G.R. No.

L-40677 May 31, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICANOR JIMENEZ and TEOFILO HERNANDO, accused.
NICANOR JIMENEZ, accused-appellant.

THE COURT RULING

The history of this constitutional right against compulsory
self- incrimination stems from the revulsion of mankind
against the abuses committed by the ecclesiastical
inquisitions and by the Star Chamber several centuries ago.
The privilege against self-incrimination "was aimed at a
more far-reaching evila recurrence of the Inquisition and
the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality." 3
Involuntary confessions had been rejected by all courts not
only on the ground of its unreliability but also more
important, on humanitarian principles which abhor all forms
of torture or unfairness towards the accused in criminal
proceedings. Although the constitutional language in which
the privilege is cast might be construed to apply only to
situations in which the prosecution seeks to call a
defendant to testify against himself at the criminal trial, its
application has been held to apply to civil proceedings, to
congressional investigations, to juvenile proceedings, and
other statutory inquiries. In the application of this right, the
natural concern is the obvious realization that an inability to
protect the right at one stage of a proceeding may make its
invocation useless at a later stage. Thus, testimony
"obtained in civil suits, or before administrative or
legislative committees, could also prove so incriminatory
that a person compelled to give such testimony might
readily be convicted on the basis of those disclosures in a
subsequent criminal proceeding."

As observed in Miranda, 1 "without proper safeguards the

process of in custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and
to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a
full opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination, the accused must be adequately and

effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those

rights must be fully honored." For an individual in police
custody is swept from familiar surroundings. He is
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the
techniques of persuasion. The presence of counsel, in such
a situation, would be the adequate protective device
necessary to make the process of police interrogation
conform to the dictates of the privilege against selfincrimination. Without the aforesaid warnings, We hold that
the purported extra- judicial confession of appellant
(Exhibits "A" and "A-1") which was obtained during
custodial interrogation by the police is inadmissible as
evidence to prove the guilt of appellant.

People v. Jose, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.

a unanimous Court rejected the contention that a
confession obtained during custodial interrogation
without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible,
notwithstanding the argument based on Messiah v.
U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo v. Illinois (378 U.S.
478), and Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) that the
presence of counsel in an in-custody police
interrogation is an adequate protective device to
make the process of interrogation conform to the
dictates of the privilege against self-incrimination.
This Court declared that the right of the accused to
counsel under Article III, Section 7, paragraph (17) of
the Constitution refers to proceedings before the
trial court from arraignment to rendition of the
judgment, and that the only instances where an
accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if
he so requests, are during the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. Thus, We rejected the
applicability of the principles enunciated in Messiah,
Escobedo and Miranda on the ground that "the rule
in the United States need not be unquestionably
adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it
has no binding effect here, but also because in
interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the
meaning attached thereto at the time of the
adoption thereof should be considered.
The United States Supreme Court decided the
following cases: Massiah vs. United States (377 U.S.
201, 1964), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478,

1964); and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966).

In Miranda vs. Arizona,
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and
is subjected to questioning, the privilege against
self-incrimination
is
jeopardized.
Procedural
safeguards must be employed to protect the
privilege and unless other fully effective means are
adopted to notify the person of his right of silence
and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored, the following measures are
required. He must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
these rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warning have been given,
and such opportunity afforded him, the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer questions or make statement.
But unless and until such warning and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.

The landmark opinion of Miranda vs. Arizona, decided in

1966, as noted above, the source of this constitutional
provision, emphasized that statements made during the
period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a
clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect
being warned prior to questioning that he has a right to
remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him,
and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel,
either retained or appointed. In the language of Chief
Justice Warren: 'Our holding will be spelled out with some
specificity in the pages which follow, but briefly stated, it is
this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege
against
self-incrimination.
By
custodial

interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does not make (sic) may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if
the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not
question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney
and thereafter consents to be questioned.'"

In case of Morales vs. Enrile, in the light of the said

Section 20, prescribed the procedure to be followed by
peace officers when making an arrest and when conducting
a custodial investigation. Thus. At the time a person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against
him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if
possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the reason arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the

assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in

violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence."

People vs. Nicandro, this Court declared that one's right

to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates "the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation
of an abstract constitutional principle." Thus, is not enough
for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, now Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of
such provision in practical terms e.g., what the person
under interrogation may or may not do - and in a language
the subject fairly understands. The right "to be informed"
carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain, and contemplates effective
communication which results in the subject's understanding
of what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is
sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required
will necessarily vary and depend on the education,
intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of
the person undergoing investigation. In further ensuring the
right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is
informed of such right; he should also be asked if he wants
to avail of the same and should be told that he could ask for
counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him
at his request. 35 If he decides not to retain counsel of his
choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore,
chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be
valid and effective, must still be made with the assistance
of counsel. 36 That counsel must be a lawyer.