LABOR STANDARDS | EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN

104. Philippine Telegraph &

Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R.
118978
Facts:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company
(hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged
concealment of civil status and defalcation
of company funds as grounds to terminate
the services of an employee. That
employee, herein private respondent
Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that
what really motivated PT&T to terminate
her services was her having contracted
marriage during her employment, which is
prohibited by petitioner in its company
policies. She thus claims that she was
discriminated against in gross violation of
law, such a proscription by an employer
being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor
Code.
Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or
considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage is
valid?
Held: Petitioners policy of not accepting
or considering as disqualified from work
any woman worker who contracts
marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by
no less than the Constitution.
The Constitution, cognizant of the
disparity in rights between men and
women in almost all phases of social and
political life, provides a gamut of
protective provisions. Acknowledged as
paramount in the due process scheme is
the constitutional guarantee of protection
to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an
employer is required, as a condition sine
qua non prior to severance of the
employment ties of an individual under his
employ, to convincingly establish, through
substantial evidence, the existence of a
valid and just cause in dispensing with the
services of such employee, ones labor
being regarded as constitutionally
protected property. The government, to
repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in
the nature of that adopted by petitioner

PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no

uncertain terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate
or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.
In the case at bar, it can easily be seen
from the memorandum sent to private
respondent by the branch supervisor of
the company, with the reminder, that
youre fully aware that the company is
not accepting married women employee
(sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.
Again, in the termination notice sent to
her by the same branch supervisor,
private respondent was made to
understand that her severance from the
service was not only by reason of her
concealment of her married status but,
over and on top of that, was her violation
of the companys policy against marriage
(and even told you that married women
employees are not applicable [sic] or
accepted in our company.
Petitioners policy is not only in derogation
of the provisions of Article 136 of the
Labor Code on the right of a woman to be
free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her
employment, but it likewise assaults good
morals and public policy, tending as it
does to deprive a woman of the freedom
to choose her status, a privilege that by all
accounts inheres in the individual as an
intangible and inalienable right. Hence,
while it is true that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements,
terms, and conditions that they may deem
convenient, the same should not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Carried to its
logical consequences, it may even be said
that petitioners policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or
common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.

LABOR STANDARDS | EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN

105. Del Monte Phils vs Velasco
(2007) G.R. 153447
Facts:
Velasco started working with Del Monte
Philippines (petitioner) on October 21,
1976 as a seasonal employee and was
regularized on May 1, 1977. Her latest
assignment was as Field Laborer. On June
16, 1987, respondent was warned in
writing due to her absences. On May 4,
1991, respondent, thru a letter, was again
warned in writing by petitioner about her
absences without permission and a
forfeiture of her vacation leave
entitlement for the year 1990-1991 was
imposed against her. On September 14,
1992, another warning letter was sent to
respondent regarding her absences
without permission during the year 19911992. Her vacation entitlement for the
said employment year affected was
consequently forfeited.
In view of the said alleged absences
without permission, on September 17,
1994, a notice of hearing was sent to
respondent notifying her of the charges
filed against her for violating the Absence
Without Official Leave rule: that is for
excessive absence without permission on
August 15-18, 29-31 and September 1-10,
1994. Respondent having failed to appear
on September 23, 1994 hearing, another
notice of hearing was sent to her resetting
the investigation on September 30, 1994.
It was again reset to October 5, 1994.
After hearing, the petitioner terminated
the services of respondent effective
January 16, 1994 due to excessive
absences without permission.
Issue: WON the employment of
respondent had been terminated on
account of her pregnancy, and therefore
violates the Labor Code which prohibits an
employer to discharge an employee on
account of the latter's pregnancy.
Held: Respondent's sickness was
pregnancy-related and, therefore, the
petitioner cannot terminate respondent's
services because in doing so, petitioner
will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code
which prohibits an employer to discharge
an employee on account of the latter's

pregnancy. Article 137 of the Labor Code

provides: that it shall be unlawful for any
employer: (1) To deny any woman
employee the benefits provided for in this
Chapter or to discharge any woman
employed by him for the purpose of
preventing her from enjoying any of the
benefits provided under this Code; (2) To
discharge such woman on account of her
pregnancy, while on leave or in
confinement due to her pregnancy; or (3)
To discharge or refuse the admission of
such woman upon returning to her work
for fear that she may again be pregnant.
Respondent was able to subsequently
justify her absences in accordance with
company rules and policy; that the
respondent was pregnant at the time she
incurred the absences; that this fact of
pregnancy and its related illnesses had
been duly proven through substantial
evidence; that the respondent attempted
to file leaves of absence but the
petitioner's supervisor refused to receive
them; that she could not have filed prior
leaves due to her continuing condition;
and that the petitioner, in the last
analysis, dismissed the respondent on
account of her pregnancy, a prohibited
act.
Petitioner terminated the services of
respondent on account of her pregnancy
which justified her absences and, thus,
committed a prohibited act rendering the
dismissal illegal.
106. Co vs. Vargas [GR No. 195167,
November 16, 2011]
Facts:

Respondent alleged that she

started working at the bakeshop in
October 1994 as a baker and worked from
8:00 a.m. until 8:30 p.m., Monday to
Saturday. Aside from baking, respondent
also served the customers and supervised
the other workers in the absence of the
owner. Furthermore, respondent claimed
that she sometimes cooked and did the
chores of a housemaid whenever the latter
was not available. Respondent had a
salary of P220 per day, which she received
every Saturday afternoon. During the
period of her employment, respondent

LABOR STANDARDS | EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN

was not given a payslip and she was never
asked to sign a payroll.
On 6 April 2003, petitioner Co's wife, Nely
Co, told respondent to cook their lunch
because the housemaid was ironing
clothes. Since respondent was busy
preparing customers' orders, she lost track
of time and was unable to cook lunch as
instructed. Irate at respondent's failure to
cook, Nely Co cussed respondent and told
her to leave and never to return because
she was not needed anymore. Respondent
was so humiliated and could no longer
bear the treatment she received from her
employers that she decided to take her
salary and leave that same day.
Respondent later filed the complaint
against Nathaniel Bakeshop and its owner
Fernando Co.
The Labor Arbiter found that the place of
business of petitioner is the same as his
place of residence and that respondent
works for petitioner as well as for his
business which is based in his home. The
NLRC reversed and set aside the Labor
Arbiter's Decision. The Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision in favor of
respondent.
Issue:

Whether the "Court of Appeals

erred in ruling that at the time Respondent
was working with the Co family, the
business was being conducted at the
residence."
Ruling:
The issue raised by petitioner is
clearly a question of fact which requires a
review of the evidence presented. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is
not the function of this Court to examine,
review or evaluate the evidence all over
again, specially on evidence raised for the
first time on appeal.
A petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court should cover only
questions of law, thus:
Section 1.Filing of petition with Supreme
Court. A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or
other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified

petition for review on certiorari. The

petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are final and conclusive and
this Court will not review them on appeal,
subject to exceptions such as those
enumerated by this Court in Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal
Bank:
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases
brought before it from the appellate court
is limited to reviewing errors of law, and
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive upon the Court since it is not
the Court's function to analyze and weigh
the evidence all over again. Nevertheless,
in several cases, the Court enumerated
the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are
binding on the Court: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to that of
the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
Petitioner failed to show that this case falls
under any of the exceptions. The finding of
the Labor Arbiter that petitioner's bakery
and his residence are located at the same
place was not reversed by the NLRC.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals upheld
this finding of the Labor Arbiter.