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Gallant v. ME Warden, 89 F.3d 823, 1st Cir. (1996)
Gallant v. ME Warden, 89 F.3d 823, 1st Cir. (1996)
3d 823
In No. 96-1048, plaintiff Alfred Gallant appeals from a court order dated
December 20, 1995 denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). As
plaintiff paid the filing fee that same day, his appeal is frivolous. Plaintiff's
motions to proceed IFP on appeal are denied, appellee's motion for summary
disposition is allowed, and the challenged district court order is summarily
affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1.
frivolousness, his action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the state court judge
who presided over his state habeas proceedings. For the reasons recited by the
district court in its order dated February 7, 1996, the judgment is summarily
affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1. Plaintiff's motions to proceed IFP on appeal and for
appointment of counsel are denied.
3
A review of the record makes clear that the trial court, although deeming
plaintiff mentally competent to stand trial, considered him mentally
incompetent to defend himself effectively. Such a determination runs afoul of
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), where the Court held that the
competency standard for waiving the right to counsel is identical to that for
standing trial. Yet plaintiff's conviction and sentence had become final prior to
issuance of the Godinez decision. And the Godinez holding, we conclude,
constitutes a "new rule" that, under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),
cannot be applied retroactively by a federal habeas court.
"[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Caspari v.
Bohlen, 114 S.Ct. 948, 953 (1994) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). "The
question is 'whether a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time
his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to
conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.' " Goeke v.
Branch, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 1277 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 488 (1990)).
Here, we cannot say that the state court would have felt compelled, prior to
Godinez, to deem the two competency standards equivalent. The Godinez Court
itself, after surveying the caselaw, took note of the divergent views that then
prevailed. See 509 U.S. at 395 n. 5. And this circuit was one of the ones there
identified as adhering to the view that the two competency standards might not
be identical. See United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 846 (1st Cir.1989)
(observing that "the competency required to stand trial may not always be
coterminous with the capacity necessary to proceed pro se ") (quoted in part in
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 395 n. 5); see also United States v. Pryor, 960 F.2d 1, 2
(1st Cir.1992) (finding of competency to waive counsel "more than covered"
competency to stand trial).
7
We have considered plaintiff's remaining allegations and find them even less
availing. Accordingly, inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to make a "substantial
showing of the denial of a federal right," Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893
(1983), the application for a certificate of probable cause is denied and the
appeal is terminated. The motions to proceed on appeal IFP and for
appointment of counsel are denied. The motion for recusal is denied as moot.