound. The threat of dioikismos was directed against Thebes herself. The order to dissolve the Confederacy was
phrased otherwise; see 51. 3; X. H. 6. 4. 2f.; Plut. Ages. 28. 1f. Proof that the Boeotian cities enjoyed local
selfgovernment is furnished by X. H. 7. 3. 5 1f.; Thebes had a boule and so, presumably, had the other cities.
We may then accept that Boeotia under Theban leadership was a federal state where the deciding power lay with
the assembly of the citizens of all Boeotian cities sitting at Thebes ( + + : 80. 2, or
Simply, + + : 16. 25. 1; 85. 3). That it was democratic is shown by 79. 3 (cf. Buckler,
1980a: 30, 34ff.). The votes it would seem were counted by heads and not by cities which of course gave Thebes
a definite advantage. The executive body of the state was the college of Boeotarchs of whom there appear to
have been seven at this time (cf. IG vii. 2407, 2408 and now a third inscription: Roesch, 1984: 45ff. = SEG 34
no. 355; 15. 52. 1; 53. 3; Paus. 9. 13. 6f. The seven are perhaps the original eleven minus Orchomenus and
Thespiae). How many of these
-248were Thebans? We do not know, but as the assembly met at Thebes and the people attending voted as
individuals, we may suspect that the majority were invariably Thebans, and indeed it probably often happened
that all were from Thebes; unless of course there was a rule which allocated Thebes a certain number of
Boeotarchs and the rest had to come from elsewhere. But we are totally in the dark here. Sordi, 1973: 82, thinks
that Thebes reserved for herself all the Boeotarchies. (Does the fact that the lists from the 370s and 360s -- the
inscriptions and Pausanias cited above -- give no ethnika signify that the named were all from Thebes?)
For a detailed discussion of the little we know about the workings of the Confederacy, see Buckler, 1980a: 23ff.
See also Roesch, 1982: 259ff., 287ff., 297f., whose concern nevertheless is with Hellenistic Boeotia.

28. 2-4. The foundation of the Second Athenian

Confederacy

The date

D's setting for the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy requires no detailed defence. Busolt pointed
out long ago that it is erroneous to separate the Boeotian and Athenian Confederacies in time and to treat each in
isolation (1873-5: 679ff.). The anti-Spartan group in Athens, chiefly the imperialists, and those who befriended
the Theban exiles, seem to have largely coincided, as literary and epigraphic evidence indicates (cf. Dinarch. 1.
38f.; Aesch. 3. 138f.; Plut. Mor. 575d-f; Svt 248 (=Tod 118) lines 39f.; Svt 256 (=Tod 121) line 20; Svt257
(=Tod 123) lines 76f.; Svt 259 (=Tod 124) line 7). While their Theban protgs freed Thebes and resuscitated the
Boeotian Confederacy, these people (the in Athens: 28. 2) put into effect plans for the foundation
of the Athenian Confederacy. Certainly, the Confederacy is not sufficiently explained as the Athenian reaction to
the aquittal of Sphodrias.
D's sequence of events received further support from Burnett, 1962: 1ff., and from Cawkwell, 1973b: 47ff.
Cawkwell sees the formation of the Confederacy as a defensive measure on the part of an Athens which felt very
nervous in the first three months or so after the liberation of Thebes. It was founded well within the terms of the
King's Peace as indeed appears from D's account: the
-249Athenians appealed to the Greeks to defend their 'common freedom' (28. 2). While the defensive nature of the
Confederacy is obvious ( Svt 257 (=Tod 123) lines 9f.), it should be added that Athens cannot have been
motivated entirely by fear or altruism. She had never ceased to dream of restoring her 5th-century empire (cf.
Isocr. 4. 20; X. H. 3. 5. 10; Andoc. 3. 15). It was not a question of if, but of when and how, and now, after the
liberation of Thebes, with Spartan unpopularity at its zenith, and with the Thebans deeply grateful to, if not in fact
already allied with, Athens (see 28. 5n.), many Athenians must have seen a chance of taking the first steps at
least in that direction by championing the freedom and autonomy promised Greece by the King's Peace. The raid
of Sphodrias is a good indication that something was afoot at Athens. If, as Xenophon represents (H. 5. 4. 34),
the Athenian attitude towards Sparta was one of relative goodwill till the raid of Sphodrias and it was the
who, taking advantage of Sphodrias' acquittal, turned the people against Sparta, then Sphodrias'
action makes no sense (cf. Busolt, 1873-5: 683 n. 1). Sphodrias' very objective, the capture of the Piraeus, points
to the foundation of the Confederacy having been set in motion. Without the Piraeus there could be no Athenian
sea-alliance. The Second Athenian Confederacy, therefore, was founded in the early months of 378, certainly
before the raid of Sphodrias (see also 29. 5-6n.). (The Attic honorific decree dating to 379/8 published by
Pritchett, 1972: 164ff., however restored, must refer to an alliance of some sort. But, contrary to what Pritchett
thinks, it does not support an early date for the foundation of the Confederacy: Kallet-Marx, 1985: 138 n. 48.)
It goes without saying that, though founded at this time, the foundation must have been on ground already
prepared. A new Athenian alliance was far from welcome to Sparta and though feelers must undoubtedly have
been put out to friends in the Aegean before the liberation of Thebes, these will hardly have been publicized. But
bilateral alliances such as that with Chios (made in summer 384, following the destruction of Mantinea) were
intended for mutual defence against Sparta and were at pains to stress the two states' strict adherence to the
terms of the King's Peace; and this in fact was also the case with the new Athenian League. Though the direct
outcome, therefore, of the momentous events of winter 379/8, the League had deeper
-250roots and its establishment cannot have come as a surprise to anyone.
This is as far as the evidence allows one to go. The suggestion by Kallet-Marx ( 1985: 133ff.) that the Athenian
invitation to the Greeks to join together in a new league (28. 2) dates to late summer or autumn 379 goes
beyond the evidence. The suggestion is based on the assumption that there was simply not enough time between
the campaign of Cleombrotus and the raid of Sphodrias for the diplomatic manuvres mentioned by D in 28. 2.
Therefore the process must have been initiated earlier than the winter of 379/8, a possibility strengthened, he
thinks, by the likelihood of a temporal overlap at 27. 3-28. 2. But the two to three months between the winter
campaign of Cleombrotus and the raid of Sphodrias (29. 5-6n.) are surely ample time for the actual launching of
the alliance. Communication by sea in the relatively small area of the Aegean was reasonably fast, even in late
winter/early spring, and the only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty about 28. 2-3 as far as
Athenian affairs are concerned is that it looks forward in time (see next n.). As for the supposed overlap at 27. 328. 2, to suspect one is not the same as to prove it. Not all narrative sequences in D are overlapped and firm
indications are needed before one is posited.
28. 2-3. The two sections should be seen as an indifferent abridgement of what may have been a narrative of
some length in Ephorus dealing with the origins, creation, and successes of the first few years of the Confederacy;
this last theme, as was the way with Ephorus (p. 123 ), in the form of a general and rhetorical synopsis which
anticipated the detail of later narratives. Thus viewed, surprising elements in the passage become intelligible.
. . . probably indicates not just the diplomatic activity initiated early in 378
which resulted in the foundation of the Confederacy, but also that of the following years, in particular of spring
377 ( Svt 257=Tod 123; 30. 1f. and nn.). 'A clearly points to the future for only
six states joined Athens in 378 (cf. Accame, 1941: 28f.). The call to defend freedom and autonomy against Sparta
will have reached Sparta's allies too, especially those outside the Peloponnese (
). We know that many of these joined Athens by 375 (
-251. . . 'A. See nn. ad 30. 1, 5; 31. 2; 34. 4; 36. 5). We may compare Isocr. 14. 15;
Plut. Pel. 15. 1: 'E . Strictly
speaking, D is wrong of course when he says that the first to 'break away' ( ) from Sparta

were Chios and Byzantium, but this is an understandable consequence of his careless abridgement of Ephorus. It
is possible that Ephorus had spoken of the apostasis of Greek states in general, with Chios and Byzantium setting
the trend, in the sense that they openly now repudiated Sparta's role as prostates of the Peace.
28. 2. 'A : we have no reason to query the statement that the initiative for the
foundation of the Confederacy came from Athens; cf. 28. 2-4n.; Hampl, 1938: 133ff. The appeal to the cities to
bestir themselves in defence of the common freedom ( ) echoes the King's Peace
and this must have been deliberate. And not only the King's Peace, but it harks back to older struggles for
freedom, to the Persian Wars and the Ionian Revolt. Significantly, not only did the decree of Aristoteles put the
emphasis on freedom and autonomy (lines io and 20), but the stele bearing the decree was set up beside the
statue of Zeus Eleutherios (lines 65f.). Nothing could be more evocative (cf. Cargill, 1981: 115, 132).
28. 3. X : the drawbacks notwithstanding, the worth of D's text is shown by the four states he mentions as
being the first to join Athens: Chios first and Byzantium, then Rhodes and Mytilene. On the front of the stele of
the decree of Aristoteles ( IG ii2 43= Svt 257=Tod 123, and now Cargill, 1981: 14ff.), which dates from Feb./Mar.
377, we find these same four cities along with Methymna inscribed by the same hand as cut the text, immediately
below the heading 'A , and in the following vertical order: X, M, M
'P, B. To the right of the Chians, heading another column and cut by the same hand, is . The
Euboean cities below the Thebans were cut by a different hand ( Fabricius, 1891: 596f.; Cargill, 1981: 33).
Thebes, we know (29. 7), was admitted to the Confederacy after the outbreak of war in spring 378. It was not
therefore one of the founding cities and neither was Methymna as the epigraphic evidence shows (below). On the
other hand, both of them were probably members and certainly allies of Athens before the close of the year of
Nikon ( 379/8). The Confederacy
-252was created by Athens in close consultation with the Chians, Rhodians, Mytileneans, and Byzantians. The decree
of accession of Byzantium survives ( Svt 256=Tod121= IG ii2 41) and it seems to have been passed when the
Confederacy was still at the planning stage; there was no synedrion as yet. All four cities therefore may be
assumed to have formed the first and founding members of the Confederacy ( Accame, 1941: 36). It may further
be assumed that an oath similar to that of the Byzantians was taken by the other three states ( Svt 256 lines 4-6:
B[ 'Ax] [ + ]). The Chians almost certainly went first and
set the pattern (see next n.).
The occurrence of the four names in D probably reflects the fact that these four states were known to have been
the original members. Isocr. 14. 27f. comments that while Thebes deserted Athens at the conclusion of the King's
Peace, Chios, Byzantium, and Mytilene remained loyal (). He does not include Rhodes perhaps
because that state had been pro-Spartan before the Peace. We may therefore accept (with Accame, 1941: 33) D's
order, Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, Mytilene, as the actual order of accession of those cities. Nor is such an
acceptance contradicted by the fact that the order in the decree of Aristoteles is different and it includes
Methymna in third position, for there appears to have been an earlier list of the original members to which
Methymna was added in fifth place, with Thebes in all probability bringing up the rear ( Svt 258 (=Tod 122), the
accession of Methymna, lines 8ff.:
; cf. Cawkwell, 1973b: 50. The reference surely is to a stele set up for public viewing and not to
an archival list, as Cargill, 1981: 107 n. 24, thinks). Thus the position stood for nearly a year till spring 377 when
the Confederacy was placed on a broader footing and advertised to the Greek world in general. On the stele of the
decree of Aristoteles the original six members were inscribed in a geographical order it would seem, beginning
with Chios which is nearest to Athens and ending with Byzantium which is furthest away. Thebes naturally enough
was inscribed by itself to the right of Chios.
: it would appear that Chios was already allied with Athens before the King's Peace and even before
Thrasybulus' expedition in 389 (14. 94. 4; cf. Nepos, Con. 5, and IGii2 23, an Attic decree in honour of a Chian
voted in 388/7). In the summer of 384, in the
-253wake of the dioikismos of Mantinea, the alliance was renewed within the framework of the King's Peace ( Svt
248=Tod 118), and when early in 378 Athens called upon the Greeks to defend their common freedom, the
Chians must have been the first to respond and the first to be admitted to the newly conceived koinon synedrion.
But here there is a difficulty. When the alliance between Byzantium and Athens and her allies is specified to be
X ( SVt 256=Tod 121 line 7), and when prospective members of the Confederacy are promised in
377 to be allied X ( Svt 257=Tod 123 line 24), which Chian alliance is meant? The common
assumption is that Svt 248=Tod 118 is meant (cf. Tod, p. 66 ; Burnett, 1962: 10; Buckler, 1971a: 506f. Cargill,
1981, does not tackle such questions). Can that be so? Accame, 1941: 34f., thinks not.
Svt 248=Tod 118 was a symmachia between Athens and Chios alone, whereas the symmachia of Svt 256 (=Tod
121) line 7, Accame thinks, must have been between Chios on the one hand and Athens and her allies on the
other, and it must have been concluded shortly before that of Byzantium (see previous n.). It must have
contained specific definitions of the duties of the two sides which were subsequently to apply in the case of
Byzantium and indeed the other allies also. X thus saves time and effort by referring to
the Chian treaty. Accame further proposes that the new type of alliance between Athens and Chios which
superseded the old, forming the basis of those alliances ( Byzantium with Athens and the other allies', ' Rhodes
with Athens and the other allies', etc.) which were concluded within the embryo framework of the Confederacy
and out of which the synedrion grew, survives in IG ii2 35. This is commonly taken to be a duplicate of IG ii2 34 (
Svt 248 = Tod 118) and in fact it reproduces it word for word from line 9 to line 24. But the horkoi section of IG
ii2 35 is not preserved and that is where the two inscriptions differed, Accame suggests. While in IG ii2 34 the
Athenians and the Chians pledged themselves to reciprocal aid in case of attack, in the second treaty of 378,
apart from the reciprocal aid, the Athenians pledged themselves to abide by the decisions of the koinon of the
allies which they were then creating, and the Chians by those of the Athenians and the koinon. We may compare

Svt 263=Tod 127, the alliance treaty between Athens and Corcyra of 375.
-254Whether or not Accame is correct about IG ii2 35, his proposal that a series of alliances on a new footing heralded
the creation of the koinon synedrion is eminently plausible and I accept it, with one qualification: these alliances,
as I argue below (30. 2n.), were bilateral treaties with Athens, but formed now within the framework of the
League.
B: see previous nn. The beginning of the surviving part of Svt 256=Tod 121 does not seem to refer to a
previous alliance between Athens and Byzantium ( Accame, 1941: 16f.: see below). The sentence probably refers
to mere friendship. We have already argued that the decree comes from the very origins of the Confederacy.
. . . M: see previous nn. For Rhodes before the King's Peace see Accame, 1941: 15f. Like Chios,
Mytilene appears to have been allied with Athens already at the time of Thrasybulus' expedition in 389 (14. 94. 34; X. H. 4. 8. 28) and friendly relations continued after the King's Peace (Isocr. 14. 28).
: there is no need to assume that this is a reference to Methymna (cf. Cawkwell, 1973b:
51). The phrase should be seen rather within the context of the generalizing statements in sections 2-3 (see ad
loc.) about the growth of the Confederacy. The decree of accession of Methymna ( Svt 258=Tod 122) shows that
by that time the Confederacy had been organized; the synedroi of the allies were involved in the oath-taking.
Methymna joined after Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, and Mytilene, but perhaps before Thebes (28. 3n.)
In seeking to establish that the Methymnaean alliance was later than the Byzantian ( Svt 256=Tod 121)
Cawkwell, 1973b: 50f., points to the five Athenians listed at the end of the latter inscription who were elected to
receive the oaths of the Byzantians. The Methymnaeans on the other hand simply swore to the synedroi of the
allies as well as to the Athenian generals and hipparchs. 'Thus the Byzantian alliance belongs to an earlier phase
of procedure more akin to the normal before the Confederacy was founded' (1973b: 51). The argument is
untenable. The five-man commission occurs afterwards too in accession treaties; see Svt 304=Tod 153 lines 4ff.;
IG ii2 230=Svt 340 lines 13ff. The real difference between Svt 256 and 258 in this respect is that the boule was
not involved in the oath-taking in 258 because Methymna was already an ally (30. 2n.).
-255 : the foundation of the Confederacy. It occurs in no other literary source and the value
and basic reliability of D's account have already been demonstrated by the discussions above. The details he gives
of the constitution of the Confederacy are confirmed by epigraphy and, to a certain extent, by the later 4thcentury evidence of Aeschines and Demosthenes.
The initiative for the foundation must have come from Athens, as D says. But she would not have moved unless
she felt certain of a favourable reception by the cities approached. Once that condition was realized, the next step
could be taken. We may assume that the envoys sent out (28. 2) were directed to communicate to the cities
visited, Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene, and Rhodesfirst and foremost, all of which were allied with Athens already or
were to be so very soon, the Athenian plan for creating a union of likeminded states to defend their freedom
against Sparta. They were also instructed, we may further assume, to request the sending of ambassadors to
Athens empowered to deliberate with the Athenian demos about the formation of such a union. This is too
simplistic perhaps, and there may very well have been a series of embassies to and fro between Athens and the
cities concerned. At any rate the Athenian demos, elated by the goodwill of the cities, 'established a koinon
synedrion of all the allies (thus the founding members were all allied to Athens by this stage) and appointed
synedroi of each city'. The establishment of the synedrion therefore was the result of a vote of the ecclesia and
this we may accept. The literal meaning of , however, is hardly credible (though Cargill, 1981:
112, seems prepared to admit it as an early usage of the League). In my view, it should be taken to mean simply
that the decree of the ecclesia which established the synedrion specified, naturally enough, that member states
should each send envoys to Athens to act as their representatives in the synedrion.
The koinon synedrion having been set up, it proceeded in common with the Athenian demos (this is the meaning
of ) to work out the constituting principles and basic procedures of the Confederacy:
the synedrion was to meet in Athens, all cities large and small were to have one vote, they were to be
autonomous, and they were to accept the Athenians as leaders. These and other joint decisions which D does not
mention made Up A which
-256governed the Confederacy (cf. Svt 262=Tod 126 line 24; Svt 263=Tod 127 lines 34f.). Whether or not we speak
of a 'constitution' of the Confederacy (cf. Accame, 1941:38), the dogmata of the Athenians and their allies which
defined and guided the organization should not be seen as not admitting of change or amendment. If conditions
demanded it and a dogma of the allies allowed it, for example, a garrison and an archon could be installed in a
member state in spite of Svt 257=Tod 123 lines 21ff. The correct interpretation of the promise not to do certain
things ( Svt 259=Tod 124 lines 25 f.) is that if the dogmata allowed it then those
things could be done. Cf. Cargill, 1981: 154f.
The Athenian motives for founding the Confederacy are not hard to discern (28. 2-4n.). But what did its members
stand to gain? Fear of Sparta did of course play its part with certain states, notably Thebes. But this fear should
be seen in a wider context, that of the endemic struggle between democrats and oligarchs which had centred on
Athens and Sparta since the middle of the 5th century. The Second Athenian Confederacy was largely an
organization of democracies (cf. Cawkwell, 1981b: 48). This polarization is clearly attested by the literary
evidence, including D (cf. 4on.; 45. 1; Isocr. 4. 16; X. H. 6. 3. 14). And in two instances that we know of, Athens

took measures to guarantee the democratic government of a member state ( Svt 263=Tod 127, Tod 156). Piracy
was another reason why many members would want to place themselves under Athens as the Athenian navy
could provide them with a degree of protection (cf. Cawkwell, 1981b: 48).
:for the workings of the synedrion see Accame, 1941: 107ff.; Cawkwell, 1981b: 48ff.; Cargill,
1981: 115ff. Whatever Athens' position vis--vis the allies in the case of the synedrion of the Delian League (
Hammond, 1967b: 57ff., esp. 60f., and de Ste Croix, 1972: 303ff., believe she stood outside it), there is no doubt
that now Athens had no vote in the allied synedrion (cf. Aeschines 2. 60f.; 3. 69f.; Demosth. 19. 144). Svt
257=Tod 123 lines 41ff., 57ff., shows that the synedrion enjoyed certain legal powers in cases concerning the
alliance and its members, but we are very vague about this (cf. Cargill, 1981: 121ff.). It is not at all clear that
there was a joint Athenian-allied court as lines 57ff. led Marshall, 1905: 35f., and Accame, 1941: 138ff., to
believe. It is more likely that in this as in all other respects Athens and the allied
-257synedrion acted separately: Larsen, 1955: 63f.; Lewis, Meritt, 89 n. 39; Cargill, 1981: 12ff. :
the general view is that while each member state had one vote it could send to Athens as many synedroi as it
wished. Some states sent only one synedros ( Svt 304=Tod 153 lines 8f.); others sent several (Tod 131 lines
26ff.). As this is all the evidence at our disposal, Accame, 1941: 109f., by 'correcting' Tod 131 is able to insist
that all states had but one synedros. It may well be doubted nevertheless whether such an emendation is
legitimate; cf. Larsen, 1955: 55; Cargill, 1981: 113f.
28. 4-5. : the language is clearly D's; cf. 16. 67. 1; 18. 33. 5. But equally
clearly it is a brief paraphrase of an Ephoran passage which outlined the measures taken by Sparta to counteract
the success Athens was having with her appeal to the Greek world. A certain amount of distortion in such cases
was inevitable (compare 12. 76. 1-2, D's version of Ephorus' rewriting of Thuc. 5. 30ff.). All the same, we would
not be justified in taking the statement to represent such a complete volte-face on the part of Sparta as to be
unhistorical (thus Westlake, 1986: 269, who is further tempted to 'account for Diodorus' new appraisal of the
situation by adopting the reasonable hypothesis that Ephorus, turning from a source violently hostile to Sparta to
one largely sympathetic, postulated a modification of Spartan policy in order to avoid glaring inconsistency'). The
Spartan measures, understandable enough in the circumstances, consisted of (a) paying more and better
attention to their allies, and (b) looking to their war machine. For the results of (a) and for what (b) actually
involved we have to wait till 31. 1 when D, doubtless reflecting Ephorus' own arrangement, takes up the Spartan
narrative again. Meanwhile he leaves Greek history altogether and turns to eastern affairs. It would therefore be
mistaken to see 28. 4-5 and 31.1 as instances of overlapping narrative.
28. 5. . . . : Cawkwell, 1973b: 58, does not see this as evidence that a treaty with Thebes
existed prior to the raid of Sphodrias: 'The clause can have a conditional force' (58 n. 3). It can, of course, but
this is rather a desperate and indeed unnecessary solution. Cawkwell's denial, rather surprising in view of the fact
that on the whole he prefers D's version of events to that of Xenophon, stems from his belief that the King's
Peace excluded such an alliance, and that it was only after Athens put aside the
-258-

Peace that an alliance was concluded. The Peace, however, was not put aside by Athens (29. 7n.), and it is certainly
possible that, as D says, an alliance existed between Athens and Thebes before the raid of Sphodrias ( Burnett, 1962:
2, 15; Cargill, 1981: 58f., who, therefore, should have included this treaty (as he does not) among those of this type
('allies of Athens and the League') he discusses in ch. 4 of his book, designating it (rather than Svt 263 =Tod 127) the
first of the kind). How long before the raid? The time of the liberation of the Cadmea when the Athenian army marched
out in force to succour Thebes (26. 1-2) is perhaps the most appropriate time, and indeed Plutarch speaks of an
alliance between the two states which, however, so he says, the Athenians renounced shortly afterwards when the
Spartans invaded Boeotia (Pel. 14. 1). It was only in the aftermath of the raid of Sphodrias, according to Plutarch (Pel.
15. 1), that the Athenians renewed their alliance with Thebes. But Plutarch is probably speaking loosely ( Cawkwell,
1973b: 58. Contra Kallet-Marx, 1985: 144 and n. 75) and reading too much into the text of Xenophon (at H. 5. 4. 19
and 5. 4. 34).
For the conversion of the Theban alliance into membership of the Confederacy, see 29. 7n.

29. 1-4. Eastern affairs: Persian and Egyptian

preparations for war
On these four sections, see pp. 100 f.
29. 1. '++ : see 2-4 n.; 2. 3n.
: for Greek mercenaries in Egypt see Parke, 1933: 57ff., 105ff.; Kienitz, 1953: 114ff. An
Athenian law on silver coinage passed in 375/4 seems to indicate that a large quantity of Attic silver owls was being
struck outside Attica at the time, and that this was causing problems in Athens. Egypt has been identified as a major
centre for such activity. The object of the Egyptian kings obviously was to have available recognizably Athenian silver
with which to pay their Greek mercenaries ( Stroud, 1974: 157ff., esp. 169f.; 92. 3n.).
29. 2. : Chabrias was a general in Athens in the winter of 379/8 (X. H. 5. 4. 14), and he must
therefore have been back in Athens by early spring 379 at the latest. His present activity in Egypt consequently
belongs between 386, when he presumably evacuated Cyprus (2-4n.), and 380; unless he was

-259ordered out of Egypt by Athens even before that year. But it seems better to assume that the Persians turned their
attention to Egypt at the conclusion of the Cypriot War (summer 380), and that that was when Pharnabazus demanded
Chabrias' recall. Cawkwell, 1973b: 47 n. 3, suggests that the events in 29. 1-4 could belong to 375. This cannot be. It
was Acoris who hired Chabrias (29. 1), and Acoris was dead by summer 380 (2-4n.). Also, the 2 wasted in
preparations which caused Iphicrates' patience to wear thin (41. 2) require a longer span than the eighteen months or
so from late 375 to early 373, when Pharnabazus and Iphicrates finally attacked Egypt (15. 41ff.). For Chabrias' career
see PA 15086; APF p. 560f.; Pritchett, 1971-91: ii. 72ff.; Develin, 223. + : 'the insistence is
unnecessary and should therefore arouse suspicion. Perhaps it echoes an Athenian disclaimer, issued when
Pharnabazus complained' ( Sealey, 1993: 79). Pritchett, 1971-91: ii. 100, maintains that though Chabrias went to
Egypt as a private individual, he was not acting contrary to Athenian wishes or interests for was not Egypt allied to
Athens? Yet, whether or not Athens sanctioned Chabrias' activities in Egypt, the former Athenian-Egyptian alliance (2.
3n.) no longer existed -- it had lapsed with the King's Peace. In fact Pharnabazus' protest (see below) must have been
based on the King's Peace. Cf. FGH115 F105; Nepos, Chabr. 3.
29. 3. : the former satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. He had been called up to Susa to marry one of the
King's daughters and he had then been entrusted along with two other generals with the task of reconquering Egypt.
The three-year effort had failed (2-4n.) and we now find him in command of a force preparing for another expedition
against Egypt. The impression given by D certainly is that though Pharnabazus had colleagues (15. 42. 4; 43. 1f.) he
held the chief command. According to Nepos, Dat. 3. 5, these colleagues were Tithraustes (who had also taken part in
the previous campaign against Egypt: Isocr. 4. 140) and Datames, who succeeded to the chief command after the
recall of Pharnabazus, presumably following the expedition's failure. Nepos' testimony nevertheless is contradictory for
he states that when sent by the Great King to join the army being prepared against Egypt Datames was given equal
imperium with Pharnabazus and Tithraustes. And in Chabr. 3. 1 he writes of the praefecti regis Persae as sending
envoys to Athens to demand the
-260recall of Chabrias from Egypt. Though in Chabr. 2f. Nepos confuses the earlier with the present expedition against
Egypt, 3. 1 seems to be the same occasion as related here by D. Ps.Demosth. 49. 28, 35 refers to the King's strategoi.

: by the King's Peace Greece had conceded Asia and the islands of Cyprus and Clazomenae to the
King (X. H. 5. 1. 31). Pharnabazus had every right therefore to demand the recall of Chabrias. The dispatch of
Iphicrates to aid the Persians on the other hand was a gesture of goodwill. According to Nepos, Chabr. 3. 1, Chabrias
was ordered out of Egypt by Athens on pain of death.
29. 4. ' . . . : he went out now, in 380/79; see 29. 2n. and 41. 1n. For his career see PA 7737;
APF pp. 248 ff.; Pritchett, 1971-91: ii. 62ff.; Develin, 245f.

29. 5-6. The raid of Sphodrias

The date

If it were the case that the tradition found in Aristid. 19. 419 Dind. and Plut. Pel. 14. 6; Ages. 24. 7, that Sphodrias'
men had been thwarted by the Eleusinian deities, arose because the raid was made during the truce observed for the
Lesser Mysteries (held during the month Anthesterion), we would have a definite date for the raid. But Aristides is
adamant that the spondai of Eleusis were never violated. As it is, the raid can only be dated approximately by being
placed in the correct sequence of events of spring 378. Why did the raid take place? Because, as has been argued, the
Athenian Confederacy was being founded and the raid was an attempt to prevent it (28. 2-4n.). As the diplomatic
manuvres preliminary to the Confederacy had already taken place, the raid could hardly belong earlier than early
spring. On the other hand, as Kallet-Marx rightly points out (1985: 136f.), several weeks should be allowed between
the raid and the beginning of Agesilaus' Boeotian campaign of 378. End of May is the terminus ante quem for the latter
(see p. 287 ) and therefore a date in April is indicated for the former.
29. 5. : according to X. H. 5. 4. 15f. and elsewhere, and Plut. Pel. 14. 3, 6; Ages. 24. 4ff. See p.
138 ' : he had been left as harmost at Thespiae by
-261-

leombrotus (X. H. 5. 4. 15). Typically D omits the relevant background.

+ . . . +: cf. FGH 124 (Callisthenes) F9, , and Plut. Pel. 14. 3;
Ages. 24. 4. Plutarch clearly derives from Callisthenes here, but not necessarily D (Ephorus).

. . . : it would seem that there were at least three versions current at the time: that King
Cleombrotus was behind the raid (Ephorus); that the Thebans were responsible who wanted to embroil Athens in
war with Sparta (X. H. 5. 4. 20 Plut. Pel. 14. 2ff.; Ages. 24. 6); that Sphodrias alone was responsible, his motive
being the desire to emulate Phoebidas ( Ages. 24. 4f.). Xenophon's explanation should be rejected for if indeed
Sphodrias had been bribed by the Thebans + (H. 5. 4. 30), even if, as Plutarch says, the
money and advice were given by a person (or persons) professing Spartan sympathies, Agesilaus, we may be
certain, would not have let him off so easily (see further n. below). And one may rightly doubt whether Sphodrias
would have dared to take such an action without the instigation and promised support of some powerful group in
Sparta (cf. Grote, x. 135 n. 1; Beloch, 1884: 139; id., GG iii. 1. 147; Meyer, GdA v. 379). I am inclined therefore
to accept the Ephoran version that Sphodrias had been incited by Cleombrotus to capture the Piraeus. Why?

Because the king and his adherents felt that such an action was required if the Athenian Confederacy were to be
nipped in the bud. Agesilaus was trying to achieve the same, but by peaceful means ( Cawkwell 1973b: 55).
Macdonald, 1972: 38ff., argues for the complicity of Cleombrotus too.
Kallet-Marx, on the other hand, 1985: 150f., sees no need to choose among the various ancient versions, all of
which are possible, though none capable of proof. In fact, Kallet-Marx, 1985: 149f., believes that the capture of
the Piraeus was not a feasible objective, that Sphodrias was aware of this, but that by raiding Attica he hoped to
scare the Athenians into remaining neutral in the coming war against Thebes, at the same time discouraging the
growth of the new league. But even if impossible (though see next n.), the capture of the Piraeus might still have
been Sphodrias' objective. With Piraeus in their hands, Spartan pressure on Athens would have been infinitely
more effective. Xenophon, of course, as Kallet-Marx points out, does not seem to
-262have believed that Sphodrias really intended to capture the Piraeus; or so he says (
: H. 5. 4. 20). But Xenophon apparent disbelief in the expedition's stated objective (nowhere does he
say that he considered the mission impossible) may well be conditioned by the fact that he held Sphodrias, a
political opponent of Agesilaus, responsible for letting Thebes off the hook by unnecessarily embroiling Athens in
war with Sparta. And as is usually the case with Xenophon, all the information he gives is chosen so as to
establish his claim, in this instance, that Sphodrias was a corrupt, incompetent, and culpable officer.
29. 6. . . . : Parke, 1933: 84 n. 5, finds the figure 'incredible'. But Cleombrotus
had left behind a third of his army and money to hire mercenaries with (X. H. 5. 4. 15). Ten thousand, therefore,
is not so incredible a figure for Sphodrias' total force at Thespiae though we may well doubt that all 10,000 were
taken along. Xenophon, however, speaks of 1 (H. 5. 4. 21) and we ought to remember that,
once taken, the Piraeus would need to be defended against Athens. In fact the size of the force may have been
one of the causes of failure. Otherwise, of Plutarch's two reasons for the failure, want of luck and want of courage
( Pel. 14. 6; Ages. 24. 6f.), the first seems to me the more appropriate. Given the lack of maps and clocks it
seems hardly fair to accuse Sphodrias of a miscalculation though miscalculate he clearly did. But not by much.
The opinion that the mission was impossible, and therefore a pretence (see previous n.), can be countered with
the fact that Sphodrias did after all succeed in reaching Thria near Eleusis. One more hour of darkness and it
might have been impossible for the Athenians to react quickly enough to save the Piraeus.
. . . : Xenophon's story (H. 5. 4. 25ff.) is an apologia of Agesilaus. Contra Tuplin, 1993:
126ff., who concludes that Xenophon included such 'inside' information here 'with the intention of revealing in no
friendly spirit what sort of place Sparta really was' (1993: 128). But surely the story was meant to explain
Agesilaus' conduct (H. 5. 4. 24) and the explanation is typically Xenophontic (cf. e.g. H. 4. 1. 29 ff.) and one
consistent with the mores of Peloponnesian gentlemen. We cannot know whether he himself believed it or simply
wrote down what he was told by Agesilaus or some friend of Agesilaus (Etymocles?). He seems to
-263have considered the acquittal 'most unjust' (H. 5. 4. 24), and he may have been thankful to have a story which
did not of course exonerate Agesilaus, but which nevertheless presented him in a humane light. The Thebans
were the evil plotters and Cleombrotus and his circle were guilty of protecting Sphodrias. Agesilaus, on the other
hand, had merely given way to the tearful pleas of young lovers. The whole story is nonsense of course and
hardly to be credited. Yet de Ste Croix is 'inclined to say that this is the most valuable account we have in any
source of the way in which great issues might be settled at Sparta' ( 1972: 134)! The very beginning of the story
shows it to be nonsense. Sphodrias, Xenophon tells us (section 26), addressed his son Cleonymus and asked him
to intercede with Archidamus. But Sphodrias was not in Sparta at the time. By Xenophon's own admission he had
disobeyed the summons of the ephors and had fled (H. 5. 4. 24).
The question to ask here is why Agesilaus acquitted Sphodrias, and the answer which readily presents itself is that
the king had failed in the end to persuade the Athenians by peaceful means to desist from founding their
Confederacy and from lending support to Thebes. It is only a guess, but a reasonable one, that the Spartan
embassy in Athens at the time of the raid represents Agesilaus' attempt to dissuade Athens. Etymocles, one of the
three ambassadors, belonged to the group of Agesilaus (X. H. 5. 4. 32; Cawkwell, 1973b: 55. Rice, 1975: 111,
postulates that the ambassadors were in Athens in connection with the trial of the two Athenian generals. But
nothing in the sources connects the embassy and the trial and there are in any case insuperable chronological
problems ( Kallet-Marx, 1985). Cawkwell's proposal is far more satisfactory). Having failed, he may well have
decided that war with Athens was now inevitable, and his comment that +
(X. H. 5. 4. 32) should perhaps be seen in this light. War was coming. Why, therefore, waste a good
soldier? For Sphodrias cannot have been bribed by the Thebans (29. 5n.). He was Cleombrotus' man to the last
(he fell at Leuctra as did his son Cleonymus: X. H. 6. 4. 14), and his motives had been patriotic (cf. X. H. 5. 4.
34). But Agesilaus will also have had domestic politics very much in mind and it is quite likely that his position at
home was strengthened considerably by this decision ( Cartledge, 1987: 137f.).

+ : the gerousia is meant. The gerousia formed the

-264-

highest criminal court at Sparta ( de Ste Croix, 1972: 131ff.). Synedrion could denote a court (cf. Lys. 9. 6) or a
council-chamber (X. H. 2. 4. 23). At 11. 50. 2, 6 D correctly calls the Spartan body 'gerousia', doubtless retaining the
Ephoran term. But D, like other Greek writers of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, did not generally distinguish
between the terms boule, synedrion, gerousia, or syngkletos when speaking either of the Greek boule or of the Roman
or Carthaginian senates; cf. 4. 83. 7; 14. 113. 6f.; 16. 65. 6ff. This is true even of Polybius; cf. 1. 11. 1; 1. 20. 1; 1.
21. 6 (with HCP i ad loc.); 1. 31. 8; 10. 18. 1; etc. In fact D may be following Polybian usage here.

29. 7-8. The outbreak of war

In the absence of any other evidence one might assume that all the acts listed here by D were the immediate
consequence of the decision to go to war. But section 8, . . . + +, is clearly one of the
provisions of the decree of Aristoteles of spring 377 (Svt 257=Tod 123 lines 25ff.), and the introduction of Thebes to
the allied synedrion may not be as early as the late spring/early summer 378 though of course she was a member by
spring 377 (28. 3n.). The military preparations nevertheless must have followed immediately upon the decision to
fight. What we seem to have here therefore is D's compressed and not entirely understood version of an Ephoran
chapter which recorded the measures taken by Athens in the year following the outbreak of war to improve her military
situation as well as her reputation in Greece; 30. 1 dates to spring/summer 377.
29. 7. + : not many would agree with Cawkwell that the vote meant
that the Peace was now dissolved and that the declaration that Sparta had broken the Peace meant in effect that
Athens considered the Peace to be 'null and void' (1973b: 54; id., 1981a: 75 f.). In 369/8 Athens praised the
Mytileneans for their services in 'the past war' ( 378-371 or 373-371) and stressed that the Athenians had fought for
the
-265-

earlier Isocrates made the suppliant Plataeans say that Athens had fought the last war ( 378-375)
(14. 17). Later in the same speech the Plataeans
entreat that Athens should be ready to make war on all, Thebes not excepted, in defence of the peace treaty;
otherwise her claim to defend the King's Peace against Sparta would ring hollow (sections 42-4). And cf. Aristid.
Panath. 293

Athens and Chios it was made abundantly clear that both sides adhered strictly to the King's

Peace. They would not contravene the Peace, even if others did (i.e. Sparta who had recently broken
version
of the treaty with Chios was made the basis for the alliances which resulted in the Second Athenian Confederacy
(28. 3n.). A year after the outbreak of war the decree of Aristoteles (Svt 257=Tod 123) promised prospective
members of the League (though not those 'who belonged to the King': lines 17f.) that they would be allied to
Athens on the same terms as the Chians (lines 23f.). What emerges is that far from denouncing the King's Peace
Athens actually presented herself as its new (and sole) prostates (cf. Accame, 1941: 48ff.; Seager, 1974: 45ff.).
Accame's restoration therefore of Svt 257 lines 12-14 (1941: 51), a promise to maintain the Peace for ever,
though not universally accepted, may well be correct. It is in any case difficult to see what else could have been
stated there.
+ + : not necessarily elected to the generalship (p. 133 ), but rather entrusted with
the conduct of affairs vis-vis the Confederacy and the war. Cf. Sealey, 1993: 58. : the son of Conon
and good friend of Isocrates (cf. Isocr. 15. 101 ff.). For his career see PA 13700; APF pp. 506ff.; Develin, 223.
: see 29. 2n.
: for Callistratus see Beloch, 1884: 145ff.; Sealey, 1956: 178ff. and 187 for the election of both
Chabrias and Callistratus in this year; PA8157 and addenda; APF pp. 277ff.; Develin, 223.
-266-

. . .: this clearly corresponds to X. H. 5. 4. 34 + +

+, + + .Polyb. 2. 62. 6 records that the
, +
Athenians +, + + ' . D's and Polybius' figures

are thus in conflict. Grote, x. 151 n. 2, sought to resolve this by assuming that while D's reference is to the vote to
man 200 triremes and levy 20,000 hoplites, Polybius' is to what was actually sent out. This is not very convincing.
More to the point is his suggestion that we must not be misled by D into thinking that these resolutions were taken by
the Athenian demos alone, but we must regard them rather as joint decisions -- the Athenian demos and the synedrion
of the allies. Such an assumption would make D's high figures more palatable and explain perhaps why Polybius'
figures are exactly half those of D. The Confederacy was a 50: 50 partnership and the allies agreed to provide as many
men and ships as the Athenians.

D omits to mention that to facilitate her war effort Athens looked to her finances. The 5th-century property tax, the
eisphora (see Griffith, 1977: 3ff.; Sealey, 1984: 77ff.), was revived, and a new method of taxation, the symmories,
was introduced in this connection (Demosth. 22. 44; FGH 328 F41, 45, 46 with nn. The year of Nausinicus, 378/7, of
the sources should be understood as the year when the system began to operate, not as the year when it was
devised). Polyb. 2. 62. 6f. says that the valuation of all property in Attica amounted to 5,750 talents, a figure
confirmed by Demosth. 14. 19 where 6,000 seems to be a rounding off of the figure given by Polybius. For the
valuation cf. HCP i. 268f. The method of collecting the eisphora is a crux. Cf. de Ste Croix, 1953: 30ff. (contra
MacDowell, 1986b: 438ff.); Thomsen, 1964 (but with de Ste Croix review in CR 16 ( 1966)); Rhodes, 1982: 1 ff.
D also overlooks the syntaxeis which were probably paid by the allies from the beginning (cf. Busolt, 1873-5: 703 f.;
Accame, 1941: 131ff.; Mitchel, 1984: 23ff.). Cawkwell, on the other hand, 1963: 91ff.; id., 1981b: 51 (cf. Sealey,
1993: 64f.), finds it difficult to believe that the Athenians could have been so cynical as to introduce regular
contributions in money right at the start and argues that syntaxeis were not introduced till 373 when they are

mentioned for the first time (ps.-Demosth. 49. 49). However, the existence of a common fund of the allies in 377 (Svt
257=Tod 123 lines 45f.) is perhaps an argument for pushing back the payment
-267of syntaxeis to the very beginnings of the Confederacy. Also, if the assessment of the syntaxeis was done by the
synedrion itself (cf. Tod 175 lines 27f.), that would have marked a real difference from 5th-century practice. Wilson's
investigation of Athenian military finances from 378 to 375 (1970: 302ff.) in no way supports Cawkwell's thesis. Many
of Wilson's figures can be halved or doubled, which renders pointless the whole exercise. On syntaxeis see Cargill's
discussion, 1981: 124ff., who nevertheless ignores Svt 257 lines 45f. and does not concern himself with the date of
their introduction.

. . . : it would be possible to make a case that Athens had 20,000 front-line and reserve hoplites at

this time (cf. Hammond, HG 663 f., who accepts D's figures). In 369 according to D (63. 2), Athens dispatched 12,000
men to help Sparta, and if the reserve hoplites are added to these, the 20,000 figure no longer seems exaggerated.
Nevertheless, the normal Athenian expeditionary forces in the 4th century were much smaller, about half the size of
that given by D for 369 -- 5,000 in 378 (26. 2; 32. 2) and 352 (16. 37. 3), 6,000 in 394 (X. H. 4. 2. 17) and 362 (84.
2). Did 369 represent an extraordinary effort and were the 12,000 the full levy of Athenian front-line hoplites? But
better sense is made perhaps of the 20,000 figure if it is seen as including the field levies of the allies. Certainly the
member states were obliged to render military service (Svt 257=Tod 123 lines 46ff.; SVt 263=Tod 127) though, with
the exception of Thebes, they are not mentioned as taking part in any of the land operations.

+ :this is in line with other figures we have for the Athenian cavalry in the 4th century (see the
references above). None of the islanders could presumably contribute cavalry. Thebes possessed a sizeable force (26.
4n.), but the estimate here, made right at the outbreak of war, may well pre-date Theban entry to the Confederacy
(cf. n. below).
+ . . . : cf. Plut. Pel. 15. 1. Again, the assumption that the contingents of the allies are included makes
the figure easier to accept. At 16. 21. 2 D says that 100 triremes were manned by the Chians, Rhodians, Byzantians,
and their allies in 356, and a projected figure of 100 triremes for these maritime states (and Mytilene and Methymna)
in 378 is not unreasonable, while the Piraeus dockyards held approximately 100 triremes when war broke out ( IG ii2
1604 as now re-dated by Clark, 1990).
-268-

: see 26. 2n.

. . . : Thebes may already have been the ally of Athens and the Alliance (28. 5n.), and her
introduction to the Confederacy may or may not have followed immediately upon the outbreak of war (29. 7-8n.).
Nothing more can be added except Cawkwell's suggestion (1973b: 49f. that the honouring of a trierarch in IG ii2
40 may indicate the sailing season of 378, but after the breakdown of the Peace. The significance which Burnett
sees in IG ii2 40 ( 1962: 3ff.), the first four lines of which are probably the end of the treaty of accession of
Thebes, is illusory; cf. Buckler, 1971a: 506f. The stone is too fragmentary for any firm conclusions to be drawn,
and Accame's use of it (1941: 38ff.) to cast doubt on D's evidence that Thebes joined after the synedrion had
been set up is unjustified (cf. Cawkwell, 1973b: 49f.). I agree with Buckler (1971a: 506f.) and Cawkwell ( 1973b:
48) that Svt 257=Tod 123 lines 23ff. [] + , does not mean that the
Theban treaty was significantly different from the Chios treaty and an improvement on it (as Burnett, 1962: 3ff.),
though I disagree with both that the Chios treaty here is that of 384 (see 28. 3n.). shows
that Thebes was a full member like everyone else, with the same rights and duties, including the obligation to
contribute ships (cf. ps.-Demosth. 49. 14ff., 21).
29. 8.0 ... : a clear reference to Svt 257=Tod 123, the decree of Aristoteles, lines 25ff.
and 35ff. The decree mentions (as does Isocr. 14. 44), both public and private, and further specifies
that any unfavourable stelai in Athens concerning would-be allies were to be destroyed. The stelai, we may guess,
mentioned such as well as the former cleruchies of Athens (in 355 many Athenians still thought of
regaining these possessions: Isocr. 8. 6). D's (Ephorus') remarks, therefore, are not inappropriate and together
with the decree of Aristoteles they testify to the degree of offence caused in the Aegean by Athenian land
expropriations in the previous century. is technically wrong, but cf. Cawkwell, 1973b: 48 and in
general Cargill, 1981: 146ff. For the importance of private overseas possessions for many Athenians in the 5th
century cf. Lewis, Studies Ehrenberg, 182; Andrewes, HCT v. 111 f.; Davies, 1981: 55ff. But see also de Ste
Croix, 1972: 43f.; 1981: 604 n. 27.
-269-

Burnett's view (1962: 11, which Cargill, 1981: 60, finds 'cogent') that the 'yoking together' in D of the abolition of the
cleruchy system and the entry of Thebes to the Confederacy means that the two were contemporary, and that the first
was cleverly designed by Athens in order to persuade her island allies to accept continental Thebes in the Confederacy,
should be rejected. The fact that the two events are next to each other in D does not mean that they are
contemporary, and in fact the admission of Thebes probably belongs to 378 (29. 7-8n.) while the decree of Aristoteles
dates to spring 377. The purpose of lines 25ff. of the decree is made clear by both D here and Isocrates (next n.).
... cf. Isocr.14. 44 + , UY+1F75

30. The expansion of the Second Athenian

Confederacy
See 28. 2-3 n.
30. 1. . . . ' : immediately below the 'Thebans' on the front face of Svt 257=Tod 123 are found
inscribed , , , , , ', all five by the same hand, but a different one from that
which cut the main text and the first six members of the Confederacy ( Fabricius, 1891: 596f.; Cargill, 1981: 33). The
logical assumption is that all five were not members of the Confederacy in Feb./Mar. 377 when the decree of
Aristoteles was passed; they joined some time afterwards, but before the expedition of Chabrias to Euboea in the same
year, for by then the Euboean cities were already allies (30. 2). This conclusion is inevitable unless one is prepared to
assume that the stonecutter who inscribed the text of the decree and the first six members was suddenly taken ill or
dismissed. The decree of alliance between Athens and Chalcis which accompanied the city's accession to the
Confederacy has survived ( Svt 259=Tod 124). It offers no contradiction. It was passed in the year of Nausinicus (
378/7) and Chalcis consequently joined between Feb./Mar. and midsummer 377. An apparent copy of Svt 259=Tod
124, IG ii2 155 ( Schweigert, 1938: 626), may in fact be the decree of alliance between Athens and another Euboean
city, either Eretria or Carystus. The following three points must be stressed in connection with the accession of the
Euboean cities.
-270-

First, the epigraphic is in fact the only evidence that the accession of the Euboean cities post-dated the decree of
Aristoteles. D's text constitutes no such evidence (pace e.g. Accame, 1941: 70; Tod, p. 71 ). It has already been
argued that the contiguity in D of the accession of Thebes (29. 7) and the decree of Aristoteles (29. 8) does not
mean that the two were contemporary (29. 7-8n.). Equally, the fact that the accession of the Euboean cities
follows on the decree of Aristoteles is no proof that the two events are necessarily meant to be in chronological
sequence in the text. They are not, as the first sentence of 30. 1 shows: the a because of which
many cities were led to fall away to Athens is that stated at 28. 2, i.e. Sparta's arrogant and oppressive misrule.
. . . ', he says at 28. 2. Section 30. I looks back to that statement.
Second, the entry ' between the Eretrians and the Carystians probably does not refer to a city in
Euboea, as Meritt, 1963: 1f., and Cargill, 1981: 33 and n. 17, think. Eurip. Iphigeneia at Aulis170, cited as
evidence by Cargill (and accepted as settling the dispute by Sealey, 1993: 284 n. 40), is a reference to the
wellknown spring and not to a town. The entry should rather be identified with Mygdonian Arethusa in south-east
Macedonia ( Accame, 1941: 72f.; Cawkwell, 1981b: 42 and n. 16). Situated some 6 miles from the coast it may
well have belonged to ' ' tenth division of the reorganized Peloponnesian League (31. 2). If so, it
will have come under Spartan control during the Olynthian War and its present early, and surely voluntary,
accession to the Confederacy will have amounted to apostasis (28. 2-3 and n.). The Euboean cities which joined
the Confederacy at this point therefore were Chalcis, Eretria and Carystus -- Icus is an island near Peparethus. It
is possible that Icus, like Sciathus and Peparethus, was under Spartan control prior to 377 (30. 5). If so one more
candidate is found for apostasis at this early date.
Third, it would seem that all five cities acceded voluntarily as indeed D says ( ), and it
is unnecessary to speculate on the basis of Plut. Mor. 350f whether Timotheus was or was not responsible for
their accession. (In any case Plutarch is probably referring to 357, pace Sealey, 1956: 188; id., 1993: 59 and n.
40, and he appears to go back in time: 357, 376, 394.) Nor is there a conflict between D and Plutarch here. D is
not saying that Chabrias, or anyone else for that matter, liberated Euboea, but
-271-

that the Euboeans freed themselves. Arethusa certainly cannot have joined as a result of an Athenian expedition in
western Thrace in early 377 (cf. Cawkwell, 1981b: 42f.). Cawkwell furthermore makes the welcome point that many if
not most of the cities entered on both the front face and the left side of Svt 257= Tod 123 will in fact have acceded
voluntarily.
. . . : is often used in D instead of for stylistic variation; cf. 15.
30. 4; 31. 3f; 32. 1; 33. 1; 46. 1; 50. 2; etc. Occasionally the two terms are used technically as at 11. 4. 5. For the
terms see HCT v. ad 8. 22. 1. . . . : Hestiaea had been destroyed by Athens following the
suppression of the Euboean revolt in 447/6 and the place was colonized with Athenian cleruchs (12. 7; 12. 22. 2; Thuc.
1. 114. 3; 7. 57. 2; 8. 95. 7; Plut. Per. 23. 4). Theopornpus ( FGH 115 F387) says that the Hestiaeans were allowed to
depart to Macedonia. Cf. HCT i. 345 ff. On the collapse of Athens in 404 and the expulsion of the colonists the original
inhabitants were presumably allowed by Sparta to return. The evidence for this is the present passage of D. The hatred
felt towards Athens by the Hestiaeans proves that they were the descendants of the people who had been expelled. D's
language, reflecting that of Ephorus, shows that the latter did not always praise Athens and censure Sparta; see pp.
115 ff.
30. 2. +1F74 1 : a reference ahead to the mid-370s when the Athenian Confederacy
reached its widest extent and achieved recognition by Sparta in the King's Peace of 375 (see next n. and 38. 4n.).
. . . : as the text stands the figure seventy seems to include the five states
mentioned earlier at 28. 3 (Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, and Mytilene) and 29. 7 (Thebes). But perhaps D missed
Ephorus' explanation that the seventy were in addition to the five states already mentioned. Such an oversight is all
too likely and if that is indeed the case D's information is brought into line with that of Aeschines 2. 70 (cf. Vial, 37 n.
3; Cawkwell, 1981b: 41 and n. 6). It would seem that the Confederacy was generally believed to have included

seventy-five members at its height. Whether this belief was correct (as I think) or not is another matter. Aeschines'
statement (2. 70) that all seventy-five cities were won over and made members of the synedrion by Timotheus, is
clearly false. Isocr. 15. 113 and
-272-

Dinarch. 1. 14 (cf. 3. 17) say that Timotheus captured twenty-four cities in all for Athens. Most of these will be
the places taken in the north Aegean in the later 360s which were not, apparently, admitted to the Confederacy (
Griffith in Imperialism, 138; Cawkwell, 1981b: 45). Is there then a contradiction between the literary and the
epigraphic evidence and where does the truth lie? On the stele of the decree of Aristoteles, on which all members
were meant to be inscribed (lines 69ff.), as this has been restored from a large number of fragments, some fiftyeight names can be said to have been recorded, certainly not more than sixty (Tod, pp. 67 f.; Cargill, 1981: 45).
How can the discrepancy between the stele and the literary sources be explained?
In his review of Cargill Hamilton suggests that Ephorus created the discrepancy by enumerating the cities of
Boeotia, the Olynthian Confederacy, and Acarnania separately as members of the League. The figure of seventyfive then passed into the 4thcentury tradition and 'may well have been fixed by the time Aeschines wrote some 30
years later' (1982a: 312f.). I find this most unlikely. Aeschines and Ephorus were exact contemporaries and the
speech On the Embassy was probably delivered before Ephorus wrote that part of his history which dealt with the
Second Athenian League (see pp. 110 ff.). But apart from this, confederated cities such as those proposed by
Hamilton could not have sent representatives to the synedrion in their own right and it is difficult to see how
anyone could have reckoned them separately as members.
The common view is that D and Aeschines are correct and that for some reason the Athenians stopped inscribing
the names of new members on the stele after a certain date. There is no general agreement either about the date
or about the reason. Cargill takes a different line. His starting principle is that states whose names were not
recorded on the stele were not members, that, therefore, there were never more than some fifty-eight members
in all and that consequently the information of D and Aeschines should be rejected (1981: 45ff.). The proposal is
especially provocative because Cargill, contrary to the scholarly consensus, is firmly of the opinion that Corcyra
was not inscribed on the stele and was not therefore a member of the League. For Cargill Svt 263 (=Tod 127) is
not a League alliance, but one between Corcyra on the one hand and Athens and her allies on the other, the first
of this kind
-273-

of treaty. In summer 375 Corcyra, Acarnania, and the cities of Cephallenia applied to join the League and their
applications were approved, but before the Athenian envoys elected for the purpose could reach the cities
concerned and administer the requisite oath (and a state's name could not be recorded on the stele, Cargill
thinks, on the basis of his misreading of Svt 262 (see below), unless this were first done) something happened
and the agreement was partly aborted: Acarnania and Pronnoi of Cephallenia took the oath and their names were
inscribed on the stele ( Svt 257 B 10-12), the rest of the Cephallenian cities and Corcyra did not and were not
admitted to the League ( Cargill, 1981: 68ff., 103ff.).
To challenge Cargill's thesis it is first necessary to look at the procedure for joining the League and on the kind of
alliances that that involved. Whatever the nature of the Delian League, the present League was a bicameral
organization (28. 3n.). Questions then arise about the treaty or treaties that prospective members were obliged to
conclude, questions which Cargill's study does not effectively get down to answering. While the evidence does not
allow complete certainty, the indications are that members of the League were (a) allied with Athens herself in
what amounted to bilateral treaties, and (b) allied with Athens' allies. These were general, 'League' alliances, that
is, individual members were not allied with each other, but with the body of the allies. (a) and (b) were not
independent acts, but were bound to each other in their provisions and oaths. There can be no doubt that this was
the case with some of the members and we have no reason for supposing that it did not apply generally.
Methymna ( Svt 258=Tod 122) was already an ally of Athens. To become also the ally of the allies of Athens
( NU 1: lines 6-8), that is, a member of the
League, she has to take the oath the other allies took. The oath is sworn to the synedrion of the allies as well as
to the Athenian generals and hipparchs. The boule is not involved here in the oath-taking, as it generally was in
the 4th century in alliance treaties, because Methymna was already an Athenian ally.
Byzantium, on the other hand, a city not allied with Athens which has applied successfully to join the League then
in process of being founded ( Svt 256=Tod 121 lines 3-6), must first enter into a bilateral alliance with Athens (
Svt 256). And this alliance is
-274-

to be like that with Chios (lines 6f. Dittenberger's restoration seems safe: Accame, 1941: 34 n. 1). The boule, the
generals, and the hipparchs are involved in the oath-taking. Of course, Svt 256 comes from the very time of the
League's foundation and Svt 258 (Methymna) from its infancy, but there is no reason to deny that by the time the
latter was concluded a definite procedure had been worked out which, as we can see ( Svt 258 lines 8-11), included
the inscribing of a new member's name on a common stele, an ancestor it would appear of the one which was soon to
carry the decree of Aristoteles (28. 3n.). At any rate, by the time Chalcis in Euboea joined in summer 377, the steps
for admission to the League must have been settled. In vt 259 (=Tod 124) we have the bilateral (Chalcis with Athens)
treaty of alliance which preceded Chalcis' entry to the League. (lines 13f.) surely indicates the usual bodies
in Athens, including the boule, charged with the taking of such oaths (cf. Rhodes, 1972: 44). Lines 21ff. point to the
treaty as the first and, probably, indispensable step to membership of the League.

SVt 262 (= Tod 126) and Svt 263 (= Tod 127) easily fit into this framework. Corcyra, Acarnania, and Cephallenia
wished to join the League and their wish was granted ( Svt 262). They were not allied with Athens, hence we observe
the double process of (a) the oath-taking between the states and the boule, the generals, and the hippeis of Athens
which would make them the allies of Athens (lines 15-17). A number of separate, bilateral alliances would have
resulted and Svt 263 appears to be the treaty of Corcyra with Athens (cf. Tod, pp. 87 f.; SVt p. 220). Svt 267 (= IG ii2
98. Add. p. 658. Re-edited with additional fr. by Schweigert, 1940: 321 ff.), a badly preserved inscription which
mentions garrisons and Athenian superintendents, may well be the decree of alliance between Athens and the cities of
Cephallenia. (Or it may date to 372 when Iphicrates had to subjugate the cities of Cephallenia anew: X. H. 6. 2. 33,
38.) (b) The allies, that is, representatives of the synedroi, were also to swear 'the oath' to the states concerned (lines
17f.). This oath is not the same as 'the oaths' in line 15 sworn by the Athenian officials, but we should see in it rather
the oath of Svt 258 (Methymna) lines 16-19. Of course, the ambassadors of the cities had also to take an oath to the
synedroi ( SVt 258 11-16), something which the shorthand of SVt 262 17f. seems to have omitted, as it has also
omitted it seems to mention
-275-

that the Athenian generals and hipparchs were to take the 'League' oath alongside the synedroi (cf. Svt 258 11
ff.).
In fact Svt 262 cannot sustain Cargill's interpretation of it. The decision of the Athenian demos concerning
Corcyra, Acarnania and Cephallenia was that the names of the cities were to be inscribed on the common stele of
the allies and the oaths administered to them (lines 10ff.). 'These things having been done' (
[: line 18) the demos was to proceed to the appointment of commissioners who would sail out to
administer the oaths to the cities concerned (lines 18ff.). These oaths or the names of the commissioners or
indeed both are also to be recorded on the common stele of the allies: lines 20f. The reference here is not to the
cities themselves, as Cargill mistranslates (1981: 104ff.; cf. Tod, p. 84 ). His view that the commissioners sent
out to receive the oaths from the cities were also responsible for the recording of the cities' names on the stele,
but that this could only be done after the oaths had been received, is thus based on a misunderstanding. And his
further view that 'this is the only interpretation that can reasonably account for the fact that an alliance made
with Korkyra, the Akarnanian confederacy, and (apparently) all four of the cities of Kephallenia led to the listing of
only the Akarnanians and one Kephallenian city (Pronnoi) on the stele of the allies' ( 1981: 107) is clearly
untenable. Svt 258 (Methymna) is equally clear that the listing of new members on the stele took place fairly
speedily after the Athenian demos gave its assent and not subsequent to the administration of the oaths to the
cities' home authorities. The suggestion by some scholars that names were 'saved up' for a while and then all
listed at once, and that this is the reason for the lack of a geographical pattern (cf. Sealey, 1957: 105), does not
tally with the evidence. Svt 263, in any case, is radically different from, e.g., Svt 293 (=Tod 147) which clearly
belongs to Cargill's second category of alliances, 'allies of Athens and the League', but to which, equally clearly
(pace Cargill), Svt 263 does not. With the usual preliminaries to such a document deliberately excluded, Svt 263
is best seen as an adjunct of Svt 262.
Why then do not Corcyra and the rest of the Cephallenian cities appear on the left side of Svt 257, the decree of
Aristoteles, along with Acarnania and Cephallenian Pronnoi? ( Svt 257 B 1 is certainly not ]: Bradeen
and Coleman, 1967: 102ff. who suggested Theraians. Mitchel, 1984a: 39 ff., prefers Pheraians.) As
-276-

Cawkwell says, it cannot be that 'they were simply omitted. The instructions of the Athenian demos were not lightly to
be disregarded' (1981b: 42). His suggestion that space was found for an important city like Corcyra on the front of the
stone is by no means impossible. But what of the remaining three cities of Cephallenia which Cawkwell ignores? A way
out of the epigraphic difficulty might be to suppose that when Svt 262 speaks of the Cephallenians no more than
Pronnoi is meant. This is unlikely. The cities of Cephallenia did not form a single state. They were independent
communities with separate coinages (cf. RE ix. 204f.). When therefore Svt262 and 267 refer to the Cephallenians it is
because all four independent states were following the same course of action at the time.
Was space then also found for them on the front of the stele? The four cities of Ceos, all of which may have joined the
League at the same time ( IG ii2; cf. Cargill, 1981: 61), perhaps provide an analogy: three are on the left side of the
stele, but the fourth, Poiessa, is on the front. But perhaps there is a more satisfactory solution to the riddle. As we
have seen, the oaths and/or the names of the men chosen to administer them to Corcyra, Acarnania, and Cephallenia
were to be recorded on the common stele of the allies ( Svt26220-2). Nothing of the kind is to be seen on the stone,
but, as Tod notes (p. 84 ), the stele 'is incomplete at the foot'. These are puzzling observations and it is surprising that
they have not attracted more scholarly attention. Assuming, as we should, that the oaths and/or the names of the
commissioners were recorded on the stele, this doubtless was done below line 96, if indeed the whole thing, as is quite
possible, was not part and parcel of Aristoteles' second proposal (lines 91ff. The decree lacks a prescript. This is a little
surprising, but cf. ML89 lines 48ff.). It is very probable that the states listed on the left side (with the exception of the
last and perhaps the first which seem to have been inscribed by different hands: Fabricius, 1891: 596f.; Bradeen and
Coleman, 1967: 102ff.; 45. 3n.), together with a certain number recorded on the front and now missing, joined the
League at the time of the conclusion of the Common Peace of 375 (cf. Cawkwell, 1981b: 42ff.); and it is quite likely
that Aristoteles' second motion sprang from this sudden growth in the League's membership. The oaths and/or the
commissioners may well have concerned more states than those specified in Svt262. At any rate, there is no
-277reason why Corcyra and the missing Cephallenian cities cannot have been listed near the foot (now missing) of the
stele, immediately below the oaths and/or the names of the commissioners. And not only these four states, but the
others also required to bring the total membership of the League to seventy-five. The extra 12 inches or so needed to
accommodate fifteen to seventeen names would not make the stele impossibly tall. We cannot now know why the
right-hand side of the stele remained uninscribed. Perhaps it was too close to another monument on that side and
hence difficult of access?

We need not assume, from the instructions of the demos to the secretary of the boule to have the names of the cities
inscribed on the common stele forthwith ( Svt26212-15), that these should all have appeared in close sequence, one
after the other, on the stone. The cities after all were all independent states and, though grouped together in the
preliminary decision of the demos to admit them as allies ( Svt 262), in all subsequent steps they would have been
treated separately. What is more, the circumstances of some required further consideration ( Svt26225ff.;
Svt26713ff.) and this may have delayed matters a little. It should not therefore surprise that, at a time when many
other cities may have been queuing to join the League, the names of Corcyra, Acarnania, and the cities of Cephallenia
were not all recorded together. See further nn. ad 36. 5.
It follows that it is not necessary to posit a discrepancy between the literary and the epigraphic evidence in connection
with the League's membership, nor to theorize (as do Woodhead, 1957a: 371; 1962: 258ff.; Sealey, 1957: 104ff.;
Cawkwell, 1981b: 42ff.) about a second 'wave' of adhesions to the League in the late 370s (or even later) which were
somehow not recorded on the common stele. Though wrong in other respects, Cargill is surely correct to insist that
there were no members of the League which were not recorded on the common stele and that the League did not
outgrow the decree of Aristoteles after 375 (as Sealey, 1957: 104ff., suggests). For a possible reason why, in my view,
the League ceased growing after 375 see n. ad 38. 4.
: see 28. 4; 29. 7. A vague but clear reference to the equal voting power enjoyed by all members.
22 . . . : the force was meant to defend the Euboean cities which had already acceded
to the
-278Confederacy (30. 1n.), and to make war on the pro-Spartan elements in north Euboea. The expedition does not
provide us with much of a terminus ante quem for the accession of Euboea since Chabrias, its leader (section 5), could
have sailed to Euboea before he helped the Thebans against Agesilaus in Boeotia in early summer.
30. 3. + : an approximate date for these events can be obtained from speculation
on the identity of the Spartan dispatched to Euboea. D's Therippides (see n. below) is unknown otherwise. But it is
very probable that he is identical with the better-known Herippidas, one of the three Spartan officers on the Cadmea at
the time of the coup (27. 3n.; Plut. Pel. 13. 3 -- if Bryan's emendation of Plutarch's text is correct. Lenschau, RE viii. 1.
684ff., does not take this into consideration, but brings Herippidas' career to a close with X. H. 4. 8. 11). If this is so,
then Herippidas could have moved from Thebes to north Euboea on receipt of orders from Sparta, and dealt with
Neogenes. Hence the events of sections 3-4 belong sometime between 382 and 379. According to Plut. Mor. 578a,
Herippidas and the other two condemned commanders had succeeded Phoebidas in 382. Cf. Parke, 1927: 159ff.
+ +u=0311 : the famous Jason who after Leuctra made himself tagos of Thessaly (for a discussion
of the date see 45. 3n., part 3). On Jason's early years see Westlake, 1935: 67ff.; Sordi, 1958: 156ff. Jason had
designs to expand both by land and sea (X. H. 6. 1. 10ff.). The geography of Hestiaea was obviously of great
importance to Jason's naval plans, as Pagasae, the port of Pherae, lies at the top of the Pagasaean Gulf, and the north
coast of Euboea extends along the narrow mouth of the Gulf at no great distance from it. The importance of the place
to the sea routes into the Gulf is well illustrated by X. H. 5. 4. 56; cf. Polyaen. 2. 7. + . . . ++:
++ (+ in section 4) is Le Paulmier's emendation of the MSS consensus ( in section
4), rightly accepted by Vogel though not by Vial. Theopompus ( FGH 115 F387) says that after the destruction of
Hestiaea in 446 the Athenians planted a colony at Oreos which place had previously been a demos of Hestiaea. At any
rate Hestiaea came to be known as Oreos too (Thuc. 7. 57. 2; 8. 95. 7; Strabo 10 C 445; see Moggi, 1976: no. 18, pp.
115ff. Vial objects to Le Paulmierw's emendation which was prompted, she says, by the fact
-279-

that Oreos was the other name of Hestiaea. Now, Vial thinks, D here only makes sense if two separate cities are
understood, and she therefore suggests that the MSS + should be emended to +, Orobiae
known to have been a city in the region of Hestiaea (Strabo 10 C 445; cf. 9 C 405; Thuc. 3. 89. 2). Vial is wrong
for while D in section 3 may be thought to be speaking of two different places, in the next section he is clearly
speaking of the same place. It might at first sight appear that Ephorus understood the city to be called Oreos and
the area Hestiaea, but as at 30. 1 Hestiaea is referred to as a polis (cf. 11. 13. 5; 12. 7. 1) one may conclude that
the city (and the surrounding country) was known to Ephorus too as either Oreos or Hestiaea. In that case we
must assume that the occurrence of both names here is the result of Ephorus' desire to vary his style and display
his erudition. That Vial's emendation is wrong is proved by X. H. 5. 4. 56 f.: Alcetas, the Spartan commander at
Oreos, had clearly been installed by Therippides/ Herippidas after the expulsion of Neogenes. And we may
compare Polyaen. 2. 7; cf. Front. 4. 7. 19. 1: the reading of the best MSS and therefore so printed by
Vogel and Vial. But surely (whatever D may have written -- we cannot now know) 1 (MS F) must be the
correct form of the name.
30. 4. : MSS . Dindorf's emendation ( Vogl), rejected by Vial, seems justified.
30. 5. ++ . . . : Vial ad loc. makes the absurd suggestion that Hestiaeotis, the
region in west Thessaly, is meant here, her proof being the reference to Metropolis which she identifies with the
city of that name in western Thessaly! But at section 5 the narrative is resumed from section 2, and Chabrias'
operations were clearly in north Euboea. Having failed to carry Oreos, he laid waste the land, chose some rocky
site nearby called Metropolis, fortified it, and sailed on. The absurdity of Vial's assertion is shown especially by the
geography of the Thessalian Metropolis. It was situated in the very depths of Thessaly, 30 miles west of Pharsalus
and some 50 miles inland. + : strictly speaking Peparethus and Sciathus do not belong to
the Cyclades (cf. Strabo 2 C 124) though both here and at 95. 1 D (or rather Ephorus: Accame, 1941: 80) thinks
that they do. Peparethus and Sciathus would have been 'persuaded' to join Sparta either by Therippides/

Herippidas or by
-280Alcetas (see above). Their neighbour to the east, Icus, which had perhaps been under Sparta too, had already
joined Athens (30. 1 n.). It is not easy to find candidates for . The same hand
which cut the Sciathians and Peparethians on the front of Svt 257=Tod 123 may also have cut ,
+ and + (Tod, p. 66. Accame, 1941: 76f., following Fabricius, 1891: 597, agrees though he assigns
the five names to three groups inscribed by the same hand, but at different times. Cargill, 1981: 34, is sceptical).
Perinthus and Maroneia in Thrace acceded voluntarily, we may guess, but the accession of the small town of Dion
west of Oreos on the north Euboean coast, as well as that of Athenai Diades immediately to the east of Dion (line
90 though apparently cut by a different hand), may have been due to the efforts of Chabrias. Both places had
perhaps been under Sparta. Dion and Athenai are not islands admittedly, but then D's language can usually admit
of a certain degree of flexibility and imprecision. Accame, 1941: 78f., further suggests the Palesciathians whom
he restores in line 85. Now, the statement that Chabrias sailed in the Cyclades may allow a wider scope than the
vicinity of Sciathus and Peparethus, and Accame, 1941: 81 ff., offers a number of Cycladic islands which he
suggests originally stood below line 85 on the front face. He may be right, at least in some of the names
suggested, though proof is lacking; see also 34. 4 n. and cf. Cargill, 1981: 34ff.
31. 1-4. Spartan countermeasures
31. 1. +. . . : see 27. 4; 28. 4-5 and nn. The Spartans put an end to their former bad
ways, and by embassies, friendly words, and the bestowal of benefits regained the goodwill of their allies. The
embassies and the friendly words require no explanation. The benefits may allude to the reorganization of the
Peloponnesian League which was, perhaps, fairer on the allies.
31. 1-2. The reorganization of the Peloponnesian League
See 28. 5 and 28. 4-5n. We are now told what the Spartan preparations were. They were chiefly concerned with
the reorganization of their League. The reorganization, which is, surprisingly, not
-281mentioned by Xenophon (or any other source), was based on geography and numbers, and the ten divisions or
districts are given in a geographical order in D: (1) Lacedaemonia; (2) Arcadia (centred on Tegea?); (3) Arcadia
(centred on Mantinea?); (4) Elis; (5) Achaea; (6) Corinth and Megara; (7) Sicyon, Phlius, and the Acte; (8)
Acarnania; (9) Phocis and Locris; (10) Olynthus and the other allies in Thrace. Each of the ten divisions had to
contribute a body of troops in approximately equal or rather equivalent numbers, and, this being the
Peloponnesian League, the basis of the calculation must have been hoplites. The evidence for the numerical
strength of the states concerned is admittedly limited, but it appears that each of the ten divisions was able to
provide some 3,000-4,000 hoplites, or the equivalent in light-armed infantry, cavalry, money, or a mixture of all
of these (I cannot see how Bengtson, GG273, reaches his estimate of 1,000 men per district).
Elis, the 4th division, sent 3,000 hoplites to the help of Argos in 418 (Thuc. 5. 58. 1; cf. 5. 75. 5), and nearly
3,000 Elean, Triphylian, Acrorian, and Lasionian hoplites took part in the battle of Corinth in 394 (X. H. 4. 2. 16).
Mantinea, if we suppose Tegea and Mantinea to have been the respective centres of divisions 2 and 3, sent nearly
3,000 hoplites to Argos in 418 according to D (12. 78. 4). At this time democratic Mantinea had conquered and
was ruling over an extensive part of Arcadia (Thuc. 5. 29. 1; 33. 1; cf. HCT iv. ad loc.), and D's figure is not
implausible and it should not be rejected as a mere Ephoran guess simply because Thucydides is silent on the
point (for Ephorus' use of non-Thucydidean material, see pp. 106, 129 ). Lysias (34. 7) claims that in 403 the
Mantineans numbered less than 3,000 men altogether, but the reference is suspect. At any rate, the permanent
federal army instituted in 370 numbered 5,000 so that about 8,000 is a reasonable figure for the total Arcadian
field army (reserves excluded) of hoplites (cf. Larsen, 1968: 194). The Spartans therefore divided Arcadia in two.
The Corinthians had in 418 campaigned with 2,000 hoplites (Thuc. 5. 57. 2; 60. 3). But in 378, after the
tribulations of the Corinthian War, Corinth is unlikely to have had more than 2,000 hoplites in all, and Megara, its
partner in the 6th district, could perhaps have put some 1,000 hoplites in the field.
Sicyon, Phlius, and the Acte made up the 7th district. Sicyon
-282sent 1,500 hoplites to Corinth in 394 (X. H. 4. 2. 16), while Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis, i.e. the
Acte (Paus. 2. 8. 5; Strabo 9 C 390), sent 3,000 (X. H. 4. 2. 16). Phlius is said to to have had a population of
more than 5,000 men in 380 (X. H. 5. 3. 16). There followed Agesilaus' settlement of the city which resulted in
many exiles (40. 5), and we might reckon 1,000-1,500 for Phlius' hoplite field force (in the early 360s it had no
more than 60 cavalry: X. H. 7. 2. 4). With some 5,000 front-line hoplites the 7th division was probably one of the
strongest. The strength of the Lacedaemonian army is a matter of controversy, but the reorganization of the
League appears to exclude the possibility that it numbered (as some scholars suggest) no less than some 7,680
hoplites for then it would not have been on a par with the other divisions (32. 1n.). And divisions of 8,000 instead
of 4,000 would result in a field force of some 80,000 hoplites which seems unacceptable (the figure in FGH324
(Androtion) F39 for 431 is corrupt (cf. Jacoby's n.), and Plutarch's 60,000 Peloponnesian and Boeotian hoplites
(Per. 33. 5), at two-thirds strength presumably (Thuc. 2. 10. 2), is hardly to be credited). No worthwhile results
are obtained from an examination of the other divisions; but see further 32. 1n.
Why was the League reorganized at this juncture? A major aim must have been greater efficiency; as D Puts it,
+ + (31. 1). It is possible that the
reorganization was initiated even before the Theban revolt at a time when, according to both D (23. 3ff.) and
Xenophon (H. 5. 3. 27), Spartan might was at its zenith. D's cryptic words at 23. 4 may well hint at a greater

attention given to her alliance by Sparta at this point following the incorporation of Olynthus and the other
Thracian cities. may refer to an additional aim of the reorganization: an increased number of
troops. The reorganization cannot have been completed overnight. It would have required discussion as well as, of
course, the assent of the allies, and it may have taken up several months. The revolt of Thebes and of part of
Boeotia intervened and the final arrangements thus excluded Boeotia.
The new system would have been simpler than the old one and more satisfactory from the Spartan point of view.
Under the old system the many cities of the League sent their levies individually (X. H. 3. 4. 3) and scores of
Spartan officers were dispatched on
-283-

each occasion to collect and command all the various contingents (Thuc. 2. 75. 3; X. H. 3. 5. 7; 4. 2. 19; 5. 1. 33; 5.
2. 7; cf. 4. 5. 7). Now, it would seem, only one officer per district was needed -- one conducted the
Corinthians, Epidaurians, Troezinians, and the rest to Sparta in the admittedly unusual circumstances of winter 370/69
(X. H. 7. 2. 3). This was a definite advantage considering the steadily diminishing number of Spartiates (though
perioikoi may have acted as too).
D concludes the list of the ten divisions with an equation: 1 cavalryman=4 hoplites=8 light-armed infantrymen. He
does not explain this, but clearly the equation was necessary if the districts were to be fairly assessed for most states
contributed an assortment of all three arms. And we may guess that there was also in Ephorus a statement about
those states which wished to contribute money instead of men, and the relevant equation. For already in 382,
Xenophon tells us (H. 5. 2. 21), permission was given to any city which so wished to provide money instead of men at
the rate of 3 Aeginetan obols per hoplite and 12 per cavalryman, and in 373 many of the cities preferred to contribute
money rather than men to Mnasippus' force (H. 6. 2. 16). Xenophon's information confirms D's equation, 1
cavalryman=4 hoplites. The alternative of providing money would have suited at least those allies who were
increasingly unwilling to campaign abroad (cf. X. H. 5. 4. 60 and Smith, 1954: 285f.). It would also have suited
Sparta; she could use the money to hire mercenaries. Another advantage of the reorganization may have been a more
equitable contribution of men or money which surely took into account a state's population and wealth. Each division
was responsible for providing so many men and no more. This must have meant that some divisions could provide
more than they actually did, but this could not be helped if they were all to be equal. The cornerstone of the new
system must have been the size of the Lacedaemonian army which formed the first division. Cartledge, 1979: 291 (cf.
id., 1987: 272), may well have a point when he says that the reorganization was 'designed perhaps to emphasize the
burden carried by the Spartans and so to restore their prestige'.
We do not know if the reorganization went beyond the land forces. Certainly Sparta had a number of island allies (30.
5; X. H. 5. 4. 65; 6. 2. 3), but it is debatable whether these were members of the Peloponnesian League. But coastal
Peloponnesus had
-284-

always contributed to Spartan fleets, and there must have been rules governing these contributions.
For the forces raised as a result of the reorganization, which in fact confirm the above analysis, see 32. 1nn.
31. 2. + : there is no problem about the states in the first seven divisions; they were all
indubitably members of the Peloponnesian League. Those in the last three groups did not traditionally belong to
the League, but this is no good reason for denying that they did at this time. The case for Olynthus and the allies
of the 'Thraceward' area seems safe enough. On the capitulation of Olynthus in 379 the Olynthians had agreed to
'have the same friends and enemies as the Lacedaemonians, to follow them wherever they lead, and to be their
allies' (X. H. 5. 3. 26) which indicates membership of the League, and D in fact states this explicitly ( 23. 3). The
Acarnanians had concluded an alliance with Sparta in 388 (X. H. 4. 7. 1) and they may have entered the League
at the same time, while we know nothing about the circumstances and nature of the treaties of Phocis and the
Locrians. But the presence of all these states here strongly suggests membership of the League. Certainly this is
more likely than the view that the ten divisions were a conglomeration of members and non-members (cf. de Ste
Croix, 1972: 338). The Chalcidians seceded to Athens in 375 (Svt 250=Tod 119 (see pp. 277 f., 328 f. for the
date); Svt 257 (=Tod 123) B lines 5f.) and so did the Acarnanians (Svt 257 (= Tod 123) B line 10; Svt 262=Tod
126).
: ? Perhaps, though we have no way of knowing. Section 57. 1 does not help.
+ . . .: see 23. 3 and 30. 1n. for a possible candidate, Arethusa.
31. 3-4. This rhetorical estimate of Agesilaus, as was the manner of Ephorus (p. 123 ), serves as an introduction
to the warfare of the next two years conducted in Boeotia by the king. Agesilaus' energy and aptitude for war are
stressed, but this is no eulogy; see pp. 119 f.
31. 3. : the battle of Sardis in 395; see 14. 80.
. . . : it was widely believed that Agesilaus had come close to overthrowing the rule of the
Great King, and that he would have succeeded had he not been recalled by his home government (cf. X. Ag. 1.
36; Plut. Ages. 15; Nepos, Ages. 4. 1-3). The origins of this belief may be traced to Agesilaus' attempt
-285to sacrifice at Aulis like a second Agamemnon before invading Asia (X. H. 3. 4. 3 f.), and in the fact that at the
time of his recall he was preparing to march as far as possible into the interior; or so our sources tell us (X. H. 4.
1. 41; Hell. Oxy. 22. 4). Isocrates (4. 144) thought that Agesilaus had conquered nearly all the territory west of
the river Halys. In reality his success was more modest and it was likely to remain so (see next n.). But Isocrates
too considered that Agesilaus' failure was ascribable to internal Greek politics (5. 86f.), and so did Polybius (3. 6.
11) who nevertheless was of the opinion that Agesilaus returned to Greece having encountered little or
no resistance in Asia. D (Ephorus), like Polybius, reflects a tradition critical of, if not hostile to, Agesilaus and
Sparta because of their Greek policies. But Ephorus was a moralist, a panhellenist (and an admirer of Athens),
and whenever Sparta acted in accord with virtue and the interests of Greece, he praised (see pp. 114 ff.). In this
instance, as a panhellenist, Ephorus readily shared the common belief that Agesilaus had come close to
overthrowing the Persian empire.
+ + : Agesilaus' inability to capture fortified places is stressed by the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia
(21. 5 f; 22. 3), and D's statement here that Agesilaus 'traversed a large part of Asia mastering the open country'
is one more link in the chain Hell. Oxy.-Ephorus-D. Unlike Alexander, Agesilaus lacked the means necessary for
capturing cities and forts, and this meant that his conquest of any part of the King's country could not but be
temporary. Confined mostly to the open country, he was a mere raider.
. . . : the epitomator's shorthand? Ephorus may have explained that the reason was the outbreak
of the Corinthian War.
31. 4. . . . : see 19. 4 and n.; also pp. 119 f.
+ . . . : not so. D was ignorant of the mechanics of the Athenian constitution (p. 133 ), and we
cannot expect him to have been better informed in the case of Sparta. When the Lacedaemonians ordered
mobilization against an enemy one of the two kings (or some other important Spartan acting in their stead) was
appointed to command. His command was just for that particular campaign (Agis at Decelea and Agesilaus in Asia
were not typical, but exceptional cases). Cf. X. H. 5. 4. 3 5: + +
+
-286. . . . . . , which is how D himself puts it earlier in section 3: + + +
+ .
32-33. 4. The first invasion of Boeotia
32. 1. + : from X. H. 5. 4. 56 we learn that Agesilaus destroyed the Theban corn harvest in
two successive years. He must therefore have entered Boeotia by the end of May 378 at the latest: Hesiod, Works

and Days383 f. and pp. 253 ff. in West's edn. for the time of harvest. For the year see 25. 1n.
. . . : I take the generic to refer to hoplites. Later in the same section we are told that
Agesilaus' cavalry numbered 1,500. As one cavalryman equalled four hoplites (31. 2), Agesilaus had with him the
equivalent of 24,000 hoplites, i.e. fivesixths of the League field forces, considering that five of the six
Lacedaemonian morai marched out. The total field forces would thus have been equivalent to about 30,000
hoplites, 3,000 per district, which is indeed the conclusion reached above in the examination of the League
reorganization (31. 1-2n.). In fact rather more than 3,000, for Agesilaus was also accompanied by light-armed
troops for which D gives no figure (32. 4). One hoplite was equal to two light-armed so that our estimate of
3,000-4,000 hoplites as the approximate assessment for each district appears quite plausible. In the following
year, 377, Boeotia was again invaded by the same force (34. 1). We have no figures for the League army on
other campaigns of the 370s with the exception of Leuctra. Four Lacedaemonian morai were present then (X. H.
6. 4. 17), and Cleombrotus therefore must have had two-thirds of the League levy with him, i.e. the equivalent of
20,000 hoplites. Now, the 8th division, Acarnania, and the 10th, Olynthus and the Thracian cities, had fallen away
by then (31. 2n.), i.e. the equivalent of some 6,000 hoplites. If we ignore the figures given by Polyaenus (2. 3. 8)
and Frontinus ( Strateg. 4. 2. 6; cf. Anderson, 1970: 321 n. 26), and work on the basis of the numbers supplied
by Plutarch in Pelopidas (D gives no figures for the Peloponnesians and Xenophon only for the Lacedaemonians,
incidentally), we see that the result is not inconsistent with our previous calculations. Cleombrotus invaded with
10,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry ( Pel. 20. 1), i.e. with the equivalent of about 14,000 hoplites.
. . . : the text is wrong as it stands; the Lacedae-287-

monian army was organized in six not five morai. The difficulty is resolved if the article is omitted (as indeed it is by a
small number of admittedly secondary MSS (presumably a correction by a copyist). is Vogel's emendation of the
of the rest of the MSS). If that is done, then Agesilaus had five of the morai with him, the sixth having been left at
home, a not uncommon measure (cf. 14. 97. 5; Thuc. 5. 64. 3). The following spring Agesilaus invaded Boeotia with
the same force (34. 1). As one mora was already at Thespiae ( X. H. 5. 4. 46 f.), the king must have led out four morai
and again left one behind.
U1F72 . . . : the organization and strength of the Lacedaernonian army are problems of
considerable intractability which cannot be treated here. For discussions and a plethora of views, see Toynbee, 1969:
365ff.; Andrewes, HCT iv. 110ff.; Anderson, 1970: 221ff.; Cartledge, 1979: esp. 254ff.; id., 1987: 37ff., 427ff.;
Forrest, 1980: 131ff.; Cawkwell, 1983: 385ff.; Lazenby, 1985; Figueira, 1986: 165ff. For our period, I accept the
evidence of Xenophon that the Lacedaemonian army (both Spartiates and perioikoi brigaded together, though not
perhaps in the lowest units, the enomoties: cf. Cartledge, 1987: 42. Contra Lazenby, 1985: 16ff.) consisted of six
morai of hoplites (I omit the cavalry morai), each commanded by a polemarch and subdivided into two lochoi (H. 7. 4.
20; 7. 5. 10. Four lochoi, according to Lac. Pol. 11. 4 where the figure should perhaps be emended to two: Toynbee,
1969: 396), eight pentecostyes, and sixteen enomoties. This is broadly consistent with the information of Thucydides
about the Spartan army (from his account of the battle of Mantinea in 418: 5. 66-73), though Thucydides evidently
became confused over the exact structure and nomenclature of the army, erroneously assuming that the highest
multiple of the enomoty was the lochos whereas in fact it was the mora. This apart, it is important to appreciate that
both Thucydides and Xenophon agree on the essentials, above all on the number of enomoties in an army of six
regiments (96 in all), on the maximum strength of the enomoty (about 40 men, i.e., it would seem, one man from
each of 40 year-classes: Toynbee, 1969: 369f.), and therefore on the strength of the army as a whole, about 4,000
men (3,840 is the exact calculation).
Many scholars nevertheless consider 4,000 Lacedaemonian hoplites too few and propose doubling Thucydides' figures:
the
-288historian spoke wrongly of the highest multiple of the enomoty as the lochos when he should have called it a mora,
each mora consisting of two lochoi. Thus there were not 96 but 192 enomoties, and the army numbered some 8,000
men (7,680 is the precise figure; cf. e.g. Toynbee, 1969: 369ff.; Wade-Gery, 1958: 71ff., 80ff.; Andrewes, HCT iv.
111 ff.). The evidence is admittedly difficult, but it seems better to let the figures stand. After all, Thucydides, who
reckoned the Lacedaemonian numbers at Mantinea in 418 to have been c.4,184 in all (i.e. 448 files, 8 deep on
average, plus the 600 Sciritans), did not consider such a sum unreasonable and neither did Xenophon, it would seem,
who also reckoned 16 enornoties in a mora, not 32. This agreement of Thucydides and Xenophon seems particularly
compelling. Also, and decisively perhaps, there is the fact that Lacedaemonia was only one of the ten divisions of the
reorganized Peloponnesian League (31. 1-2n.). She was the equal, for example, of Corinth and Megara together, or of
half of Arcadia. She must therefore have provided no more than 3,000-4,000 hoplites.
There are, it is true, certain difficulties with the low figures, but none is insurmountable. There is, for instance, the
often-voiced objection (cf. Toynbee, 1969: 378f.; Lazenby, 1985: 7) that if Sparta had had no more than some 4,000
hoplites, she could not have imposed her will on Greece. However, all of the 4,000 were well-trained professionals,
which was unusual in 5th-century Greece. The advent of the equally well-trained (and not more numerous!) Theban
hoplites in the 4th century made all the difference. What is more, Sparta had the Peloponnesian League behind her. X.
H. 7. 1. 23f. makes the Arcadians complain that they, being the most populous section of the Greek nation, had made
Sparta what she was; and we might compare Timolaus' picturesque analogies at X. H. 4. 2. 11f. One might add too
that Sparta did possess additional troops, the perioikoi and neodamodeis, which, when need arose, she used for
garrisons or distant expeditions or even in battles.
: this is certainly the Ephoran figure for the strength of a mora as Plut. Pel. 17. 4 ( FGH 70 F210) confirms.
At 15. 37. 1 we are told that 500 Thebans defeated twice as many Spartans. As there were thought to have been two
morai present at Tegyra (Plut. Pel. 17. 4), we obtain again the number 500. Ephorus may have derived this by
reckoning a call-up of the first 30 year-

-289-

classes, i.e. 480 men, and adding the officers (cf. X. Lac. Pol. 11. 4). Plut. Pel. 17. 4 gives Callisthenes' figure too,
700, which may be the mora at full strength, 640 men, plus the officers, plus one of the cavalry morai (cf. X. Lac.
Pol. 11. 4). Polybius' figure, 900, perhaps refers to the later time of Nabis. + : this is palpable
nonsense as it stands. The beginning of the passage, + . . . , seems factual
enough, but most of the rest seems to refer to the hippeis rather. Ephorus appears to have included a description
of the Spartan army at this point in the Histories and in summarizing it D 'has telescoped a reference to the
Skiritai with one to the 300 "hippeis" ' ( Andrewes, HCT iv. 104). For the Sciritans cf. Toynbee, 1969: 208f. (but
they were hoplites not light-armed, as Thuc. 5. 67. 1; 68. 3 shows); Andrewes, HCT iv. 103 f.; Anderson, 1970:
249ff.; Lazenby, 1985: 10. The 300 hippeis are one of the more elusive aspects of the Spartan socio-military set
up. The belief that a special (or crack or elite) corps of 300 picked young Spartans called hippeis formed a royal
bodyguard and fought with the king in battle in a separate formation is fairly general (cf. e.g. Andrewes, HCT iv.
112; Cartledge, 1979: 204, 275; id., 1987: esp. 204f. Anderson, 1970: 231 ff., is in a minority in casting doubt
on these views). It rests on a handful of remarks in ancient writers, above all in Herodotus and Thucydides.
Ephorus, to judge from D here, gave the usual story about the hippeis. Can the belief be substantiated?
The most explicit statement in Herodotus is at 8. 124. 3 where it is said that 300 picked Spartiates, o
, honoured Themistocles on his visit to Sparta by accompanying him as far as the Laconian
border. Two other statements hardly help to elucidate this statement. At 1. 67. 5 it is said that the five oldest
men who retired from the hippeis every year were called agathoergoi and served the state in various ways for a
year. And at 6. 56 we are told that when on campaign a Spartan king was guarded by 100 picked men. These are
not called hippeis and some scholars in fact (e.g. Michell, 1952: 249) refuse to see them as such. (On Herodotus
see also end of n.) A much clearer statement is provided by Thucydides. At 5. 72. 4 it is said that King Agis at
Mantinea was posted at the centre of the battle-line and around him stood the 300 hippeis so-called (. . .
'A ). The trouble with this
-290information is that it does not quite tally with Xenophon whose witness on things Spartan deserves greater
credence even than that of Thucydides.
The first thing to note about Xenophon is that, with one possible exception (H. 6. 4. 14; see below), he does not
anywhere refer to the hippeis by name. In Lac. Pol. 4. 1-6, however, he describes a system by which 300 young
Spartans were selected on the basis of merit. The selection was made by three men called hippagretal appointed
by the ephors. Each hippagretes selected 100 young men. The purpose of the institution was the encouragement
of with + as the final objective. It is impossible to be definite about Xenophon's
meaning, but he seems to say that (a) the three hippagretai were over 30 years of age ( +
: 4. 3) and (b) the 300 themselves were men between about 20 and 30 years of age (: 4. 3;
, + : 4. 7). The age-group
from which they derived would then appear to be the which we encounter as a feature of the
Lacedaemonian army (H. 2. 4. 32; 4. 5. 14). It is rather disconcerting that Xenophon does not say either here, at
Lac. Pol. 4. 1-6 or 13. 6f., or anywhere else that these 300 acted as a royal bodyguard; nor does he refer to them
as hippeis, though of course the term hippagretai ('those who gather the hippeis') implies that of hippeis. The
hippagretai are mentioned again in the Hellenica in connection with the conspiracy of Cinadon (3. 3. 4-11). To
arrest Cinadon as quietly as possible, the ephors sent him along to the senior hippagretes (3. 3. 9) who was to
give him some of the young (or younger, /: 3. 3. 8f.) men for his assumed mission to Aulon. The
men concerned are not specified as hippeis though they must have been of military age and presumably in their
twenties; Cinadon himself is described as A (3. 3. 5) and as serving in the army (3. 3. 7).
What Xenophon says, or rather does not say, about the hippeis and their role is disconcerting enough. No less
worrying is the fact that, with the single possible exception noted above, the hippeis are nowhere mentioned in
connection with battles he describes (often in some detail) which involved the participation of Spartan kings. Not
only that, but Xenophon's evidence strongly suggests that the king and his companions (whoever and however
many they were) fought as part of one of the morai, presumably the first, or leading,
-291mora ( Lac. Pol. 13. 6). When Pausanias attacked the democrats in the Piraeus in 403 he did so initially with two
morai (H. 2. 4. 31). He was with those two morai himself as the narrative shows: when the democrats began
giving him trouble, Pausanias ordered to charge out (2. 4. 32). He himself followed with the
others ( ). Very soon afterwards the king found himself in trouble. Both polemarchs fell as
well as a number of other Lacedaemonians and Pausanias was forced to retreat for the moment (H. 2. 4. 33f.). In
394 Agesilaus was returning from Asia when he met the allies at Coronea. He had been reinforced by one and a
half moral for the battle. Again, no mention is made of the hippeis (H. 4. 3. 15 ff.; Ag. 2. 6 ff.). Even more
surprising is the absence of the hippeis from H. 4. 5. 6ff.: Agesilaus was in the Corinthia in 390 when the
decimation of the mora by Iphicrates was announced to him. Calling his officers together Agesilaus ordered the
army to follow as soon as possible while he himself set out at once ( Lac. Pol. 13. 1, 7 explains
who these were). The also followed in haste. If these are not Agesilaus' bodyguards then they must be
the men who had been guarding the prisoners (H. 4. 5. 6). Where are the hippeis?
Xenophon does, however, on two occasions refer to the men who fought before the king, but without calling them
hippeis or giving them a number. The thirty or so Spartans who fell while defending Archidamus in 364 (
+: H. 7. 4. 23) are described as agathoi and as being from amongst the most prominent of
the citizens (H. 7. 4. 24). The same emerges from Xenophon's account of the Spartan rout at Leuctra (H. 6. 4.
13f.). The men who fought before Cleombrotus ( + : H. 6. 4. 13) were Deinon the
polemarch, Sphodrias + , his son Cleonymus (cf. H. 5. 4. 33),
+ (H. 6. 4. 14). in the text is perhaps a corruption of , but even so we see
that (a) they were only one group of men amongst others who fought with the king, and (b) they may have

belonged to the polemarch like the O rather than to the king. The men who fought and fell with
Cleombrotus were the very best of the Spartans, as Plutarch puts it ( Ages. 28. 8). Isocrates too says that the
state appointed the most distinguished of the citizens to guard the king in battle ( Letter 2. 6). Xenophon's
evidence, therefore, does not
-292-

port the claim that a corps of 300 hippeis acted as a royal bodyguard. What is more, it conclusively proves that the
king fought within one of the morai and not separately with the hippeis.
The number 300 is in any case untenable. The system was that 300 young men were selected from a (presumably)
much larger number of men between the ages of 20 and 30 ( Lac. Pol. 4. 3). However, by the time of the
Peloponnesian War Spartiate numbers had become too small to cope with such a procedure (in the 370s there were no
more than some 1,200 Spartiates of military age: H. 6. 4. 12, 15, 17); unless of course what we find outlined in the
Lac. Pol. is the 'Lycurgan' theory, and practice fell far short of it, at least as far as the strength of the hippeis was
concerned. This is not unlikely. The Lac. Pol. belongs to a genre. Within that genre Xenophon, whose stated aim (1. 12) was to show how the Spartans attained pre-eminence in Greece by adhering to the laws of Lycurgus, might well not
feel inclined to point out that the Sparta of his time no longer had, say, 500-600 young men in their twenties.
What then can we say about the 300 hippeis and their function? To be dogmatic would be inapposite as well as
dangerous. Nevertheless, all the indications seem to point to this conclusion: the 300 hippeis were an ancient
'Lycurgan' institution meant to encourage healthy rivalry among the young Spartans. Once they had indeed been
hippeis, but they were so no longer; they merely kept the title (Strabo 10 C 481-2). Once they had numbered 300, but
from the middle of the 5th century at the latest they could no longer so do. However, the name, the 300 hippeis, was
retained, and thus they were known at home and abroad. It was not their function to act as a royal bodyguard by
nature of their office. Yet in elitist Sparta (and this was an elitism based only partly on merit; birth and wealth almost
certainly counted for more) the eminent men who fought with the king must largely have coincided with the hippeis,
past and present. Thucydides' statement at 5. 72. 4 about Agis and the 300 hippeis so-called should be seen in this
light. It might be objected that perhaps a change took place between the time of Thucydides and that of Xenophon.
Institutions of this kind, however, in an ultra-conservative state like Sparta rarely admit of radical change. After all, the
title, hippeis, persisted long after the knights had lost their mounts.
( Kelly, 1981: 31 ff., suggests that the lochos of Amompharetus at
-293-

Plataea mentioned in Herodotu was in fact the 300 hippeis. The suggestion is based on a series of
unsubstantiated assumptions. To voice but three objections: (a) Herodotus does not say that the Pitanate lochos
numbered 300 men called hippeis -- yet he was aware of both of these items of information as we have seen. (b)
The impression one derives from Herodotus is that Pausanias and Euryanax were not stationed with the Pitanate
lochos. (c) As Den Boer, 1954: 288ff., argues, the MSS readings ireas and irees at Herod. 9. 85. 1-2 are
preferable to Valckenaer's emendation irenas and irenes preferred by Kelly. Kelly, however, is right to criticize
some of Den Boer's conclusions: all men who fell in battle and women who died in childbirth were exempt from
the ban on named tombstones as Plut. Lyc. 27. 2 says, and the text should not be emended (as it is by Den Boer)
to mean that only priests killed in war and priestesses could have inscribed tombstones. Also, the four Spartiates
Herodotus names as buried in the first Lacedaemonian grave at Plataea were not the only occupants of that
grave; Herodotus was clearly being selective. Nevertheless, neither point can lend support to Kelly's view that the
first grave contained irenes (i.e. hippeis as he sees it) rather than irees.)
32. 2. 'A . . . : Xenophon's failure (H. 5. 4. 35 ff.) to mention the Athenian presence tallies
well with his policy of ignoring as many as possible of the anti-Spartan actions of the Athenian (25.
3-27. 3n.). On D's evidence, this was in fact the second time in 378 that the Athenians had marched out to aid
the Thebans. For the first time, in midwinter 379/8, see 25. 3-27. 3 n.
32. 3. + :D gives only one episode, albeit the most famous, of the campaign of 378.
For a less inadequate picture of Agesilaus' operations in Boeotia we must turn to Xenophon's account which,
however, is largely an apologia for Agesilaus' lack of success. The Theban strategy, Xenophon informs us, was a
defensive one. A large part of the arable land was fenced off with ditches and stockades. For the novelty of this
see Anderson, 1970: 134; Hanson, 1983: 67ff. For the likely course of this field fortification see Munn, 1987: 114
ff. He suggests that it ran from Cynoscephalae in a south-easterly direction keeping north of the Asopos. Behind
these lines the Thebans and their allies kept guard. Finally, Agesilaus succeeded in passing within the lines and
laying waste the land as far as Thebes. It was at this
-294time that Chabrias' exploit took place though Xenophon does not mention it.
2 LA: we therefore know these facts about the hill: (a) it was fairly low and not too steep as
Agesilaus tried to attack the enemy. (b) It was fairly extensive for it accommodated a large number of troops. (c)
It was about 20 stades from Thebes (cf. Aristid. Panath. 284 Dind. + ) and (d) it was
oblong in shape and, occupied by the enemy, it appears to have frustrated Agesilaus' plan to march where he had
wanted to march. Now we know that Agesilaus penetrated behind the lines at Cynoscephalae (X. Ag. 2. 22), a
place which cannot unfortunately be located independently or with any certainty. Pindar's biographers cite it as
the place of his birth and further say that it was between Thespiae and Thebes, but belonging to the latter (cf.
Steph. Byz. s.v.). Its name signifies perhaps a group of hills (cf. RE xx. 1608f.; va. 1447f.; Suppl. x. 355; Munn,
1987: 113 and n. 26). That it was on the way to Thebes from Thespiae and close to the frontier is shown by X. H.

5. 4. 15: in the winter of 379/8 Cleombrotus advanced from Thespiae to Cynoscephalae and remained there for
sixteen days watching the attitude of Thebes. The trouble with identifying D's hill, even if we could locate
Cynoscephalae, is that we do not know what Agesilaus' movements were once over the trench and stockade. The
most convenient (though not quite direct) way of reaching Thebes from Thespiae is that followed by the presentday road which proceeds down the long Kanavari valley in a north-easterly direction. Once in the northern (or
Aonian) plain, the road proceeds east to Thebes. Immediately to the west (less than a mile away) of the mouth of
this valley there was situated the Cabeireion in 'a small valley or hollow in the hills opening northward on the
Teneric plain . . . The hills on either side are low, bare, and treeless' (Frazer, v. 136; cf. Buck, 1979: 13f. On the
Cabeireion see Schachter, 1981-94: ii. 66 ff.; Fossey, 1988: 211f.). It is possible that Agesilaus tried to reach the
northern (Aonian) and western (Teneric) Theban plains, at the same time threatening Thebes, by marching down
the Kanavari valley. If he did, the low hills of Pouridi (or Gyftoaidema) or Ntarani south-west of Thebes on either
side of the road to Thespiae are good candidates for the elevated ground occupied by the Thebans and Athenians.
The allies had perhaps hurried back and had succeeded in overtaking
-295Agesilaus because the king, busy with plundering and laying waste the land, had proceeded more slowly. But
perhaps the allies did not succeed in intercepting the Spartans until the valley of the Cabeireion and it was there
that Agesilaus received his famous check (see further 33. 4n.). If this is what happened we may assume that
Agesilaus was prevented from reaching the plains west and especially north of Thebes, and that he had to confine
his activities to the south and south-west of the city for the time being. All the above suggested locations satisfy
D's information that the hill was about 20 stades from Thebes.
It is possible nevertheless, as suggested by Munn, 1987: 112 ff., that with such a large force, both infantry and
cavalry, Agesilaus decided not to risk marching through the relatively narrow Kanavari valley, but preferred
instead to move through the fairly open countryside to the south which leads from Leuctra in the direction of
Thebes, passing on the left a ridge of hills (Rakhi Kendani) some 4 miles south-west of Thebes which Munn
identifies with Cynoscephalae. Munn then identifies the elongated crest known as Konizos, some 2-3 miles southwest of Thebes, with D's hill (1987: 119 f. and see his map p. 114 ). His description of how the campaign
developed at this stage may well be correct.
This n. (as well as the one at 34. 1) is based in part on the 1: 100,000 Greek General Staff map and on a
personal visit to the area west of Thebes in August 1977. For this region of Boeotia see Philippson, i. 2. 500ff.;
Wallace, 1979: 5f., 67; Fossey, 1988.
32. 4. + : D and Nepos, Chabr. 1. 2, agree that there was a skirmish of light troops
before Chabrias' exploit and we should see Polyaen. 2. 1. 2 in that light too. : Nepos, Chabr. 1.
2, on the other hand says that Agesilaus was victorious in the skirmish. Polyaen. 2. 1. 2 seems to support D.
: see 25. 3 n.
32. 5. : the 5,000 infantry and 200 cavalry of section 2 were Athenian citizens. But
there were mercenaries present too under the specific command of Chabrias, to judge from the present passage
and from X. H. 5. 4. 14, 54. There was at least one other Athenian general, Demades or Demeas, who may be the
same as the Demophon who led the midwinter expedition to free the Cadmea (26. 2 n.). Neither D nor the rest of
the sources (Polyaen. 2. 1. 2; Nepos, Chabr.1; Demosth. 20. 76)
-296-

exclude the presence of other generals. What is more, D's statement does not preclude the possibility that Chabrias
was in command both of the mercenaries and of the Athenian troops, the latter along with Demophon ( Demades/
Demeas) and perhaps others. Indeed the other sources are explicit that he commanded Athenian troops.
: who performed the stratagem? Clearly hoplites as they were armed with shields and
spears, standing in a phalanx formation, and about to receive the attack of Agesilaus' hoplites. Demosth. 20. 76 and
Polyaen. 2. 1. 2 are explicit that Athenian citizens were involved, while the latter includes the Thebans too under
Gorgidas. Likewise Nepos, Chabr. 1. 2, speaks of the phalanx as a whole as having carried out Chabrias' instructions.
D's X 'A + is ambiguous. It could mean that
the order was given to the mercenaries alone whose commander he was, or it could mean that Chabrias, whose
specific duty on this campaign was to command the mercenaries, gave the order to the soldiers in the phalanx in
general. D's account as a whole supports the second interpretation: the Thebans and their allies were occupying a
strong position. Agesilaus advanced against them, but following Chabrias' tactic he decided to retreat (sections 3-6).
The evidence of Demosthenes and Polyaenus too, as we have seen, asserts that the citizen troops were involved. The
question, therefore, whether the mercenaries present also performed the stratagem becomes of small importance. If
they did, then they must have been hoplites and not peltasts (cf. Anderson, 1963: 412). But it appears from X. H. 5. 4.
54 and Nepos, Chabr. 1. 2, that the mercenaries were peltasts, not hoplites. They were almost certainly the same body
of peltasts as that at H. 5. 4. 14, some six months earlier.
What exactly was the tactic? There is no real problem here. As Agesilaus' hoplites charged uphill, the enemy hoplites,
smartly and all together ( ' : section 6), stood at ease,
i.e., while still keeping their formation they downed shields, resting them against their knees. Their spears remained
upright. Their stance was exactly that of the great bronze statue of Athena Promachos on the Acropolis. The
'stratagem' itself was hardly novel (pace Nepos, Chabr. 1. 2). On the contrary, it was the normal way by which
-297-

hoplites stood at ease (cf. X. An. 1. 5. 13). It was the timing that was crucial. The allies had been ready to receive
the Peloponnesians as the latter advanced uphill, when suddenly they stood at ease -- an almost contemptuous
action in the face of the advancing enemy. If Agesilaus had hoped to intimidate his opponents by his daring
charge uphill and drive them off the ridge, he now realized that he had miscalculated. Intimidated himself by their
and (section 6) he ordered a retreat.
D's description of the tactic is the best we possess and it requires no elucidation from the other sources which
have in fact misunderstood the stratagem. Polyaenus' 'with their spears held
out upright' is wrong and even more wrong is Nepos' 'proiecta hasta' 'with spear advanced'. (Nepos is likely to
have mistranslated his Greek source; cf. Themist. 9. 4 'tuam petens amicitiam' and Thuc. 1. 137. 4
.) Nepos and Polyaenus have been interpreted in a way that is totally unacceptable by Mller, 1908: 46,
and Parke, 1933: 77: 'At a word of command from Chabrias his soldiers went down on one knee and rested their
shields against the other, and with spears pointed forward awaited the enemy's charge.' But a hoplite phalanx
could hardly receive another thus. Mller's and Parke's misinterpretation of the tactic has led to a mistaken
reconstruction of the statue of Chabrias; see 33. 4 n. For Parke's erroneous view that a new type of peltast
carried out the stratagem see 44. 1-4n.
33. 1. : no other source mentions symbouloi as accompanying Agesilaus in 378. During the
Peloponnesian War symbouloi had been attached to unsuccessful nauarchs (Thuc. 2. 85. 1; 3. 69. 1; 8. 39. 2),
and in 418, when Agis had displeased the Spartans by withdrawing from Argos without a battle, ten symbouloi
were appointed to accompany the king (Thuc. 5. 63. 4). The regulation was temporary and the powers of the ten
must have been limited (see Andrewes, HCT iv. ad loc.). The thirty symbouloi who followed Agesilaus to Asia and
Agesipolis to Thrace were clearly different. They were advisers and helpers of the kings properly speaking; they
were not meant to circumscribe the kings' authority in any way ( Busolt, GS ii. 676; Westlake, Studies, 257 n.
33).
But symbouloi here may be a vague reference to the two ephors who generally accompanied the king in a
consultative capacity (cf. X. H. 2. 4. 36; Lac. Pol. 13. 5). Andrewes ( HCT iv. 125) remarks
-298that 'the may throughout have played a large part in Ephoros' account of the campaign' of Mantinea in
418, and it may be that here too Ephorus loosely referred to symbouloi by way of setting the scene for Agesilaus'
answer to the criticism of his decision not to fight. If candidates for symbouloi had to be found one could name,
apart from the two ephors, the men mentioned at X. H. 6. 4. 14, but really all the officers and
officials who took part in a council, a such as that held on the morning before the battle of Leuctra for
example (X. H. 6. 4. 8).
But whatever we conceive the symbouloi in this context to be we should not draw too rigid a distinction between
them and the , as does Muttelsee, RE iva. s.v. , under the influence of
Kahrstedt, GS i. On the basis of D, Muttelsee contrasts sharply between symbouloi as being mere , and
as enjoying . Under the Spartan system, however, the only sharp distinction was between the
kings and the other Spartiates, the latter being all (X. H. 3. 4. 7; 6. 1. 14). This distinction apart it would
be true to say that in the small and personal world of Sparta a man wielded as much power as his birth, wealth,
and connections allowed him to. Official titles provided but a flexible framework of reference. The symbouloi of
Agesilaus in Asia were / too for they undertook whatever tasks or commands the king saw fit to
assign to them (cf. X. H. 3. 4. 6, 10, 20; 4. 1. 15, 21. Kahrstedt, GS i. 162f., 200ff., 220 f., sees too much in the
word and thinks that only D uses it correctly (!); cf. the review by Wade-Gery, JHS 46 ( 1926), 293 ff.).
+ : Agesilaus' policy of invading Boeotia was criticized both by his fellow Spartans and by
the Spartan allies (X. H. 5. 4. 13; 5. 4. 60; Plut. Ages. 26; Pel. 15. 3). Obviously he defended himself and we may
have here a distant echo of that defence.
: for the reference to Tyche here and in section 3, and whether it is Ephoran in origin or a
Diodoran elaboration, see p. 14.
33. 2-3. This does not represent a favourable treatment of Agesilaus; see p. 119 ; and for Ephoran anticipatory
rhetoric, p. 123.
33. 3. . . . : see I. 2n.
33.4. . . . : in fact only one statue was put up by the demos as the other sources say ( Nepos,
Chabr. I. 3; Arist. Rhet.3.
-2991411b; Aesch. 3. 243). The occasion was his sea victory over Sparta near Naxos in 376 (Aesch. 3. 243). A
number of marble fragments discovered in the Agora seem to have belonged to the inscribed base of Chabrias'
statue; see Schweigert, 1940: 314 ff.; Burnett and Edmonson, 1961: 74ff.; Anderson, 1963: 411ff.; Buckler,
1972: 466ff. A headless herm which has vanished from the Vatican is reported to have been inscribed with the
name, patronymic, and demotic of Chabrias ( Richter, The Portraits of the Greeks ( 1965), 159).
Burnett and Edmonson asserted on the basis of Mller's and Parke's mistaken interpretation of Polyaenus and
Nepos (32. 5n.) that the statue represented Chabrias kneeling on one knee. This is indefensible; see the criticisms
of Anderson and Buckler. As the latter points out (1972: 474), the kneeling position is unlikely in the context of
Greek sculpture, while standing hoplites at rest abound and many examples date to the 4th century. Nor is the

base unusually long and narrow for a standing hoplite even if we assume a one-wreath front.
The restoration of some of the dedications, especially that on fragments D and E on the front face, is not beyond
dispute. Schweigert, who reconstructs a three-wreath front face, restores fragments D and E thus: [
]+ [. . . ] ANTEITI || [7-8] . This is the third citation under the wreath on the
right. He can find no satisfactory restoration of the letters given in capitals, but he does suggest (1940: 319 n. 5)
that [+ ][] +. . . is epigraphically possible. Burnett and Edmonson, following Wilhelm ( Anzeiger
Oester. Akad. 84 ( 1947), 190 ff.), restore [ ]+ [+ ][] + II [ ]
[][]. As they prefer to reconstruct the monument with a one-wreath front (1961: 77, though in n.
7 they concede the possibility of a second wreath), the single and most important citation on this face, according
to them, referred to some obscure and otherwise unrecorded event in the Hellespont. This seems rather unlikely.
As D says, Chabrias was particularly proud of the tactic he employed against Agesilaus and when he was
subsequently awarded a statue by the demos he asked that it should exhibit the posture assumed by his soldiers
on that occasion (cf. Nepos, Chabr. I. 3). It would be a little surprising, therefore, if that famous event was not
mentioned on the monument. If the position taken up by the Thebans and Athenians was in the neigh-300-

bourhood of the Cabeireion (32. 3 n.), a partial restoration of fragments D and E could be [ ]+ [+
][] +. . . The substitution of Corybanteion for Cabeireion is a little difficult, but it appears that at least
from the early 5th century Cabeiroi, Corybantes, and Curetes were often identified in literature (cf. Strabo 10 C 466;
472f.; Waites, 1923: 25ff.; Nock, 1941: 580; Hemberg, 1950: 189. In late literature the confusion was widespread; cf.
Clem. Alex. Protrept. 2. 19; Arnobius, Adv. nat. 5. 19). It is not impossible, therefore, that the Athenian(s) who
composed the citation referred to the Cabeireion as the Corybanteion. There is no difficulty about fitting this in for
fragments D and E could be further apart than shown by Burnett and Edmonson in their fig. 3. The name of the
sculptor could take up a longer space, e.g. . . . O[] or . . . [ (+demotic)
].
The possibility remains of course that the monument had a twoor even a three-wreath front and that the success in
Boeotia was mentioned further to the left above one of the other wreaths. It was not inscribed on the left or the right
faces. The citations there are better preserved and they refer to other events.

33. 5-6. Second attack on Thespiae. Death of

Phoebidas
See 27. 4n. where it is suggested that this was the second attack on Thespiae. Sections 5-6 exhibit well the different
points of view of Xenophon and Ephorus. As in the case of the Spartan defeat at Leuctra, Xenophon (H. 5. 4. 42ff.)
makes the best of Phoebidas' defeat and seeks to explain it. He belittles the Theban victory, ascribing it to good luck
and the cowardice of the Thespians. D's account is admittedly but a poor summary of Ephorus', but even so certain
elements stand out in strong contrast to Xenophon. He concedes that the Thebans (he does not specify their strength
whereas Xenophon says they were in full force), who actually assaulted the city wall, achieved nothing worthwhile,
though the 200-man-strong Thespian advance guard was destroyed. Phoebidas then rushed out of the city and hastily
attacked the retreating Thebans. He lost 500 men and was himself killed.
33. 5. : see 26. 4n.
33. 6. : Ephorus therefore probably gave no figure; see p. 133.
-301: cf. Plut. Pel. 15. 6; Polyaen. 2. 5. 2.
+ : Diodoran rhetoric though Phoebidas probably did fight well and die bravely. Otherwise
Xenophon would not have mentioned him, and he would not have added that they (H. 5. 4. 45).

34. 1-2. The second invasion of Boeotia

As in the case of the first invasion, D concerns himself with but the climax of the campaign. For further information we
must turn to X. H. 5. 4. 47-55 whose narrative again is one-sided and largely a Spartan apology. What principally
mattered to Ephorus on the other hand (and this comes through in D) was the fact that for the second year in
succession the mighty Spartans, led by the great Agesilaus, were checked in the open field.
34. 1. + + 1 : in fact early next spring 377; cf. X. H. 5.4. 47. This vague chronological
indication may conceivably be Ephoran; see Introd. n. 264. + + : see 3 2. In.
: because they had occupied a similar position in the previous campaign (32. 3). The
present are called + by Xenophon (H. 5. 4. 50) which seems to suggest a gently sloping hill.
He confirms that the place was . . . + ; see also Polyaen. 2. 1. 12
+ + , , and cf. 2. 1. 24, the same incident, but wrongly assigned to 394.
The exact site of Graos Stethos escapes us. It must have been south-east of Thebes, and at not too great a distance
from the city for otherwise the action described by Xenophon becomes impossible: the Thebans, fearing for their city,

 and reached there not very long afterwards. Agesilaus withdrew from Thebes on the same
day and encamped at Graos Stethos (H. 5. 4. 54). The place therefore must have been not too far from Thebes and
D's narrative agrees on this point. The south-east direction of Graos Stethos is indicated by Xenophon's comment on
the route taken by the allies when hastening back to Thebes -- they took (H. 5. 4. 51). Potniae
was about 10 stades south of Thebes (Paus. 9. 8. 1; Buck, 1979: 14; Fossey, 1988: 208ff.).
Two further statements of Xenophon help to some extent, but
-302-

also add difficulties to the identification of the site. First, he says that on returning from the Tanagran frontier
Agesilaus marched, initially at least, + (H. 5. 4. 49). What teichos is that? There are
two possibilities: (a) Tanagra is meant (the usual interpretation). (b) Teichos is an inept reference to the trench
and stockade ( Munn, 1987: 124: ff.). In either case Agesilaus was proceeding in a westerly, or rather southwesterly, direction away from Tanagra. Second, he says that while on Graos Stethos the allies had the trench and
stockade behind them. With this information in mind, Blte, reasonably enough, identified Graos Stethos with
either of the hills known as Psilorakhi or Mikri Psilorakhi some 2-3 miles south-east of Thebes ( RE vii. 2. 1827f.).
The road from Tanagra skirts these hills on the south side. Even more reasonably, Munn, 1987: 126ff., identifies
Graos Stethos with Golemi, a hill not far from Mikri Psilorakhi, but on the south side of the road from Tanagra.
Golemi is a great deal closer both to the road running north to Thebes through Potniae and to the Theban
fieldworks along the Asopos river and, therefore, fits Xenophon's account even better.
The trouble with both identifications, of course, is that Xenophon insists that the ditch and stockade in the rear of
Graos Stethos also ran by Scolus (H. 5. 4. 49 f.); and the location of Scolus is controversial. Paus. 9. 4. 4
provides the best clue as to its whereabouts: on the road from Plataiver to Thebes the main road presumably
which the Thebans did not follow in 373: Paus.9.1 6), before crossing the river Asopus, 40 stades down the river,
are the ruins of Scolus (and cf. Strabo 9 C 408 + + + + +,
. It seems fairly clear from this that Scolus was on the south side of Asopos (as
generally agreed: see e.g. Pritchett, 1957: 13; Burn, 1984: 510; Wallace, 1979: 87ff. Contra (now) Pritchett,
1965-85: i. 107ff.; ii. 178ff.; iii. 289ff.; iv. 97ff.; Fossey, 1988: 119ff.; Munn, 1987: 121ff., who does not
nevertheless tackle the evidence of Pausanias and Strabo). But if the Theban stockade was on the south side of
the river, the movements described by Xenophon and D become impossible because of the distances involved.
One way out of the difficulty perhaps is to assume that the land of Scolus stretched north of the river and was
consequently traversed by the trench and stockade, and that this is what Xenophon meant by +
(H. 5. 4. 49); another, that the
-303stockade, which encircled and protected the plains and other good agricultural land, as Xenophon says (H. 5. 4.
38), was extended south of the river at this point to take in Scolus, a place claimed by both Thebes and Plataea it
would seem (Herod. 9. 15. 2; Strabo 9 C 409; Paus. 9. 4. 4).
(Some scholars follow Meyer, 1909: 97 n. 2, in identifying Xenophon's Graos Stethos with the Graia of Strabo 9 C
404 (cf. Paus. 9. 20. 2; Steph. Byz. s.v. and +) and placing it on the Theban-Tanagran frontier.
This cannot be correct for it pushes Graos Stethos too far to the east. Meyer in fact is doubly wrong: Strabo's
Graia was a place in Oropus near the sanctuary of Amphiaraos; cf. Buck, 1979: 19.)
34. 2. + + + : 2pe' aim was to show that the Thebans and their allies (we do not
know whether the Athenians were present with as strong an army as in 378) had had the better of it, but D has
butchered the action by telescoping it. The fighting began several miles south-east of Thebes at Graos Stethos
(see previous n.), and the final act was played outside the walls of the city some hours later (X. H. 5. 4. 53). D
has fused the two ends together leaving out the middle (for such shortcomings see p. 134 ). He suddenly faces us
with the statement + + + , and we are left to guess, with the help of
Xenophon, that the Thebans, having abandoned the strong position they had been occupying, retreated to their
city and part of them, the greater part perhaps, made their way inside the walls. Xenophon represents that the
entire Theban army caused the Sciritans alone to fall back (H. 5. 4. 53). D, on the other hand,
says that Agesilaus himself was involved in the fight against the Theban rearguard, and that he retreated when
the rest of the Thebans came out to face him. This certainly was a better justification for the Theban trophy than
the retirement of the Sciritans alone. Xenophon further claims that Agesilaus suffered no casualties. D
nevertheless at 52. 5 mentions Lacedaemonian graves outside Thebes which dated to the time of Agesilaus'
invasions.
D's description exhibits his normal rhetorical elements; see pp. 15 f.
... : cf. Plut. Ages. 26; Pel.15. Unlike Xenophon, Ephorus took great interest in the
Theban leaders and the growth of Theban power; see p. 128. Related in
-304-

some detail in Xenophon, Agesilaus' Boeotian campaigns achieved little and proved counter-productive in the long run;
cf. Munn's good analysis: 1987: 133 ff.

34. 3-36. The war at sea

34. 3. . . . : D passes over Cleombrotus' attempted invasion of Boeotia in early 376 for which see
X. H. 5. 4. 59.
. . . +: Ephorus, therefore, treated the land and sea operations separately, as does Xenophon (H. 5. 4.
60 ff.). No parallel chronology is involved, however, as the sea war followed the land war.
: not strictly so. For the reason why all these events from 28. 1 to 35. 2 are placed under 377/6, see
pp. 135f. The naval action near Naxos was fought on 16 Boedromion in the year of Charisandrus, 376/5, about Sept.
376 (Plut. Phoc. 6. 7; Cam. 19. 6; Mor. 349e-f; Polyaen. 3. 11. 2). The archon year is not given by either Plutarch or
Polyaenus, but is obtained from the sequence of events in Xenophon (25. In.).
: D ignores the background to the battle and gives only the immediate events leading up to it. See X.
H. 5. 4. 60f.: the Peloponnesians decided to switch their attention from Thebes to Athens. They therefore manned a
fleet and sent it out to starve Athens to submission. The Athenians soon found themselves under an effective naval
blockade, the Peloponnesian ships having taken their stations at Aegina, Ceos, and Andros. The cornships could only
reach as far as Geraestus, a small harbour at the southernmost point of Euboea. On the shortage of corn which ensued
in Athens see Demosth. 22. 15.
: a Pollis was nauarch in 396/5 ( Hell. Oxy. 9. 2; 19. I), but1 there is no proof that this is the same man. It is
not necessary therefore to question our sources' information (X. H. 2. 1. 7; Plut. Lys. 7. 3) that a law at Sparta forbade
a man to hold the nauarchy twice. On the Spartan nauarchy see Pareti, 1909: 71 ff.; Sealey, 1976: 335ff.; Andrewes,
HCT v. 454f.; Stylianou, 1988: 467f.
+ : in contrast to Xenophon, D speaks of just one large convoy of cornships which Pollis
decided to capture, and to safeguard which the Athenians sent out a fleet (not their entire fleet it would seem, and
perhaps it was not even under the
-305-

command of Chabrias; see below). But the difference between D and Xenophon is superficial: a large number of
cornships must have gathered at Geraestus, not being able to proceed further as Xenophon says (H. 5. 4. 61),
and it was these that the Athenians brought in in a convoy. But there is an important difference between D and
Xenophon, which once again demonstrates the superiority of Ephorus' historical account over that of Xenophon,
and it is this: Xenophon represents that the battle was fought in order to lift the naval blockade and, the
Athenians having won, the blockade was lifted. If Xenophon had bothered to enquire where the battle was fought,
the absurdity of what he says might have become apparent to him. For the battle was fought between Naxos and
Paros and it cannot therefore have been related to the blockade. (But cf. Tuplin, 1993: 159ff. who thinks that
Xenophon, in addition to underplaying the Athenian naval successes of the 370S on purpose, deliberately
misrepresented the present event.) D's information is surely correct and a testimony to the worth of his source:
Athens first dispatched a fleet to lift the blockade (the decision had not been easy according to Demosth. 22. 15).
That was soon done, Pollis having apparently decided not to risk a battle. After that success Chabrias was sent out
to the Cyclades with the entire fleet (section 4) where he began to lay siege to Naxos. Pollis now decided to
intervene and the engagement was fought.
( D. Thomas, "Aristotle's Treatment of Historical Material in the Politics" (unpublished Oxford thesis, 1978), 104f.,
speculates from Arist. Pol. 1270b 12-14 that Pollis had been distracted for a while by an Athenian-inspired intrigue
on Andros.)
34. 4. + : though he omits the background to the naval war as we have seen, D gives
valuable information on the events leading up to the battle (previous n.) and full information on the battle itself.
In fact D and the schol. Aristid. Panath. 173. 16 Dind., are the only sources to note Chabrias' attack on Naxos and
Pollis' attempt to relieve the city which resulted in the battle, though Demosth. 23. 198; 24. 180; Aesch. 3. 222,
243; Dinarch. 1. 75; Plut. Phoc. 6. 5; Cam. 19. 6; Polyaen. 3. 11. 2, 11, confirm D's locality by labelling the battle
as that of Naxos.
Naxos was clearly hostile to Athens before the battle. But had it already been admitted to the Athenian
Confederacy and had it perhaps defected when Pollis appeared in the Aegean? Some
-306scholars have thought so, though no evidence can be adduced to support this (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 152).
Certainly Tod 125 (=IG ii2 1635 -- new text with nn.: Inscriptions de Dlos, no. 98), the accounts of the Athenian
Amphictyons of Delos of the years 377-3, constitutes no such evidence ( pace Accame, 1941: 81ff.; Hornblower,
1982a: 190) for the states mentioned thereon of which one is Naxos, because the Myconians, Ceians, Siphnians,
and Andrians joined the Confederacy not earlier than the late summer or autumn 375; they are entered on the
left side of Svt 257 =Tod 123, but below the Acarnanians and Cephallenians (who joined in the second prytany of
375/4: Svt 262=Tod 126). Naxos is not to be found on Svt 257=Tod 123. On the other hand her accession to the
Confederacy after the battle is perhaps indicated by Svt 321=IG ii2 179 which speaks of legal agreements
between Athens and Naxos. Some of the literary sources refer vaguely to a large number of the Cyclades as
having acceded to the Confederacy after the battle (Demosth. 20. 77, 80; Plut. Phoc. 7. 2). This may be an
exaggeration, but it is in line with what has been suggested above (30. 2n.) about the possible number of names
missing from the front of Svt 257. It is possible that one of the missing names was that of Naxos. Cargill, 1981:
37, leaves the question of Naxian membership open.
If already an ally, Chabrias' attack on Naxos need not mean that the island was in revolt from Athens. An
alternative explanation for the attack is that a pro-Spartan group on the island had been co-operating with Pollis.

Similarly, Aegina, Ceos, and Andros were used as bases by the Peloponnesian fleet (X. H. 5. 4. 61). An inkling of
anti-Athenian activity in the Cyclades, occasioned apparently by Pollis' presence, is provided by Tod 125 lines
134ff., where it is said that some Delians in 376/5 (or shortly before) violently ejected the Athenian Amphictyons
from the temple of Apollo. Pro-Athenians in the area included the Delian Pythodorus honoured with proxenia at
Athens in 369/8, no doubt for 'services rendered', at the suggestion of Phoxias and Epicrates, the latter probably
the same as the Amphictyon of that name for the period 377-373 ( Syll. i. 158; Tod 125 lines 10f., 62f.); see
Osborne, 1974: 171f., who points to the very unusual provision that the money to pay for the inscription of a
second copy of the decree to be set up in the temple of Apollo on Delos was to come from the sum exacted
+ . He may very
-307-

well be correct that these are the same as the people mentioned in Tod 125 lines 134ff. Pythodorus' proxenia was
extended to his nephew in 363/2 and Osborne may also be correct that this was part of a policy to offset the results of
the Theban naval venture in the Aegean (1974: 173f.).
. . . : in fact a strategos. D is using the term in its non-technical sense here as at 36. 5 and 18. 15. 9.
Xenophon too occasionally uses nauarch in its general sense (cf. H. 5. 1. 13). Yet D's terminology in this respect is
usually correct. He consistently calls the Athenian generals strategoi and the Spartan admirals nauarchs. With the
exception of the three instances above no other case of an Athenian general termed nauarch is to be found, and there
is but one instance of a Spartan nauarch called a strategos (47. I). The plural nauarchoi at 13. 99. 1 is
understandable; and cf. 13. 76. if. and 13. 97. 5f. where Athenian strategoi and Spartan nauarchs are nicely
contrasted. Occasionally D is very accurate as at 43.6 and 45.2 where the exact title of appointment seems to be
given. In these cases D has departed from his source least.
: of what kind? As the walls were shaken battering-rams must be meant (), perhaps protected by
'tortoises' (+), though stone-throwing catapults cannot be excluded. Aeneas Tacticus (32f.) writing just before
the middle of the 4th century mentions all three as employed in sieges. For Greek siegecraft see Garlan, 1974. Ephorus
evidently gave sieges some attention. He added interesting information to Thucydides' description of the siege of
Samos in 441/0: 12. 28. 2f.; Plut. Per. 27. 3, who cites Ephorus as his source; see Garlan, 1974: 132ff.; Lawrence,
1979: 42. And the siege of Perinthus in 341/0, with which Ephorus brought his Histories to an end, is recognized by
Marsden as technically accurate: 1977: 217f.
34.5. : X. H. 5. 4. 61 says 60.
: though the other sources are silent on the Athenian numbers (Aesch. 3. 222 should be
dismissed) D's figure is perfectly reasonable and quite consistent with the epigraphic evidence. Approximately 100
hulls are recorded on IG ii2 1604 which dates to 379/8 (29. 7n.). Many of these are described as old and, when we
also take into consideration that Athens was none too wealthy at this time, we may safely conclude that the number of
triremes which could be manned and sent out would have fallen considerably short of the total number of hulls
recorded by
-308-

the dock superintendents. It may further be assumed that some of the 83 triremes would have belonged to the
allies. For the obligatory allied contribution of both men and ships see 29. 7 nn. : Plut. Phoc. 6. 5 says that
Phocion commanded the left wing and that he was victorious after some sharp fighting. D's Cedon on the other
hand was killed and the left wing had to be rescued by Chabrias who proceeded to win the battle. This does not
seem to be a case of D inverting a pair of names (for which see p. 138 ) for the details are different. It is better to
suppose that Plutarch's version of the battle was different from that of Ephorus. Different and incorrect; Phocion
was too young in 376 to have commanded the left wing. As he was 80 in 322/1 ( Plut. Phoc. 24. 5) he must have
been about 26 in 376 (cf. Plut. Mor.791f; 819a; Polyaen. 3. 12; Nepos, Phoc. 2. 1). One might conjecture that he
had served under Cedon and that perhaps he had played some prominent part in the battle after Cedon's death;
or perhaps he commanded the triremes dispatched by Chabrias from the right to aid the left. D is our only source
here and only one other Athenian Cedon is known from the 4th century ( IG ii2 2308a). A third one in Archaic
times is mentioned by Arist. A th. Pol. 20. 5; Rhodes, CAAP ad loc.; cf. PA 8281; Develin, 239.
: 'breaking open'. An unusual present tense of . For D's use of it see McDougall s.v.
. : Polyaen. 3. 11. 11 relates a stratagem by which Chabrias won the
battle. This is, however, wholly inconsistent with D and Plut. Phoc. 6. 5 and rather unlikely in itself.
35. 1. This reads somewhat like an apologia: Chabrias could have done more; he could have destroyed the entire
enemy fleet, had he not desisted in order to pick up the citizens who were in the sea. We know that the honours
bestowed on Chabrias after the battle were unsuccessfully attacked by Leodamas as unconstitutional (Demosth.
20. 146). An attempt may have been made by the general's enemies to belittle his victory by pointing to the fact
that the Athenians had lost almost as many ships as the Spartans. This section thus may be an echo of Chabrias'
defence. Leodamas is named by Aesch. 3. 139 as a leading pro-Theban and the attack on Chabrias may indicate a
struggle in Athens between pro- and antiThebans. Chabrias had allowed the Spartans to escape for political
considerations, his enemies may have claimed.
-309 . . . : X. H. 1. 6. 35ff. is almost certainly correct that the anger of the people against the
generals in 406 was due mainly to their failure to rescue the thousands of Athenian shipwrecked who were thus
left to drown. Chabrias was anxious to prevent the same disaster from happening again and hence, as D himself
goes on to say, 'refraining from pursuit, he gathered up the bodies of his fellow citizens which were afloat, saved

those who still lived, and buried the dead' (Sherman). It is interesting to observe that D has repeated the same
mistaken, or at least incomplete, view first expressed at 13. 101. 1 f. Ephorus should therefore be held
responsible? Cf. Andrewes, 1974: 115.
35. 2. + . . . : the other sources are silent on Athenian losses.
. . . : Demosth. 20. 77 speaks of 49 enemy triremes captured which is certainly an
exaggeration; unless the figure represents the total number of ships captured by Chabrias during his entire
career. The schol. Aristid. Panath. 173. 16 (iii. 282 Dind.) agrees with D on the number of enemy vessels sunk,
but mentions only two as captured; cf. IG ii2 1606 (374/3) and IG ii2 1607b (373/2) where five triremes are listed
as captured by Chabrias.
+: he was rewarded with ateleia, the privilege to be enjoyed by his descendants (Demosth.
20. 75 ff.). A statue was set up in his honour in the agora (33. 4n.) and he was awarded a crown (Demosth. 24.
180). Athen. 4. 165e claims that when he died the Athenians spent 1,000 drachmas on his funerary monument.
: Ephorus' comment, see p. 116 n. 312.

35. 3. A chronographic notice

+ : again, the entry on Roman affairs is very brief and at
the end of a year's account and it is possible that it derives from the Greek chronographer; see pp. 26 f. M.
Manlius Capitolinus was the hero of the defence of the Capitol against the Gauls (14. 116. 6). His attempted coup
(dated 385/4 V) was a consequence of the social and economic problems which seem to have beset Rome at the
time. For detail, most of it probably legendary, see Livy 6. 15f., 18-20. Cf. Perl, 1957: 44, 123 f., 127, 154;
Cornell, CAH2 vii. 2. 231 f.
-310-

Archon Charisandrus, 376/5

36. 1. ++ : 384 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 637. Once again the MSS indicate that the fasti employed by D were a
great deal more sound to begin with than they are at present in D's text, and of a common origin with those used by
Livy. MS M, by contrast with P, reads . In this way the number of names is brought into
line with the number announced though we are still two names short of the six given by Livy 6. 18. 1. These names
probably dropped out by mistake: pp. 27 f.; Drummond, 1980: 60, 64f.

36. 1-4. Chabrias in the north Aegean

36. 1. : the Triballians, who were perhaps distinct from both Illyrians and Thracians, lived south of the
Danube, between the Isker and the Morava; see Papazoglu, 1978: 58ff., 67ff., and map facing p. 664.
: Ephorus' reason for the Triballian raid has been generally discounted in favour of other explanations such as
pressure exerted on the Triballians by the Celts or the Autariatae. These explanations cannot, however, stand (
Papazoglu, 1978: 13 f. and n. 10). The Triballians were certainly not migrating. They were on a plundering raid and it
is not impossible that famine had set the tribe moving south in search of food as D says. The great distance between
the Triballian homeland and Abdera should not deter us from accepting this explanation ( Papazoglu, 1978: 14). For
the Triballians' hostile actions near and far see Isocr. 12. 227. : a Diodoran word, see p. 16.
36. 2. + : cf. Aeneas Tact. 15. 8 + .
++ : Ephorus knew that the tribesmen were not the neighbours of the Abderitans. They first had to
traverse a part of Thrace before reaching Abdera. Their route to the Aegean was probably the valley of the Nestus.
+ ++ : Aeneas Tact. 15. 8 speaks of a pitched battle. But the battle is more likely to have been as D
says: the Abderitans suddenly fell on the retreating and disorganized Triballians. + : cf. Aeneas
Tact. 15. 8 .
36. 3. . . . : there is a disagree-311-

ment here between D and Aeneas Tact. 15. 9. The latter, mainly concerned with stressing the need for caution,
speaks of an ambush laid by Triballians into which the Abderitans fell. D on the other hand envisages a pitched
battle during which the Thracian allies of Abdera went over to the enemy with the result that the Abderitans were
defeated. Both D and Aeneas agree that the Abderitans' first easy victory had caused them to regard the
Triballians with undue confidence and that their losses were very heavy indeed. Perhaps the two accounts should
be combined: the Abderitans, two successive levies, fell into an ambush and abandoned by their Thracian allies

were annihilated.
According to a garbled scholion on Aristid. Panath. 172. 7 (iii. 275 Dind.), the people of the neighbouring Greek
city of Maroneia aided and abetted the Triballians against Abdera. The motives of the Maroneitans are not difficult
to discern, if the report is true. The two cities had long competed for trade and influence in the area and while for
most of the 5th century, as both coins and the Athenian tribute lists show, Maroneia lagged far behind Abdera,
during the first half of the 4th century she seems to have drawn level with her rival ( Schnert-Geiss, 1979: 437
ff.). To employ the Triballians was a masterstroke. The magnitude of the Abderitan disaster is reflected in the
coinage. It would seem that the city closed its mint for several years and when its coinage was resumed it was of
a different type. Its trade and supply of silver must have been dislocated; cf. May, 1966: 242; Schnert-Geiss,
1979: 450.
36. 4. + + : Chabrias' expedition to Thrace dates either to autumn 376, after the battle
of Naxos, or, better, to spring or summer 375. Abdera is entered on the left side of Svt 257=Tod 123. All the
entries on the side probably date to the same time (almost all were cut by the same hand; see 30. 2n.), i.e.
summer/autumn 375, and perhaps we should not allow too much time to elapse between Chabrias' intervention
and the city's accession to the Confederacy; and see section 5n.
The only other source to refer to Chabrias' intervention is the schol. Aristid. Panath. 172. 7; 173. 17 (iii. 275,
282f. Dind.). But the scholiast has hopelessly confused it with earlier events in Thrace which likewise involved
Chabrias. Aristides' own chronology in sections 172f. is sound on the whole. In section 172, in enumerating the
Athenian achievements during the Corinthian War, he mentions the conciliation of the Thracian kings in 389
-312-

Stylianou, 1988 for the date) which, according to our main sources, was due to Thrasybulus of Steiria ( X. H. 4. 8. 26;
D 14. 94. 2; cf. Lys. 28. 5; Isocr. 5. 6; Arist. Pol. 5. 1312a). In section 173, in praising Athenian energy following the
liberation of Thebes, he touches on Chabrias' successes in the north Aegean after the battle of Naxos. In commenting
Rehdantz, 1845: 63, thinks that the events mentioned by the scholiast date to the
on 172. 7 scholiast A writes:
time of Thrasybulus' expedition to the Hellespont. Schaefer, 1885-7: i. 43 f., on the other hand, ascribes them to 375
and Chabrias' operations in Thrace in that year. Both are partly right and partly wrong. When Thrasybulus sailed to
Thrace in 389, Ergocles and, it seems, Chabrias too served with him as generals (Lys. 28. 4 f., 12; IG ii2 21=Svt
238A; PA 7310, 15086; Beloch, 1884: 314). What is more Chabrias appears to have been instrumental in the treaty
between Athens and Seuthes. IG ii2 21 is badly preserved, but Chabrias' name appears three times in it. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that he played a (leading) part in the conciliation between Seuthes and Amedocus too (about the
latter cf. IG ii2 22=Svt 238B), though as he was junior to Thrasybulus, only the latter is mentioned by the literary
sources. The scholiast however seems to have had additional information. But unfortunately Chabrias' involvement in
Thrasybulus' diplomacy in the Hellespont has led the scholiast to confuse these earlier events with Chabrias'
intervention in Abdera in 375: the first part of his comment on 172. 7 (as well as that on 173. 17), . . .
, belongs to 375. The second, . . . , to 389, the time of Thrasybulus' expedition. (We may
note the closeness in language between the scholiast here and X. H. 4. 8. 26 . . .
For the scholiast and Maroneia see previous n. . . . : Abdera had been depleted of troops and the
introduction of the garrison must have had the consent of the synedrion of the allies and the Abderitans themselves.
The promise in Svt 257=Tod 123 lines 21ff. concerned unilateral Athenian action; see 28. 3 n.
-313 . . . : not so of course and D himself records Chabrias' death in battle at 16. 7. 4 under 358/7.
Chabrias in fact is mentioned later in Book 15 at 68. 1 f.; 69. 1 ff. Meyer, GdA v. 396, thinks that this is a mistake on
the part of D due to the severe abridgement of his source, and he may be right. In a lengthier narrative Ephorus
perhaps spoke of the assassination of the garrison commander installed by Chabrias. It is even conceivable that the
man murdered was that Chales, king of the Triballians, mentioned by the scholiast (see above), and that D misread
Chabrias for Chales. But however that might be D's abridgement must still be made to bear most of the blame.

36. 5-6. Timotheus in the Ionian Sea

36. 5. : as this stands in the text it seems to lead straight on from, and to be in some way connected
with, the events at Abdera. Perhaps on Chabrias' return to Athens Timotheus was put in charge of the fleet and sent
west; hence D's expression .
: see 34. 4n.
, . . . : for the admission to the League of these states, including Corcyra
which D does not mention (see below), see n. ad 30. 2. Cargill does not believe that Corcyra and three of the four
Cephallenian cities joined the League, but, as we have seen (30. 2n.), his use of the epigraphic evidence is
unsatisfactory. Equally unsatisfactory is his reading of the literary evidence. 'The sources', he says, 'use phraseology
the precision of which is significant' (1981: 69). When Xenophon tells us that Timotheus . . . + +
though he did not enslave or exile anyone or change the laws ( H. 5. 4. 64) he is 'hardly describing the
recruitment of a League ally' for did not the decree of Aristoteles in any case and as a matter of course forbid such
treatment? 'Xenophon's point can only be that Timotheos was showing unusual generosity to a conquered state' (1981:
70). Isocrates 'supports this interpretation' by grouping Corcyra with a number of states which were captured by
Timotheus, but clearly not admitted to the League (15. 107 f.). Later sources too 'share the careful language of the

contemporary authors'. Nepos writes of Corcyra being brought back 'sub imperium Atheniensium' ( Tim. 2. 1) while D
omits any mention of Corcyra from his account
-314-

(1981: 71 f.). But this should not make us doubt the account's reliability, for this is 'the proverbial exception that
proves the rule: Diodorus is discussing new League members recruited by Timotheos, and Korkyra was not one of
them' (1981: 71).
Of course, the assumption that D is discussing the recruitment of new League members is not justified by 15. 36.
5, but is based on what D says elsewhere and on other evidence. In fact, none of the sources cited by Cargill is
explicit in the passages quoted that the states mentioned did or did not join the League. When Xenophon referred
to Timotheus' humane treatment of the Corcyraeans the last thing on his mind it would seem was the Athenian
League. What was on his mind surely was Chares' misbehaviour on Corcyra fifteen years later (for which see D 15.
95. 3) and he wished to contrast the latter with the former (see also 46. 1 n.). This is not to deny that Corcyra was
in all probability taken by force (see below). But this does not support Cargill's case. After all, on his view too (and
as Svt 262 makes perfectly plain), Corcyra was accepted for membership after its capture by Timotheus! As for D,
his account is less straightforward than Cargill imagines (see below). Nor is Cargill's treatment of it consistent. Why
see such great significance in the absence from the passage of Corcyra, 'the proverbial exception that proves the
rule', but disregard D's clear statement that Timotheus won over (i.e. for the League) the cities (all four
presumably) of Cephallenia?
+: see Svt 262=Tod 126 and Svt 257 (=Tod, 123) B line 10. The Acarnanian decision to
join the Confederacy would in fact have been a federal one. For the Acarnanian Confederacy see Larsen, 1968: 89
ff.
+: Alcetas, the king of the Molossians, and his son Neoptolemus are shown on Svt 257 (=Tod 123) B lines
13-14. The inclusion of Neoptolemus may represent an attempt by Alcetas to strengthen his son's chances of
succession. Even so on his death the succession was disputed and Neoptolemus had to accept his younger brother
Arybbas as co-ruler; cf. Tod, ii. pp. 216f. Nepos, Tim. 2. 1, says that 'Timotheus sociosque idem adiunxit Epirotas,
Athamanas, Chaonas omnesque eas gentes, quae mare illud adiacent.' One might surmise from this that, apart
from the Molossian tribes, Alcetas held sway over a number of neighbouring tribal groups too for no Athamanes or
Chaones are shown on Svt 257=Tod 123; but this is hardly conclusive (30.
-3152n.). The term 'Epirotas' does not seem to have been used earlier than the second half of the 4th century to
describe the peoples of the area which was known as Epirus later. Ephorus and Theopompus spoke of the
+ in which they included Chaonia in north-west Epirus (on the coast) and Athamania in south-east
Epirus (inland); cf. Strabo 7 C 321, 323 f., 326; 8 C 334. The Athamanes though seem to have generally acted
separately from the other Epirotan tribes (cf. 14. 82. 7; 16. 29. 1). But Nepos cannot be trusted to have
reproduced his source faithfully enough to allow fruitful speculation here. For the Epirotan tribes see Hammond,
1967a: esp. 443 ff. and chs. 11 and 12 with maps on 464 and 614.
. . . : under this vague generality D unwittingly hides Athens' most important
gain in the area, Corcyra. Xenophon on the other hand mentions only Corcyra though he does take cognizance of
Timotheus' further successes ( H. 5. 4. 64; cf. Isocr. 15. 109; Nepos, Tim. 2. 1). D's failure to list Corcyra is due as
usual to his unintelligent abridgement of Ephorus: he has included the beginning of narrative, i.e.
the general's arrival at Cephallenia, as well as the end, the decisive naval battle. But the important middle part of
the story has been replaced by the vague sentence in question. See nn. above and ad 30. 2.
The accession of Corcyra may not have been accomplished peacefully, the pro-Spartan oligarchs (for whom see 46.
1) having to be overcome first. Isocr. 15. 109 (cf. 107f.) speaks of Corcyra being captured ( +).
Aristid. Panath. 173. 17 (284 Dind.) points to on the island. Most explicitly though the scholiast ad
It may well be therefore that the Spartan fleet under Nicolochus (not Nicolaus;
Aristid. Panath. 173. 17 says:
cf. X. H. 5. 4. 65; Polyaen. 3. 10. 12) was meant to succour a Corcyra threatened by Timotheus. Xenophon's
language ( ) seems to imply that some force was used, but that Timotheus was as
moderate as possible. It is likely that the oligarchs had held the upper hand before Timotheus' arrival (which need
not imply an oligarchic constitution: 46. 1 and n.) and it is
-316even possible
that they
were allied
with Sparta.
For power
politics on the
Ionian islands
see 45. 1 ff.
and 46. 1 nn.
. . .
:
actually off
Alyzeia on the

west coast of
Acarnania ( X.
H. 5. 4. 65;
schol. Aristid.
Panath. 282
Dind.), but as
this city was
opposite
Leucas and as
the battle was
fought
between the
island and the
mainland, it
was also
known as the

(
FGH 70
(Ephorus)
F2II; Polyaen.
3. 10. 4, 12,
17; Aristid.
Panath.313).
Dinarchus (1.
14; 1. 75; 3.
17) refers to it
as the

.
Isocr. 15. 109
says that
Timotheus
was sent out
on his
periplous of
the
Peloponnese
with 50
triremes and
13 talents. X.
H. 5. 4. 63
mentions 60
triremes, the
same number
he fought the
battle with
against
Nicolochus' 55
ships ( ibid.
65 ).
Polyaenus on
the other
hand gives
the figure of
40 (3. 10. 6,
11; but see 3.
10. 12, +

+ ,
which
necessarily
implies that
he had more
than 40
triremes,
while at 3. 10.
16 he says
that
Timotheus'
fleet was
augmented by
squadrons
from the
Corcyraeans
and the other
allies; X. H. 5.
4. 66 says
that this was
after the
battle). For
the battle
itself see X. H.

5. 4. 65 f.;
Front. Strat.
2. 5. 47;
Polyaen. 3.
10. 4, 6, 11,
12, 13, 16, 17
(6, 12, 16 and
13, 17
respectively
refer to the
same two
stratagems
allegedly
employed by
Timotheus).
Cf. Schaefer,
1885-7: i. 47
ff. and 49 n.
1. According
to Polyaen. 3.
10. 4 the
battle fell on
the day of the
feast of Scira
which should
be identified
with the feast
of the
Scirophoria
celebrated on
12
Scirophorion
(June/July. On
the
Scirophoria
see Jacoby n.
on FGH 328
FF 14-16 ).
36.6. +

:
Timotheus, a
close friend of
Isocrates,
could not fail
to win praise
from a wellknown pupil
of the master
(p. 119 ). Cf.
Isocrates' own
eulogy of
Timotheus,
15. 101 ff.
Xenophon too
has praise for
Timotheus'
good conduct
( H. 5. 4. 64.
As was said
above, he is
very probably
contrasting
Timotheus'
behaviour
with that of
Chares). But
more
important
than their
connection
with
Isocrates,
Timotheus'
moderation
towards his
fellow Greeks
could not but
be praised by
a moralist and
a panhellenist.

+
,
+

+, D
says; cf.
Isocr. 15.
116, 124,
127, 138. On
the Ephoran
viewpoint see
pp. 110 ff. His
fellow
citizens,
highly pleased
both with his
victories and
with the
Common
Peace which
followed (38.
4n.), heaped
honours on
him, including
statues
(Aeschin. 3.
243; Paus. 1.
3. 2; 1. 24. 3;
Tod
-317128; Nepos, Tim. 2. 3) and a monument at Delphi ( Vatin, 1983: 26 ff.).

37. 1-2. Tegyra

This is but the briefest outline of what occurred. Plut. Pel. 16 fills in the background. Orchomenus was proSpartan and defended by a strong Spartan garrison; two morai it is claimed. D simply says +
. When this garrison was away on an expedition to Locris, Pelopidas saw his chance of capturing
the city and marched against it. Though he must have heard of the action Xenophon chose to ignore it (unless
H. 6. 4. 10 is a reference to it). See Pritchett, 1965-85: iv. 103 ff. For the date see the chronological excursus
below at 45. 3, part 1.
37. 1. : cf. Plut. Pel. 16. 2 + + + .
The Sacred Band consisted of 300 men ( ibid. 18. 1 ). One might therefore venture to suggest that D's figure
embraces both horse and foot: there were 300 hoplites and 200 cavalry.
: cf. Plut. Pel. 17. 6. The action was fought at Tegyra some 5 miles north-east of Orchomenus (
Plut. Pel. 16. 3; 17. 1). Fossey, 1988: 367ff. D fails to name the place here, but does so at 81. 2 in the
epainos on Pelopidas. Plutarch tells us that Pelopidas and his Thebans were returning home having failed to
capture Orchomenus; a fresh garrison had arrived from Sparta and was guarding the city. At Tegyra the
Thebans fell in with the Spartans who were on their way back from Locris ( ibid. ).
: as there were 500 Thebans present, the Spartan force is reckoned to have been 1,000
strong. Elsewhere D says that the mora was made up of 500 men (32. 1) and hence the two morai mentioned
by Plut. Pel. 17. 3 are obtained. These are Ephorus' figures as Plut. Pel. 17. 4 confirms (=FGH 70 F210).
Plutarch feels duty-bound to supply alternative figures for the strength of the mora which enhance even more
the Theban victory: + + , +
, , + ( Pel. 17. 4. For the strength of the mora and the
Spartan army in general see 32. 1 n.). Thus a maximum of 500 Thebans defeated 1,000 or perhaps 1,400 or
even 1,800 Spartans. As Jacoby puts it, 'die
-318boeotische panegyrik ist deutlich' ( FGH ad 124 F18). And see following n.
: similarly Plut. Pel. 17. 11 ff. though Plutarch used other sources
apart from Ephorus as well as his own knowledge of Boeotian history and topography for his account of
Tegyra. For the cult and sanctuary of Apollo Tegyraeus in the vicinity of Tegyra mentioned by Plutarch in
connection with the battle see Schachter, 1981-94: i. 75; Fossey, 1988: 367ff.
It has been suggested that the two moral and ( Plut. Pel. 16. 2f.; 17. 3, 9)
correspond to Cleombrotus' army of four morai sent out in response to an appeal for help by Phocis ( X.
H. 6. 1. 1), and that Tegyra therefore should be dated to 375 ( Cawkwell, 1963: 89 n. 49, though he has
now changed his mind; see id., 1981b: 44). But this is very unlikely. Xenophon at H. 6. 1. 1 is hardly

reconcilable with Plutarch, and Cleombrotus probably did not go to Phocis in 375 (see the chronological
excursus below). What is more it seems incredible that Cleombrotus' name should have escaped our
sources if indeed it was half his army that Pelopidas had severely defeated. In fact the tradition that two
Spartan morai were defeated is questionable. We may accept that two morai were involved, but not both
in the battle. Only one mora clashed with the Thebans. The other, the replacement of the first, fresh out
from Sparta, was at Orchomenus at the time (it prevented Pelopidas from capturing the city), and
presumably it moved out and against the Thebans but after the battle. The Thebans did not in any case
await it; they hastily withdrew as Plutarch says ( Pel. 17. 9f.). The oversight of the sources may of
course have been deliberate as it redounded to the glory of Thebes and Pelopidas.
37. 2. One of a number of anticipatory comments which herald the Theban victory at Leuctra; see 34. 2;
39. 1; 50. 5 f. Schwartz, correctly, would assign them to Ephorus ( RE v. 1. 681). For the Ephoran
attitude to Sparta and Thebes see pp. 117 f.

37. 3. A chronographic notice

See Jacoby, FGH iilb. 558; cf. Sanders, 1987: 41 f.
-319

Archon Hippodamus, 375/4

38. 1. ' is the correct form of the genitive as we can see in inscriptions. Develin, 240.
' : 383 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 637. Four tribunes are named, as announced, two short of Livy's usual college of
six (6. 21. 1). See pp. 27 f. and Drummond, 1980: 61 f.

38-39. The Peace of 375/4

Svt 265. For the date see the chronological excursus below at 45. 3, part 1.
38. 1. ' : the Great King was chiefly concerned with maintaining his hold on western Asia Minor, which
meant preventing any mainland Greek state from becoming too strong in the Aegean. The King's Peace with its
autonomy clause had been devised for that very purpose and hence the King's anxiety to have it reaffirmed. All the
same, the reason which D (Ephorus) gives may well have been another of the King's main aims. At this time there was
hardly a Persian campaign in the western satrapies which did not involve large numbers of Greek mercenaries and
20,000 of them took part in the invasion of Egypt shortly afterwards according to D (41. 3).
D's statement that peace was now made at the initiative of the King, and the motive he ascribes to his intervention,
are important as proving that not all of his account of the Peace of 375 is confused. (38. 3-39 n.). The participation of
the King is placed beyond doubt by a fragment of Philochorus ( FGH 328 F151 with n.). Xenophon does not mention
the King, but gives the initiative for the Peace to Athens. Further, he represents that the treaty was a bilateral one
between Athens and Sparta ( H. 6. 2. 1), though he must of course mean that their respective allies were a party to it
too; cf. Roos, 1949: 267f. Roos ( 1949: 277f.) is too kind to Xenophon when he suggests that the historian omitted the
part of the King 'in order to give to Athens . . . and to Sparta . . . the full credit of it'. A more likely explanation would
be that the pro-p Spartan and panhellenist Athenian chose to overlook the fact that in the 370s Sparta and Athens
used the big stick of the King to intimidate Thebes. When in the 360s the situation was reversed Xenophon was not so
reticent (cf. H. 7. 1. 33 ff.). Isocr. 14. 41 does
-320not mean that the King was not involved in the peace negotiations, but only that he took no part in the preceding
warfare.
38. 2. ' ' . . . : this further stresses the fact that the Peace was a general one, a Common
Peace, and not a bilateral affair as Xenophon represents. Of course the term 'the Greeks' does not mean that all the
Greek states were present and took the oaths. The non-belligerent states (few, considering the extent of the Athenian
and Spartan alliances) may not have taken part. But this matters little. The Greek League against Persia did not
comprise all the Greek cities. It was 'Greek' in the sense that it was open to all the Greeks and claimed to represent
Greece. The Common Peace likewise encompassed all the Greek states, belligerent or not. This was in fact its main
characteristic. There is a general consensus amongst the sources that the Greek cities almost universally accepted the
Peace readily (the Thebans appear to have been the only exception; see below); X. H. 6. 2. 1; FGH 328 ( Philoch.)
F151; Isocr. 14. 41; cf. 15. 109 f.; Nepos, Tim. 2. 2.
: the conference was held at Sparta ( X. H. 6. 2. 1). The oaths sworn amounted
to a renewal of the Peace of 387/6. ' was
Philochorus' comment on this Peace (F151). For its terms, which were in fact essentially those of the original Peace,
see 5. In. A major difference concerned the sanctions clause; Athens now appears to have joined Sparta as a coprostates of the Peace (section 4n.). The appointment by 'the Greeks' of who went from city to city and
evacuated the garrisons was, of course, aimed at ensuring that all cities were left . It is possible that the
same was done in 387/6 in spite of the silence of the sources.

The strictures of Badian notwithstanding, 1987: 27 ff., there can be little doubt that, in whatever manner, in 387/6,
375, 372/1, and 366/5 the King firmly gave his pledge to abide by the terms of the Peace 'he sent down', whether
himself in person to Greek ambassadors (cf. 16. 43. 30. or, as on this occasion, through his emissaries (cf. X. H. 3. 4.
6); so that vt 248 (= Tod 118) lines 11-12 and Dion. Hal. Lys.12 (overlooked by Badian) are perfectly justified in
referring to the King as 'swearing to the Peace'. Cf. 19. 1 and n.
38. 3-39. : this is wrong of course. The Thebans were certainly not excluded in 375 for we
know that they
-321-

continued as members of the Athenian Confederacy (ps.Demosth. 49. 14, 21, 48ff.; IG ii2 1607 lines 49, 155;
Accame, 1941: 230 lines 15 f.), and Isocr. 14. 1, 5, 14 tells us that Plataea was seized by Thebes (in 373)
. So what has gone wrong with D's account? The commonest view is that D has confused the two Peaces of 375
and 372/1; the Thebans were excluded from the latter Peace, but not from the former. For some of the scholars
who hold this opinion see the references given by Lauffer, 1959: 315 n. 1. Add Ryder, 1965: 124. But D has his
supporters too (cf. Lauffer, 1959: 315 n. 2), most notably Judeich, 1927: 182 ff., and Sealey, 1956: 189 ff. Roos,
1949, agrees that the Thebans were not excluded in 375, though he considers this not an error on the part of D,
but a deliberate misrepresentation by the pro-Theban sources used by Ephorus. Lauffer too, 1959, considers chs.
38 f. and 50 a doublet, but he blames Ephorus and Ephorus alone for it (see below for both).
The simplest and to my mind correct way of dealing with. 38. 3 f. is to regard it not as a doublet, but as a badly
excerpted Ephoran narrative: while D has related some of the circumstantial detail bearably well he has, as is
sometimes his wont, missed the all-p important upshot of it all, i.e. the fact that in the end Thebes was
intimidated into accepting the Peace on the Spartans' and the Athenians' terms. Later, at 50. 4, when relating the
Peace of 372/1, noticing the similarity between his two accounts, D added to his statement that
the Thebans were . This is a more satisfactory explanation than the assumption that D read the
exclusion of Thebes back to this Peace from that of 372/1. In any event, the theory of a Diodoran doublet here
appears untenable for it goes contrary to our understanding of how D worked. D followed down his chronographic
handbook and his narrative source so that, naturally, he dealt with the events of 375 before those of 371. While,
therefore, elements of the Peace of 375 could have entered that of 372/1, the reverse process is less easy to
envisage. In other words we would have a doublet if the Thebans were excluded in 375 but not in 371 and D had
said they were, misled by what he had previously read and written. It is better therefore to suppose that D
botched the culmination of the Ephoran account here; he misunderstood Ephorus to mean that the Thebans were
excluded from the Peace when in truth they had only been threatened with exclusion. In the end they had given
in
-322and taken the oaths as 'Thebans' and allowed the other Boeotians to do so too .
Roos' hypothesis that Ephorus' sources are responsible for the error solves nothing; it merely shifts the blame. In
any case it is naive to reason that D cannot be responsible because the words and at 50.
4 prove that he was aware of the close similarity between his two accounts of the Peaces of 375 and 372/1 and 'it
seems unthinkable that the same compiler should notice that he is telling the same story twice, make this clear by
additions, and even then fail to see that he is condensing the same passage which he had already condensed once
before!' First, D may not have seen anything wrong in having the Thebans excluded twice. Secondly, a compiler
like D was perfectly capable of letting an error stand so as to avoid wasting time and effort in correcting it (see
pp. 24, 137 ). Thirdly, the Ephoran accounts of the two Peaces were not dissimilar, but with this important
difference: in 375 the Thebans had eventually yielded to Spartan pressure. In 372/1 they had not, and D was just
the man to miss this vital point and further disfigure the narrative by having the Thebans excluded on both
occasions. Besides, a potent reason why Ephorus could not have said that the Thebans were excluded twice is
that this would have made nonsense of his Greek narrative of the years 375-371.
There is nothing in sections 3-4 which is inconsistent with a 375 date and with the Peace of that year. The
Thebans had vigorously objected to the Spartan interpretation of the autonomy clause in 387/6, and they had
only backed down and conceded the independence of Boeotia after Agesilaus had taken the field against them. In
371 they answered the Spartan challenge and won at Leuctra. It would be very surprising therefore if they had
made no objection at all to letting Boeotia free in 375. The issue must surely have been hotly debated at Thebes
itself, in the Athenian assembly, in the allied synedrion, and at the peace congress at Sparta. Section 3 is an echo
of that debate. Callistratus and the Athenians in general are very likely to have opposed Theban expansionism,
and Epaminondas, who did not necessarily leap into fame at the peace congress of 372/1 for the first time, is
certain to have defended the Boeotian Confederacy. Whether the altercation took place in Athens or Sparta (see
n. ad below) it makes little difference; a 375 context is far from improbable.
-323It was said above that the motive which D ascribes to the King for wishing to have the Common Peace reaffirmed
shows that, at the very least, not all of D's account is in error. And there is something else. Section 4 concerns
the co-prostasia of the Peace by Athens and Sparta which was certainly initiated in 375 (section 4n.). If therefore
sections 1, 2, and 4 are not lifted from the Peace of 372/1, but correctly belong to 375, why should it be supposed
that the details* of section 3, out of which section 4 proceeds, are drawn from the later Peace? It is simpler to
assume that D has misrepresented the crowning detail of section 3, i.e. that the Thebans were not excluded from
the Peace in the end. There is in fact in the second half of section 4 a statement which strongly indicates that in
Ephorus the combined pressure of Athens and Sparta eventually succeeded in overcoming Theban objections on
this occasion. The Athenians and Spartans, D says, resented the Theban claim to hegemony and they the

Boeotian cities from Thebes.

What of ch. 39? It is remarked elsewhere that the growth of Theban power (and the corresponding decline of
Sparta) was one of Ephorus' major themes, and it has left its traces in D (pp. 112 ff.). I would view ch. 39 as D's
version of an outburst of Ephoran rhetoric of the usual sort (p. 123 ) which anticipated the Theban triumph at
Leuctra. It anticipated, but it did not immediately presage. On commenting on the Theban attitude to the Peace of
375 Ephorus looked ahead to 371 when the Theban aspirations were realized. The various elements of ch. 39 are
found elsewhere than 50. 5f., as Lauffer, 1959, has not noticed, who consequently proceeds to draw quite
unacceptable conclusions (see below). We may note especially the prowess of the Thebans stressed at 11. 82. 3;
15. 20. 1; 26. 1; 37. 2; 50. 5. The recurrence in D therefore of the Theban valour and of the Spartan defeat at
Leuctra surely indicates a theme which ran through Ephorus' history of this period. The close similarity in
language to which Lauffer attaches such significance is, in reality, of no significance at all. D's language is
monotonously uniform and we know that Ephorus too did not always take care to vary his description of the same
or similar things (p. 124 ).
A further argument against the doublet hypothesis can be adduced from the sequence of D's narrative in chs. 3840. Ch. 40 is generally (and probably erroneously; see below) considered to
-324-

represent the reaction of some Peloponnesian states after Leuctra. But whether the events of ch. 40 belong after the
Peace of 375 or after Leuctra (these being the only two possibilities), the conclusion is inescapable that ch. 39 cannot
derive from the Ephoran narrative which introduced the campaign of Leuctra because if that were so and ch. 40 were
given a post-Leuctra date, what has happened to the campaign itself?
' 2AL D declares at 39.3, so that what-p ever
it was that intervened in Ephorus, it was not Leuctra. If, on the other hand, ch. 40 is assigned to the aftermath of the
Peace of 375 (as it should be) then the true nature of ch. 39 is immediately apparent: it is the remnants of Ephorus'
anticipatory comments on the Theban victory at Leuctra four years later. The transition sentence just quoted (39. 3), a
formula in fact, is common in D. There are many such both in parts of the Bibliotheke based on Ephorus, and in those
based on other authors (p. 23 and n. 63). They show that D was on every occasion aware that what he was saying,
whether his own or his source's, belonged to the future. None of these transitional formulae (which in part served to
whet the readers' appetite with things to come) are apologies for errors of anticipation, and the one at 39. 3 is not (as
Lauffer, 1959: 317 f., thinks) D's way of admitting that he has jumped the gun, but that he is now, after consulting his
date-book, aware of it and is taking measures to rectify the situation.
I am in fact totally resistant to the view of Lauffer who, accepting the doublet theory, blames not D for it, or Ephorus'
sources, but Ephorus himself (1959: 345 ff.). 'Daraus folgt aber, dass die Dublette selbst nicht von Diodor verschuldet
ist, sondern auf zwei wrtlich bereinstimmende Stellen in seiner Quelle zurckgeht' (1959: 346). Chs. 38 and 50 are
a good example of Ephorus' doubling technique, Lauffer thinks. Ephorus knew that the Thebans were not excluded in
375, but he deliberately falsified history for rhetorical and artistic reasons. This is too serious an allegation to be left
unanswered.
To substantiate his theory (and I fail in any case to see what possible artistic effect could result from such a
misrepresentation of the facts) Lauffer points to the transitional formula at 39. 3, to the words and
at 50.4, and to the fact that 50. 5f. is briefer than ch. 39. In Lauffer's opinion all these prove
-325represent the reaction of some Peloponnesian states after Leuctra. But whether the events of ch. 40 belong after the
Peace of 375 or after Leuctra (these being the only two possibilities), the conclusion is inescapable that ch. 39 cannot
derive from the Ephoran narrative which introduced the campaign of Leuctra because if that were so and ch. 40 were
given a post-Leuctra date, what has happened to the campaign itself?
' 2AL D declares at 39.3, so that what-p ever
it was that intervened in Ephorus, it was not Leuctra. If, on the other hand, ch. 40 is assigned to the aftermath of the
Peace of 375 (as it should be) then the true nature of ch. 39 is immediately apparent: it is the remnants of Ephorus'
anticipatory comments on the Theban victory at Leuctra four years later. The transition sentence just quoted (39. 3), a
formula in fact, is common in D. There are many such both in parts of the Bibliotheke based on Ephorus, and in those
based on other authors (p. 23 and n. 63). They show that D was on every occasion aware that what he was saying,
whether his own or his source's, belonged to the future. None of these transitional formulae (which in part served to
whet the readers' appetite with things to come) are apologies for errors of anticipation, and the one at 39. 3 is not (as
Lauffer, 1959: 317 f., thinks) D's way of admitting that he has jumped the gun, but that he is now, after consulting his
date-book, aware of it and is taking measures to rectify the situation.
I am in fact totally resistant to the view of Lauffer who, accepting the doublet theory, blames not D for it, or Ephorus'
sources, but Ephorus himself (1959: 345 ff.). 'Daraus folgt aber, dass die Dublette selbst nicht von Diodor verschuldet
ist, sondern auf zwei wrtlich bereinstimmende Stellen in seiner Quelle zurckgeht' (1959: 346). Chs. 38 and 50 are
a good example of Ephorus' doubling technique, Lauffer thinks. Ephorus knew that the Thebans were not excluded in
375, but he deliberately falsified history for rhetorical and artistic reasons. This is too serious an allegation to be left
unanswered.
To substantiate his theory (and I fail in any case to see what possible artistic effect could result from such a
misrepresentation of the facts) Lauffer points to the transitional formula at 39. 3, to the words and
at 50.4, and to the fact that 50. 5f. is briefer than ch. 39. In Lauffer's opinion all these prove
-325-

that D had knowingly come across a doublet in his source. The first two points have already been dealt with. The third,
while it may indicate that D did not wish to repeat fully comments he had made in ch. 39, hardly proves Lauffer's
contention for the doublet lies not in the repetition of the praise of Thebes and her leaders here (and elsewhere), but in
the fact that the Thebans are said to have been excluded twice, in 375 and in 372/1. It is all very well to draw one's
attention to the ancient criticism of Ephorus that he described similar things in very much the same language, but this
does not mean that where the details were different Ephorus ironed these out thus falsifying history out of some
perverse desire to repeat his accounts (p. 124 ). The verbal similarities apart, a comparison of ch. 39 and 50. 5 f.
reveals significant differences which further shake Lauffer's thesis. Two statements made in 50.
derives from, led up to the campaign of Leuctra; the original of ch. 39 did not.

narrative it

To conclude: while the theory of a doublet and, further, that others than D were responsible cannot be definitely
disproved, it seems an altogether more satisfactory explanation that the details of ch. 38 are factual and belong to
375, with the exception of the statement that Thebes was excluded from the Peace. When we consider the mess made
of other accounts (e.g. Leuctra and the Corcyra campaign of 373/2), it does not seem at all unlikely that D is
responsible for the blunder.
38. 3. : see 28. 1n.
: the peace congress or the synedrion of the Athenian Confederacy? Judeich, 1927: 184 n. 1, and
Sealey, 1956: 189, think the latter. Lauffer, 1959: 320, objects that the term koinon synedrion occurs elsewhere in D
and indeed it is used of the assemblies or councils of the Greek League of Corinth (11. 3. 4; 11. 55. 4, 5; 17. 14. 1;
17. 73. 5), of the Delian League (11. 70. 4), of the Peloponnesian League (12. 39. 4), of the anti-Spartan alliance of
395 (14. 82. 2), as well as of the Second Athenian Confederacy (15. 28. 3; 29. 7; 30. 2). It is possible that the peace
congress is indicated here though all the eleven instances of the
-326-

term in D just cited refer to leagues and similar bodies and not to peace congresses. Either way it does not affect
what was said above about 38. 3-39. If the peace congress at Sparta is meant, then Epaminondas and Callistratus
clashed there in 375. If the syne-p drion of the Athenian Confederacy is meant, then Callistratus and
Epaminondas opposed each other there in 375 in their respective addresses of the Athenian assembly and the
synedrion of the allies. Of course it is all rather badly stated in D, but there is nothing surprising in that. Nor is
there anything surprising in the assumption that the proposed renewal of the Peace was discussed beforehand in
the synedrion of the Confederacy. It was one of the principles of the Confederacy that a decision to go to war or
to make peace required the assent of Athens and the majority of the allies (Svt 257 = Tod 123; cf. Aesch. 2. 60;
3. 69). So the peace proposals must have been discussed in the synedrion. At the meeting Epaminondas, as a
Theban representative, spoke against the dissolution of the Boeotian Confederacy which was required by the
proposed terms of the Peace, but he could not carry a Majority of the synedrion. Later at Sparta the Thebans and
the rest of the allies took the oaths ( X. H. 6. 3. 19 for 372/1, but doubtless that was
the case in 375 too). The Thebans obviously swore as 'Thebans' (cf. Svt 257=Tod 123 line 79), and the Boeotian
Confederacy was dissolved, at least in theory. There is nothing improbable in this.
Whether the Boeotian Confederacy was dissolved in practice is another question. Almost certainly it was not. At
any rate, in the summer of 373 when Plataea was captured and destroyed, and before the resumption of war, the
Confederacy was very much in existence (46. 4; Paus. 9. 1. 6: both mention Boeotarchs; Isocr. 14. 8f.; cf. 33).
The number of Pelopidas' Boeotarchies too argues against the interruption of that office in 375. When he fell in
summer 364 he was Boeotarch for the thirteenth time ( Plut. Pel. 34. 7). He was not a Boeotarch in 371 ( ibid. 20.
3 ) and, probably, 378 (cf. Fuscagni, 1972: 415 ff.); but he must have been in 375 and 374 if the thirteen
Boeotarchies are to be accounted for. What happened therefore was that the Thebans promised to dissolve the
Confederacy (perhaps not in so many words), but did not. On the contrary, once Sparta had evacuated her
garrisons, the Thebans began to take over the cities which had previously resisted them with Spartan help (46. 4
ff.; Isocr. 14. 8f.). The 'cold war' between
-327Athens and Sparta which followed immediately upon the conclusion of the Peace (40 n.; 45. 1 and n.;
chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 2) facilitated the Theban task. Athens needed Thebes and was therefore
willing to tolerate Theban actions in Boeotia as she had done before the Peace (and as indeed Isocr. 14. 21, 24f.,
26, 33, 38, says), while Sparta soon had her hands full in the Ionian Sea. Much of the Peloponnese too was
dangerously restless (ch. 40). Circumstances in 371 were quite different. Sparta then had an army poised in
Phocis and, more important, Athens was prepared to leave Thebes to her fate.
Isocr. 14. 37, the Athenian threat to have the Thebans declared because of their conduct over Oropus,
does not necessarily refer to this occasion (as Schaefer, 1885-7: i. 53f., and Sealey, 1956: 190f., suggest). It
may even be that the Athenian threat was to exclude the Thebans from their Confederacy (Glotz and Cohen, iii.
137). If, however, the threatened exclusion was from the Peace, and as Isocrates does not mention the Boeotian
cities, then the time perhaps was shortly after the conclusion of peace.
Finally, against those who for the sake of simplicity would assign 38. 3, the clash between Callistratus and
Epaminondas, to 371, merely because that is when Epaminondas stood up to Agesilaus ( Plut. Ages. 27. 5-28. 3)
and they are averse to complicating matters by having Eparninondas confront opponents on more than one
occasion, it should be said that the sources mention another confrontation between Callistratus and Epaminondas;
see Nepos, Epam. 6; Plut. Mor. 193c-d; 810f. The place was Arcadia and the occasion either 366 ( Roy, 1971:
596 n. 145 ) or 362 ( Cawkwell, 1961: 84 n. 4).

38. 4. : i.e. the prostasia of the Peace was now to be shared by Athens and Sparta
(see 5. 1 n.; Hampl, 1938: 14 ff.). Nepos, Tim. 2. 2f. (whose ultimate source was probably Ephorus), makes the
same point and so does Isocrates (15. 109 f.; cf. 7. 12; also Demosth. 9. 23 which goes a great deal further) in
his own way. Both add what D does not, i.e. that the Athenians were so delighted with their position vis--vis the
Peace that they dedicated an altar to Eirene and voted annual sacrifices; see FGH 328 F151 with n.; Robert,
1977: 211 ff. It does not appear that the co-prostasia was worked out in detail; see 67. 1 n.
It is suggested above (30. 2n.) that some seventy-five states
-328became members of the League, that all of them were recorded on Svt 257= Tod 123 and that the process was
completed by autumn 375, in the aftermath of the conclusion of the Common Peace in that year. (For the date of
the Peace see chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 1.) There is no evidence that any cities were added to the
League after 375. The evidence usually cited for acquisitions in 373 hardly amounts to that: 47. 2f. is a very
confused passage (see n. there). Why then did the League grow no further after 375? The answer should perhaps
be sought in the re-establishment of the Common Peace which set Athens and her League in a new light. Not only
was the latter recognized by Sparta and the King, but Athens was elevated to the position of co-prostates of the
Peace. The joy with which the Peace was received indicates that many patriotic Athenians felt they were on the
road to empire again. Certainly Athens is more self-assured and even aggressive after the Peace, and there are
signs of renascent imperialism already in the later 370s (cf. Sealey, 1957: 95ff.; Hornblower, 1982a: 190ff.). It is
not the case that Athens gradually went back on the principles enunciated in the decree of Aristoteles. These
appear (the evidence is less than plentiful) to have been broadly honoured where the members of the synedrion
were concerned. (To this extent Cargill 1981 is right.) It is rather that she saw her chance for empire in keeping
future allies for herself and not enrolling them as members of the synedrion where they would be protected (cf.
Griffith in Imperialism, 137ff.). : see 28. 1 n.

39. The growth in Theban power

39. 1. : see 34. 2; 37. 1-2; 37. 2n.; Plut. Pel. 15. 6ff.; 16f.
39. 2. : the famous Theban mentioned here for the first time in D. For the most detailed modern
treatment of Pelopidas see Bersanetti, 1949: 43ff.
: 'Gorgidas' according to Plut. Pel. 18. 1; 19. 3; Polyaen. 2. 1. 2, though MS F of Polyaenus consistently
reads 'Gorgias'. Gorgidas is credited with the creation of the Sacred Band by Plut. Pel. 18. 1 and Polyaen. 2. 5. 1;
Athen. 13. 602a ascribes this to Epaminondas, naturally. The creation (or rather reorganization; cf. 12. 70. 1) of
this renowned body apart, his defeat of Phoebidas
-329at Thespiae in 378 would have contributed to his reputation as a soldier (Polyaen. 2. 5. 2).
: for Epaminondas see Fortina, 1958; Cawkwell, 1972: 254ff., as well as the works cited by the
latter on 254 n. 1. : cf. Plut. Ages. 27. 6 ( ); Pel. 3. 6;
4. 1; 5. 4. As noticed in the Introduction (pp. 10 f.), Ephorus ascribed the short-lived Theban hegemony to the
paideia and general moral qualities of Epaminondas. With that man's death at Mantinea, Theban greatness was at
an end: 79. 2; 88. 3f.; Polyb. 6. 43; cf. Plut. Mor. 864d on the Thebans' lack of education and polish.
The tradition of Epaminondas' training in Pythagorean philosophy is a strong one; cf. 10. 11. 2; 15. 52. 7; 16. 2.
3 (certainly confused); Aristox. F38, 96 (Wehrli, ii); Plut. De genio579d-f; 583b-c; 585d-586a; Nepos, Epam. 2.
2; Paus. 9. 13. 1; Diog. Laert. 8. 1. 5; Cic. De orat. 3. 139; De off. 1. 155; cf. Arist. Rhet. 2. 1398b. As Lysis was
a historical personality and the dates of the two men are not inconsistent, there is no reason to reject the
tradition; cf. Fortina, 1958: 5f.; Lvque and Vidal-Naquet, 1960: 294ff.
+ : for the facts of Leuctra see chs. 51ff. nn.

40. Strife in the Peloponnese

D's picture of a deeply troubled Peloponnese in the wake of the Peace of 375 is usually viewed with incredulity by
scholars who prefer to give ch. 40 a post-Leuctra date; cf. Grote, x. 271 n. 1; Stern, 1884: 93ff., 155; Meyer,
GdA v. 420; Beloch, GG iii. 1. 174 nn. 2, 4;Glotz and Cohen, iii. 151 n. 22; Hammond, HG 495; Cartledge, 1979:
296; id., 1987: 266; Buckler, 1980a: 292 n. 1. Buckler's objection that D at 40. 1 'speaks of the Spartan
hegemony as though it were a thing of the past' and that therefore the disturbances are better dated after
Leuctra, is unsound for D speaks in the same way at 5. 2 and 45. 2, yet neither passage could possibly be
assigned a post-Leuctra date. The general view is questioned by Lauffer, 1959: 318 n. 5, but without
argumentation, and in any case the grounds on which he does so are very shaky as we have seen (38. 3-39n.).
Equally Roy, 1973: 135ff., who also aims to question the date commonly given to ch. 40, spoils his case
-330by rejecting Ephorus' albeit incompetently transmitted explanation of the troubles. Yet surely our only hope of
placing these events in their correct context lies precisely in accepting what Ephorus had to say about them. Thus

viewed, not only does ch.40 cease to be an awkward problem, but it provides valuable insight into the condition of
the Peloponnese in the mid-370s. We would seek in vain for such illumination in Xenophon.
D explains the events of ch. 40 as the result of the conclusion of peace, + (not of any
Spartan defeat be it noticed), and at the end of the chapter, after commenting, +
I + , he passes to Persian affairs, the invasion of Egypt of 373 (chs. 41ff.). With
that narrative concluded he returns to Greek affairs: (45. 1). The situation he describes
at 45. 1 is basically that of 40. 1-2: we are still in the aftermath of the Peace of 375, with democrats vying with
oligarchs for control. But while in ch. 40 he was concerned with the Peloponnese, he now moves to the Ionian Sea
where the involvement of Athens soon led to the resumption of hostilities (45. 1-2). The first area of conflict in
the west was Zacynthus and as this certainly does not belong to a post-Leuctra, but to a post-Peace of 375
context, it is but logical to conclude that the events of ch. 40 also belong to the same context. Firm evidence to
clinch this is lacking, but as evidence to the contrary is not forthcoming, the mere silence of Xenophon and a
vague feeling that such disturbances could not have occurred in the Peloponnese in 375/4 are not good enough
for rejecting D's sequence here. And if on examining the events of ch. 40 themselves we discover nothing
inconsistent with a pre-Leuctra date, then that would effectively place the ball in the court of those who would
date ch. 40 after Leuctra.
As so very often we must suspect that D has been maladroit in comprehending and abridging Ephorus. The five
attempted coups occurred now after the conclusion of peace -- Ephorus would have commented on the aftermath
of the Peace, and the last sentence of ch. 39, , should be understood as
pointing to that. But sections 1-2, + , outline a process which stretched back to
386 and the Peace of Antalcidas though the renewal of the King's Peace appears to have shifted it into a higher
gear. Sections 1-2 should be seen in the
-331-

same light as 5. 2 and 45. 2. We must not therefore allow the apparent contradiction between the explanation D
provides for the coups (the revengefulness of the democrats once in control), and the coups themselves (in at least
one instance it was the oligarchs who attempted a revolution), to mislead us, as Roy, 1973, is misled. Roy in fact is
totally off the scent when he suggests that the Ephoran discussions at 5. 1-3 and here are anachronistic, that the
democratic reactions to Sparta and her supporters properly belong after Leuctra, and that there was no connection
between the autonomy clause of the King's Peace and the political troubles in the years 386-371, in spite of Ephorus'
claim to the contrary.
The contest between democrats and oligarchs with the respective backing of Athens and Sparta was just as much a
feature of this period as of the 5th century (cf. e.g. Isocr. 4. 16; X. H. 6. 3. 14; de Ste Croix, 1981: 295ff.). D's
(Ephorus') comments at 5. 1-3 and here are perfectly to the point as the details of the Zacynthian and Corcyraean
affairs make plain (45-46. 1 -- overlooked by Roy). We should consequently be tolerant of the inconsistency between
the general remarks at 40. 1-2 and the examples given at sections 2-4; and we should view sections 1-2 as referring
to a lengthy strife which by 375 had resulted in some cities being under democratic and others under oligarchic
regimes -- hence D's mixed bag of examples. Zacynthus and Corcyra parallel the examples of ch. 40 in this respect. In
the first case the oligarchs are in control at the conclusion of peace, in the second, the democrats. The renewal of the
Peace will have fed the hopes of all those, be they oligarchs or democrats, not in power in their cities at the time or
even in exile. They could appeal to the autonomy clause in their effort to return and/or regain power. The presence of
a clause about exiles in the Peace would provide an even better explanation, but such a clause is very doubtful (5.
1n.). For Ephorus and the Common Peace see pp. 127 f.
40. 2. + + : hardly anything definite is known about Phigalia in south-west Arcadia
(present-day Pavlitsa) in the 4th century. In the 360s it appears that it followed the lead of Arcadia (cf. Ernst Meyer,
RE xix. 2082) and it is thus assumed that before Leuctra it had been a loyal ally of Sparta. But in absence of any
evidence to the contrary nothing prevents us from assigning a pre-Leuctra date to the switch from oligarchy to
democracy at Phigalia and the banishment of the pro-Spartan
-332-

party. If it could happen at Phlius at a time when Sparta ruled supreme why could it not happen at Phigalia in the
mid-370s? The details of the bloodbath which followed in no way contradict this hypothesis.
: thus MF, but PX. Phigaleia (or Phigalia) appears to have been the earlier version of the name
(cf. Herod. 6. 83. 2; Paus. 8. 3. 1f; 8. 5. 7; 8. 39. 2ff.). It is found in 4th-century inscriptions (e.g. Syll. i. 239c)
though by the beginning of the 3rd century at the latest the gamma seems to have been dropped (IG ii2 687; IG
V. 2. 419ff.). The city's coinage on the other hand has both forms in the Hellenistic period ( Head, 1911: 418),
and in literature too Phigalia and Phialia are found together, with Phigalia predominating. See Ernst Meyer, RE xix.
2065ff. Ephorus perhaps gave the earlier version, but we cannot be sure.
: the Heraea occupied by the exiles prior to the raid on Phigalia is often identified with the city of that name
in western Arcadia on the north bank of the Alpheus some 15 miles east of Olympia (cf. e.g. Blte, RE viii. 1.
414). Sievers, Gesch. Griechenlands, 251 n. 5, objected to this because of the distance involved. And indeed
Heraea is some 20 miles to the north, hardly a suitable base for a surprise operation against Phigalia. Sievers
suggested that some fort near Phigalia was meant, but he offered no candidates. D describes the Heraea of the
exiles as a which anything but fits Heraea on the Alpheus, a city located on a gentle slope by the
river (Paus. 8. 26. 1). It is therefore proposed that D's Heraea is in fact the Heira, the mountain in northern
Messenia which Aristomenes supposedly defended for ten years during the Second Messenian War (Paus. 4. 17.
10; 4. 20. 1, 5. The reading of the name in Pausanias is due to Schwartz). Leake, i. 469f., 501, placed Heira some
5 miles west of Phigalia on the south side of the river Neda near modern Sidherokastro. But there are no ancient
remains there. Most scholars now would identify Heira 'with the hill of St Athanasius, which rises to the south of

the village of Kakaletri, on the upper waters of the river Neda' (Frazer, iii. 415). Subsequent studies have
supported Frazer; cf. Gaertringen and Lattermann, 1911: 13ff.; Valmin, 1930: 118f.; Roebuck, 1941: 11f. The
fortifications on the hill appear to belong to the Archaic period and to the 4th century BC. For a photograph of the
hill see MME pl. 9. 2. The hill of St Athanasius is some 4 miles southsouth-east of Phigalia on the south side of the
river Neda in
-333northern Messenia. For Phigalia itself, little investigated to date, see Frazer, iv. 390f.; Orlandos, AD 11 ( 1927-8),
1ff.; Ernst Meyer , RE xix. 2067ff.; Cooper, 1972: 359ff.; Leekley and Noyes, 1976: 100.
. . . : urban Dionysia with dramatic festivals were held in the spring (in Elaphebolion at Athens)
and if the massacre occurred in spring 374 then that is a terminus ante quem for the first renewal of the King's
Peace. But the incident at Phigalia could be as late as spring 373. For the chronology of this period see the
excursus below.
40. 3. + : we know a little more about Corinth, but not enough to put the matter beyond
dispute. At the conclusion of the King's Peace in 387/6 large numbers of Corinthians were driven into exile (X. H.
5. 1. 34). Many of them sought and found refuge in Athens (Demosth. 20. 52ff.). Others it seems retreated to
Argos, a natural enough choice. It was these exiles, of democratic and anti-Spartan sympathies, who now
attempted to return with disastrous consequences both to themselves and their supporters. The pro-Spartan
regime established in 387/6 was a strong one and it survived the Leuctra disaster. There can be no question that
it was oligarchic in character, though our evidence seems to suggest that it was far from being a narrow
oligarchy. In dealing with the circumstances of the appointment of Timoleon to the Sicilian command in the
mid340s, D speaks of a Corinthian gerousia which met in a bouleuterion, though decisions ultimately lay with a
larger body, the synedrion (16. 65. 6-8). Plutarch in fact goes so far as to interpret as a democracy whatever it
was his sources said about the Corinthian polity of the 360s and later (Tim. 5. 2; cf. 3. 1-2; 7. 2). Perhaps they
spoke of a Corinthian demos (cf. end of following n.). 40. 4. + + : Megarian
politics in the 4th century are highly problematic. We know that a narrow oligarchy was set up with Spartan help
in 424 (Thuc. 4. 74. 3). We do not know how long that lasted, though it was still in power in 421 ( ibid. 5. 31. 6 ).
Thucydides remarks that for a regime set up by so few men after a revolution it lasted a very long time (4. 74. 4).
The implication seems to be that at the time Thucydides was writing (not later than c.400), the government in
question no longer existed (contra Beloch, GG iii. 1. 70 n. 3; Accame, 1951: 61f.; Ernst Meyer, RE xv. 192; cf.
Gomme, HCT iii. 536; Legon, 1981: 247, 263).
-334-

1981: 247, 263). If Demosth. 18. 96 is to be given any credence, Megara was held by a harmost and garrison at some
time between the end of the Peloponnesian War and 395. Perhaps Lysander had stepped in at the collapse of the said
regime and installed a harmost, or perhaps the narrow oligarchy was still in power, but required the backing of Spartan
spears as had been the case in Athens in 404/3. (For Lysander's Megarian connections cf. Meyer, RE xv. 192; Legon,
1981: 260f.) At any rate Plato in the Crito (dramatic date 399) speaks of Megara as a well-governed city (53b). It
would thus seem that by that date Megara was under a moderate oligarchy, as indeed was Thebes.
We are ignorant of the stance Megara adopted in the Corinthian War. Beloch (GG iii. 1. 70 n. 3, followed by Accame,
1951: 61f.) believes that it joined the anti-Spartan alliance of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, and underwent a
similar democratic revolution to Corinth, the democratic government being still in power at the time of Leuctra. As
evidence he cites Plato, Theaet. 142c and the present section of D -- the reference to the Megarian demos. Theaet.
142C, however, probably refers to the warfare in the Corinthia in the 360s (cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato ( 1929 3rd edn.)
320), and in any case all it shows is that, at the time the injured Theaetetus was being transported home, Megara was
not hostile to Athens. A state of neutrality could account for that. Megara was possibly neutral in the Corinthian War
(cf. Sinclair, 1978: 33 n. 17; Legon, 1981: 263ff.).
There are three pieces of evidence which prove conclusively that in the 370s Megara, whatever its constitution, was a
loyal member of the Peloponnesian League. ( Legon, 1981: 274ff., on the other hand, sees Megara as neutral after
375.) First, there is D's statement that Megara and Corinth together constituted the 6th district of the reorganized
Peloponnesian League in 378 (31. 2). Secondly, on his way back from Boeotia in 377 Agesilaus stopped at Megara (X.
H. 5. 4. 58; Plut. Ages. 27. 1). Thirdly, it is clear from ps.-Demosth. 59. 35f. that when hostilities were resumed in 373
Megara was on the Spartan side and hostile to Athens. One might add that at the time of Epaminondas' second
invasion of the Peloponnese Megara was still the ally of Sparta (68. 2 and n.). It is of course quite possible that Megara
was both democratic and allied to Sparta at this juncture, as were Phlius in the Corinthian War (but see 19. 3 n.) and
Syracuse in the
-335Peloponnesian War. Phlius needed Spartan protection against Argos, and Syracuse and Megara against Athens. But it is
also possible that Megara was still under an oligarchic regime of some description, in spite of D's
+ . The mere use of the word demos, especially in a 4th-century context, does not necessarily imply a
democracy; cf. Larsen, CP 49 ( 1954) 14 n. 2; id., 1968: 175, 178; Tod 144 (362/1) line 30: + [; Roy,
1971: 587 n. 95. In any case, what matters here is that there is nothing inherently improbable in an attempted coup
at this time to change the existing political order.
: the Sicyonian case appears plain enough on the surface. A pro-Spartan oligarchy was in control
there till 368 though in this same year the city was forced to join Thebes (X. H. 7. 1. 18, 44ff.; D 15. 69. 1; 70. 3; see
nn. ad loc.). The attempted revolution therefore was in all probability due to democratic elements. Cf. Griffin, 1982:
67f. and n. 19.

A tantalizing possibility is introduced by a badly fragmented citation from the Chabrias monument mentioned above
(33. 4n.), restored as [ + . . . ] | [ . . . ] by Schweigert, 1940: 318f. Given that the
monument dates from the mid- or later 370s an explanation could be found for the mention of Sicyonians within the
context of the war against Sparta whose ally Sicyon was at the time (thus Schweigert, 1940: 318f.; Burnett and
Edmonson, 1961: 87). Alternatively one might venture to suggest an Athenian involvement in northern Peloponnese in
support of democratic movements in the area in the way that the Zacynthian democrats were supported (45. 3f.). A
commercial treaty between Athens and Troezen (IG ii2 46) dated to the mid-370s by Woodhead (1957b: 225ff.; but cf.
Lewis, 1959: 248ff.; Gauthier, 1972: 166f.) may point to Athenian diplomatic activity being used to exploit antiSpartan
feeling in the Peloponnese. The possibility that the second agreement recorded on the reverse of the stone of IG ii2 46
was with Sicyon (only the last letter of the name survives -- N) is remote, but still a possibility ( Burnett and
Edmonson, 1961: 86 n. 36). A restoration of the citation on the Chabrias monument such as o[ +
] | [+ + ] is as likely as that of Burnett and Edmonson, 1961: 87.
40. 5. : a pro-Spartan government was installed at Phlius by Agesilaus in autumn 379 (19. 3n.) and
this was strong enough to survive Leuctra and the subsequent attacks
-336on it by its many enemies (X. H. 7. 2. 1 ff.). Xenophon does not mention any Phliasians exiled at the time of the
settlement, but there must have been many for 600 were killed on this occasion alone according to D (and cf. X. H. 7.
2. 5 where numbers of exiles are spoken of in 368).
: this may be the same as : held against Phlius by Argos later (X. H. 7.
2. 1). For the probable location of the latter see Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 103 ff. I cannot agree with Legon, 1967: 335 n.
75, that the present incident is in fact to be identified with X. H. 7. 2. 5-9. The circumstances are totally different. The
Phliasian exiles played but a small part in Xenophon's incident of 368; cf. Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 109 n. 83.

Archon Socratides, 374/3

41. 1. + : 382 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 637. Only three tribunes are named, not four as announced, but L. Papirius
(placed second in Livy's college of six: 6. 22. 1) must have been omitted in the way explained by Drummond, 1978:
87f.; id., 1980: 61f. MS F, as often, offers additional names (cf. Vial, 139). See also pp. 27 f.

41-44. The invasion of Egypt

The Persian narrative is resumed from 29. 4. See pp. 100 f.
41. 1. +: this may well be the chronographer. The invasion of Egypt in fact spanned two archon
years as it began (May/June: section 4), and ended after the Etesians and the annual
inundation of the Nile. The Nile begins to rise about the time of the summer solstice (1. 36. 7; Herod. 2. 19. 2) and it
reaches its highest level by September (cf. Burton, 141). The invasion took place either in 374 or 373 and D's date
thus marks either its end or its beginning. It was certainly over by autumn 373 for Iphicrates was back in Athens in the
autumn of that year where he replaced Timotheus as general (X. H. 6. 2. 13; ps.-Demosth. 49. 9, 22). On the other
hand it cannot belong earlier than 374 for surely it cannot antedate the Peace of 375 (probably concluded
summer/autumn: see the excursus at 45. 3), and several months ought to be allowed for the journey of the Greek
mercenaries to Ace. The expedition made but slow progress
-337(section 5) and Kienitz, therefore (1953: 90 n. 3), queries D's statement that it set out . That
does not leave enough time, he thinks, to accommodate the events of the campaign. He tentatively suggests that the
campaign began either a year earlier in spring 374 or, more likely, early in 373 and D has got the season wrong. The
first suggestion goes beyond the evidence, for the narrative of chs. 41-3 is of a single summer's campaign; and the
second suggestion is unnecessary. The four to five months (May/June -- Sept./Oct.) envisaged by D's source seem
sufficient enough time for the events related.
: shortly after Darius' death in 405/4 Egypt was free of Persia and ruled by Amyrtaeus, though parts of it,
notably Elephantine, continued under Persia for a little while longer; cf. Kraeling, 1953: 111ff. But even before this
date Persia was not fully in control in Egypt to judge from 13. 46. 6 and Thuc. 8. 35. 2; cf. Kienitz, 1953: 73ff.;
CHI511f. The Persians had made two previous attempts that we know of to reconquer Egypt. The first, under
Abrocomas, had come to nothing because of Cyrus' revolt (X. An. 1. 4. 3, 5). For the second see 2-4n.
U0386: not so. Pharnabazus was clearly the supreme commander as is shown by 29. 3; 41. 5; and
43. 2. Iphicrates only commanded the Greek corps. Pharnabazus of course is the well-known former satrap of
Hellespontine Phrygia (29. 3n.). He must have been in his seventies by now for he is said by Xenophon to have been
older than Agesilaus (H. 4. 1. 31). For his career see Lenschau, RE xix. 1842ff
: if D's statement that Iphicrates was sent to Pharnabazus at the same time that Chabrias was recalled
from Egypt is accepted (29. 3 f.), then Iphicrates went out in 380/79 (29. 2n.). It may seem a little surprising that he
spent some six years with Pharnabazus before they took the field against Egypt in 374/3, but that is not impossible.
Certainly the sources are silent about Iphicrates in these years as far as Greece is concerned. He does not, for
example, appear to have been involved in the warfare of the early years of the Confederacy (unlike Timotheus and
Chabrias), so he may well have been in Persian service. We are told that the preparations against Egypt took up a
number of years, much to Iphicrates' chagrin (41. 2; see next n.), though he was not idle all the time (41. 3n.).

41. 2. : 'more years (than necessary)'; cf. 44. 1,

-338-

+ + . The preparations began in 380/79 (29. 2n.; cf. Parke, 1933: 62;
Kienitz, 1953: 89) and as the invasion took place in 374/3, some six to seven years were taken up by them. This
is not unlikely. Persian preparations were notoriously slow and sometimes they came to nothing (see n. below).
Appointed in 380/79, Pharnabazus may have found it difficult to procure enough Greek mercenaries for war broke
out in Greece shortly afterwards; hence the King's desire to end that war (38. 1 and n.).
+ the account is consistently favourable to Iphicrates. He is raised to the same
level with Pharnabazus (41.1, 3; 42.4), his military adroitness is stressed (42.5; 43.1), the blame for the
expedition's failure is laid squarely on the timidity of the Persian generals as well. as on their jealousy and even
fear of Iphicrates (43), and the narrative is concluded with a eulogy of Iphicrates' military genius (44). All this
agrees well with Ephorus' attitude to non-Greeks. For the emphasis he laid on the importance of Greek generals
and soldiers to Persia (and Egypt) and his panhellenism, see pp. 114 f.
0 : cf. section 5, ++ , and the comment
at Hell. Oxy. 19. 2 regarding the financial difficulties Conon faced in 395; cf. also Isocr. 4. 142 which refers to the
same (395) occasion. The shortage of money related in Polyaen. 3. 9. 59 probably refers to this period and the
conspiracy at Ace mentioned at 3. 9. 56 may have been caused by the long delays and the money difficulties.
41.3. : Ace or Acco (later Ptolemais and even later St Jean d'Acre or simply Acre) in north Palestine; see
Strabo 16 C 758: + ,
. For Persians at Ace see Stern, 1982: 254, 278. Polyaen. 3. 9. 63 speaks of a landing manuvre by
Iphicrates in Phoenicia against hostile Phoenicians. As Iphicrates did not to our knowledge operate in this area at
any other time we must ascribe this episode to the years 380/79-374/3 when he was in Persian service. Kienitz,
1953: 90 n. 4, doubts the historical basis of the episode because D's detailed account says nothing about any
fighting in Phoenicia, and because the Persians would not have chosen Ace as their base if Phoenicia was in revolt.
D's silence is not of course an argument against the historicity of the episode; and we know that parts of
Phoenicia and Cilicia had
-339risen in revolt in the 380s at the instigation of Evagoras and Acoris (2. 2-4 nn.). Some of these places may still
have been in revolt and Pharnabazus may have taken the opportunity of using Iphicrates and his mercenaries to
subject them.
Ace is mentioned in Demosth. 52. 20, Which reference dates to this time. The people mentioned there may have
been hoping to trade with the Persian camp. FGH 115 (Theop.) F263 probably refers to the successful campaign
of 344/3; contra Burn, CHI 372. . . . : the usual impossible information about barbarian
numbers; see p. 130.
'. . . : repeated from 41. 1. In the longer narrative of his source the repetition would have been
less awkward. Twelve thousand according to Nepos, Iphicr. 2. 4. Both figures are quite credible. Cyrus, a
generation earlier, had recruited no less than thirteen thousand Greeks (X. An. 1. 2. 9).
. . . : see pp. 131 f.
. . . : a hundred of these were used according to Polyaen. 3. 9. 63 to defeat Phoenician rebels
(see above).
41. 4. : see 41.1 n. For such chronological indications in Ephorus see Introd. n. 264.
42. 1. : Nectanebos I of Sebennytus had been on the throne since c.380 (2-4n.).
. . . : see I. 30f. and cf. Polyaen. 3. 9. 38, Iphicrates' stratagem undertaken +
.
42. 2 : cf.1. 33. 7f.; Burton, ad loc.; Burn, CHI 373 for a good map.
42. 4.

: the third mouth from the east.

43. 1. . . . : the only other reference to the quarrel between Pharnabazus and Iphicrates
which appears to have contributed to the collapse of the campaign is in Plut. Artox. 24. 1:
22a2a , .
43. 1-2. . . . : according to Ephorus therefore Iphicrates and Pharnabazus
differed on strategy. It would seem that the two had not been on the best of terms from the beginning (41. 2)
and now, while the mercenary leader was in favour of moving against Memphis immediately, Pharnabazus

preferred to wait till all of his forces had concentrated; and he also turned down Iphicrates' second suggestion
-340that he allowed to move against Memphis alone with his mercenaries.
, (section 2)! And Pharnabazus' Persians
(section 2). After Iphicrates had fled to Athens and Pharnabazus'
envoys had demanded that he be punished as responsible for the failure of the campaign, the Athenians promised
that if there was any substance in the charge Iphicrates would be punished as he deserved. Shortly afterwards he
was elected general. It is very likely that we have in D a reflection of Iphicrates' apologia offered in Athens on his
return. The ill success of the expedition which had involved so many Greeks would doubtless have been discussed
extensively in Greece, and Iphicrates' explanation that he was not to blame for it, that Persian procrastination and
jealousy of him were, would have found ready favour with the many who viewed the Persian military machine
with contempt. It would have been grist indeed to Ephorus' panhellenist mill to accept such an explanation (see
pp. 114 f.).
It may at first sight seem surprising that Iphicrates proposed sailing against Memphis which was situated some
120 miles up the Nile from the Mendesion. But the capture of Memphis might have settled the issue in the
Persians' favour. For the importance of Memphis' position see 1. 50. 3. To control effectively both upper and lower
Egypt one had to hold Memphis. Possession of Memphis had been crucial in the 450s when the Athenians and
Egyptians battled against Persia. On being called in to help, the Athenians had then sailed up from the Mendesion
mouth and captured two-thirds of Memphis. Their failure to capture the rest had proved disastrous in the end
(Thuc. I. 104, 109f.). One cannot of course expect Iphicrates to have been familiar with the details of the
Athenian expedition to Egypt, but the importance of Memphis must have been common knowledge; cf. 16. 48. 7.
43. 2. . . . : Rhodoman rightly suspected a lacuna here, but the loss is not
serious and the meaning of the passage is easily recoverable. Something like (see above) is
clearly indicated, as also suggest ed by Rhodoman.
43. 4. : this is one of several instances where Ephorus' use of Callisthenes' Hellenica
is strongly indicated. Earlier in the Histories Ephorus had offered a different
-341explanation (perhaps one of several?) for the annual inundation of the Nile (1. 39. 7). Here he associated it with
the Etesians, which was Callisthenes' explanation ( FGH 124 F12 with n. and RE X. 2. 1706). For Ephorus' sources
see p. 104. The Etesians, i.e. the summer winds which blow from the Mediterranean, have nothing to do with the
flooding of the Nile of course; cf. Burton, 138 ff.
43. 5. : the sources disagree about what actually befell Conon after his arrest by Tiribazus;
cf. 14. 85. 4; Isocr. 4. 154; X. H. 4. 8. 16; Nepos, Con. 5. 3f.; schol. Aristoph. Eccles. 196; Swoboda, RE xi.
1332.
43. 6. . . . : see 34. 4n. He replaced Timotheus as general and took command of the
expedition to relieve Corcyra (47. 3 n.; X. H. 6. 2. 13).
44. Digressions by way of praise or censure are usually to be found at the end of a public man's life (pp. 5 if.).
However, a chapter on Iphicrates' military arete at this point is understandable. Iphicrates owed his fame to his
successful career as a general (44. 1; cf. X. H. 6. 2. 27 ff.) and if D (Ephorus) is correct in ascribing Iphicrates'
military innovations to his long experience ( ) as a general in Persian service, then ch. 44 is
a good epilogue to the Egyptian campaign. And in fact the last sentence of the chapter shows that this eulogistic
assessment of Iphicrates concluded the Egyptian expedition. Besides, Ephorus may have felt that such a
favourable appraisal was the best way to end an account which took pains to prove that Iphicrates was not
responsible for the failure of the campaign.
44. 1-4. : only D and Nepos, Iphicr. 1. 3 f., refer to the military innovations of
Iphicrates. According to D the Athenian general replaced the large shield of the hoplite, the aspis, with the smaller
and lighter pelte; hence the name of the new troops, peltastai. The result was greater mobility for the soldier. The
spear was made half as long again, and the sword was almost doubled in length. The footgear Iphicrates made
light and easy to untie and these boots became known as .(section 4 -- see n. there). Nepos'
information is essentially the same, but with these differences. The length of the spear was doubled while that of
the sword was simply increased and Nepos further adds that the body armour was changed: bronze breastplates
and chain mail were replaced by linen corslets.
-342First, both D and Nepos are obviously mistaken in supposing that the Greek heavy infantry in general, the
hoplites, was converted to a medium-heavy force of peltasts (cf. Arrian's definition of the three basic Greek
infantry categories, Tact. 3. 1-4), and that henceforth there were no longer hoplites, but only peltasts! And of
course the peltasts were not new to the Greek world, but had been known since at least the early 5th century. It
is surely inconceivable that Ephorus was responsible for these absurdities. At the same time one is puzzled by the
fact that contemporaries D and Nepos made the same mistake, apparently independently of each other. There are
two possibilities: (a) both D and Nepos (or perhaps the source used by Nepos which ultimately went back to
Ephorus) misunderstood Ephorus, especially if (see below) Iphicrates armed some at least of his hoplites in this
way while serving in Egypt in order to suit the conditions there, or (b) D and Nepos used the same biographical or

military handbook which had got its facts wrong. It is certain that D did occasionally use secondary sources to
supplement his main authorities (see p. 50 ). One cannot decide between the two possibilities though (a) seems
to me the more likely.
The blunder apart, what is one to make of their information? This is a thorny problem and a detailed discussion
here is impossible. The reader is referred to Lippelt, 1910; Kromayer and Veith, 1928: 89; Parke, 1933: 79ff.;
Best, 1969: esp. 102ff.; Anderson, 1970: esp. 129 ff.; Griffith, Studies Edson, 161 ff. No two scholars agree on all
points and I will confine myself mainly to expressing my own opinion.
What emerges from D and Nepos is that the new equipment was meant to combine the best features of light and
heavy troops. The long, thrusting spear and the longer sword were evidently intended for hand-to-hand fighting,
while the light but adequate pelte and absence of metal armour rendered the new troops more mobile than
hoplites. Unfortunately, there is not a scrap of evidence for peltasts of this type in action in the 4th century (pace
Parke, 1933:81, who believes that Chabrias' stratagem in Boeotia in 378 was executed by this new type of
peltast; see 32. 5n. Griffith, 1935: 5, 17, 196, 239, 317 -- he has now revised his opinion: Studies Edson, 163 n.
8 -- is of the opinion that the 'Iphicratid' peltast as explained by D and Nepos became the standard mercenary of
the 4th century, playing an
-343First, both D and Nepos are obviously mistaken in supposing that the Greek heavy infantry in general, the
hoplites, was converted to a medium-heavy force of peltasts (cf. Arrian's definition of the three basic Greek
infantry categories, Tact. 3. 1-4), and that henceforth there were no longer hoplites, but only peltasts! And of
course the peltasts were not new to the Greek world, but had been known since at least the early 5th century. It
is surely inconceivable that Ephorus was responsible for these absurdities. At the same time one is puzzled by the
fact that contemporaries D and Nepos made the same mistake, apparently independently of each other. There are
two possibilities: (a) both D and Nepos (or perhaps the source used by Nepos which ultimately went back to
Ephorus) misunderstood Ephorus, especially if (see below) Iphicrates armed some at least of his hoplites in this
way while serving in Egypt in order to suit the conditions there, or (b) D and Nepos used the same biographical or
military handbook which had got its facts wrong. It is certain that D did occasionally use secondary sources to
supplement his main authorities (see p. 50 ). One cannot decide between the two possibilities though (a) seems
to me the more likely.
The blunder apart, what is one to make of their information? This is a thorny problem and a detailed discussion
here is impossible. The reader is referred to Lippelt, 1910; Kromayer and Veith, 1928: 89; Parke, 1933: 79ff.;
Best, 1969: esp. 102ff.; Anderson, 1970: esp. 129 ff.; Griffith, Studies Edson, 161 ff. No two scholars agree on all
points and I will confine myself mainly to expressing my own opinion.
What emerges from D and Nepos is that the new equipment was meant to combine the best features of light and
heavy troops. The long, thrusting spear and the longer sword were evidently intended for hand-to-hand fighting,
while the light but adequate pelte and absence of metal armour rendered the new troops more mobile than
hoplites. Unfortunately, there is not a scrap of evidence for peltasts of this type in action in the 4th century (pace
Parke, 1933:81, who believes that Chabrias' stratagem in Boeotia in 378 was executed by this new type of
peltast; see 32. 5n. Griffith, 1935: 5, 17, 196, 239, 317 -- he has now revised his opinion: Studies Edson, 163 n.
8 -- is of the opinion that the 'Iphicratid' peltast as explained by D and Nepos became the standard mercenary of
the 4th century, playing an
-343important part in the warfare of that century. But where is the evidence?).
The peltast/hoplite hybrid is not to be found either in Classical or Hellenistic antiquity, a decisive fact which has
not been stressed sufficiently. On the contrary, battles in Greece are still fought with hoplites, and the peltasts
involved are, as far as we can see, the old hit-and-run javelin-men. ( Best, 1969: 41ff., is wrong that by 'peltasts'
Xenophon means spearmen equipped with a shield of some description. A single passage, H. 2. 4. 12, which Best
discusses at length, is enough to disprove this. is obviously translated 'peltecarrying as well as light (i.e. without shields) javelin-men'. Both the word (which Best persists in
mistranslating 'spearmen') and the position of these troops (behind the hoplites on a slope) make it clear that
they were javelin-men. Thrasybulus had intended them to throw over the heads of his hoplites, while the
who could naturally reach further, were posted behind the javelin-men.)
All the same, the story of the new equipment cannot be a fabrication of Ephorus. There must be some substance
to it especially as D provides a definite context for the reforms -- the years Iphicrates spent in Persian service
(44. 1). One might therefore hazard a hypothesis (cf. Anderson, 1970: 130f.). Like Cyrus' Ten Thousand, the
mercenaries Iphicrates commanded for the King against Egypt would have comprised both hoplites and peltasts
(armed with javelins), with the former predominating. Xenophon in the Cyropaedia gives a good idea of the kind
of opposition the

(7. 1. 3. 3); cf. An. 1. 8. 9.

Now, Iphicrates was distinguished from most of his fellow mercenary leaders because he combined brains with
brawn. The list of his stratagems in Polyaenus is exceptionally long -- 63 in all. According to 3. 9. 38, on being
informed that the Egyptian coast lacked harbours Iphicrates forthwith thought of an answer to the problem. It is
possible, therefore, that Iphicrates re-equipped a part at least of his Greek force in such a way as to make it more
effective against the heavy and unwieldy Egyptian infantry (cf. X.
-344-

Cyr. 6. 4. 17). He gave them longer spears and swords in order to outreach the Egyptians, and light shields and
no metal body armour so as to exploit Egyptian immobility. Interestingly both D and Nepos agree that a longer
spear was substituted for a shorter one, not that javelins were replaced by spears, so that the troops thus reequipped seem to have been hoplites and indeed a hoplite would have been more adept at wielding what
amounted to a pike than a peltast. We hear too that while at Ace Iphicrates undertook amphibious operations
against Phoenicia (Polyaen. 3. 9. 63) and the new type of soldier described by D and Nepos would have been
better suited to that kind of operation.
That Iphicrates' innovations occurred in Phoenicia and Egypt seems to be indicated by Nepos' statement that
metal armour was replaced by linen. Greeks generally wore woollen clothes, for linen was expensive. It had to be
imported largely from Egypt (cf. Michell, 1940: 188, 290f.). But in Egypt linen was common and it was worn by
the lower classes (cf. Herod. 2. 81. 1). Linen corslets had originated in Egypt and though not unknown in Greece
(cf. Page, 1959: 215f.; Anderson, 1970: 22f.) they were characteristic of the Persians and other non-Greeks
(Herod. 1. 135; X. An. 4. 7. 15; 5. 4. 13; Cyr. 6. 4. 2). In Greece corslets were made of leather rather than linen.
In a hot, humid climate such as that of Egypt a linen corslet, apart from its lighter weight, was far more
comfortable to wear than leather or metal; and linen was plentiful too. Hence Iphicrates' preference.
One might suggest, therefore, that Iphicrates' reforms were temporary. They were meant for Egypt where they
suited the military situation (and climate) but, as was said above, there is no evidence subsequently for this novel
infantry. With Iphicrates' flight from Asia in 373, the new-style soldier disappeared from history. There was one
exception. The Iphicratean boots (see below) were Iphicrates' one lasting reform (though cf. Griffith, Studies
Edson, 163 f. and n. 11); that and the professionalism he applied to soldiering.
To conclude: D 15. 44 and Nepos, Iphicr. 1. 3f. derive from an Ephoran chapter on the military ability and
innovations of Iphicrates. But the Ephoran information was misunderstood by the 1st-century BC writers to whom
hoplites and peltasts were mere names. D certainly had little idea of what a peltast was; cf. 16. 24. 2.
( Best, 1969: 7, 102ff., does not believe in the reforms of
-345Iphicrates though he does believe ( ibid. 5ff.; Griffith, Studies Edson, 162f., agrees) that the approximate type of
spear-carrying 'peltast' described by D and Nepos had existed in Thrace since at least the time of Peisistratus;
Iphicrates merely made use of it. He bases this belief on a small number of Attic Late Archaic vase
representations of Thracian peltasts seemingly armed with single spears rather than twin javelins. None of the
vases, however, is later than c. 490. One might seriously question, therefore, whether these representations
constitute evidence for the peltasts of the 4th century. Best also fails to allow for the artistic licence of the vase
decorators which was considerable. As he himself notices the figures of spearmen on 5th-century vases later than
c. 490 which he identifies as peltasts carry hoplite shields, not peltai. And Lucian Necr. dial. 27. 3 is hardly
admissible as evidence. For Griffith, Studies Edson, 166, the only innovation connected with the Egyptian
campaign was the rearming of the mercenary hoplites with longer spears.)
44. 1. + + : the war for, not against, Persia. The latter is the natural meaning, but cf. Thuc.
1. 128. 3 2 , 'the Greeks' war', 'the war for Greece' (cf. HCT i ad loc.). 44. 2. :
'symmetrical' or 'of suitable or moderate proportions'. The word 'pelte' generally signified a small, light shield.
Such a shield was considered specifically Thracian. See Best, 1969: 3f.
44. 4. : This is probably D rather than Ephorus. The type of boot invented by Iphicrates survived
throughout antiquity so that D could well have been familiar with it in the ist century BC. Alciphron, Letters 3. 21
(Schepers and Loeb edns.), refers to . He is of the 2nd or 3rd century AD though the letters purport to
be of 4th-century Bc Athenians. Sallustius, a 5thcentury AD cynic philosopher, is said to have worn Iphicratid
boots (Photius from Damast. Vit. Isid. p. 1045); cf. Suidas s.v. ; Steph. Byz. S.V. .

45-46. The 'cold war' period, 375-373

See below for the chronology.
45. 1. :with the Egyptian campaign completed D, certainly following Ephorus' own
arrangement, takes up again Greek affairs which were interrupted at 40. 5.
-346What is said here rather confirms that disturbances occurred in 375/4 after the Peace of that year. The troubles
which now plagued Greece are those spoken of at 40. 1. Both Athens (now a coprostates of the Peace) and Sparta
exploited the unrest by backing their respective supporters in the cities. D goes on to exemplify his statement
with the instance of Zacynthus. This is hardly a postLeuctra situation. After Leuctra Athens no longer vied with
Sparta for support in the cities (see further 40 n.).
: 'because of the unaccustomed government (or constitution)'. Both the original King's Peace and its renewal in
375 were followed by disturbances as many cities broke away from Sparta, or as they attempted to do so while
switching from oligarchy to democracy. That was the picture painted by Ephorus and it is in sharp contrast to that
of Xenophon (see 5. 1-3; 40. 1-2 and nn.).
: as opposed to . This is almost certainly Ephoran. For Ephorus and the Common

Peace see p. 127.

45. 2. . . . : for chronological indications in Ephorus see Introd. n. 264. Just how brief was
the period of peace? About two years it would seem as peace was made probably in summer 375 and fighting was
resumed in autumn 373 (see the chronological excursus below).
It should be noted that there was not now as in 378 a formal proclamation (by Athens) that the Peace had been
broken by Sparta, and a declaration of war (29. 7). There was rather a gradual disintegration of the conditions of
Incidents during it
peace until Sparta and Athens found themselves fighting each other again in the Ionian
eventually led to a renewal of hostilities. It is not surprising that peace did not last. Athens, with her enlarged
Confederacy and her new position as co-prostates of the Peace, was no longer as timid as she had been, and it
may even be that she was more to blame for the fresh outbreak of war than Sparta. In 378 on the other hand
Sparta was clearly the guilty party (see 45. 4 n.). Ephorus at any rate did not on this occasion point the finger at
Sparta, but seems to have considered both cities responsible for the renewal of war.
-347 . . . : the text is obviously wrong as it stands. The exiles whom Timotheus received
were democrats as Zacynthus was under a pro-Spartan oligarchy at the time (see 45. 3 n.; X. H. 6. 2. 3).
Because of this Le Paulmier suggested a lacuna between and . If that is the case then a context must
be found for the statement that the demos, once in power, exiled all those who had ruled the island under the
Spartan epistasia. There is no real difficulty. The present passage should be seen in relation to 5. 1-3, i.e. to the
strifes of the years after the Peace of Antalcidas. Though these troubles were of the same nature and had the
same cause as those which followed the Peace of 375 (40 and n.), our passage belongs with the former because
of its date the exiled oligarchs were again in control and their democratic opponents themselves in exile when
Timotheus arrived on the scene in 375 before the Peace of that year. What did the missing text relate?
Presumably it told of the return of the oligarchs, perhaps with Spartan help (5. 2-3 n.), and of the subsequent
expulsion of the democrats. It is not impossible of course that the missing information is not the result of a
lacuna, but of D's telescoping technique.
: see 34. 4n.
45. 3. : there is no justification for the identification of Arcadia with the Nellus of Tod
123 (=Svt 257) lines 131ff. That entry is perhaps earlier than the conclusion of peace (it appears to be a spillover
from the front face of the inscription), while the occupation of Arcadia post-dates the Peace ( Cawkwell, 1963:
88). Still, the democrats at Nellus were almost certainly the same as those planted at Arcadia by Timotheus.
While still at Nellus they joined the Athenian Confederacy and were entered on the stele of the decree of
Aristoteles. Cf. Mitchel, 1981: 73 ff., who argues the same.
It is not clear whether the stronghold occupied was already called Arcadia or whether the exiles named it so. If
the latter then Dugani's thesis is strengthened (1979: 325ff.). He sees the name as an anti-Spartan slogan,
'Arcadia' alluding to a future free and democratic Arcadia. We have seen (40. 4n.) that there is a hint of Athenian
support for anti-Spartan movements in the Peloponnese. . . . : cf. X. H. 6. 2. 2. D neglects to
mention that Timotheus now withdrew to Athens.
-348Excursus: the chronology of the years 375-371
It is necessary at this point to deal with the chronology of the years 375-371. This is done under three broad headings:
(1) the Peace of 375/4; (2) the period of 'cold war' and the warfare of 373-371; (3) the date of Cleombrotus' dispatch
to Phocis and the election of Jason as tagos of Thessaly (this, it is argued, belongs after Leuctra, but it is discussed
here because of its association in Xenophon with Cleombrotus' expedition, and because it is, as a result, usually dated
in 375).
1. The Peace of 375/4
The precise date of the Peace of 375/4 is in dispute. Dates given to it vary from summer 375 to autumn 374 (cf.
Buckler, 1971b: 353 n. 4). The most likely date is summer 375 though the nature of the evidence cannot allow of
certainty. Two considerations have been advanced in favour of a 375 date.
(a) Timotheus' naval expedition to the Ionian Sea belongs to the summer of 375 (25. 1n.). He won the battle of
Alyzeia on the day of the feast of Scira, i.e. some time in June/July of the same summer (36. 5n.). It is possible that
the Peace was concluded on the day of the festival of the Synoecia (16 Hecatombaeon), i.e., sometime in July/Aug. (
Cawkwell, 1963: 90 n. 56 in conjunction with Jacoby, FGH iiib. 1. 523ff. Cawkwell's suggestion is convincing). But
July/Aug. 375 or 374? The latter year seems to be excluded by the fact that Timotheus would have found it very
difficult to winter in the west because of his severe shortage of money ( X. H. 5. 4. 66; cf. ps.-Arist. Econ. 1350a30;
Beloch, GG iii. 2. 234; Cawkwell, 1963: 89; Tuplin, 1984a: 564 n. 77. Some disagree; cf. e. g. Sealey, 1957: 102; id.,
1993: 285 n. 59). Hence peace was concluded about a month after Alyzeia, in middle or late summer 375.
(b) The second consideration adduced in support of a 375 date is unacceptable. It is based on Xenophon's
arrangement of his narrative of these events ( H. 5. 4. 63-6. 2. 1). Its best exponent is Cawkwell, 1963: 89 (and see
Buckler, 1971b: 358. Cawkwell, 1981b: 44 and n. 23 presents a modified view). As this part of the Hellenica is crucial
to this excursus, it is necessary to refute Cawkwell's (and Buckler's) arguments in detail.

Book 5 of the Hellenica appears to finish with the summer of 375

-349-

and with Timotheus in the Ionian Sea. Book 6 begins: ' + +.

+ , . There follows the
Phocian appeal to Sparta and the sending out of Cleombrotus. , Xenophon
continues, Polydamas of Pharsalus arrived at Sparta and requested help against Jason, unsuccessfully.
, Xenophon goes on (6. 2. 1) . . . . . .
IO . Cawkwell thinks that 'if the Peace were to fall in 374,
it would be necessary to stretch Xenophon's account uncomfortably'. The battle of Alyzeia, he believes, is
synchronized in Xenophon with the Theban successes in central Greece, Cleombrotus' dispatch to Phocis, the
appeal of Polydamas, and the Peace itself. 'Thus in view of his synchronisms there is no question of his account
spilling over into a new campaigning year. All this fits satisfactorily into 376 and 375.' Yet Xenophon's
synchronisms do not on the whole inspire one with confidence. Compare, for instance, 1. 1. 27 where he
synchronizes the exile of the Syracusan generals with the battle of Cyzicus which belongs in 410 while the exile of
the generals dates to 411, on the evidence of Thuc. 8. 85. 3 (see HCT v. ad loc.). Compare also 3. 2. 21 where he
synchronizes the Spartan war against Elis with the operations of Thibron and Dercylidas in Asia Minor, and 3. 3. 1
where Agis' death and Agesilaus' succession to the throne are misdated ( Cawkwell, 1976a: 63 n. 8, is himself
rightly sceptical of Xenophon's chronology).
Buckler argues from the evidence of Xenophon too. First he accepts the synchronism of the conclusion of peace
with the confrontation between Sparta and Thebes in Phocis ( 1971b: 353). Then he accepts the synchronism of
Timotheus' sojourn in the Ionian Sea with Cleombrotus' presence in Phocis (p. 354 ). Otherwise, he argues, 'Xen.
Hell. 6. 1. 17 makes no sense when he speaks of morai stationed near Sparta to be employed against Athenian
triereis' (p. 354 n. 10). But this is a weak argument surely for Leucas, Acarnania, and Cephallenia are, if anything,
further away from Laconia than Attica, and Corcyra is much further so. Thus, he postulates, 'if the Theban
invasion of Phocis can be dated with a fair degree of certainty . . . it would put us one step closer to ascertaining
the date of the peace treaty itself'. This he proposes to
-350-

do by dating the battle of Tegyra to which, he assumes, the Theban move against Phocis was a strategic follow-up.
Thus he passes from one fallacious argument to another for, granted that the battle of Tegyra was fought in the spring
(because of the high water level of lake Copais -- pp. 356 f.), but the spring of which year? Buckler opts for 375, but in
truth 376 would do just as well (Tegyra pre-dates the Peace, and 378 and 377, the years of Agesilaus' invasions of
Boeotia, should surely be excluded). As we cannot decide between 376 and 375, the rest of Buckler's argument
collapses: the operations in Phocis and western Boeotia cannot help with the dating of the Peace. (The analogy he
draws (p. 358 and n. 28) between Xenophon's phrase . . . + (6. 1. 1) and D's
+ = (37. 1) is counter-productive for this very common phrase in
D is useless for precise and often even for approximate dating. D's narrative here is broadly synchronistic and the
at 37. 1 roughly corresponds to the naval warfare of the two years 376 and 375.)
Buckler concludes by stressing 'two attractive features' of peace in 375. First, Timotheus did not have to stay in the
west over the winter. This is reasonable, as we have seen. But the second 'attractive' feature, that peace in 375 would
explain why the Spartans did not invade Boeotia then (they had only just arrived in Phocis and the Peace intervened),
is simply begging the question for we do not in fact know if Cleombrotus went to Phocis prior to the Peace of 375/4
(probably he did not; see section 3 of this excursus). It should be added further that even if the Theban victory at
Tegyra (which was exaggerated in the Thebans' favour; see 37. 1n.) were to be dated to spring 375, it would not
necessarily mean that Phocis was threatened in that year and before the Peace, for the evidence suggests that the
Spartan garrisons were not evacuated from Orchomenus and elsewhere in Boeotia till after the Peace.
To recapitulate: a (summer) 375 date for the Peace is probable, but only because of the necessity to have Timotheus
back home before the winter and not because of Xenophon's arrangement of his material.
-3512. The period of the 'cold way' and the warfare of 373-371 Cawkwell, 1963: 84 ff., appears correct in arguing on the
basis of Isocrates' Plataicus and against Xenophon Hellenica that hostilities were not resumed till autumn 373. X. H. 6.
2. 2ff. represents a very short-lived peace broken by Timotheus' interference in Zacynthus: two of the Athenian envoys
who had concluded the Peace had sailed directly () from Sparta to order Timotheus home; and directly (a second
) after the Zacynthians 'from the city' had complained to Sparta, the Spartans dispatched Mnasippus against
Corcyra. The Athenians responded by sending out Timotheus, and the war was on. We know from ps.-Demosth. 49. 6
that Timotheus sailed from Athens in Apr./May 373. Hence, according to Xenophon, Mnasippus must have attacked
Corcyra some time before that date and war broken out before the destruction of Plataea, destroyed
(Isocr. 14. 1, 5, 14). As this contradicts Isocrates and Paus. 9. 1. 8 (where the destruction of Plataea is dated to the
archonship of Asteius, 373/2), we had better assume that Xenophon is once more confused and turn to D for possible
illumination. Ps.-Demosth. 49. 22 provides a terminus ante quem for the Spartan attack on Corcyra: as Timotheus'
trial took place in Nov./Dec. 373, Mnasippus must already have been at Corcyra for some time; cf. section 13. The
period of peace cannot have been as brief as Xenophon represents for D provides a series of what can aptly be termed
'cold war' events leading up to Mnasippus' attack on Corcyra, and these events must be allowed a certain amount of
time to run their course. Xenophon's chronology is not saved even if the Peace is dated to 374 for he maintains that
Mnasippus sailed before Timotheus and this, as was just seen, contradicts ps.-Demosthenes 49, Isocrates, Pausanias,
and of course D. (For a defence of Xenophon's account see Gray, 1980: 315ff., but cf. Tuplin effective criticism of her
case, 1984a: 537ff.)It would help the discussion if D's events in 45. 2-47. 7 were tabulated:
1.
Timotheus lands exiles on Zacynthus (45. 3).
2.
Zacynthian oligarchs appeal to Sparta (45. 4).
3.
Spartan embassy to Athens (45. 4).

4.
5.

Aristocrates sent to Zacynthus (45. 4).

Oligarchic revolt on Corcyra (46. 1).
-352-

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Appeal to Sparta of Corcyraean oligarchs now in exile (46. 1).

Alcidas dispatched (46. 2).
Appeal to Athens of Corcyraean democrats (46. 3).
Athens votes to help Corcyra and Zacynthus.
(a) Ctesicles is sent to Zacynthus (46. 3).
(b) Naval preparations to aid Corcyra (46. 3).
(c) (Timotheus sails out but remains in the Aegean; cf. 47. 2 f.).
Mnasippus attacks Corcyra (47. 1).
Timotheus is relieved of his generalship (47. 3).
Great fleet prepared for Corcyra (47. 4).
Meanwhile, Ctesicles is sent to Corcyra (47. 4).
Ctesicles and the Corcyraeans defeat Mnasippus (47. 5f).
Athenian fleet arrives in the west (47. 7).

The most important observation to be made from D is that the sending out of Timotheus (9b+c) was not in response to
the expedition of Mnasippus (10) for the latter was not to sail for some months yet. This is correct as we have seen
above. The dispatch of Timotheus appears to have been a precautionary measure following the appeal of the
Corcyraeans (8) who believed themselves threatened by Alcidas (7). Both these naval expeditions (Alcidas and
Timotheus) belong to the 'cold war' period. A reasonable and probably correct assumption is that as Alcidas' expedition
proved a false alarm, Timotheus decided against hastening west and remained in the Aegean instead, acquiring more
ships and crews and no doubt money (47. 2 n.; X. H. 6. 2. 12).
Events 1-9 belong to the 'cold war' period. Events 3-7 and 9a are omitted by Xenophon, and 8 and 9b and c are
mistakenly set after 10, as we have seen. (If Athens indeed interfered in northern Peloponnese at this time then the
'cold war' incidents should be extended; see 40. 4n.) Events 9a and 13 do not represent a doublet in spite of the near
unanimity on the point amongst scholars, simply because the details given at 46. 3 and 47. 4 are different. We are
dealing with two separate events at two different times. The appeal of the Corcyraean demos to Athens for help
against the threat of Alcidas, real or supposed, seems to have been accompanied by an appeal by the Zacynthian
exiles. At any rate, the Athenians decided to succour both (46. 3). Ctesicles was sent to Zacynthus, presumably with
no troops as he was meant to lead the exiles, while a fleet was being prepared for Corcyra.
-353This fleet eventually sailed under Timotheus in spring 373 (ps.Demosth. 49. 6) and cruised in the Aegean over the
summer months finishing up at Calauria. By then, autumn 373, Mnasippus had arrived at and was besieging Corcyra
and the city seemed lost. In their chagrin the Athenians relieved Timotheus of his command and elected Iphicrates in
his place. While Iphicrates prepared over the winter of 373/2 the situation became desperate at Corcyra. Iphicrates
could not sail before spring 372 and until his fleet was ready; a temporary measure was therefore taken: a small force
was sent out to Corcyra to serve under Ctesicles who either went there directly from Zacynthus or, perhaps, from
Athens, having returned home by then (9a probably belongs to autumn, winter, or spring 375/4; 13 to autumn, winter,
or even spring 373/2).
There is no need therefore to suppose that we are faced with a doublet here. Sections 46. 3 and 47. 4 refer to different
occasions. What has led to the belief of a doublet is the fact that Xenophon first of all omits 9a (and really the entire
series of 'cold war' events), and secondly associates 13, which properly belongs after the investment of Corcyra, with
the fitting-out and dispatch of Timotheus' fleet in spring 373 which consequently belongs considerably earlier than the
expedition of Mnasippus. D's order concerning the expeditions of Timotheus and Mnasippus is undoubtedly correct, and
equally correct are the two tasks of Ctesicles: one came before the sailing of Mnasippus and concerned Zacynthus, the
other after the investment of Corcyra and was aimed at saving that city ( Beloch, GG iii. 1. 157, does not see 46. 3 and
47. 4 as a doublet either, but I cannot agree with his explanation).
The appeal to Sparta of the Zacynthian oligarchs (2) and the Spartan embassy to Athens (3) presumably followed not
long after Timotheus' action on Zacynthus (1). No dates are available for the attempted oligarchic coup at Corcyra (5)
and the expeditions of Aristocrates (4) and Alcidas (7). The fact that the Athenians apparently voted in favour of the
Corcyraean and Zacynthian democrats at the same time (9) argues for the near contemporaneity of the expeditions of
Aristocrates and Alcidas. Timotheus sailed in the spring of 373 with the considerable fleet of 60 triremes he had spent
some time preparing (46. 3), and consequently the Athenian psephisma may belong to autumn or winter 374/3.
-354-

Doubtless Ctesicles departed for Zacynthus at once as he had no preparations to make. We may therefore venture
to date the expedition of Aristocrates to the sailing season of 374 though it could belong as early as autumn 375
(the Zacynthian exiles may have defended themselves for some considerable while before Athens dispatched
Ctesicles). The expedition of Alcidas on the other hand was probably being prepared, or even just rumoured,
when the Corcyraeans appealed to Athens (cf. the events of 434/3: Thuc. 1. 31 ff.). Though Alcidas may have
sailed in the autumn of 374, he may belong as late as spring 373. The latter date is in fact preferable; Timotheus'
time-wasting in the Aegean is better explained perhaps on the assumption that he had heard that Alcidas had
avoided Corcyra and headed west (it is even possible that Alcidas' expedition never materialized).
The above is in perfect agreement with the suggestion that Aristocrates and Alcidas were the Spartan nauarchs
for the respective years 375/4 and 374/3: Beloch, GG ii. 2. 281, 289. Sealey, 1976: 355ff., on the other hand,
ignores the evidence of ps.-Demosth. 49. 6, Isocr. Plataicus, and Paus. 9. 1. 8, and persists in supporting

Xenophon's sequence against that of D. His thesis is that Spartan nauarchs assumed their command in the spring
(335 ff.), and that Mnasippus, therefore, being the nauarch for 373, attacked Corcyra in the spring of that year
and before Timotheus left the Piraeus. The contemporary Xenophon, he thinks, is correct when he maintains that
Mnasippus was already at Corcyra when Timotheus sailed. Furthermore, to set Mnasippus' expedition in spring
373 argues for 374 as the date of the Peace, for does not Xenophon explicitly say that very little time elapsed
between the Peace and the attack on Corcyra? Sealey is wrong and should be rejected for even if the nauarchs
entered upon their office in the spring (but cf. Stylianou, 1988: 467 n. 16), the case still remains that Corcyra was
attacked in the autumn of 373. That can only be changed if Isocr. Plataicus and Paus. 9. 1. 8 are dismissed, and
the authority of Xenophon is not weighty enough to justify such an action. So even if Mnasippus took up his
command in the spring, he did not proceed against Corcyra till the autumn, many months after Timotheus sailed.
The siege of Corcyra was probably pursued over the winter months (47. 1 n.). Sealey's thesis concerning the time
of the year the nauarchs assumed their command does not negate D's sequence, even if granted. For then we
have only to
-355assume that Mnasippus was nauarch from spring 373 to spring 372. From spring 375 to spring 374 Nicolochus
was nauarch (X. H. 5. 4. 65), and from spring 374 till spring 373 either Aristocrates or Alcidas. The one left out
could of course have commanded without the official title of nauarch; cf. my remarks on the Spartan nauarchy,
1988: 467f.
The Peace of 372/1 was concluded on 14 Scirophorion in the Attic year previous to that of the battle of Leuctra (
Plut. Ages. 28. 7), the year of the archon Alcisthenes (50. 1; Dion. Hal. Lys. 12), i.e. in June/July 371. The battle
of Leuctra was fought shortly afterwards at the beginning of the year of Phrasicleides, 371/0 (51. 1; Marm. Par.,
FGH239 A72; Plut. "Ages". 28.7; Cam. 19.4; Paus. 8. 27. 8). Xenophon says that the defeat was announced at
Sparta on the last day of the Gymnopaidiai (H. 6. 4. 16). The date of the battle is given as 5 Hecatombaeon, the
first month in the Attic calendar, by Plutarch at Ages. 28. 7, but as 5 Hippodromius, the eighth month in the
Boeotian calendar, at Cam. 19. 4. Pdech, 1972: 1 ff., seems correct therefore in reasoning that the date
according to the Attic calendar is nothing but a careless conversion by Plutarch himself of what presumably was
the traditional Boeotian date for the battle (5 Hippodromius was apparently a lucky day for Boeotians for two
great victories were won by them on that day: Cam. 19. 4). Greek calendars were in notorious disagreement with
each other ( Bickerman, 1968: 32f.) and Plutarch himself was aware of this ( Aristid. 19). Pdech is therefore
justified in taking scholars to task for reckoning exclusively according to the Attic calendar (e.g. Beister detailed
study, 1970: 59ff.). Pdech's own calculations, however, are unsatisfactory for he first supposes that the
Gymnopaidiai at Sparta coincided with (were a part of) the Karneia, and secondly he fails to suspect that the date
5 Hippodromius may not be a 'true' (and accurate) lunar date, but a modified one. And of course it is a mere
assumption that the Boeotian year began on the full and not on the new moon ( Plut. Pel. 24. 2 rather argues for
the latter). Thus his too precise Julian date for the battle, 18 Aug. 371, is highly suspect. We know very little
about the Gymnopaidiai and the Karneia, but it would appear that they were totally separate from each other in
spite of Bekker, Anecd. Gr. i. 234; see Nilsson, 1906: 140ff. (cf. RE vii. 2. 2087ff. Gomme, HCT iv. ad 5. 82.
2 :' the very day of the festival', is wrong. 'The very time of the festival' is
-356a correct translation for the Gymnopaidiai lasted for several days as shown by Thucydides' context (5. 82. 2f.)
and X. H. 6. 4. 16).
Suspect though Pdech's Julian date for the battle of Leuctra is, his enquiry has unwittingly cast doubt on another
aspect of the campaign -- the twenty-day period which Plutarch says intervened between the Peace and the battle
( Ages. 28. 7). It appears that Plutarch made his own calculation here by counting the days from 14 Scirophorion
(the date of the Peace) to 5 Hecatombaeon (the date of the battle). While the Peace was probably enough
concluded on 14 Scirophorion, the date of the battle as we have seen was 5 Hippodromius (Boeotian calendar),
not 5 Hecatombaeon, and so the generally accepted twenty-day period should be rejected (and Beister's careful
calculations on the basis of this interval, 1970: 13ff., reconsidered). About all this, and more, see also now Tuplin,
1987: 77 ff.
The capture of Plataea belongs to the second half of the summer of 373. Paus. 9. 1. 8 dates it to the year of
Asteius, 373/2, and says that it was in the third year before that of the battle of Leuctra. From Isocr. Plataicus we
know that there was still peace at the time, and Mnasippus' attack on Corcyra therefore must have occurred not
earlier than autumn 373 (see beginning of part 2). The fact that D places the destruction of Plataea under 374/3
is of no importance for under that year is found the entire narrative from the incident on Zacynthus down to the
successes of Iphicrates in the Ionian Sea in 372. What is of significance, however, is D's (Ephorus') sequence. The
destruction of Plataea and the subjection of Thespiae (46. 4-6) are inserted between the sailing of Timotheus
which we know belongs to spring 373 (46. 3; 47. 2), and the attack on Corcyra (47. 1). We may as well allow D's
statement that Thespiae was subjected after the capture of Plataea. Isocr. 14. 9 is no evidence that the reverse is
true for Thespiae could have been coerced into joining the Boeotian Confederacy between the destruction of
Plataea and the time of the speech. According to Isocrates Tanagra too was subjected at this time.

3. The date of Cleombrotus' dispatch to Phocis,

and the election of Jason as tagos of Thessaly
At the time of the peace negotiations of 372/1 at Sparta, Cleombrotus was in Phocis with an army. This much is
clear (X. H. 6. 4. 2; cf. Plut. Ages. 28. 5). The date of Cleombrotus' dispatch
-357to the north, however, is a matter which has not been satisfactorily settled. At H. 5. 4. 63 Xenophon states that

for two consecutive years, 376 and 375, the Theban territory remained free from invasion. As a result the
Thebans marched . . . . The obvious meaning of this is
that the Thebans were busy capturing the towns in the proximity of Thebes (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 237; Thespiae is
described as one of the at H. 5. 4. 46). Yet shortly afterwards Xenophon asserts that the Thebans
+ , (H. 6. 1. 1). So there can be little doubt
that to Xenophon's mind at least the Boeotian cities had at this time, i.e. shortly before the Peace of 375, come
under the sway of Thebes. Threatened, the Phocians appealed to Sparta and Cleombrotus was sent forth with four
Lacedaemonian morai and the corresponding contingents of the allies, i.e. two-thirds of the total field forces of the
Peloponnesian League. This happened just before the conclusion of the Peace of 375 according to Xenophon (H. 6.
2. 1). He does not tell us what became of Cleombrotus after the Peace, and in fact the king is not heard of again
till after the conclusion of the Peace of 372/1 when we suddenly hear that the king is still in Phocis. 'Still' because
certainly that is the impression one derives from Xenophon. Scholars have questioned his account on the following
grounds.
First, Cleombrotus must have been recalled after the Peace of 375 along with all the Spartan garrisons in Boeotian
towns. Secondly, the king could not in any case have stayed in Phocis with two-thirds of the Peloponnesian levy
for some four years. Thirdly, if he was still in Phocis in 373 when Plataea was destroyed and Thespiae subjected
(see above), why did he not intervene? One way out of this difficulty is to assume (with e.g. Meyer, GdA v. 397f.,
and Tuplin, 1993: 185) that Cleombrotus was indeed withdrawn after the Peace of 375, but sent back some time
before Leuctra, and Xenophon has neglected to tell us so. The objections to this view appear formidable, while
Beloch's alternative suggestion is attractive. He suggests ( GG iii. 2. 236ff.) that it is not possible that Phocis was
threatened before the Peace of 375 when Thespiae, Plataea, and evidently Tanagra too, not to mention
Orchomenus, were held by Spartan garrisons (Isocr. 14. 13f.; Plut. Pel. 15f.). The garrisons were withdrawn as a
result of the Peace of 375, and it was then that Thebes saw and seized her
-358chance. Beloch is therefore unable to accept that Phocis was threatened twice, both times before a Peace, and
that it was twice saved by Cleombrotus. He concludes that there was but one Spartan expedition, in 371 when
Phocis was seriously threatened, and that Xenophon has made a mistake in placing these events before the Peace
of 375; they belong before the Peace of 372/1. I am inclined to agree. From a close look at Xenophon it emerges
that the Spartan army defeated at Leuctra had not been out for more than a year, and that there was no
expedition to Phocis prior to the Peace of 375. H. 6. 4. 17 leaves little doubt that not more than months separate
it from the and expedition referred to in the passage, certainly not more than a year in view of
those men who had been left behind on + + (annual magistracies) and who were now (a few days
after Leuctra) ordered out. Of course, this still leaves open the possibility that there was a previous expedition in
375, but Xenophon's own information at H. 5. 4. 59-63 seems to exclude this.
After Cleombrotus' failure to invade Boeotia in spring 376 there was discontent amongst the Spartan allies and at
their meeting at Sparta the feeling was that they 'could man far more ships than were available to Athens and
could starve her into submission; the same ships could be used to transport an army across to Thebes by
whichever route they preferred, either through Phocis or through Creusis' (section 60. Warner's translation). And
indeed a strong fleet was manned and Athens was blockaded. The battle of Naxos followed (section 61). 'Next the
Spartans made preparations for transporting an army across the gulf to invade Boeotia, but the Thebans asked
the Athenians to send a force round the Peloponnese. They calculated that, if this were done, it would be
impossible for the Spartans + , + ,
(section 62). The Athenians obliged. Timotheus was sent to the Ionian
Sea with sixty triremes. The result was, Xenophon emphasizes, that 'there was no enemy invasion of Theban
territory either in the year when Cleombrotus was in command of the army ( 376) or in the year when Timotheus
sailed round the Peloponnese' ( 375 -- section 63).
It might be objected that a Spartan army nevertheless did reach Phocis though it failed to enter Boeotia. But this
would be an illogical objection to raise for, if a major Spartan army could have
-359reached Phocis, it could have reached Boeotia too and, what is more, it would have wanted to do so (cf. section
60). The whole point, as Xenophon says, was to get together a sufficient number of troops and transport them
across the gulf, and the Spartans did not succeed in doing so in 375 because of Timotheus' threatening presence
in the Ionian Sea. There was no Spartan expedition to Phocis in 375, therefore, and something is very seriously
wrong with H. 6. 1. 1-6. 2. 1, as indeed something is seriously wrong with H. 6. 2. 2ff., as we have seen. (Tuplin,
who considers such a view to be 'a gross misestimation of Hellenica' ( 1993: 185), does not explain how
Cleombrotus could have reached Phocis in 375.)
When was Jason elected tagos of Thessaly? In Xenophon, the appeal of Polydamas to Sparta is certainly
chronologically linked to the expedition of Cleombrotus to Phocis. How else should +
at H. 6. 1. 2 be understood? Xenophon therefore has misplaced both. But even if Polydamas' appeal is
kept distinct from Cleombrotus' expedition, that does not mean that it is correctly dated by Xenophon (as Sordi,
1958: 170ff., and Cawkwell, 1981b: 44 and n. 23, think). The speech of Polydamas itself (H. 6. 1. 4ff.) is not
particularly illuminating, chronologically speaking, though section 10 would appear to point to 375 rather than
371: early in 375 Jason may not yet have become the ally of Athens, but by autumn 373 the two were certainly
allied (ps.-Demosth. 49. 10) so that section 10 makes no sense in a 371 context even if Jason had ceased to be
an ally by then. However, it is usually forgotten (even by Cawkwell, 1981b: 44 and n. 23) that the speech is
Xenophon's, not Polydamas', and composing it some twenty years after the events Xenophon was all too likely to
throw together disparate elements of different dates.
Nor can section 17 help (pace Sordi, 1958: 171) for the statement + 0311 +
0311 + 0311 , can
apply equally to 375 as to 372/1. If to 372/1 then the morai abroad would be those with Cleombrotus. If to 375,

the one or two morai on guard duty in Boeotian cities are sufficient to explain the expression .
One mora was certainly on garrison duty at Orchomenus before the Peace of 375, and Polydamas' appeal might
have coincided with the relief of that garrison by a fresh mora (37. 1 n.). In any case Xenophon is vague enough
for even one mora abroad to justify his expression.
-360Lastly, the date of Polydamas' appeal is not necessarily the date of Jason's election, and the inconsistency
between D and Xenophon may be less severe. Xenophon apparent date of 375 (or shortly thereafter) for Jason
tageia is generally accepted (cf. most recently Tuplin, 1993: 207 ff.). A notable exception is Beloch who prefers to
bring down to 372/1 both Cleombrotus' expedition to Phocis and Jason's election (GG iii. 2. 237). Xenophon's date
is undermined by an examination of his own text. First, the synchronisms at H. 6. 1. 1 f. are very questionable as
we have seen (part 1). Second, H. 6. 1. 2-19 is a digression involving probably a considerable jump forward in
time. , , he concludes at H. 6. 1. 19. The next time
he takes up Thessalian affairs he makes a considerable jump forward from 371 to 358 (H. 6. 4. 27ff.), and he
concludes at H. 6. 5. 1 with almost the same words as at H. 6. 1. 19. It may be that the leap forward at H. 6. 1.
2-19 is represented only by sections 18-19, or it may be that the whole belongs later and it has been misplaced
by Xenophon. If we look at H. 6. 4. 20-37 we see that sections 20-6, where others than Thessalians are involved
(it is a Hellenica narrative as it were), are part of the normal narrative, whereas sections 27-37, being a
Thessalica (see H. 6. 5. 1-), leave the rest of the narrative behind and go forward in time till we reach
the year 358. Hence the remark at H. 6. 5. 1 to warn the reader that he is returning to the proper narrative-- the
immediate aftermath of Leuctra. Similarly, it is perfectly possible to argue that H. 6. 1. 2-18 belongs to 375 while
sections 18-19 stretch over the years 375-371. Thus, even if we accept that Polydamas' appeal has not been
misplaced by Xenophon, the recognition of Jason as tagos does not have to pre-date the Peace of 375 and it could
belong as late as 371.
This being the case it becomes legitimate to ask, why does Jason's election to the tageia have to be before
Leuctra? ( Tuplin various suggestions, 1993: 209, do not amount to anything very much.) We have no other
evidence but that of Xenophon and D, and with Xenophon's largely discredited D's comes into its own. The fact
that D sets Jason's recognition under 370/69 is of no importance (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 238). But what he has to
say about it is, and it cannot be lightly dismissed. At 57. 2 Jason is seen increasing his power. The time I take to
be the immediate aftermath of Leuctra, i.e. 371. (X. H. 6. 27, where the capture of
-361Heracleia in Trachis is also mentioned, provides additional confirmation.) Then 57. 3-59. 4 deals with
Peloponnesian affairs concluding with Agesilaus' campaign in Arcadia in winter 370. The Thessalian narrative is
then resumed (60. 1). Jason is now offering to the Thessalians the hegemony of Greece. (It is possible that 60. 12 echoes an actual propaganda manifesto of Jason; cf. Westlake, 1935: 96.) He stresses that 'the
Lacedaemonians had sustained a great disaster at Leuctra; that the Athenians laid claim to the mastery of the sea
only; that the Thebans were unworthy of first rank; and that the Argives had been brought low by civil wars and
internecine slaughter' (Sherman's translation). It is important to observe that the context is a post- and not a
pre-Leuctra one -Sparta has been toppled and the agon for a new hegemon is on (the slaughter at Argos is the
skytalismos related at 57. 3-58). , D continues, + ,
. For hegemon we should read tagos, the latter term in fact not being used
by any other author except Xenophon. Pace Tuplin, 1993: 208f., there can be no doubt whatsoever about this.
+ in the Thessalian context (cf. 60. 5, + ) points indubitably to the tageia of
Thessaly. Hegemon in any case was the correct nonThessalian term to use for what the office of tagos amounted
to, for traditionally tagoi were appointed by common consent to pursue some national enterprise, or to deal with
some danger ( Robertson, 1976: 104ff.), and there could be no greater enterprise than the hegemony of Greece.
This is highlighted by D's words, + , which should be seen in connection with X.
H. 6. 1. 19-- the military preparations of Jason immediately after his election.
There is no reason, therefore, to reject the evidence of D. On the contrary it makes good sense whether on its
own or even in combination with the details supplied by Xenophon. On his return from Leuctra the powerful ruler
of Pherae was indeed + (X. H. 6. 4. 28; cf. Westlake, 1935: 95ff., who, however, preferring the
usual date for the tageia, interprets D 60. 1-2 differently), and he became even greater when he appealed to the
patriotism of his fellow Thessalians and was elected tagos. It was in the immediate afterglow of this success that
he set in motion the great preparations for holding the Pythian festival of 370.
The following dates of the period 375-371 may therefore be
-362considered as certain or at least as reasonable and in their proper order:

Mid-/late summer 375

Peace of
375/4.

Timotheus
lands exiles
on
Zacynthus.

Zacynthian
oligarchs
appeal to
Sparta.

Spartan
embassy to
Athens.

Autumn/spring/summer
375/374

Aristocrates
to
Zacynthus.

Failed
oligarchic
coup at
Corcyra.

Summer/winter 374

Appeal to
Sparta of
Corcyraean
oligarchs now
in exile.

Autumn 374/spring 373

Alcidas sent
out.

Autumn/winter 374/373

Appeal to
Athens of
Corcyraean
demos.

Ctesicles
sent to
Zacynthus.

Naval
preparations
to aid
Corcyra.

April/May 373

Timotheus
sails out.

Late summer/early
autumn 373

Plataea
destroyed.

Autumn 373

Minasippus
attacks
Corcyra.

Timotheus
relieved of
his
command.

Autumn/winter 373/372

Athenian
fleet
prepared for
Corcyra.

Autumn 373

Ctesicles
sent to
Corcyra.

Spring 372

Ctesicles
and the
Corcyraeans
defeat
Mnasippus.

Iphicrates in
the Ionian
Sea.

Autumn/spring 372/371

Cleombrotus
in Phocis.

June/JulY 371

Peace of
372/1.

July/August 371

Battle of
Leuctra.

Jason tagos
of Thessaly.

371/370 (after Leuctra)

45. 4. . . . : X. H. 6. 2. 3 mentions no such embassy, but says that the Spartans sent out
Mnasippus against Corcyra as soon as the Zacynthians 'from the city' complained to them. As was seen, the whole
series of events which led to the fresh outbreak of war is missing from Xenophon (Excursus at 45. 3, part 2). The
result is that the reader is left puzzled. The troublespot, Xenophon assures us, was Zacynthus. But Zacynthus did
not warrant the great armament of Mnasippus that we are suddenly faced with in his account, and Xenophon in
fact is clear that the Spartan objective was Corcyra.
-363M + ' (Zacynthus perhaps) (H. 6. 2. 4). Far better sense is made
of the undertaking if D's information is taken into consideration. Cawkwell, 1963: 88, rightly cautions against
Xenophon here, though to deny that Zacynthus was a casus belli is to oversimplify things: Zacynthus was one of
two (or more; see 40. 4n.) incidents which led again to war.
+ : Timotheus' landing of the exiles on Zacynthus has always baffled scholars. The Athenian
general had had severe financial difficulties and at one point it seems his men had come close to mutiny (X. H. 5.
4. 66; ps. -Arist. Econ. 1350a30). One would have thought that he would have been glad to receive news of the
Peace and his orders to return home. So what was he doing acting as irresponsibly as a Sphodrias and providing
Athens and Sparta with a new source of friction? This is indeed a puzzle and Beloch cannot be blamed for
considering Timotheus guilty of the resumption of hostilities ( GG iii. 1. 156 n. 3). Elsewhere he even calls
Timotheus' action a breach of the Peace ( GG iii. 2. 236). Sealey ( 1957: 106, 111) argues much the same. But
the matter is less simple.
It is just possible that there was a clause about exiles in the Peace (5. 1n.). If that be the case then Timotheus far
from breaking the Peace was actually implementing it by assisting the exiles to return. The fact that Sparta
opposed their return does not necessarily argue against such a clause, for the democratic exiles may have been
branded as + , , and/or by their enemies, and as such they would have been
outside the Peace. The Athenians on the other hand may have considered them as simple political exiles and thus
supported them. But, an exiles clause or not, the Athenians would have based their support on other grounds too.
They would have helped the exiles in the first instance because these democrats, a substantial section of the
Zacynthian population, were their allies and in fact belonged to their Confederacy (45. 3 n.). A Common Peace
had just been concluded which promised freedom and autonomy to everyone. Why should not the exiles (who had
perhaps sworn to the Peace too; cf. X. H. 6. 3. 19) be allowed to return? Timotheus would have felt a personal
obligation to help too. The democrats had not fought with him for the glory of it, but doubtless because they
counted on him to aid their return. He and Athens may even have promised
-364them that. Also, the exiles may have based a demand for help on the fact of their membership of the Athenian
Confederacy (cf. Svt 257=Tod 123 lines 46ff.; Svt 263 =Tod 127). All of this taken together with the new,
elevated position of Athens vis--vis Sparta and the Peace, may have encouraged the Athenians to ignore the
Spartan protests and to stand by Timotheus' action. Athens' coprostasia of the Peace appears to have been
broadly divided on the basis of land and sea hegemony, the Spartans predominating in the former, the Athenians
in the latter, and Athens therefore may have felt that the enforcement of the Peace in the Ionian Sea was her
concern and not Sparta's (for the co-prostasia of the Peace see 38. 4 and n.).
+ : D often uses this word in the loose sense of 'help' though frequently help within the framework
of an alliance; cf. 12. 81. 5; 13. 34. 4; 13. 38. 6; 13. 61. 1; 15. 47. 2. The Spartans may have felt that they had
both a moral and a legal obligation to act in defence of the 'autonomy' of one of their allies for Sparta was still a
prostates of the Peace albeit jointly with Athens now. We do not hear whether they based their action on the
Peace; probably they did.
46. 1. + : the oligarchic revolt, not mentioned by any other source, failed before the appeal to
Sparta of the oligarchs for the Spartans hoped to capture the city (46. 2; 47. 1; chronological excursus
at 45. 3, part 2). Hence Beloch, GG iii. 1. 157, is incorrect. Corcyra appears to have joined the Athenian
Confederacy against the opposition of the people who now attempted a coup (36. 5n.). I see no reason for
deducing from X. H. 5. 4. 64 (as Tuplin, 1984a: 562, seems inclined to do) that democracy at Corcyra post-dated
the admission of the island to the Athenian League. For Xenophon's comment see 36. 5n. : cf. Thuc. 1.
36. 1f. with HCT i ad 1. 36. 2; X. H. 6. 2. 9.
46. 2. : perhaps Alcidaswas sailing to Sicily (15. 1n.) and the Spartans thought of killing two
birds with one stone. Or possibly Alcidas was only sailing to Sicily and the Corcyraeans misunderstood the Spartan
intentions. If he did sail to Sicily, he did not remain there indefinitely for his twenty-two ships probably formed
part of Mnasippus' fleet. See also 47. 1n.
46. 3. : Athens had pledged herself to render
-365the utmost possible assistance to the Corcyraean demos ( Svt 263=Tod 127). Her obligation would have been

heightened by her role as co-prostates of the Peace. + : D is certainly wrong at 51. 4 and 62. 1
and perhaps at 47. 4 where he uses . But he is not wrong here; see the chronological excursus at 45. 3,
part 2. : according to X. H. 6. 2. 10 though one Hellenica MS reads N. Ctesicles is a much
more common name in Athens than Stesicles, and he could thus be identical with the general of Lysias 9. 6 (see
PA s.v.; Develin, 243f.).

46. 4-6. The destruction of Plataea

46. 4. . . . : whether Plataea (re-established by Sparta after the King's Peace: 5. 2-3
n.) petitioned Athens for an alliance requesting military protection (which she sorely needed after the departure of
the Spartan garrison) and further promising to hand herself over to Athens, as D says, is not known from any
other source though it is quite credible. But would Athens in her current need of Thebes have been willing to take
such a course of action? It is possible, and the Thebans at least feared so, if D is to be believed. We hear at any
rate that shortly before this date Athens had stood up to Thebes in the case of Oropus (38. 3n.). Isocr. 14. 26
makes the Plataeans say that they were destroyed twice because of their friendship for Athens, and X. H. 6. 3. 1
too speaks of friendship between Athens and Plataea at this time. It is possible of course that D misunderstood an
Ephoran comment on Plataea's long record of loyalty to Athens; but see 46. 6n. ad . The appeal for help
must, to some extent, have been based on the Peace (cf. 5. 1n.). For Plataean suspicions of Thebes which were
soon realized see Paus. 9. 1. 5.
: the Boeotian Confederacy was now, before the outbreak of war, (still?) in existence; see. 38.
3n.
46. 5. : Paus. 9. 1. 6f. supplies a little more information about what happened. The attack was
sudden like the more famous one which introduced the Peloponnesian War, and it caught the Plataeans off their
guard.
: the Thebans were less generous according to Paus. 9. 1. 7 who says that the Plataeans were allowed to
depart, the men with one garment each, the women with two.
-366-

46. 6. + : cf. Isocr. 14. 1, 7, etc.; X. H. 6. 3. 1, 5; Paus. 9. 1. 8.

+ : 'they pillaged'. Thespiae, another Boeotian city invariably hostile to Thebes, was forced at this
time to join the Boeotian Confederacy (chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 2). In 423 its walls had been pulled down
by Thebes (Thuc. 4. 133. 1) and this is what may have happened now too; Isocr. 14. 19, 35,
/ , possibly refers to Thespiae. These last walls had been rebuilt or strengthened by Agesilaus in
summer 378 so that the city could serve as a base against Thebes (27. 4n.). X. H. 5. 4. 41 writes , but
Thespiae must have possessed some makeshift fortification already early in 378 when Sphodrias was left there by
Cleombrotus. But the city wall had probably not been properly rebuilt since 423.
Paus. 9. 13. 8 says that the Thespians were present at Leuctra on the Theban side albeit unwillingly; they were allowed
to depart before the battle (cf. Polyaen. 2. 3. 3). After the battle, fearing reprisals, the Thespians occupied a
stronghold near their city from which they were ejected by Epaminondas (Paus. 9. 14. 1-4). This is perhaps an
indication that their city had indeed had its walls dismantled in 373. (It was dioecized, Tuplin suggests: Athenaeum, 64
( 1986), 321 ff.) And it was probably at this time, after Leuctra, that Thespiae was razed to the ground and its people
driven away (Demosth. 16. 4). Some at least were received at Athens ( Aristid. Panath. 59 (180 Dind.)); cf. X. H. 6. 3.
1, + , but anachronistically, for Xenophon cannot be right when he speaks of the destruction of
Thespiae before Leuctra ( may indeed be interpreted: 'leur ville n'est plus une cit, mais une simple +
du territoire thbain; ils n'ont donc plus aucun droit civique ni par consquent aucun rle politique' -- Roesch, 1965:
45. But + at H. 6. 3. 5 and the association of Thespiae and Plataea leave little doubt that Xenophon erroneously
considered Thespiae to have been destroyed before Leuctra).
: cf. Aristid. Panath. 59 + . : known chiefly from the Hellenistic period, this
institution had deeper roots. The term itself was in use in both literature and inscriptions by the late 4th century at the
latest. It occurs in Arist. F 575 Rose (from Photius). It is unnecessary to regard this as an anachronism on the part of
the excerptor, for
-367-

similar terms such as + were used in inscriptions already early in the 4th century ( Gawantka, 1975: 166
n. 7), while isopoliteia itself is found in two Milesian decrees of the time of Alexander ( Gawantka, 1975: nos. 19,
21). An early 4th-century inscription from Cyrene speaks of (ML 5 line 12). Strabo 9 C 404 mentions
isopoliteia in a quotation from Philochorus ( FGH 328 F113), a younger contemporary of Aristotle. The passage is
confused it is true ( Gawantka, 1975: 93 n. 7), but there is no reason to deny that the term derives from
Philochorus. D's use of the word here may be the earliest known instance of it in literature if its Ephoran origin is
conceded (as it is not by Kahrstedt, 1934: 78 n. 5, 86 n. 2, and Gawantka, 1975: 178 n. 31a. Kahrstedt suggests
that D incorrectly wrote isopoliteia instead of isoteleia).
The institution of isopoliteia anticipated the term. For its history in the 6th and 5th centuries see Gawantka, 1975:
165 ff. A possible case of isopoliteia early in the 4th century (not dealt with by Gawantka) is the 'union' of Argos
and Corinth ( Griffith, 1950: 247f.). Of relevance here is the isopoliteia granted to the Plataeans by Athens in the
5th century. According to Thuc. 3. 55. 3 the Plataeans defending themselves before the Spartan judges in the

summer of 427 claimed to be allies as well as citizens of Athens. In their speech the Thebans repeated the
Plataean claim (Thuc. 3. 63. 2). Thus, while Plataea still stood, its people had been admitted, potentially at least,
to the Athenian citizenship. The case of isopoliteia seems plain (see Gomme, HCT ii. 339 f. Contra Gawantka,
1975: 174ff., who rejects Thucydides as incompatible with ps.Demosth. 59. 104-6 and Isocr. 12. 92-4. But he
agrees that Thucydides was aware of the institution of isopoliteia though not the term).
At the destruction of Plataea the next step was taken of admitting the Plataeans in fact to the citizenship. The
psephisma quoted at ps.-Demosth. 59. 104 therefore is the further enactment which in 427 fulfilled the original
offer, and provisional acceptance, of potential citizenship referred to by Thucydides. We may compare the similar
case of the Samians (ML 94 lines 12ff., 32ff.; Tod 97). Yet the Plataeans appear to have remained a distinct body
in Athens, no doubt in the hope that they would eventually be restored to their country ( Gomme, HCT ii. 339f.).
When in 420 they were settled in the territory of Scione (Thuc. 5. 32. 1) they
-368probably reverted to their previous (pre-427) condition of +. (For the frequent
combination of or and in Hellenistic times see Larsen, 1966b: 53; Gawantka, 1975:
146.)
This, one may venture to suggest, is what happened after the King's Peace too, when Plataea was reconstituted
by Sparta, though the symmachia may have lapsed then and been replaced by simple friendship (Isocr. 14. 26;X.
H. 6. 3. 1). And as Athens did not perhaps approve of the Spartan refoundation of Plataea, those Plataeans who
returned may no longer have been isopolitai; but they were once more granted this privilege when they again fled
to Athens following the second destruction of their city. So D may not be so wide of the mark (and anachronistic)
when he says (46. 4) that in 373 the Plataeans were + and that they were
granted isopoliteia when they fled to Athens.
+ : for Ephorus' attitude to Athens see pp. 115ff.

47. The outbreak of war. The siege of Corcyra

47.1. : in fact a nauarch: see 34. 4n.
: 60 according to X. H. 6. 2. 3.
: X. H. 6. 2. 5 agrees though he says that they were mercenaries and that they were in
addition to Mnasippus' Lacedaemonian troops; cf. X. H. 6. 2. 18. The mercenaries were hoplites as Anderson,
1970: 307 n. 67, correctly observes.
: see 46. 1n. If Sparta based her action on the Peace, she did so with far less justification than in
the case of Zacynthus. She was supporting exiles (guilty of an attempted coup) against the recognized
government of Corcyra which had taken the oaths to the Peace.
: for the topography of Corcyra see Dontas, 1965: 139ff. (map facing 144), and id.,
Praktika ( 1965), 66ff., and (1966), 85ff., for the archaeological reports on the excavations of 1965 and 1966.
Also Kalligas, 1980: 81ff. The ancient city occupied the peninsula of Palaiopolis (now Analepsis) as far south as
Cape Canoni ( Gomme topography, HCT ii. 370ff., which is based on that of Schmidt, 1890, must be rejected.
-369probably reverted to their previous (pre-427) condition of +. (For the frequent
combination of or and in Hellenistic times see Larsen, 1966b: 53; Gawantka, 1975:
146.)
This, one may venture to suggest, is what happened after the King's Peace too, when Plataea was reconstituted
by Sparta, though the symmachia may have lapsed then and been replaced by simple friendship (Isocr. 14. 26;X.
H. 6. 3. 1). And as Athens did not perhaps approve of the Spartan refoundation of Plataea, those Plataeans who
returned may no longer have been isopolitai; but they were once more granted this privilege when they again fled
to Athens following the second destruction of their city. So D may not be so wide of the mark (and anachronistic)
when he says (46. 4) that in 373 the Plataeans were + and that they were
granted isopoliteia when they fled to Athens.
+ : for Ephorus' attitude to Athens see pp. 115ff.

47. The outbreak of war. The siege of Corcyra

47.1. : in fact a nauarch: see 34. 4n.
: 60 according to X. H. 6. 2. 3.

 : X. H. 6. 2. 5 agrees though he says that they were mercenaries and that they were in
addition to Mnasippus' Lacedaemonian troops; cf. X. H. 6. 2. 18. The mercenaries were hoplites as Anderson,
1970: 307 n. 67, correctly observes.
: see 46. 1n. If Sparta based her action on the Peace, she did so with far less justification than in
the case of Zacynthus. She was supporting exiles (guilty of an attempted coup) against the recognized
government of Corcyra which had taken the oaths to the Peace.
: for the topography of Corcyra see Dontas, 1965: 139ff. (map facing 144), and id.,
Praktika ( 1965), 66ff., and (1966), 85ff., for the archaeological reports on the excavations of 1965 and 1966.
Also Kalligas, 1980: 81ff. The ancient city occupied the peninsula of Palaiopolis (now Analepsis) as far south as
Cape Canoni ( Gomme topography, HCT ii. 370ff., which is based on that of Schmidt, 1890, must be rejected.
-369victory at Alyzeia, having had refitted his own ships and manned others from Corcyra, he had no more than just
over 70 (X. H. 5. 4. 66). In 372 Iphicrates brought 70 triremes west. He captured 10 Sicilian, and, the
Corcyraeans having doubtless made their contribution, his fleet numbered about go (X. H. 6. 2. 14, 33, 35, 38). It
would appear that Corcyra, like the rest of Greece, was not what it had been in the 5th century. If the normal
Athenian fleet of the 4th century was less than half the strength of the normal 5th-century fleet, then the
Corcyraean navy cannot have been in a healthier state and the above figures tell us that it was not. Whereas at
the beginning of the Peloponnesian War Corcyra had 110 or 120 triremes (Thuc. 1. 29. 4; 47. 1), it is doubtful if it
had more than 20 or 30 at this time. No wonder therefore the Corcyraeans did not venture out to face Mnasippus;
they were not up to it. Xenophon says as much: + + (H. 6.
2. 8). As for his statement that + + (H.
6. 2. 9), it must be remembered that these are the Corcyraean envoys speaking in Athens, and in any case the
statement may be correct, but in the context of the 4th century. Isocr. 15. 109, K . . .
, is hardly credible. Isocrates was either thinking in 5th-century terms, or he was reflecting
Corcyraean boasting at Athens. Also, it served the eulogy of Timotheus to exaggerate.
47. 2. . . . : the preparations mentioned at 46. 3 completed, Timotheus sailed out in the
spring of 373. We are now in the autumn of the same (Julian) year and the sentence looks back to Timotheus'
spring sailing; see chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 2.
: X. H. 6. 2. 11 gives the same figure, as does ps.Demosth. 49. 11. Allied ships were included amongst
the 60: ibid. , sections 14ff.
+ : denotes time here, 'before'. The urgency or non-urgency of the Corcyraean
situation apart, Timotheus had other reasons for remaining in the Aegean for the time being (ps.-Demosth. 49.
6ff.). I do not see that D's phraseology supports Cargill thesis ( 1981: 72) about the nature of the relationship
between Athens and Corcyra. 'Before sailing out in aid of the Corcyraean allies of Athens' is the meaning.
47. 2-4, 7. : though errors and confusions
-371are not rare in D, this is one of two grotesque muddles in Book 15. The other is the campaign and battle of
Leuctra. Ephorus is certainly not to blame for either (on Leuctra see 51. 3 and 54. 5-56nn.). The simplest and
probably correct explanation for both muddles is that D, after a hasty and careless reading of the lengthy and
complicated narratives of Ephorus which included digressions (see p. 123 ), put aside his source and wrote his
own brief account; ludicrous confusion ensued.
Ephorus treated Timotheus favourably (p. 119). We would expect him to have stressed at some length the man's
services to Athens (as Isocr. 15. 107ff. does), and to have said as little as possible, and that in an apologetic vein,
about his removal from office and trial. D mentions the first, but not the second. Isocrates also does not mention
the 373 trial though he does, briefly, that of 357 ( ibid. 129 ). Ephorus may have digressed to relate that
Timotheus was again, some years later, re-elected general, and this might explain D's statement that
+ + (47. 3). That Timotheus was not restored to his command,
but was tried, acquitted (though disgraced), and then sailed to serve the King, is clear from ps.Demosth. 49; cf.
X. H. 6. 2. 13. What then of the sailing to Thrace and the new allies and ships? It was seen above (30. 2n.) that
eulogists of Timotheus tended to speak collectively, and not necessarily truthfully, of his services to Athens. I am
inclined to see the present information as a confused rendering of an Ephoran passage on T imotheus' successes
in Thrace in the later 360s. (Others explain differently; cf. Woodhead, 1962: 258ff. Duani, 1979: 333f., is too
fanciful.)
The absurd statement in 47. 7, that Timotheus and Iphicrates arrived in the Ionian Sea together, is more
satisfactorily explained. Aristid. Panath. 313 (291 Dind.) asserts that the crowning achievement of Athens in the
4th century was the stop she put to Dionysius' attempt to attack Greece with the aid of the barbarians, specifically
Persia (cf. Lysias 33. 5ff.). Two Athenian generals foiled this plan, the one by capturing Dionysius' ships which had
sailed to Greece, the other by defeating his allies, the Spartans, at Leucas, and assuming command of the sea.
The schollast on this passage supplies Aristides' source -- Ephorus (iii. 294 Dind. = FGH 70 F211). The scholiast is
of course mistaken in attributing the plan to Dionysius II. And Dionysius did not move against
-372Greece with all his ships. Nor were the battle of Leucas and the capture of Dionysius' ships contemporary. But the
errors of the scholiast provide a key to D's confusion: Ephorus would seem to have remarked that Iphicrates'

success in capturing the Sicilian ships complemented Timotheus' victory at Leucas three years earlier. Both
generals put an end to the 'plans' of Dionysius to subject Greece with the help of Sparta (cf. 23. 5n.). D,
somewhat like the scholiast, misunderstood this, assuming that Timotheus and Iphicrates were in command
together. That Ephorus lies behind all three, Aristides, the scholiast, and D, is shown by a comparison of D 47. 7,
+ . . . , , and Aristid. Panath. 313, + . .
. + . X. H. 6. 2. 35 gives different details (see 47. 7n.). The scholiast makes
nonsense of : () + + . . . + +
.
Section 16. 57. 2 is proof (if such were needed) that Epharus is not responsible for the confusion in 47. 7 (though
the Sacred War was recounted by Ephorus' son Demophilus: 16. 14. 3). There D correctly mentions Iphicrates
alone in command in the Ionian Sea. 47.4. . . . : in view of the previous note these
numbers should be treated with care. X. H. 6. 2. 14 says that after energetic preparations Iphicrates set out with
70 triremes. He had to scour Attica to get together this many. One is tempted to see the 30 triremes which,
according to D, Timotheus acquired from new allies in addition to his original 60 as what, in fact, remained of the
original fleet by autumn 373. As for the 40 which supposedly resulted in a grand fleet of 130 triremes, these may
be the ones assembled by Iphicrates. Xenophon's number is thus obtained.
+ . . . : a stereotype Diodoran description of military preparations (pp. 15f.). B is usually
a generic term in D meaning 'missile weapons' whether thrown by hand or shot with bows or from catapults; cf.
12. 61. 6; 13. 55. 4; 17. 11. 3; 17. 44. 4; 20. 12. 3; 20. 47. 7; 20. 73. 2f. Often though belos in D signifies a
catapult or, more generally, an engine of war; cf. 14. 42. 2; 14. 43. 3; 14. 50. 4 (cf. Philo, Bel. 82. 8; 97. 10).
Similarly Polybius (cf. 5. 4. 6; 8. 5. 2) though, like D, by belos he can mean simply a missile weapon.
see p. 133.
-373: 600 according to X. H. 6. 2. 10 who says they were peltasts.
: this was Ctesicles' second mission in the west; see chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 2; 46. 3 n.
47. 5. . . . : cf. X. H. 6. 2. 10f. who says that Alcetas was asked to help get the men across to
the island. As it was now late autumn or winter, the peltasts probably made their way to Epirus overland by way
of Boeotia and Thessaly. At any rate it is difficult to see why Alcetas' help was needed if the troops sailed round
the Peloponnese in their own ships.
47. 5-6. + : cf. X. H. 6. 2. 15ff. The different standpoints of D (Ephorus) and
Xenophon should again be noted. Xenophon ascribes the Spartan failure (he is concerned to explain it) to a
combination of incompetence and even corruption on the part of Mnasippus, and luck on the part of the
Corcyraeans. D on the other hand represents that the able leadership of the Athenian Ctesicles was the decisive
factor in the Corcyraean victory (see Introd. n. 306).
Why did Mnasippus fail? Xenophon's aspersions on Mnasippus (generally accepted; e.g. most recently by Tuplin,
1993: 132) are suspect. The charge of incompetence cannot really be answered. But the implied charge of
corruption can. By spring 372 and shortly before he was killed, Mnasippus had discharged some of his
Mnasippus' expenditure indicates that his
mercenaries and he owed the rest as much as two months' pay.
finances cannot have been in a very healthy state. A trireme required at least two-thirds of a talent per month for
its upkeep (cf. Wilson, 1970: 304f.). A fleet of 60 triremes therefore would have needed 40 talents a month. If
the siege continued for five to six months, from autumn 373 till spring 372, Mnasippus would have had to spend
no less than some 300 talents on his fleet alone-a very considerable sum and surely beyond the means of a
Peloponnesian League unsupported by Persia. And then there were the mercenaries. A mercenary in the 4th
century required about 7 or 8 obols a day for his pay and food ( and ; cf. Perlman, 1976-7:
258f.). Fifteen hundred mercenaries would have required some 10 talents a month.
-374It would seem therefore that, as the siege dragged on over the winter months, Mnasippus ran out of money. In
similar circumstances in 375 Timotheus had to lie to his men to avoid a mutiny (ps.-Arist. Econ. 1350a30). He
had been saved by being recalled home after a relatively short stay in the west whereas Mnasippus had to
persevere till the city was taken. It is reasonable therefore to suppose that the indiscipline of the mercenaries was
due to a genuine shortage of money. It may be relevant here to point to a statement of Aelian (NA 11. 19) that
when the tidal wave struck Helice in the winter of 373/2 (48. 1 n.) there were ten Lacedaemonian ships moored
off the coast. Diog. Laert. 3. 20 (quoting Favorinus, Memorabilia) adds that the Spartan Pollis was in command
and that he was drowned. What was he doing there? It cannot be proved, but it is likely that he was involved in
-- either levying additional money for the needy Mnasippus or even collecting the original
contribution which some cities may have been slow in dispatching ( Anderson explanation, 1954: 88f., seems farfetched).
47. 6. + : the sudden charge of the besieged took Mnasippus by surprise: X. H. 6. 2. 17.
Xenophon mentions captured and killed on the Peloponnesian side, but gives no figures.
: cf. X. H. 6. 2. 18ff. Mnasippus chased the Corcyraeans back to the city, but near the wall they
rallied. In the ensuing fight Mnasippus was killed. The graves from which the Corcyraeans fought back were
between the hill (Soteros; 47. 1 n.) and the city wall. From these perhaps come the 4th-century fragments

discovered in the last war near the south-west end of the wall and now in the museum ( Dontas, 1965: 144).
47. 7. T : see 47. 2-4, 7 n.
K : X. H. 6. 2. 36 gives just Crinippus (likewise Polyaen. 3. 9. 55) though he later mentions
Cissides as the commander of the second force sent by Dionysius to aid Sparta (H. 7. 1. 28). According to
Xenophon Crinippus committed suicide unable to bear his misfortune.
. . . : nine was the number of triremes captured, but X. H. 6. 2. 35 says that a tenth escaped.
Polyaen. 3. 9. 55 gives the number captured as ten out of an original force of eleven (cf. 47. 2-4, 7 n.).
: X. H. 6. 2. 35 says rather that the captured
-375Syracusans were ransomed. But a sale of booty did take place. On the evidence of 16. 57. 2 f. there were gold
and ivory statues aboard the captured ships meant for Olympia and Delphi. These Iphicrates sold on orders from
home and used the money to pay his troops. Schaefer, 1885-7: i. 66 n. 2, may be right that Dionysius'
dedications were intended for the Olympic festival of summer 372.
. . . : if we reckon 200 crew per trireme then each man fetched about 2 minae which is not
unreasonable; cf. X. Mem. 2. 5. 2; Finley, 1960: 5.

47. 8. Chronographic notices

N+ + : Theopompus (FGH 115 F103. 12) gives an outline of the events which led to the
murder of Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras. Grote, x. 33 n. 1, prefers Theopompus to the versions of D and Arist.
Pol. 5. 1311b. He is followed by Judeich, 1892: 131f., 132 n. 1. Hill, 1940: 140f., is not so sure. See also Beloch,
GG iii. 2. 100 (99 ff. for the genealogy of the dynasty). The confusion in D (the chronographer's perhaps) may be
due to the closeness of the names Nicocreon, the original conspirator, and Nicocles, one of Evagoras' sons who
succeeded him to the throne. : for the war see Livy 6. 27. 6-29; cf. Perl, 1957: 127;
Cornell, CAH2 vii. 2. 318.

Archon Astelus, 373/2

48. 1. 'P+ : 381 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 637; Livy 6. 22. 5. Six tribunes named, as promised, and in complete
agreement with Livy, apart from the order in which they are named. See pp. 27 f.

48-49. The earthquake of 373/2

48. 1. ': D's date is confirmed by Arist. Meteor. 343b; Paus. 7. 25. 4; Strabo 8 C 384; cf. Polyb. 2.
41. 7. The time of the year, winter, is given by Arist. Meteor. 343b; 344b; Paus. 7. 24. 12; Strabo 8 C 385.
The disaster made a strong impression on contemporary Greece. Aristotle, Callisthenes, Heraclides Ponticus, and
Ephorus all gave it space in their works. Xenophon of course would not
-376have been interested in natural disasters unless personally involved. A host of later writers refer to it ( Blte, RE
vii. 2855ff.), but their details are second-hand unless, like Eratosthenes and Pausanias, they added personal
observations to their accounts. In fact Ephorus' own information was derivative. We know that he used
Callisthenes' Hellenica elsewhere (pp. 104f.). Did he use it here? The various accounts of the disaster can be
divided in two on the basis of whether it is said that both Helice and Bura were submerged by the sea (which is
wrong) or that Helice alone was submerged, but Bura simply flattened by the earthquake (which is correct: below
48. 3 n.). The mistake may have arisen from the fact that Bura probably possessed a little harbour-town, perhaps
of the same name, which was of course submerged, and that event was wrongly transferred to Bura itself. We
know from Pausanias that neighbouring Aegeira possessed a harbour-town of the same name. For Bura he
mentions only the road which descended to the shore (7. 25f.). The submersion of the harbour-towns of Aegeira
and Bura may be the reason why Philo, De aeternitate mundi 140, lists all three, Helice, Bura, and Aegeira, as
having been swallowed up ( Marinatos, 1960: 190).
The best statement of the correct view is in Strabo 1 C 59: Bo+ + +I+1F78 +
+ + '; cf. 8 C 384f. Strabo refers his details to Heraclides Ponticus and adds that
Eratosthenes had, by his own testimony, visited the place where Helice had vanished. Pausanias also visited the
area and saw the mountainous site of Bura (7. 24; 7. 25. 8). Bura cannot therefore have been submerged. Helice
on the other hand had been in the plain near the sea. Furthermore Pausanias says that Bura was rebuilt by those
of its people who survived (7. 25. 9: + . -- with Mnasippus at Corcyra?).
Finally, there is Strabo's statement (8 C 386) that Bura was 40 stades distant from the sea. Polyb. 2. 41. 7 and
Aelian, NA 11. 19, also get the facts correctly (though not Pliny, NH 4. 12, as Jacoby, FGH iid. 424, says). See
Baladi discussion, 1980: 145 ff.

According to D both Helice and Bura were submerged. This would have mattered little had he been alone in saying
so. But others say the same; ps.- Arist. De mundo396a; Ovid, Met. 15. 293; Pliny, NH 2. 206. Of greater
importance is the fact that Callisthenes, as quoted by Seneca, stated the same incorrect view: NQ 6. 23. 4; (6.
32. 8); 7. 5. 3 f. It seems, therefore, that Ephorus'
-377use of Callisthenes here is not just 'mindestens nicht unmglich' ( Jacoby, FGH iid. 423), but very probable. It
would appear, however, that Ephorus combined Callisthenes with Heraclides Ponticus (cf. nn. ad FGH 70 F212;
124 FF19-21). This is indicated by a comparison of D with Strabo 8 C 385 (cf. Wehrli, viii. 18f., 73; Gottschalk,
1980: 94f.). The ascription of the disaster to the anger of Poseidon in literature would seem to derive originally
from Heraclides' + (cf. Wehrli, viii. 18f., 73, and Gottschalk, 1980: 94f.). The story of the Ionian
appeal in fact as we have it in D and Strabo may have been first related by Heraclides. Callisthenes was not of
course a stranger to divine explanations (cf. Strabo 17 C 814), but we do not know if he combined here a natural
with a supernatural explanation like Ephorus ( Jacoby, FGH iid. 423f., does not argue this pace Barber, 1935:
132, who thus sees this as more evidence for Ephorus' use of Callisthenes).
In the same winter of 373/2 the temple of Apollo at Delphi was destroyed by fire according to the Marm. Par., Tod
205 s. 71, and Macrobius, Sat. 3. 6. 7 (quoting Epaphus). This is not mentioned in any other source, and probably
the fire had not been caused by the earthquake. Cf. Pouilloux, 1962: 300ff., and Tod 140 (which, though, dates to
spring 360: Pouilloux, 1949: 192ff.).
+ + : we cannot know whether this is D or Ephorus speaking.
48. 3. : wrong. The tidal wave accomanied the earthquake ( Arist. Meteor. 368b; cf.
Marinatos, 1960: 189). D himself in fact implies that the wave was caused by the earthquake: +
+ . Strabo states this explicitly: + + (8 C
384). 'E: Helice had been the chief and probably oldest city in Achaea; cf. Blte, RE vii. 2855ff.; Anderson,
1954: 72ff. It was famous especially for its temple and image of Poseidon (Paus. 7. 24. 5ff.; Strabo 8 C 384). For
the possible location of the submerged city and for a theory of what happened see Marinatos, 1960: 186ff.; id.,
Archaeol. Reports ( 1966/7), 12.
B+: Buris in Latin, Bura in Greek authors (cf. Blte, RE vii. 2855ff.). The site of the city has been identified
by Ernst Meyer, 1939: 133ff.; id., 1957: 81ff. Bura lay on a precipitous spur to the east of the river Cerynites in
eastern Achaea. It is mentioned again later by D (20. 103. 4 under 303/2) in connection with Demetrius'
-378-

operations in the Peloponnese in that year. He granted the city its autonomy.
48. 4. : it would be reasonable to suppose that Ephorus, as well as pointing to the
divine anger, also gave details of the opinions of the natural philosophers. These D omitted, choosing to concentrate
instead on the anger of the gods. The story was grist to his moralizing mill and his interest is shown by the promise to
deal with the subject of divine retribution on the sacrilegious later in his work. This he does in 16. 61-4 (from Book 30
of the Histories: see pp. 95 f.), and he may have done so in even greater detail in connection with the great
earthquake at Rhodes in 227/6 mentioned in Book 26 fr. 8. For Ephorus and the supernatural, in which he was far from
uninterested, see pp. 12 f.
49. 1 : twelve according to Herod. 1. 145; Strabo 8 C 383. But the number will have varied. D's number
is accepted for this time by Caspari, 1915: 182f. (Cf. 177f.), and Kleiner in Kleiner, Hommel, and Mller-Wiener, 1967:
14f. Magie, 1950: ii. 867 n. 48, suggests that D perhaps reflects a tradition that originally the Ionian League consisted
of nine cities. Lenschau's solution, Klio, 33 ( 1940), 220f., is ingenious: of the twelve cities listed as making up the
League (cf. Magie, 1950: ii. 867 n. 48, for references in addition to Herodotus and Strabo cited above), two were the
islands of Samos and Chios which were given their freedom by the King's Peace, while Priene was not a city properly
speaking at this time; hence the transfer of the Panionion to Ephesus. There remain therefore D's nine cities. This
would place the Ionian embassy to Achaea after 386 which indeed agrees with the evidence of Strabo (see n. below).
We might then conclude that D in his usual bungling way misunderstood the nine cities which sent the embassy to be
the cities which originally celebrated the Panionia.
. . . : the old Ionian League and its festival at Mycale; cf. Herod. I. 148; Strabo 8 C
384; 14 C 639; Nilsson, 1906: 74ff.; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Kleine Schriften, v. 1. 129ff. (art. published 1906);
Caspari, 1915: 173ff.; Roebuck, 1955: 26ff.; Magie, 1950: ii. 866 n. 47; Kleiner in Kleiner, Hommel, and M llerWiener, 1967: 12ff.
. . . : for the problems of this passage, almost certainly due to D's
incompetent abbreviation
-379-

of Ephorus, see the discussion in Stylianou, 1983: 245 ff. It is also argued there that the Ephesia of Thuc. 3. 104.
3 should not be identified with the Panionia; contra Hornblower, 1982b: 241ff., and 1991: 527ff.

: cf. Parke and Wormell, 1956: i. 212ff.

. . . : 'to take copies of their ancient and ancestral altars'; cf. Strabo 8 C 385: a copy of the
temple. On the meaning of RH see Ziehen, Leges Graecorum Sacrae ( 1896), 115 no. 40 on lines 13 f.
49. 2. + + : Strabo too, 8 C 385, mentions the koinon of the Achaeans (the information of
both ultimately derives from Heraclides; see 48. 1 n.). The evidence seems conclusive that Achaea was organized
in a Confederacy at this time. In fact the Confederacy had existed already in the 5th century; see Larsen, Studies
Robinson, 797ff.; id., 1968: 80ff; Anderson, 1954: 72ff. Strabo, 8 C 385, says that the Ionians first approached
Helice and on failing applied to the koinon. Anderson, 1954: 88, considers D's sequence more likely.
49. 3. : perhaps they were even killed: Paus. 7. 24. 6; Aelian, NA 11. 19.
49. 4. : this appears correct; see Nilsson, 1967: 447f., and cf. the large number
of references in Farnell's geographical register of Poseidon cults, iv. 81ff.
49. 5. : it is not the case that Ephorus in this instance inserted part of a
'scientific' explanation into his 'religious' account (as Gottschalk, 1980: 95 n. 23). These underground rivers would
have been associated with Poseidon and his worship; cf. Paus. 8. 7. 2. Ephorus' purpose in adding this information
was to prove further that the Peloponnese was especially sacred to Poseidon.
. . . : there were others, but these two visibly ran underground, or so Ephorus thought. For other
wholly or partly underground rivers see FGH 566 (Timaeus) F41; Polyb. 16. 17. 5ff.; Paus. 8. 54. 1ff.; Strabo 6 C
270f., 275 -- the Alpheus: Pritchett, 1965-85: i. 123ff.; Walbank, HCP ii. 329. And Paus. 8. 7. 2 with Pritchett,
1965-85: i. 131ff., for a remarkable underground stream which runs from near the village of Nestani in Arcadia
and rises in the sea off the coast of Argolis. Baladi, 1980: 93ff.
. . . : this is the river Ladon, a
-380tributary of the Alpheus. It originates near Pheneus in north-east Arcadia; see Paus. 8. 20 with Frazer, iv. 262f.,
and 231ff.; Strabo 8 C 389; Baladi, 1980: 98ff.
. . . : see Paus. 8. 222 with Frazer, iv. 268f.; Strabo 6 C 275; 8 C 371, 389. This river
reappeared as the Erasinus in the Argolid plain. The ancient claims have been confirmed by modern science:
Pritchett, 1965-85: i. 122f., 132.
: Vogel's emendation. The MSS read either or . Pausanias calls it 'Stymphelos'
except once (2. 24. 6) when he calls it 'Stymphalos'. That the people of the city called themselves 'Stymphalioi' is
proved by their coinage (Head, 1911: 454) as well as by the usage of the ancient authors in general (Frazer, iv.
270f.). Vial's emendation 'Stymphalon' is not necessarily correct for we cannot know which form D (Ephorus) used
here. Elsewhere D uses the form 'Stymphalos' (3. 30. 4; 4. 13. 2; 4. 33. 7; 19. 63. 1), but for none of these
passages was Ephorus the source.
49. 6. : Philo, De aeternitate mundi 140, adds Aegeira (48. 1 n.). Pollis and his squadron (47. 5-6
n.) were not guiltless to religious minds (Diog. Laert. 3. 20). Strabo 8 C 385 says that after the disaster the
Achaeans gave to the Ionians the model of the temple they had requested. One wonders how, when city and
temple had disappeared!

Archon Alcisthenes, 372/1

50. 1. : 380 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 638. Eight tribunes announced, but only seven given of whom five are
also given by Livy (6. 27. 2), if in D is indeed a corruption of Cn. Sergius ( Drummond, 1980: 65
n. 39). The names given together by D and Livy are also to be found in the FC. See 22. 1n. As often, MS F adds
names not confirmed by other sources.

50. 2-3. The comet of 373/2

50. 2. : see 1. 3n.
: for other omens which foretold the Spartan downfall see 54. 1-3 and nn.; X. H. 6. 4. 7;
Plut. Ages. 28. 6; Lys. 18. 1; Mor. 397e-f; Cic. De div. 1. 74-6; 2. 54. On Ephorus and the supernatural see pp.
12 f.
-38150. 2-3. : only two other sources mention this phenomenon -- Arist. Meteor. 343b; 344b;
and Seneca, NQ 6. 26. 3; 7. 5. 3f; 7. 16. 2. Seneca derives his information from Aristotle, Callisthenes, and

Ephorus, to all of whom he refers by name. There was evidently controversy at the time concerning the nature of
the object and its fate, as is shown by Arist. Meteor. 343b 15ff. Aristotle pronounced it a comet; and it dispersed
without leaving anything behind. Others thought differently. Callisthenes described it as an extended flame or
torch ('columna ignis immensi': NQ 6. 26. 3; 'talem effigiem ignis longi': NQ 7. 5. 3. Cf. Aristotle's list of meteoric
phenomena at Meteor. 341b). Otherwise Aristotle's description is similar to that of Callisthenes and D:
+ + + + (or , the alternative MS
reading). 19 ( is perhaps the correct reading on the evidence of D and Seneca).
Some said that on disappearing the object had left behind one or more stars. Amongst these, it would appear,
was Democritus (his dates are somewhat uncertain, but it is possible that he was alive in 373/2: Diog. Laert. 9.
34, 39, 41, 43). Aristotle would have none of this (343b), but Ephorus accepted it; for which he is severely and
unjustly criticized by Seneca, NQ 7.15.if. (Seneca is thus wrong that no one except Ephorus said that the comet
split up). But Ephorus here, as elsewhere, used more than one source, and D's description makes it clear that
Callisthenes was yet again the ultimate source: + ,
7 (pp. 104f.). D does not mention the splitting up of the comet, but that is hardly disconcerting.
50. 2. : in fact some eighteen months later.
50. 3. + : more is made of the explanation of the natural philosophers here; cf. 48. 1, 4nn.

50. 4-6. The Peace of 372/1

For the date see the chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 2.
50. 4. : the participation of the King in this Peace is often denied on the basis of Xenophon's
silence; cf. especially Accame, 1941: 152ff. As 15. 38 and 15. 50. 4 are generally considered to represent a
doublet, the mention of the King here is dismissed as a detail erroneously introduced from the Peace of 375. That
38 and 50. 4 are not in fact a doublet, see 38. 3-39n.
-382Accame's contention (1941: 154) that, whereas in 375 the King is given a motive for his intervention, in 371 he is
not, and that for this reason alone D's statement is dubious, is weak because the King had other reasons for
intervening in 375, as in 371 (38. 1n.), and these are not supplied by D either. Luckily we are not entirely
dependent on D here. There is the explicit testimony of Dion. Hal. Lys. 12 that the King was indeed a party to the
Peace of 372/1: (Dionysius almost
certainly derived this information from Philochorus; FGH 328 F151n.). Accame's objection that IG ii2 103 (=Tod
133 -- an Attic decree of 368 in honour of Dionysius I of Syracuse): + ] , [
] [] [ 1 ], proves that Dionysius was in error (1941: 154f). cannot be
sustained for the epigraphic reference is probably to the Peace concluded at Athens after Leuctra (cf. Buckler,
1980a: 237f.), and no one would argue that the King was a party to that.
The epigraphic reference cannot surely be to the original King's Peace (as Lauffer, 1959: 323) for no Athenian
could ever have spoken of Dionysius and his sons as 'supporting the King's Peace which the Athenians. . .
concluded', meaning the Peace of 387/6, when in fact Dionysius had, in the period 386-371, supported the
Spartans in exploiting the Peace against Athens and the rest of Greece (very different is the language used when
referring to the 370s in the decree commending the Mytileneans (Tod 131 lines 46ff.) passed in the very same
year as Tod 133). That leaves us with only the present Peace and that of 371/0 concluded at Athens. But the first
was overtaken by Leuctra, and the present tense, + (line 24 in Tod 133), points to the more recent of
the Peaces ( Hampl, 1938: 21ff.). Tod 133 is thus additional evidence that the Spartans participated in the Peace
at Athens; see below under 57. 1. It might be objected that such references as in Tod 133 are not to any
particular peace: there was one peace in 387/6 which was renewed from time to time and that is what is being
referred to. But neither the terms nor the circumstances of the various peaces were precisely the same so that
contemporaries could, and in fact did, distinguish between them; cf. e.g. FGH 328 (Philoch.) FF149, 151.
Accame's attempt to exploit Xenophon's silence and vagueness is unconvincing, for two reasons. First, it is
Xenophon after all
-383-

who is speaking at H. 6. 3. 10ff., and not Callistratus, and what he says is not necessarily factual. Second, Xenophon
could have deliberately excluded the King from the Peace. (On X. H. 6. 3. 1ff. see Tuplin, 1913: 101ff.) Even if we
accept that at the time of the congress Antalcidas was at Susa, this does not exclude the possibility that the King had
already dispatched his edict, + . . . , as D puts it (50. 4), and that the Greeks
had acted as a result of it. Personally I am inclined to see H. 6. 3. 12 as referring to this edict:
+ . This is often seen as a reference to the original King's Peace
(cf. e.g. Tuplin, 1993: 102), but unnecessarily so, and the last sentence of H. 6. 3. 12, given in the present tense,
shows that the King was taking an active interest in Greek affairs at the time. It should be added further that, though
not mentioned again, the motive Ephorus gave for the King's involvement in 375 (38. 1), may still have counted with
the King, as preparations were being made about this time for yet another attempt to subdue Egypt ( Nepos, Dat. 3. 5;
4. 1; ps.-Demosth. 49. 28, 32, 35). For the King's involvement argues also Xenophon's phraseology at H. 6. 3. 18:
. That rather points to a royal edict.

However, there is nothing objectionable in meeting half-way critics like Accame who assign the initiative for the Peace
to Athens, by suggesting that both the King and Athens promoted the peace congress. Sparta too may well have had a
hand; why else would Antalcidas have been sent to Persia (cf. Buckler, 1980a: 48 f.)?
On the peculiarities of the Athenian embassy to Sparta see Mosley, 1962: 41ff.; Tuplin, 1977: 51ff. On Athenian policy
at this time, Ryder, 1963b: 237ff. On Theban policy, Mosley, 1972: 312ff.; Cawkwell, 1972: 258ff.; Buckler, 1980a:
52ff.
. . . : Svt 269. For the terms see 5. 1n.; 38. 4n.
: see 28. 1n.
. . . : this is hardly the way a writer partial to Thebes and the Boeotian Confederacy
would have put it; cf. e.g. Plut. Ages. 27f.: the 'Greeks' there side with Epaminondas and Thebes. Not so in D (see p.
118 for the Ephoran viewpoint). X. H. 6. 3. 18ff. relates what occurred at Sparta though he omits the clash between
Agesilaus and Epaminondas (for which see Plut.
-384-

Ages. 27. 6-28. 4; Nepos, Epam. 6. 4). As members of the Athenian Confederacy the Thebans first swore to the
Peace as 'Thebans'. Indeed they had no choice but to do so for the Confederacy did not, officially at any rate,
recognize Thebes' control of Boeotia. On the following day, however, they demanded that their signature be
changed to 'Boeotians'. On Agesilaus' retort that they could only be a party to the Peace as 'Thebans', they
departed and their name was struck from the treaty. They were . What does this incident signify?
There was probably a combination of factors at work. In 375 the Thebans had, after some initial objections (38. 339n.), taken the oaths as members of the Athenian Confederacy and had thus agreed to the dissolution of the
Boeotian Confederacy. That dissolution had been nominal rather than actual for we know that in 373 the
Confederacy was in existence before the outbreak of war (38. 3n.). It may well be, therefore, that in 371 too the
Thebans reasoned that they could get by if they went along with the Peace and pretended to acquiesce in the
independence of Boeotia. But conditions were different now. The rapprochement between Athens and Sparta in
375 was suspect and, as the Peace disintegrated, her need of Thebes caused Athens to turn a blind eye to the
latter's activities in Boeotia. Further, Sparta was not in a position to act in 375. Now, however, Cleombrotus was
in Phocis with an army and Athens was determined to remain neutral. It would have dawned on the Theban
leadership, therefore, that this time Sparta ( Agesilaus) was resolved to dislocate the Boeotian Confederacy, and
for good. But there must also have been a great deal of fear and indecision on the Theban side ( Cawkwell, 1972:
258ff., 263ff.). Many Thebans would have preferred peace and safety to the prestige of the Boeotian hegemony
(see 52. 1n.).
50. 5. : i.e. Sparta was implementing the Peace in her role as prostates.
: see 5. 3n.: 20. 1n.
50. 6. + + : D's chronographer would have mentioned the two events,
the Peace and the battle of Leuctra, under the successive years of Alcisthenes and Phrasicleides, and D, in the
absence perhaps of any chronological hints in Ephorus, assumed that some time elapsed between the Peace and
the battle; hence the stock statement about great, yearlong preparations. In reality, a very few weeks separated
the battle
-385-

from the Peace (though not twenty days). Also, Cleombrotus was sent to Phocis in 372/1, perhaps shortly before the
Peace (chronological excursus at 45. 3, parts 2 and 3). It is possible that Ephorus mentioned this in his account of the
Peace, but explaining how he had come to be already in the field, and D wrongly assumed the dispatch of Cleombrotus
to be after the Peace and directly aimed at Thebes, rather than before it and intended for the protection of Phocis. But
D's account of Leuctra is a very confused affair (see below). In any case it is not necessary to suppose that a
proTheban source was at work here.
: see 26. 2n.
: see 19. 3n.
: for the contribution of the allies see 31. 1-2n.

Archon Phrasicleides, 371/0

51. 1. : 379 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 638. Eight names are announced and eight are given, six of which
correspond to the six given by Livy (6. 30. 2), though three are evidently corrupt ( Drummond, 1980: 65 n. 39). See
22. 1n.

51-56. The campaign of Leuctra

For the date see the chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 2.
51. 1. : see Plut. Pel. 20. 1; i.e. they were devoid of non-Boeotian allies. But the Boeotians were
with them: 52. 2; X. H. 6. 4. 4; Paus. 9. 13. 8; Polyaen. 2. 3. 3. Jason was an ally (54. 5; X. H. 6. 4. 20), but he was
not present at the battle.
. . . : Sparta, as a prostates, had called for action against the Thebans, the co-prostates, Athens,
acquiesced, and no city therefore could 'legally' aid Thebes; cf. 5. 1n.; 5. 2-3n.; 38. 4n.
51. 2. . . . : the opportunity was judged ideal to crush Thebes; cf. Plut. Ages. 28.
6; Buckler, 1980a: 54f. But cannot represent the Spartan intentions; cf. X. H. 6. 3. 20
+.
. . .: Cf. X. H. 6. 3. 20.
51. 3. . . . : as seen above (50. 6n.) D has got the timing and purpose of Cleombrotus'
dispatch to Phocis wrong. That Ephorus was not to blame for the confusion is
-386

obvious from D's own account: after the rejection of their ultimatum the Spartans immediately sent out
Cleombrotus with an army. + + + (not ; see n. there),
(52. 1). On discovering that the passes before him were occupied by the enemy,
Cleombrotus decided to invade Boeotia by a different route. 0 (53. 1). All this is
nonsense of course if Cleombrotus set out from Laconia, and it only makes sense in the light of what we know
from the other sources, i.e. that Cleombrotus was already in Phocis when ordered to invade Boeotia.
. . . +: Aristid. Leuctr. pro Theb. 1. 7, 34 p. 644 Dind., says that the ultimatum was
delivered by Cleombrotus. Grote, basing himself on Xenophon (X. 239 n. 1), doubts that there was
communication between the two sides after the congress dispersed. But Xenophon's text rather argues in favour
of it: + 9 (H. 6. 4. 3). D's ultimatum from Sparta to Thebes may well have gone
by way of Cleombotus.
The Spartan demands cannot have been explicitly stated in the peace terms for then the Thebans would not have
added their name to the treaty document on the first day. The demands represented rather the Spartan
interpretation of the autonomy clause. The Plataeans in fact had declared their treatment at the hands of Thebes
a violation of the King's Peace (Isocr. 14. 5, 10, 12, 17, 23f., 39), and the Thespians had doubtless added their
voice too (cf. X. H. 6. 3. 1). The independence of Boeotia apart, Sparta could do no less than demand the
resettlement of Plataea especially as she had been instrumental in the rebuilding of the town after the King's
Peace of 387/6. All Spartan actions in Boeotia between 386 and 379 were probably based on the autonomy clause
and the prostasia of the Peace (5. 2-3 n.).
The association of Thespiae with Plataea here is misleading for probably Thespiae had only had its walls
demolished before Leuctra (46. 6n.). Perhaps some Thespians (the anti-Theban faction; there was also a
democratic pro-Theban group: X. H. 5. 4. 46, 55) had already been expelled by the time of the peace congress
and their land confiscated (cf. Isocr. 14. 35, 44) so that the demand
+ could apply to both Plataeans and Thespians. In any case it is hard to
-387find another candidate for Isocrates' / (14. 19, 35). The walls of
Orchomenus were demolished after Leuctra, while those of Tanagra stood intact throughout the 4th century (
Roller, 1974: 260ff.). And Plataea, Thespiae, Orchomenus, and Tanagra are the only cities mentioned in the
sources as having opposed Thebes at this time. I agree with Buckler, 1980a: 20ff.; id., 1977: 76ff., that Paus. 9.
13. 8-14. 4 is suspect in part. But I see no reason for rejecting the statement that before Leuctra the Thespians
had a polis. It is Xenophon who should be rejected (46. 6 n.). Buckler, 1980a: 20ff., is correct to stress that with
the exception of Plataea, Orchomenus, and Thespiae there is no evidence that the Thebans adopted harsh
measures, such as the demolition of walls and the confiscation of land, against any other Boeotian cities; and they
never felt it necessary to garrison the federated cities.
51. 4. : see 51. 3n.; 46. 3n.
. . . +: not so the other sources and one suspects that this is D writing carelessly
rather than Ephorus; cf. X. H. 6. 4. 15; Plut. Ages. 28. 5; Nepos, Epam. 6. 4; Paus. 9. 13. 9.
52. 1. : thus the MSS. The emendation is Wesseling's and it generally stands
unchallenged (it is printed by both Vogel and Vial), students of the campaign assuming that Cleombrotus reached
as far as Coronea. Tuplin, 1979: 351 ff., is perfectly correct, however, to revert to the MSS reading. As he argues,
not only is there no need to emend the text, but Chaeronea makes better sense in the reconstruction of
Cleombrotus' route.

+ E: these would have been the allies from central Greece such as the Phocian peltasts
and the cavalry from Heraclea; X. H. 6. 4. 9; cf. Beister, 1970: 24f.; Tuplin, 1979: 355. Cleombrotus' orders
presumably were for everyone to gather at Chaeronea.
: in view of the fact that the Boeotians were in position at the passes near
Coronea first (52. 7; 53. 1), a shift back in time should be understood here: Cleombrotus had not yet reached
Chaeronea when the Thebans marched out. Alternatively, Cleombrotus may have delayed at Chaeronea, either
because he was waiting for his allies or deliberately ( Tuplin, 1979: 354f.), thus giving the Thebans the
opportunity to march out and occupy the passes.
-388: D's poor ability to deal with what must have been a detailed and involved narrative in his source
deserts him altogether in places. It should surely be dismissed as absurd that the Thebans voted (and as far as D
is concerned acted upon the vote) to remove their women and children to Athens. On the other hand, Paus. 9. 13.
6 says that at Leuctra the three Boeotarchs who opposed Epaminondas suggested that they should send their
women and children to Athens while they themselves made ready to undergo a siege rather than fight a battle.
One may guess that Ephorus had said that many Thebans opposed Epaminondas' bold plan of meeting the
Spartans head-on, and were in favour instead of remaining on the defensive as in 378 and 377. If a proposal was
made in the assembly to send all non-combatants to Athens it certainly did not get very far. The story itself is
suspect because of its Herodotean echo (Herod. 8. 41-1). But cf. next n.
+ . . . + : each Boeotarch possessed equal authority in the field though it did, it
seems, sometimes happen that the Boeotarchs voluntarily surrendered their authority to one or more of their
colleagues because they judged them better suited to carry out a particular task ( Buckler, 1980a: 26f.). This is
how D should be understood at 62. 4 and 68. 1. That D is wrong here (as is Nepos, Pel. 4. 2) is shown by his own
information at 53. 3: Epaminondas had not more authority than his colleagues. Yet something may lie behind D's
assertion. There must have been intense discussion at Thebes with Epaminondas playing a leading part, and
Ephorus perhaps noted a proposal to evacuate the noncombatants to Athens, which was rejected (previous n.), as
well as the eventual acceptance of Epaminondas' motion to march out against Cleombrotus.
: a Diodoran clich (p. 133). The Boeotarchs were elected probably in late autumn perhaps
a month or so before they assumed their office ( Buckler, 1980a: 28f.).
52. 2. : a favourite word with D, not always to be believed though here certainly true (p. 16).
: see 26. 2n.
: 'able and willing' or 'fit and qualified'. A Diodoran word often used in connection with men being
enlisted; cf. 13. 97. 1; 14. 18. 4; 14. 44. 2; 16. 28. 1; 17. 31. 1. All Boeotians, of course, were liable to serve,
but they might not all have been willing to do so. . . . : Front. Strat. 4. 2. 6 gives
4,000
-389-

Thebans including 400 cavalry (but see Anderson, 1970: 321 n. 26). Otherwise we have no figures for the Boeotians
(Polyaen. 2. 3. 8 does not give 6,000 pace Anderson, 1970: 321 n. 26, while the 6,000 at 2. 3. 12 is an addition from
D 52. 2). D's 6,000, whether hoplites alone or hoplites and cavalry together, seems reasonable when compared to
Boeotian numbers in the 5th and 4th centuries (26. 4n.). Some Boeotians doubtless stayed away (cf. Paus. 9. 13. 8).
About half of the 6,000 would have been Thebans; cf. Busolt, 1905: 444f.; Wolter, AS iv. 299ff.; Judeich, 1927: 193f.;
Anderson, 1970: 197f.; Buckler, 1980a: 55. For a study of the Boeotian federal army see Salmon, 1953: 347 ff.
52. 3. + + : Ephorus' treatment of the omens is of interest. Though not unimportant in themselves,
they are used here to show the superiority of Epaminondas' intellect and paideia over the mere superstition of the
. For Ephorus, paideia, and religion see pp. 10 ff. Cf. Sordi, 1974: 45 ff.
+ . . . : the text is corrupt beyond recovery. Perhaps it is best to emend the MSS to
(with Madvig) and to (again with Madvig): see Vogel's text. Vial's
restoration is ungrammatical. Thus, a blind herald was proclaiming the escape of
slaves and, as was customary, warned against anyone exporting or concealing them; they were to be kept safe for
their owners instead. For a suggestion why this was considered a bad omen see Sherman ad loc.
52. 5. . . . : the grammateus of the polemarchs (or Boeotarchs) at Thebes and at other
Boeotian cities was an annually elected official who assisted his superiors in their duties; cf. X. H. 5. 4. 2, 4: Plut. Pel.
7. 4; Mor. 577b. The office was evidently important though most of the evidence derives from Hellenistic inscriptions
(see Roesch, 1965: 157, 161, 163; Busolt, GS ii. 1440). The evidence of D here indicates that one of the duties of the
grammateus was that of aide-de-camp when the Boeotarchs were on campaign.
: Plut. Mor. 578c says that Theban hipparchs carried a spear and a seal as badges of office.
Elsewhere he says that the magistrates chosen by lot at Thebes always carried with them a sacred spear (Mor. 597bc). At Plataea and Chaeronea on the other hand the archon was not allowed to carry or even touch metal (Mor. 274b;
Aristid. 21. 4; cf. Roesch, 1965: 158). Evidence
-390-

is lacking, but one wonders whether the spear and band carried by their secretary might not have been the
Boeotarchs' symbols of office. It could be, however, that the grammateus had a band tied to his own spear so as
to be readily discernible to the soldiers to whom he passed on the commands of the Boeotarchs. +
+ : see 34. 2n.
52. 6. . . . : according to Front. Strat. 1. 12. 5 he made a reply.
52. 7. . . . : cf. Paus. 9. 13. 3 + . . . +
. The Boeotian position was between Coronea and Haliartus at Mt. Tilphusius which in antiquity was only a
few hundred feet from lake Copais; cf. Wolter, AS iv. 291. For the extent of the lake see Pritchett, 1965-85: ii.
89ff. For Mt. Tilphusius, which should probably be identified with both the ridges known as Petra and Palaiothivai,
see Fontenrose, 1969: 125f.; Buck, 1979: 9; Wallace, 1979: 144 f. D here speaks of , which could mean a
single pass (cf. X. H. 6. 4. 3 + ), but at 53. I he writes . Fossey, 1972: 1 ff.,
identifies two passes, one between Petra and the lake and the other between Palaiothivai and the village of
Koutoumoula (see his map p. 3 ). In fact Fossey, 1972: 13 f., suggests that the forts on Petra and Palaiothivai
together constitute ancient Tilphusium referred to at Demosth. 19. 141, 148 (cf. D 4. 66. 5; Strabo 9 C 410,
413). The forts, however, cannot be dated and Fossey's suggestion that they date to 371 is a mere guess. But
their purpose is clear: they were meant to control the natural route from western to eastern Boeotia.

. The most likely route followed by Cleombrotus into Boeotia is that suggested by Burn, 1949: 321f.
(accepted by Buckler, 1980a: 57 ff.; contra Wolter, AS iv. 291ff.; Pritchett, 1965-85: i. 56f.) except that the
starting point was Chaeronea and not Coronea (52. 1n.). Cleombrotus first fell back to Ambrossus in Phocis and
then, setting out from there, he marched over Mt.
-391Helicon by way of Stiris and the modern villages of Kyriaki and Koukoura (see Buckler's map p. 56 ) and
descended to Thisbe in Boeotia. Pritchett's objection to this route is based on D's statement,
, but this, as Pritchett himself argues on p. 53 (against Wolter and Heurtley, BSA 26 (
1923/5), 40), probably refers to Cleombrotus' march from Siphai to Creusis along the shore route round Mt.
Koromboli. It is possible, however, that Cleombrotus traversed Mt. Koromboli; see Roesch, 1967: 292, who
describes a route from Siphai to Creusis which passes over Mt. Koromboli (cf. Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 177). See
also Beister discussion, 1970: 36ff.
. . . : from Thisbe Cleombrotus proceeded south-east to Siphai on the coast and from there
to the port of Creusis (see previous n.), thus safeguarding his communications with the Peloponnese, before
heading inland towards Thebes. As for the route he followed to Leuctra from here, the one traced by Pritchett,
1965-85: i. 52ff., is possible, but see Tuplin, 1987: 74ff., for other possibilities. The townships taken were those
of Thisbe, Siphai, and Creusis. At the last, ten triremes were captured ( is Vogel's emendation. X. H. 6. 4. 3
says twelve). For all these places see Fossey, 1988: 157ff. (with maps).
53. 2. : Burn, 1949: 322, assumes that the Thebans reached Leuctra first. But this is contrary to D;
and cf. X. H. 6. 4. 4; Plut. Pel. 20. 4; Anderson, 1970: 195, 320 n. 17.
+ : it is not certain that there was an ancient village called Leuctra, and if so, where it
was located; Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 49ff.; Buck, 1979: 10; Wallace, 1979: 152; Tuplin, 1987: 73 n. 7; Fossey,
1988: 154ff.
. . . : on the battlefield and the respective camps of the combatants, not easy
to fix, see Pritchett, 1965-85: i. 57; Beister, 1970: 44ff.; Wallace, 1979: 111; Buckler, 1980a: 60f.; Tuplin, 1987:
73f. The Theban victory monument discovered by Ulrichs in 1839 ( Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, ii. (
1863), 103f.) was excavated and restored by Orlandos, Ergon ( 1958), 48ff. (= Praktika ( 1958), 43f.); ( 1959),
173; ( 1960), 222ff.; ( 1961), 229ff.
+ : cf. 53. 3 56. 3 . Otherwise D gives no figures for
Cleombrotus' army. In fact the king had some 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry as Plut. Pel. 20. 1 says; see 32.
1n. However, the battle was fought
-392-

between the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans; the rest of the Boeotians and the Spartan allies did little if anything.
Four morai up to thirty-five years from the minimum amounted to some 2,200-2,300 men of whom only 700 were
Spartiates ( X. H.6. 4. 15; 32. 1n.). The Thebans probably numbered some 3,000 hoplites (52. 2n.).
53. 3. The story of the evenly split board of Boeotarchs is also given by Pausanias (9. 13. 6-7) though with some
differences and additions, the most important being the names of Epaminondas' fellow Boeotarchs. Xenocrates, one of
the three who supported Epaminondas, is mentioned elsewhere by Pausanias (4. 32. 5-6), an episode confirmed by IG
vii. 2462 = Tod 130 (see n. below). Cf. Plut. Pel. 20. 3 and X. H. 6. 4. 6 for the dilemma which faced the Theban
leaders.
53. 4. It was seen above (52. 3n.; 52. 3-7) that Epaminondas' paideia proved superior to the unfavourable omens. But
the soldiers remained superstitious and we are now told how Epaminondas employed his ingenuity to overcome their
fears by inventing favourable omens.

 + . . . + : see X. H. 6. 4. 7 f. Xenophon does comment that some people said that the
various reports of supernatural happenings had been fabricated by the Theban leaders, but characteristically he is
inclined to believe in the divine signs. Like D, Polyaenus (2. 3. 8, 12) and Frontinus ( Strat.1. 11. 16) say that
Epaminondas was responsible for these portents.
+ + : thus also X. H. 6. 4. 7 though he mentions only Heracles as
thereby armed and gone to take part in the battle. In D, on the other hand, the rumour claimed that the ancient
heroes in general picked up the weapons and set out to aid the Boeotians. Callisthenes (apud Cic. De div. 1. 74=
FGH124 F22a), by contrast, said that the weapons were found lying on the floor; and cf. Polyaen. 2. 3. 8 for yet
another version. For Heracles and the Heracleion at Thebes see Schachter, 1981-94: ii. 14ff.
: for the oracle of Trophonius at Lebadea see Paus. 9. 39-40. 2 with Frazer's nn.; Philippson, 1939: 11ff.;
Nilsson, 1967: 450; Schachter, 1981-94: iii. 66ff.
U=1F41 : a different reply is given by Paus. 4. 32. 5-6; or perhaps a different section of the same
reply. See also Callisthenes, apud Cic. De div. 1. 74 = FGH 124 F22a; Polyaen. 2.
-393-

3. 8. IG vii. 2462 = Tod 130 lines 4-5 has been seen as referring to the carrying out of the god's response; see
Beister, 1973: 65ff., but cf. Tuplin, 1987: 94ff.
+ + . . . : Schachter, 1981-94: iii. 111ff. Inscriptions testify to the celebration of this
festival; cf. IG vii. 552; 1711; 2487; 2532; 3091; RE iii. 82. For the priesthood of Zeus Basileus which presided
over the festival see Roesch, 1965: 200 ff.; Schachter, 1981-94: iii. 114ff.
54. 1. : this episode is known only from D. Dindorf emended 'Leandridas', C. Mller 'Cleandridas'. On
the last emendation is based the suggestion that he may have been a son of Gylippus, the victor of the Athenians
in Sicily whose father was named Cleandridas. Both these men had been exiled for corruption; Thuc. 6. 93. 2; 7.
2. 1; D 13. 106. 9f. (the MSS read 'Clearchon' wrongly for 'Cleandridan'); Plut. Per. 22. 3; Nic.28. 4; Lys. 16;
Poralla, P. 72; RE xi. 557. Whatever the correct name of this Spartan, he was not a deserter ( Anderson, 1970:
206), but an exile; and he did not tell the Thebans the story of the outraged maidens of Leuctra. This mistaken
assumption was first made by Underhill, ad H. 6. 4. 7. According to D it was who told
Eparninondas about the maidens.
: the original oracle perhaps concerned Laconian Leuctra and was adapted to Boeotian Leuctra after
the event.
54. 2-3. The story of Scedasus and his outraged daughters is the central portent of the battle and it is given, with
variations, by all the major sources: X. H.6. 4. 7; Plut. Pel. 20. 47-21. 1; Mor. 856f; Paus. 9. 13. 5f.; cf. ps.-Plut.
Mor. 773b-774d; Aelian fr. 77; Westlake, 1939: 13. Burkert, 1979: 74f., argues the commonplace character of
the theme: 'Girls falling into the hands of enemies, to be raped and killed, guarantee the victory, the "dispersion"
of the hostile army'. The name Scedasus means 'the disperser'. Schachter, 1981-94: ii. 122.
54. 2. + : this is contrary to the other sources. Two explanations
present themselves. Either Ephorus knew of two versions of the story in the first of which the maidens were the
daughters of Scedasus while in the second their father was called Leuctrus, and these he combined; he is known
to have done this elsewhere; cf. his combination of the separate traditions (Herod. 1. 65) of Lycurgus' inspiration
from Crete and
-394-

Delphi ( FGH 70 F149). Or, D confused his source: if Ephorus spoke of the daughters of Scedasus as Plutarch does at
Pel. 20. 5, + , then it may be that D mistook for a patronymic and
derived + from it, and having reached this point it was but natural to explain Leuctra as the 'field of Leuctrus'.
This kind of thing is well within his powers.
54.4. : Ephorus may well have included a speech by Epaminondas here which D omitted (cf. FGH 70
T21 and p. 17 for D's attitude to set speeches in a historical work), though not before reading it perhaps and being
misled by it (next n.).
54. 5-56. + : the intervention of Jason is certainly misplaced as scholars unanimously agree.
Jason would have had no reason to want to avert the battle whereas after the Spartan defeat it would not have been in
his interests, as Xenophon rightly reasons ( H. 6. 4. 25), to assist the Boeotians in destroying the worsted Spartan
force. But really, this is part of a greater confusion for D represents that, at the conclusion of a truce by Jason,
Cleombrotus began to withdraw from Boeotia. On doing so he was met by a second army out from Laconia under
Archidamus which the Spartans had dispatched because they were fearful of the reckless courage of the Boeotians.
With the two armies united, the Spartans considered it shameful to fear the Boebtians (but cf. 51. 3f. !). So they
disregarded the truce and returned to Leuctra where a battle was fought with Cleombrotus and Archidamus leading the
Lacedaemonians.
It was said above that Ephorus is not to blame for the earlier muddle (51. 3 n. ); and he is not to blame here. His
treatment of Leuctra was detailed and digressive (FGH 70 T21, 25; F213 ); all the more reason, therefore, why D
should become confused. In any case the Ephoran account must have been generally sound for otherwise Polybius (12.

25f ) would have noticed it and said so. His aim, after all, was to show that Ephorus' land battles were inferior to his
sea battles. So the confusion cannot be Ephoran. On the other hand the muddle is so insistent that one is tempted to
speak of a deliberate misrepresentation and even to suggest that D used a pro-Theban source alternative to Ephorus.
Or was it perhaps a Hellenistic military handbook of some description? Anderson, 1970: 208, draws attention to the
similarity between D's description of the battle and Onesander, Strat. 21. 5ff., esp. section 8. But
-395the suggestion of an alternative source here (thus e.g. Tuplin, 1987: 84 n. 42) is unnecessary. The best and most
economical solution is that D, having skipped through the relevant Ephoran chapters, put them aside and composed his
own account into which he introduced the usual rhetorical elements suitable for a battle.
Archidamus' presence at the battle can to some extent be refuted by D's own account. Archidamus is mentioned twice,
at 54. 6 when the retreating Cleombrotus meets up with him, and shortly afterwards at the very beginning of the
battle when Archidamus is made to lead one of the Lacedaemonian wings (55. 1). Nowhere else in D's fairly lengthy
subsequent description of the battle is Archidamus mentioned. One would have expected that a son of Agesilaus and
later king himself who had arrived leading an army and who commanded one of the wings, thus on a par with
Cleombrotus, would have been mentioned again, especially at the moment when the Spartan retreat became a rout,
+ . . . (56. 2), unless of course Archidamus was not present at all.
D seems mostly to have used his own language and terminology and to have interpreted Ephorus accordingly. The
verb +, for example, 'to shun or avoid battle' (55. 2) is Hellenistic; cf. 17. 27. 2; 19. 29. 1, 7; 19. 40. 4;
19. 42. 7; 19. 82. 4; 20. 57. 3. There are no instances of it before 15. 55. 2. It is found in Polybius, a historian used as
well as imitated by D; cf. Polyb. 3. 90. 10; 3.91. 10; 3. 107. 6; 4. 10.9; 10. 7.7; 11. 16.5. The of the Theban
formation (55. 4) is a word widely used by D when describing battles; see 3. 6n. for its meaning. It is similarly used by
Polybius; cf. 1. 16. 4; 1. 74. 5; 2. 3. 5; 2. 68. 9; 5. 104. 2. For the + , the denseness, or
solidity, of a formation, which is also used of the deep Theban phalanx, cf. McDougall s.v.
The term (or or ), meaning an oblique formation and used by D here as well as at 17. 57. 6;
19. 29. 7; and 19. 82. 4, does not seem to occur in Polybius or in earlier writers. It is found in late Hellenistic and
Roman military writers; cf. Asclep. Tact. 10. 1; 11. 1 (1st cent. BC); Ones. Strat. 21. 8 (1st cent. AD); Arrian, Tact.
26. 3 (2nd cent. AD). But this literary genre went back to at least Aeneas Tacticus in the first half of the 4th century
who is known to have written a Tactica as well as other military treatises. It is possible, therefore, that the term loxe
was applied to
-396-

Epaminondas' formation already in the 4th century, by military specialists in the first instance, but also by
historians such as Ephorus. At 19. 29. 7 and 19. 82. 4 D was following Hieronymus of Cardia who wrote in the
first third of the 3rd century. Book 17 may be left aside for one can only guess as to D's source(s) for it. But it
really does not matter whether Ephorus employed the term loxe or not. It would be sufficient to assume that his
description of Epaminondas' battle formation was not radically different from that of D ( +
. . . + +: 55. 1-2), and that D applied the term loxe to it (
: 55. 2).
The word at 55. 3 (its only occurrence in D in a military context) does not necessarily place D in the
same category as Onesander ( Anderson, 1970: 208) for the word is used by classical writers in military contexts
too; cf. Herod. 8. 16. 1: + + +, ; X. An. 5. 2.
13: + . Ephorus may well have described the Spartan formation as +
and he may even have explained why it became so too; see 55. 3n.
It matters little, therefore, whether the terminology of ch. 55 is 4th century or not. What matters is that, the
blunder about Archidamus and the insipid rhetoric apart, D's description of the battle is basically correct:
Epaminondas did give his battle-line a loxe formation, relying on the weight of one of his wings to win while the
other wing was instructed to +. Confirmation is provided by the other sources (see below).
Two serious omissions should be noted. (1) D does not mention the role of Pelopidas and the Sacred Band. This is
not Ephorus' fault. At 81. 2, in the epainos of Pelopidas, making better use of his source, D remarks on the
independent and important part played in the battle by Pelopidas and the Sacred Band. (2) The cavalry battle is
omitted. But Plutarch too does not mention it, and it is possible that it was overlooked by Ephorus.
54. 5. . . . +: the alliance may date back to the time of the foundation of the Boeotian
Confederacy. It was in the interest of both Jason and Thebes to stand together against Sparta. Jason and Sparta
clashed in north Euboea sometime between 382 and 379 (30. 3 and n.). In autumn or winter 377/6 Jason came
to the aid of corn-starved Thebes (X. H. 5. 4. 56). A year or so later he referred to the Boeotians as his allies (X.
H. 6. 1. 10), and
-397Xenophon is explicit that at this juncture Jason was the ally of the 'Thebans', i.e. the Boeotians (H. 6. 4. 20).
. . . : X. H. 6. 4. 21 mentions mercenary infantry and Jason's horseguards. He gives no figures,
but cf. H. 6. 1. 5 where he says that Jason had 6,000 mercenaries.

 . . . +: similar sentiments are put into Jason's mouth by Xenophon (H. 6. 4. 23).

-56. The battle

Apart from D, , X. H.6. 4. 4-15, and Plut. Pel. 23, our three major sources, see also Dinarch. 1. 72f.; Paus. 9. 13.
8-14. 1; Nepos, Pel. 4. 2; Polyaen. 1. 10; 2. 3. 2, 3; 2. 3. 11; 2. 3. 15; Front. Strat. 4. 2. 6; cf. Polyb. 12. 25f. Of
modern discussions see Kchly and Rstow, 1852: 171f.; Delbrck, 1920: 158ff.; Wolter, AS iv. 313ff. (cf. 301ff.,
an examination of the sources; 308ff., a criticism of modern reconstructions, in particular of Kchly and Rstow
and Delbrck); Judeich, 1927: 195ff.; Anderson, 1970: 198ff.; Cawkwell, 1972: 260ff.; Buckler, 1980a: 62ff.; id.,
1980c: 75ff.; id., 1985: 134ff.; Lazenby, 1985: 151ff.; Cartledge, 1987: 236ff.; Tuplin, 1986b: 50f.; id., 1987:
84ff.; id., 1993: 134ff.; Hanson, 1988: 190ff.; Voto, 1989: 115ff. Of the three major sources D's evidence has
already been examined (54. 5-56 n.); Xenophon and Plutarch remain to be considered.
Xenophon
Xenophon's account is an apologia. As elsewhere, he is concerned to explain the Spartan defeat, not the Theban
victory, though in doing the former he cannot avoid doing the latter too to some degree. He gives a number of
reasons why the Spartans were defeated. Cleombrotus' failures against Thebes in the past, and the criticism these
had engendered, made him over-eager to join battle ( H. 6. 4. 4-6). The wine drunk at midday and just before
the battle did not help matters. On the contrary, it made them all somewhat excitable ( H. 6. 4. 8); mistakes
resulted. First, instead of allowing the Boeotian deadwood to depart, Cleombrotus used some of the best nonLacedaemonian units to turn them back, thus making the Boeotian line larger and more closely massed than
before. Underhill, ad H.6. 4. 9, and Wolter, AS iv. 302 n. 1, correctly question the military significance of this.
Second, he placed his
-398-

worthless cavalry in front of his line thus forcing the Thebans to follow suit. This criticism is sounder than the first,
provided we accept that the Spartan action was not a reaction. For it is possible that it was Epaminondas who
positioned the excellent Boeotian cavalry before him thus compelling Cleombrotus to do the same. He would have
calculated that his horsemen would quickly defeat those of the Spartans, and he planned to charge with the phalanx at
the same time as his cavalry threw the enemy cavalry onto their own hoplites. The co-operation between foot and
horse may be one of the novel features of Leuctra ( Cawkwell, 1972: 262; but cf. Pritchett, 1965-85: iv. 119;
Cartledge, 1987: 239; Tuplin, 1993: 186f.), though Xenophon in the Hipparchicus recommended such a tactic (8. 19;
the work was written in the 360s, and it is possible that Xenophon was influenced by Leuctra). In any case the rout
and flight of the Spartan cavalry and the simultaneous rapid advance of the Theban phalanx certainly contributed to
the Spartan defeat ( H.6. 4. 13).
Third, the Spartan formation was no more than twelve men deep, whereas that of the Thebans no less than fifty. The
Thebans reasoned that chom ( H.6. 4. 12). The
weight of their formation enabled the Thebans to push the Spartans right off the field;
( H.6. 4. 14). Fourth (perhaps: Tuplin, 1993: 135), there was general confusion and uncertainty
amongst the Spartans and their allies for the king began to lead against the enemy without having first signalled his
intention to the rest of the army ( H.6. 4. 13).
The clear impression one derives from Xenophon, therefore, is of a state of confusion and unpreparedness on the
Spartan side: spurred on by the criticism of the Spartans Cleombrotus moved off hastily without having issued proper
orders. At the same time the cavalry fell foul of their own hoplites and the Thebans were seen charging. Seeing things
through Spartan eyes, and those of the circle of Agesilaus in particular who blamed Cleombrotus for the defeat (cf.
Isocr. 6. 9, 111), it did not occur to Xenophon that Cleombrotus may have been less to blame for the haste and
confusion than his critics claimed; that it was the speed of Epaminondas rather which had caught the Spartans off
balance (cf. Cawkwell, 1972: 262).
The Spartans were not noted for their ability to anticipate an
-399-

enemy's moves and twice in the past they had been unpleasantly surprised by an already deployed or even
advancing phalanx -- at Mantinea in 418 (Thuc. 5. 66. 1f.), and at Corinth in 394 ( X. H. 4. 2. 19). By custom the
Spartans took their time when advancing. They would sacrifice a goat to Artemis the Huntress (cf. Pritchett,
1971-91: ii. 114) and move forward slowly keeping in step to the sound of many flute-players (Thuc. 5. 70; X. H.
4. 2. 20; Plut. Lyc. 22. 4f.; Paus. 9. 13. 4). For the importance of the flute-players to the Spartans see the
evidence collected by Stahl, commentary to Poppo's edn. of Thucydides, ad 5. 70; cf. Pritchett, 1971-91: i. 106f.
Now, according to Polyaen. 1. 10, the Spartans were defeated at Leuctra because for the first time ever they
omitted to march into battle to the sound of flutes. Anderson, 1970: 82, sees no truth in the story, but perhaps
we should see it as confirming Xenophon's (and Plutarch's; see below) evidence that the Spartans were forced to
fight before they were ready.
Plutarch
Plutarch's account is the most difficult to evaluate. His evidence has been bedevilled by source criticism. Yet the
attempt to pinpoint Plutarch's sources is often futile. Plutarch was not D. He was thoroughly conversant with all
the important 4th-century historians and with many of the less important ones too (cf. the sensible remarks of

Frost, Plutarch's Themistocles: A Historical Commentary ( Princeton, 1980), 41 ff). For the life of Pelopidas he
used not only Callisthenes (cf. Westlake, 1939: 15ff), but Ephorus too as well as many minor sources; and he was
of course familiar with Xenophon. This does not mean that he did not often follow specific sources for particular
narratives. The problem is that we cannot always distinguish these. It would not be unreasonable to suppose that
he used Callisthenes for Pel. 23; but it would be dangerous to assume that he relied only on Callisthenes (as
Buckler, 1980c: 75f.; Tuplin, 1987: 84).
Pel. 23 is full of military terms. Some of these were used in the 4th century; e.g. (for the meaning of
: Roussel, 1969: 336f.), and with the same meaning as later. Others, such as
and , were certainly used in the 4th century (cf. X. Cyr.7. 1. 6, 23; 7. 5. 3; An.1. 10. 9), but
we cannot be sure that Plutarch means the same thing by them as a 4th-century historian would ( pace e.g.
Anderson, 1970:
-400-

324f. n. 61). Plutarch in fact appears to use and as synonyms here. Being unmilitary, and living
centuries after the events, Plutarch would not have fully understood the technical language of the 4th century. Like D,
he would have tended to confuse as well as read his own terms into the sources. It is quite possible, therefore, that he
means the same by and as Arrian at An. 3. 12. 2 ( . . . : Pel. 23. 3;
phi: An. 3. 12. 2), i.e. a simple extension (making longer) of the right wing of the
phalanx though not by adding more troops to it as in Arrian, but by marching to the right as we know the Spartans did
on other occasions (see 55. 3n.).
Buckler, 1980c: 83ff, interprets Plutarch's to mean that 'Kleombrotos at Leuktra was attempting to fold
back the right, i.e. Spartan, wing ( ) by withdrawing elements . . . from the left of the right wing
and moving them behind the line, which remained facing ahead' (1980c: 85). But Plutarch in fact says that the
Spartans at the same time, i.e. the whole wing was in motion, whereas Buckler requires it to
remain stationary. This is against Xenophon too who says that Cleombrotus had begun to lead (
: H. 6. 4. 13) when the Thebans charged. Less unsatisfactory in this respect, but not any more acceptable (because
not in agreement with what Xenophon says), is Lazenby's 'compromise . . . that the Spartans tried to do two things at
once -- increase the depth of their phalanx and "lead it round" to take the advancing Thebans in flank' (1985: 159).
Tuplin, 1987: 84ff., examines in detail Buckler and Anderson (see 55. 3n.), agreeing with them in part, but offering
various tentative suggestions of his own.
55. 1. TA TA : 'by an unusual disposition of his own'. D does not explicitly say that the
depth of the Theban phalanx was extraordinary. But he implies it: . . . . . . . . . (5.
4); . . . . . . (56. 1); see 54. 5-56n. for the meaning of these terms in D and
55. 4-56. 3n. and the Appendix for what they signify for the battle of Leuctra. Ephorus, it may be assumed, was more
explicit. The only indication in Plutarch of the depth of the Theban phalanx is the adverb which he uses:
K ('E )
-401-

. 'That he might thrust back Cleombrotus by falling on the (Spartan) wing in a mass (or in a body)' ( Pel.
23. 1). refers to the Spartan wing (cf. Thuc. 3. 78. 1; Flacelire and Chambry in the Bud of the Pel.
(1966), 160), not to the Theban formation which was not a column as it was wider than it was deep (see below);
it was a deep phalanx. Perrin mistranslates in the Loeb, as does Buckler, 1985: 139. Buckler's insistence that the
Theban formation was a column (a 'deep column', a 'beak-like column', even a 'very deep column': 1985: 142) is
the one flaw in a study which decisively refutes Devine's far-fetched hypothesis that Epaminondas formed his
troops into a hollow, wedge-shaped formation both now and at Mantinea: 1983: 201ff Anderson, 1970: 210, and
Lazenby, 1985: 201 n. 16, translate 'in the flank', but this would have been impossible for the
Thebans to accomplish.
X. H. 6. 4. 12 provides the best evidence for the depth of the Theban line: while the Spartan line was no more
than 12 deep, the Thebans . We may doubt that the Thebans charged 50 shields
deep (cf. Cawkwell, 1972: 261). Their objective was to push the Spartans back and cause their line to disintegrate
( X. H. 6. 4. 12; Plut. Pel. 23. 1). As the Spartans were no more than 12 deep, the Thebans had only to make
their phalanx, say, 25 shields deep to achieve their purpose. We know that they were 25 shields deep at Delium
in 424 (Thuc. 4. 93. 4), and it is possible that that was their depth at Corinth in 394 too ( X. H. 4. 2. 18). To have
given their phalanx twice that depth at Leuctra would have been a wasteful use of their none too plentiful
hoplites. On the other hand we may accept that Xenophon's Spartan informants, who had perhaps been posted on
the Spartan right which had extended beyond the Theban left, actually counted some 50 Theban ranks.
One explanation for this may be that the Thebans charged in two successive waves, each 25 shields deep.
Another, and more likely, involves the role played by the Sacred Band. According to Plut. Pel.23. 2f. (cf. D 15. 81.
2; Dinarch. 1. 72.f.), Pelopidas with the Sacred Band charged in advance of the main Theban formation and
anticipated Cleombrotus' outflanking manuvre. The king, positioned on his own right, had been engaged in
marching diagonally to the right at the time. Now, if both the main Theban formation and the Sacred Band were
arranged 25 shields deep, and
-402if the latter was posted immediately behind the extreme Theban left, then that would explain why the Spartans
considered the Theban line to have been 50 shields deep. (Cf. Anderson, 1970: 217ff) The unusual position of the
Sacred Band can be explained in three ways. (1) It was meant to mislead the Spartans about the strength of the
Theban formation (and in so doing to intimidate them perhaps). (2) It was one way of keeping the Sacred Band

out of the way of the main formation, as the two bodies were intended to act independently. (3) At any rate, the
Sacred Band had to be on the Theban extreme left because its task was to neutralize the Spartan encircling
manuvre. Though not an exact parallel, it might be helpful to cite the battle of Amphipolis in 422 and Brasidas'
dispositions which provided for two successive attacks on the enemy, first, by a small, select unit which caught
the enemy unawares, terrified him, and 'fixed' his formation; followed by the main body of troops shortly
afterwards (Thuc. 5. 8ff).
The number of Lacedaemonians present was about 2,300 (32. 1 nn.; 53. 2n.). Arranged 12 deep they presented a
front of 190 men. If the Thebans numbered about 3,000 (52. 2n.), an arrangement of 25 deep would give them a
front of 120 men. To this we may add the Sacred Band arranged 12 broad and 25 deep. Thus the Theban line was
able to engage most of the Spartan line. A Theban front wider than that allowed by a formation 50 shields deep
does away with the problem posed by Anderson (1970: 215) and satisfactorily explains the high number of
Lacedaemonians killed.
55. 2. : D is guilty of some errors and of vagueness here. He does not distinguish between the
Thebans and the rest of the Boeotians, but writes as though Epaminondas placed on the left the best men
selected from the entire Boeotian army (as it happened, the Theban contingent did include the best Boeotian
fighting men, especially in its elite unit, the Sacred Band). In fact D does not even specify which wing it was that
Epaminondas used to charge the Spartans with.
The Theban plan emerges reasonably clear from a combination of D, Plutarch, and Xenophon. Epaminondas
placed his Thebans, arranged in a deep phalanx, on the left wing opposite the Spartans, while he instructed the
rest of the Boeotians on the right (presumably standing in a phalanx of the usual depth?) who faced the Spartan
allies to avoid battle as far as possible (
-403 and : 55. 2). This is the loxe phalanx of D and Plutarch; cf. Polyb. 12. 25f:
. Lvque and Vidal-Naquet, 1960: 294ff, speculate that Epaminondas'
concentration of force on, and use of, his left wing, was the result of his Pythagorean training. This is
unnecessary, for there is a simpler explanation; his wish to get at the Spartans. (Cf. Cartledge, 1987: 240.)
Epaminondas intended to overwhelm the Spartans with the weight of his deep left wing. Because the Spartan line
was longer, he was forced to march diagonally across the field to the left. The angle at which he did so was
perhaps increased as Cleombrotus countered by beginning to march diagonally to the right (see below). I agree
with Cawkwell (1972: 261 n. 3) that Plutarch is not necessarily using his terminology differently from D here, and
that the move to the left ( ) by Epaminondas was in addition to his having the phalanx loxe (contra
Anderson, 1970: 324 n. 60).
55. 3. v : what the Spartans did, or attempted to do, is the most controversial
aspect of the battle. This is largely because of the difficulty of interpreting Plutarch. I incline towards the simplest
interpretation possible (see 55-56n.). One may agree at the outset that the Spartans had intended to encircle the
Thebans as Plutarch attests. The crux of the matter then is: how could they achieve this? The answer to this
question requires the refutation of Anderson's reconstruction of the attempted Spartan manceuvre (1970: 211ff;
accepted by e.g. Tuplin, 1987: 86ff.).
The way an outflanking manuvre was carried out by a longer line is exemplified, in Anderson's view, by the
'Battle of Thymbrara', i.e. the battle between Croesus and Cyrus, as imagined by Xenophon at Cyr.7. 1. 5ff: the
phalanx attempting the encircling manuvre would come to a stop. Either or both wings would turn into column
and march out. They would then wheel forward through 90 degrees so as to be at right angles to the stationary
centre of the phalanx. The men would face in the same direction and be ready to take in flank the enemy
attacking their own centre. This is the sort of manuvre envisaged by Plutarch. It is Anderson's view too that the
way in which the Spartans took the Athenians in flank at Corinth in 394, and then swept the battlefield, is that
outlined by Xenophon in the Cyropaedia.
-404-

It is not possible to enter into a discussion of the character of the Cyropaedia here, but one's initial suspicion that the
work is concerned more with the ideal than the real is borne out by closer investigation. The ponderous tactics of the
'Battle of Thymbrara', involving hundreds of thousands of men, bear little relation to the actual battles of the 5th and
4th centuries fought between relatively small Greek forces.
At Corinth in 394, the Spartans, who were on the right of the line, realizing that the enemy was on the move, took up
their positions, and . . . ( X. H. 4. 2. 19). This does not mean that they first turned into column
and marched out to the right (as Anderson, 1970: 145). It simply means that they began moving forward, but bearing
to the right in exactly the same way as the Thebans ( X. H. 4. 2. 18). The result of this Spartan
diagonal march to the right was that their right wing now extended a long way beyond the Athenian left wing. When
the Spartans were within less than a stade of the Athenians (i.e. less than 200 yards; and they could not have got as
near as that unless they were marching forward as well as bearing to the right at the same time, and not just moving
out to the right in column) they performed the customary sacrifice and then
; and when the two lines met, the Spartans ( H. 4. 2. 20f.). It is obvious that
the bending forward of the Spartan right wing began while the Spartan phalanx was advancing and at a distance of
less than 200 yards. (Contrast, on the other hand, Cyr.7. 1. 5ff and Anderson, 1970: 182f. and 211, for the necessity
of the phalanx to remain stationary while the encircling manuvre is carried out, and for the considerable distance
required between friend and foe before the movement could be attempted.)

According to Anderson, the Spartan encircling manuvre at Corinth resulted in a second Spartan phalanx 'drawn up at
right angles to the first, "like the letter gamma" ' and it was this second phalanx which 'now advanced across the
battlefield, cutting up the enemy contingents one after another'. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is clear
from Xenophon that the Spartans went on their way across the battlefield keeping together in one body, i.e. the entire
phalanx was advancing and not just a part of it ( H. 4. 2. 21).
-405More examples from Thucydides and Xenophon show that the outflanking manuvre was not executed in the manner
of Cyr.7. 1. 5ff At the battle of Olpae in 426 this is how Thucydides describes the encircling attempt of the
Peloponnesians: (3. 108. 1.); i.e. the two lines first came
together and then the kyklosis movement was put into operation. Again, at Mantinea in 418 one meets with the same:
the two sides were already in conflict before T+
A(Thuc. 5. 73. 1).
It thus seems clear from the evidence of actual battles that, contrary to Cyr.7. 5ff, the kyklosis tactic was rather a
simple and straightforward matter: as the two hostile formations closed on each other, the one which was longer bent
forward its projecting wing and took the enemy in flank. The wheeling round of the wing followed the shortest possible
line. Anderson, 1970: 183, objects that such a direct attack would have been too difficult for hoplites to execute. But
the diagonal moves of the Thebans and Spartans at Corinth (and of course that of the Thebans at Leuctra) were
considerably more difficult to execute. We may further compare the encounter between Spartans and Argives at
Corinth: the Spartans were advancing across the field when they met the retreating Argives. The two formations were
other words, the initial impulse of the first polemarch had been to clash with the
moving along directions at
Argives head-on. The Spartans could only have achieved that by wheeling their entire phalanx sharply to the left. It
emerges from this that Greek hoplites, the best of them at any rate, were capable of rather more flexible manuvres
in the field than Anderson gives them credit for.
This, therefore, is how Plut. Pel. 23. 2f. should be interpreted. The Spartans were marching diagonally to the right, and
their right wing had, perhaps, already begun to bend forward for the kyklosis when the Thebans charged at the double
thus spoiling the manuvre. Pelopidas and the Sacred Band attacked ahead of the main phalanx and possibly smashed
into the leading mora (with
-406-

which the king presumably was: 32. 1n.), pinning it down and making kyklosis impossible. The confusion amongst
the Spartans remarked by Plutarch is adequately explained by this and by the reasons given above (55-56 n.:
Xenophon on Leuctra).
: the Spartan phalanx became 'crescent-shaped' because of the encircling manuvre which Cleombrotus
had attempted to effect; see previous n. and 54. 5-56 n. For different suggestions see Wolter, AS iv. 308f.;
Judeich, 1927: 196; Cawkwell, 1972: 262.
55. 4-56. 3. For a while the Spartans stood firm and it was at this time that Cleombrotus fell. In the end the
Theban weight told; the Spartans were pushed right off the field with great loss; cf. X. H. 6. 4. 13f.; Paus. 9. 13.
10. For the nature of hoplite fighting see the Appendix.
56. 4. : an impossibly high number as there had been no more than some 2,300
Lacedaemonians present (53. 2n.). X. H. 6. 4. 15 gives the correct figures: nearly 1,000 Lacedaemonians killed
including about 400 Spartiates; cf. Plut. Ages. 28. 8; Paus. 9. 13. 12; Aristid. Leuctr. 1. 18. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom.
2. 17. 2 gives 1,700 Spartiates killed; he must have confused Xenophon's numbers. Four hundred Spartiates
killed out of a total of 700 ( X. H. 6. 4. 15) is a very high proportion. It is explained by the fact that (a) there was
a high concentration of Spartiates around the king in the first mora (see 32. 1n.) and that was where the fighting
was at its severest, (b) the Spartiates fought mostly in the front ranks (Isocr. 12. 180), and (c) the Theban
phalanx was probably broader than generally assumed (see 55. 1n.).
: Xenophon gives no figures. Paus. 9. 13. 12 says forty-seven.
: cf. X. H. 6. 4. 15; Paus. 9. 13. 11f. The intervention of Jason and the relief expedition
under Archidamus belong now; see 54. 5-56n.

Archon Dysnicetus, 370/169

57. 1. 'P : 378 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 638. All four tribunes promised are named and they correspond to the
first four of the six given by Livy (6. 31. 1). See pp. 27 f.
-407The peace congress at Athens, 371/0
The Spartan disaster at Leuctra signalled the start of a new struggle for the hegemony of Greece. There were three
contestants: Boeotia (i.e. Thebes), Jason (60. 1-2), and of course Athens. Athens was already a co-prostates of the
Peace (38. 4 and n.) and some time after the battle she took a step (omitted by D: see below) aimed at securing for

herself the sole prostasia of the Peace. At a general congress in Athens (almost certainly not attended by the Boeotians
and Jason) all the participants (with the exception of Elis) swore to 'abide by the treaty sent down by the King and by
the psephismata of the Athenians and their allies'. This was accompanied by a compulsory sanctions clause ( X. H. 6.
5. 1-3; Svt270). In other words Athens with her alliance was now to be what Sparta and her alliance had been vis-vis the King's Peace till 375. This is the most satisfactory interpretation of the stipulation to abide by the decisions of
the Athenians and their allies. But problems do remain and many prefer to see this difficult clause as aimed at the
further expansion of the Athenian Confederacy (see esp. Swoboda, Rhein. Mus. 49 ( 1894), 324ff.; Accame, 1941:
160ff; Momigliano, 1934b: 487ff.; cf. Woodhead, 1957a: 373; Duani, 1979: 330ff. Contra Hampl, 1938: 20ff.;
Sordi, 1951: 34ff.; Ryder, 1965: 132f.; cf. Seager, 1974: 54f.; Sealey, 1993: 69f.).
Obviously, if the congress amounted to an attempt to enlarge the Athenian Confederacy, we could hardly expect
Sparta to have participated. But Sparta did participate and her participation is evidence that the congress was
concerned with the renewal of the King's Peace though it is doubtful whether there had been enough time for the King
to have sent down another rescript. Xenophon could have been more explicit about the Spartan participation, but he
says enough to indicate that Sparta swore to the Peace. .... . . . . .
'H, he says at 6. 5. 2-3. Sparta must have been amongst these . (Lewis disagrees: Hornblower,
1983: 224 with 311 n. 4. But at H. 6. 5. 37, even as interpreted by Lewis, need not exclude Sparta. I
cannot therefore see why it is an argument against Spartan participation.) Unlike the Peace at Sparta, the Peace at
Athens made it obligatory to go to the aid of any city + z+. If Sparta was not amongst these then H. 6. 5.
36 makes no sense: the Athenians, claimed the Spartan envoys in the winter
-408-

of 370/69, were obliged to help Sparta . And it was on the basis of these same horkoi that
Sparta attacked Mantinea shortly before this time (X. H. 6. 5. 10; 6. 5. 36). Further evidence for Spartan
participation is also provided by Tod 133 lines 24 ff where Dionysius and his sons fare praised in 368 for aiding
the
King's Peace concluded by the Athenians, Lacedaemonians, and the rest of the Greeks. The Peace in question is
surely that made at Athens( Hampl, 1938: :21 ff.; 50. 4n.).
One might object to the above by pointing to the sharing of the hegemony between Athens and Sparta in spring
369. If they shared the leadership in 369, is it possible that Athens insisted on the sole prostasia in 371 and, what
is more, that Sparta consented? But things were clearly very different in 369 from what they had been in 371.
Jason was dead and Thebes had united under her the whole of central Greece (57. 1 and nn.). Athens now felt
threatened no less than Sparta and a joint hegemony may have seemed safer. Why did Sparta go along in 371?
The weeks after Leuctra must have been extremely worrying for Sparta. The democratic wind of change was
blowing in the Peloponnese and there may have been a fear of intervention by Thebes. An even greater fear must
have been the possibility of Athens joining Thebes and exploiting the Spartan weakness to the full. The
antiSpartan, pro-Theban group at Athens doubtless urged just that (cf. Seager, 1974: 54). The Spartan
willingness therefore to allow Athens the prestige (and responsibility) of the sole prostasta of the Peace was good
diplomacy. It ensured that Athens would oppose Thebes and stand by Sparta.
Further Spartan concessions, likewise geared towards securing Athenian co-operation, concerned the recognition
of Athens' claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese by 'the Greeks' referred to by Aesch. 2. 32; Demosth. 9. 16;
19. 253; ps.-Demosth. 7. 29; cf. Papastavrou, 1937-8: 53 ff., who suggests this as the time for the recognition.
Aeschines' mention of Amyntas of Macedon sets a terminus ante quem of 369/8 to the event (see p. 34 ). The
peace congresses of 375 and 372/1 with their voluntary guarantee clauses should be excluded as possible
occasions for the recognition, the first one in particular as it was too soon after the foundation of the Athenian
Confederacy. That leaves the congress at Athens after Leuctra, and the conferences at which Sparta and her allies
sought and obtained an alliance with Athens in winter 370/69
-409and spring 369 (X. H. 6. 5. 33 ff.; 7. 1. 1 ff.). The latter occasion is preferred by Accame, 1941: 155 ff.;
Cawkwell, 1961: 80 ff.; Ryder, 1965: 128 ff.; and Sealey, 1993: 75 f. The former is more likely, however (
Sealey, 1993: 75 f., does not exclude it as a possibility), as Aeschines' language suggests a general congress:
+ + Hampl's objection to Papastavrou (
1938: 18ff.) that an Athenian would not have referred to the Peace at Athens as an alliance of the Spartans and
the other Greeks is uncompelling because, first, the Athenians did not of course have to recognize their own
claims to Amphipolis; the recognition naturally had to come from the other Greeks. Now Boeotia and her allies
were absent and so was the Great King. The main participants, apart from Athens and the members of her
Confederacy, were Sparta and her allies; hence Aeschines' wording: 'an alliance of the Spartans and the other
Greeks having assembled etc.' And it was unnecessary for the orator to mention the fact that the meeting was at
Athens. Sparta and her allies, therefore, recognized the Athenian claims (to both Amphipolis and the Chersonese
at the same time: thus rightly Sealey, 1993: 288 n. 5, against Cawkwell, though not because there was no
common peace in 366/5, as Sealey believes) in 371; Boeotia and the King did so in 366/5 (see 76. 3 n.). Second,
Aeschines' term for the congress, symmachia, is not as strange as it seems to Ryder ( 1965: 129) for the Peace at
Athens was also an alliance: . . . (H. 6. 5. 2). This, in fact, was the main
difference between this Peace and its predecessors (cf. 5. 1 n.).
D omits the Peace at Athens. Rather than believe that Ephorus did not deal with it, it is better to assume that D's
method of working is responsible. On completing the narrative of Leuctra D perhaps consulted the chronographer
under Dysnicetus (370/69). He then sought in Ephorus the events he found entered there under that year. As a
result the Peace of 371/0 was overlooked.

57. 1. Thebes consolidates her position in

central Greece
+ : cf. p. 120. But Epaminondas would also have had practical reasons for
preserving Orchomenus; cf. Buckler, 1980a: 66. + : only the 'edited' MS
F
-410reads (adopted in the Teubner); the rest of the MSS read . Vial therefore (p. 146 ad 57. 1) retains the
latter and emends it to . This is quite possibly correct (for a likely corruption of to see
Lysias 12. 66). Orchomenus, she thinks, was admitted to the Confederacy on exactly the same basis as all the
other members. Buckler ( 1980a: 66, 291. n. 33) follows the earlier editors in reading and interprets this
obscure statement to mean that the Orchomenians were not given full equality within the Confederacy, but were
placed under the jurisdiction of their neighbours. I can find no justification for this hypothesis. The simplest
meaning of D is that Orchomenus now joined the Confederacy. The expression + may seem
surprising, but at 28. 1 D does refer to the Boeotian Confederacy as a . + here
therefore can hardly refer to the Orchomenians' neighbours.
+: the Phocians were forced to conclude a defensive alliance with Boeotia: X. H. 6. 5. 23; 7. 5. 4; Ag. 2.
24; Svt 271.
: Xenophon does not mention the Aetolians and D's information has been unnecessarily questioned (e.g.
by Beloch, GG iii. 1. 171). On the third invasion of the Peloponnese in 366 Epamlinondas 'freed' Calydon and
Naupactus, probably handing the cities to the Aetolians, and this would indicate that Aetolia was the ally of
Boeotia (75. 2; schol. Iliad 2. 494 (Erbse); cf. Bosworth, 1976: 172 n. 69). A former objection that 'Aetolians'
here points to the existence of the Aetolian Confederacy at too early a date was removed by the discovery in 1937
of Tod 137 which proves the existence of the Confederacy in autumn 367 (see SEG xii. 100). Schweigert's
suggestion (1939: 5 ff.), that after Leuctra Epaminondas was responsible for the transformation of Aetolia from a
cantonal state to a Confederacy, has not found wide acceptance. In fact the Aetolian Confederacy appears to
antedate Leuctra (see Sordi, 1953: 419 ff.; Larsen, 1968: 78 ff., 196 f.) and may already have existed in the 5th
century ( Kelly, 1978: 133 ff.). : both the western (Ozolian) and eastern (Opuntian) Locrians are meant;
cf. X. H. 6. 5. 23; Ag. 2. 24.
: the Phocians and Locrians had been allied to Sparta(31. 2) and the Aetolians too had probably not been
on the best of terms with the Boeotians. But in addition to simple friendship, an alliance was concluded in the case
of the Phocians and Locrians and probably the Aetolians too.
-411 and , frequently found together in inscriptions (cf. Svt174 line 3; 184 lines 21f.; 208 line 11; Tod
118 = Svt248 lines 9f.; Tod 157 = Svt309 line 39; Tod 168 = Svt328 lines 9f.), are often interchangeable in the
literary sources; cf. X. H. 7. 1. 2; 7. 4. 2-4.
: these successes, therefore, were the result of a single campaign according to D. They belong either in
371 after Leuctra or in 370. The list of Boeotian allies can be increased from X. H. 6. 5. 23; Ag. 2. 24. At some
time between Leuctra and winter 370/69 the Euboean cities and Acarnania deserted the Athenian Confederacy
and joined Boeotia (X. H. 6. 5. 23; Ag. 2. 24). The winning over of the Heracleots, Thessalians Melians (Malians),
and Aenianes, on the other hand, was an early result of Jason's death (57. 2n.; Sordi, 1958: 192; contra
Westlake, 1935: 128f.). D mentions the last three as accompanying the Boeotians in 362 (85. 2).
A subject which has received little attention concerns the relation between Boeotia and her allies. Admittedly
there is a dearth of evidence, but it would appear that the Boeotians imitated the Athenian Confederacy and
organized their allies into a synedrion which sat at Thebes and which passed dogmata binding on all; see Tod 160
(date 355-350)lines 11 , 24 ; X. H. 7. 3. 11 (Sicyonians addressing the Theban boule
in 366/5):

.See also Hornblower, 1983:168,232; Lewis in Essays Boiotia, 71ff.

Byzantium revolted from the Athenian Confederacy and joined Thebes probably in 364 (79. 1n.). The Byzantian
synedroi in the inscription can only have been delegates to a synedrion of Boeotian allies, not to the Boeotian
'Bundesrat' (Beloch, GG iii. 1. 197 n. 4; cf. Hammond, 1979: 206 ). Equally, the passage quoted from the
Hellenica points to a synedrion of allies which issued koina dogmata; H. 7. 3. 1 . Sections 7. 3. 1
and 7. 3. 11 taken together perhaps indicate that a decision was taken by the allies that no citizens were to be
exiled from member states and no exiles received back without a common decree of the allies. The purpose of
such a provision is obvious.
The evidence is too meagre to do more than allow a guess at
-412-

what the Boeotian position vis--vis the allied synedrion was. X. H. 7. 1. 24 seems to say that the Arcadians (and
presumably the rest of the allies too) were duty-bound to follow Boeotian leadership in war, and as the hegemon
Boeotia, like Athens, may have been outside the allied synedrion and on a par with it. X. H. 7. 5. 4 does not contradict
this as the members the Athenian Confederacy owed no more to Athens (Svt 257 =Tod 123 lines 46ff.; Svt 263 =

127). The Boeotian and Athenian alliances were different in this respect from the Peloponnesian League which forced
its members to follow Sparta wherever she led them.
Roy, 1971: 594ff. , discusses the alliances within the Peloponnese in the 360s as well as the alliances of the
Peloponnesian states with Boeotia. His analysis would have been facilitated and brought to a more satisfactory
conclusion had he assumed the existence of an allied synedrion. Buckler, 1980a: 73f., denies that such a synedrion
was established, while Busolt, GS ii. 1425f., restricts it to the allies in central Greece.

57. 2. Jason increases his power

+ + : Jason was on his way back from Leuctra as X. H. 6. 4. 27 says. From Boeotia he
crossed into Phocis and captured the suburb of Hyampolis. Then he marched through Opuntian Locris. Arriving at
Heraclea in Trachis he captured the city by treachery and destroyed it, giving its territory to the Oetaeans and Melians.
X. H. 6. 4. 27 stresses that the destruction of Heraclea was not a defensive measure. On the contrary, he wanted to
keep Thermopylae open in case he should want to move south again; see Westlake, 1935: 95; Sordi, 1958: 182f.;
Buckler, 1980a: 67; Tuplin, 1993: 118f. and n. 49.
+ . . . +: for the foundation of Heraclea in 426, the hostile neighbouring tribes and the
subsequent history of the place, see Thuc. 3. 92f.; 5. 51. 1 and HCT ad loc.; D 12. 59. 3ff.; 77. 4; 14. 38. 4f.; 82. 6f.
: the mountainous region on the northern border of Thessaly which commanded the two important passes
into
Macedonia; see Head, 1911: 304; Lenk, RE xix. 906ff; Hornblower, 1983: 186, 223. Those who follow Xenophon and
date Jason's election to the tageia in 375 assign the subjection of Perrhaebia to that time or in the period 375-371; cf.
Westlake,
-413-

1935: 84f.; Sordi, 1958: 178. It is argued above (chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 3) that Jason's tageia in
fact belongs after Leuctra, as do the successes sketched here.
. . . : i.e. he had not yet been elected tagos; see previous n.

57. 3-58. The skytalismos at Argos

57. 3. : yet at 13. 48. 2 Some 1,500 leading citizens are said to have perished at Corcyra in 410 as a
result of a stasis. On this occasion more than 1,200 (58. 3; but see n. ad loc.).
. . . : so called too by Plut. Mor. 814b. The incident is referred to by Isocr. 5. 52 (in general
terms), Dion. Hal. Ant. 7. 66. 5, and Aristid. Panath. 273, 31 1; schol. 166. 11 Dind. According to Plutarch and
Aristides, Athens helped to bring about a reconciliation between the factions. Xenophon does not mention the
event; cf. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 174f.; Meyer, GdA v. 420; Tomlinson, 1972: 139f. Aeneas Tact. 11. 7-10 does not
refer to the skytalismos as Hug, 1877: 6n. 6, thought (he is followed by Bon in the Bud edn. of Aeneas ( 1964),
22 n. 1, and others, though not by David, 1986, or Whitehead ad loc.), but it should be seen in the context of
Thuc. 5. 83. 1f. (summer 417). It is called the (Aeneas Tact. 11.7) because of the first attack in
winter 418/7 which resulted in a short-lived oligarchy (Aeneas Tact. 17. 2-4; Thuc. 5. 81. 2; D 12. 80. 2-3).
Missing the significance of Aeneas' distinction between a first and a second oligarchic attack, David, 1986: 343ff.,
attempts to date 11. 7-10 in the period 386-371, wrongly in my opinion.
58. 1. + . . . : it is true of course that Argos was not allied to Sparta, as Roy
observes (1971: 570; 1973: 138 n. 19), but there must surely have been a connection between this massacre
and what was occurring in neighbouring Arcadia at the same time. Argive and Arcadian democrats had long
supported each other. At the dioikismos of Mantinea in 385 some of the sixty democratic leaders expelled whom
X. H. 5. 2. 6 describes as went to Athens (IG ii2 33); the rest must have taken refuge at Argos.
Democratic Argos in fact was a haven for Peloponnesian democratic exiles (40. 3, 5). At this time a democratic,
anti-Sartan movement was gaining momentum in
-414Arcadia (59. 1n.) and democrats at Argos, whether Argives or Arcadian exiles, must have been heavily involved.
The wealthy victims of skytalismos had perhaps tried to keep Argos out of Arcadian affairs, not wishing to be
involved in the war against Sparta that was bound to follow if Arcadia revolted.
There was of course a strong, usually predominantly so, socioeconomic undercurrent in the strife between
democrats and oligarchs, rich and poor, in Greece as the evidence of Aristophanes, Plato, and Isocrates, to mention but three of the
major sources, makes clear, and Argos was no exception as D's language indicates: + +
(58. 1; cf. Isocr. 5. 52); + (58. 2); (58. 3). See

the detailed studies by Fuks, 1972: 17ff. esp. 35 n. 66; id., 1974: 51ff. esp. 71f.
58.3. : the reading of MSP omits . F (and JK) read ,
but these are derivative and 'emended' MSS (see Preface).
58. 4. + . . . : this may well represent Ephorus' own sentiment; see pp. 12 f.

59. The Arcadian Confederacy

59. 1. : the bloody stasis at Tegea clearly belongs not earlier than autumn 370 for
Agesilaus terminated his Arcadian campaign in midwinter 370/69, and very shortly afterwards the Boeotians were
reported as having arrived at Mantinea (X. H. 6. 5. 20, 22). At the beginning of the stasis the Arcadian
Confederacy was still at the planning stage. In fact it was the agitation to set up the Confederacy which
precipitated the stasis (X. H. 6. 5. 6f.). The foundation of the Confederacy therefore belongs late in 370 ( Roy,
1971: 569ff. , and 1974: 505ff. against Dugani, 1970: 281ff., who dates the foundation to Aug./Sept. 371).
Even if D's account is preferred to that of Xenophon, that is, that the initiative came from Lycomedes and
Mantinea, and that the Confederacy had already been founded when stasis broke out, it does not argue for a date
earlier than 370. In fact ch. 59 bears every mark of being a typical Diodoran excerpt of an Ephoran narrative: he
provides Lycomedes with the wrong ethnikon, has Agesilaus attack Tegea instead of Mantinea, and concludes with
a stereotype comment:
-415-

+ + + +. One may not, therefore,

safely assume that Ephorus dated the foundation of the Confederacy before the stasis at Tegea though, even if he did,
370 remains the more likely year than 371. However, the actual date of the foundation apart, the idea must have been
canvassed for some while. The synoikismos of Mantinea was clearly a necessary preliminary and that event probably
took place in the autumn of 371 immediately after the peace congress at Athens (at least that is the impression one
derives from X. H. 6. 5. 3).
. . . : an oversimplification for though Lycomedes was a leading, if not the leading, figure in the first
few years of the Confederacy, democrats from both Mantinea and Tegea and indeed the rest of Arcadia doubtless cooperated in its foundation. Arcadian exiles living at Argos, and even at Athens, must have played their part too (58.
1n.). In addition, Eleans and Argives lent their support (62. 3; X. H. 6. 5. 5, 16, 19, 23).
: he was a Mantinean as D himself says at 62. 2; cf. X. H. 7. 1. 23; Paus. 8. 27. 2. For such confusions in D
see p. 138.
: see 28. 1n.
: on the Confederacy see further 62. 2; 67. 2; 72. 3f; X. H. 6. 5. 6, 11, 12; 7. 1. 23ff., 39; 7.
3. 1; 7. 4. 2, 12, 33ff.; Paus. 8. 27. 2; Tod 132; Svt272; Busolt, GS 11. 1395ff.; Schaefer, 1961: 310ff.; Larsen,
1968: 180ff.; Duani, 1970; Roy, 1971: 569ff. ; id., 1974: 505ff.; Buckler, 1980a: 71. On Lycomedes, Miller, RE xiii.
2299 (6). Ultimate authority on major issues lay with the primary assembly, the Myrioi. Both the events which led to
its creation and its brief history make it clear that the Confederacy was democratic (cf. Roy, 1971: 569ff. ), though it is
difficult to say just how democratic. As Larsen observes in reviewing the question, 'magistrates, council and assembly
were fully as much at home in a moderate oligarchy as in a democracy' and more important is the fact that such
numbers as five and ten thousand, when mentioned in connection with constitutions, are associated with moderate
oligarchies' (1968: 194). It may be doubted, therefore, that democracy in Arcadia was as broadly based as at Athens.
The Myrioi were probably meant to include roughly all Arcadians of hoplite status and not all free adult males. The
name certainly suggests some property qualification. The Confederacy was democratic in the sense that it allowed full
rights
-416-

to more people than the regimes favoured by Sparta (cf. Schaefer, 1961: 292ff., on the significance of the figure
10,000 in Greek history; pp. 310 -14 on the Arcadian Myrioi.)
Apart from the assembly there was also a federal boule; see Tod 132 lines 2-4: + + +
+ + . It is not clear what the body of 50 damiorgol listed in the inscription were; a
subdivision of the boule like the Athenian prytaneis, or executive magistrates? Head of the Confederacy and
supreme commander of its army was the annually elected strategos. Reelection was possible. He was not the only
executive officer though the archontes mentioned in the sources (cf. X. H. 7. 4. 33) may be the same as the
damiorgoi. A feature of the Confederacy was the creation of a standing army, the eparitoi, 5,000 in number, paid
by the state. On taxation see Larsen, 1968: 188f.
An interesting question concerns the capital of the Confederacy. It is generally thought that Megalopolis was
conceived as its federal capital from the start and this may be correct, though the actual foundation of the city did
not take place till 368/7, according to D (Ephorus), and the reasons behind it were primarily military (72. 4 and
n.). The great size of the city does not by itself indicate that it was intended as a capital from the beginning. As it
was meant to be a bulwark against Sparta it necessarily had to be large and populous. In any case, several years
should be allowed for the building of the city, and the Thersilion which eventually accommodated the Myrioi (
Paus8. 32. 1) cannot have been completed before the late 360s. Such evidence as we have for the meetings of

the Myrioi, the boule, and the federal magistrates in the 360s points to Tegea rather than Megalopolis as the
capital. Tod 132, for example, was found at Tegea and the Tegean damiorgot head the list, an indication that the
Myrioi and the boule had met at Tegea. Also, the conference which concluded the peace between Elis and Arcadia
seems to have taken place at Tegea (X. H. 7. 4. 36; but cf. Larsen, 1968: 192 and n. 1). It may further be noted
that the Boeotian garrison dispatched to Arcadia probably in 363 ( Larsen, 1968: 191 and n. 1) was based at
Tegea (cf Roy, 1971: 572 n. 18 ).
59. 2-4. The synoikismos of Mantinea escapes D's attention (see X. H. 6. 5. 3-5; Moggi, 1976: no. 40 251ff.). But
the failure to perceive that the two Spartan campaigns which are related separately and under successive years
(59. 4 under 370/69 and 62. 1-2 under
-417-

369/8) were in fact the complementary moves of the same Spartan plan attempted in winter 370/69 may be due to
Ephorus rather than D. With his Spartan sources Xenophon (H. 6. 5. 10ff.) would have been in a better position to
know.
59. 2. : from the details he supplies it is clear that this is the stasis at Tegea related by X. H. 6.
5. 6-9.
59. 2-3. . . . : X. H. 6. 5. 9f. says that 800 of the party of Stasippus fled to Sparta. He does not
say how many fled to Pallantium, but they must have been very few, a dozen at most, as a single waggon sufficed for
their transport back to Tegea. One may not therefore subtract Xenophon's 800 from D's 1,400 to obtain the number
captured and slaughtered at Pallantium. And in any case, had 600 pro-Spartan oligarchs been butchered by the
democrats, Xenophon would probably have mentioned it.
59. 2. : about 5 miles west of Tegea; cf. Frazer, iv. 420f.; Ernst Meyer, RE xviii. 2. 231ff.
59. 3. . . . +: cf. X. H. 6. 5. 10. The oaths referred to by Xenophon are those of the Peace at Athens
(see under 57. 1).
59. 4. See X. H. 6. 5. 12ff. Xenophon's detailed account perhaps betrays autopsy.

60. 1-2. Jason tagos of Thessaly

60. 1. : Jason was in all probability elected tagos after Leuctra and not before; see
chronological excursus at 45. 3, part 3.
+ : cf. 57. 2 and nn.
60. 1-2. : see excursus at 45. 3, part 3.
60. 2. + . . . +: see 57. 3-58 and nn. This again argues for a post-Leuctra date for the election.
: see p. 362.
+ . . . : D is the only source for an alliance between Jason and Amyntas of Macedon
though Isocr. 5. 20 and Arrian, An. 7. 9. 4, may allude to it. A majority of scholars date the alliance before Leuctra; cf.
Schaefer, 1885-7: ii. 9f.; Geyer, 1930: 126; Westlake, 1935: 86f.; Sordi, 1958: 179ff. All four date it to 374/3. Meyer,
GdA v. 416, is in a minority in accepting a post-Leuctra date. Hornblower, 1983: 223, leaves the
-418-

question open. D, however, sets the alliance in the context of Jason's election to the tageia and his post-Leuctra
date ought, therefore, to be accepted.
Sordi, 1958: 180, takes issue with D for referring to the agreement as an alliance. This, she thinks, is due to a
pro-Macedonian source, probably Callisthenes. Xenophon on the other hand, she suggests, is correct in hinting at
a submission of Macedon to Thessaly and he seems to be supported in this by Isocrates (5. 20) and Arrian (An. 7.
9. 4). X. H. 6. 1. 11, however, cannot be taken as evidence for anything; it merely represents Jason theorizing
about the future, while Isocrates and Arrian may be exaggerating. But in any case, no matter what the precise
relationship between Jason and Amyntas was, it probably went under the title of symmachia and so D is strictly
correct; cf. Svt 275 and 277 -- unequal symmachiai between Boeotia and Macedon.

60. 3-6. Chronographic entries

60. 3. : a Diodoran expression provoked by the observation that the deaths of three rulers
were entered under the same year in the chronographer; cf. 12. 19. 1; 15. 91. 2; 16. 65. 2; 66. 3; 88. 3; 17. 5.

6; 7. 4; 63. 4; 100. 1; 18. 35. 2. : the same explanation applies as for

(previous n.). It does not mark the season of the year ( Spoerri, 1966: 48), though as it happens all three rulers
probably died in the summer, but not of the same year. Such vague expressions abound in D; cf. 15. 34. 3; 50.
4; 59. 1; 80. 1; 81. 5. 'A: Dindorf's emendation. The MSS read ; cf. Vial's n. pp. 147f.
. . . : Amyntas reigned for twenty-four years and died in 369/8 at an advanced age; Isocr. 6.
46; Justin 7. 4. 8; pp. 33ff.
60. 4. 'A . . . : see pp. 37 ff.
60. 5. The story of Jason is thus concluded very briefly with a chronographic entry to which however D chose to
add a couple of morsels from Ephorus (below).
+ + : certainly when compared with the rule of his brothers and nephew; cf. X. H. 6. 4.
33ff. This is likely to be Ephorus' estimate of the rule of Jason whether as tagos of Thessaly or tyrant of Pherae or
both. Pace Westlake, 1935: 84 n. 2 (cf.
-419-

Hornblower, 1983: 223), it does not conflict with 15. 57. 2. For Jason's aggrandizement to have been viewed with
suspicion by many in Thessaly (still before his election to the tageia it would seem) does not mean that he ruled his
subjects harshly.
. . . D introduced the Ephoran version into this collection of chronographic entries; cf. 14.
11. 1 for a similar instance. Ephorus' version was basically that of X. H. 6. 4. 31f. The other version given by D derives
from the chronographer (see next n.). Whereas Xenophon does not supply the seven youths with a motive, Ephorus
said that they had acted for the sake of glory. This is not totally impossible though it is likely that the honours the
assassins received from many Greek cities (X. H. 6. 4. 32) gave rise to this belief. D's other version attributes the
murder to Jason's brother Polydorus. As Polydorus was Jason's immediate successor (see next n.) it was inevitable that
he should come under suspicion. The actual circumstances of the murder were probably never in question, i.e. that
Jason was killed by a group of young men (cf. Val. Max. 9. 10. ext. 2), and what the of the chronographer means
is that Polydorus was suspected of having engineered the plot (cf. Meyer, GdA v. 417).
It is not possible now to determine why Jason was killed and whether the seven youths had acted alone or as part of a
larger, and political, conspiracy. For a sensible discussion see Westlake, 1935: 100ff. For a less sensible one, Sordi,
1958: 188ff. Carrying on from where Tropea left off ( Giasone il tago della Tessaglia ( 1898), 65ff. He suggested two
alternatives: (a) Thebes had originated the conspiracy as she stood to benefit most from Jason's death. (b) Delphi was
involved in the plot), Sordi considers it probable that Delphi was implicated. She bases this on X. H. 6. 4. 31f. and
Aelian quoted in the Suida s.v. : A " 'I + + U 1F75
+ ". But behind Delphi she sees Sparta and even Athens. And not only was the plot hatched outside
Thessaly, but it was executed by non-Thessalians too for, Sordi thinks, there is nothing to suggest that the youths
were Thessalians while on the contrary Xenophon states that they were received with honour by the Greek cities. All
this is surely wrong. The seven youths were clearly participating in the Pheraean cavalry review (X. H. 6. 4. 31).
Military reviews and processions were a good time for getting rid of tyrants as the citizens could freely carry arms on
the day (cf. Thuc. 6. 56. 2; the murder
-420of Hipparchus). The Pheraean cavalry review in fact was part of the general review of Thessalian forces (this is plain
from X. H. 6. 4. 30f.) which marked Jason's election to the tageia; it did not mark the beginning of a campaign against
Persia (as Sordi, 1958: 186ff.).
Jason was murdered late in the summer of 370, just before the Pythian festival of that year which he was preparing to
celebrate. The festival was held in the month Boukatios (Aug./Sept.), and it must have been very near when Jason was
killed because the animals intended for the festival had already been brought in (X. H. 6. 4. 29); cf. Bischoff, RE x.
1589; Beloch, GG iii. 2. 83; Spoerri, 1966: 47f.
' . . . : Under 370/69 the chronographer noticed Jason's murder by his brother Polydorus
who succeeded him and ruled for one year. Under 369/8 (61. 2. The text required emendation; see n. there) he
entered Polydorus' murder by his nephew Alexander who proceeded to rule for eleven years. These statements are not
quite accurate, of course, but they are consistent with what we know about the devices employed by chronographers.
Polydorus had a brother, Polyphron, and together these two ruled for about a year. If Plut. Galba 1 is emended
( ) + , then Polyphron ruled for ten months (which is nearly a year; X. H. 6. 4. 34 gives him one
year) and Polydorus for two. The chronographer, however, ignored Polyphron and gave the entire year to Polydorus
because the latter was the immediate successor of Jason. Compare 12. 64. 1 and 12. 71. 1 and see p. 42
D is not therefore responsible for the misrepresentation of Thessalian history at 60. 5 and 6 1. 2. Xenophon's account
too does not seem to be free from errors. Polydorus and Polyphron are not likely to have ruled as tagoi jointly (X. H. 6.
4. 33, accepted generally; cf. Westlake, 1935: 127f.; Sordi, 1958: 191; Robertson, 1976: 104; Buckler, 1980a: 110).
As Polydorus was the older of the two it makes better sense to suppose that he alone succeeded Jason, both as tyrant
of Pherae and tagos of Thessaly, and that Polyphron followed at his death. We may compare the case of Hippias and
Hipparchus and Thucydides' pronouncements on the point (Thuc. 1. 20. 2; 6. 54f.). A further indication also is the fact
that only Polydorus is said to have been suspected of the murder of Jason. Hence D's chronographer may well be
correct in naming only Polydorus as Jason's successor.
-421-

All three of Jason's successors claimed (and used) the title of tagos though with increasingly less success. It
appears from Xenophon that the tageia was a constitutional office for which the consent of all parts of Thessaly
was required ( Robertson, 1976: 104). The Boeotian involvement in Thessaly (begun very soon after Jason's
death; see 57. 1n.) on the side of those who wished to be free made this an impossible condition to fulfil.
60. 6. In fact Duris of Samos wrote "Macedonica" (or Historiai) from 370/69 to 281/80; FGH iia. 76; Kebric, 1977.

Archon Lysistratus, 369/8

61. 1. 'P : the stasis, followed by a short-lasting period of anarchy, preludes the year of anarchy
noted by D in 15. 75. 1 (367/6). It seems to have been the outcome of the LicinioSextian Rogations, themselves
the result of the problems (political, social, and economic) Rome was facing at the time. (For a good, recent
survey see Cornell in CAH2. vii. 2. 323ff.) Both Livy and the Fasti Capitolini extend the period of anarchy to five
years, but purely for chronological purposes, it seems (see pp. 270 f.). + : 377 V; CAH2 vii. 2.
638. A college of six is announced and six tribunes are in fact named. If is a corruption of C.
Veturius, and K of L. and C. Quinctius ( Drummond, 1980: 59 n. 14, 65 n. 36),
then D's six correspond exactly to Livy's six (6. 32. 3). Cf. Perl, 1957: 127f., 154.

61. 2-5. Thessaly

61. 2. . . . : a chronographic entry. Polyphron the younger brother murdered Polydorus
probably by poisoning him (X. H. 6. 4. 33). Alexander, the son of Polydorus, revenged his father by killing his
uncle (X. H. 6. 4. 35; Plut. Pel. 29. 8); cf. Westlake, 1935: 128. The simplification here is explained by the fact
that the chronographer omitted Polyphron; see 60. 5 n. + + : thus correctly P and X (Vial ad loc.).
The rest of the MSS read + + .
'A + : the MSS read + . : cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 83 f.; Spoerri,
1966: 44ff. + . . . + : X. H. 6. 4. 35ff. and Plut. Pel. 26ff. agree.
-422Though the accusations are probably substantially true, the sources are evidently biased against Alexander; cf.
Westlake, 1935: 131f., 156f.; id., 1939: 14. + : not a strictly accurate generalization; cf. X. H. 6. 4.
34.
61. 3. + : Sordi, 1958: 202f., may be correct that these are the people exiled from Larissa
by Polyphron (X. H. 6. 4. 34), and that the Larissaean appeal to Macedon dates to the time of Polyphron. D
himself in the following section mentions exiles from Larissa as accompanying the king. There may, however,
have been a renewed appeal to Macedon after Alexander had murdered and succeeded his uncle.
'A : the time was probably late summer 369 (see the chronological discussion at 67. 2).
Alexander had newly succeeded his father on the throne (60. 3n.). Buckler, 1980a: 112f., discusses the king's
motives for intervening in Thessaly. For the long-standing friendship between the Macedonian kings and the
Aleuadae of Larissa, cf. Robertson, 1976: 119.
61. 4-5. The king had been too quick for the tyrant who arrived too late and perhaps with insufficient forces;
Geyer, 1930: 128; Westlake, 1935: 130; Sordi, 1958: 202f.; Hammond, 1979: 181 ; Buckler, 1980a: 113.
61. 5. K + : about 15 miles south-west of Larissa, the seat of the other famous Thessalian family, the
Scopadae; see Sthlin, RE xi. 1580ff.
+ : I agree with Geyer, Westlake, Sordi, and Hammond that the king went back on his
promise to free the cities. Buckler, 1980a: 113f., 246, on the other hand, suggests that the king, the Thessalians,
and the Boeotians came to an agreement.

62-67. 1. The first invasion of the Peloponnese

For the chronology see the discussion at 63. 1-2.
62. 1-2. : the time was winter 370 and these events ran parallel to those in 59. 4.
Polytropus' attempt to march against Mantinea from the north was meant to form the other arm of a pincer
movement; see nn. ad 59. 1; 59. 2-4. 62. 1. : cf. 46. 3n. Polytropus had set out from Corinth with a
force collected there: X. H. 6. 5. 11.
. . . X: X. H. 6. 5. 11, on the other hand, specifies
-423that Polytropus' troops were mercenaries. This is perhaps supported in his text by section 13 where it is said that
the Mantineans were in danger of TA Polytropus' troops who were, therefore, peltasts. For

 see 19. 3n.

. . . : there is no reason to reject this information though it is strange that Xenophon
should refer to them as mercenaries. At 64. 2 D says that amongst 200 men killed were + B +
.This is seems contradicted however by 65. 6 where 200 Boeotian exiles are mentioned in the Spartan
service. If the figures are not corrupt (the article should perhaps be deleted at 64. 2?), we must assume that the
number of Boeotian exiles fighting for Sparta had been augmented in the meanwhile; cf. Paus. 9. 15. 4 for
Boeotian exiles near Sicyon in 368. The Argive exiles would have fled the skytalismos (57. 3-58).
: Orchomenus had not yet joined the Arcadian Confederacy; X. H. 6. 5. 11.
62. 2. . . . 'A: see 59. 1 nn.
: cf. 67. 2 ( ). These are clearly the eparitoi of X. H.
7. 4. 22, 33 f., 36; 7. 5. 3, though in this instance the anti-Spartan Arcadian troops in Xenophon (H. 6. 5. 13) are
Mantineans. FGH 70 F215 proves that Ephorus had also called them eparitoi; cf. Hesychius s.v. . Jacoby
suggests that D replaced an obscure technical term with one which would have been readily intelligible to his
readers; cf. Reid, 1974: 132 n. 32. However, the Arcadian term would have been equally unintelligible to readers
of the late 4th century and the way D refers to the corps rather suggests that Ephorus himself did the interpreting
and D chose to use the term alone.
: Pritchett, 1971-91: ii. 223, considers the figure corrupt as too large; but see Buckler, 1980a:
292 n. 3. D is our only authority for their numerical strength. ' : see X. H. 6. 5. 13f.: the
action was fought at Elymia. According to Xenophon Polytropus made the same mistake as Phoebidas in 378 (H.
5. 4. 42ff.). As Xenophon saw it, on both occasions the enemy won out of desperation.
: Xenophon gives no figure, but says that a great many would have been killed but for the Phliasian
cavalry.
62. 3. + . . . + : a stalemate had been reached and clearly outside help was needed
if either side were to
-424-

make any progress. The Arcadians and their allies went to Athens. Xenophon does not mention this, but as he
represents that the Boeotians were already on the march when Agesilaus withdrew (H. 6. 5. 19, 22), we should place
the Arcadian appeal at the point when it was realized that the Spartans intended to intervene in Arcadia. Aristid.
Panath. 285 Dind. wrongly sets the appeal immediately after Leuctra.
+ +H : thus the major part of nonSpartan Peloponnese. Demosth. 16. 12
provides confirmation; cf. Aristid. Panath. 285 Dind.
. . . : Demosth. 16. 12; 16. 27; cf. Paus. 9. 14. 4; Svt 273. For the possibility of a
synedrion of the Boeotian allies to which the Peloponnesians were admitted, see 57. 1n.
62. 4. : perhaps the same as on the second invasion; 7,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry (68. 1).
. . . + : see 57. 1 nn.
. . . + + : it is possible that the entire board of seven Boeotarchs was present ( Buckler,
1980a: 74) though the sources are not explicit. According to Plut. Pel. 24. 3 there were other Boeotarchs besides
Pelopidas and Epaminondas; cf. Mor. 194; 817f; Aelian, VII 13-42. Nepos, Epam. 7.3, and Appian, Syr. 41, on the
other hand, say that there were only three Boeotarchs, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, and one other. D's meaning is not
clear. He may mean that Epaminondas and Pelopidas alone led out the Boeotian army, or he may mean that other
Boeotarchs went along too, but they allowed Epaminondas and Pelopidas to command; the second meaning is
indicated by 68. 1 (cf. 52. 1n.)
62. 5 + : they arrived at Mantinea: X. H. 6. 5. 22. : a Diodoran word; see p. 16.

: at 81. 2 he gives 70,000 which is also

may represent the hoplites, cavalry, and
peltasts, while the 70,000 at 81. 2 may include the light-armed and unarmed.
: the Boeotians had not therefore been dispatched with instructions to invade Laconia. That decision
was taken now in the light of the situation the Boeotarchs discovered in the
-425Peloponnese. This is further indicated by the fact that the Boeotarchs' year of office was almost at its end. X. H. 6. 5.
23ff. is at pains to prove that the Thebans were apprehensive about invading Laconia and that the idea itself was due
to their Peloponnesian allies.

63. 1. : for Spartan numbers see 32. 1n. : see 19. 3n.
63. 1-2. . . . : a botched summary of an Ephoran eulogy of Athens. The Spartan envoys
tried to reach the hearts of the Athenian assembly by reminding it of how Athens and Sparta had always stood
together in times of crisis (X. H. 6. 5. 33f.) and by some sophisticated flattery, according to Callisthenes (FGH 124 F8)
and Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1124b); cf. Pearson, 1960: 31. But the basis of the Spartan appeal, as indeed of that of
the Arcadians and their allies earlier, was the guarantee clause of the Peace at Athens: +
(X. H. 6. 5. 36); see discussion at 57. 1. A Boeotian embassy was perhaps present too;
Buckler, 1980a: 88, 295 n. 28; cf. the argumentum to Aristid. orat. 11-15 Leuctr. (33-7 Dind.).
The date of the Spartan appeal and the chronology of the first invasion
It is generally held that D has misplaced the Spartan appeal to Athens and the march of Iphicrates which, on the
evidence of Xenophon, are said to belong to the spring of 369 when the Boeotians were on the point of withdrawing
from the Peloponnese; cf. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 179; Cary, CAH1 vi. 91; Cartledge, 1979: 299; id., 1987: 384ff.; Buckler,
1980a: 87. This view is nevertheless highly questionable.
D's account is consistent and plausible. As the Boeotians and their allies stood poised to invade Laconia in midwinter
370/69 (see below) the Spartans, well aware of their weakness to meet the impending danger, appealed to Athens.
The Athenians responded and Iphicrates was dispatched. Meanwhile the invasion of Laconia had begun (63. 3-4).
When the Boeotians withdrew from Laconia back into Arcadia (65. 5), the Athenians, + + ,
+ (65. 6). There followed the foundation of Messenia (66). D's account as a whole is out by
a year of course,
-426

but this is of no importance. What matters is the sequence of his narrative and the actual information he supplies.
X. H. 6. 5. 32f. in fact supports D's account. The Boeotians and their allies had been ravaging Laconia and they
had just failed to capture Gytheium when the Athenians, on hearing of these events, called an assembly to
discuss the crisis. The time therefore is midwinter 370/69. e + e + +
. In spite of Xenophon these envoys must have been in Athens in connection with the
appeal (cf. Grote, x. 320; Underhill, ad loc.).
The invasion of Laconia must have come as a complete surprise not only to the Spartans, but to the rest of
Greece also. This is shown by the inadequate defence of Laconia -- the Spartan allies were absent and had to be
sent for in a hurry. When Sparta at last realized what was afoot, and that can only have been a day or two before
her borders were violated, she sent out appeals to her few remaining allies as well as to Athens, as D says. Her
allies, mostly in north-east Peloponnese, did not have to debate the point; they dispatched their contingents at
once -- by sea, as the land routes were closed to them (X. H. 7. 2. 2). When the last of these arrived at Sparta
the enemy was already at Amyclae (X. H. 7. 2. 3). At Athens however the demos could not decide, and when it
finally did, and Iphicrates marched out, the Boeotians had been in Laconia for no less than two weeks or so ( '
: X. H. 6. 5. 27; : H. 6. 5. 30 + e + : H. 6. 5. 32. Cf. Tuplin,
1993: 143 n. 65, who, however, gives 'the quickest timetable for the invaders' movements'). They had failed to
take Sparta itself and they were thinking of withdrawing because of the problems they were facing (H. 6. 5. 50).
How long did they remain in Laconia and the Peloponnese?
When the Boeotarchs set out from Thebes their year of office was drawing to a close, but presumably enough of it
remained, several weeks, to enable them to get to Mantinea and back before the expiry of their office at the time
of the winter solstice (22 Dec.). It was about the time of the winter solstice that Laconia was invaded ( Plut. Pel.
24. 2f.). According to Plut. Ages. 32. 13 the Boeotians remained in the Laconice for three months while in Pel. 25.
2 (cf. Mor. 194c; 817f; Aelian, VH 13. 42) it is said that the Boeotarchs added four months to their office. It was
during these four months, Plutarch says, that they ()
-427 + . Now D in 67. 1 says that the invasion of Laconia and the foundation of
Messenia were accomplished in eighty-five days (I take to refer to these two events rather
than to the whole campaign, as Beloch does, GG iii. 2. 238). We may therefore conclude that the Boeotians
returned home in the fourth month after the winter solstice, that they spent some three months in Laconia and
Messenia, and that they were in the field for some five months in all.
It should be emphasized against e.g. Wiseman, 1969: 178 nn. 2 and 3, that only a very few weeks can have been
spent in Laconia itself, for it would have been impossible for 70,000 men (62. 5n.) to remain there for a longer
time and certainly not for three whole months and those the months of January, February, and March! The
Peloponnesian invasions of Attica in the Archidamian War which were conducted in late spring/early summer
never lasted for more than a few weeks; the second in 430 lasted a mere forty days, and that in fact was the
longest. After the first couple of weeks the problem of keeping a large force supplied became too formidable
(Thuc. 2. 23. 3; 57. 2; 4. 6. 2; Pritchett, 1971-91: i. 38f.).
The Spartan appeal to Athens, therefore, belongs in midwinter 370/69, while the Boeotian withdrawal from the
Peloponnese did not take place till the middle of spring. Why then did Xenophon confuse the issue by having the
Boeotians march home shortly after Iphicrates reached Arcadia? There can be only one answer. Xenophon was
well aware that on their return to Arcadia from Laconia in January the Boeotians, far from returning home,
crossed into Messenia and refounded that ancient state. But he had no intention of relating that event. On
reaching the hateful moment therefore, ' + + , +

 + + + + + (H. 6. 5. 51), he launched an

unwarranted attack on Iphicrates (cf. Meyer, GdA v. 426f.; Buckler, 1980a: 295 n. 30). Meanwhile some two to
three months went by as well as the restoration of Messenia.
The Athenian objective to save Sparta was achieved without the loss of any citizen troops when Epaminondas
withdrew from Laconia. The Athenian citizen levy then probably returned home as D says (65. 6), with the
exception of a part of it which, along with a force of peltasts, remained in Corinth with Iphicrates to
-428-

guard that city as well as to harass the Boeotians on their way home later (Paus. 9. 14. 6).
63. 1. + : the reference is to the building of the walls of Athens after the Persian Wars: 11.
39-40. 4; Thuc. 1. 89. 3-93. 2.
. . . : D must have misunderstood Ephorus' comment for the usual tradition is that the Spartans
resisted a demand by some of their allies to destroy Athens in 404; cf. X. H. 2. 2. 19f.; Isocr. 14. 31; Plut. Lys. 15. 3;
Andoc. 3. 21. The Phocians appear to have spoken up for Athens on that occasion: Demosth. 19. 65; Suida s.v.
where 'Athenians' should be read for 'Thebans'.
63. 2. . . .: Athens was praised by her citizens and admirers for her humanity and kindness
towards the weak and oppressed; cf. X. H. 6. 5. 45; Isocr. 4. 52; 14. 1, 52ff.; Demosth. 23. 156; Aristid. Panath.
172ff. Dind.; Leuctr. 1. 5 (611 Dind.); 70 (641 Dind.). She was often flatteringly criticized too for supposedly choosing
the weak rather than the strong as friends; cf. Andoc. 3. 28; Isocr. 4. 53; Demosth. 20. 3; Plato, Menex. 244e. For
Ephorus' attitude to Athens see pp. 114 ff.
: Callistratus proposed the motion: ps.-Demosth. 59. 27.
: a Diodoran word (p. 16 ), but correctly used here as X. H. 6. 5. 49 confirms.
: the men of military age, as Herod. 9. 12. 2 ( ). D also describes the Athenians sent to
Chaeronea in 338 as neoi (16. 85. 2). We know that on that occasion all men up to the age of 50 were sent out ( Lyc.
c. Leocr. 39).
: according to X. H. 6. 5. 49 they set out on the following day.
: see 29. 7n.
. . .: X. H. 6. 5. 49 agrees that the soldiers were willing, but criticizes Iphicrates for wasting time.
63. 3. . . .: Diodoran rhetoric; the Spartans remained on the defensive in their
unwalled city (65. 1).
63. 4. : cf. X. H. 6. 5. 24, ; Eurip. fr. 1083 (ap. Strabo 8 C 366).
. . . : both logistics and strategy dictated the division
-429of so large a force and the invasion of Laconia from several directions at once (cf. the comments of Buckler, 1980a:
77f.). There is no real disagreement between D and Xenophon for although the latter mentions only two divisions, the
Thebans and Arcadians (i.e. the two most important contingents), and two routes (H. 6. 5. 25), the same as those of D
for the Boeotians and Arcadians, he later speaks of the Eleans and Argives as present in Laconia (H. 6. 5. 30, 50).
Xenophon's information is thus incomplete rather than inconsistent with that of D.
64. 1. . . . : Vial's text. , the reading of all the MSS, is omitted by Vogel, while
Sherman adopts Madvig's emendation . Vial retains the MSS reading and translates: 'Le premier corps, formpar
les Botiens, prit la route directe de la ville de Sellasia.' It was Loring's suggestion that should be retained and
translated 'straight' (1895: 60 n. 135). In any case, as the rest (and less direct) of the principal routes into Laconia
were followed by the other contingents, the Boeotians must in fact have taken the most direct route from Tegea to
Sellasia along the bed of the Sarandapotamos and past Caryae. This road is mentioned in Thuc. 5. 55. 3; Polyb. 16.
37. 4; Livy 34. 26. 9f.; 35. 27. 12f. (see Loring, 1895: 52ff., 60ff.; Buckler, 1980a: 77ff.). For the site of Caryae see
Paus. 3. 10. 7; Jochmus, 1857: 44f., 49; Loring, 1895: 61; Pikoulas, 1987: 137ff. For that of Sellasia, Pritchett, 196585: i. 62ff. X. H. 6. 5. 25, 27 says that the Boeotians found Caryae undefended and that on hearing of the Arcadian
success at Oeum they pressed on to Sellasia.
Hellasia instead of Sellasia and Ischolas instead of Ischolaos (below) may represent traces of Ephoran spelling.
+ . . . : cf. X. H. 6. 5. 25.

64. 2. : from Tegea they marched to Thyreatis (cf. Paus. 8. 54. 4) and from there they invaded Laconia
along the Astros-Sparta road over Mt. Parnon; cf. Paus. 2. 38. 4; Frazer, iii. 305ff.; Loring, 1895: 62; Buckler, 1980a:
78. We should not however assume, with Leake, iii. 29 and Loring, 1895: 62f., that the Argives returned home from
Mantinea before invading Laconia through the Thyreatis. It was probably while negotiating Mt. Parnon that they fell in
with Alexander and his force ( Buckler, 1980a: 79).
-430 + : see Paus. 2. 38. 7.
+ + : see 62. 1n.
64. 3-5. : the Arcadians invaded Laconia through the mountainous region of Sciritis. The route
followed was probably the one discovered recently by Pikoulas, 1987: 146 (map on p. 128 ). At Oeum they met and
annihilated Ischolas (Ischolaos according to Xenophon; cf. Polyaen. 2. 22. But there is no real difference: see above ad
64. 1. On D and Xenophon on Ischolaos see Tuplin, 1986b: 48). Thence they proceeded to Caryae to meet up with the
Boeotians: X. H. 6. 5. 24-7. For Sciritis see Andrewes, HCT iv. 33f.; Pikoulas, 1987: 121ff. For the site of Oeum,
Loring, 1895: 61f.; Pikoulas, 1987: 135f. D's rhetorical account of Ischolas' stand is rather different from that of
Xenophon.
64. 6. ++ : D is too vague for a definite identification of the route taken by the Eleans. One suspects that
they were assigned the easiest route. Of the five principal routes into Laconia from the north ( Pikoulas, 1987: 146
with map p. 128. As he is concerned with the Sciritis Pikoulas does not of course mention the road taken by the
Argives), three have already been accounted for, while the fifth and westernmost which ran north-north-west from
Sparta to Leuctron (near modern Leondari) skirting the Taygetus (identified by Pikoulas, ibid.) cannot possibly have
been followed by the Eleans. This leaves the fourth route. It reached Sparta from the north-west and it was perhaps
the easiest for an army: Loring, 1895: 47ff.; Ernst Meyer, RE xviii. 1014ff.; Andrewes, HCT iv. 91ff. (map opp. p-34).
We may agree that from a point south of the modern village of Skortsinou (near ancient Belmina) the Eleans followed
the Olympia-Sparta road south-east past Pellana, and that they left this road somewhere near Kalyvia of Georgitsi and
heading east crossed the Eurotas and reached Sellasia, the mustering area: Loring, 1895: 63; Buckler, 1980a: 78f.
(map p. 80). The question then is, how did they reach the point south of Skortsinou? According to Pikoulas ( 1987: 146
with map p. 128), on reaching the vicinity of Belmina, the Sparta-Olympia road branched into at least three directions,
one leading to Leuctron, the middle to Asea by way of Orestheion, and the third to Asea again by a more direct route.
Did the Eleans follow the more western route from the plain of Megalopolis (not yet founded) past Leuctron, as Loring
suggests, or did they traverse the mountains
-431from the eastern edge of the plain of Asea, as Buckler ( 1980a: 78, 293 n. 14) thinks (the middle route), or did they in
fact take the shortest road to Belmina? D's description of the route as cannot help us
decide. may mean that the route was open and easy, or it may mean that it was unguarded. If the first,
Loring's candidate is indicated (cf. Andrewes, HCT iv. 92), if the second, one of the other two, for Leuctron was
certainly guarded: X. H. 6. 5. 24.
+ . . . : at Sellasia all four divisions were reunited. The Arcadians and Boeotians had already
joined up at Caryae (64. 3-5n.). The Eleans reached the town from the south, perhaps so that Sellasia would be pinned
between two armies in case the Spartans had decided to defend such a strategic place: Buckler, 1980a: 79. Sellasia
was burned: X. H. 6. 5. 27.
+ . . . : on reaching the plain north of Sparta the invaders encamped at the temple of Apollo
Thornax. On the following day they proceeded south keeping the Eurotas on their right. They did not attempt to cross
the bridge which was strongly defended: X. H. 6. 5. 27; Paus. 3. 10. 8; Buckler, 1980a: 79ff. Polyb. 5. 22. 1-4 briefly
describes the position of Sparta and the features of the surrounding country.
65.1. : the same figure is given at 1. 3 (see n. there) and 50. 2, but for the period of Spartan
hegemony; cf. Plut. Ages. 31. 1: in 600 years of Dorian presence in Laconia no enemy had ever dared invade the land.
+ . . . : their small numbers compelled the Spartans to remain on the defensive. Plut. Ages.
31. 3f. makes the same remarks though he stresses the role of Agesilaus in enforcing this strategy (he quotes
Theopompus = FGH 115 F322) as does X. Ag. 2. 24; cf. H. 6. 5. 28; Plut. Pomp. 84. 7f.; Polyaen. 2. 1. 29.
65. 2-3. + : Eparninondas did not get anywhere near Taygetus as D's own information about the
routes taken by the invaders shows. If the error is not D's then Ephorus must have blundered with his Laconian
topography. But perhaps Ephorus simply mentioned mountains and D jumped to the wrong conclusion.
D goes on to relate that Eparninondas crossed the Eurotas whose current was strong as it was winter. On doing so his
army became confused and he was attacked by the Spartans who had the
-432-

better of the battle, killing many of the enemy. X. H. 6. 5. 30f. says that the crossing of the river took place near
Amyclae, that it was unopposed, and that it was only on the third or fourth day after the crossing, when
Epaminondas marched north against Sparta, that a skirmish which involved a Spartan ambush occurred on the
outskirts of the city. Polyaen. 2. 1. 27 gives a third version which bears an affinity to that of D: the Spartans and

the Thebans were drawn up against each other with the Eurotas between them when Agesilaus caused the
Spartans to retire to a + . A small force was left behind on the bank so as to entice the Thebans
to cross. This the Thebans did, but on pursuing the enemy they fell into an ambush which had been set +
+1F77, and lost 600 men. Front. Strat. 1. 10. 3 gives the same version, but says that Agesilaus
told his men that he had been bidden by the gods 'ex collibus pugnare'. Consequently, 'exiguo praesidio ad ripam
posito accessit in colles'. There remains Plut. Ages. 32. 2-4: when the enemy were attempting to cross the
Eurotas and attack the city, Agesilaus + +. The cold
current of the river now flowing at its fullest was very troublesome to the Thebans who proceeded with
Epaminondas at their head. The episode is then concluded with Agesilaus' remark as he gazed upon the Theban.
Was the river crossed at this juncture or not? We are not told. The next section, 5, does not necessarily follow
directly upon 4; Plutarch here merely gives highlights of the invasion selected from his major sources,
Callisthenes, Xenophon, and Theopompus.
D, Plutarch, Polyaenus, and Frontinus give the same or similar details. The common factor is their use of Ephorus
or the Ephoran tradition; in addition, in the case of Plutarch, his use of Callisthenes, one of Ephorus' sources. D
can be trusted to have disfigured Ephorus' account and to have injected the usual rhetorical embellishments; and
he has. We may nevertheless accept the bare bones of the narrative if not as factual at least as what Ephorus had
said. All four accounts agree that the two opponents confronted each other across the Eurotas. D, Polyaenus, and
Frontinus agree that the Boeotians crossed the river and clashed with the Spartans. D and Polyaenus agree that
the Spartans killed many of the enemy. Plutarch, Polyaenus, and Frontinus agree that the Spartans moved from
their original position to a place of natural strength. D and Plutarch agree that the current of the
-433Eurotas gave Epaminondas some trouble. D adds that his army became confused as a result.
Underhill ad H. 6. 5. 30 dismisses D's account with the observation that 'it is . . . difficult to believe that the philoLaconian Xenophon would have passed over a Spartan victory in silence'. It is a fair point. Yet D is backed by
Plutarch, Polyaenus, and Frontinus; and Xenophon omits other events equally favourable to Sparta; for example,
Agesilaus' victory over Tissaphernes near Sardis in 395 as narrated in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (11. 4-6). It is a
less significant affair in Xenophon.
65. 2. + : this seems to be in stark contrast to the unseemly behaviour of the women (and old men)
mentioned in other sources: X. H. 6. 5. 28; Arist. Pol. 1269b37-40; Plut. Ages. 31. 5. Plato, Laws813e-814c, was
perhaps inspired by this occasion and it is not impossible that the Spartan women overcame their initial
consternation and went on to help defend the city, as D says.
65.4-5. + : an insignificant skirmish according to X. H. 6. 5. 30f., not a battle as D represents
(65. 2-3n.). Plut. Ages. 32. 5 mentions no fighting; similarly Aelian, VH 4. 8; Polyaen. 2. 1. 29.
65. 4. . . . +: see Tuplin, 1993: 142f. and nn. 61 and 62.
+ : cf. Plut. Ages. 31. 4; 32. 5. For the internal turmoil at Sparta at this time
see Plut. Ages. 32. 6-12; Nepos, Ages. 6. 2-3; Polyaen. 2. 1. 14; David, 1980: 299ff.; Cartledge, 1979: 298; id.,
1987: 164 and 160ff. in general.
65. 5. + . . . +: cf. X. H. 6. 5. 32, 50; Plut. Ages. 32. 5, 13; Pel. 24. 4.
+ +: we cannot know exactly when Epaminondas hit on the idea of freeing Messenia.
In any case he cannot have crossed directly from Laconia to Messenia over Taygetus especially as it was winter.
But even in summer the best way for an army to enter Messenia from Laconia was by way of the plain of
Megalopolis; cf. Andrewes, HCT iv. 92.
65. 6. +' ++: see 63. 1-2n. . . . : these are the Phliasians,
Corinthians, Epidaurians, Troezenians, Hermionians, Halieians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians of X. H. 6. 5. 29; 7. 2.
2. Strictly speaking they arrived not at the end of the invasion of Laconia, but
-434-

a few days after it began (X. H. 6. 5. 29; 7. 2. 2). Phlius, Sicyon, and the Acte, to which belonged Epidaurus, Troezen,
Hermione, and Halieis, formed the 7th of the ten territorial divisions of the reorganized Peloponnesian League (31. 2),
Corinth most of the 6th ( Megara, her partner in the division, was less populous), and Pellene a part of the 5th
(Achaea). What we have here therefore is the equivalent of two divisions of the League army both of which together
could field a maximum of some 6,000 hoplites (31. 1-2n.). But none of these cities could have sent its full field levy for
that would have left it defenceless. Also, as they had to travel by sea, there was a limit to the numbers they could
send. D's figure of 4,000, therefore, is perfectly reasonable.
: more than 6,000 according to X. H. 6. 5. 29 and this must be about correct for otherwise Xenophon's
comment lacks cogency. Tuplin, 1993: 144n. 67, is sceptical.
+ + . . . :See 62. 1n.
+ : the perioikic towns of Laconia.

 : not really, but as they intended to defend rather than attack they could at least hold their own.
D is exaggerating as so often for rhetorical effect.

66. The foundation of Messenza

66. 1. + : Leschhorn, 1984: 164ff.; Demand, 1990: 11of. For Epaminondas' reasons see Buckler,
1980a: 86. On the importance of Messenia to Sparta cf. Roebuck, 1945: 151f.; Toynbee, 1969: 258f.; Oliva, 1971:
194ff.; Cartledge, 1979: 299; id., 1987: 385.
. . . . . . : see 81. 3n.
: the Argives were, naturally, especially eager: Paus. 4. 26. 7f.; 27. 6f. They marked
their participation in the oikismos by a dedication of statues of heroes at Delphi: Paus. 10. 10. 5; Syll. 161; Bourguet
in "Fouilles de Delphes", iii. 1: Epigraphie ( 1910), 41ff.
. . . : see 66. 6; 14. 34. 2-6; 14. 78. 5f.; cf. 66. 5n.; Plut. Ages. 34. 1; Pel. 24. 9; Paus. 4. 26. 5.
+ : only D supplies this important detail. Most of the non-Messenians given Messenian
citizenship must have been the Laconian helots and perioikoi who had joined Epaminondas and were now stateless.
The outburst in Isocr. 6. 28
-435that it was not the case that the genuine Messenians had been restored, but rather that the helots had been set up on
the Spartan frontier, is justified in the sense that: (a) not many Messenians from abroad (see previous n.) are likely to
have returned home (cf. Dipersia, 1974: 59 n. 15, though her first argument is weak; the distribution of free land in
fertile Messenia was no mean attraction. Her second argument is more valid: Dionysius, the firm ally of Sparta, would
have prevented prospective settlers from setting out for Messenia). And (b) there must have been many Laconian
helots enrolled in the Messenian state.
The sources' statements concerning the origins of the new Messenian citizens echo the claims and counter-claims of a
discussion about the status of Messenia which raged in the 360s. The Thebans and their allies claimed to have
reconstituted an ancient city; cf. the inscription on the base of the statue of Epaminondas at Thebes: ' +
(Paus. 9. 15. 6). The Spartans on the other hand, with a view to gaining the support of the more
conservative elements in Greece, maintained that the whole Messenian issue was simply one of a conflict between
masters and slaves, and outsiders ought not to interfere; cf. Dipersia, 1974: 56ff.
: see Paus. 4. 26. 3-27; 9. 14. 5; Strabo 8 C 361; Plut. Ages. 34. 1-2; Pel. 24. 9; Mor. 540d-e;
817f; Isocr. 6. 27f.; Dinarch. 1-73; Lyc. c. Leocr. 62; Nepos, Epam. 8. 5; Aelian, VH 13. 42; Dion. Chrys. 15. 28. The
care with which the city was built on Mt. Ithome (Paus. 4. 27. 5-7) is exemplified by the remains, the most striking of
which is the fortification wall. On the topography and archaeology of the city see Frazer, iii. 429ff.; Philippson, iii. 2.
371ff., and the more recent study (with extensive bibliography) by Ernst Meyer, RE suppl. xv ( 1978), 136ff. For the
circuit wall, Scranton, 1941: 112f.; Winter, 1971: passim (365 index) esp. 111 n. 23, 165f.; Lawrence, 1979: 473
(index).
: thus the MSS, retained by Vogel and Vial,
the first with a comma after and in square brackets. Dindorf's emendation , is
followed by Sherman. The precise text is beyond restoration, but the meaning is not in doubt. The constitution was
presumably democratic though we hear nothing about it. In Hellenistic times it appears to have been oligarchic; cf.
Ernst Meyer, RE suppl. xv ( 1978), 150f.
-436-

66. 2-6. A digression on Messenian history

Ephorus included a digression on Messenian history at this point in imitation of Callisthenes whom he used here as
elsewhere: Jacoby, RE x. 1706; FGH iic. 24f., 66f., 99f.; iid. 424f.; see p. 105. He distinguished seven stages which
stand out clearly in D's excerpt ( FGH iid. 424f., though Jacoby wrongly sees eight stages; see below 66. 2-3n.). The
detailed account of Pausanias, whose Book 4 is the only continuous narrative of Messenian history to have survived,
does not agree with D in every particular. The sources of Pausanias are an intractable problem which has received
much inconclusive attention since the end of the 19th century. Source criticism has centred especially on Pausanias'
accounts of the First and Second Messenian Wars which he derived from Myron of Priene and Rhianus of Bene in Crete
(4. 6. 1-4). His precise relationship to his sources does not concern us here. It is sufficient to refer to Jacoby FGH ad
265 (Rhianus) FF38-46 who believes that Rhianus associated Aristomenes with a Messenian revolt of about 490 (which
Jacoby does not consider historical) and that Pausanias did not use either Myron or Rhianus directly, but through an
intermediary; and Pearson, 1962: 397ff., who argues against both views (see his n. 2 on p. 397 for the earlier
literature on the subject). See also the discussion of the various views by Oliva, 1971: 139ff. It seems evident that
neither Myron nor Rhianus had much information on the Messenian Wars that was not available to Callisthenes and
Ephorus. They simply took the 4th-century tradition and embellished it mostly with fictitious episodes. This is why the
bare outline of Pausanias' account is basically that of D 15. 66. 2-6. Pausanias Book 4 provides an insight into 3rdcentury 'romantic' historiography.What kind of Messenian 'history' was available to Callisthenes and Ephorus?
(a) A continuous tradition from early times which probably included the figure of Aristomenes (cf. Shero, 1938:
500ff.; Treves, 1944: 102ff.; Walbank, HCP i. 480; contra Pearson, 1962: 409 and n. 30). The tradition was not
free from contradictions, for example, concerning the number of wars and the identification of Aristomenes' own
war.
(b) The verses of Tyrtaeus which do not appear to have been widely known earlier than the 4th century. These

seem to have
-437been vague about names and places and cannot therefore have formed the basis of a detailed account of early
Messenian history.
(c) The elaborations, distortions, or even pure inventions of the propaganda war which followed the foundation of
Messenia in 369 (see 66. 1n.). Isocr. 6. 19, 22f., provides a good example. Indeed, the propaganda war was
older than 369. In the 5th century Athens had used the Messenians as a weapon against Sparta. The Athenian
soldiers who followed Cimon to Messenia in 462 to put down a revolt of slaves must have discovered for
themselves that the 'slaves' were in fact an entire Greek nation. They had perhaps expressed themselves
accordingly, for the Spartans, + + , i.e. fearful that they
might conspire with the besieged Messenians, + (Thuc. 1. 102. 3; cf. D 11. 64.
2; Paus. 4. 24. 6; de Ste Croix, 1972: 179f.). The Athenians countered by settling the expelled Messenians at
Naupactus (Thuc. 1. 103. 3). Henceforth, and especially in the Archidamian War, Athens was not slow in
exploiting Sparta's Achilles' heel, Messenia. Thus Athenian interest in the Messenians and their past was older
than 369. A striking instance is the play Cresphontes by Euripides performed in the late 420s and therefore
almost certainly inspired by the events at Pylos in 425 (see n. below; Treves, 1944: 103; Pearson, 1962: 403f.
and n. 15).
66. 2. . . . : incorrect. Presumably an erroneous inference by D from what his source said
about the Messenians having been many times conquered in war. There was no city called Messene at the foot of Mt.
Ithome previous to the foundation of 369. In fact there was no city of any name at that spot as Paus. 4. 1. 3 states (cf.
Strabo 8 C 358).
. . . : cf. 4. 31. 4; 4. 68. 6; Paus. 4. 2. 5-3. 3.
: a fuller Ephoran version is obtained by a combination of Strabo 8 C 361 and Nicolaus of Damascus (
FGH 90 FF31, 34). According to Ephorus, Cresphontes, though a Heraclid, tried to be fair to his Messenian subjects
thus antagonizing the Dorian element who murdered him. But one surviving son, Aepytus, returned to Messenia
afterwards to avenge his father and recover the throne. The same basic story is given in Paus. 4. 3. 3-8, except that
an anachronistic element is stressed there, that of
-438-

an alleged conflict, not between Dorians and native Messenians, but between the demos and the well-to-do who
thus murder Cresphontes because of his pro-demos sympathies (4. 3. 7). Yet another elaboration of the story is
that Cresphontes was murdered by a kinsman who then usurped the throne. This is the version Euripides gave in
his play Cresphontes except that in the play Cresphontes was the name of both the murdered king and the son
who avenged him (in contrast to Apollod. 2. 8. 5; Hyginus 137; see Turner, P. Oxy. xxvii ( 1962), 74 (on no.
2458); Austin, NFE41 ff. with P. Oxy. no. 2458 on pp. 42ff.). There was constant strife during the reigns of
Aepytus and his descendants until they were conquered by the Spartans. Pro-Spartan versions are given by Isocr.
6. 23 and Plato, Laws 3. 683c-d. Paus. 4. 3. 3-Io, as we have seen, is neither pro-Messenian nor pro-Spartan (cf.
Pearson, 1962: 403 ff.; Cartledge, 1979: 118). That the Ephoran version was the one accepted by the Messenians
is shown by the fact that Cresphontes and Aepytus were amongst the heroes summoned to return at the sacrifice
which marked the foundation of Messene in 369 (Paus. 4. 27. 6).
66. 2-3. . . . +: D's abridgement has resulted in an inaccuracy and a minor doublet.
Ephorus had not said that the Spartans were masters of Messenia before the killing of Teleclus and the First
Messenian War (as Isocr. 6. 22 f.). But he had remarked that after the end of the dynasty of Cresphontes the
Spartans gained Messenia as a result of the First Messenian War. He then went on to give the causes of that war.
Jacoby's 4th epoch ( FGH iid. 424; see above 66. 2-6 n.) does not therefore exist in D. 66. 3. T :
Teleclus of the Agiad House, seventh in line from Eurysthenes (7. 8. 2; Herod. 7. 204), dates to about the middle
of the 8th century (for a discussion of the early part of the Spartan kinglists see Cartledge, 1979: 341ff.).
Teleclus' reign marked the beginning of Spartan aggression against Messenia. Land-hunger was probably the main
motive. Strabo 8 C 360 says that Teleclus established three colonies in south-east Messenia, while Paus. 4. 4. 1-3
in giving the Spartan and Messenian versions of the cause of the war states that the Messenians believed the
Spartan incentive to have been the fertile land of Messenia. The literary evidence receives some support from
archaeology; cf. Coldstream, 1977: 162ff., 182; Cartledge, 1979: 83, 112f.
+: cf. Strabo 6 C 279 "E . Paus. 4. 4.
-4392-3 says more. Teleclus with some of his people were at the sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis on the border between
Messenia and Laconia attending a festival when an incident developed and the king was killed. Pausanias gives
the respective Spartan and Messenian accounts. +, therefore, should be translated 'at a festival
gathering' or 'in a struggle'. Vial's 'sur le champ de bataille' is unwarranted.
. . . M: Ephorus perhaps gave the death of Teleclus as the only casus belli for the
Spartans (Strabo 6 C 279). Pausanias gives other reasons (4. 5. 1), but especially the affair of the Messenian
Polychares and the Spartan Euaephus. He says that the first full-scale invasion of Messenia did not begin till a
generation later than the death of Teleclus. For his account of the First Messenian War D (8. 7-9, 12, 13) probably
used Myron of Priene, as a comparison with Pausanias indicates (cf. Schwartz, RE v. 1. 678). Pausanias, however,
having decided to agree with Rhianus that Aristomenes belonged to the Second and not the First Messenian War
(4. 6. 3-5), carefully removed all mention of Aristomenes from his account. Not so D and this involved him in a

contradiction in 15. 66 for in Ephorus Aristomenes had figured in the Second War; hence perhaps the remark at
66. 4 that + . For the war cf. Cartledge, 1979:
113 ff.
+: all the references in the sources to the 'twenty-year war' derive from Tyrtaeus (fr. 5 West, ap. Strabo
6 C 279 and Paus. 4. 15. 2). The figure is obviously suspect (it is twice the length of the Trojan War), but the war
was probably long. Its date can only be approximately discovered. It was controversial in antiquity. While
Pausanias dated it from 743 to 724 (4. 5. 10; 4. 13. 7), other dates ranged from 770-750 to 735-715 (for a
discussion of the ancient dates see Busolt, GG i. 589 n. 4). Modern commentators have tested the given dates by
a comparison with other evidence: the sudden disappearance of Messenians from the Olympic victor lists, the
foundation of Taras, and the destruction of old Asine in Messenia. All three are thought to point to the last two or
three decades of the 8th century as the time of the First War; cf. Pearson, 1962: 399 f.; Oliva, 1971: 105 f.;
Coldstream, 1977: 163 f., 239. But see now Parker, 1991: 25ff., who argues forcefully that both the First and the
Second Messenian Wars belong in the 7th century.
-440 . . . : cf. FGH 70 F216 (ap. Strabo 6 C 279 f.) Strabo gives Ephorus' account of the
conspiracy of the Partheniai which was resolved by the foundation of Taras. Polyaen. 2. 14. 2 derives from
Ephorus. Arist. Pol. 5. 1306b follows the same tradition. Antiochus, writing in the 5th century, knew a somewhat
different version of the story: FGH 555 F13 (ap. Strabo 6 C 278 f.). For the Partheniai and the foundation of Taras
see Dunbabin, 1948: 29ff.; Berard, 1957: 162ff.; Kiechle, 1963: 176f.; Pembroke, 1970: 1240ff.; Moretti, 1971:
21 ff.; Coldstream, 1977: 239; Cartledge, 1979: 130. For the probable true identity of the Partheniai cf. Parker,
1991: 30f.
. . . : the Second Messenian War. A very approximate date for it may be obtained from
Tyrtaeus' statement . . . + (fr. 5 West, ap.
Strabo 6 C 279 and Paus. 4. 15. 2) who is looking back from the Second War, in which he participated, to the
First. The obvious meaning of this (as Paus. 4. 15. 3 says) is that the Second War was fought in the third
generation after the First (cf. Kiechle, 1959: 93). If the First War belongs late in the 8th century (see n. above),
the Second should be dated to the middle of the 7th (cf. Oliva, 1971: 112f.; Cartledge, 1979: 127. Contra Parker,
1991). The exact dates given by Paus. 4. 15. 1 and 4. 23. 4 for its beginning and end, 685/4 and 668/7, seem too
high therefore. They do not derive from Pausanias' source, Rhianus, who wrote in verse, but are due to the efforts
of some Hellenistic chronographer; Sosibius' is as good a candidate as any (cf. Jacoby, FGH iiib. 641). Conflicting
dates for the Second Messenian War appear to be responsible for some of the different figures given for the
duration of the Spartan occupation of Messenia; see 81. 3 n. For the course of the war see Cartledge, 1979: 127f.
'A: most commonly, and in the 4th century especially, associated with the Second Messenian War, the
war of Tyrtaeus. In the 3rd century Myron put Aristomenes back in the First War (Paus. 4. 6. 1-5). Whether
Rhianus, Pausanias' other source, brought him down to the beginning of the 5th century, is controversial; see 66.
2-6 n.
T+ . . . : it would seem that the story that Tyrtaeus was sent by Athens to help Sparta was
first related by Callisthenes, though doubtless he did not originate it. That
-441-

honour belongs to some Athenian propagandist whose name escapes us. The story was repeated by Ephorus
and in the 3rd century by Philochorus who even provided Tyrtaeus with an Attic deme, Aphidnae (for
Callisthenes and Philochorus the evidence is Strabo 8 C 362); cf. Athen. 14. 630f; Lyc. c. Leocr. 105-7;
Poralla, 120. The Suida s.v. considers him either a Spartan or a Milesian. He was almost certainly a Spartan,
as Strabo 8 C 362 insists, quoting as evidence Tyrtaeus himself; and cf. Strabo 6 C 279,
The story that he was an Athenian or a Milesian, if not pure propaganda, reflects on the fact that
4thcentury and later Greeks, understandably enough, were unable to credit contemporary Sparta with a poet.
66. 4. . . . : see 66. 3 n. . . . : the revolt of the mid-460s. Thus Ephorus knew
of only three wars. Plato however (Laws 3. 698d-e) mentions that at the time of the battle of Marathon the
Spartans were involved in war against the Messenians. The only other source to refer to this war is perhaps
Strabo 8 C 362 when he speaks of a third and a fourth war, the fourth being that of the 460s; cf. Wallace,
1954: 32ff.; Den Boer, 1956: 168ff. For the view that Plato's war is the one treated by Rhianus in his poem
see 66. 2-6 n. A Messenian revolt c.490 is probably fictitious: Wade-Gery, Studies Ehrenberg, 289 ff.; Parker,
1991: 43.
66. 4-5. + : see 11. 63-4 (469/8); 11. 84. 7f. (456/5); Thuc. 1. 101. 2-103. 3; Plut. Cim. 16. 4-5;
Paus. 4. 24. 5-7. The earthquake and revolt involve notorious problems of chronology; see the discussions by
Gomme, HCT i. 303, 401 ff.; Reece, 1962: 111 ff.; Bayer and Heideking, 1975: 120 f., 130 ff.; Cartledge,
1979: 217; Badian, 1993: 89 ff. For the course and results of the revolt as well as the differences between the
accounts of D and Thucydides see Gomme, HCT i. 298 ff.; Cartledge, 1979: 218 ff.
66. 5. . . . +: D's severe abridgement of his source is seriously misleading. What Ephorus
had said was that on leaving Ithome the surviving Messenians had gone some to Naupactus and others to
Sicily. He had followed the fortunes of the first group for a while mentioning that some of these had ended up
on Cephallenia. This occurred in 421 when the Athenians removed the Messenians from Pylos
+ +. +
(Thuc. 5. 35. 7). After the end of the
-442Peloponnesian War the Spartans expelled the Messenians from both Naupactus and
Cephallenia. In 14. 34. 2-6 D tells us what became of them: some went to Sicily to serve
Dionysius while others went to Cyrene where they were virtually annihilated; cf. Paus. 4. 26.
2; 10. 38. 10. The story of the Messenians in Sicily is taken a little further at 14. 78. 5 f.
where Zacynthus seems to be a mistake for Cephallenia. See also D. Asheri, "La diaspora e il
ritorno dei Messeni", in E. Gabba (ed.), Tria Corda: Scritti in onore di A. Momigliano ( Como,
1983), 27ff.
A minor question is raised here by Thuc. 5. 56. 2-3 where it is stated that in the winter of
419/8 the helots removed from Pylos to Cephallenia in 421 were sent back again. How was it
then that according to D 14. 34. 2 there were Messenians at Cephallenia after the war?
Andrewes, HCT iv. 38, suggests that 'either not all the original garrison was sent back, or
those whose release is described in X. HG i. 2. 18 returned to Kephallenia'. It is more than
likely of course that some or all of those released in 409/8 returned to Cephallenia, but
Andrewes' first alternative receives support from Thucydides' text. The Argive demand that, as
the Spartans had contravened the terms of the treaty, the Athenians ought to return
to Pylos was met only partly by Athens: on the stele below the terms
they added that the Spartans were not true to their oaths and they then transported the helots
from Cephallenia to Pylos. It is to be noted that only the helots were returned, not the
Messenians, and X. H. 1. 2. 18 in fact speaks only of helots evacuating Pylos in 409/8. At both
5. 35. 7 and 5. 56. 2 Thucydides distinguishes between Messenians and helots. The
Messenians were the people settled at Naupactus in 455 (4. 41. 2) while the helots were the
deserters to the garrison at Pylos (4. 41. 3). The Athenians obviously were not sure that their
action was justified (cf. Andrewes, HCT iv. 78) and consequently confined themselves to
sending back only the helots who did after all belong to the country. Thus the Messenians
remained on Cephallenia to be expelled after the war as D says.
The connection of displaced Messenians with the city of Messene in Sicily is not clear. Ephorus,
to judge from D and Strabo 6 C 268 (if the latter is derived from Ephorus), mentioned only the
settlement of expelled Messenians at Zancle which henceforth was called Messene. Pausanias'
source Rhianus gave more information (Paus. 4. 23. 6ff.), but its value is dubious. Herod. 7.
-443164. 1 states only the change of name. Thuc. 6. 4. 6 relates that Anaxilas, the early 5th-century tyrant of
Rhegion, expelled the Samians and other Ionians from Zancle, settled the place ,
and renamed it Messene + . Numismatic evidence supports Thucydides'
early 5th-century date for the change of name; cf. Robinson, 1946: 13ff.; Vallet, 1958: 337ff.
67.1. . . . : see 63. 1-2n. : the fine walls of Messene
cannot have been defensible yet. The city therefore needed protection.

67. 1. The alliance between Athens and

Sparta

 . . . : Svt 274. The date is the spring or summer of 369 following the
Boeotian withdrawal from the Peloponnese. It is sometimes assumed that the alliance was concluded in
midwinter 370/69 and that the only issue now was the details of the hegemony of the alliance. But this
issue was a central one and clearly no oaths could be sworn until it was resolved. For other instances of
alliances which involved provisions for command in the field cf. Thuc. 5. 47. 7; X. H. 7. 5. 3; Svt 290 =Tod
144 lines 35f. In none of these examples were the oaths taken till agreement was reached on the question
of command. At any rate it is plain from Xenophon that the alliance was not yet concluded at this stage;
see H. 7. 1. 1 . . . ; 7. 1. 2 ;
7. 1. 13 + .
D's account of the alliance is severely abridged and incompetently stated, but even so it is in basic
agreement with X. H. 7. 1. 1-14. Both Xenophon and D concentrate on what was the main issue: the
command in the coming war. The need to do so at this juncture shows that the sharing of the hegemony
in 375 and 372/1 had not been worked out in detail (38. 4n.). Also, in the latest reaffirmation of the King's
Peace in 371 after Leuctra, Athens had been recognized (by Sparta too) as the sole prostates of the Peace
(57. 1n.); she was now returning to the pre-Leuctra position of a joint hegemony. As Procles makes clear
in Xenophon the alliance itself was not at issue; that had been readily agreed upon by both sides. But
what occasioned some argument was the question of
-444who was going to command what against Thebes. The Athenian boule had already proposed that
Athens ought to command at sea, Sparta on land (the old arrangement; H. 7. 1. 2, 11). Procles
seconded that and the Athenian demos voiced their agreement (H. 7. 1. 12). This is what D must
mean by + , +
+ . But then Cephisodotus raised an objection and the demos, changing
their minds, voted that both commands, land and sea, should be held in turn by Athens and Sparta
for periods of five days at a time (H. 7. 1. 14). This is how D's + +
, should be understood, for the literal meaning of the
sentence makes no sense.
For discussions of the alliance see the bibliography in Svt 274. Add Ryder, 1965: 75ff.; Buckler,
1980a: 90ff.

67. 2. Arcadian successes in 369

. . . : see 59. in.; 62. 2n. : the 'correction' in the Teubner
edn. is by Le Paulmier. The MSS read II (M), II (PX), or II (F); cf. Vial 152
who follows M. The perioikic town some 12 miles northwest of Sparta at or near modern Kalyvia
Georgitsi; cf. 64. 6n.; Walbank, HCP i. 534; Cartledge, 1979: 187. Is this another instance of
Ephoran spelling? See 64. 1 n.
+ : the campaign is not mentioned in any other source (IG v. 1.
1591, a tombstone, may have resulted from it: Cartledge, 1979: 300). The Arcadians must have
undertaken other operations in 369. At H. 7. 1. 25 Xenophon gives two examples of Arcadian
energy at this time: they extracted the Argives from a difficult position near Epidaurus and they
attacked Messenian Asine with some success. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 184f.; iii. 2. 238, considers these
events to belong to 369, to the time between the first and second invasions of the Peloponnese
(he dates the latter to summer 369; see the chronological excursus below). The action near
Epidaurus, however, cannot belong earlier than midsummer 369 because it involved Chabrias who
was general for the year 369/8. Cf. Buckler, 1980a: 92.
-445-

Excursus: the chronology of the 360s

The chronology of the 360s is even more involved and uncertain than that of the 370s. Definite dates
there are: the invasion of Laconia belongs in midwinter 370/69 (see discussion at 63. 1-2); the clash
at Olympia took place in late July 364; Pelopidas fell in Thessaly shortly after 13 July 364; the battle of
Mantinea was fought in June/July 362 (see below for the arguments). Otherwise events must be
dated, with more or less uncertainty, in relation to the few definite dates. Crucial here is the date of
Epaminondas' second invasion of the Peloponnese; did it take place in 369 or 368? Depending on
which, scholars have followed high or low dates for the early 360s. High dates are argued by Beloch,
GG iii. 2. 238 ff.; Ryder, 1965: 170ff.; Roy, 1971: 590 ff.; Cawkwell, 1972: 276ff.; Buckler, 1980a:
233 ff.; Sealey, 1993: 250, and are accepted by the majority of scholars; cf. e.g. Hornblower, 1983:
225 ff. Low dates are argued by Niese in a fundamental study of the chronology of the 360s, 1904:
84ff. They have more recently been upheld by Hammond, HG665, and Wiseman, 1969: 176ff.; cf. also
Niese earlier article, 1899: 520ff.
It should be stressed at the outset that much of the evidence is indecisive and can fit the low no less
than the high dates. For example, Svt 280=Tod 136, the alliance between Athens and Dionysius,
cannot help in determining the successive years of the two relief forces from Sicily which are
connected with the second and third Boeotian invasions of the Peloponnese respectively. This is not
because we cannot date the alliance with a fair degree of accuracy. It is true (as Buckler, 1980a: 234,

points out) that the names of several archons of the period of the two Dionysii can fit the beginning of
Svt 280 just as well as that of Nausigenes (archon for 368/7) with which the inscription is generally
restored. But in fact the year 368/7 offers the only real possibility for the alliance. Such an alliance
between Athens and Dionysius could hardly have been concluded in one of the years of the other
possible archons, and surely it could not have been made with the younger Dionysius. In late
spring/early summer 368 Dionysius and his sons were honoured by Athens (Tod 133 is firmly dated);
and at the Lenaean festival of 367, not long before his death (below), Dionysius won first prize at
Athens with one of his tragedies, and the beauty of the poetry cannot have been what swayed the
judges.
-446-

This surely is the right context for the alliance: the winter of 368/7 or the spring of 367; and the generally accepted
restoration of the tribe Aeantis in the 7th prytany in lines 1 f. (i.e. Mar. 367), though doubtful ( Buckler, 1980a: 234ff.;
Lewis in Develin, 255), may be correct. Thus a fairly satisfactory date can be given to the alliance, but the reason why
this cannot help us here is because the two Sicilian relief forces to Greece could easily have anticipated the alliance; or
the alliance could have been made after the first, but before the second.
The Attic honorific decree (Tod 133) is equally unhelpful as a means of deciding between the two sets of dates in spite
of claims to the contrary. I agree (with Buckler, 1980a: 237f., against Wiseman, 1969: 184) that lines 24f. should be
seen as indicating that Dionysius was already actively helping Athens and Sparta against Thebes, but this in no way
invalidates the low dates for if the first Sicilian relief force is dated to 368 then it must certainly have arrived in Greece
by late spring of that year (see below) -hence the honours bestowed on Dionysius and his sons. These are not
excessive ( pace Buckler, 1980a: 238f.) for one relief force and perhaps the promise of more, if they are not excessive
for two. Besides, Athens had other reasons for being grateful. The Peace which Dionysius was aiding (Tod 133 lines 24
ff.) was the Peace at Athens (see excursus under 57. 1); and the tyrant may have played a role in the peace mission of
Philiscus in autumn 368 (70. 2 n.).
Equally inconclusive in this respect is the sources' date for the death of Dionysius. D 15. 73. 5; 74. 4; the Marmor
Parium A74; and Eusebius/Hieronymus, all assign it to 368/7 (archon Nausigenes), Olymp. 103, 1. In 15. 73f. (under
368/7) D relates Dionysius' last war against Carthage and death. There can be little doubt that the placing of these
events under Nausigenes is due to the chronographer (see the usual formulae at 73. 5) and that it is correct. But when
exactly within the year of Nausigenes? In 73. 4f. he says that the tyrant died after having concluded
a truce with Carthage at the beginning of winter. The war, therefore, broke out in 368. On the other hand, it would be
foolhardy to be dogmatic about how much time ' could accommodate. In ch. 74 we are told that
Dionysius died from too much drink consumed while celebrating his victory at the Lenaean festival in Athens. The
Lenaea were held in January/February ( Mikalson, 1975: 109f.; Parke, 1977:
-447104ff.). It would be unwise to place undue trust in this story (for its possible origins see p. 84 ) and date Dionysius'
death in February or March. The tyrant could have died at any time between March and July 367 and still given rise to
the tale. But for ch. 74 scholars would date Dionysius' death in winter 368 on the basis of ' . There is nothing
impossible therefore in Dionysius sending out his second relief force in spring 367.
In fact, greater attention should be paid elsewhere in the text of D -- to 70. 1. The mercenaries of the first relief force
received pay for five months when dispatched: + . They departed for home at the end of
summer,+ , say in September. They arrived in Greece, therefore, not later than May. This chronological
information is doubtless Ephoran. Now, when the relief force arrived at Corinth, Epaminondas had already been in the
Peloponnese for some time (chs. 68f.; X. H. 7. 1. 15ff.), and if both the first and second invasions of the Peloponnese
are dated in 369 then we must envisage the Boeotians turning about and marching back to the Peloponnese no sooner
than they reached home in mid-spring, after a long and arduous winter campaign. This is hard to believe, even for
Boeotian hoplites. Epaminondas' second invasion, therefore, and Dionysius' first relief force are best dated in 368 (cf.
Hammond, HG665; Wiseman, 1969: 181). The above still holds even if we suppose (with Ryder, 1965: 170) that
Dionysius' men did not serve in Greece for five months. The pay for five months they received was meant to support
them over the summer; they must therefore have arrived in Greece at the beginning of summer. The trial of Pelopidas
and Epaminondas after the first invasion constitutes further evidence for the low dates. As Niese rightly pointed out (
1904: 86; followed by Wiseman, 1969: 188ff.) it is a valid conclusion from Plut. Pel. 24f. that neither man served as a
Boeotarch in 369. It follows that the second invasion of the Peloponnese, as well as Pelopidas' first intervention in
Thessaly, came in 368 and not in 369, though see table below and 67. 3n.; 68. 1n. (For the trial(s) of Epaminondas
see 72. 2n.)
As we have seen, 368 was the year in which Dionysius launched his last attack on the Carthaginian epikrateia in Sicily.
Some of the supporters of Beloch's high dates, but who also, rightly, date the beginning of the last Carthaginian war in
368 and Dionysius' death in the following year (unlike Beloch who sets these events in
-448-

367 and 366), see a connection between the outbreak of war in Sicily and the fact that Cissides, the commander
of the second Siceliot relief force to Greece, announced, in the middle of a campaign in Arcadia, that the time for
him to leave was up (X. H. 7. 1. 28; cf. Stroheker, 1958: 237 n. 83; Caven, 1990: 206; Lewis, CAH2 vi. 150). I
am not averse to seeing such a connection, though a supporter of the low dates could well associate a projected
new expedition in western Sicily by Dionysius in summer 367 with orders to the relief force to depart for home at
a certain date. I find this more likely. In 368 Dionysius' position vis--vis Carthage was so strong (and his
gratitude to Sparta for past services so deep) that perhaps he could afford to send the 2,000 Celts and Iberians to
the Peloponnese for the duration of the summer. Things did not go exactly as he had hoped and though he could
not refuse the Spartans a second relief force he may have judged that he needed these troops back before he

took the field himself. But of course the departure of Cissides may have been quite unconnected with whatever
may have been happening in Sicily at the time (Xenophon does not even hint at such a connection). Beloch's
opinion that Dionysius could not have sent any troops to the Peloponnese once he declared war against Carthage
(GG iii. 2. 239) is a mere conjecture unsupported by any evidence. Equally arbitrary (and indeed contrary to the
evidence) is his view that the Fourth Carthaginian War began in 367 (and therefore Dionysius' death occurred in
366) because the alliance with Athens, which dates to 368/7 (above), had to precede this event (GG iii. 2. 259f.
Stroheker, 1958: 237 n. 83, is aware of this though he still adheres to Beloch's high dates). This part of his
chronology, therefore, rests on very questionable foundations.
The dates of Amyntas and Alexander of Macedon have been used as evidence for both the low and the high dates.
In fact they support neither as they can fit both. Buckler's detailed discussion (1980a: 240f.) is vitiated by poor
understanding of the chronographer employed by D, and inability to distinguish between chronographic entries
and summarized narrative. His arguments are therefore unacceptable. Alexander II was murdered in 368/7. His
accession year is 369/8. It is this date which is displaced in D's chronographer (see P. 34 ). Alexander's accession
year indicates that Pelopidas' first mission to Thessaly cannot date earlier than late summer or autumn 369. This
is in accord with the fact that
-449-

Alexander of Pherae cannot have succeeded to the tyranny before midsummer 369. Jason was murdered in August
370. Polydorus and Polyphron together ruled for about one year (6o. 5 n.). Alexander therefore came to power in late
summer 369.
Further support for the low dates is provided by IG ii2 1425A col. ii lines 227-31 (archon Nausigenes, 368/7): Troezen
sent two gold crowns to the Athenian demos in that year. The crowns would naturally have been voted for and sent to
Athens immediately upon the service rendered to Troezen. What could that be? During the second invasion of the
Peloponnese Epaminondas attacked Troezen, but found the city too strongly guarded. He was equally unsuccessful
against Epidaurus (69. 1; cf. X. H. 7. 1. 18). It is possible that Athens had reinforced the militias of these coastal cities
(as she had done at Corinth); hence the gratitude of Troezen.
It is necessary to comment on Xenophon's words + U=1FF3 at H. 7. 1. 1 which persuaded Beloch to
place the second invasion of the Peloponnese in 369. I agree with Cawkwell, 1972: 277, that, whatever the meaning of
these words in an author like Xenophon, strategy demanded that the alliance conference (between Athens and Sparta)
be held as soon as possible after the Boeotian withdrawal from the Peloponnese. H. 7. 1. 1-14, therefore, should be
dated in late spring/early summer 369. I cannot however agree that H. 7. 1. 15, the beginning of the second invasion,
'goes naturally with's. 14' ( Cawkwell, 1972: 277). The initiative lay with the Thebans, and they did not march south
again till the following spring. A Thucydides of course would have mentioned the fact that something like a year
intervened between the conclusion of the alliance and the second invasion, but then Xenophon is the historian who
sent Cleombrotus to Phocis four years too early (excursus at 45. 3, part 3).
The second invasion of the Peloponnese, therefore, belongs in 368, the two relief forces of Dionysius in 368 and 367
and Pelopidas' first intervention in Thessaly in 368. Events related to these can now be dated. The so-called Tearless
Battle was fought while Archidamus and the second Sicilian force were returning to Sparta (X. H. 7. 1. 28-32). Its
immediate result was the foundation of Megalopolis. Both events, therefore, belong in spring/early summer 367, which
is D's date (72. 3-4; but see n. ad 72. 4). Both D and Xenophon agree that the unsuccessful peace mission of Philiscus
followed Epaminondas' second invasion of the Pelopon-450nese. It therefore belongs in autumn or winter 368 (see also 70. 2 n.). Another event which dates in 368 is Euphron's
coup d'tat at Sicyon. Meloni, 1951: 18, shows that Xenophon's date for the coup, after Epaminondas' third invasion of
the Peloponnese (H. 7. 1. 44), is impossible. D's date, 369/8, is to be preferred; cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 243; Buckler,
1980a: 243f.; Griffin, 1982: 71. I disagree with all four, however, that the fourth attack on Phlius in which Euphron
participated (X. H. 7. 2. 11-15) dates in 367. This is because they follow the high dates. In reality the four attacks on
Phlius date in the successive years 369 (H. 7. 2. 4), 368 (H. 7. 2. 5-9), spring 367 (H. 7. 2. 10), and spring 366 (H. 7.
2. 11-15). The year 366 is also Ernst Meyer's date for the fourth attack (RE xx. 285), followed by Pritchett, 1965-85:
ii. 109. Later in 366 Euphron was deposed and even later in the same year he was murdered (H. 7. 3. 1-12).
Pelopidas' second intervention in Thessaly should be dated to autumn 368 -- Alexander of Macedon had already been
murdered (71. 1-2; Plut. Pel. 27. 2; p. 34). The first Boeotian army to free Pelopidas was dispatched immediately on
his capture (71. 3 ; Plut. Pel. 28. 1 ; cf. Paus 9. 15. 1; Buckler, 1980a: 248). Epaminondas served in the
ranks on that occasion having been deprived of his Boeotarchy after his return from the Peloponnese earlier in the year
(72. 1-2 nn.). Early in 367 he led the army to Thessaly which secured the release of Pelopidas (75. 2n.; Buckler,
1980a: 248f.). Pelopidas' embassy to Persia (81. 3; X. H. 7. 1. 33ff.; Plut. Pel. 30) took up most of the summer,
autumn, and winter of 367/6. It should be allowed no less than some six months ( Buckler, 1980a: 249). The congress
at Thebes, therefore, should be dated in spring 366. It failed and for the rest of the year the Thebans tried hard to
impose a settlement on Greece. They succeeded in the late summer/autumn (76. 3: the Boeotian-Laconian War lasted
over five years). Amongst their efforts was the invasion of Achaea in late spring 366 (H. 7. 1. 41).
The loss of Oropus which caused something of a reversal in Athenian policy occurred in summer 366. The schol. Aesch.
3. 85 places the incident in 367/6 while D puts it in 366/5. Niese, 1904: 105f., and Beloch, GG iii. 2. 242, reconcile the
two by assuming that the incident took place 'um die Wende des attischen Jahres' (Beloch). The assumption is less
dubious than Roy, 1971: 593 n. 119, imagines, as both schol. Aesch. 3. 85 and D 15. 76. 1 derive
-451-

from chronographers, and as in fact the fall of Oropus appears to straddle two archon years. We know from X. H. 7. 4.
1 that Chares and the Phliasians were busy fortifying Thyamia sometime in the summer of 366 when Oropus fell and
Chares was recalled. D 15. 75. 3 has the activities of Chares at Phlius under 367/6. The loss of Oropus is the very next
event he gives, but under 366/5 (76. 1). The incident itself may have lasted for several weeks (the Athenians marched
out in full force and there were negotiations with the Thebans: H. 7. 4. 1) so that by the end Cephisodorus had
perhaps succeeded Polyzelus as archon. The alliance between Athens and Arcadia and the Athenian attempt on Corinth
followed soon afterwards in late summer/autumn 366 (X. H. 7. 4. 2-5; Roy, 1971: 593 ). The attempt on Corinth drove
that city to accept the Theban settlement (X. H. 7. 4. 6 ff.).
The Peace of 366 (concluded in late summer/autumn) was not accepted by Sparta. She continued the struggle to
recover Messenia. It was at this time that Dionysius II sent a small force to aid her (X. H. 7. 4. 12). Elsewhere in
Greece the Peace lasted for a while, probably till summer 365 (cf. Ryder, 1965: 83, 137, who does not however believe
in a Common Peace in 366/5) when war broke out between Elis and Arcadia. The battle in the Altis came at the end of
several Arcadian campaigns and Beloch (GG iii. 2. 242) is correct to place the outbreak of war in 365. The fighting at
Olympia took place on the second day of the festival (X. H. 7. 4. 29; Gardiner, Olympia ( 1925), 301 ff.). Miller, 1975:
215 ff., argues that the festival fell on the second full moon after the summer solstice. In 364 it began on 28 July. The
battle of Mantinea was fought on 12 Scirophorion in the archonship of Charicleides (363/2) hence in June/July 362 (15.
82; Plut. Mor. 350a; ps.-Plut. Mor. 845e; cf. X. H. 7. 5. 14, ; Beloch, GG iii. 2.
245; Buckler, 1980a: 259ff.). It was followed by a Common Peace probably concluded very early under Molon (362/1).
D puts it under 363/2, but this is because it forms part of the narrative of the Mantinean campaign.
The solar eclipse of 13 July 364 fixes Pelopidas' last intervention in Thessaly (80. 2; Plut. Pel. 31. 3). D places
Epaminondas' naval venture in the same archon year, 364/3, correctly; it cannot be 365 or 362. But was it 364 or
363? The year 364 is preferable for a number of reasons. Hammond, HG665, followed by Wiseman, 1969: 195f., opts
for 363, but his reason for so doing must be
-452-

discarded. It is based on a misunderstanding of D 15. 79. 1. Calculating that 100 triremes would require a
complement of some 17, 000 men, Hammond concludes that the naval expedition must have taken place in 363
for in 364 belongs Pelopidas' last invasion of Thessaly and Pelopidas mustered the entire Boeotian field army for
the expedition: ' Boeotia had not the resources in manpower to plan a naval enterprise with a complement of
17,000 in the same summer' (cf. Wiseman who reckons 20,000 on the orthodox basis of 200 men per trireme).
Hammond's case is untenable because D 15. 79. 1 does not say that Epaminondas sailed out with 100 warships,
but only that the people voted to construct 100 triremes; in the meanwhile Epaminondas sailed out
(see 79. 1 n.). Nor can IG vii. 2408 (a proxeny decree which lists the Boeotarchs; Pelopidas and
Epaminondas are not amongst them) help, for even if it could be dated to 363, Epaminondas could still have
commanded the fleet without being a Boeotarch.
Buckler, 1980a: 257f., argues for 364 from Plutarch's statement that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were away
when Orchomenus was destroyed (Marc. 31. 3; cf. Paus. 9. 15. 3). The statement is of course suspect -- it seeks
to dissociate the two men from such a deed. More seriously, Buckler has misunderstood Plutarch and Pausanias.
The absence of Epaminondas and Pelopidas they speak of is that of 368 or 367 when the two were in Thessaly,
Pelopidas a captive and Epaminondas attempting to free him, either as Boeotarch (the second expedition) or
serving in the ranks (the first expedition). Actually Plutarch does not say so explicitly, but this is what he must
mean. Pausanias' chapters on Epaminondas in Book 9 are commonly thought to derive from Plutarch's lost
Epaminondas or at least from the same tradition ( Peper, 1912: 129ff., but see Tuplin, 1984b). It should be noted
that Paus. 9. 15. 2 combines the two rescue attempts.
D sets the destruction of Orchomenus in 364/3 in the same year as the naval venture and Pelopidas' last
intervention in Thessaly. Plutarch (Marc. 31. 3) and Pausanias (9. 15. 3), on the other hand, as just seen connect
the destruction with the rescue of Pelopidas. Most scholars prefer D's date and rightly so (cf. Meyer, GdA v. 460f.;
Beloch, GG iii. 1. 201. While D gives a relatively full account of the conspiracy which led to the destruction of the
city, Pausanias' statement is brief and en passant. Isocr. 6. 27 (dramatic date 366) is evidence that the
destruction is later than 366. Two
-453-

further considerations support 364 as the year of the Theban naval venture: (a) the fact that Epaminondas did not
command the expedition to avenge Pelopidas' death, and (b) the dates of Clearchus of Heraclea (see 81. 5 n.).
For the chronology of events in the Aegean and the Great Satrap Revolt see 81. 6 n.; 90. 1 n.;91. 1 n. For western
chronology see also 15. 1 n.
The dates for the major events in Greece in the 360s may then be listed as follows:

369

Spring/summer

SpartanAthenian
alliance.

1st attack on
Phlius.

368

Spring

1st
intervention
in Thessaly.

(? Late spring:
67. 3 n.; 68. 1
n.)

2nd invasion
of the
Peloponnese.

2nd attack
on Phlius.

Dionysius'
1st relief
force.

Autumn

Pelopidas'
2nd
intervention
in
Thessaly and
his capture.

Rescue
attempt.

Autumn/winter

Philiscus'
mission.

Euphron's
coup at
Sicyon.

367

Spring

Pelopidas
rescued.

3rd attack
on Phlius.

Spring/early

Dionysius'

summer

2nd relief
force.

Tearless
Battle.

Megalopolis
founded.

366

Summer-winter

Pelopidas'
embassy to
Persia.

Spring

Congress at
Thebes.

4th attack
on Phlius.

3rd invasion
of the
Peloponnese.

Euphron
deposed.

Midsummer

Loss of
Oropus.

Late
summer/autumn

ArcadianAthenian
alliance.

Late
summer/autumn

Peace of
366/5.

Euphron
murdered.

365

Summer

War between
Elis and
Arcadia.

364

Summer

Boeotian
naval
venture.

Destruction
of
Orchomenus.

-454

67. 3-4. Pelopidas'first intervention in Thessaly

For the date see excursus above.
67.3 + . . . . : who were these Thessalians? Beloch, GG iii. 1. 18; Geyer, 1930: 128; Westlake,
1935: 130 (cf. 137), assume that they were the same nobles, the Aleuadae of Larissa, who had asked Alexander II of
Macedon to intervene very shortly before (61. 3). Sordi, 1958: 203f., however, considers it probable, on the basis of
Plut. Pel. 26. 1, that the request came from such Thessalian cities as Pharsalus which had always been against both
the Aleuadae and the tyrants of Pherae.
Buckler, 1980a: 246, develops the thesis that an agreement was reached between Alexander of Macedon, Boeotia, and
the Thessalians as a result of which Larissa and Crannon were handed over peacefully to Pelopidas (cf. 61. 5 n.). But
the fact that Larissa was surrendered with no fighting is hardly evidence for prior agreement between Alexander and
Boeotia. It is more likely that the garrison was overawed by Pelopidas, especially as a civil war was in progress in
Macedonia at the time. It is moreover possible that the king ordered the garrison to surrender in the hope of securing
the services of Pelopidas in his domestic quarrel. Plutarch's testimony, which clearly derives from the same original
source as D's (see n. below and p. 105), is less than satisfactory. He does not take the trouble to fill in the
background. For example, but for D we would assume that Larissa was freed from Alexander of Pherae. It is not
necessary to assume a pro-Macedonian bias in Plutarch's source (as Sordi, 1958: 201). Plutarch's method in
composing the Lives is responsible rather. D on the other hand explains that Larissa and Crannon were captured by
Alexander of Macedon and kept contrary to the promise he had made to the Thessalians (61. 4-5). The appeal to
Thebes, therefore, was against both Alexanders: to free the cities occupied by Alexander of Macedon, and the rest of
Thessaly from the tyrant of Pherae. It is nevertheless possible that two groups of Thessalians appealed to
-455Thebes, the Aleuadae of Larissa (Beloch, Geyer, Westlake), and cities such as Pharsalus (Sordi).
U=1F70: Plut. Pel. 26. 2 (Cf. 27. 1) is equally vague. It is clear nevertheless from what was achieved (
Plut. Pel. 26) that Pelopidas' army was not insignificant. This is supported by Front. Strat. 1. 5. 2 = Polyaen. 2. 4. 2;
Front. Strat. 3. 8. 2 = Polyaen. 2. 4. 1; Front. Strat. 4. 7. 28. The campaigning therein can only belong to the first
intervention (cf. Buckler, 1980a: 247). It is possible, therefore, that Pelopidas returned from the north before
Epaminondas set out for the south with the full Boeotian expeditionary levy (68. 1 and n.).
. . .: the envoys probably addressed themselves to the Boeotarchs in the first instance who
subsequently put their request for help to the Boeotian federal assembly, perhaps convened especially for the purpose;
cf. 80. 1-2 and 28. 1 n. for the machinery of the Boeotian Confederacy.
67. 3-4. . . . . . . : cf. Plut. Pel.
26. 2: . . . . . . . This is striking proof of the common source of D and Plutarch (see p.
105 ).
67. 4. . . . M: according to Plut. Pel. 26. 2f. while still at Larissa Pelopidas had held an interview with
Alexander of Pherae at which he had unsuccessfully tried to make Alexander +
. For Boeotian aims in Thessaly and Macedon see Geyer, 1930: 128; Westlake, 1935: 132 ff.;
Sordi, 1958: 204 ff.; Hammond, 1979: 181 f.; Buckler, 1980a: 110ff.
. . . : the alliance ( Svt275) worked in the interests of Boeotia and it was imposed on Macedonia as
the surrender of hostages shows. While D mentions only Philip (cf. 16. 2. 2; Justin 7. 5. 2; Aelian, VH 13. 7), Plut. Pel.

26. 5 says that thirty other noble youths were obtained and sent to Thebes besides the young prince. Alexander
probably swore to have the same friends and enemies as Boeotia; at least that is what Ptolemy Alorites had to promise
a year later ( Plut. Pel. 27. 4). This further indicates the subordinate position of Macedonia in the alliance. D is silent on
this point, but Pelopidas had been asked to settle a dynastic dispute between Alexander and Ptolemy Alorites. He
succeeded in temporarily patching up the differences between king and pretender (Plut. Pel. 26. 4f.).
A point of controversy here concerns Aeschines' testimony (2.
-45626-9) that Philip was still in Macedonia shortly after the murder of Alexander. Many scholars prefer this evidence and
assume that Philip was handed over to Pelopidas not by Alexander, but by Ptolemy; cf. Geyer, 1930: 129; Bengtson,
GG 274 n. 4. Aymard, 1954: 15 ff., argues in favour of D and Plutarch. He is followed by e.g. Hammond, 1979: 181 ;
Buckler, 1980a: 118. Cf. 81. 6 n.; Sordi, 1975: 56ff.
: Plut. Pel. 26. 4. Behind these vague statements may lie the reorganization of the
Thessalian Confederacy effected by Pelopidas; cf. Westlake, 1935: 134 ff.; Sordi, 1958: 207 f. with 207 nn. 2, 4 for
references to the views of other scholars on the date and extent of the reorganization; Buckler, 1980a: 116 f., 247 f.
On the Confederacy and its constitution see IG ii2 116 (= Tod 147); IG ii2 175; "SEG" xvii. 243 (published by Daux,
BCH 82 ( 1958), 329 ff.; cf. Larsen, CP 55 ( 1960), 241 f.); Busolt, GS ii. 1478ff.; Sordi, 1958: 207ff. (with Larsen's
review, CP 55 ( 1960), 229 ff.); Larsen, 1968: 12 ff.

68-70. 1. The second invasion of the Peloponnese

68. 1. : not the usual . This might be taken to add slight support to the
suggestion made above that the second invasion of the Peloponnese came after Pelopidas' first intervention in Thessaly
in spring 368; see 67. 3 n.
. . . : it was good diplomacy on the part of the Boeotians to await the invitation of their
Peloponnesian allies before taking the field. There was still work to be done in the Peloponnese. The Peloponnesian
League had not entirely disintegrated and, with the help of Athens, Sparta might even begin to regain ground unless
Boeotia intervened further.
' + : see 52. 1 n.; 62. 4n.
68. 2. M: Beloch, GG iii. 1. 180 n. 1, rejects this on the basis of Isocr. 8. 118. Megara, he thinks, was neutral
at this time and allowed passage to both sides. Similarly Legon, 1981: 274ff., argues that Megara was neutral after
375 and suggests (276) that Chabrias' present troops were mercenaries; Megara was not officially involved. Isocr. 8.
118 is too vague, however, and in any case in 5. 53 Isocrates says that the Thebans posed a serious threat to Megara
in the 360s. It is perfectly possible that Megara was still
-457-

actively pro-Spartan and that it was one of the states which, along with Corinth and Phlius, opted out of the war
in 366 (76. 3 n.). Its neutrality then would date from 366. In any case, Megara could hardly have prevented the
Boeotians from traversing its territory when some 20,000 Athenians, Spartans, Corinthians, etc., holding a good
defensive position at the Isthmus, could not keep Epaminondas out of the Peloponnese. Also, Plato, Theaet. 142C,
which probably refers to the fighting in the Corinthia in 369 (first invasion) or 368 (second invasion), might
indicate that at the time Megara was still on the Spartan side. I see no reason therefore for rejecting D's
information. See 40. 4n.
: cf. H. 7. 1. 15. Perhaps the only Achaean city to send troops. She had also aided Sparta in the winter
of 370/69 when Laconia was invaded (X. H. 7. 2. 2).
+ chiefly the Troezenians, Epidaurians, Sicyonians, and Phliasians (69. 1; X. H. 7. 2. 2).
There were hardly any other allies left to Sparta.
. . . :a reasonable figure for their combined forces. The local contingents were probably in full
force.
68. 3. . . . . . . : Xenophon says nothing about trenches and palisades, but simply that
the allies + ,
(H. 7. 1. 15). The only other source to mention the field fortifications is Front. Strat. 2. 5. 26 and,
like D, he implies that they stretched from one end of the Isthmus to the other. That would have been
unnecessary, however, and an intelligent translation of D in fact indicates that the trench and palisade were not
continuous. The intention of the allies was to fortify the passes so as to keep the Boeotians out of the
Peloponnese. And this they did from Lechaeurn to Cenchreai wherever there were ; cf. 11. 16. 3. In spite
of the close similarity in language, the substance of the two passages is different. In 480 a wall was built across
the Isthmus (; cf. Herod. 8. 71. 2). The fieldworks in 368 followed a different line.
From Lechaeum to Corinth there ran the Long Walls and no entrenchments were needed. Behind Corinth is the
massive rock of the Acrocorinth and between that and Mt. Oneion is the main pass into the Peloponnese. A trench
and palisade were presumably thrown up here and defended by the Athenians and some others of the allies. Mt.

Oneion, which runs for some 6 miles from east to

-458west, from the Saronic Gulf to near the Acrocorinth, needed field defences only at its eastern end. The coastal
road which runs between the mountain and the sea needed blocking. Half a mile or so from the coast begins a
path which leads over the mountain. Its approaches were fortified with a trench and palisade. The Spartans and
Pellenians defended both the coastal route and the mountain pass (68. 4f.;X. H. 7. 1. 15-17;Polyaen. 2. 3. 9);
see Stroud, 1971: 138ff.; Buckler, 1980a: 94f. This was not the last time that the passes over and at either end
of Oneion were thus fortified. Cleomenes defended the area with trenches and palisades against Antigonus in 224:
Polyb. 2. 52. 5; Plut. Cleom. 20. 1.
For the city walls of Corinth, the Acrocorinth, and the Long Walls to Lechaeum see Carpenter and Bon, 1936. For
the topography of the region, Fowler and Stillwell, 1932: 71ff.
68. 4. : likewise X. H. 7. 1. 15.
+ : i.e. Epaminondas drew up his phalanx and offered battle. This is not mentioned by the other
sources, but it is quite consistent with the military ethos of the age.
68. 4-5. : D gives no details and his description of the fighting includes some of the usual
rhetorical elements (see pp. 15 f.); nor, considering Epaminondas' aim of breaking through, is it likely that the
attack was made . . . . See X. H. 7. 1. 15-17 who, characteristically, represents the Boeotian
success as largely due to the incompetence of an unnamed Spartan polemarch. He also says that the Thebans
employed a stratagem; cf.Polyaen. 2. 3. 9; Front. Strat. 2. 5. 26. For what occurred and where see Stroud, 1971:
139f.; Buckler, 1980a: 95ff.; Tuplin, 1986b: 46. Paus. 9. 15. 4 wrongly says that the action was fought near
Lechaeum. He makes the same mistake as earlier at 9. 14. 6. Epaminondas' conduct in this action was held
against him on his return home (72. I-2n.).
69. 1. D and Xenophon agree that the Boeotians and their allies campaigned against the cities of the Acte southeast of Corinth as well as in the region west of Corinth as far as Pellene. But where did they go first? Xenophon
says they proceeded west before turning against Epidaurus. D reverses the situation. Scholars unanimously follow
Xenophon ( Tuplin, 1993: 152 n. 18, is an exception), but there is really no way of deciding between the two.
' :X. H. 7. 1. 18 mentions only
-459-

Epidaurus. Athens may well have had something to do with the strong garrisons which saved these cities (see p. 450 ).
An inscription from Troezen dating to this time honours a certain Echilaus, son of Philonides, a Plataean, with
and because, having arrived at Troezen, he showed himself a brave ( Syll. i.
162). For relations between Athens and Troezen at this time see also 40. 4n.
:cf.X. H. 7. 1. 18, 22; 7. 2. 11; 7. 3. 2; Paus. 6. 3. 3. The harbour of Sicyon was captured too: Polyaen. 5. 16.
3; Aeneas Tact. 29. 12.
: the MSS. The emendation is Le Paulmier's and it is surely correct, the being easily mistaken for a
;cf. 15. 19. 3. Phlius was not of course attacked nor did it go over to the Boeotians. But it was attacked by the
Boeotians' Peloponnesian allies when marching north to join Epaminondas. D perhaps misunderstood his source.
Pausanias and Stephanus Byzantius give an idea of the kind of detail Ephorus supplied. Paus. 9. 15. 4 tells of a
Sicyonian township called Phoubia taken by Epaminondas, and of his humane treatment of the Boeotian exiles
captured therein. The place seems to be the same as Steph. Byz. s.v. : 01 and ibid. s.v.
: " (FGH 70 F81). Ephorus Book 23 covered the year 368. For the possible
location of the place see RE xx. 1. 346f.
> 2: is Dindorf's insertion (rejected by Vial). X. H. 7. 1. 18; 7. 2. 11, mentions Pellene.
69. 1-4. : cf.X. H. 7. 1. 181f.; Plut. Mor. 193f. Xenophon does not mention Chabrias and the
Athenians (in fact he does not name the defenders) while D ascribes the repulse of Epaminondas entirely to Chabrians
and the Athenians, the cowardly Corinthians running away at the critical moment and leaving an open gate
unprotected. Otherwise D's account of the action is typically rhetorical though perhaps preferable on the whole to that
of Xenophon: Tuplin, 1986b: 45. Plutarch says that a few Thebans were killed by Chabrias, but Epaminondas
considered the action insignificant. For Ephorus' attitude to Athens and Athenians seepp. 114ff. For Chabrias at Corinth
see Thompson, 1985: 51ff.
69. 1. :cf.X. H. 7. 1. 18 . :cf.X. H. 7. 1. 18
. On the
-460Phliasian Gate see Carpenter and Bon, 1936: 71ff.; cf. Wiseman, 1978: 81.
69. 2. ' : X. H. 7. 1. 19 mentions only some lightarmed troops.

 :cf.X. H. 7. 1. 19 .
69. 3. . . . : cf.X. H. 7. 1. 19. The in Xenophon are almost certainly the 300
of the Sacred Band whom he mentions nowhere else.

70. 1. The first Sicilian relief force

For the date see the excursus above.
. . . :cf.X. H. 7. 1. 20 . "
'.
: for the close relation between Sparta and Dionysius cf.23. 5n.; 19. 3n.
. . . : this is significant information for the chronology of the early 360s; see excursus above.
' " : Xenophon was much impressed by the small force of mercenary cavalry which accompanied the
Celts and Iberians (H. 7. 1. 21).

:X. H. 7. 1. 22 mentions an attack on Sicyon and the capture of a fort called Deras before the Sicilian
force departed.

70. 2. The peace mission of Philiscus

For the date see excursus above.

:X. H. 7. 1. 27 says that Philiscus of Abydus was sent on a peace mission to Delphi by Ariobarzanes
the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia whose trusted lieutenant he was. But whatever the ulterior motives of Ariobarzanes
(two years later he rose in revolt against the King; 81. 6n.), Philiscus doubtless made his proclamation in the name of
the King; nothing else would have induced all the major Greek cities to convene at Delphi at this time. Who took the
initiative? Sparta presumably had lost no time in mobilizing her friends outside Greece, in the main Dionysius and
Persia. For Spartan relations with Ariobarzanes see X. H. 5. 1: 28; Ag. 2. 26. For the triad of Sparta, Dionysius, and
the King
-461-

[ + ]
see 23. 5 and n. It is tempting to connect Tod 133 lines 8-10, +
[][ ] , with the congress at Delphi. The temple of Apollo at
Delphi had been destroyed in winter 373/2 (48. 1n.). Like most tyrants, Dionysius took a great interest in the
national sanctuaries (cf. 13. 1n.;47n.) and he may have urged a congress at Delphi as a means of encouraging
the speedy rebuilding of the temple as well as promoting a peace favourable to his friends the Spartans
(cf.excursus at 67. 2). In addition to Athens, therefore, it is possible that he communicated his ideas to the
Persians.
It should be added, however, that a national sanctuary was an ideal place for a meeting of Thebans and Spartans.
The Thebans would not have gone to Athens and certainly not to Sparta, and the Spartans would hardly have
gone to Thebes. Tod 133 is dated in the tenth prytany of Lysistratus ( 369/8); all the more reason why the
mission of Philiscus should be dated late in 368 and not in the winter of 369/8 ( Beloch, GG iii. 2. 240). Tod 133
bestowed Athenian citizenship on Dionysius and his sons. From Demosth. 23. 141 we know that Ariobarzanes and
Philiscus were similarly honoured and perhaps at the same time. One might thus risk a guess that the King's call
for a Common Peace had been aided and abetted by Dionysius and Ariobarzanes who saw to it that the terms
proposed were favourable to Sparta. Interestingly, the number of mercenaries left to Sparta by Philiscus, 2,000, is
the same as that dispatched by Dionysius (70. 1-2). Dionysius' second relief force sent to Greece after the failure
of the congress may also have numbered 2,000 men.

': to Delphi(X. H. 7. 1. 27) as D neglects to mention.

: D's severe abbreviation of his source here has missed the substance of the matter.
Moreover, the passage as it stands makes little sense. The wording, not surprisingly, is very close to 50. 4 (the
Peace of 372/1); cf.38. 2f. The sense of the aorist is passive: 'they were not accepted (or
admitted)', and that is the correct translation at 50. 4. But there the verb is qualified by . Here it
is not and the result is an anacoluthon (see p. 137 ). Nevertheless, the meaning is not in doubt: the Thebans
refused to give up Boeotia and the congress broke up.
D, therefore, in an admittedly badly abbreviated passage,
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represents that the independence of the cities of Boeotia was the obstacle to peace. Xenophon, on the other hand,
maintains that Messenia was the central issue (H. 7. 1. 27). We must read between the lines. Philiscus' connections
(see n. above) and his action following the failure of the congress clearly indicate that the proposed peace was meant
to aid Sparta in some way. What did Sparta want most? Obviously the return of lost territory, Messenia in particular.
The autonomy clause with, perhaps, attached to it (see 5. 1n.) would have formed the heart
of the proposed terms. It is inconceivable that the Boeotians and their allies would have conceded the return of
Messenia to Sparta. Equally inconceivable that Sparta would seriously have demanded the dissolution of the Boeotian
Confederacy in 368. But she may have done so as a matter of diplomacy; as a bargaining measure and in order to
show that Thebes and not she was being intransigent: 'If you insist on keeping Boeotia then we insist on the return of
Messenia,' the argument may have run, 'but if you insist on the independence of Messenia then we insist on the
independence of Boeotia'.
The Spartans and their friends were trying to turn the clock back by proposing a Common Peace on the old lines. In
the past Boeotia had been the issue, not Messenia. In effect, they were offering to recognize the Boeotian Confederacy
if Thebes would let Messenia be. The Thebans of course would have none of this and as they were backed by their
numerous allies the congress came to nothing. It was necessary in the end for the Thebans to go up to the King
themselves and explain the new situation in Greece. Basically the talks broke down because Thebes objected to the
return of Messenia to Sparta, and Philiscus departing left a mercenary force to fight for Sparta thus making it plain
whom he considered responsible for the continuation of the war.
: Sherman translation ' adhering to their own design' is acceptable; cf. 1. 28. 7 which Oldfather
translates ' from their own point of view'. Vial paraphrases.
: see 28. 1n.
. . . :cf.X. H. 7. 1. 27.
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70. 3. Euphron tyrant of Sicyon

For the date see excursus at 67. 2.
. . . : D agrees with Xenophon's unfavourable picture of Euphron. For a defence of Euphron see
Meloni, 1951a: 10ff.; de Ste Croix, 1981: 297f. But cf. Griffin, 1982: 70ff. Meloni sees Euphron as a man who tried to
keep Sicyon neutral in difficult times and was therefore mistrusted by both sides in the war. In honouring Euphron's
grandson (also named Euphron) in 318, however, the Athenian state preferred to pretend that the family had always
been pro-Athenian ( IG ii2448). For Euphron's place in the new tyranny of the 4th century see in addition Parke, 1933:
97ff.; Moss, 1962: 1ff.; Berve, Tyrannis, i. 305f.; Frolov, 1974: 376ff.; Fuks, 1974: 71 and n. 23; but esp. Mandel,
1977: 93ff. Also Leschhorn, 1984: 175ff. On Xenophon on Euphron see Tuplin, 1993: 121ff.
. . . ': the Arcadians were involved too (X. H. 7. 1. 44f) though their intention was not to set up
Euphron as a tyrant.
. . . :cf.X. H. 7. 1. 44-6. D does not say what happened to Euphron subsequently (see 7576n.). For that see X. H. 7. 3. 1-12 with Tuplin, 1993: 121ff.

Archon Nausigenes, 368/7

71. 1. : 376 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 638. Four consular tribunes are promised and four are named, probably out of
an original college of six. But D cannot be checked here because the relevant portion of the FC is missing and for Livy
this year marks the beginning of the period of anarchy; cf. Broughton, MRR i. 108f.; Drummond, 1980: 64 n. 34. See
also pp. 27 f.
I ': an Ephesian according to Africanus and indeed this is a most uncommon Athenian name.
There is only one other Pythostratus listed in LGPN ( ii. 388) and he may not even be of the 4th century BC.

71. 1. A chronographic notice

. . . : see pp. 33 ff.
[[ ' ]. . . [ ]: Vogel brackets these words
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(not so Vial) as inconsistent with 60. 3 and 16. 2. 4. Indeed Ptolemy Alorites cannot have been a son of Amyntas
and a brother to Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip. Various explanations have been offered for the error, repeated
at 77. 5. Beloch, GG p. 2. 67, suggests that Ptolemy is designated adelphos because he married the princes' sister
Eurynoe (Justin 7. 4. 5, 7); and his father may indeed have been called Amyntas, the name being fairly common

in Macedonia. Hammond, 1979: 182, correctly objects that adelphos cannot mean brother-in-law and that
Ptolemy cannot have been the son of just any Amyntas; he must have belonged to the royal house for otherwise
he would not have been appointed regent. He suggests that he was a son of Amyntas II, the Little (see Introd. n.
106). But Hammond's explanation for is hardly credible: 'If he [D] was using Marsyas, as we have
suggested, we can see that he took the words out of Marsyas , saw that he was anticipating
the accession of Philip, removed but left .'
There are simpler and more plausible explanations. For example, D could have tried to add to the chronographer
from his own knowledge and got it wrong. Or, more likely, the chronographer himself may have felt it necessary
to explain who Ptolemy was and wrote: ' ' '
' , and either D or a copyist reversed the relationship and carried the mistake forward to 77.
5. If Ptolemy was the uncle of the princes then may have stood in the text originally here and at 77.
5. and could easily be confused in such entries (cf.61. 2n.). Even more simply, it is possible
that the chronographer had only described Alexander as '' and the relationship became attached to
Ptolemy by mistake at some stage thus causing some enterprising copyist to add after Alexander.
There is nothing improbable in the suggestion that Ptolemy was a younger brother of Amyntas and an uncle of the
three princes. His very position at court and the fact that he was appointed epitropos for Perdiccas (Aesch. 2. 29;
Plut. Pel. 27. 4) indicate that he must have been closely related to the royal family. Similarly, Philip may have
been appointed regent for his nephew Amyntas in 359 ( Griffith, 1979: 208, is among those who do not believe in
Philip's regency and perhaps this is correct). There is no good reason to contradict this. Syncellus' claim that
Ptolemy was
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carries little weight (Sync. 500 Dind.), while the epithet Alorites, if indeed it derives from the city
of Alorus ( Geyer, 1930: 102f., 129), may indicate nothing more than birth or lengthy residence there.
: according to Marsyasap. Athen. 14. 629d ( FGH 135/6 F11) Alexander was murdered during the
performance of a war-dance called telesias. Ptolemy was generally suspected: 16. 2. 4; Marsyas ap. Athen. 14. 629d;
Justin 7. 4. 7; 5. 4. Hammond, 1979: 183f., discounts the possibility.
: to the chronographers, less concerned with historical truths than with uniform chronological tables,
Ptolemy was king for three (or four) years. In reality he did not reign, but was regent for Perdiccas (Aesch. 2. 29; Plut.
Pel. 27. 4). The proof for this perhaps is that there are no coins bearing his name.
71. 1-2. . : this is probably what caused the mistaken figure for the 'reign' of Ptolemy in the MSS.
The correction is Rhodoman's; see Vogel, iii, p. xviii.

71. 2-7. Second intervention in Thessaly.

Pelopidas captured. Attempt to rescue him
For the dates of these events see excursus at 67. 2.
71. 2. . . . : for a similar analysis of Pelopidas' motives cf. Plut. Pel. 26. 1. Plutarch though more
aptly sets it before the first intervention in Thessaly.
. . . : D neglects to say that the Thessalians had appealed to Boeotia for protection against
Alexander and that Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent out as envoys; they took no Boeotian troops with them ( Plut.
Pel. 27. 1;cf. Nepos, Pel. 5. 1). Sordi, 1958: 209, sees this as a victory for the peace party at Thebes which was
desirous of reaching a modus vivendi with Alexander in Thessaly.
: D omits Pelopidas' second intervention in Macedonia which resulted in a new Boeotian-Macedonian
alliance, as well as the circumstances which led to his capture: Plut. Pel. 27. 2-7; Svt 277; Westlake, 1935: 139ff.;
Bersanetti, 1949: 69ff.; Sordi, 1958: 211f.; Buckler, 1980a: 120ff.

: cf. Paus. 9. 15. 1; Nepos, Pel. 5. 1. Polyb. 8. 35. 7-9 criticizes Pelopidas for making a
present of himself to the tyrant.

-466

carries little weight (Sync. 500 Dind.), while the epithet Alorites, if indeed it derives from the city
of Alorus ( Geyer, 1930: 102f., 129), may indicate nothing more than birth or lengthy residence there.
: according to Marsyasap. Athen. 14. 629d ( FGH 135/6 F11) Alexander was murdered during the
performance of a war-dance called telesias. Ptolemy was generally suspected: 16. 2. 4; Marsyas ap. Athen. 14. 629d;
Justin 7. 4. 7; 5. 4. Hammond, 1979: 183f., discounts the possibility.
: to the chronographers, less concerned with historical truths than with uniform chronological tables,
Ptolemy was king for three (or four) years. In reality he did not reign, but was regent for Perdiccas (Aesch. 2. 29; Plut.
Pel. 27. 4). The proof for this perhaps is that there are no coins bearing his name.

71. 1-2. . : this is probably what caused the mistaken figure for the 'reign' of Ptolemy in the MSS.
The correction is Rhodoman's; see Vogel, iii, p. xviii.

71. 2-7. Second intervention in Thessaly.

Pelopidas captured. Attempt to rescue him
For the dates of these events see excursus at 67. 2.
71. 2. . . . : for a similar analysis of Pelopidas' motives cf. Plut. Pel. 26. 1. Plutarch though more
aptly sets it before the first intervention in Thessaly.
. . . : D neglects to say that the Thessalians had appealed to Boeotia for protection against
Alexander and that Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent out as envoys; they took no Boeotian troops with them ( Plut.
Pel. 27. 1;cf. Nepos, Pel. 5. 1). Sordi, 1958: 209, sees this as a victory for the peace party at Thebes which was
desirous of reaching a modus vivendi with Alexander in Thessaly.
: D omits Pelopidas' second intervention in Macedonia which resulted in a new Boeotian-Macedonian
alliance, as well as the circumstances which led to his capture: Plut. Pel. 27. 2-7; Svt 277; Westlake, 1935: 139ff.;
Bersanetti, 1949: 69ff.; Sordi, 1958: 211f.; Buckler, 1980a: 120ff.

: cf. Paus. 9. 15. 1; Nepos, Pel. 5. 1. Polyb. 8. 35. 7-9 criticizes Pelopidas for making a
present of himself to the tyrant.

-466
: the contrast in character between captor and captive was not missed by Plutarch (Pel. 28. 2-10).
71. 3. . . . : this, the strongest army ever sent abroad by Boeotia, shows the anger felt at Thebes at
what had occurred. It was commanded by two Boeotarchs, Cleomenes and Hypatus: 71. 4, 7; Paus. 9. 15. 1; Plut. Pel.
28. 1; 29. 1. Nepos, Epam. 7. 1, wrongly speaks of one man in command.
: Svt276. Faced with a major invasion Alexander turned to the only power which could offer immediate help,
Athens. An alliance was concluded amidst much rejoicing in Athens; see Svt 293=Tod 147, the alliance between
Athens and Thessaly in 361/0, lines 39f., where the alliance with Alexander is referred to; Plut. Pel. 31. 6; Mor. 193d;
Demosth. 23. 120; Ephippus fr. 1 FAC; Hermippus fr. 63 FAC; Svt276; Westlake, 1935: 142; Sordi, 1958: 212f.
: the same who made the forthright speech at the congress at Sparta in 372/1s (X. H. 6. 3. 7-9). See PA
2727; APF pp. 161f.; Develin, 254. He seems to have been a political ally of Aristophon, a pro-Boeotian (Aesch. 3.
139), and an opponent of Callistratus; cf. Sealey, 1956: 193f., 200f.; id., 1993: 72; Mosley, 1962: 44. His election to
the generalship and the alliance with Alexander indicate that Athens was turning her attention away from the
Peloponnese and towards the Aegean. In the previous year, 369, she had begun her efforts to capture Amphipolis; see
under 57. 1 and 81. 6n.
71. 4. : presumably because the Eurypus was considered unsafe, no doubt due to the stationing
of Boeotian triremes there.
' : compared to the Boeotians, Alexander was weak in hoplites but stronger in cavalry. This fact
conditioned their respective tactics. While the Boeotarchs were anxious to bring on a pitched battle, Alexander was
anxious to avoid one. Instead he used his superior cavalry to harass the Boeotians and prevent them from foraging.
While his own army was reinforced by the Athenians, the Boeotians were soon abandoned by their Thessalian allies. As
the food and water ran out they had no option but to retreat.
. . . : we can hardly deduce from this that the expedition took place after the harvest had been
gathered ( Buckler, 1980a: 126, 248) for Alexander's cavalry prevented foraging and
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even if the corn still stood in the fields the Boeotians could make little use of it. And more than food they would
have needed water. The expedition probably belongs late in the year, but for other reasons; see excursus at 67.
2.
71. 5. : probably the plain of Pharsalus.
. . . : they found themselves in a virtual state of siege, caught : Plut. Mor. 680b;
: Mor 797a-b; 'quod locorum angustiis clausi ab hostibus
obsidebantur': Nepos, Epam. 7. 1; : Paus. 9. 15. 2.
71. 6-7. The same story is given by Plut. Mor. 680b; 797a-b; Nepos, Epam. 7. 1-2; Paus. 9. 15. 2. Plutarch
understandably does not relate the episode in the Pelopidas; he probably did so in the lost Epaminondas. The

story may be picturesque ( Westlake, 1935: 143), but there is nothing incredible about it; cf. Sordi, 1958: 214
and n. 5; Buckler, 1980a: 126.
. . . : precisely the tactics employed by Xenophon against the superior Persian cavalry (An.
3. 3. 16ff.).
71. 7. . . . : according to Plut. Pel. 29. 1 they were each fined 10,000 drachmas. The
generals, he thinks, were unlucky or inexperienced; cf. Mor. 680b; Nepos, Epam. 7. 1.

72. 1-2. The trial(s) of Epaminondas

Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and at least one other Boeotarch had been tried and acquitted in the spring of 369 after
the first invasion of the Peloponnese. D omits this trial. The present passage is generally thought to be the only
explicit evidence for a second trial, of Epaminondas alone, arising out of the second invasion of the Peloponnese
though Plut. Pel. 28. 1 and Nepos, Epam. 7. 1, are seen as referring to it. The first trial and acquittal are
mentioned in many sources: Plut. Pel. 25; Mor. 194a-c; 540d-e; 799e-f; 817f; Aelian, VH13. 42; Appian, Syr. 41.
212ff.; Paus. 9. 14. 5, 7; Nepos, Epam. 7. 3-5; Cic. Inv. 1. 55f. The historicity of the trials and the details
involved have been extensively discussed. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 247ff., denies the historicity of the first trial. He is
followed by Westlake, 1939: 13f. (cf. id., 1935: 138f.). Cary, 1924: 182ff., accepts the first and rejects the
second. Most scholars, however, accept both trials as historical; cf. Swoboda, 1900: 472; Bersanetti, 1949: 93ff.;
Cuff, 1954: 259ff.; Wiseman, 1969: 186ff.;
-468-

Beister, 1970: 75ff., 97ff.; Cawkwell, 1972: 276ff.; Buckler, 1978: 36ff.; id., 1980a: 138ff. It has to be said
nevertheless that D here constitutes no clear evidence for a trial, as opposed to a deposition from the Boeotarchy. The
talk is simply one of slanderous accusations of treason, presumably in the assembly ( +SSSSS), rather than
in a court of law.
72. 1. . . . 2 : 'it is necessary to give the proper (or fitting) words (i.e. it is necessary to give an
explanation) in his defence' (cf. Vial) and not 'we must give his own plea in defence' as Sherman translates. +
(and the opposite ) are popular with D; cf. McDougall s.v. + . . . : 68. 2-5.
. . . : a truce was arranged between Epaminondas and the Spartan polemarch and the Boeotians
traversed Mt. Oneion without further fighting: X. H. 7. 1. 17; 68. 4-5 n.
72. 2. + : there were men at Thebes hostile to Epaminondas and Pelopidas and their policies. Chief
amongst these appears to have been Menecleidas, one of the liberators ( Plut. Pel. 25. 5). Although the sources give
jealousy as his motive (cf. in addition to D, Plut. Pel.25. 1, 5; Nepos, Epam. 5. 3), he may well have genuinely
disagreed as to the conduct of foreign policy. For an analysis of internal Theban politics see Cawkwell, 1972: 266f.;
Buckler, 1980a: 130ff.
: Buckler (1980a: 144, 305 n. 63) points out that in its technical sense was generally
confined to a claim in a private suit (cf. Harrison, 1968-71: ii. 88). But D is not being technical. He is simply saying in
his own language that Epaminondas was accused of treason.
+ : the people were angry with his conduct of the campaign (cf. Plut. Pel. 28. 1
), perhaps with some justification. The Spartans were the main enemy and if he really had them in his power on
Mt. Oneion, as his soldiers probably claimed, why did he let them go? Epaminondas was consequently deposed from
office and sent out as a simple hoplite with the army which was to rescue Pelopidas. D therefore puts the second
invasion of the Peloponnese and the second intervention in Thessaly in the same campaigning season and this appears
correct (see excursus at 67. 2).
. . . . . . : the vacant Boeotarchy
-469had not perhaps been filled and on Epaminondas' triumphant return from Thessaly he was reinstated. is not of
course an office, but it is difficult to see to what else he could have been restored. He is absent from the new text from
Boeotia ( Roesch, 1984: 46), in contrast to Pelopidas who heads the college of seven Boeotarchs, but that decree
seems to date to the mid-360s, as Roesch suggests. Buckler, 1980a: 144f., who believes in an actual trial, thinks that
Epaminondas was acquitted, but not that he was deposed from office; or rather his deposition from office was
temporary and for the duration of the trial. Once acquitted Epaminondas automatically resumed his office. Buckler is
following Athenian legal practice here, which may or may not have been the same as at Thebes. In fact he feels
compelled to reach this conclusion because he dates the second invasion of the Peloponnese and subsequent 'trial' to
369, but the rescue attempt of Pelopidas to 368. How then did Epaminondas come to be a private citizen in 368? -- He
had tried at the midwinter elections and he had failed; the people were still angry with him. 'Obviously Diodoros has
compressed the events of 369 and 368, a typical shortcoming of his, and one capable of explanation in this instance.'
Indeed, such shortcomings are not rare in D, but it is preferable in this case not to sacrifice the obvious meaning of D
for a chronology unsupported by any conclusive evidence.

72. 3. The Tearless Battle

For the date see excursus at 67. 2. X. H. 7. 1. 28-32 describes the battle in some detail; cf. Plut. Ages. 33. 5-8. As
Plutarch says, the unseemly joy with which the Spartans greeted the news of victory shows the depth to which they
had sunk since Leuctra. For the battle and its topography see Niese, 1904: 121ff.; Blte, RE xiv. 867f.; Buckler,
1980a: 107.
. . . : certainly an exaggeration though both X. H. 7. 1. 32 and Plut. Ages. 33. 5 state that
large numbers of the enemy fell; cf. Niese, 1904: 124.
: for the oracle at Dodona see Parke, 1967: 138.
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72. 4. The foundation of Megalopolis

The date

While Megalopolis, on the evidence of D, was in actual fact built now, in 368/7, in the aftermath of the Tearless Battle
(see excursus at 67. 2), it would appear from Pausanias that the decision to found the city was taken earlier, in 371/0,
and was an outcome of the establishement of the Arcadian League. For in Paus. 8. 27. 8 it is stated that the city was
'synoecized' in the year of archon Phrasicleides, the second year of Ol. 102, a few months after the battle of Leuctra,
i.e. in autumn 371. Scholars in general have tended to discount Pausanias in preference to D (Ephorus),
notwithstanding the fact that 8. 27. 8 appears to derive from a generally reliable chronographer employed by
Pausanias (cf. Hejnic, 1961: 111ff.), and Braunert and Petersen, 1972: 61f., have suggested that it is only the date for
the battle of Leuctra that Pausanias extracted from the chronographer, the association of the foundation of Megalopolis
with the battle, + + + , probably being Pausanias' own surmise. Cogent at
first sight, the argument is undermined by Hornblower's acute observation (1990a: 72) that one of the men chosen as
founders of Megalopolis by the Arcadians according to Pausanias (8. 27. 2) was Proxenus of Tegea who was killed in
370 ( X. H. 6. 5. 7). Hornblower is surely right to insist (against Niese) that Pausanias' Proxenus and the one in
Xenophon are one and the same person.
Taking then the evidence of Pausanias and D together, as it seems to me we should, a koinon dogma of the Arkadikon
proposed the foundation of Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 27. 5) in 371/0 and oecists were appointed, including Proxenus of
Tegea, as Pausanias says (8. 27. 2). For whatever reasons, however, the decision was not acted upon until after the
Tearless Battle. Pausanias' own information points to an explanation of this sort. The Aegytan town of Leuctron and
indeed the entire district of Aegytis (Paus. 8. 27. 4; see below ad 72. 4 for text) were still in Spartan hands in 371/0
and did not fall to the enemy till winter 370/69 ( X. H. 6. 5. 24). As Hornblower, 1990a: 76, is sympathetic to
Duani's view ( Ziva Antika, 19 ( 1969), 263ff.) of several stages to the foundation, taking up several years (371368), it is difficult to see why he attempts to explain away D's date of 368/7 for the actual founda-471-

tion. He suggests that the item about Megalopolis at 72. 4 came not from Ephorus, but from the chronographer
where, however, the entry was under 371 and not under 368. D then misplaced the item, and the information
in the chronographic source referred to Leuctra and not to the Tearless Battle (1990a: 73). This is
unconvincing. It is unlikely, at least in its present form, that 72. 4 is from the chronographer, any more than 72. 3
(the Tearless Battle) is (and Hornblower does not claim this for the latter). Sections 72. 3 and 72. 4 undoubtedly
belong together and this, surely, is the important point here. If 72. 3 is summarized Ephorus then so must 72. 4 also
be, and I see no reason for thinking otherwise. The statements (72. 3) and
(72. 4), therefore, probably originated in Ephorus and not in the chronographer. It is highly probable nevertheless
that both items, the Tearless Battle and the founding of Megalopolis, also appeared in the chronographer, and that D
found them there, one after the other, under Nausigenes (368/7), and padded them out with material from Ephorus.
For the archaeology and topography of the city see JHS 11 ( 1890), 294ff.; 13 (1892-3), 319ff., 356ff.; Gardner et
al., "Excavations at Megalopolis 1890-91", JHS Suppl. 1 ( 1892); Frazer, iv. 317ff., for description and plans;
Praktika ( 1901), 45ff.; (1962), 178f.; (1963), 218; Petronatis, Megale Polis in Arcadia no. 23 in the series Ancient
Greek Cities by the Athens Centre of Ecistics ( 1973; in Greek); for the city wall see Maier, i. 149ff., for inscriptions
relating to the building and maintenance of the walls, esp. no. 34 ( Syll. 559) lines 22ff., 25-8. See also the remarks
of Winter, 1971: 365 (index); Moggi, 1976: no. 45; Leschhorn, 1984: 167ff. (discussion and extensive
bibliography); Demand, 1990: 111 ff
: in the first instance Megalopolis was meant to act as a bulwark against Spartan incursions (cf. Paus. 8.
27. 1). But it was also to serve eventually as the capital of the Arcadian Confederacy; see 59. 1 n.
+ . . . : it is sometimes said on the strength of Paus. 8. 27. 2; 8. 52. 4; 9. 14. 4; and 9. 15. 6, and
such statements as that in Diog. Laert. 3. 23 (cf. Aelian, VH 2. 42), that Epaminondas and Thebes founded, or at
least played a leading part in founding, Megalopolis. A closer look at Paus. 8. 27. 1 ff. and 9. 15. 6, however, shows
that the Arcadians and the Arcadians alone were responsible for the foundation. The words to be under-472lined in Paus. 8. 27 are: (section 1) + . . . + . . . ; (section 2)
+ + +. . . + + (i.e. he
is not really. Cf. on the other hand 9. 14. 5 + + +) . . .
+ + + (all Arcadians) . . . (section 5) + (of the
Arcadian Confederacy). It is furthermore clear, as Braunert and Petersen, 1972: 65 f., observe, that in the epigram
on the statue base of Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. 9. 15. 6) a distinction was made between the Theban

participation in the foundation of Messene and that in the foundation of Megalopolis: + . . .

. . . , but . As Braunert and Petersen argue, is
a reference to the Boeotian hoplites dispatched under the command of Pammenes to guard Megalopolis while it was
being built: Paus. 8. 27. 2.
: cf. Frazer's remarks, iv. 317f.
: 'by throwing together' -- a hapax legomenon.
. . . +: Paus. 8. 27. 3f. gives the names of the towns which, by a federal dogma, were to be
synoecized. They are 39 in all (if we accept Niese's emendation of 6
. . . to + + + . . . (1899: 540 n. 1). There is thus a discrepancy between D and
Pausanias. More than one explanation is possible.
Beloch, GG iii. 2. 171f., suggests that many of the towns mentioned by Pausanias were not incorporated into
Megalopolis till late in the 4th century, and that the original number synoecized was only 22 or 23. And it is true that
the independent existence of some of these towns is verified by literary, epigraphic, and numismatic evidence. An
alternative explanation is that Pausanias' list goes back to the federal dogma of the Confederacy, but that the
original and optimistic intentions were not fully realized; cf. Braunert and Petersen, 1972: 74ff.; Moggi, 1976: 309ff.
We should not neglect to consider the possibility that D has contributed to the discrepancy. Ephorus was strong on
foundations of cities (cf. Polyb. 9. 1. 4; 34. 1. 3; Strabo 10 C 465). One would expect him therefore to have given
full details of the towns and regions involved as Pausanias does. D may have picked out two regions, the two listed
first perhaps, counted the towns, and wrote that Megalopolis was synoecized out of 20 towns of
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Parrhasia and Maenalia ( Pausanias names 18 communities of Parrhasia and Maenalia). This would not be inconsistent
with his methods. Of course, if the synoecism was effected in two stages, the first involving only two regions and the
second, soon afterwards when the Arcadians decided that a larger population was required, comprising, in theory at
least, the rest of the communities named in Pausanias, then we have an even better explanation why D gives only
Parrhasia and Maenalia. This receives some support from the fact that Megalopolis was founded in Maenalian territory
and Parrhasia was immediately to the west. The townships of these two regions therefore would naturally be the first
to be moved to Megalopolis.
For the location and history of the towns and districts named by Pausanias cf. Frazer, iv. 304ff.; Hitzig and Blmner,
1896-1910: iii. 1. 207ff.; Kahrstedt, 1954: 139ff.; Hejnic, 1961: 10ff.; and Blte's various contributions in RE.

73-74. The Fourth Carthaginian War and the

death of Dionysius
For the chronology see the excursus at 67. 2.
73. 1. : see nn. ad 24. 1-3.
K: we have no reason for questioning this; cf. Stroheker, 1958: 145.
"Contra" Meyer, GdA v. 498. For the term epikrateia see 15. 1n. It is possible, as Huss suggests (1985: 142), that
Dionysius' professed casus belli was also aimed at driving a wedge between the Punic and non-Punic inhabitants of the
epikrateia. If so, it does not seem to have met with any success, to the extent at least that D's briefest of narratives
allows us to judge. Greek Selinus and Campanianoccupied Entella went over to him, but Eryx had to be captured and
Dionysius proceeded through the epikrateia ravaging the countryside.
73. 2. . . . : the figures are not unbelievable; cf. 14. 47. 7; Huss, 1985: 142 n. 8;
Caven, 1990: 207.
+: Thuc. 6. 4. 2; HCT iv. 207, 209; Princeton Encyclopedia, s.v. The city had been conceded to Carthage in
the previous treaty: 17. 5n. On Punic presence there see Rallo, 1982-3: 169ff.
": a native (Elymian) settlement inland from Selinus, some 20 miles to the north-east; see Princeton
Encyclopedia, s.v. In
-474
404 it was captured by Campanian mercenaries (14. 9. 8f.). It was still held by them in 345 (16. 67. 3f.). Indeed,
inscriptions show them still there in the 3rd century, Hellenized, but still recognizably Italian: SEG xxx. 1117ff.;xxxii.
914; xxxv. 999.
+ + +: another Elymian foundation: Thuc. 6. 2.3.

: founded by Carthage subsequent to the destruction of Motya by Dionysius (13. 54. 4; 22. 10. 4), its
position and fortifications were even stronger and it successfully resisted even the Romans during the First Punic War:
HCP i. 104ff. (map p. 106); Frederiksen, Archaeological Reports for 1976-7 (1977), 74f.; CAH2 vii. 2. 560 (map p.
561).
+ . . . + . . . : though Carthage was not able for the time being to meet Dionysius in the field
she did, it seems, succeed in strengthening the garrison of Lilybaeum. Polyaen. 5. 9 should perhaps be linked to this;
see Stroheker, 1958: 236 n. 79; Caven, 1990: 207.
73. 3. . . . + : this is an intriguing statement and scholars have rightly connected it with the
alleged treachery of one Suniatus, a political rival of Hanno (below), reported in Justin 20. 5. 11-12: Whittaker in
Imperialism, 78; Caven, 1990: 207. But cf. Huss, 1985: 143 n. 15. D's source did not disbelieve in the report that the
Carthaginian naval dockyards had been set on fire and he further believed that a part at least of the Carthaginian fleet
had been destroyed in the fire (73. 4: + ). What he criticizes
Dionysius for is that the tyrant rashly assumed that the entire Carthaginian fleet had been destroyed in the
conflagration. However, Dionysius' decision to send more than half of his warships back to Syracuse may have been
due to the onset of winter and to a calculation that the Carthaginians, whatever their remaining potential, were
unlikely to undertake a major naval operation so late in the year. He was wrong, but the representation of him as rash
and overconfident may be less than fair.
73. 4. . . . : under the command of Hanno: Justin 20. 5. 11-12; Pomp. Trog.
prol. 20; Stroheker, 1958: 146; Caven, 1990: 207f.
73. 5. : it would appear that Ephorus did not elaborate on the illness which killed
Dionysius, hence D had recourse to an alternative source (ch. 74).
-475 . . . : from the chronographer. That Dionysius died in the year of Nausigenes (368/7) seems to
have been generally agreed (see excursus at 67. 2). Thirty-eight years of reign take us back to 406/5 (archon Callias)
under which year in fact D records the beginning of the tyranny, explicitly stating at 13. 96. 4 that Dionysius ruled for
38 years. So D's dates for Dionysius are consistent. There was also wide agreement about the length of the tyrant's
reign, 38 years: D; Cicero, De nat. deorum 3. 81; Tusc. disp. 5. 57; Helladius ap. Photius Biblioth. 279, p. 530a Bekker
Val. Max. 9. 13. There is an assumption among many scholars that the correct set of dates (a rule of 38 years starting
in 406/5) goes back to Timaeus whereas Ephorus had got his figures wrong. The reason for this is Polybius 12. 4a 3-6
wherein Timaeus is criticized for falsely accusing Ephorus of blundering over Dionysius' dates. He (Ephorus) is
supposed to have written that Dionysius became tyrant at 23, ruled for 42 years, and died at the age of 63. In
defending Ephorus Polybius does not try to resolve the problem, but merely blames the copyist. Jacoby solution (
1904: 184; accepted by e.g. Brown, 1958: 77; Walbank, HCP ii. 325f.) is as follows: like Timaeus, Ephorus accepted
that Dionysius died in 368/7 and that he was 63 years old at the time. But unlike Timaeus he assumed that the despot
was 23 years old when he came to power and not 25. He therefore wrongly set the beginning of his rule in 408/7, thus
giving him a reign of 40 instead of 38 years. This is what Timaeus, whose own (correct) figure derived from Philistus,
must have criticized, and Ephorus would thus have written . The entered Ephorus' text by
mistake. Jacoby sees proof of this in the fact that the Marmor Parium dates the beginning of Dionysius' reign in 408/7
(FGH 239 A62); it must have followed Ephorus.
This is all very ingenious, but rather unlikely. Ephorus based himself on Philistus for his account of Dionysius no less
than Timaeus. Moreover, it would appear that the early years of Dionysius were not dealt with in a separate book, but
in Book 16 alongside mainland Greek history for which his main source was an equally reliable historian, the writer of
the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (pp. 89 ff.). Why should Ephorus have altered specific information of this kind in Philistus? It
is far more likely, as Beloch has suggested ( GG iii. 2. 259), that (cf. 13. 96. 4)
was corrupted to .
-476-

What then did Timaeus censure in Ephorus? Perhaps Philistus did not specify how old Dionysius was either in 406/5
or in 368/7 (cf. Nepos, De reg. 2. 3) and while Ephorus suggested one thing Timaeus calculated another.
The 12 years of the younger Dionysius are reckoned from 368/7 till, presumably, 356/5 when he retired from
Syracuse (16. 17. 2).
74. 1-4. See p. 84. There is nothing improbable in the story of a member of the chorus hastening to Syracuse to
give Dionysius the good news. Whereupon the tyrant celebrated the victory in suitable style. The rest of the story,
however, is malicious gossip such as the pen of Timaeus rather than Ephorus was likely to produce, especially the
claim that he sought defeat at the hands of the Carthaginians because of an oracle which affirmed that Dionysius
would die when he won over his betters. This is in stark contrast to the rest of D's account of Dionysius, not least to
14. 75. 3 where it is astutely asserted that Dionysius was not willing to destroy Carthaginian power totally for then
the Syracusan populace might turn their attention towards unseating him.
74. 1. . . . : the tragedy he staged and with which he won first prize was the "
: Tzetzes, Chil. 5. 180; Nauck, TGF494 and 493ff. for Dionysius the tragedian.
74. 2. . . . : a tradition probably going back to Philistus through Ephorus maintained
that Dionysius was generally a temperate man: Cicero, Tusc. disp. 5. 57; Nepos, De reg. 2. 2; pp. 68ff.

 : the story in Plut. "Dion"6. 2f. and Nepos, Dion 2. 4f., which Timaeus certainly related (Plutarch
says so), that a soporific was administered to a seriously ill and dying Dionysius so as to render him unconscious
and hasten his death, is seen by some as being out of harmony with what is said here, indicating a different source
for D (cf. Sanders, 1988: 56; Caven, 1990: 3). Not so. Neither Plutarch nor Nepos accounts for Dionysius' illness.
74. 5. ? : that Syracuse continued functioning as a self-governing Greek polis,
on the surface at least, seems evident. In addition to the present passage see 13. 96. 3; 14. 45. 2; 14. 47. 2; 14.
64. 5; 14. 70. 3; ps.-Arist. Econ. 2. 1349a; Cicero, Tusc. disp. 5. 60; Svt 280 (=Tod 136) lines 35-8 (the
emendation is questionable). It is worth noticing too that the coinage continues to bear the city's name. There was
clearly a
-477symbiosis of some sort (whether formally stated or tacitly assumed) between the city and Dionysius, the precise
nature of which, however, escapes us. The Athenian state referred to him as archon of Sicily (Tod 108 line 7; 133
line 19; Svt 280 line 8) and so in reality he was, but this does not take us very far where Syracuse is concerned. Cf.
Beloch, GG iii. 2. 200f.; Stroheker, 1958: 172ff.; Berve, Tyrannis, ii. 648. One possibility is that Dionysius' power
rested on the office of strategos autokrator to which he was elected in 405 and which he may have continued to hold
(cf. Httl, 1929: 99ff.). Or perhaps it was a matter of a lifelong strategia (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 196ff.). Caven, on the
other hand, suggests that after the attempted rebellion of 404/3 an arrangement was worked out between Dionysius
and the city whereby he was accepted as the city's hegemon, entrusted with the direction of the foreign policy and
military matters (1990: 82f., 158f.). This of course (as Caven recognizes) amounts to the position of a strategos
autokrator. The truth is we cannot know the exact constitutional form, if any, through which Dionysius' tyrannical
powers were exercised. See the discussion of Lewis, CAH2 vi. 136ff. For the various terms used to describe
Dionysius' position cf. Sartori, 1966: 13ff. See also n. below.
+ : Philistus apparently spared no effort in describing just how magnificent the funeral really
was: FGH556 FF28, 40.
. . . : he was buried in the acropolis by the gates called royal. I cannot go along with
Oost, 1976: 235, that this constitutes evidence for Dionysius having assumed the royal title, or even for the
previous presence of kings at Syracuse (1976: 224ff.; see also p. 57 ). Presumably the gates were so called either
because they were especially imposing, or because of their connection with the tyrants' palace, or both. The fact
that D nowhere refers to Dionysius as king (admitted by Oost) seems significant because his detailed account of the
first half of the tyrant's career is based on a 4th-century historian. Nor does 16. 17. 2 ( of
the younger Dionysius) prove anything beyond a loose way of writing; cf. 19. 81. 3f.; 85. 3 ( of
Demetrius in 312); 92. 5; 93. 4.
-478-

Chapters 75-76 (Archons Polyzelus and

Cephisodorus, 367/5)
These two chapters are a mere collection of disjointed notices. It is possible that D could not face the daunting task of
dealing with a detailed and involved book of Ephorus (Book 24: see p. 95 ) which covered events in Greece from about
spring/summer 367 till spring/summer 365, finishing with a review of paideia in the middle decades of the 4th century.
He avoided this onerous task by using his chronographer to whom he added a little either from what he knew himself
(the last sentence of 76. 2 is perhaps D's own; see n. there) or from his narrative source (76. 4 is perhaps what is left
from an Ephoran digression). Against the objection that the chronographer cannot have been so detailed see pp. 43 ff.
( Schwartz, RE v. 1. 668, considers 76. 2 to derive from the chronographer).
An alternative explanation is that D hastily read through Ephorus and made notes which amounted to little more than
headings of the main events narrated by his source. These he stuck together (perhaps borrowing an item or two from
the chronographer) to form 75 and 76. It is obviously impossible to decide between the two alternatives, but
whichever the right one may be, the unfortunate result of such a process is that either the beginning or the end of
events occurring outside the period covered in 75 and 76 is missing. For example, the beginning of Euphron's career is
noted at 70. 3, but we hear nothing more about him. His downfall and murder belong in 366. Similarly, Pelopidas'
success in Persia as well as the rest of the events which led to the Common Peace of 366/5 are missing. The Peace
itself is noted (it was doubtless entered in the chronographer). But D's retrospective reference to Pelopidas' successful
mission to Persia in 81. 3 (cf. 90. 2) is evidence that Ephorus had treated the preliminaries to the Peace fully. He must
also have related the alliance between Athens and Arcadia because it emerges suddenly and unexplained at 77. 3.

Archon Polyzelus, 367/6

75. 1. : 375 V. The year of anarchy; see 61. In.
-479-

75. 1. The massacre at Scotussa

Cf. Plut. Pel. 29. 7; Paus. 6. 5. 2f. Plutarch adds that Meliboea suffered the same fate. Pausanias dates the event
to 371/0, but that cannot be, as Beloch, GG iii. 1. 183 n. 1, observes, for Alexander had not yet come to power.

Beloch may be right in suggesting that Pausanias made a mistake in his Olympiad placing the event under the
102nd instead of the 103rd Olympiad. Both Beloch and Westlake, 1935: 144 f., consider that these atrocities
belong after the rescue of Pelopidas. Sordi on the other hand, 1958: 215 n. 1, notices that in D the massacre
occurs before the third invasion of the Peloponnese and the second expedition to free Pelopidas. This order of
events is supported by Plut. Pel. 29. 6 where it is represented that Epaminondas was aware of the fate of
Scotussa and Meliboea when negotiating with the tyrant for the release of his friend. Scotussa was situated in the
Pelasgiotis about 10 miles west of Pherae. Its coinage seems to stop suddenly at this time; see Sthlin, 1924: 109
ff.; RE iiia. 613 ff.; Head, 1911: 309 f.; Philippson, i. 1. 70.
: Plutarch and Pausanias say that Scotussa was allied to Alexander. Presumably then he
suspected it of conspiring to break away. The fact that the women and children were sold into slavery and the
money obtained given to the mercenaries is perhaps an indication that Alexander was already beset with
economic problems; cf. 95. 1 n.
: an unpublished 2nd-century inscription about the fortifications of Scotussa makes
no explicit reference to a taphros, but several to water-channels, hydragogoi (V. Missailidou-Despotidou, Oxford
M. Phil. thesis, 1986).

75. 2. The third invasion of the Peloponnese

For the date see excursus at 67. 2. Cf. X. H. 7. 1. 41-3. Xenophon opines that the Theban objective in invading
Achaea was (section 41). The
Arcadians had been chiefly responsible for the failure of the congress at Thebes (section 39). See Roy, 1971: 578
f. ; Westlake, 1975: 26 ff.; Buckler, 1980a: 158f., 185 ff. I agree with Buckler, 1980a: that the invasion of
Achaea had nothing to do with the Boeotian naval programme.
-480-

: Achaea was already a Confederacy; see 49. 2 n. : we know nothing about any other
cities won over outside Achaea.
: the westernmost city in Achaea perhaps to be identified with ruins near the modern village of KatoAchaia; Herod. 1. 145; Strabo 8 C 337; Paus. 7. 17. 5 ff.; Blte, RE xvii. 2435 ff. A fragment of Ephorus (FGH 70
F84) from Book 24 which narrated events of 367-365 (see 75-76 n.; p. 95 ) runs:
OME . . ., a certain reference to the present 'liberation' (see
below) of the city by Epaminondas.
N1: the famous Athenian 5th-century naval station on the north side of the entrance to the Corinthian
Gulf. The Aetolians claimed the place as theirs; X. H. 4. 6. 14; Demosth. 9. 34; Strabo 9 C 426f.
K: on the Aetolian coast about 4 miles from the sea near modern Mesolongi. Like Naupactus it was
claimed by the Aetolians. In 390 it was held and guarded by the Achaeans against the Aetolians: X. H. 4. 6. 1,
K, A . . . . : all three cities had been garrisoned and
all three were 'freed'. Calydon and Naupactus were probably handed over to the Aetolians (57. 1 n.; Buckler,
1980a: 190). Calydon and Naupactus had to be garrisoned against the Aetolians; Dyme against the Eleans
perhaps as it was near the Elean border. But it is possible that the garrison was aimed against a threatened
insurrection by the democrats who enjoyed the support of Arcadia (X. H. 7. 1. 43). Achaea had been ruled by
proSpartan oligarchies since 417 (Thuc. 5. 82. 1; Larsen, 1968: 87).
Jacoby suggests that a fragment of Daimachus (FGH 65 Fi and n.) who is said to have been one of Ephorus'
sources (FGH 70 T17; pp. 105 f.) may derive from an account of the present events. The suggestion is incapable
of proof. The context of the fragment is mythological and we do not know if Daimachus dealt with 4thcentury
history. The verb need not be seen as betraying a pro-Epaminondas source. The cities were freed in
the sense that the garrisons were driven out and Calydon and Naupactus detached from Achaea.
-481-

75. 2. The rescue of Pelopidas

: for the date see excursus at 67. 2. Though D strangely does not
mention it, Epaminondas commanded the army which freed Pelopidas: Plut. Pel. 29; Paus. 9. 15. 1-3 (who reduces the
two Boeotian expeditions to one); Nepos, Pel. 5. 2; Westlake, 1935: 143f.; Sordi, 1958: 215; Buckler, 1980a: 126 ff.

75. 3. Warfare at Phlius

: Madvig deletes and the words are consequently bracketed by Vogel and Vial. Thompson, 1983a:
303 n. 3, is right, however, to question Madvig. As he suggests, at most alone should be bracketed as a
gloss on . For the aristeia of Phlius and the part played by the Athenian Chares see X. H. 7. 2. For the
chronology of the events see excursus at 67. 2. For a topographical study of the campaigning see Pritchett, 1965-85:
ii. 96 ff. For Chares, Develin, 256.

 : X. H. 7. 2. 18ff. mentions two victorious actions the first of which may have involved
Argives, but the second was against Sicyonians. As for Chares, it is possible that he took part in one of the earlier
campaigns in spite of the silence of Xenophon. But see Thompson, 1983a: 303 ff., who is probably correct to connect
one of the victories over the Argives, not with either of the battles mentioned by Xenophon, but with the engagement
at the Nemean Ravine in which Aeschines distinguished himself (Aesch. 2. 168) and about which Ephorus is very likely
to have written (FGH 70 F82). The Athenian point of view of 75. 3 does not, however, necessarily point to Ephorus and
away from the chronographer. D's chronographer derived ultimately from Eratosthenes and Apollodorus (pp. 43f.) who
employed the Atthides extensively.

Archon Cephisodorus, 366/5

76. 1. : 370 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 638. Four consular tribunes are named as promised. Livy (6. 36. 3) as usual
gives two more. The time-gap between D and the Varronian system which
-482-

had increased to nine years at 15. 20. 1 is now reduced to five. See pp. 27 f.

76. 1. The loss of Oropus

For the date see excursus at 67. 2.
. . . : cf. Aesch. 2. 164; 3. 85; Isocr. 5. 53; Paus. I. 34. 1. Themison as well as a certain
Theodorus are mentioned as joint culprits in Demosth. 18. 99; cf. the scholiast. X. H. 7. 4. 1 does not mention
Themison, but merely says that Oropus was captured by its exiles. The two versions are doubtless complementary:
Thermison captured the place by means of its exiles whose leader was Theodorus. Aesch. 3. 85 says that Oropus
was captured 2. The scholiast elaborates: 2 .
Perhaps Aeschines meant no more than that there was no war in that part of Greece, the Thebans and Athenians
fighting each other elsewhere. Certainly, the arbitration offered and accepted (see below) indicates that both sides,
but especially Athens, were anxious to avoid direct hostilities between Attica and Boeotia. The statement should not
in any case be seen as referring to the Peace of 366/5 which belongs later than the capture of Oropus; see excursus
at 67. 2; Cf. Sealey, 1956: 195 n. 129.
: it would appear that Chabrias was in command for he was tried afterwards along with
Callistratus: Demosth. 21. 64 with schol.; Arist. Rhet. 1. 1364a; 3. 1411b; Hermippus ap. Aul. Gell. 3. 13; Diog.
Laert. 3. 24; Plut. Demosth. 5. 1-3; cf. ps.- Plut. Mor. 844b; Antiphanes fr. 300 FAC. Sealey's chronology, 1956:
195f., is awry; the trial must have taken place immediately after the fiasco (cf. Cawkwell, 1961: 84 n. 2). It marked
a change in Athenian foreign policy; see 76. 3n.; 81. 6n.
: cf. X. H. 7. 4. 1 OME .It is possible that a fragment of
Agatharchides ( FGH 86 F8) refers to the arbitration; see Buckler, CQ :27 ( 1977), 333f. For Thebes and Oropus see
14. 17. 1-3; Thuc. 8. 60. 1-2; Strabo 9 C 399; Paus. 1. 34. 1.
-483-

76. 2. Cos: a new capital

Moggi, 1976: no. 46 325 ff.; Demand, 1990: 127 ff.
: did this mark the political unification of Cos or was it merely a change of site of the capital? Neither the
literary nor the archaeological evidence is conclusive, as the detailed investigation by Sherwin- White, 1978: 40 ff.,
proves. She nevertheless comes down on the side of political unification in 366/5 for the first time. I remain
unconvinced. I concede that neither the Coan 5thcentury coins, nor the description of the Coans as Koioi in the
Athenian tribute lists, nor Herod. 1. 144. 3 and 2. 178. 2, nor the fragment of the coinage decree (a surface find in
the modern town of Cos), by themselves establish that a politically unified Cos existed in the 5th century ( 1978:
50). One must therefore fall back on the evidence of D and Strabo, and for what that is worth it rather points to a
simple transfer of capital. Sherwin-White's interpretation of D and Strabo 14 C 657 seems at fault. in D
which both he and Strabo employ here does not necessarily imply 'the existence of previous settlements' on the new
site ( 1978: 51), and the reference she gives, D 15. 94. 3, in fact proves the opposite: Megalopolis had not existed
before; cf. 13. 75. 1: U=1F30 . . . 2IOT
NU .Rhodes was certainly a foundation on a new site. Strabo on the other hand uses in
the case of Rhodes (14 C 654) which was indeed a political union. The meaning of is clear: 'to change one's
abode'. Whether the new abode requires to be built or not, the verb does not specify.
However, even if one interpreted the none too plentiful archaeological finds to mean that a city existed at this time
on the spot to which the capital was transferred (and that is very probable whatever one's interpretation of Thuc. 8.
41. 2; cf. HCT v n.) an excellent case could still be made that that city, Cos Meropis, was not independent, but
politically subordinate to Astypalaea. The meaning of Strabo 14 C 657 seems plain: the polis (i.e. the political
centre) of Cos used to be called Astypalaea and was situated elsewhere on the island. After a stasis, it was
transferred to where it is now and its name was changed to Cos. (The object of is . . .
which was previously called Astypalaea, not the place/city to which the Coans removed, pace Sherwin- White, 1978:

56.) D does not contradict Strabo. Neither

-484-

says that political unification took place in 366/5. On the contrary, Strabo strongly implies that that was already a
reality when Cos was founded.
For a while at least the new capital was also known as Cos Meropis (Strabo 15 C 686, 701).
. . . : the concentration of much of the island's population in w capital is confirmed by archaeology;
see Bean and Cook, BSA 52 ( 1957), 122.
: they extended for 2 or 3 miles; cf. Morricone, Bolletino d'arte, 35 ( 1950), 55.
: cf. ps.- Scylax, GGM i. 73, Periplous 99. Trade must have been uppermost in the Coans' minds from
the beginning; Sherwin- White, 1978: 68, 236 ff.
. . . : this is the comment of a man who lived much later, in the Hellenistic era when Cos
thrived; it is D's therefore, possibly the chronographer's, but not Ephorus'.

76. 3. The Common Peace of 366/5

For the date see excursus at 67. 2. The Peace has occasioned considerable discussion. Was it a Common Peace as D
says, or was it a very limited peace between Boeotia and a few north-eastern Peloponnesian states as Xenophon
represents? For the first version see Cawkwell, 1961: 80 ff.; id., 1972: 269 ff. For the second, Hampl, 1938: 61 ff.;
Ryder, 1957: 199 ff.; id., 1965: 137 ff.; Buckler, 1980a: 25 1 ff.; Salmon, 1984: 379 ff. (stressing the role of Corinth).
It seems to me that Cawkwell's interpretation is basically correct.
D's evidence: an explanation is offered above (75-76n.) why the events which led to the Peace are missing in D. Their
absence therefore in no way adds support to Xenophon's version ( pace Ryder, 1965: 137). D's information otherwise
is unequivocal and consistent and strongly points to a general settlement in 366/5 which involved the Great King. His
statement that the Common Peace brought to an end the Boeotian-Laconian war which had lasted for just over five
years should perflaps be considered decisive. It is a simple statement, probably deriving from the generally reliable
chronographer. The rest of the information in 76. 3 may likewise derive from the chronographer rather than Ephorus.
In 77. 1 D resumes his narrative without contradiction (this possibly marks the beginning of Ephorus Book 25; see
-485-

75-76 n. and p. 95): , AL 3 , and at 81.3

in the eulogy of Pelopidas he refers to what he had not mentioned before: Pelopidas' success in including Messenia
in the general settlement (cf. Plut. Pel. 30. 1; 31.1). Last, but not least, at 90. 2 in explaining the Spartan anger
against the King, D says that it was due to his having admitted Messenia to the Common Peace along with the rest
of the Greeks. This Common Peace has to be that of 366/5; the Peace of 362/1 did not involve the King (cf. De
Sanctis, 1934: 15 2; 89. 1 n.).
What D has to say about the outbreak of war between Elis and Arcadia shows that Ephorus had a better grasp of the
contemporary political scene than Xenophon. Xenophon says simply that the Eleans suddenly seized Lasion, that the
Arcadians reacted by immediately marching against them, and the war was on. As with the aftermath of the Peace
of 375 and the outbreak of hostilities which followed then (45. 4n.), D's account is fuller and more comprehensible.
Triphylia and the Acroreia, to which Lasion belonged, were the bones of contention (77. 2n.). The Elean envoy to the
King in 367 had returned satisfied while the Arcadian envoy had not, and it is evident that the King had decided in
favour of Elis as no doubt the Thebans had promoted the Elean case (X. H. 7. 1. 26, 32, 38; Buckler, 1980a: 156).
As at this time, however, the Arcadians were still in control of the disputed territories one might argue that this
constitutes evidence for Xenophon's claim that the Theban Common Peace proposals had been unsuccessful.
Nevertheless this is only true in so far as Xenophon's own narrative is concerned for D's account remains consistent.
He says that the Eleans seized Triphylia NU.Why should the Eleans need the pretext of the
exiles to take back what had belonged to them, and what had been recognized as belonging to them by the King?
The most satisfactory explanation is that there had indeed been a Common Peace agreement, but that by the time it
had been accepted (late summer/autumn 366: excursus at 67. 2) its original terms had been somewhat modified so
as to placate Arcadia (and indeed Athens; see below). Arcadia in other words was allowed to keep Triphylia and the
neighbouring communities. Hence the Eleans could not act openly, but needed an excuse. The immediate reaction of
the Arcadians suits this interpretation well for unlike Xenophon, who says that they marched against the
-486Eleans directly, D states that the Arcadians first attempted to resolve the crisis diplomatically. It looks therefore as if
they had a legal leg to stand on: the terms of the recent Common Peace? Some support is added to the above thesis
by the probability that Boeotia supported Arcadia in the war with Elis ( cf. Roy, 1971: 583, 595 f. ).
Xenophon's evidence: Xenophon's evidence is negative. While we may, with certain reservations, accept what he
says as more or less factual, it would be unwise to deny that what he does not mention did not actually happen. His
reasons for misrepresenting the Common Peace of 366/5 are not difficult to fathom. This renewal of the King's Peace

legalized the hitherto de facto liberation of Messenia, an event which Xenophon could not steel himself to relate.
More than that. The hated Thebans had usurped Sparta's (and Athens') role as hegemon and the general settlement
had confirmed them in their position of predominance just as the King's Peace of 387/6 had re-established Sparta as
the leading power in Greece. The King had then given his sanction to Sparta; now Thebes was to be the prostates of
the Peace. The Spartans and their friends must have found this humiliating position intolerable and this explains the
malicious irony with which Xenophon has 'laced' his account of Pelopidas' embassy to Persia (H. 7. 1. 33 ff.). His
purpose was to belittle and ridicule the Theban peace initiative. Very different is Plutarch's treatment, Pel. 30-31. 1.
There is nevertheless a strong hint in Xenophon that a general settlement was reached which included Athens (that
Argos was a party to the Peace is clear from H. 7. 4. 11). At the Susa congress when Leon of Athens protested at
the Theban-inspired contents of the royal rescript which required Athens to draw up her ships on land, the King
ordered a clause to be added to the edict which said, IOT ,
AL IOT (H. 7. 1. 36 f.). The demand to is to be understood in relation to the use
Athens was making of her fleet in the north, in Thessaly and Macedon, where she was upsetting Theban plans (cf.
71. 3f.); and at the time of the congress a war to recover Amphipolis was in progress (81. 6n.). On the return home
of the Athenian embassy Timagoras, who had presumably been ready to accept the Theban proposals, was executed
for treason (H. 7. 1. 38), and Xenophon goes on to relate with relish how the congress at Thebes came to nothing
(H. 7. 1. 39 f.) though some months later Corinth and a few other north-487-

eastern Peloponnesian states made peace with Thebes (H. 7. 4. 6-11). Now, Demosth. 19. 137 is evidence that Athens
took up the King's offer to submit alternative proposals (Tod 139 lines 2-5 may be the embassy in question) as a result
of which a new royal rescript was sent down which conceded that Amphipolis (and the Chersonese: see other
references under 57. 1) belonged to Athens: . (
Ryder, 1965: 139, misunderstands H. 7. 1. 37: the 'further negotiations' were to be within the context of a general
settlement and not merely between Athens and the King.)
The situation in 366 was strikingly similar to that of 387/6 when Athens was 'bribed' (with the offer of Lemnos, Imbros,
and Scyros) into accepting the Spartan-Persian settlement. Sparta was then primarily concerned with dissolving the
Boeotian Confederacy, breaking up the union of Corinth and Argos, and then dealing with her intransigent allies in the
Peloponnese (H. 5. 1. 36-2. 1). Thebes' first priority now was to keep Sparta weak by maintaining the independence of
Messenia. She could afford to make some concessions to Athens so as to persuade her to recognize Messenia and
accept the settlement: the clause about was dropped and Amphipolis and the Chersonese conceded.
After the loss of Oropus and the displeasure with their Peloponnesian allies, the Athenians would have been even
readier to add their name to the Peace. Athens' right to Amphipolis and the Chersonese, therefore, seems to have been
recognized in two stages: at the congress at Athens in 371/0 Sparta and the other participant states granted their
recognition (see under 57. 1); in 366/5 Boeotia and her allies as well as the Great King did the same.
With Athens acquiescing, Arcadia, Athens' new ally (H. 7. 4. 1 ff; 67. 2n.), could hardly stand alone though in fact
there is some indication that she too was placated before she consented (see above). Thus, with Boeotia (and her
allies), Athens (and her Confederacy), Argos, Arcadia, as well as the north-eastern Peloponnesian states participating
(Elis too was perhaps forced to take the oath), the Peace was certainly a Common Peace. Sparta was of course
excluded, but then so was Boeotia in 372/1 and 371/0. Its exclusion does not, therefore, alter the nature of the Peace
( pace Buckler, 1980a: 254f.). After all, Sparta also remained outside the Peace of 362/1, but no one would deny that
that Peace was a Common Peace. D's statement that the Laconian-Boeotian
-488-

war was now (in 366/5) ended is not incompatible with the fact that Sparta was excluded and left to carry on the
war against Messenia alone.
One other modification of the original terms can be extracted from Xenophon's inadequate witness. The proposals
which Pelopidas brought down included a compulsory guarantee clause (H. 7. 1. 36f.). This was eventually dropped.
Sparta's friends would have insisted on this as otherwise they might have been obliged to march against her (H. 7.
4. 10. Note especially the sentence ( ) ).
D's picture of a short-lived Common Peace is not contradicted by Xenophon therefore. On the contrary, proper use
of the Hellenica even adds support to it.
. . : the war begun in 378 is termed Boiotikos polemos at 25. 1. It involved the repeated
(and attempted) invasion of Boeotia by the Peloponnesians. The present war began with an invasion of Boeotia (the
Leuctra campaign), but by the time it came to its end the Peloponnese had been invaded three times by the
Boeotians, the first invasion including a severe ravaging of Laconia. Hence perhaps its double appellation, the
Laconian-Boeotian war. The chronographer, one suspects, would have had trouble in finding distinctive names for all
these wars.

76. 4. An Ephoran literary digression?

It is said above (75-76n.) that Ephorus perhaps concluded Book 24 of the Histories with a review of paideia in the
middle decades of the 4th century. At any rate it is preferable to consider this section to be the incompetent
summary of such a chapter than a collection of chronographic entries, as does Grilli, 1962: 127ff., who compares it
to 89. 3 (certainly a chronographic entry) and to the Chronica of Eusebius and Hieronymus. Grilli notes the absurdity
of referring to Aristotle and Anaximenes as in 366/5, and he further points to the

awkward syntax of the passage: the sentence + , + is

tacked on rather oddly. He therefore concludes that the reference to Aristotle (who is mentioned elsewhere in D,
pace Grilli; see 12. 1. 5) and Anaximenes is an interpolation in D's text. He sees proof for this in the fact that neither
is mentioned in the Chronicon of Eusebius, who, being a
-489sensible man and working from a text which contained the same entry as our passage, left out the interpolation as
chronologically absurd. This difficulty, however, disappears if we see the passage as a badly abbreviated Ephoran
chapter. Ephorus knew Aristotle; they were contemporaries and had probably studied at Athens at the same time.
And he certainly knew Anaximenes, another contemporary, whose work he used (p. 105). The placing of Isocrates
and his pupils, one of whom (very probably) was Ephorus, at the head of the passage points to Ephorus. Section 76.
4 in fact should be compared to 12. 1. 4-5 (see pp. 103f.). Concerned as Ephorus was with paideia he must have
had a great deal to say about it in his work (pp. 10f.). Against Grilli argues also the fact that both Xenophon and
Anaximenes are mentioned at 89. 3 and in the normal form of the chronographic source. : Cf. Cic. De orat.
2. 22, 94; Dion. Hal. "Isaeus" 19; Isocr. 1; ps.-Plut. Mor. 837c-e; Philostr. Vit. Soph. 506; Diog. Laert. 2. 15; 2. 64;
4. 23; 5. 61. +: see Wendland, Anaximenes von Lampsakos ( 1905); FGH iia. 72. + . . .
: cf. Diog. Laert. 8. 46, 79; Guthrie, i. 179f. In the west Philolaus and were still alive in the early 4th
century; Guthrie, i. 329ff. + . . . : all three in fact belonged to Socrates' circle; see Plato,
Phaedo59b-c; Guthrie, iii. 489ff.; KP 1. 190, 402f., 562f.

Archon Chion, 365/

77. 1. + : 369 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 638. Five consular tribunes are named though no total number is given
here. As usual the complete college consists of six tribunes, the one missed out in D being Q. Quinctius (Livy 6. 36.
6). See pp. 27 f.

77. -4. War between Elis and Arcadia

1

or the date see excursus at 67. 2. 77. 1. : Roy, 1971: 583 n. 75, doubts the existence of these exiles. But it
is not difficult to guess who or what these people were: they were pro-Spartan Arcadians who fled when Arcadia
rebelled against Sparta (cf. 59. 2f.; X. H. 6. 5. 10). In the early
-490360s when friendly relations existed between Elis and Arcadia they had presumably been elsewhere, in Achaea
perhaps or in Sparta itself.
. . . : Triphylia occupied an area between the rivers Alpheus and Neda. It is difficult to say just how
far east it extended though certainly Heraea in the north by the Alpheus and Phigalia in the south by the Neda did
not belong to it. Mt. Minthe was mostly within Triphylia (see the map by Graefinghoff, Athen. Mitt. 38 ( 1913), pl.
iv). Lasion, some 11 miles north of the Alpheus and near the Arcadian border, did not belong to Triphylia but to the
Acroreia: X. H. 3. 2. 30; cf. Blte, RE viia. 200. D's description of Lasion as is justified; Frazer, iv.
98ff. He calls it at 14. 17. 8. For the Acroreia cf. Hirschfeld, RE i. 1200.
77. 2. : for the conflict cf. Polyb. 4. 74. 1; Swoboda, RE v. 2400ff.
77. 3. + : see 75-76 n. and the excursus at 67. 2 for the date; X. H. 7. 4. 2, 6, 29; Svt 284;
Roy, 1971: 581f.; Buckler, 1980a: 195ff. Xenophon does not in the Hellenica mention any Athenian troops as
present at this time. But as he agrees (7. 4. 6) that Athens was bound by the terms of the alliance to send her
cavalry in the event of Arcadia being attacked, and as the Athenian cavalry was at Olympia in the summer of 364,
we might conclude that the Athenian troopers were involved against Elis from the beginning. In Poroi 3. 7, on the
other hand, Xenophon names two Athenians, Lysistratus and Hegesileos, who commanded forces sent to succour
Arcadia. Hegesileos commanded the Athenian contingent in 362 (84. 2n.), so that Lysistratus must be the cavalry
commander in 365 and 364. It was astute of Lycomedes to require nothing more from Athens than her cavalry, an
arm in which the Arcadians, like the rest of the Peloponnesians, were weak; but they had plenty of good hoplites.
Besides, the alliance stood a better chance of being approved by the assembly and subsequently honoured if the
ordinary Athenian was not required to campaign himself. On the two Athenian commanders cf. Develin, 259, 263.
+ + . . . : cf. X. H. 7. 4. 13. 77.4. + + : the war involved at
least three invasions of Elis and considerable fighting, all of which D ignores. For the details see X. H. 7. 4. 14ff. The
Arcadians quickly
-491gained and maintained the upper hand and captured most of the disputed as well as much Elean territory. After
Lasion they captured the rest of the towns of the Acroreia with the exception of Thraestus before marching to
Olympia; see 78. 2n. and cf. 14. 17. 8f. where D gives a better account of the Spartan invasion of this area in 402.
The loss of territory is reflected in the number of Elean phylae and Hellanodicae. These were increased from 10 to 12
in 368, but reduced to 8 in 364. In 348 they again stood at 10: Paus. 5. 9. 5-6.
. . . : cf. X. H. 7. 4. 14. Margana was a town in the Pisatis west of Olympia perhaps between the
modern villages of Phloka and Strephi; cf. Blte, RE xiv. 1680ff. Cronium is the Hill of Cronus at Olympia, not a

polis! There is no better example of D's careless use of his sources than this.
: both were perioikic towns on the west coast of Messenia which had still
been holding out for Sparta. Coryphasion was the Spartan name for Pylos: Thuc. 4. 3. 2; Strabo 8 C 345, 359; Paus.
4. 36. 1, 7; Pieske, RE xii. 47ff.; Cartledge, 1979: 299, 301. Although the towns were probably captured in this
year, there is reason to assume that they were captured during the follow-up campaign against Elis (they are not
mentioned by Xenophon). What is more, they must have been handed over directly to the newly created state of
Messenia. What we have here is a severely telescoped narrative; the middle of the story is missing.

77. 5. A chronographic notice

See 71. 1n. and pp. 33ff.

Archon Timocrates, 364/3

78. 1. + : 368 V; CAH2 vii. 2. 639. Three consular tribunes are announced and three named and,
therefore, D's college is three tribunes short of Livy's college (6. 38. 2). See pp. 27 f.
. . . + : declared an anolympiad by the Eleans: 78. 3; Paus. 6. 4. 2; 8. 3; 22.
3. : the wrestling according to Africanus. 'This is
-492such an abnormal way of identifying a festival that it must be correct. Either the stadion was never run or its victor
was not counted' ( David Lewis in a letter). The mistake then, if such it is, is either the chronographer's or D's.

78. 1-3. The Olympic festival of 364

78.2. + . . . : for the Pisatan claims to Olympia cf. Ziehen, RE xvii. 2531ff. On the district of
Pisatis in which Olympia lay, Ernst Meyer, RE xx. 1732ff.
. . . +: as D correctly represents, Pisatis was an independent state for a while and allied to
Arcadia. The same is true also of the Acroreia (77. 4n.). This is proved by a fragmentary Arcadian decree found at
Olympia which admitted Pisatis to an alliance with Arcadia, Sicyon, Messenia, and, perhaps, Argos: Kunze,
Olympiabericht, 7 ( 1961), 211ff.= SEG xxii. 339=Svt 285a; SEG xxix. 405; xxxii. 411. Its status is further shown
by the issue of gold and silver coinage ( Hill, 1906: 76f.; Ernst Meyer, RE xx. 1754, but cf. Kraay, 1976: 106 and n.
1) and by a proxeny decree: Syll. i. 171; Busolt, GS ii. 1403.
+ +: this is wrong of course. The Pisatans and Arcadians had been in
possession of the sanctuary since the previous year as D's own information attests (77. 1-4). They, and not the
Eleans, prepared for and held the festival: X. H. 7. 4. 28f. Xenophon's account is reasonably detailed and Ephorus'
must have been even more so with, perhaps, a lengthy review of the rival Pisatan and Elean claims to Olympia. D is
once more guilty of a careless abbreviation of his source; +0311 perhaps referred to the
Pisatans and Arcadians in Ephorus and not to the Eleans.
78. 3. : a Diodoran word (p. 16) though obviously the Eleans would have taken the field in full force. The
Achaeans marched with them: X. H. 7. 4. 28, 30. Against them were ranged, apart from an unspecified number of
Arcadians, 2,000 Argives and 400 Athenian cavalry: ibid. 29. : cf. X. H. 7. 4. 30-32.

78. 4-79. 2. Epaminondas' naval venture

For the date see excursus at 67. 2.
-49378. 4. . . . : a Diodoran expression; see 16. 32. 3; 17. 15. 3; 17. 94. 5.
On each of these occasions an important decision had to be taken and the speaker needed to employ all his
rhetorical gifts to persuade his audience. It is probable that D substituted this expression for a set speech in his
sources in each instance.
Epaminondas' remarks would have been exaggerated abroad and especially at Athens. Aeschines, some twenty
years later, claimed that Epaminondas had urged the Thebans, speaking metaphorically of course, to remove the
Propylaea of the Athenian Acropolis and set it up at the entrance to the Cadmea (2. 105). D and Isocrates (5. 53)
agree that Thebes was aiming at the hegemony of the sea; of. also Aristid. Leuctr. 1. 53 (23. 634 Dind.). But
whatever his precise aims, as Epaminondas was counting on exploiting the disaffection of some of the Athenian allies
in the Aegean, it is unlikely that he would have spoken about gaining for Thebes the sea supremacy. That was rather
the impression formed at Athens when the news broke that a Boeotian fleet was loose in the Aegean.

 + . . . : this appears paradoxical at first sight, but what is meant presumably is

that the Boeotians did not have to match the Athenian navy. With their command of the land, a moderate-sized fleet
would have sufficed (cf. Burn, JHS 74 ( 1954), 213).
: he may have stressed that Boeotia was well situated for naval enterprises or at least Ephorus,
who thought that, may have made him say so; cf. FGH 70, F 119.
79. 1. Just what did the naval programme amount to? It is not impossible that the assembly voted to build 100
triremes, but that these were actually built, manned, and sent out is not easy to credit. Such an undertaking would
have been well beyond the resources of Boeotia; it was beyond those of Athens at this time and no better argument
can be advanced than that. (For those who do require more, cf. Buckler, 1980a: 161.) But D in fact does not say
that 100 triremes were built. He merely refers to the psephisma to construct 100 triremes and says that
Epaminondas sailed . His fleet must have been modest (excursus at 67. 2 and below). Some scholars
nevertheless insist that a major shipbuilding programme was initiated and that this was either completed or
approaching completion when Epaminondas sailed. But as they
-494-

acknowledge that such a project was beyond the means of Boeotia and that, further, several years would have been
needed for its implementation, they date its inception to 367/6 and fill the Boeotian purses with Persian gold. Thus
Carrata Thomes, 1952: 23ff.; Buckler, 1980a: 155f., 160f.; cf. also Sealey, 1993: 90. It is an interesting hypothesis,
but one incapable of proof for not a shred of evidence connects the Great King with the Boeotian naval enterprise.
Equally unsubstantiated is the theory that Thebes turned to Carthage for help with the shipbuilding (as Glotz, 1933:
331ff., and Carrata Thomes, 1952: 25f., suggest; see also Roesch, 1984: 52ff.) though IG vii. 2407 (a Boeotian federal
decree in honour of a Carthaginian) does seem to point to diplomatic relations between Boeotia and Carthage, aimed
perhaps against Sparta's friend Syracuse (cf. ML 92: Athens and Carthage in 406). Political motives could also lie
behind IG vii. 2408 (a Boeotian federal decree in honour of a Byzantian) and Roesch, 1984: 46 (a Boeotian federal
decree in honour of a Macedonian). Roesch, on the other hand, connects all three decrees with the Theban naval
venture. IG vii. 2407 might even have a commercial explanation (cf. Cawkwell, 1972: 272 n. 1).
Archaeological evidence, though often adduced in support of a substantial naval programme, is inconclusive: Carrata
Thomes, 1952: 27ff.; Fossey, 1979: 9ff.; Buckler, 1980a: 164; Roesch, 1984: 52ff. (with a map of Epaminondas'
'naval bases' in the Euboean Gulf on p. 55 ). The seawalls of Larymna, for example, may date to the early 370s when
north Euboea was held by Sparta; or, if they date to the 360s, they may have been a defence against Alexander of
Pherae; or they may be later.
Epaminondas' objectives must have been modest. By 364 there was dissatisfaction with Athens in the Aegean and
Epaminondas meant to exploit it and thus undermine the Athenian Confederacy (see next n. but one). Boeotia had
always possessed a small navy (cf. Salmon, 1953: 358ff.) and this, moderately augmented, and added to the navies of
Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, could have proved a serious threat to Athens. Those three states fought the Social War
with some 100 triremes (16. 21. 2. Is D's figure of 100 triremes the result of a misunderstanding of what Epaminondas
said? He may have urged an alliance with Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium which would have enabled Thebes to fight
Athens with a fleet 100 strong).
-495-

But the Boeotians probably voted to build some triremes at least because D mentions and this adds
credence to the reported psephisma. Just what the size of Epaminondas' fleet was is impossible to discover. The
of Laches does not help (pace Cawkwell, 1972: 270f.; Buckler, 1980a: 169); it is simply D's way
of making good his source's silence on the matter (p. 133 ). But Laches' squadron must have been small (he was
probably on guard duty at the Hellespont; cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 246) and that is why he avoided an engagement.
Cawkwell's explanation why there was no battle is uncompelling (1972: 271). How was Laches to
unless he fought them? In any case the Peace had disintegrated by summer 364 and even if it
had not, a Boeotian fleet in the Aegean fostering rebellion against Athens was certainly a warlike action.
. . . : this is incorrect for one could accommodate many ships (cf. Demosth. 14.
22f.). It may be that D confused with with or that is corrupt.
'+ . . . + : the three most important members of the Athenian Confederacy in the Aegean.
Athenian (mis)behaviour in 365 and 364 must have worried these states and made them all the readier to listen
to Boeotian overtures; cf. Cawkwell, 1972: 271ff.; Griffith in Imperialism, 140ff.; Hornblower, 1982a: 197ff.; id.,
1983: 232ff. Contra Cargill, 1981: 166ff. : Develin, 262.
. . . . . . : the precise meaning of here escapes us: he 'made the cities friendly to Thebes'
(Sherman). 'friendly' is perhaps too weak a translation of ( Hornblower, 1982a: 200n. 137). Vial's 'acquit les
cits Thbes', on the other hand, probably goes too far in the other direction. Epaminondas' success at any rate
is difficult to gauge, but it does not seem to have amounted to much. Chios and Rhodes, though they may well
have given Epaminondas a favourable and even enthusiastic reception (concerning Rhodes see Kraay, 1976: 179
n. 1), certainly did not revolt and join Boeotia; Byzantium probably did (cf. Hornblower, 1982a: 200f.; id., 1983:
232). It was the ally of Boeotia and a member of the synedrion of the Boeotian alliance in the later 350s (Tod
160; 57. 1n.). The usual view is that the revolt did not take place till 357, the outbreak of the Social War. But
with the exception of 16. 7. 3, none of the sources states that Byzantium rebelled in 357 along with Rhodes and
Chios. What the sources do say is that
-496-

these three states fought against Athens: Demosth. 15. 3; Isocr. 8. 16; 15. 63f.; Dion, Hal. Isocr. 15f.; Pomp. Trog.
prol. 6. The force of D 16. 7. 3 is weakened by the strong probability that Cos was never a member of the Athenian
Confederacy as D implies (cf. Sherwin-White, 1978: 42f.). Byzantium did rebel from Athens (though not in 357 as
Rhodes and Chios did) and that, in a writer like D, is enough to explain .
That Byzantium rebelled and allied itself to Boeotia in 364 seems indicated by a fragment of Ephorus ( FGH 70 F83)
where it is said that Chrysopolis, which belonged to Calchedon (13. 64. 2; 14. 31. 4; X. H. 1. 1. 22; Strabo 12C 563),
was handed over, or was to be handed over, to the allies. These allies may well be the Byzantians and the subject of
the verb Epaminondas (for the possible context of the fragment see p. 95 ). It would appear that from 364 Byzantium
began a policy of aggrandizement in the area, and Timotheus had to intervene at some stage in the late 360s ( Nepos,
Tim. 1. 2). In 362 it was beaching cornships bound for Athens (Demosth. 50. 6), and by the late 350s it had taken
over both Calchedon and Selymbria (Demosth. 15. 26). A disturbance in the Cyclades at about this time may have
been connected with the Boeotian naval expedition. This concerns the attempt by Ceos to secede from the Athenian
Confederacy: Tod 142 (=Svt 289) lines 17ff., 27ff., 57ff. (cf. Tod 141=Svt 287 which probably belongs to the time of
the revolt). See Cargill, 1981: 169; Sealey, 1993: 91f. The naval enterprise, therefore, came to very little. Byzantium
apart, there was no widespread rebellion against Athens (for possible Athenian diplomatic moves to counteract Theban
propaganda see 34. 4n.) and Epaminondas did not get the chance to repeat the attempt; he was overtaken by events
on the mainland (cf. Plut. Philop. 14. 2f. who agrees that Epaminondas returned , but ascribes this to his
unwillingness to succeed!).
79. 2. This is consistent with Ephorus' view of Epaminondas vis-vis the Theban supremacy; see pp. 10 f., 120.

79. 3-6. The destruction of Orchomenus

For the date see excursus at 67. 2.
79. 3. + . . . +: D is the only source to describe the episode in some detail. For Boeotian exiles
cf. 62. 1; 64. 2; 65.
-497-

6; Paus. 9. 15. 4. It would appear from Plut. Pel. 25. 14f. that Menecleidas was a leading figure in the conspiracy to
overthrow the constitution; cf. Buckler, 1980a: 145ff. The knights of Orchomenus were natural allies in such an
attempt. 79. 4. : thus the MSS, retained by Vogel though it makes no sense; cf. the Teubner app. crit.
for proposed emendations, the least unsatisfactory of which perhaps is Dindorf's + . Vial prints
Wesseling's +. But the meaning of the passage seems clear: the coup was arranged for the day on which a
regular cavalry review was held at Thebes. It was during such a review that Jason of Pherae was murdered (60.
5n.). 79. 5. , +: the Boeotian koinon because (a) the Boeotarchs referred the matter to it and (b)
the decision to destroy Orchomenus would have been a federal one.
79. 5-6. See Buckler, 1980a: 182ff.

80-81. 4. Pelopidas' last campaign

For the date see excursus at 67. 2.
80. 1. . . . : cf. Plut. Pel. 31. 2. Alexander had captured a number of cities belonging to
the Thessalian Confederacy. In addition he was occupying Phthiotic Achaea and Magnesia.
80. 2. + + + + : correct. The ultimate decision lay with the federal assembly; see
nn. ad 28. 1 and 79. 5. : PlUt. Pel. 31. 4 agrees.
+ : cf. Plut. Pel. 31. 3. On 13 July 364; cf. Ginzel, 1909-14: ii. 527.
80. 3. + : Cf. Plut. Pel. 31. 4-6. It is possible that many were seeking for an excuse not
to intervene in Thessaly; cf. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 199n. 2; Westlake, 1935: 148 n. 1; Sordi, 1958: 218 and n. 4. At any
rate the Boeotian field army remained at home and Pelopidas set out +
( Plut. Pel. 31. 4 'with 300 volunteer cavalry and some mercenaries'. Perrin mistranslates in the Loeb as
Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 118 n. 29, and Buckler, 1980a: 176, have not perceived). D does not make it clear that the
Boeotian hoplites stayed at home and in 80. 6 he combines Pelopidas' expedition with that sent against Alexander
after Pelopidas' death. Sordi sees pro-Boeotian sources at work. In fact, D's abridgement of his
-498source is responsible; see further 80. 6n. and p. 118: Ephorus was no pro-Boeotian. Nepos, Pel. 5. 3, is equally
misleading and probably for the same reason. But clearly there cannot have been 7,000 Boeotian hoplites at the
battle of Cynoscephalae. : see p. 14.
80. 4. : Alexander's army was positioned at the Thetideion to begin with. A race then developed as the
infantry of both sides tried to occupy the intervening hills. Meanwhile Pelopidas' cavalry charged that of Alexander
and drove it off the low ridge of the Thetideion and into the plain: Plut. Pel. 32. 1-4. Location of the Thetideion:

Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 114 ff.

. . . + : Plut. Pel. 32. 1 merely says that Alexander had more than twice as many hoplites as
Pelopidas. The latter had augmented his mercenaries and 300 volunteer cavalry with Thessalian foot and horse at
Pharsalus: Plut. Pel. 32. 1. According to Plutarch, Pelopidas' cavalry was excellent and numerous and this is borne
out by the facts: Pel. 32. 3.
80. 5. 'A : Alexander won the race for the hills from which nevertheless Pelopidas managed to
eject him by a joint cavalry and infantry assault: Plut. Pel. 32. 4-7. For the hills see Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 118;
Buckler, 1980a: 176 ff. D's description of the battle is typically vague and rhetorical. He agrees with Plut. Pel. 32. 811 that Pelopidas charged Alexander and thus met his death; cf. Nepos, Pel. 5. 4, where Pelopidas charges
Alexander on horseback. According to Plutarch Alexander lost more than 3,000 dead. For the battle see Kromayer,
AS ii. 116ff.; Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 118f.; Buckler, 1980a: 176ff.
80. 6.: on receipt of news of Pelopidas' death the Boeotians dispatched 7,000 hoplites and 700 cavalry
to Thessaly under the command of Malecidas and Diogeiton: Plut. Pel. 35. 2. These two are mentioned in the
proxeny decree, IG vii. 2408. According to D, Alexander was brought to battle and soundly defeated. D's epitome of
Ephorus fails to differentiate this second expedition from that of Pelopidas. We may nevertheless accept his
statement that a second battle was fought before Alexander submitted. Plut. Pel. 35. 2-3 does not mention a second
battle, but suggests that Alexander's defeat by Pelopidas was so heavy that the mere presence of the Boeotian army
was enough to force Alexander to the conference table. Rather than perceive a clash of sources here, D's deriving
from a pro-Boeotian account (Sordi,
-4991958: 218 n. 3 and 219), it is better to ascribe the difference to Plutarch's desire to enhance the glory of his subject,
Pelopidas; he makes the most of Pelopidas' indecisive victory while he hurries over the second campaign which
finally cut Alexander down to size. This is quite consistent with his methods in the Lives; cf. Buckler, 1978: 36ff.
. . . B: Plut. Pel. 35. 3 agrees. When he says that Phthiotic Achaea and Magnesia were
freed, that is not in basic contradiction to D's claim that they were handed over to the Boeotians: the two areas were
left free, but allied to Boeotia (they did not join the Thessalian Confederacy as Buckler, 1980a: 182, suggests).
Alexander was allowed to retain Pherae and Pagasae as well as, perhaps, part of Magnesia (Polyaen. 6. 2. 1; Beloch,
GG iii. 1. 200; Westlake, 1935: 151; Sordi, 1958: 220 and n. 2). Thessaly was thus divided into three parts
independent of each other, but separately allied to Boeotia. Plut. Pel. 31. 2 suggests that this was the situation
before Alexander seized Phthiotic Achaea and Magnesia though of course the tyrant was not then allied to Boeotia.
Alexander's present subject-status is shown by the clause +

: Plut. Pel. 35. 3; Svt 288.
For the honours bestowed on Pelopidas by the Thessalians which included a statue at Delphi by Lysippus, the
inscribed base of which has been, discovered, see Plut. Pel. 33; Nepos, Pel. 5. 5; Bersanetti, 1949: 83ff.; Bousquet,
1963: 206ff.; Sjoqvist, 1973: 10f.

81. 1-4. The epainos on Pelopidas

For Ephorus' epainoi and psogoi see pp. 6 ff. D here touches on facts which he omitted to mention before: Pelopidas'
part in the liberation of Thebes, his victory at Tegyra, his role in the battle of Leuctra, his embassy to Persia. Vial,
pp. x and 158, is led by this to conclude that D employed a source other than Ephorus for the eulogy. But the
correct explanation surely is that the above facts were the victims of D's severe abbreviation of his source. If they
get a mention here this is because D, naturally, paid the epainos more attention. Also, he could less easily have
missed the highlights of Pelopidas' career collected in one short chapter, the epainos, than scattered in the Ephoran
narrative.
-500-

81. 1. + + : see 25. 2n.

81. 2. T: thus the MSS. Estienne emended T from Plut. Pel. 16f. The reference is clearly to the battle at
Tegyra: 37. 1-2.
: see 5 5. 1n.
. . . : 50,000 at 62. 5. See n. there for an explanation.
81. 3. : see 75-76n.; 76. 3n.
: according to Paus. 4. 27. 9-11 Messenia was refounded 287 years after the capture of Eira, i.e. the
Messenians were homeless, he concludes, for nearly 300 years. This was Ephorus' figure too. Plut. Mor. 194b and
Aelian, VH 13. 42, on the other hand, thought that new Messenia was reconstituted 230 years after the destruction of
old Messenia, while Isocr. 6. 27 and Dinarch. 1. 73 give the figure 400. The different figures evidently depend on
whether the reckoning was done from the First or the Second Messenian War and on the dates accepted for the
beginning and end of these wars; see 66. 3 n. and Forrest explanation, 1980: 69, for the figure 230.

81. 4. + . . . : not quite true. Pelopidas was certainly not a Boeotarch in 371 (81. 2; Plut. Pel. 20.
3; 23. 6; Paus. 9. 13. 6f.), and on the basis of Plut. Pel. 34. 7, + + . . . , he
was also not a Boeotarch in one other year and that year appears to have been 369 (see chronological excursus at 67.
2). Nevertheless, Pelopidas was a Boeotarch almost continuously (and when not a Boeotarch he held some other
office: Plut. Pel. 15. 5) and D's statement is therefore excusable if not strictly correct.

81. 5. Clearchus of Heraclea

A chronographic entry. Clearchus was murdered in 353/2 after a rule of twelve years (16. 36. 3; FGH 434 (Memnon)
F1. 1). The beginning of his rule therefore should be under 365/4 and not 364/3. It may be that one of the entries on
his successors (at 16. 36. 3; 88. 5; 20. 77. 1) is to blame (Beloch, GG iii. 2. 94 f.), but as these are consistent it is
preferable to assume that it is the first entry which is misplaced. Clearchus became tyrant in summer or autumn 364
(cf. 81. 6n.) i.e. under 364/3 by the Attic calendar, but perhaps under 365/4 if the local calendar of Heraclea (a
Megarian
-501-

colony) lagged behind that of Athens by several months like that of Sparta. One explanation for the displacement,
therefore, might be that the chronographer who translated the Heracleot dates into Attic ones failed to allow for
this gap, and if the notices on Clearchus' successors are correct perhaps that is because their accessions and
deaths occurred at times when the local Heracleot and the Attic calendars coincided (cf. p. 38). The year 365/4
for the beginning of Clearchus' rule is supported by FGH 434 (Memnon) F6. 1 (cf. F7. 3) where it is said that the
grandchildren of the oligarchs exiled by Clearchus at the time of his coup returned to Heraclea after eighty-four
years. Their return took place in spring or summer 281 because Seleucus I was murdered between 25 August and
24 September 281 ( Sachs and Wiseman, Iraq, 16 ( 1954), 205 f.). Reckoned exclusively the eighty-four years
take us back to 365/4.
On Clearchus and his successors see Justin 16. 4-5; Isocr. Letter 7; Aeneas Tact. 12. 5; Polyaen. 2. 30. 1-3;
Demosth. 20. 84; Theopomp. ap. Polyb. 38. 6. 2 and Athen. 3. 85a-b; Memnon, FGH 434 F1 ff.; Nymphis, FGH
432 F10; ps.-Chion, Epistles 13-16 (ed. with introd. and nn. by Ingemar Dring, 1951); Suida s.v. K and
3955 (ed. Adler); Apel, 1910 ; Th. Lenschau, RE xi. s.v. Klearchos (4); Beloch, GG iii. 1. 137 ff.; iii. 2.
94ff.; Parke, 1933: 97ff.; Moss, 1962: 6ff.; Berve, Tyrannis, i. 315 ff.; ii. 679 ff.; Fuks, 1972: 36 n. 66; 1974:
61, 71 n. 23; Burstein, 1976: 47 ff.; Welskopf, 1989: 51 f.
... + : Clearchus, a Heracleot exile, was called in with his mercenaries (he was in Persian
service at the time) to help re-establish order. Instead he established his own rule. According to Justin 16. 4. 1-4
the governing class of Heraclea had first petitioned Timotheus and Epaminondas, but unsuccessfully, and were
then forced to turn to Clearchus. Timotheus nevertheless may not have been an innocent bystander. We know
from Demosth. 20. 84 that he obtained for Clearchus the Athenian citizenship, probably in 375 (Burstein, 1976:
127 n. 32); and the close relationship between the two, both pupils of Isocrates (Isocr. Letter 7. 12; FGH 434 F1.
1; Suida s.v. K), is further shown by the name Clearchus gave to his son and successor Timotheus, born
shortly after the beginning of the tyranny (Burstein, 1976: 132 n. 105). In fact the names Clearchus gave to his
two sons (he called the younger Dionysius) betray his connections and aspira-502-

tions; and D does say that he tried to emulate Dionysius of Syracuse. Duani, 1979: 328 and n. 69, sees Plato as well
as Timotheus behind the installation of Clearchus as tyrant. Clearchus' methods became a little too tyrannical and
revolutionary and Isocrates and his circle dissociated themselves from him (Letter 7 esp. section 12). Whatever the
criticisms of his contemporaries, however, there is little doubt that Clearchus ruled + ; cf. Beloch, GG iii. I.
138f.; Burstein, 1976: 54ff.

81. 6. Timotheus in the north

Another chronographic entry. Events in the Aegean in the 360s cannot be disentangled beyond dispute. (For good,
recent discussions which, however, defer in some respects from what follows see Hornblower, 1982a: 193ff.; Sealey,
1993: 74ff., 249ff.) Iphicrates had in (probably) 369 begun operations against Amphipolis. Still unsuccessful more than
three years later he was replaced in autumn 366 by Timotheus who was appointed general ' 'A
(Demosth. 23. 149; Aesch. 2. 27). There is no reason to assume from Aeschines' expression +
+ that Iphicrates did not arrive in the north earlier than 368. After all, in the next section he claims
that the 16-yearold Philip was set on Iphicrates' knees! And to date Iphicrates' arrival in the north to 369 gets rid of
the minor puzzle of why Athens took no action to capture Amphipolis that year: Cawkwell, 1961: 81 and n. 2.
Timotheus was sent out immediately after the conclusion of the Common Peace in late summer/autumn 366 which
bestowed Persian and Theban recognition on Athenian claims to Amphipolls and the Chersonese (76. 3n.). He sailed
first against Amphipolis, the main target, where, in spite of having secured the services of Charidemus, he could do
little, his resources being small; at the siege of Samos, begun shortly afterwards, he had no more than 30 triremes
and 8,000 peltasts (Demosth. 23. 149f.; Isocr. 15. 111). Demosthenes' statement that, prior to his employment by
Timotheus, Charidemus had quitted the Chersonese because Y+1F50 + (23. 150)
might suggest that Sestos and Crithote were not yet in Athenian hands.
Timotheus, therefore, switched his attention from Amphipolis to the Chersonese. On setting out from Athens he had
been

-503-

directed to aid Ariobarzanes of Hellespontine Phrygia, an honorary citizen of Athens, but without contravening the
Peace. This was an impossible task, for Timotheus soon saw that Ariobarzanes was clearly in revolt against the King;
the King's generals, Autophradates of Lydia and Mausolus of Caria, were campaigning against him. He avoided the
dilemma by turning against the pro-Persian regime on Samos. After a ten-month siege the city fell in summer 365.
Many of the inhabitants were expelled and replaced with Athenian cleruchs (18. 8. 7; 18. 18. 9: in 323/2 the Samian
exiles were returned to Samos by Perdiccas after an exile of forty-three years; Demosth. 15. 9; Isocr. 15. 111;
Nepos, Tim. 1. 2; D 18. 8. 7; 18. 18. 9; ps. -Arist. Econ. 1350b; Polyaen. 3. 10. 5, 9, 10; Heracl. Pont. Politeiai 10.
7 (FHG ii. p. 216=Arist. F611 Rose); Strabo 14 C 638; Craterus, FGH 342 F21; IG ii2 108. IG ii2 1609 probably
dates to 370/69 and not to 366/5 as Davies, 1969: 309ff., suggests, and the cleruchy of lines 88ff., therefore, is not
the Samian cleruchy; see Sealey, 1957: 95ff.; id., 1993: 88, 251 f.; Cawkwell, 1973a: 759ff. The objection raised
by Harris to the earlier date, 1988: 50 n. 20, is not insuperable; cf. e.g. Sealey, 1993: 289 n. 3. On Timotheus,
Samos, and the cleruchy see also Cargill, 1983: 321 ff. and Shipley, 1987: 155 ff.).
By now Ariobarzanes was being besieged at Assos (or Adramyttium: Polyaen. 7. 26) by the King's generals and
Agesilaus had arrived on the scene as his ally. Timotheus saw a way of 'aiding' Ariobarzanes without breaking the
terms of the Peace, as well as of regaining part at least of the Chersonese. Sestus and Crithote in the Chersonese
were held by Ariobarzanes (it was perhaps his offer to hand them over in exchange for help that had occasioned the
instruction to Timotheus to aid the satrap). At this instant the Thracian Cotys, an enemy of Athens, was besieging
Sestus from the land while Mausolus was blockading the city from the sea. Timotheus and Agesilaus drove Cotys off
and persuaded Mausolus to depart. Timotheus then 'received' Sestus and Crithote from Ariobarzanes (X. Ag. 2. 26;
Isocr. 15. 112; Nepos, Tim. 1. 2f.). Elaeus on the tip of the Chersonese, was already a member of the Athenian
Confederacy (Tod 123, (=Svt 257) line 123). Much remained to be done, for Cotys still held the rest of the
Chersonese including the important city of Cardia and he was soon to capture Sestus and threaten Crithote and
Elaeus (Demosth. 23. 150, 158). Timotheus nevertheless turned against
-504Amphipolis and the Macedonian coast. Allied with Perdiccas of Macedon (for a while) and Menelaus of Pelagonia, he
waged war against the Chalcidians and Amphipolis till 362 when he was replaced by Callisthenes (Aesch. 2. 30). He
captured Pydna, Methone, Torone, and Potidaea (see below) and a number of other towns in the neighbourhood
though an attack on Amphipolis in 364/3 failed (81. 6; Demosth. 2. 14; 23. 150ff.; cf. 4. 4; Isocr. 15. 113; Aesch.
2. 29; schol. Aesch. 2. 31; Dinarch. 1. 14; cf. 3. 17; Polyaen. 3. 10. 8, 14, 15; 4. 10. 2; Nepos, Tim. 1. 2; Tod 143:
important as showing that Timotheus' operations in the north were still continuing early in 362. He did not capture
Olynthus, as Moysey says, 1976: 188 n. 20, misled by Nepos, Tim. 1. 2). In summer 364 the naval expedition of
Epaminondas necessitated his presence in the Propontis where he clashed with the Byzantians and raised the siege
of Cyzicus (see below). It is possible that he sailed into the Black Sea and helped to install Clearchus as tyrant at
Heraclea (81. 6; Nepos, Tim. 1. 2 f .; 79. 1 n.; 81. 5n.).
T. . . : only these two are mentioned by D. They were taken from the Chalcidians. Both cities had
belonged to the 5th-century Athenian empire, and in fact Potidaea had been an Athenian cleruchy after winter
430/29 (Thuc. 2. 70. 4; Tod 60=ML 66). In spring 361 cleruchs were again sent to Potidaea (Tod 146). As the cities
captured by Timotheus in the north were probably not admitted to the Confederacy, Athens was not acting contrary
to the promises made in 377; cf. Griffith in Imperialism, 138; Cawkwell, 1981b: 45; Cargill, 1981: 149.
K. . . : cf. Nepos, Tim. 1. 3. Besieged by persons unknown. Grote, x. 420, suggested the Theban
fleet and this is not impossible in spite of the objections of Moggi, 1976: 343. But perhaps the attackers were rebels
against the King and hence Timotheus' action could not be construed as a contravention of the King's Peace. That
Peace presumably did not forbid action against states or persons on the Asiatic mainland acting unlawfully (cf. ps.Demosth. 50. 5f.: the date is 362/1). But there are too many gaps in our knowledge for certainty. For Cyzicus in
general at this time cf. Moggi, 1976: no. 48 341 ff.
-505-

Archon Charicleides, 3632

82. 1. 'P : an entire college (the last) of consular tribunes has been missed out by D here, that of 367 V (Livy
7. 1. 2); see pp. 27 f. The consuls he cites are those of the following year, 366 V (CAH2 vii. 2. 639). The time-gap
between him and the Varronian system is thus reduced to four years; cf. Perl, 1957: 107f. L. Sextius Lateranus was
the first plebeian to be admitted to the consulship; cf. CAH2 vii. 2.334ff. 82-87. The fourth invasion of the Peloponnese
and the campaign and battle of Mantinea
82. 1. + + . . . + : hardly a doublet (pace Roy, 1971: 584 n. 85); just D looking back, as the joining of
+ to the perfect participle shows: 'they were in the position of having held the games jointly'. Cf., rightly,
Vial. Sherman mistranslates.
+ M : it was the Tegeans who misappropriated the sacred money and the Mantineans who
objected and who further desired an end to the Arcadian occupation of Olympia and peace with Elis (X. H. 7. 4. 33 ff.).
D has erroneously reversed the roles of the two cities as is shown by the fact that Elis fought with Mantinea against
Boeotia and Tegea (84. 4. For such shortcomings see p. 138 ).
82. 2. : though D neglects to say so, peace was made with Elis: X. H. 7. 4. 35f.; IG iv. 616; Tod,
1913: 58f.; Buckler, 1980a: 205. Not in Svt.

 + : the Confederacy was split in two along the old lines of oligarchs, now centred at Mantinea, and
democrats, centred at Tegea. Whereas at Tegea the oligarchs had been mostly killed or exiled (X. H. 6. 5. 6ff.), at
Mantinea they had survived. Like Lycomedes they favoured an independent Arcadia. Xenophon describes them as the
and + + (H. 7. 4. 35. f.; 7. 5. 1). Both sides apparently claimed
to represent the true Confederacy; cf. Demosth. 19. 11, 198, 305; Svt 290=Tod 144; Busolt, GS ii. 1404 and n. 5. At
this juncture Mantinea controlled a majority in the Myrzoi and the support of most of the eparitoi. Tegea on the other
hand carried most of the federal officials: X. H. 7. 4. 34ff.; 7. 5. 1 ff.; Roy, 1971: 584ff.; Thompson, 1983b: 149ff.
-50682. 3. : see p. 133. The Boeotian contingent would probably have numbered 7,000 hoplites and 600700 cavalry; cf. 68. 1; 71. 3; Plut. Pel. 35. 2.
82. 4. 'A : Athens was already allied with Arcadia (77. 3n.) and though the Confederacy
was now split in two there was little doubt which half Athens would support. For Sparta the split of Arcadia was the
best possible news and an alliance with the Mantinean half was concluded: X. H. 7. 5. 1, 3; Svt 291.

82. 5-84. 2. The attempts on Sparta and Mantinea

No two accounts of the attempts on Sparta and Mantinea agree in every detail. Nevertheless, two basic versions can be
distinguished: that of X. H. 7. 5. 6 ff., followed by Plut. Ages. 34. 3-5 (where only the attack on Sparta is related. For
sections 6-11 he used a different source, probably Callisthenes); cf. Polyaen. 2. 3. io. And that of Callisthenes as found
in Polyb. 9. 8. 2-13 (cf. Jacoby, FGH iid. 124 F26n.). Ephorus used Callisthenes, but he also used other information not
entirely consistent with that of Callisthenes (see below) and this explains the differences and similarities between D
and Polybius (see p. 105 ). In Mor. 346b-e, Plutarch follows the Callisthenic version. Justin 6. 7 reflects the Ephoran
version, but perhaps with an element or two from Xenophon thrown in.
According to Xenophon Epaminondas was at Tegea when he heard that Agesilaus and the Spartans were marching to
join their allies at Mantinea and that they had already reached Pellana in north-west Laconia. He conceived the plan to
capture the undefended city of Sparta. After an overnight march he made his attack in the morning. Unfortunately for
him the Spartans had learned of his intention and Agesilaus had quickly doubled back and was waiting for him. The
attack failed. It then occurred to Epaminondas that the Arcadians would be coming to the help of Sparta leaving
Mantinea undefended. After another overnight march he reached Tegea where he rested with his hoplites, but he
dispatched the Boeotian and Thessallan cavalry against Mantinea. Bad luck again intervened for the Athenian cavalry
was now at hand to save the Mantinean population which was out in the fields harvesting.
-507-

The Callisthenic version differs in two important respects: the Spartans were already at Mantinea when Epaminondas
set out from Tegea, and they did not arrive back at Sparta till after the attack had begun. And Epaminondas moved
against Mantinea himself with both horse and foot, and was foiled by the Athenians arriving, again, with both cavalry
and infantry. Ephorus altered this version somewhat.
Xenophon's version is doubtless correct as the nn. below demonstrate.
82. 5. 'E. . . T + : D may have misunderstood his source (cf. Tuplin, 1979: 349) or
Ephorus may have added this variant to Callisthenes' account. To reach Mantinea Agesilaus had to march through
the hostile territory of Tegea; cf. Polyb. 9. 8. 2 (Callisthenes); X. H. 7. 5. 7-10.
82. 6. : cf. Westlake, 1975: 31f.; Buckler, 1980a: 209.
. . . : see 84. 2; cf. Polyb. 9. 8. 13; p. 14; HCP ii ad loc. Ephorus derived this from
Callisthenes, but Xenophon too had remarked that fortune had not favoured Epaminondas; otherwise his planning
and daring could hardly be faulted: H. 7. 5. 8.
+ A: the two Spartan kings in 362 were Agesilaus and Cleomenes II. The king in command of the army here
was certainly Agesilaus (cf. X. H. 7. 5. 9) and the man left behind at Sparta (83. 2) must be Archidamus, not
Agesilaus. Tuplin ( 1979: 349ff., 356f.) suggests that 'Agesilaos' at 82. 6 was gradually corrupted to 'Agis', while at
83. 2 the text may have originally read ('A ) 'A + .
. . . : D seems to differ from the other sources in saying that Agis (i.e. Agesilaus),
fearing the cunning of Epaminondas, guessed his intention and by sending Cretan runners to Sparta he put the city
on its guard (cf. Justin 6. 7. 3 who, however, makes the people at Sparta sense the coming danger). Callisthenes
had said that a Thespian called Euthynus from Epaminondas' army warned Agesilaus (ap. Plut. Ages. 34. 4). He
becomes in Polyb. 9. 8. 6. X. H. 7. 5. 10 says that a Cretan informed Agesilaus about the
approaching enemy. This Cretan as well as those mentioned by D were certainly serving with the Spartan army (
Tuplin, 1979: 350), and Xenophon does not say otherwise (pace e.g. Walbank, HCP ii. 129; Westlake,
-5081975: 31; Buckler, 1980a: 315n. 47). But whoever the informant was (and this has not been generally understood)
the information he gave can only have been to the effect that Epaminondas had given orders to his troops to march
after dinner (the Thespian deserter) or that he had left Tegea and was proceeding south (the Cretan or Cretans who

may have been scouting in the vicinity). As Polyb. 9. 8. 3 f. says, Epaminondas had kept his plan secret and he may
even have given out false information so that, in fact, Agesilaus had still to evaluate the report he received. He
guessed, correctly, that Epaminondas' target was Sparta (though cf. Cartledge, 1987: 235, who thinks that the
march to Sparta was merely a diversionary tactic -- but Xenophon had no doubts about the matter and the
Boeotians did actually assault the city); , is how D puts it. There is,
therefore, rather more to Agesilaus' inspired guesswork in D than Tuplin, 1979: 350f., allows, though, as he
suggests, Ephorus, in his desire to compare the two great men, may have chosen to highlight this aspect.
: a hapax legomenon and a rare enough word to point directly to Ephorus; cf. p. 15; Herod. 6. 105. 1;
9. 12. 1.
S : Xenophon appears correct in saying that Agesilaus had not gone further
than Pellana, and that he arrived back at Sparta before Epaminondas. As Roloff, 1903: 7ff., points out it would have
been impossible for Agesilaus to reach Sparta from Mantinea, a distance of some 50 miles by the most direct route,
shortly after the attack began in the morning, as Polyb. 9. 8. 2, 6 claims. Buckler, 1980a: 316 n. 50, calculates that
an army could not easily have reached Sparta from Mantinea in less than nine hours after Epaminondas commenced
his attack. The same fatal criticism applies to Polybius' claim that Epaminondas reached Mantinea with all his army
(9. 8. 9) following his overnight march from Sparta. Polybius' information must therefore be
discounted in favour of that of Xenophon.
The impossible version of Callisthenes arose because (a) Agesilaus was away from Sparta and had to get back in a
hurry, (b) there were Spartan troops at Mantinea at the time ( X. H.7. 5. 10) and these along with the allies
marched to defend Sparta arriving there after Epaminondas, though surely very late on the day of the attack if not
in fact after Epaminondas had departed ( X. H.7. 5. 14), and
-509(c) Archidamus did play a prominent part in the defence of the city which may have created the impression that
Agesilaus was not present (cf. Isocr. Letter 9. 4f.; X. H. 7. 5. 12f.).
It should be noted (as it has not been) that Ephorus' version could just about fit the demands of time and space for
according to D the fighting lasted all day and the Spartan army, setting out from the neighbourhood of Tegea, a
dozen or so miles south of Mantinea, did not get back till nightfall (83. 5). Epaminondas then withdrew and gave
orders for supper (84. 1). Polybius on the other hand says that after the failure of the attack Epaminondas had
breakfast (9. 8. 7). For the attack on Mantinea, however, Ephorus was just as wrong as Callisthenes-Polybius.
83. 1-2. See 82. 6nn.
83. 3-4. : cf. X. H.7. 5. 10-13; Plut. Ages. 34. 5-11; Justin 6. 7. 1-9; Aeneas Tact. 2.
2.
83. 4. ... : see 26. 4n. According to Polyb. 9. 8. 5 Epaminondas arrived
and, attacking immediately, pushed his way as far as the market place, occupying a large part of the city; cf. X. H.7.
5. 12; Buckler, 1980a: 210f., 315 n. 49. 83. 5. . . . : see 82. 6n.
84. 1. : cf. Polyb. 9. 8. 7-8. According to X. H. 7. 5. 14 the Mantineans had not yet arrived
and Epaminondas' reasons for withdrawing were rather different. : see 82. 6nn.
. . . + : cf. Plut. Mor.346c; Front. Strat. 3. 11. 5.
84. 2. + . . . : cf. X. H. 7. 5. 14 which should be preferred to D and Polybius; see 82. 6n.
Epaminondas stopped at Tegea with the hoplites while he sent the cavalry against Mantinea. It was noon when it
reached the city (Polyb. 9. 8. 9). Obviously Epaminondas intended to move against Mantinea with the hoplites too
after resting for a few hours, still ahead of the Mantineans and their allies (Polyb. 9. 8. 8) who would have been
hastening back from Sparta (84. 2, Polyb. 9. 8. 12, and Plut. Mor. 346c-e argue against Buckler's assumption,
1980a: 211f., that the Eleans and Achaeans remained at Mantinea all the while). Meanwhile the cavalry would have
secured large numbers of the
-510-

Mantinean population and perhaps the city itself if they arrived without warning. In the end, Epaminondas did not
move against Mantinea because his cavalry returned having been checked, and he was not to know that the Athenian
hoplites had not yet reached Mantinea. It is even possible that his cavalry commanders assumed that the Athenian
hoplites were at hand and reported so to Epaminondas. The lan with which the Athenian troopers charged might have
been seen as confirming this. Greek cavalry was usually more courageous when operating in the vicinity of a friendly
phalanx of hoplites.
: see 82. 6n.
. . . : Polyb. 9. 8. 11 says that the Theban vanguard had just reached the sanctuary of Poseidon which
was at a distance of 7 stades from Mantinea when the Athenians appeared; see map HCT iv, opp. p. 96 and Pritchett,
1965-85: ii. 50ff. for the site of the sanctuary.

 2 + : Cf. Polyb. 9. 8. 11

; 'A ; Plut. Mor. 346e ' M. Presumably the

southern end of Mt. Barberi (Alesion); see map HCT iv, opp. p. 96.
: just as Xenophon is correct that Epaminondas remained at Tegea with the infantry (above), so he is
correct that only the Athenian cavalry now arrived at Mantinea. Required by the alliance treaty of 366 to send their
cavalry when Arcadia was threatened (77. 3n.), the Athenians had acted quickly and their horsemen reached Mantinea
at noon (Polyb. 9. 8. 9) on the day following their departure from Eleusis. They had had their evening meal at the
Isthmus and it would appear that they rode all through the night; that is the impression one derives from X. H. 7. 5.
15 who adds that they did not even stop in the morning to feed themselves and the horses ( Kromayer, AS i. 36n. 2,
however, assumes that they rode only during the day and they arrived at Mantinea on the third day after setting out).
It would of course have been impossible for the Athenian hoplites to keep up with them. We might further add that
Xenophon would surely have known the exact circumstances of the clash in which his two sons participated, especially
as the elder, Gryllus, died a hero's death during it. The version of Callisthenes and Ephorus should therefore be
rejected: Epaminondas did not arrive before Mantinea with
-511-

his entire army and he was not thwarted by the Athenians both horse and foot. What gave rise to this version?
First, however, D should be absolved from the charge that he has fused together the two cavalry battles, the one
in which Gryllus was killed and the other, several days later, which accompanied the battle of Mantinea proper.
The two are of course conflated in D, but he is not to blame. Callisthenes and Ephorus too had not, it would seem,
clearly (if at all) distinguished between the two. Polyb. 9. 8. 12 says that with the arrival of the Athenians, the
Mantineans who had been left behind took courage and manned the walls. He leaves it at that. His source
presumably went on to relate the battle of Mantinea. D takes it a step further: while part of the Athenian force
entered the city, the rest fell into battle formation. Plut. Mor. 346c-e, on the other hand, maintains that
Epaminondas had encircled Mantinea when the Athenians approached; while the Athenian hoplites fell into
phalanx formation, their cavalry fought with the enemy.
The facts of Mantinea must have been difficult to disentangle from the beginning. Victory was claimed by both
sides (89. 1; X. H.7. 5. 26f.). Eulogies and epitaphs were composed in honour of Gryllus, while in the famous
painting in the Stoa Poikile at Athens, Euphranor showed Gryllus killing Epaminondas in the cavalry engagement.
A copy of this was set up in the gymnasium at Mantinea ( Plut. Mor. 346e-f; Paus. 1. 3. 4; 8. 9. 8; 8. 11. 6; 9.
15. 5; Pliny, HN35. 129. Shrimpton, 1971: 312n. 15, does not believe that the painting included Epaminondas).
Paus. 8. 11. 5ff. displays the confusion that surrounded the battle. At a distance of 30 stades from Mantinea on
the way to Pallantium, i.e. in the area where the battle was fought, was a copse of oak trees known as Pelagos
(see map HCT iv, opp. p. 96 and for the topography Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 56ff.); there the action was fought
between the Athenian and Mantinean cavalry on the one side and the Theban cavalry on the other. Pausanias
proceeds to relate that the glory for killing Epaminondas was claimed by Mantinea, Sparta, and Athens. He
accepts the latter's claim that Gryllus was the man who smote Epaminondas. Ephorus of course made no such
claim, but it would appear from FGH 70 F85 (ap. Diog. Laert. 2. 54) that for Ephorus too (who was probably
familiar with the literature on Gryllus; cf. Jacoby ad loc.) the cavalry engagement in which Gryllus fell was part of
the battle of Mantinea; cf. 85. 4 and n.
-512-

: see 29. 7n. H : thus F. 'H H PXM. The name is given as 'H by Ephorus (
FGH70 F85) and X. Poroi 3. 7.
. . . : a relative of Eubulus. He served as general in 349/8 in Euboea: Demosth. 19. 290 with schol.;
PA 6339; 77. 3n.
84. 4. : the Arcadians who sided with Mantinea and the Achaeans are mentioned at 85. 2. The
Phliasians were probably present too to judge from Svt 290 = Tod 144, the alliance between Athens, Arcadia, Elis,
Achaea, and Phlius after the battle. And it is possible that at 85. 2 hides one or two other north-east
Peloponnesian cities such as Troezen and Epidaurus.
: an acceptable figure. Cf. Kromayer, AS i. 114ff., who nevertheless exaggerates the number
of Lacedaemonian hoplites. Even if present in full force these could not, in my view, have exceeded some 3,500 men
in all (see 32. 1 n.). And a part of their army would probably have been left at home. Cf. Anderson, 1970: 222.
: this seems inflated (though Kromayer, AS i. 114ff., accepts it). The Athenians probably sent some 600
(they sent 400 in 364: X. H. 7. 4. 29) and no other contingent is likely to have been stronger. Phlius had a small but
good body of horsemen (X. H. 7. 2. 4, 10) and the Spartans ( X. H. 7. 5. 10; Hipparch. 9. 4), Eleans (85. 7f.; X.
H.7. 4. 16, 26), and Arcadians. (85. 8; Paus. 8. 11. 5) cannot have contributed more than a few hundred each; the
Achaeans perhaps none. In 378 Agesilaus had no more than 1,500 horsemen (32. 1). The 2,000 figure may
represent Ephorus' assumption that the cavalry was about one-tenth of the infantry. That was indeed frequently the
case with Athenian and Boeotian expeditionary forces (cf. 26. 2; 68. 1; 71. 3; 94. 2; 16. 37. 3; X. H. 4. 2. 17), but
in this instance many states contributed few horsemen or even none.
: the claim cannot be checked. X. H. 7. 5. 5 lists Megalopolis, Asea, Pallantium, and a
number of unnamed townships in south-east Arcadia on the side of Tegea. Larsen, 1968: 193 n. 2, takes this as
evidence that that was about the extent of the Tegean part of the Confederacy; Mantinea must have had the rest of
Arcadia with her and that is why Xenophon does not give a list in her case. However, Xenophon is hardly an

unbiased
-513

observer and in the absence of any other evidence one must nevertheless counter that Ephorus believed most of
Arcadia to have sided with Tegea.
'A : if these are not the Peloponnesian Achaeans wrongly transposed here from the previous sentence from
which they are missing, then we should see these people as the Phthiotic Achaeans who had become the allies of
Boeotia in 364 (80. 6n.).
. . . : the essenians and Sicyonians (85. 2).
: see list in 85. 2.
: again, a reasonable figure; cf. Kromayer, AS i. 121ff. : as in the case of the Mantineans and
their allies (see n. above), Ephorus may have reckoned the cavalry as one-tenth of the infantry. The figure seems
rather high. Epaminondas' cavalry came mostly from Boeotia and Thessaly and though it outnumbered the Athenian
cavalry in the earlier action in front of Mantinea ( X. H. 7. 5. 16), it cannot have done so very significantly as the
Athenians were able to contain it. Perhaps there were 1,0001,200 Boeotian and Thessalian horsemen and a few
hundred others. Polyaen. 2. 3. 14 gives 1,600.
85-87. The battle
85. 1. : see X. H. 7. 5. 21f. The Mantineans and their allies had taken up their positions on the
Tegean-Mantinean border at the gap between Mytika and Kapnistra (see map HCT iv, opp. p. 96). Epaminondas first
formed his men in ordinary phalanx opposite that of the enemy. But instead of joining battle he led them (he was on
the left wing) towards ( ibid. 21 ). There he brought up side by side the Boeotian lochoi, which
had been marching in column in two or four files, to form a strong front, much deeper than the enemy's. Xenophon
does not specify which part of Epaminondas' army adopted this deep formation, but it is evident from section 23 that
not all the army did so. According to Arrian, Tact. 11. 2, the deep attacking column was made up of all the Boeotians
and not just the Thebans as at Leuctra. Between Leuctra and Mantinea Epaminondas would have had plenty of time to
train the Boeotians to operate together in the new tactics.
85. 2. Only D gives the order of battle of the two sides.
-514-

see 84. 4n. : the Thessalian Confederacy; cf. X. H.7. 5. 4. :

Alexander of Pherae sent a contingent: X. H. 7. 5. 4.
. . . : the division and posting of the cavalry on each wing by both sides as well as the actions
which followed may be what drew Polybius' criticism of Ephorus in 12. 25f 4-5. Polybius probably visited the site
which was marked by Epaminondas' tomb (Paus. 8. 11. 7 f.; 8. 12. 1) and he perhaps concluded that there was not
enough space for several thousand horsemen to have operated on the wings. Kromayer, AS i. 52 and n. 3, and
Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 64f., nevertheless calculate that there was enough room, even at the narrowest point of the
Mytika gap, for the Athenians and their allies to position their cavalry drawn up six deep (see below) on the wings of
a phalanx of hoplites of normal depth. And they base their calculations on D's figure of 2,000 for the allied cavalry.
D's battle dispositions become even more tenable if the figure 2,000 is exaggerated (84. 4n.) and if we consider an
interesting piece of information he supplies at 85. 7: the Elean cavalry was posted in the rear. A reasonable
explanation for this may be that the allies wanted to leave sufficient space on the wings for the rest of the cavalry.
Or, the Elean contingent may have been intended as a reserve as the Boeotians were expected to try and break
through. Alternatively, the cavalry may have been stationed on the wings, but in advance of the hoplites. At any
rate Xenophon does not contradict D's information. Even if (H. 7. 5. 24) is taken to refer to the
Boeotian and Thessalian cavalry on the left, there is the cavalry on the on the right ( ibid. ), and D's
statement is still broadly correct and consistent with Xenophon.
From D and X. H.7. 5. 22ff. it emerges that as at Leuctra Eparninondas directed the attack against the main enemy,
in this instance the Mantineans and Spartans who formed the right wing of their battle-line. These he charged with
his own left, the Boeotians. The Mantineans and their allies drew up their cavalry in a shallow formation (six deep on
R+stow's emendation of 6' for at H. 7. 5. 23). Epaminondas meant his cavalry to punch a hole
in the enemy cavalry. He therefore gave it a deep formation and he further posted TGR t to stiffen its
impact ( ibid. 24 nded from ; cf. X. Hipparch. 5. 13.
-515For the hamippoi see FGH328 F71n.; HCT iv. 79f.). As soon as it was ready it was ordered to attack while behind it,
and obscured by it as at Leuctra (Polyaen. 2. 3. 14; cf. Front. Strat. 2. 2. 12), advanced the Boeotian hoplites. From
D we may deduce that it attacked in two columns, one against the Mantinean and Spartan cavalry on the left and
the other against the Athenian cavalry on the right (see below). The infantry battle was fought in the western half of
the field, chiefly between the Boeotians and the Spartans. Less was done elsewhere though rather more perhaps
than Xenophon would lead us to believe. 85. 3. usual rhetorical elements (p. 15).

85. 4-8. The cavalry battle

We have seen (84. 2n.) that in D the two separate cavalry battles are combined into one. However, it is still possible
to pick out elements of the earlier action in sections 4-8. The separate treatment of the cavalry and infantry battles
gives the appearance of a rhetorical battle-piece but in fact, and this was also the case at Leuctra, the cavalry battle
was fought and won before Epaminondas charged with the hoplites. But little time intervened between the two
actions. As at Leuctra, Epaminondas timed his infantry charge to coincide with the rout of the enemy cavalry.
85. 4. . . . . . . : it is to be doubted that the Athenian cavalry charged the
Theban cavalry in the battle of Mantinea. It was the Thebans and Thessalians rather who charged the Athenians. X.
H.7. 5. 22 remarks on the general unreadiness of the allied infantry and cavalry when Epaminondas attacked. D's
claim should be seen rather as an element of the earlier action in which Gryllus was killed.
: the Athenian cavalry had to be defeated as everyone knew that the Boeotians had been victorious on
the day. But the references to the courage and experience of the Athenian troopers reflect the earlier action which
had been fought to a standstill. . . . : this certainly belongs to the battle of Mantinea
proper. The light-armed are the hamippoi mentioned by Xenophon (85. 2n.), and the hamippoi must refer to the
deep formation adopted by Epaminondas' cavalry. D goes on to explain what sort of troops Epaminondas posted
with the cavalry. . . . : the implication seems to be that the
-516-

Athenians were weak in javelin-men and could not have stiffened their cavalry with such troops. We know that at some
time after Mantinea they adopted Boeotian tactics and intermingled lightarmed infantry with their cavalry; cf. FGH328
F71n.
85. 4-5. SI : the Boeotians had their own hamippoi (cf. Thuc.5. 57. 2), but it would
seem that, as D says, the Thessalian slingers and javelin-men (cf. X. H. 6. 1. 9) accompanying the Boeotians were now
employed in the same role of supporting the cavalry.
85. 6. NU : their own rather, the left. It would have been impossible for
the Athenians to flee round both wings. This is possibly another of the things Polybius criticized in Ephorus (85. 2n.);
unless the error is D's.
: these are clearly the troops, both hoplites and cavalry, stationed opposite
the Athenian position in order to prevent the Athenians (posted on the right wing) from intervening in the fighting ( X.
H.7. 5. 24). The low hills should perhaps be identified with the rising ground northeast of the village of Mandzagra (
Loring, 1895: 88; Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 58f.; Buckler, 1980a: 217; see his map p. 214 ). Xenophon does not refer to
this covering force again, but D, we see, says that it was attacked by the retreating Athenian cavalry and annihilated.
He repeats this at 87. 3 where he says that the Athenians were in possession of the dead Euboeans and mercenaries.
It is indeed possible that part of the Athenian cavalry fled north beyond the left flank of their hoplites while the rest,
fleeing south, attacked and defeated the Euboeans and mercenaries on the hills.
85. 7. : they were attempting to turn the Athenian phalanx.
: stationed behind the hoplites (85. 2n.), the Elean cavalry now moved to defend the
Athenian left which had begun to crumble.
85. 8. : on the allied right meanwhile the Mantinean and Spartan cavalry (D does not mention the
latter; cf. X. H.7. 5. 10) had moved forward to meet the attacking Boeotians ( ), but they had
been quickly defeated and chased back to their own hoplites.
-517-

8-87. 2. The infantry battle

86. 1. : perhaps a conscious effort by Ephorus to echo Thuc. 5. 74. 1 and other such
statements in Thucydides (for which see Gomme, HCT iv ad 5. 60. 3). But cf. X. H. 7. 5. 26.
86. 2. NU : the only people mentioned in the infantry battle; cf. 87. 3. Thus, in spite of all
the inane rhetoric, the truth still emerges in D. As at Leuctra, Epaminondas advanced with the phalanx in a loxe
formation and aimed his attack exactly at the point where the Lacedaemonians were. Xenophon is silent about
whom Epaminondas struck and defeated and this may indicate that it was the Spartans; cf. Polyb. 12. 25f 3:
e. ). As the Mantineans and other Arcadians were on the right wing with the Spartans, they too
perhaps were involved in the defeat and flight. 86. 2-87. 1. Little need be said about the insipid rhetoric which
approaches Homeric proportions in places (acf. 86. 4 !). It is fairly typical of D. But one must
search for the facts beneath the rhetoric.
86. 4. OGR : we do not know who commanded, nor do we hear of any noteworthy Spartan
killed in the battle.

86. 5. . . . F . . . : as at Leuctra, the weight of the Boeotians caused the enemy line to
disintegrate (see the Appendix). Then the killing began; see X. H.7. 5. 22-4.
87. 1. : all sources agree that Epaminondas fell at the moment of victory. His slayer was
certainly a Spartan. Plut. Ages. 35. 1 calls him Anticrates; cf. Nepos, Epam. 9. 1; Polyb. 12. 25f 3. The glory for
killing Epaminondas, however, was claimed by others too; see 84. 2n.
87. 2. O? . . . : cf. on the other hand Xenophon's dramatic description of the effect of
Epaminondas' death on his victorious troops: H. 7. 5. 25. But cf. ; Westlake, 1975: 39f. and n. 52. On Xenophon on
Epaminondas the general (perhaps not an unqualified belated encomium) see Tupin: 156f.
O . . . : cf. X. H. 7. 5. 26f.
87. 3. : see 85. 6n.
-51887. 4. . . . . . . : cf. X. H. 7. 5. 26 and see Pritchett, 1971-91: iv. 246 ff.
87. 5-6. Cf. Paus. 8. 11. 7; Nepos, Epam. 9. 3; Justin 6. 8. 11-13; Aelian, VH 12. 3. In accordance with Greek
custom Epaminondas was buried on the battlefield: Paus. 8. 11. 7 f.; cf. Pritchett, 1965-85: ii. 44 ff.

88. The epainos of Epaminondas

See pp. 10 f., 120.
88. 2. T K: perhaps a textual corruption of T ( KNU). This would remove one of the
difficulties which prevent some (e.g. Drews, 1962: 388) from accepting ch. 88 as a Diodoran adaptation of an
Ephoran eulogy. But even if that were not so, D was more than capable of botching his summary of Ephorus.
Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates are often listed together as the three great Athenian leaders of this period; cf.
Aesch. 3. 243; Demosth. 20. 84.
M: a figure of some interest to Ephorus: 11. 81-3; Andrewes in Essays Starr, 190 f.
88. 4. : this is evidence that Book 25 of Ephorus which narrated the battle of
Mantinea was written after the destruction of Thebes in 335: pp. 110 ff.

89. 1-2. The Common Peace of 362/1

For the date see excursus at 67. 2.
89. 1. : cf. Svt 292 = Tod 145 line 4 ; i.e. the King was not
involved. This inscription is sometimes treated with undue scepticism. It is probably a Greek reply to the satraps in
revolt against the King in 362/1 and it almost certainly refers to the Peace of that year (see the comments and
bibliography in Svt and Tod, Ryder, 1965: 140 ff. and 90. 1-3 n.). It confirms D, Polybius, and Plutarch that the
Peace was a Common Peace, that it was accompanied by an alliance (see below), and that the King played no part in
it.
. . . M: Polyb. 4. 33. 8 f. and Plut. Ages. 35. 3-5 agree that it was a Common Peace from
which the Spartans alone were excluded. Plutarch refers to it as
-519-

while Svt 292 = Tod 145 lines 2, 5 actually calls it koine eirene. This much is generally accepted. What
causes controversy is the claim of D and Polybius that the Peace was accompanied by symmachia. One must first
reject De Sanctis' view (1934: 147 ff.; cf. Treves, 1944: 105) that in Polyb. 4. 33. 9 refers to the Arcadian
allies of Megalopolis. in the same passage certainly indicates the southern half of the Arcadian Confederacy,
but is best interpreted as a reference to the participants in the Peace (cf. HCP i ad loc.). According to both D
and Polybius therefore the Peace was accompanied by symmachia and in this symmachia was included Messenia (cf.
Demosth. 16. 9) whose autonomy was explicitly stated in the terms of this as well as of the previous Peace. A
symmachia is further indicated by Svt292 (= Tod 145) lines 15 f.: ] []s. The problem then
hinges on what is meant by symmachia in this context.
Ryder, 1965: 142, distinguishes between a compulsory guarantee clause and a formal alliance. He accepts that the
Peace was accompanied by the first, but he denies that a formal alliance was involved. 'A compulsory guarantee clause
of this sort did not constitute of itself what the Greeks called an alliance.' He further suggests that D interpreted as
symmachia what in his source was a guarantee clause fully stated, while Polybius was being anachronistic when he
called the participants in the Peace symmachoi. In other words their 4th-century sources did not record an alliance.
Both points are open to criticism.

The Peace at Athens in 371/0 is the only previous Common Peace to have included a compulsory guarantee clause (see
under 57. 1), though Pelopidas had tried to have such a clause accompany his unsuccessful Peace in 367/6 (X. H. 7. 1.
36). According to X. H. 6. 5. 2 the guarantee clause in 371/0 ran:
, . Is this not the substance of a symmachia, an epimachia in 5thcentury terms, but generally referred to as a symmachy in the 4th? Cf. Tod 101 = Svt 223 lines 4 ff.; Tod 102 = Svt
224 lines 4 ff.; Tod 118 = Svt 248 lines 26 ff.; Tod 123 = Svt 257 lines 46 ff.; X. H. 7. 4. 6. (Further on this,
Stylianou, 1994: 7 f.) There is of course an important difference. In the latter, 'formal', alliances the parties involved,
usually two, were specified. The oaths were taken at the respective cities and generally there was a common interest,
a common threat to face, which ensured the implementation of the
-520alliance. This common interest was frequently so strong that a purely defensive arrangement assumed an offensive
character: the Arcadian-Athenian alliance, for instance (X. H. 7. 4. 29). On the other hand Phocis in 362 refused to
follow the Thebans to the Peloponnese, insisting on strict adherence to the stipulations of the alliance (X. H. 7. 5. 4).
Now, the defensive clause attached to the Common Peaces of 371/0 and 362/1 was left somewhat in the air. The cities
vaguely swore to aid any participant state which was the victim of aggression. A fatal weakness of such a clause was
that it was subject to the interpretation of the rest of the clauses: the Spartans in 369 considered the Athenians dutybound to aid them in accordance with their oaths. The Athenians nevertheless were not at all sure whether the
Spartans were the victims or the aggressors (X. H. 6. 5. 36). In other words, not all Athenians were sympathetic to the
Spartans. Demosth. 16. 9f. provides a further case in point. The Athenians and the rest of the Greeks had pledged
themselves to defend Messenian autonomy. This, as Demosthenes realizes, rather placed Messenia beyond Athenian
factional politics. The decision to aid Megalopolis, on the other hand, depended on whether she was judged to be the
aggressor or the victim of aggression; i.e. on whatever happened to be the Athenian attitude to her at the time. It
does not, therefore, seem at all unlikely that Callisthenes and Ephorus could have described the compulsory guarantee
clause as a symmachia for that is what it essentially was; cf. X. H. 6. 3. 18 where is used in the voluntary
guarantee clause in the Peace of 372/1.
As in some (perhaps even all) of the previous Peaces, the autonomy clause was accompanied by a demobilization
clause (cf. X. H. 6. 3. 18: the Peace of 372/1). At the time of the conclusion of peace the two sides were probably still
in Arcadia, the Mantineans and their allies at Mantinea, the Tegeans and their allies at Tegea. The treaty therefore
called on everyone to return to his own country: +
, as D puts it at 94. 1. It is impossible to say whether the clause was intended to mean anything
more than that, but some participants clearly thought so: 94. 1 n.
-521-

89. 3. Chronographic notices

See pp. 31 f. on historiographical notices. On Anaximenes cf. 76. 4 and see FGH no. 72. On Philistus see pp. 51 ff.
(passim) and FGH no. 556.

Archon Molon, 362/1

90. 1. 'P : the consuls of 365 V ( CAH2 vii. 2. 639).

90-93. The Satraps' Revolt

D's is the only connected account of the Great Satrap Revolt. In spite of a number of studies of the rebellion many
problems still remain; see Judeich, 1892: ch. 5; Beloch, GG iii. 2. 254 ff.; Meloni, 1951b: 5 ff.; Osborne, 1973:
537 ff.; id., 1975: 291 ff.; id., 1981-3: ii. 61 ff.; Hornblower, 1982a: 170 ff.; Burn, CHI375 ff.; Sekunda, 1988;
Weiskopf, 1989. (I have not seen a 1975 Princeton dissertation, 'Greek Relations with the Satraps 371-343 BC',
by R. A. Moysey, for which cf. Hornblower, 1982a: 170 n. 1.) Weiskopf, 1989, seeks to show that D (Ephorus)
greatly exaggerated the extent and nature of the revolt, or rather the revolts, since Weiskopf sees only a series of
disconnected episodes of local instability, centred mostly round the figures of Ariobarzanes and Orontes. In his
view Autophradates and Mausolus were not involved. This is contrary to the explicit testimony of D and it is not
supported by any evidence. It is in fact based on the failure of other sources to refer to the rebellion in the same
unequivocal terms as D. However, considering that the revolt was 'nipped in the bud' (91. 1 n.), such silence is
understandable. But D does as it happens receive some support from incidental statements in other writers
(below passim). The setting aside of our one clear testimony leads Weiskopf to some quite arbitrary
reconstructions. See also Hornblower, 1990b: 363 ff.; Moysey, 1991: 111 ff. For the evidence of numismatics see
Moysey, 1989.
90. 1. : 362/1 marked the high point of a rebellion which had deeper roots. Ariobarzanes of
Hellespontine Phrygia had been in revolt since 366 (81. 6 n.) and Datames of Cappadocia even earlier, though
perhaps not continuously. The latter had been in charge of the preparations for a new expedition against Egypt
-522-

for a while, but he had betaken himself to Cappadocia because of court intrigues ( Nepos, Dat. 3. 5-5. 6). We
cannot date this exactly, but may do so approximately by association with the known dates of Iphicrates and
Timotheus. Iphicrates was back in Athens from Ace by autumn 373 (ps.-Demosth. 49. 13, 22) and Timotheus

sailed out to Ace to replace him in early summer 372 ( ibid. 28 ). He was still serving the King in the following
year ( ibid. 30 ). The switch of Greek mercenary leaders presumably coincided with the replacement of
Pharnabazus by Datames ( Nepos, Dat. 3. 5). If IG ii2 1609, which lists Timotheus as a trierarch, dates to 370/69
(81. 6 n.), then Timotheus must have left the King's service in 371 or early 370 and that may also be the time of
Datames' departure. But there can be no certainty. Moysey, 1986, argues that the issues of coinage of
Pharnabazus and Datames in Cilicia were struck separately and that Datames' is later in date, even running into
the 360s. Between the date of his departure (whenever it was) and 366 Autophradates of Lydia waged war on
him, but was in the end forced to leave Datames in de facto (perhaps even in de jure) possession of Cappadocia
(I date Nepos, Dat. 7-8, to this period. Sekunda's more precise dating, 1988: 43 ff., does not seem warranted by
the evidence). In 366/5 Autophradates and Mausolus of Caria were still loyal as their campaign against
Ariobarzanes shows (X. Ag. 2. 26 f.; cf. Tod 138 lines 1-2), but X. Ag. 2. 26 f. indicates that Mausolus at least
was only formally loyal (below). By 362 Autophradates was certainly in revolt: when in that year Charidemus
crossed to Asia he found that Artabazus, the King's grandson and legitimate satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, had
been imprisoned by Autophradates (Demosth. 23. 154 with Tod 143. Charidemus was presumably discharged
when Timotheus was relieved of his command, perhaps in spring 362: 81. 6 n.; Beloch, GG iii. 2. 246 f.).
D's date of 362/1 for the satrapal koinopragia (90. 3) is further confirmed (1) by the fact that it had collapsed by
362/1, very soon after it was concluded (see 91. 1 n.) and (2) by Svt 292 =Tod 145, the reply to the satraps (on
which see next n.). This necessarily post-dates the Common Peace concluded in summer 362 (excursus at 67. 2)
and it probably antedates the breakdown of that Peace in the following summer (hostilities broke out again in the
Peloponnese a year after the Peace: 94. 1). Of course, it is perfectly possible that the satraps addressed
themselves to the peace
-523-

congress itself, in which case their coalition dates not later than middle/late summer 362.
As often, D includes the events of several years under one: Artabazus' campaign against Datames (91. 2 ff.) belongs in
359 (91. 2-7 n.), Tachos' expedition to Phoenicia and overthrow in 360 (92. 3-4 n.), while the death of Agesilaus (93.
6) occurred in winter 360/59 (n. there).
90. 1-3. + : Ephorus saw the revolt primarily as a coastal affair, stretching from the Black
Sea to Egypt, and this appears correct ( Osborne, 1981-3: ii. 68 f.). It involved a grand alliance of rebel satraps and
subject or semisubject nations, though Egypt had been free since the late 5th century. The only outsiders were the
Spartans. It is impossible to gauge the extent to which the nations mentioned contributed to the revolt. And the claim
that the Greek cities of Asia participated (they are referred to as though they were a separate entity) may be
exaggerated (but see Stylianou, 1983: 248; cf. 16. 44. 4: Ionian Greeks as mainland Greeks contributed troops
to the King). The essence of the revolt in fact was the coalition of satraps in western Asia Minor as D's own evidence
shows, and when a majority of these satraps came to terms with the King, the revolt collapsed. Though Datames in
Cappadocia probably co-operated, he does not appear to have belonged to the inner group of rebel satraps (cf.,
however, Moysey, 1989: 138); and Tachos of Egypt fought his own war even after the rebellion in Asia Minor had
collapsed.
Svt 292 = Tod 145 is evidence for the satrapal koinopragia. Weiskopf, 1989: 84 f., dismisses the inscription as a
document of indeterminate date and circumstances which can offer nothing to the discussion. This is an unduly
sceptical position to adopt. With Tod (p. 141 ), 'we need have little hesitation' that the 'satraps' are indeed those in
revolt against the King in the late 360s, and that the 'common peace' is that of 362 which did not involve Persia (89. 1
n.). It is difficult to see what other reference the inscription could possibly have.
90. 1. + +: the 'satraps and strategoi' are spoken of again at 90. 3 as the participants in the
koinopragia. The term 'satrap' needs no clarification. Though rarely used in the 5th century, 4th-century writers
employ it regularly. It usually signifies the governor of a province, but in some cases the term is
-524-

used to denote lesser officials, sub-satraps or hyparchoi (14. 11. 3; 14. 24. 1 (a hyparchos according to X. An. 1. 8.
5); X. H. 3. 1. 10 ff.). Indeed, one of the four men named (90. 3), Orontes, may not have been a satrap as such,
but a sub-satrap (see below). For a discussion of the title of satrap see R. Schmitt in Studies Palmer, 373 ff.
Strategos on the other hand seems to signify a special command, superior to that of an ordinary satrap: 13. 36. 5;
14. 12. 8; 14. 99. 1; Thuc. 8. 5. 4; X. H. 4. 1. 37; 4. 8. 12; cf. 1. 4. 3; Meyer, GdA iv. 1. 69 f. The distinction
between strategos and satrap emerges clearly from X. An. 1. 1. 2; 1. 9. 7; H. 4. 1. 37: the generalship was a
command over and above that of a satrapy though the strategos might or might not be a satrap himself (see
Andrewes, HCT v ad 8. 5. 4; 8. 108. 4; cf. Tuplin, Coinage and Administration, 114). It is possible that
Autophradates was appointed strategos in the 360s when ordered to fight against Datames and Ariobarzanes (90. 3
n.). Likewise Artabazus in 359 (91. 2). D, however, once refers to a satrap as a strategos: 13. 40. 6. Elsewhere the
Persian leaders in military enterprises are properly called strategoi:15. 2. 2; 29. 3; 41. 5; 91. 1 f.
90. 2. T . . . : if Schneider's conjecture T from the of the MSS at X. Ag. 2. 27 is accepted
(as it should be: below) then Tachos was already in some position of authority in 365, possibly a co-regent with his
father Nectanebos (Nectanebos I) who was still alive in 362 ( Kienitz, 1953: 95; Johnson, 1974: 11 ff.) and the
friend, perhaps even an ally (below), of Sparta. Xenophon's emended statement is supported by an Attic honorary
inscription ( IG ii2 119 = Hicks and Hill, 121) which speaks of envoys to Athens from Tachos and which mentions the
secretary of the year, one Phanocles. As the secretaries of the years 363/0 are already accounted for, and as
Tachos, in any case, was overthrown by Nectanebos II in the course of the Egyptian year of 21 Nov. 361 to 20 Nov.
360 ( Kienitz, 1953: 175 ff.), the decree is best dated in 365/4 or 364/3 ( Moysey, 1976: 187 n. 16). Then there is
Plut. Ages. 36. 6: Agesilaus used money Tachos sent to him to recruit mercenaries before setting sail with them for
Egypt sometime after the battle of Mantinea (92. 2 n.). Tempting though it is to do so, it is not necessary to connect

this with the occasion related by Xenophon (Ag. 2. 27), especially as Plutarch says that the money was sent,
whereas Xenophon clearly implies that Tachos was present in person in the north-east Aegean in 365 and, along
with
-525Mausolus, gave Agesilaus a magnificent send-off. Plut. Ages. 36. 6 probably refers to another, and later, occasion.
A suggestion by Beloch ( GG iii. 2. 126) that the Tachos of the Attic decree is not the Egyptian king, but the
successor of the rebel Glos (15. 18. 1), is most unlikely, though not because Athens would not have honoured 'so
insignificant a rebel' ( Hornblower, 1982a: 175). That Tachos was dead before the 380s were out (2-4 n.; 9. 3, 4
nn.).
Hornblower, 1982a: 175, in an attempt to overcome the difficulties of the sources, proposes to retain in X.
Ag. 2. 27, thus preferring the facilior to the difficilior lectio. This he considers justified linguistically ('the addition of
and the small alteration of to are only slight obstacles' -- two are in fact required), while
historically, and contextually 'it makes much better sense: Xenophon goes on to speak, in the next paragraphs ( Ag.
2. 28 f.), of "the Egyptian king", but this is . . . not a resumptive reference to the "Tachos" mentioned previously,
but the introduction of a new topic, the events of 361, known from the Agesilaos of Plutarch. Editors have been
seduced by the mention of Egypt in the later Xenophontic passage into a false emendation in the earlier.' And he
concludes that the Attic decree which mentions Tachos should be dated in 362 or 361, which in turn necessitates the
assumption (made by Kienitz, 1953: 177) that the secretary Phanocles died in office: 'The difficulties of a rebel
Tachos active in mid-decade are thus removed, without the need to resort to co-regencies.'
This is not fully convincing. First, retention of also demands the alteration in X. Ag. 2. 27 of to , if
the text is to make sense, and the obstacles are no longer slight, but a great deal more formidable than any posed
by Schneider's simple emendation. Secondly, and perhaps decisively, in accepting the invitation of the Egyptian
king, Agesilaus, Xenophon says ( Ag. 2. 29), was seeking to (+ A) ' +
. This to Sparta is indubitably the one mentioned shortly before, in 2. 27, and the
mention, therefore, of the Egyptian king in 2. 28 f. is indeed 'a resumptive reference to the "Tachos" mentioned
previously'. Schneider's emendation is thus unavoidable, linguistically no less than historically and contextually.
There is no reason, therefore, why Tachos cannot have been
-526-

active in the mid-360s and the friend and even ally of Sparta. In Plut. Ages. 37. 8 Tachos describes himself in his
appeal to Sparta as an old ally and friend. And Isocrates in the Archidamus (dramatic date 366) refers to the
Egyptian king (no name given) as willing to aid Sparta. The basis of the Spartan-Egyptian cooperation was their
common hostility to Persia. When in 367 the Great King bestowed his favour on Thebes, Sparta had to look
elsewhere for powerful friends. Tachos and Ariobarzanes (cf. 70. 2 n.) provided her with much-needed money; in
return they got Greek mercenaries and Agesilaus to command them. + : see 92. 2 and n.
: the Common Peace of 366/5; see 76. 3 n.
90. 3. . . . 'E : see 90. 1-3 n.
: we should not envisage formal alliances in every instance though Sparta and Ariobarzanes
may have been allied.
: these are only the satraps and strategoi as, rightly, Vial. Sherman mistranslates.
+ + : i.e. not all the rebels will be mentioned, but the most important. Datames is not listed,
but then Datames may not have been a properly appointed or recognized satrap (90. 1 n.). Furthermore, he was
rather too far away from the paralios around which the revolt centred. Indeed both he and Tachos were very much
on the sidelines of the satrapal revolt.
'A . . . +: Ariobarzanes had stepped into Pharnabazus' position as satrap at Dascylium
when the latter had been recalled by the King to marry one of his daughters and campaign against Egypt (2-4 n.).
He was a close relative of Pharnabazus, either a younger brother or, more probably, a son ( Beloch, GG iii. 2. 145
ff.). Harpocr. s.v. says that he was appointed satrap by Artaxerxes and this must be correct: Weiskopf, 1989: 27 ff.,
arguing against the usual view that Ariobarzanes was only appointed a caretaker satrap until such a time as
Pharnabazus or the King made other arrangements. By 366 Ariobarzanes was in revolt (81. 6 n.). According to the
common view ( Beloch, GG iii. 1. 213) it was because Artabazus, the son of Pharnabazus and the King's daughter,
had come down to the coast to assume his father's command on the King's orders that Ariobarzanes rebelled.
Weiskopf disagrees, proposing instead that Ariobarzanes' activities were misrepresented at Susa by Autophradates
of Lydia for
-527-

personal reasons. The attack launched against Ariobarzanes by Autophradates and Mausolus as a consequence did not
necessarily aim at destroying him, but only at 'cutting him down to size'. As for the reason why Artaxerxes so readily
believed Autophradates' lies, this should be sought in the climate of suspicion and violence which, according to Plutarch

( Artox. 26 ff.), marked the King's final years, and specifically in the fear Artaxerxes felt of another Cyrus emerging in
the West (1989: 33 ff., esp. 37 ff.).
In fact, the evidence allows more than one conjecture here. By 366 (as Weiskopf himself suggests) the King, who had
recently switched his support from Sparta to Thebes, may well have been displeased with Ariobarzanes' Greek policy
(the satrap was a firm friend of Sparta) and therefore himself decided to replace him in Hellespontine Phrygia with
Artabazus, without needing to be prompted by anyone. But if there were enemies at work who deliberately
misconstrued Ariobarzanes' actions, these might as well be sought in the court circles where the struggle for power
intensified in the 360s ( Plut. Artox. 24 ff.; Sekunda, 1988: 51). It is possible that Ariobarzanes was recalled to Susa to
answer charges laid against him, but thought it wiser to disobey the summons. Whatever the truth, the initial attempt
to suppress him failed and his prospects looked even brighter when he secured Spartan backing (81. 6 n.) and
especially when the other satraps in western Asia Minor joined in the rebellion. Artabazus, however, managed to
survive in the Troad supported by his brothers-in-law Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes (Demosth. 23. 154 f., 157; cf.
Tod 199) and that proved fatal to Ariobarzanes in the end. Weiskopf, by contrast, in line with his general view of the
revolts of this time (with which I disagree: above 90-93 n.) holds that Ariobarzanes, fighting alone, was completely
defeated by 363 and Artabazus then took over as satrap at Dascylium (1989: 45 ff.).
The statement that Ariobarzanes took over the kingdom of Mithridates is false. From the present passage and the two
chronographic entries at 16. 90. 2 (337/6) and 20. 111. 4 (302/1) on the rulers of a district in north-west Asia Minor
centred on Cius and 'Arrhine' (the name is corrupt; cf. the Teubner app. crit. ad 20. 111. 4), we deduce that in 363/2
an Ariobarzanes succeeded Mithridates as ruler at Cius. This Ariobarzanes is clearly not to be identified with the satrap.
D's mistake can be explained in two ways: on finding an entry in the chronographer which recorded the
-528-

transfer of Cius from Mithridates to Ariobarzanes he assumed this Ariobarzanes to be the satrap ( Beloch, GG iii. 2.
150). Or, Ephorus included two men called Ariobarzanes in his list of rebels, the satrap and the ruler of Cius, and in
abbreviating his source D mistakenly joined the two statements.
Who was Ariobarzanes of Cius? Beloch, GG iii. 2. 150f., plausibly explains that Mithridates I of Cius who died in
363/2 was a close relative of the satraps Pharnabazus and Ariobarzanes. He was put in charge at Cius either by
Pharnabazus or even Pharnaces and thus formed his own line of rulers. : as has been seen, Mausolus cooperated with Autophradates against Ariobarzanes in 366/5. With a powerful fleet of 100 triremes he was besieging
Assos and Sestus when he was 'persuaded' by Agesilaus and Timotheus to depart (81. 6n.). And that was not all. He
provided Sparta with money, ostensibly because of the ' (X. Ag. 2. 27; cf. Plut. Ages. 13.
5 -- Idrieus was a brother of Mausolus). BY 362/1 he had joined the rebellion. The influential people at court who
may have traduced Ariobarzanes (above) may also have posed a threat to other satraps, including Mausolus. But no
doubt he also hoped to derive some benefit from the resultant anarchy (cf. Davies, 1978: 236ff.). For all questions
to do with Mausolus see Hornblower, 1982a. And see also now Ruzicka, 1992. For the coinage see Moysey, 1989:
126ff.
For Weiskopf, 1989: 65ff., Mausolus was never a rebel. X. Ag. 2. 27 does not, in his view, argue that he was, while
several references to Mausolus elsewhere which show him involved in Ionia (Polyaen. 6. 8; 7. 23. 2) and Lycia ( TAM
ii. 3. 1183; Steph. Byz. s.v. Solymoi; ps.- Arist. Econ. 2. 1348a) should best be seen as 'policing operations'
designed to extend 'Hecatomnid, and so Achaemenid, influence' (1989: 68). But such material, least of all that from
Polyaenus, cannot argue for Mausolus' loyalty or disloyalty in the second half of the 360s. D 15. 90. 3, on the other
hand, is unequivocal evidence for rebellion, and X. Ag. 2. 26f. does clearly point to disloyalty. As we have seen,
Mausolus abandoned the siege of Assos and Sestus not because of fear, but ; and he proceeded to give
money to an open and active enemy of the King.
: Mausolus clearly is included among the satraps and generals who formed the koinopragia. It is a
fact
-529though that D and the other Greek sources, with hardly any exceptions ( Plut. Alex. 10. 1 is one such exception), do
not call the Hecatomnids satraps, but use other titles such as dynast and king. Inscriptions from Caria and Lycia, on
the other hand, do refer to them as satraps. There is no need to surmise from this, as some do (e.g. Childs, 1981:
75 and n. 122), that the native Carian satraps were subordinate to the neighbouring Persian satraps. Hornblower
does not even raise the question. To his mind the Carian satraps were indubitably of the same status (directly
responsible to the King) as their Persian colleagues (1982a: 137ff.).
+ . . . : Hornblower, 1982a, e.g. on p. 18 and n. 106.
: 'the hearth and capital'. D uses the same combination to describe Alesia in Gaul (4. 19. 2).
Halicarnassus became Mausolus' capital sometime between 377 (the date of Mausolus' accession) and 362. For the
synoecism of Halicarnassus and the city in general see Moggi, 1976: no. 42 263 ff.; but especially Hornblower,
1982a: 78ff.; also Demand, 1990: 120ff. for Mausolus as oecist and Ruzicka, 1992: 33ff.
'. . . : this description of Orontes presents problems because (a) we do not otherwise hear
of a satrapy of Mysia and (b) Trogus, prol. 10, refers to Orontes as praefectus Armeniae at the time of the collapse
of the revolt. Various solutions have been offered. Some have assumed that D was looking ahead when he
designated Orontes satrap of Mysia (e.g. Meyer, GdA v. 979). Others have understood D's term 'satrap' to mean
subsatrap (e.g. Judeich, 1892: 222 n. 2; Troxell, 1981: 28); or they have surmised that Orontes was no more than
a fief-holder in the region ( Cook, 1983: 222); or, at best, that he was a lesser officer with property in Mysia, one of
any number of such lesser officers ( Weiskopf, 1989: 69ff.); or they have perceived a corruption of the text (
Krumbholz, 1883: 75 n. 2; Hornblower, 1982a: 177 n. 61). Beloch on the other hand, GG iii. 2. 138ff., accepts that

Orontes was in charge of Mysia at this time. Following his chastisement at the close of the Cypriot War (15. 11. 2)
when he was evidently deprived of his ancestral Armenia, he was sent west and given control of the satrapy of Mysia
'das heisst ber alles, was nach dem abfall von Milet, Ephesos, Erythrae und der Abtrennung von Karien von der
alten Kstensatrapie noch brig war' (140). Beloch
-530in fact identifies Orontes' Mysia with Ionia ( GG iii. 1. 213and see also the map at the back of iii. 2). Trogus'
designation of Orontes as satrap of Armenia is untenable in any case, for Orontes, as a leading rebel, had to be in
the west and it cannot be that he held both Armenia and Mysia. Nor could he have been given Mysia after the revolt
for that would have amounted to a degradation and not a reward for his treachery. Beloch's views are argued more
fully by Osborne, 1975: 291ff.; 1981-3: ii. 65ff. (curiously he does not refer to Beloch in either place), who further
clarifies Orontes' career in two articles, 1971: 297ff., and 1973: 515 ff. What can the truth of the matter be?
Certainly Orontes had once been satrap of Armenia (X. An. 3. 5. 17. Date: 401. For his early career see Osborne,
1973: 515ff.). He cannot have been so at this juncture though. His role in the revolt requires that he be given a post
in western Asia Minor. Hornblower, 1982a: 176ff., who believes that Orontes was still satrap of Armenia, objects (to
Beloch and Osborne) that Armenia was not too far from the action; Datames after all was in Cappadocia. He further
suggests that Ephorus may have exaggerated the Greek or western Anatolian character of the revolt. That is of
course possible, but nothing in the evidence contradicts the view that the revolt was in fact chiefly a western
Anatolian affair and the concern of the satraps mentioned in the present section. Whatever part (if any) Datames
played in the satrapal koinopragia (90. 1-3 n.; 90. 3 n. above), he was no further away from the western satrapies
than central Asia Minor; and Cappadocia was numbered with these satrapies (X. An. 1. 9. 7). Armenia, on the other
hand, is a great deal more distant. Nor is it at all clear why the satrap of an important province like Armenia would
want to become involved in a rebellion some 600 miles away. See further Osborne, 1981-3: ii. 67ff.
It is not difficult to explain Trogus' reference to Orontes as praefectus Armeniae (see Osborne, 1975: 295; 1981-3:
ii. 68). D's statement is less easily explained away. Hornblower, 1982a: 177 and n. 61, attempts to do so by positing
an error in D's text: Mysia must have dropped out of the list of rebellious nations which follows, and from which in
fact it is missing, and into that of the satraps. This, however, is rather an extreme measure, not to be employed
unless all other paths are closed to us. And see below the textual n. ad loc. It should further be noted that, as
Hornblower
-531-

reconstructs the text, it is not Mysia (in fact M) that allegedly dropped out of its proper place, but M; and
what has happened to the genitive + which, in Hornblower's, view, is supposed to have stood next to
Orontes' name in the original text?
The evidence clearly points to Mysia and the Mysian coast as the domain of Orontes. There is first the striking
coincidence between 90. 3, 91. 1, and OGIS264 (the Pergamene Chronicle) lines 4ff.: D refers to Orontes as satrap of
Mysia and the inscription shows him interfering at Pergamum, a city in Mysia (cf. X. An. 7. 8. 8). On returning to his
allegiance to the King, Orontes, D says, + . . . + + +
(91. 1). One of these cities was Pergamum according to the Pergamene Chronicle: + [
] [ 'A] + . Then there is the epigraphic testimony from Athens discussed by
Osborne which, as he says, 'offers very strong support for the view that Orontes did serve in the west in an official
capacity which could without undue difficulty be termed "satrap of Mysia" ' (1981-3: ii. 72). Finally there is Orontes'
coinage, all of which is confined to cities on the coast from Lampsacus to Colophon ( Babelon, 1910: 105ff.; Baldwin,
1924: 16). Indeed, if Troxell ( 1981: 27ff.) is correct, as she seems to be, the coinage is confined to just two coastal
cities, Adramyttium and Cisthene, both in Aeolis, Mysia being the inland area. The Lampsacene gold staters usually
assigned to Orontes (cf. Baldwin, 1924: 16, and pl. ii nos. 15-17) were not coined by him. For Mysia speaks also the
fact that the genitive form OPONTA on many of his coins denotes Aeolic. See also Moysey, 1989: 123ff.
If the above is conceded then a question is raised about the status of Orontes. Was he a full satrap as D implies and
Beloch and Osborne maintain, or, considering the imprecise nature of the sources on this point (noted above: go. 1
n.), was Mysia attached to a neighbouring satrapy and was Orontes therefore a hyparch or sub-satrap as suggested by
Judeich and Troxell? (For such subordinate officers and their function see go. 1 n. and cf. Tuplin, Coinage and
Administration, 120f.) The second alternative may seem a little surprising in view of the fact that Orontes was chosen
to lead the revolt ( Osborne, 1975: 296f.), but it is far from impossible. Even as a sub-satrap Orontes would have been
no ordinary man, considering his background and connections. Nor were his
-532fellow rebels in a position to stand on their dignity -- Ariobarzanes was no longer officially a satrap while Mausolus was
not even a Persian; and there is some evidence that Autophradates was forced to join the revolt (Polyaen. 7. 14. 3-4;
Osborne, 1973: 549). Also, as a sub-satrap in Mysia Orontes lends 15. 11. 2 ( + + ) a fuller
scope. What is more, such an interpretation makes unnecessary the assumption that Ionia was once again detached
from Lydia as in the late 390s (see below). The suggestion, however, that Orontes was a full satrap of Mysia cannot be
totally excluded, supported, as it seems to be, by the lapidary documents adduced by Osborne (1981-3: ii. 72ff.)
wherein we see Orontes with an arche in western Asia Minor and acting very much like his own master within it. But
Osborne's accompanying suggestion, that Orontes did not arrive on the scene till after 366/5 because of X. Ag. 2. 26,
Autophradates' siege of Assos (1975: 308), is uncompelling because as a strategos (if he was that; see 90. 1 n.)
Autophradates could have operated away from his own satrapy and even in the territory of another satrap (cf. Lewis,
1977: 119 n. 75).
A. . . : Autophradates succeeded Tiribazus as satrap of Lydia in 392/1. Tiribazus had governed
Lydia, Caria, and the coastal area (Ionia), and he had been in charge of Persian negotiations with the warring states of
Greece. After the failure of the Sardis congress of 392/1 ( FGH 328 F149), Tiribazus had gone up to the King to obtain

the necessary authority for a policy of support for Sparta. He was detained and Struthas was sent down who favoured
Athens (X. H. 4. 8. 16f.). It would appear that the King's decision was based on more than disagreement over foreign
policy. The spectre of a second Cyrus was all too real a mere ten years after Cunaxa. Tiribazus' command was largely
what Tissaphernes' had been (but probably without Cappadocia and Phrygia: Lewis, 1977: 119 n. 78), and his
friendship with Sparta (Cyrus' friend and ally) was calculated to make the King uneasy (it was used against Tiribazus
by Orontes later: 15. 8. 4; 15. 10. 2). As a safety measure, therefore, the King broke up Tiribazus' extensive satrapy:
Struthas was assigned the coastal area, Ionia, with the task of reaching an agreement with the Greek powers
satisfactory to the King (an inscription from Miletus actually describes Struthas as 'I: Tod 113).
Autophradates was given Lydia (Sardis) and Hecatomnus, a local noble, Caria.
-533-

Autophradates and Hecatomnus were given their own task: to suppress Evagoras of Cyprus ( FGH 115
(Theopompus) F 103. 4). Weiskopf rejects Theopompus as wrong: Struthas, he thinks, was satrap in Lydia at the
time, not Autophradates. The latter was in western Asia Minor, it is true, but only as a lesser officer. He was not
appointed satrap, he suggests, until after the unsuccessful invasion of Egypt in 374/3 (1989: 38f. and 38 n. 67). But
it is most unlikely that a mere 'lesser officer' would have been put in charge of such an important undertaking as the
one against Evagoras.
The new arrangement failed to produce results. Struthas' proAthenian policies got nowhere and the efforts of
Autophradates and Hecatomnus against Evagoras probably did not even get off the ground (2. 3n.). The King,
therefore, reverted to Tiribazus' policy and Tiribazus himself was again sent down to the coast (X. H. 5. 1. 25). That
was about 388. That Ionia was under his control (at least that part of it which was under Persian rule) is clear from
X. H. 5. 1. 28. But did he deprive Autophradates of his satrapy of Lydia? ( Caria remained under its local rulers till
the Macedonian period.) This is a common opinion amongst scholars who go on to assume that he remained satrap
of Lydia and Ionia till the late 380s when he departed for Cyprus to fight Evagoras (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 135f.;
Osborne, 1975: 303. Lewis, 1977: 118 n. 75, does not concede a separation of Ionia from Lydia at all in 391 and is
unwilling to take FGH 115 F103. 4 at its face value).
The assumption is unsubstantiated and, though the opposite cannot be proved, it is rather more plausible to leave
Autophradates in uninterrupted possession of Lydia and to see the returned Tiribazus as the successor of Struthas
on the coast and the negotiations with Greece. ( Hornblower, 1982a: 37 n. 11, argues similarly.) An inscription from
Sardis, a Roman copy of a much earlier text ( Robert, 1975: 306ff.), speaks of a certain Droaphernes as
in the thirty-ninth year of Artaxerxes. Robert takes the latter to be Artaxerxes II Mnemon and thus dates
the document to 365 (1975: 310). This is almost certainly correct though not necessarily for the reasons he
advances ( Welskopf, 1989: 91 f.). But Robert takes hyparch here to mean satrap and therefore sees Droaphernes
as satrap of Lydia (1975: 312f.). He does not comment on the problems this creates, for Autophradates is fairly
securely the satrap of Lydia in 366/5 (see 81. 6n.). In view of this perhaps we should see Droaphernes
-534Autophradates and Hecatomnus were given their own task: to suppress Evagoras of Cyprus ( FGH 115
(Theopompus) F 103. 4). Weiskopf rejects Theopompus as wrong: Struthas, he thinks, was satrap in Lydia at the
time, not Autophradates. The latter was in western Asia Minor, it is true, but only as a lesser officer. He was not
appointed satrap, he suggests, until after the unsuccessful invasion of Egypt in 374/3 (1989: 38f. and 38 n. 67). But
it is most unlikely that a mere 'lesser officer' would have been put in charge of such an important undertaking as the
one against Evagoras.
The new arrangement failed to produce results. Struthas' proAthenian policies got nowhere and the efforts of
Autophradates and Hecatomnus against Evagoras probably did not even get off the ground (2. 3n.). The King,
therefore, reverted to Tiribazus' policy and Tiribazus himself was again sent down to the coast (X. H. 5. 1. 25). That
was about 388. That Ionia was under his control (at least that part of it which was under Persian rule) is clear from
X. H. 5. 1. 28. But did he deprive Autophradates of his satrapy of Lydia? ( Caria remained under its local rulers till
the Macedonian period.) This is a common opinion amongst scholars who go on to assume that he remained satrap
of Lydia and Ionia till the late 380s when he departed for Cyprus to fight Evagoras (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 135f.;
Osborne, 1975: 303. Lewis, 1977: 118 n. 75, does not concede a separation of Ionia from Lydia at all in 391 and is
unwilling to take FGH 115 F103. 4 at its face value).
The assumption is unsubstantiated and, though the opposite cannot be proved, it is rather more plausible to leave
Autophradates in uninterrupted possession of Lydia and to see the returned Tiribazus as the successor of Struthas
on the coast and the negotiations with Greece. ( Hornblower, 1982a: 37 n. 11, argues similarly.) An inscription from
Sardis, a Roman copy of a much earlier text ( Robert, 1975: 306ff.), speaks of a certain Droaphernes as
in the thirty-ninth year of Artaxerxes. Robert takes the latter to be Artaxerxes II Mnemon and thus dates
the document to 365 (1975: 310). This is almost certainly correct though not necessarily for the reasons he
advances ( Welskopf, 1989: 91 f.). But Robert takes hyparch here to mean satrap and therefore sees Droaphernes
as satrap of Lydia (1975: 312f.). He does not comment on the problems this creates, for Autophradates is fairly
securely the satrap of Lydia in 366/5 (see 81. 6n.). In view of this perhaps we should see Droaphernes
-534-

as a hyparch (sub-satrap or lieutenant) of Autophradates who was left in charge of Lydia (cf. HCT v. 39 ad 8. 16. 3;
Demosth. 15. 9) while Autophradates was appointed a strategos of the King with the task of fighting first against
Datames and subsequently against Ariobarzanes (9o. 1 n.; 90. 3n. above).
We are in the dark about Autophradates' career after the revolt. I would agree with Osborne (1973: 549) that Polyaen.
7. 14. 3f. is no evidence that he continued as satrap of Lydia till Orontes' supposed second revolt in the 350s (as e.g.
Judeich, 1892: 207, 212 f.; Meyer, GdA v. 979; Beloch, GG iii. 2. 136). The Polyaenus passages probably refer to the
time immediately prior to the satrapal coalition Of 362/1.

For Weiskopf, 1989, of course, Autophradates, like Mausolus, was never disloyal. This, as has already been stressed
(90-93 n.), is contrary to the explicit testimony of D.
+ + : thus all the MSS and the reading is clearly corrupt as it stands with the strong
possibility of a lacuna before (contra Weiskopf, 1989: 11). Dindorf's emendation + ' + (preferred
by Vial) is sensible. But emendations such as those proposed by Vogel ( + ), Ulrichs ( + +
), and Wesseling ( + + OR + ' + ) are more likely in view of
the earlier statement in this section that the Greek cities of Asia were heavily involved in the revolt (cf. 90. 1-3 n.).
. . . : no other source mentions all these people as being in revolt at this time. It is possible that
Ephorus lacked precise information, but, on learning that the whole parallos chora from Ionia to Egypt was in revolt,
listed the various coastal regions in their proper geographic order from west to east.
Lycia had been conquered by Persia and placed in the first satrapy according to Herodotus (1. 171. 1; 176; 3. 90. 1).
But in the 5th century at least Persian rule appears to have been nominal and government was left in the hands of an
indeterminate number of warring local princes. Recent epigraphic and in particular numismatic discoveries have shed a
fair amount of light on some of these and on Lycia in general though much is still obscure. For the 4th century see
Morkholm, 1964: 65ff.; Bousquet, 1975: 138ff.; Robert, 1978: 3ff.; Kraay, 1976: 272f.; Morkholmand Neumann,
1978; Childs, 1981: 72ff.; Bryce, 1983: 37ff.; id., 1986: 111ff.; Zahle, in L'Or perse, 169 ff.
-535The most significant of the local princes in the second quarter of the 4th century appears to have been a certain
Pericles whom Theopornpus describes as 'king' of the Lycians, a title Pericles himself appears to have employed (
Wrrle, 1991: 203 ff.). He goes on to mention the capture of the city of Telmessus by this Pericles ( FGH 115 F103.
17). This evidence is commonly linked with that of inscriptions (in particular with TAM i. 11, 67, and 104) and coins,
and the suggestion made that Pericles succeeded in wresting Lycia from Persian control and in holding it united under
him for a while; and that he was the man responsible for the Lycian involvement in the satrapal revolt (cf. Treuber,
1887: 102ff.; Beloch, GG iii. 1. 234; Metzger, 1974: 87f.; Childs, 1981: 76 ff., 76 n. 131; Bryce, 1983: 39f.; Moysey,
1989: 130ff.; Wrrle, 1991: 215). Elusive though the evidence is, there may be truth in this; as indeed there may be
truth in the further suggestion that Lycia was handed over to Mausolus by the Great King as a reward for his renewed
loyalty in 361, and that the Carian may even have been instrumental in suppressing the Lyclans. (Contra Hornblower,
1982a: 181 f., who dismisses both suggestions, but cf. his pp. 120 f.) At any rate, the trilingual inscription from
Xanthos in Lycia shows that Pixodarus, a younger brother of Mausolus, was not only satrap of Caria in 337, but of Lycia
also ( CRAI 1974: 85, 116f., 136f., with Badian, Studies Schachermeyr, 40ff., for the correct date, though see Moysey,
1989: 134). It is unlikely that he was the first Carian to rule both areas.
The Pisidians were always troublesome (cf. X. An. 1. 1. 11) and most of Pisidia appears never to have been conquered
by Persia (it is not included in Herodotus' tribute list at 3. 9o f.). Acoris of Egypt had formed an alliance with the
Pisidians and Aspendians in the 380s ( FGH 115 F103. 13 = Svt 237) the nature of which can only have been antiPersian. The Pisidians serving with Autophradates against Datames in the early 360s (90. 1 n.) were probably
mercenaries. Pamphylia is included by Herodotus in the first satrapy (3. 90. 1). In contrast with their neighbours the
Pamphylians were a nation of city-states, some of them Greek (cf. Jones, 1971: 123 f.). Most important amongst these
was Aspendus which had in the past shown a propensity to rebel against the King. We do not know what part, if any,
the Pamphylian cities played in the revolt. The date and circumstances of a stratagem of Datames near Aspendus in
Polyaenus (7. 21. 4) escape us.
-536Cilicia and Phoenicia were restless and partly in revolt at the time of the Cypriot War and Phoenicia even later, in the
mid-370s (2. 2-4 nn.; 41. 3n.). In the 6th and 5th centuries Cilicia had been ruled by local dynasts bearing the
hereditary name Syennesis who, however, paid tribute to the King. As a result of its involvement with Cyrus in 401 it
appears that Cilicia was transformed into a normal satrapy under a Persian (but cf. Judeich, 1892: 209): Herod. 1. 74.
3; 3. 90. 3; 5. 118. 2; 7. 98; 9. 107. 3; Aeschyl. Pers. 326 ff.; X. An. 1. 2. 12, 21, 26f.; D 14. 20. 2f.; Kahrstedt, RE
iva. 1023 f. The revolts in Syria and Phoenicia were presumably the result of the Egyptian campaign if indeed they had
not been incited by Tachos already before he arrived in the area (92. 2-93 n.).
90. 4. . . . : the first half of the statement is correct only if the prosodoi refer to gold and silver,
and the second half of the statement clearly indicates that that is what is meant; the indispensable mercenaries would
accept nothing else in payment. A fragment of Polycleitus of Larissa ( FGH 128 F3) asserts that the King derived his
silver from the coastal satrapies, the inland satrapies paying their tribute in kind. On the basis of this Cawkwell, 1968:
4f., suggests that the Great King may have been less wealthy than most Greeks imagined. Polycleitus' assertion
nevertheless is contrary to Herodotus' statement that all satrapies paid tribute in silver (3. 89 ff.). As Tuplin points out
( Coinage and Administration, 139) Persian tribute was a more complicated matter than Polycleitus supposed, who was
perhaps misled by the fact that only the coastal areas of the empire had coinage economies. For the tribute in general
see his discussion, Coinage and Administration, 137ff.

91. 1. The revolt collapses

If Orontes' betrayal of his fellow rebels took place in Syria, as is widely believed on the evidence of Trogus prol. 10,
then the events of several months or even a whole year are missing from D. If, on the other hand, the rebellion
collapsed soon after its beginning and Orontes did not get anywhere near Syria (see below) then D's date, 362/1, for
Orontes' return to his allegiance to the King seems reasonable. In any case its approximate correctness is supported by
the following facts: (1) the second of three decrees of the Carian
-537-

city of Mylasa (Tod 138 lines 17 ff.) is dated in the forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes, i.e. in 361/0, and it designates
Mausolus as satrap. Mausolus, therefore, was loyal again by this date. (2) From Demosth. 23. 155ff. we learn
that, having been released by Autophradates, Artabazus assumed command of his province and turned against
Charidemus in the Troad. The latter then appealed to Cephisodotus, general in 360/59 ( Beloch, GG iii. 2. 246f.).
It is reasonable to infer that Autophradates released his prisoner when he dissociated himself from the revolt. (3)
Tachos' Syrian campaign would appear to belong in spring or early summer 360 ( Kienitz, 1953: 96, 175ff., 180f.
and see 92. 3-4n.). Some time previous to this Rheomithres was sent to Egypt by the rebel satraps where he
obtained money and warships. Orontes' betrayal appears to have taken place while Rheomithres was away (92. 1
n.) for immediately on his return he followed Orontes' example and deserted to the King. Orontes' betrayal,
therefore, cannot belong later than early 360.
The above evidence points to 361 as the date of the collapse of the revolt or early 360 at the very latest.
: what were Orontes' objectives in rebelling? Clearly to improve his position. He was at the
time the satrap, or (more likely) sub-satrap, of a relatively unimportant province, when he had been satrap of
Armenia in the past and the King's general in the war against Evagoras. If Ephorus is to be believed, Orontes was
persuaded to abandon his fellow rebels by the King's promise of the satrapy of the whole parathalassios. It has
been suggested ( Hornblower, 1982a: 179) that Orontes was probably aiming high in joining the rebellion,
meaning (I take it) that he was aiming for the throne. This seems unlikely. If Orontes was really after the throne,
the King would hardly have approached him and he would not have turned traitor vis--vis the other rebels; it
would have been a fight to the finish. Also, it may be of some significance that on all his coins (90. 3n.) Orontes'
tiara is shown flat and not upright as worn by the King (X. An. 2. 5. 23; Cyr. 8. 3. 13).
An intriguing, and unique (because inscribed) silver siglos in the Cabinet des Mdailles, Paris (unpublished), first
brought to my attention by Dr Colin Kraay in 1981, bears the inscription OPONTA (again the Aeolic genitive: see
90. 3n.). Sigloi are of course impossible to date with any precision, but it is a fair guess
-538-

that this one was struck in north-west Asia Minor by our Orontes. ( Dr Ian Carradice, in a letter dated 21 April 1995,
concurs that the siglos is clearly of a 'late' type IV, his group C, dating to c.375-340; see his study of sigloi in Coinage
and Administration, 73ff., where, however, this particular siglos is not mentioned. It is not known to Troxell, 1981, and
Moysey, 1989.) What does it signify? The silver sigloi like the gold darics were certainly Persian royal currency (cf.
Head, 1911: 828), but it would be unwise to conclude from the siglos that Orontes aimed for the throne. D tells us that
money was given to Orontes by the other rebels for the hiring of mercenaries (91. 1). Pzerhaps Orontes wished to
impress on his Greeks that he was their paymaster and leader.
Where did Orontes betray the revolt? On no other evidence than Trogus, prol. 10: 'deinde in Syria praefectum
Armeniae Oronten etc.', it is generally believed that Orontes had proceeded as far as Syria and there surrendered to
the King (cf. Judeich, 1892: 208; Meyer, GdA v. 979; Beloch, GG iii. 1. 214; iii. 2. 256; Osborne, 1973: 540; id., 19813: ii. 68; Hornblower, 1982a: 180). Further, a grand plan is perceived by which Tachos, Orontes, and Datames were to
take the offensive against the King simultaneously, Tachos and Orontes having first converged on Syria. As for
Datames, Polyaen. 7. 21. 3 (the only evidence) is taken as proof that he was acting in support of the Syrian offensive
of Orontes. But (pace Beloch and Hornblower) Polyaen. 7. 21. 3 can be provided with neither a date nor a firm
geography (nor, by the way, does () + + prove that the King had taken the
field in person; cf. Polyaen. 3. 11. 7). The concerted grand offensive thus collapses and one is entitled to ask whether
Orontes' advance to Syria, based entirely on the extremely brief and unsatisfactory Trogus, prol. 10, is nothing but a
mirage. D's text argues that it is. (Weiskopf too is of the opinion that Orontes did not reach Syria (1989: 82f.), but his
reasons for so believing are wrong in my view.)
Orontes, we are told, was supplied with money by his fellow rebels in order to enlist mercenaries, but on deciding to
take up the King's promise of a greater command he first of all
of an offensive in Syria? What

for the preparation and execution

-539-

seems to clinch the argument is the fact that themselves were arrested and sent to the
King. The financing of the satrapal koinopragia and the hiring of mercenaries must have followed immediately
upon Orontes' election as leader. The arrest of the men who brought the money, therefore, can have taken place
nowhere else but in western Asia Minor. This is supported by what Orontes went on to do: he handed over to the
officers of the King many of the cities and the recruited soldiers. One of the cities surrendered was Pergamum
(90. 3n.). Though Orontes did not have to be on the spot to hand over the cities, it makes better sense if he was.
Section 92. 1 is further evidence in support of the above. Rheomithres may well have been a subordinate of
Orontes (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 215f. and 216n. 1). We have seen that he was sent to Tachos by the rebels for
money and warships, but that by the time he returned Orontes had already betrayed the revolt and Rheomithres
followed suit (see above and 92. 1 n.). Rheomithres sailed from Ionia and returned to Ionia. Yet if Orontes had
meanwhile advanced to Syria, Tachos' money and ships would have been taken directly there and not to Ionia.
I am therefore led to conclude that ' Syria' in Trogus is perhaps a corruption of 'Mysia', the place where Orontesin
fact was and to which Rheomithres returned. Such a corruption is very possible palaeographically and later
copyists would have been more familiar with Syria than Mysia.
For the career of Orontes after the revolt we depend on the interpretation of Demosthenes' speech On the
Symmories (14) 31 (delivered in 354) and the dating of IG ii2 207 commonly thought to belong to 349/8. On this

basis it is usually believed that Orontes remained in the west till at least 349/8 and that he took part in another
revolt in the 350s together with Artabazus. Osborne nevertheless argues convincingly that Orontes did not long
survive the satrapal revolt (1971: 297ff.; 1973: 542ff.; 1981-3: ii. 72ff.). He plausibly suggests that Demosth.
14. 31 is not a reference to a contemporary situation; and he questions that IG ii 2 207 is a single decree dating
to 349/8 (1981-3: i. 52ff.; ii. 61ff. But cf. Moysey, 1987). Crucial here is the mention of Charidemus in frr. b, c,
and d lines 12, 14, and 21, along with Phocion and Chares. Parke, CR 42 (1928), 170; 1933: 128, 132, considers
357/6 to be the year when Charidemus became an Athenian citizen. He bases this on Demosth. 23. 141 203.
Davies, APF p. 571, agrees. Charidemus
-540-

cannot therefore have been a general before that date. As IG ii2 207 implies that he was a general at the time of the
decree, the inscription must be later than 357/6, and as Orontes is mentioned in it he must have been in the west after
that date. Osborne, however, 1971: 318; 1981-3: ii. 77ff., rightly it seems to me, follows the older view ( Schaefer,
1885-7: i. 419; PA 15380), that Charidemus could have been a general as early as 361/0. Contra Moysey, 1987,
though see Develin, 1988: 75ff., but especially Walbank, 1988: 83ff.

91. 2-7. Datames in Cappadocia

The same basic story is also given by Nepos, Dat. 6; Front. Strat. 2. 7. 9 (overlooked by Sekunda, 1988: 48); and
Polyaen. 7. 21. 7 (cf. 7. 28. 2 which may be a variant of the same stratagem if Arsames is a mistake for Datames:
Judeich, 1892: 196). Polyaenus does not provide the story with a context. D, Nepos, and Frontinus do, but the
contexts of all three are different. According to D, Datames' adversary was Artabazus, the King's general. According to
Nepos the episode occurred during an encounter with some Pisidians; nothing to do with Datames' revolt against the
King. According to Frontinus, Datames' opponent was Autophradates (but he misunderstands the respective stations of
the two men for he refers to Datames as 'dux Persarum' when the title properly belongs to Autophradates). Clearly
only one (if even that) of these accounts can be correct. One may nevertheless not disbelieve that at different stages
of his career Datames fought against all three, Pisidians, Autophradates, and Artabazus. Evidently the episode became
famous though writers did not agree on its exact occasion. I am inclined to agree with Sekunda, 1988: 48, that D's
version is more likely to be correct.
D's campaign of Artabazus against Datames, if accepted as factual (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 257, who does accept it and
Judeich, 1892: 195f., and Meyer, GdA v. 964, who do not), must belong after the collapse of the satrapal revolt and
indeed after Artabazus had replaced Ariobarzanes as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia and ejected Charidemus from the
Troad. It cannot thus be earlier than 360/59 (cf. 91. 1n.). As Datames was assassinated while Artaxerxes Mnemon still
lived (91. 7; Nepos, Dat. 9-11), Artabazus' campaign must belong before the winter of 359/8 or
-541early 358 when Artaxerxes died (p. 43); therefore in 359. (Otherwise Weiskopf, 1989: 58ff.)
91. 2. : the connection is not temporal (pace Weiskopf, 1989: 10), but one of kind: the treachery of
Orontes is paralleled by that of Mithrobarzanes.
+ +: there is no reason to deny (as does Sekunda, 1988: 51) that Artabazus was satrap of
Hellespontine Phrygia at the same time; see 90. 1n.
. . . + : for Datames' activities in the 360s see Nepos, Dat. 4ff.; Polyaen. 7. 21;
Aeneas Tact. 40. 4f. (with Whitehead ad loc.); Babelon, 1910: 414ff.; Fogazza, 1972: 130f.; Sekunda, 1988. For his
coinage at this time see Moysey, 1989: 108ff.; Lemaire, in L'Or perse, 144ff.
91. 3. : the word can mean a son-in-law, brother-in-law, or father-in-law. Nepos' precise socer, father-inlaw ( Dat. 6. 3), may have no firmer basis than his own translation of the imprecise Greek term of his source. It seems
to have misled Vial, Sekunda, 1988: 43f. (who draws some doubtful conclusions as a result), and Welskopf, 1989: 10.
. . . : Nepos, Dat. 6. 3, gives only the second reason, naturally, as the Pisidians are the enemy
in his version. Polyaenus and Frontinus give no reason for the treachery.
91. 4. : this sounds rather more likely than Nepos' version that Datames had
circulated the report to the rest of his troops that Mithrobarzanes was only pretending to be a deserter to fool the
enemy. This smacks of a later elaboration of the story. Polyaenus and Frontinus are closer to Nepos' version on this
point.
91. 5. : on the name and likely background of Mithrobarzanes see Sekunda, 1988: 48.
91. 7. + + . . . : the details given in Nepos, Dat. 10f. (cf. Polyaen. 7. 29. 1), are the kind
that 4th-century writers of Persica would invent or elaborate; cf. the remarks of Drews, 1973: 116 ff.
92. 1. Interrupted by the story of treachery in Cappadocia the narrative of the collapse of the satrapal coalition is
resumed.

+ : see 91. 1nn. X. Cyr. 8. 8. 4 says that Rheomithres left behind in Egypt his wife and children as well
as the children of his friends as hostages and then proceeded to betray the
-542'greatest oaths' by coming to terms with the King. This, as it happens, complements D's information on the revolt well
and therefore argues for a more extensive rebellion than merely the rebel 'lesser officer' Orontes straggling locally
against the loyal Autophradates (Weiskopf's view: see 90-93n.; 90. 3n.). It was only reasonable that Tachos should
demand such guarantees. He was not a party to the satrapal revolt, but he would naturally have been ready to cooperate with the rebels against the King. On the other hand he would have had no reason to trust the satraps who,
their differences with their King settled, would be his natural enemies. Hence the hostages. Unfortunately for Tachos,
however, Rheomithres promptly went over to the King on his return to Ionia, the hostages notwithstanding. We may
be sure that Tachos had not heard of Orontes' betrayal of the revolt while Rheomithres was in Egypt; otherwise he
would not have parted with some 50 triremes and 500 talents of silver. Orontes' action, therefore, belongs either
shortly before or shortly after Rheomithres' return; see also n. below.
: the city in Ionia founded in the late 380s by Tachos, one of Tiribazus' subor0dinates, and claimed and won
by Clazomenae; see ch. 18 and nn. there.
: Orontes and Rheomithres must have acted simultaneously or nearly so for these leaders would
not have trusted Rheomithres if Orontes was already known to have gone over to the King.
. . . : none of the four rebel satraps. Autophradates abandoned the revolt of his own volition
(Demosth. 23. 155) and Ariobarzanes was betrayed by his own son ( X. Cyr. 8. 8. 4; Arist. Pol. 5. 1312a; Harpocr.
s.v.). But these must be the subordinates of the satraps.

92. 2-93. Tachos' Syrian campaign and downfall

In addition to helping those Greek states engaged in fighting Persia, the Egyptian kings persistently fanned disaffection
in Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Asia Minor; see 90. 2n.; cf. 14. 79. 7; 15. 2. 3 and n.; 15. 4. 3; 15. 8. 1; 16. 41. 3; 16. 42.
2; FGH 115 F103. 13. The disruption caused by the satrapal revolt now gave Tachos the chance to take the offensive.
If he could take over the cities of the Phoenician and Palestinian seaboard he would deprive the
-543Great King of all his bases for attack against Egypt (cf. Stern, 1982: 254). He had already prepared the ground with
diplomacy. Hieron. Jovinian. 1. 45 (= Migne, PL 23. 287) provides the information that Strato, king of Sidon, cooperated with Tachos and X. Ag. 2. 30 reports that the latter fled to Sidon on his overthrow in 360 (90. 2n.; 92. 34n.). This is reflected in the local coinage: Betlyon, 1976: 27; id., 1982: 11ff.; Moysey, 1989: 120f.
92. 2. . . . : Polyaen. 3. 11. 7 speaks of Chabrias training enough Egyptians to man 200 warships.
Ps.-Arist. Econ. 1353a reduces the number to 120 adding that Tachos required only 60 in the end. These figures
cannot be checked, but they are credible enough. The 50 triremes Tachos gave to Rheomithres ought perhaps to be
deducted from the total.
. . . : the other sources give no figures; cf. X. Ag. 2. 28. For Greek mercenaries in
Egyptsee 29. 1n. and below. Presumably the 80,000 Egyptian infantry would have been of the heavily armed type
described by Xenophon ( Cyr. 6. 2. 10; 7. 1. 33; An. 1. 8. 9); cf. Lloyd, 1983: 309f., on their role in Egypt at this time.
+ . . . : see 90. 2n. Plut. Ages. 36. 6 (cf. Mor. 214d) mentions the mercenaries (he gives no figure)
recruited in the Peloponnese with Tachos' money. He adds that Agesilaus was sent out with 30 advisers as in 396. The
date is perhaps late 362 or (more probably) early 361 (cf. Kienitz, 1953: 96, 175ff.). . . . :
see pp. 119 f.
92. 3. : cf. Plut. Ages. 37. 1; Nepos, Chabr. 2. 3. This was the second time Chabrias was serving an Egyptian
king (29. 2 n.). He cannot have arrived in Egypt earlier than the middle of summer 363 as he was a general for 364/3
(Tod 142 lines 17f.). Ps.-Arist. Econ. 1351a outlines the means by which Tachos, on Chabrias' advice, raised enough
gold and silver to finance his war efforts; cf. Polyaen. 3. 11. 5; Will, 1960: 254ff.; Gershevitch, CHI 524. The
thousands of Greeks who served in Egypt in the 4th century did not come cheap and they would have demanded
payment in some respectable currency. It is not surprising, therefore, that large numbers of Attic silver tetradrachms
have been found in Egyptian hoards along with local imitations of varying quality. One particular hoard of 54
tetradrachms minted in Egypt seems to date to c. 360: Milne, 1933: 119ff.; cf. Stroud, 1974: 169f.;
-544Moysey, 1989: 119f.; and see Kienitz, 1953: 113ff., for the Egyptian army organization and war economy in the 4th
century. . . . : thus also Plut. Ages. 37. 5; Nepos, Chabr. 2. 3. Pritchett, 1971-91: ii. 59ff., 100, contests
this.
+ . . . : things had not gone well between Agesilaus and Tachos from the beginning; cf.
Plut. Ages. 36. 7-11; Mor. 210b-c; 214d-f; Nepos, Ages. 8. 1-5; Athen. 9. 384a; 14. 616d-e; 657b, c; 15. 676c-d.
Agesilaus had apparently hoped for the supreme command ( X. Ag. 2. 28f.; Plut. Ages. 37. 1). It is to be noted that
D's account is not unfavourable to Agesilaus. It is of course dangerous to argue from D's incompetent abbreviation, but
it would appear that Ephorus concentrated on the important part played in the whole affair by the Greek corps and its

leader; and he explained the ill success of the Syrian campaign as the inevitable result of Tachos' failure to follow the
sound advice of the experienced Agesilaus and stay at home (see pp. 114 f.); Agesilaus' service in Egypt and his
conduct there created a bad impression in Greece as Xenophon's defence indicates: Agesilaus fought in Egypt for the
freedom of the Greeks of Asia and he supported the rebel Nectanebos against Tachos because Nectanebos was a
philhellene! ( Ag. 2. 29, 31). Plut. Ages. 36. 1-5; 37. 5-11 (cf. Artox. 22. 6) will have none of it: Agesilaus went to
Egypt to earn money for Sparta and his abandonment of Tachos amounted to treachery. Doubtless Plutarch's criticism
is largely his own. But some of it may derive from his sources. As for the other Lives, Plutarch used a number of
sources for the Agesilaus. Not least amongst these was Theopompus (cf. 36. 7-11 with Athenaeus cited above who
refers to Theopompus as his source. In the Agesilaus Theopompus is cited at 10. 10; 31. 4; 32. 14; and 36. 11 if
'Theophrastos' is really 'Theopompos' as Ziegler suggests). Theopompus, who had considered Agesilaus the greatest
and most famous man of his time ( Ages. 10. 10), may well have criticized his mercenary service in Egypt.
92. 3-4. . . . + : for Tachos' connections with Phoenicia and his military objectives
see 92. 2-93 n. It would appear that while he himself remained somewhere in Phoenicia with the mercenaries, he
dispatched his Egyptians under Nectanebos against targets in Syria, i.e. against cities situated anywhere between
Cilicia in the north and the Egyptian border in the south (cf. Jones, 1971: 226). The campaign is best dated in spring
-545or early summer 360. A date a year earlier ( Beloch, GG iii. 2. 121ff.; Moysey, 1989: 119n. 29, 121) sits less well with
the evidence and is uncomfortably close to events in Greece in 362 in which Agesilaus was a major participant (cf.
Kienitz, 1953: 96, 175ff.).
92. 3. : cf. X. Ag. 2. 30f.; Plut. Ages. 37. 3-38. 1. Ephorus proceeded to substantiate his
criticism that Tachos had made a fatal error in leaving Egypt: the man left in charge of the country now rose in revolt,
contacted his son Nectanebos in Syria, and Tachos found himself faced with a rival, and more popular, king. Plutarch
gives a somewhat different, though not necessarily contradictory, account. His claim that Nectanebos was Tachos'
cousin, if true (cf. Kienitz, 1953: 97 n. 1), would make the man left in charge in Egypt an uncle of Tachos, if both D
and Plutarch are accepted as correct. It is more likely, however, as we learn from Egyptian inscriptions, that the man
left in charge of Egypt was a brother of Tachos who therefore was an uncle of Nectanebos II ( Gershevitch, CHI524f.).
According to Plutarch everything in the end depended on the attitude of the Greek mercenaries, i.e. Agesilaus, and
when he deserted to Nectanebos, Tachos had no choice but to flee.
92. 5. + + : Tachos first took refuge with King Strato at Sidon (see 92. 2-93 n.). Here he awaited the
result of his appeal to Sparta. When that failed, he fled to Persia ( Plut. Ages. 37. 7-38. 1). Arabia here is the north
Arabian desert described in X. An. 1. 5.
: neither Xenophon nor Plutarch mentions this. It is, however, corroborated by Aelian, VH5. 1,
and Athen. 4. 150b-c who quotes from the Aegyptiaca of Lyceas of Naucratis (FGH 613 F2). The anecdote they relate
confirms Tachos' presence at the Persian court. Cf. Athen. 14. 616d-e.
. . . : according to Justin, prol. 10, Artaxerxes Ochus campaigned against Egypt three times. The
second and third campaigns belong in 351 and 343 (16. 40. 3; cf. Beloch, GG iii. 2. 284ff.). The first took place before
the death of his father, on the evidence of Syncellus i. 486f. ( Dindorf, 1829): + ++
, + + +, , + .
Artaxerxes II died in the winter or spring 359/8 (p. 43) and the best date for Ochus' first campaign appears to be 359 (
Kienitz, 1953: 99). It is highly probable that he was accompanied by Tachos and this would give
-546some substance to D's statement that the deposed king was appointed to command the expedition against Egypt.
93. 1. A chronographic entry. For its problems, see p. 43. It is rather awkwardly placed here in the middle of the
narrative. The explanation may well be that Ephorus, having mentioned Tachos' flight to, and good reception by,
Artaxerxes, went on to add that the Great King died shortly afterwards (+ . . . ). Taking his cue
D consulted his chronographer and entered the relevant facts at this point.
+ . . . : that was certainly the case with Ochus and very likely also with Arses, and
even Darius III may have been so addressed in some parts of the empire: Badian, Studies Schachermeyr, 40ff.; Sachs,
1977: 129ff.; Hornblower, 1982a: 46ff.
93. 2-6. . . . : D confused his source here. Tachos did not reappear in Egypt, at least
not while Agesilaus was there. The king whom Agesilaus supported was Nectanebos II. This is clear from X. Ag. 2.
30f.; Plut. Ages. 37ff.; Mor. 191c-d; 214d-f; Athen. 14. 6 6d-e. Nectanebos' opponent is not named except that
according to Plut. Ages. 38. 1 he came from Mendes. cf. Gershevitch, CHI525. Otherwise D's account is very close to
that of Plutarch as the following nn. show. The common source was probably Callisthenes -- via Ephorus of course in
the case of D.
93. 2. . . . : cf. Plut. Ages. 38. 1: 10,000.
+ . . . : cf. Plut. Ages. 38. 5.
: cf. Plut. Ages. 38. 5: + . From this and from the
Demotic Chronicle col. ii. 16f., Meyer, Kleine Schriften, ii. 80f., suggests Heracleopolis in the Delta as the city in
question.

93. 3. : cf. Plut. Ages. 39. 1.

: cf. Plut. Ages. 39. 4: .
: Agesilaus' stratagem, doubtless related by Ephorus, has fallen victim to D's abbreviation. It is supplied by
Plut. Ages. 39. 4f.
93. 4-5. : cf. Plut. Ages. 39. 9.
93. 6. . . . + : cf. Plut. Ages. 40. 2. Specifically he was given 230 talents of silver; 220 according to
Nepos, Ages. 8. 6. X. Ag. 2. 31 mentions only 'much money'.
-547
. . . + : cf. Plut. Ages. 40. 3f.; Paus. 3. 10. 2; Nepos, Ages. 8. 6f. It was winter at the time: X. Ag.
2. 31; Plut. Ages. 40. 3f., probably the winter of 360/59 ( Kienitz, 1953: 175ff. But cf. Hamilton, 1982b: 281ff.: he
argues for the winter of 359/8). There is no epainos. Perhaps Ephorus did not consider that Agesilaus deserved one (p.
119) or perhaps D skipped it.
: Plut. Ages. 40. 4 and Nepos, Ages. 8. 7, must surely be correct that the body was covered in wax as there
was no honey. It is possible that Ephorus himself mistakenly assumed that the usual practice was followed of
preserving the body in honey (cf. X. H. 5. 3. 19); equally possible that D missed the point. On the death and burial of
Agesilaus see Cartledge, 1987: 331ff.

94. 1-3. War in the Peloponnese

94. 1. . . . : we are thus in the summer of 361. For the dates of Mantinea and the Common
Peace see the excursus at 67. 2.
+ : see 89. 1n. Those people, in other words, who did not wish to be Megalopolitans, but
preferred to retain their earlier identities, saw the clause about everyone returning to his own country after the battle
as applying to themselves. Whether those Arcadians (anti-Theban and anti-federalist) and their allies (94. 2n.) who
took their side also understood the clause in this light and, therefore, as sanctioning the (partial at least)
disestablishment of Megalopolis, we cannot say on present evidence.
. . . . . . : see 72. 4n.
94. 2. + . . . : the text is corrupt, but the meaning does not seem to be in
doubt. Sometime after the Peace of 362/1, Athens, Achaea, Elis, Phlius, and the Mantinean half of the Arcadian
Confederacy entered into an alliance: Svt 290=Tod 144 (concluded in 362/1). It is to these states that the unwilling
townships now appealed for help. Of the proposed emendations those of Dindorf ( + +) and
Reiske ( +), instead of + + of the MSS, are the most likely. It is also
possible, however, that there is a lacuna after + in which the Mantinean part of Arcadia was originally
indicated, perhaps with a vague suggested by Capps and printed by Sherman and Vial.
-54894.2-3. : this was the second time that Pammenes was aiding Megalopolis. The first occasion was in 368/7
at the foundation of the city; see 72. 4 n.

94. 4. A chronographic notice

'A: Athanis according to Plut. Timoleon 23. 6; 37. 9; and Athen. 3. 98d who calls the history Sicelica; cf. FGH
562. On the seven-year from the end of Philistus' work (89. 3) which Athanis covered in one book, cf.
Cataudella, 1975: 81 ff.

Archon Nicophemus, 361/0

95. 1. : the consuls of 364 V ( CAH2 vii. 2. 639).

95. 1-3. War in the Aegean

95. 1. : Alexander's attack on Tenos was debated in the Athenian assembly on 23-4 Metageitnion in the
year of Molon (ps.-Demosth. 50. 4), i.e. sometime in Aug. -- Sept. 362. This was after the battle of Mantinea and
probably after the Peace too ( Sordi, 1958: 223 n. 4, dates it after the battle, but before the Peace). D's date,
therefore, for the attack on the Cyclades is too low by a year. The events on Peparethus and Corcyra on the other hand
may belong under 361/0 (cf. Beloch, GG iii. 1. 217; Westlake, 1935: 153; Sealey, 1956: 201 f.; id., 1993: 92). If
Ephorus differentiated Alexander's Aegean depredations chronologically, this is lost in D's excerpt.

: Alexander's aim probably was to raise money ( Westlake, 1935: 152 f.). Hence the reference to his ships
as pirates; cf. X. H. 6. 4. 35; Demosth. 23. 162. Sordi, 1958: 223 ff., argues that rather more than mere piracy was
involved. She further distinguishes between the attack on the Cyclades (summer 362) and the (later) events on
Peparethus. She sees the attack on Tenos and other Cycladic islands as well as the raid on the Piraeus (Polyaen. 6. 2.
2) as linked to Epaminondas' operations in the Peloponnese when the Argive ports were open to Alexander as Thebes'
ally. It would not have been easy, she thinks, for Alexander's navy to carry out these raids, but for the Argive ports.
-549-

: we know of Tenos from ps.-Demosth. 50. 4. : a member of the Athenian Confederacy (Tod
123 (= Svt 257) line 85) in the northern Sporades, not the Cyclades; see 30. 5 and n.
95. 2. 'A : Alexander's force found itself besieged at Panormus, a town on the
coast facing Magnesia; cf. Polyaen. 6. 2. 1. : PA 9141; Davies, APF p. 342; Develin, 268.
: Alexander apparently waited until Leosthenes sent away some of his triremes
before attacking: Polyaen. 6. 2. 1; cf. 6. 46.
. . . : probably the triremes of the men who had subcontracted their trierarchies and who were
prosecuted by Aristophon as responsible for the defeat: ps.-Demosth. 51. 8f. They were imprisoned on a charge
of having .
95. 3. . . . : he fled to Macedonia: Aesch. 2. 21 (with schol.), 124; Hyperid. 4. 1. The
prosecutor may have been sristophon (previous n.); cf. Sealey, 1956: 202; id., 1993: 92.
. . . : see p. 133. What is meant perhaps is that Chares succeeded to Leosthenes' naval
command.
+ : Chares did not move against Alexander probably because there was little
he could have done, the tyrant having returned home. At any rate there was now a de facto cessation of
hostilities. The alliance which Athens concluded with the Thessalian Confederacy about this time (Svt 293=Tod
147) may have taken the wind out of Alexander's sails.
Chares was not popular with upper-class Athenians, a fact reflected in the sources. The reason was the naked
imperialism which he, and his political ally Aristophon, pursued in the 360s and 350s. For the connection between
the two see 16. 21. 4 with Dinarch. 3. 17 and Polyaen. 3. 9. 29; Athen. 12. 532a -- e; schol. Aesch. 1. 64. In the
speech On the Peace (8), Isocrates gave vent to his feelings. According to Arist. Rhet. 1417a 32 the speech was
largely an attack on Chares and, though the general is not named in it, sections 50 and 55 clearly allude to him.
As the enemy of Timotheus, Chares could hardly expect any better from the pen of Isocrates. Cf. nn. below.
: cf. Aeneas Tact. 11. 13 ff. where it is affirmed that Chares had a hand in
the revolt. It is
-550-

added moreover that it was an oligarchic revolt and that it succeeded and this is confirmed by Demosth. 24. 202; cf.
18. 234. The censure of Chares here is in stark contrast with the praise of Timotheus at 36. 6; see n. there. Cargill,
1981: 172 ff., unconvincingly seeks to set the incident in the early 360s. I also fail to see his grounds for postulating
that Aeneas Tact. 11. 13 ff. is 'probably Diodoros' ultimate source' here (1981: 173). ' . . . : cf.
Isocr. 8. 125, 142. + 1: cf. Arist. Pol. 5. 1306a: an attempted revolt on Aegina. For
Chares' bad reputation cf. Athen. 12. 532a-e who quotes Theopompus; Leutsch and Schneidewin, Corpus
Paroemiographorum Graecorum, i, P. 463.

95. 4. A chronographic notice and the concluding

formula
: these Boeotian historians are but mere names to us; see FGH iic. 20 f. Their dates are
uncertain as is the nature of their writings.
+ U=0311 . . . : the usual definition at the end of a book; see p. 25.
-551-

APPENDIX
The Nature of Hoplite Fighting
There has been recent controversy about the nature of hoplite fighting. According to the general view the opposing
lines of hoplites would not only approach and engage each other in close formation, each man in the front line staying

as near as possible to his neighbour on the right (as Thuc. 5. 71. 1 explains), but they would also seek to maintain this
at all costs throughout the engagement since a broken phalanx invited disaster; hoplites out of formation were
extremely vulnerable. In fact, while taking care to keep their own phalanx intact, it was the objective of hoplites to
break up that of their enemies. Instrumental here was the technique of the 'push', the othismos, applied not only by
those in the front rank, but by all ranks. Clearly a deeper phalanx had the advantage, but as that might mean a
shorter line, care had to be taken to avoid encirclement. Actual fighting was done whenever the hoplites in the front
rank could use their spears. Obviously, for victory co-ordination was essential and that again depended on training and
team spirit. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Spartans excelled in hoplite warfare.
This view was questioned by Cawkwell ( 1978: 150 ff.), but upheld by Holladay ( 1982: 94 ff.; cf. Buckler, 1985: 141
f.). Responding to Holladay's criticism Cawkwell has recently set out his ideas more fully (1989: 375 ff.). Central to his
thesis is the belief that 'battles were not short in duration'. And after citing some evidence he concludes that the
average battle probably lasted for two or three hours. But this was an impossibly long time for hoplites to be pushing
and fighting in the manner the communis opinio would have them do. In any case, the evidence, according to
Cawkwell ( 1989: 376 f.), shows that on the whole the 'push' (othismos) came late in the battle when one side became
exhausted. Until that time the hoplites were involved in hand-to-hand fighting. How was that done? Cawkwell's answer
(1989: 378 ff.), which he considers consistent with ancient testimony, is that bodies of opposing hoplites might charge
each other in close formation, but that once engaged they could open up their ranks sufficiently not only to allow the
individual front-rank hoplites better use of their weapons, but also to enable them to be replaced in that position once
they had had enough. Thus the hoplite phalanx, in Cawkwell's view, was a fairly sophisticated fighting machine and its
rear ranks were not so much meant to add weight to it and to step forward once those in front of them were killed or
injured, but their main role, if I
-552-

understand Cawkwell aright, was to act as reserves if so required, that is, if the battle dragged on.
It seems to me that the 'traditional' view, as expounded by Holladay, is essentially correct and that Cawkwell does
not succeed in answering Holladay's points. Obviously this is not the place for a detailed treatment of the matter,
but some comments are necessary, especially as Cawkwell includes Leuctra among the battles which are supposed
to exemplify his notion of hoplite warfare.
The first thing to clarify is that it is not the length of a battle as such which should concern us here. What we need to
know is the length of time two opposing hoplite formations spent in contact, in actual fighting. The examples
Cawkwell cites, to the extent that they are relevant, do not provide this information. It would be very unwise to take
Herod. 7. 167 at face value, that the battle of Himera lasted 'from dawn to late evening', but however long it lasted
it clearly involved more than the clash between the Greek and Carthaginian infantry. The latter were not of course
hoplites, but all the same we hear that they fought for as long as it took wooden ships to be set on fire! (D 11. 22).
The fighting on Sphacteria, it is true, went on 'most of the day' (Thuc. 4. 35. 4), but it was not a hoplite battle.
Oenophyta, on the other hand, was. However, D's extraordinary claim that it lasted all day (11. 83. 1) is impossible
to assess in the absence of any other evidence. It reads in fact like a rhetorical exaggeration. Similarly his statement
at 16. 46. 9.
Thucydides' account of the battle of Delium in 424 is more to the point. The distance between Delium and Tanagra is
a good 5 miles as the crow flies, and when the Boeotians set out from the latter place it was already late in the day.
Nor did they rush straight into battle once they met the Athenian army (4. 93. 1). On the other hand, the Boeotian
pursuit of the defeated Athenians was cut short by the coming of darkness. What intervened seems typical enough
of hoplite battles and it cannot have lasted very long. Perhaps it lasted no longer than half an hour. Cawkwell notices
the flight of the defeated Boeotian left wing to the right wing which was still fighting and comments that this was 'a
matter of some considerable time'. But men running for their lives would have covered a few hundred yards in no
time at all. Naturally, in longer-lasting battles the strength and stamina of troops was critical. And of course soldiers
in the front rank did get killed, whether tired or not, and were replaced by those behind them who would be fresher.
In this sense, and in no other, the rear ranks did act as reserves.
Delium, in all respects a normal hoplite battle (excepting the depth of the Theban phalanx), does not quite support
Cawkwell's contention that the othismos was quite a distinct concept from the fighting and that by and large it came
at the end when one side showed signs of exhaustion. In the
-553battle the Thebans prevailed over the Athenians, + + (4. 96. 4).
'And when they had pushed them a short distance were at first closely following', translates Cawkwell (1989: 377)
who sees this as consistent with his view. This is not a fair translation of the Greek. Warner's translation in the
Penguin Classics Series is a great deal closer to the sense of the text: 'The Thebans . . . got the better of the
Athenians, pushing them back step by step at first and keeping up their pressure.' In other words, the fighting must
have been intermittent, punctuated with concerted efforts at pushing. The same is true of other examples adduced
by Cawkwell. Why should we think that Thuc. 6. 70. 1, + ho + excludes pushing?
Cawkwell is quite definite that it does (1989: 377), as he is definite that + at X. H. 2. 4. 34
means fighting and not pushing. That came later, 'after the hand-to-hand conflict' (1989: 377). But the reason why
Pausanias made his phalanx much deeper than usual was because pushing was to be done from the start and the
Athenians were drawn up on sloping ground. Why should be taken as marking the beginning of the
othismos? Likewise at Leuctra, as Xenophon states explicitly, the Thebans adopted a deep formation with the
thought that if they won at the point where the king was, victory would be all but theirs ( H. 6. 4. 12). The othismos,
therefore, was of the essence and not something to resort to at the end, and the terminology in H. 6. 4. 14 does not
prove otherwise.
The main part of Cawkwell's paper is taken up with an attempt to show that the sort of hoplite fighting he proposes
is possible ( 1989: 380 ff.). Again, the evidence cited is either irrelevant or unconvincing. For instance, the kind of

manuvres Cawkwell notes in Xenophon ( 1989: 380) were carried out in training or at any rate before closing with
the enemy and not when actually engaged. The same is true of the 'whistles' and 'referees' (1989: 381 f.). There is
no hint in the sources that these were used in order to execute the sort of movements Cawkwell suggests during
actual fighting. Acceptance of the 'traditional' view of hoplite warfare and of the central role of the othismos also
helps to explain the 'very remarkable statement' (1989: 380) in Xenophon that when reviewed by Cyrus and
ordered to assume their usual battle formation, the Ten Thousand stood four deep ( An. 1. 2. 15). The only other
mention of a four-deep phalanx (as Cawkwell notes (1989: 380 n. 18), but does not explain) is D 13. 72. 6. The two
instances can be similarly explained. The Ten Thousand expected to fight against Persians and such troops and their
formation did not therefore require so much 'weight'; while Agis, faced only with inferior Athenian troops, gave his
phalanx less than the usual depth so as to cover as much of the wall of Athens as possible. Finally, 'contemplation of
hoplites on vases and in reliefs' does not, pace Cawkwell, 'give the orthodox furiously to think' (1989: 384). If, for
-554

instance on the Chigi vase, hoplites are represented the way they are, the reason surely is that that was the only way
they could be drawn and their equipment, their shields in particular, decorated to maximum effect. On the other hand,
Thucydides' telling comments at 1. 49. 1-3 ought to cause Cawkwell himself 'furiously to re-think' his ideas.
For recent discussions which also favour the 'traditional' view see V. D. Hanson , The Western Way of War ( New York,
1989), 152 ff.; J. Lazenby, in V. D. Hanson (ed.), Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience ( London, 1991), 87
ff., esp. 93 ff.
-555-

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