Benjamin Peirce and the Howland Will

Author(s): Paul Meier and Sandy Zabell

Source: Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 75, No. 371 (Sep., 1980), pp. 497-506
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the American Statistical Association
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BenjaminPeirceand theHowlandWil
PAULMEIERand SANDY ZABELL*

The Howlandwillcase is possiblythe earliestinstancein American that the earlier will should be recognized.But this the
law of the use of probabilistic
and statisticalevidence.Identifying
in the signatureofSylviaAnnHowland,Benjamin Executor, Thomas Mandell, declined to do. Not only
30 downstrokes
Peirceattemptedto showthat a contestedsignatureon a willhad did he claim that the later will governed,but he also
been tracedfromanotherand genuinesignature.He arguedthat contendedthat two of the threesignatureson the earlier
theiragreementin all 30 downstrokes
was improbablein the extremeunder a binomialmodel. Peirce supportedhis model by will were tracings from the third, thus providing an
providinga graphicaltest of goodnessof fit.We give a critique independent ground for invalidating that will (see
of Peirce's modeland discussthe use and abuse of the "product Appendix 1).
rule"formultiplying
probabilities
ofindependent
events.

Hetty Robinson retained distinguishedcounsel and

KEY WORDS: Charles S. Peirce; 19th-century

mathematical sued.' Thomas Mandel retained equally distinguished
statistics;Law and statistics;Handwriting
analysis;Independence; counsel and defended.Between them, both sides called
Productrule.

1. INTRODUCTION
On July2, 1865, Sylvia Ann Howland of New Bedford,
Massachusetts, died, leaving an estate of $2,025,000,
and a single heir-her niece Hetty H. Robinson, who
had lived withher forsome years. Two milliondollars is
a respectable sum, even by today's inflatedstandards,
and in 1865 it was certainlya prize worthcontesting.
The Howland will, dated September 1, 1863, and a
codicil of November 18, 1864, left half the estate to a
number of individuals and institutions. It provided
that the residuewas to be held in trustforthe benefitof
Hetty Robinsonand, at the time of Hetty's death, to be
distributedto the lineal descendentsof Hetty's paternal
grandfather,Gideon Howland, Sr. Hetty's father had
died a monthearlier,leaving her $910,000 outrightand
the income froma trust of $5,000,000. AlthoughHetty
Robinson was thus already a wealthy woman, she
claimed a rightto inheritoutrightthe entire estate of
her aunt, providingas evidence forthis claim an earlier
will,dated January11, 1862, whichleftthe entireestate
to Hetty with instructionsthat no later will was to be
honored.
Family feudsare relevanthere,as is a claimed agreement between Hetty and her aunt to leave mutual wills
excludingHetty's father.For our purposes,it is enough
to observe that Hetty Robinson had an arguable claim
* Paul Meieris Professor
ofChicago,
ofStatistics,The University
Chicago, IL 60637, and Sandy Zabell is AssociateProfessorof
Mathematics, NorthwesternUniversity,Evanston, IL 60201.
Supportfor this researchwas providedin part by NSF Grant
SOC 76-80389.The authorsare gratefulto a numberof friends
and colleagueswith whomthey discussedaspects of this caseP. Diaconis, S. Fienberg,J. Langbein,P. McCullagh,J. Tukey,
and H. Zeisel, among others.Special thanksare due to David
the inference
Wallace forextensivediscussionconcerning
problem
that arose,and StephenStiglerforhelpfulcorrespondence
on the
The staffofthe New BedfordPublicLibrary
historical
background.
were especiallyaccommodating
in locatingand arrangingforthe
copyingof unique source documentsand exhibits,and to them
theauthorsexpresstheirspecialgratitude.

as witnessessome of the most prominentacademicians

of the day. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., Parkman Professorof Anatomyand Physiologyin the Medical School
of Harvard University,examined the contested signatures under a microscope,as did Louis Agassiz, and
testified(for Robinson) that he could find no evidence
of pencil markssuch as mighthave appeared in tracing.
(The cross-examinationof ProfessorHolmes was both
briefand painful;see Appendix2.) Amongthose testifying forthe Executor were Benjamin Peirce, Professorof
Mathematics at Harvard, and his son, Charles Sanders
Peirce, who was later to do importantwork in several
branches of philosophy.The Peirces were among the
firstto contributeto the developmentof mathematical
statisticsin the United States; a recentsurvey of their
workin this area is given in Stigler (1978, pp. 244-251).
Professor Peirce undertook to demonstrateby statisticalmeans that the disputedsignatureson the second
page of the will were indeed forgeries.His method was
to contrastthe similaritiesbetween one of the disputed
signatures (referredto in the trial record as signature
#10) and the unquestioned original (referredto as
signature#1) with the lesser degree of similarityto be
found in pairing 42 other signaturespenned by Sylvia
Ann Howland in her later years on other documents.
(See Figures A and B.) It is this analysis with which
we shall be concerned.
The Peirceanalysis,as we shall see, is at once ingenious
and in some respectsnaive. It leads to a distributional
problem, discussed in Appendix 4, which is nontrivial
and has some interestin its own right.The data available

1 December,1865. Testimonywas taken in 1867, decisionrendered October 1868 (Robinsonv. Mandell, 20 Fed. Cas. 1027).
A copyofthetrialtranscript
is availablein theNew BedfordPublic
Libraryand the testimony
in the textand Appendixes2 and 3 is
extractedfromthat source.

? Journalof the AmericanStatistical Association

September 1980,Volume 75, Number371
Applications Section

497

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498

Journal
of the American
Statistical
Association,
September
1980

A. The UnquestionedOriginalSignature(no. 1) and

the Two DisputedSignatures(nos. 10 and 15)

human affairs.We should not be surprised,therefore,to

findsuch imputationsas a matterof coursein the present
problem.

2. THE PROBLEM

in the record is sufficientto allow some interesting

analyses, but tantalizingforits failureto include details
of major relevance for the problem at issue. However,
as we proceed,it is well to keep in mindthat no organized
theoryof statistical inferenceexisted at the time, and
that, for example, casual imputationsof independence
weremade almostautomaticallyby thoseseekingto bring
considerationsof probability to bear on problems of

Let us start with the evidence as given, making

assumptionsas needed,and returnlater to judge which
seem plausible and which not. The evidence consisted
of photographiccopies of 42 signatures,in addition to
the original(#1) and one of the purportedcopies (# 10).
Suppose we are given some index of agreement between signatures.In the presentcase Professor Peirce
chose the numberof coincidences-in length and position-among the 30 downstrokesin each of a pair of
signatures,when the two weresuperimposed.We might
thenlet Xi, .. ., X42 be thevalues of that index obtained
in matchingeach of the 42 uncontestedand uninvolved
signatureswith#1, and let Y be the value of that index
in matching#10 with#1. We could then pose the problem as one of judgingwhetherY could reasonably have
been drawn at randomfromthe same population that
gave rise to the sampleof size 42.
Since, in this case, Y = 30, that is, #1 and #10 coincide in all 30 downstrokes,
and the Xi are presumably

B. Some of the42 ComparisonSignatures

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499

Meierand Zabell: BenjaminPeirceand the HowlandWill

all smallerthan 30, we mightassign a significanceprobability of 1/43 = 2.3% to this outcome. This is a small
enoughprobabilityto raise suspicion,but farfromoverwhelming.2(If we had available the individualXi values
(whichwe do not) we mightbe willingto proceeda little
more parametrically.We can determine (see Table 1)
that the average index in random pairings of the 42
signaturesis near 6 with a standard deviation of about
2.5. Thus Y is nearly 10 sample standard deviations
away from X and, if we believe that the population
sampled is at least approximately normal, the disat an extremelevel.)
crepancywouldbe judged significant
way and came
ProfessorPeirce proceededin a different
to the conclusionthat the odds against such a coincidence
as that betweensignatures#1 and #10 wereastronomical
(of order 1020). To see how he arrived at this striking
result,let us followthe order of testimonyin the case.

ofCharlesSandersPeirce
2.1 Testimony

1. C. S. Peirce's Table of Coincidences

Coincidences
?l0

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Number of Pairs

Number of Strokes
0

15
97
131
147
143
99
88
55
34
17
15

30
291
524
735
858
693
704
495
340
187
180

20

288

861

5325

30_

that the line of writingshould not be materiallychanged.

The son, Charles Sanders Peirce-then a memberof

By materiallychanged,I mean so muchchangedthat there
in the general
couldbe no questionthattherewas a difference
the staffof the United States Coast Survey-testified
directionofthetwosignatures.
on the work he carried out under the directionof his
father.Charles was provided with photographiccopies
2.2 Testimonyof BenjaminPeirce
of signatures#1 and #10 (the third signature is not
mentioned in the testimony) and with copies of 42
C.S. Peirce was followedto the stand by his father,
signaturesof Sylvia Ann Howland on leases and other who testifiedas to his own examinationand comparison
documents.Following instructionsgiven to him by his of #1 and #10.
father,Charles undertookto match every possible pair
and of sucha kindas iris extraordinary
The coincidence
of the 42 uncontested signatures and to observe the
thetracing
of 10
to suggestdesign,and especially
resistably
. . . but the differences
are
agreementbetweeneach pair in respectto the numberout
over 1. Thereare smalldifferences
such as to strengthenthe argument for design. . . . The coof 30 identified"downstrokes" in which they were in
incidencesare manifestlythose of position; while the difagreement.There being (") = 861 possible pairs, and
ferencesare those of form.Coincidenceof positionis easily
30 downstrokesto be checked for each, this meant a
effectedby design,and can be tolerablywell accomplished
by an unskilfulhand. It especiallybelongsto the downward
total of 25,830 comparisons,for which Charles reported
stroke. . . . It involves a close agreement in the average posiagreement in 5,325 or 20.6 percent of them-very
tion of the stroke,an agreementin its slant,and no extravanearly 1 in 5. More particularly,he gave the distribugant diversityof curvature.But coincidenceof formis exceedinglydifficult....
tion of numberof agreementsas shownin Table 1. Thus,
In a longsignature.completecoincidenceof positionis
forexample,15 pairs each had two coincidencesout of30,
an infallibleevidenceof design.The mathematicaldiscussion
of this subject has never,to my knowledge,been proposed,
fora total of 2 X 15 = 30 strokescoinciding.
but it is not difficult;
and a numericalexpressionapplicable
The precisedetails of the matchingprocessand of the
to this problem,the correctness
of whichwould be instantly
criteria for judgment of agreement were only briefly
of the world,can be
by all the mathematicians
recognized
readilyobtained.
touched on in C.S. Peirce's testimony:
Q. Whatwas the standard... ofcoincidence?
A. I consideredthat two lines coincidedwhenevertheycoin-

ProfessorPeirce went on to describe his son's work

and,
withoutqualification,assertedthat since the overall
cided as well as . . . nos. 1 and 10, in those same lines.
proportionof matches was very nearly one-fifth,the
Later, under cross-examination,Charles added some probability of finding30 matches in a given pair of
furtherdetails:
signatureswas one in 530 or "once in 2,666 millionsof
millionsof millions." (Note: There is some errorhere,
I made it a condition that in shifting one photograph over
anotherin orderto make as manylinesas possiblecoincide,-

since 530 = 9.31 X 1020.) Lest the point be missed, Peirce

added:

the
One mighttry to improveon this a littleby considering
This numberfar transcendshuman experience.So vast an
probabilitythat out of 44 signatures,a given pair will have the
Such evanescent
is practicallyan impossibility.
improbability
greatestindex of coincidences,that is, (4Y4)1 = .0011. (Strictly
of probabilitycannotbelongto actual life.They are
shadows
speaking,we are not given the numberof coincidencesbetween
whichthelawcares
lessthanthoseleastthings
unimaginably
eithersignature#1 or #10 on the one hand, and any of the 42
notfor.
othersignatureson the other,but presumablynone of these even
of such
approachesthe 30 of #1 and #10.) The appropriateness
When asked the purpose of his son's display of the
issue, but one that we will
test is an interesting
a significance
distributionof the number of coincidences,Peirce exnot touchon.
2

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of the American
Journal
StatisticalAssociation,
1980
September

500

no cases of 0 or 1 agreement,with 9 expected-and the

considerableexcess of outstandinglygood matches-20
(with 13 or moreagreements),withless than 3 expected.
Number of
If we calculate the usual goodness-of-fit
chi-squared
Agreements
Obs.
Exp.
(O - E)
(O - E)2IE
for this frequencytable we get X2 = 170.7 on 12 df.
We can improvethis a littleby choosingp to minimize
? l?0
9.1
-9.1
9.1
chi-squared, but the minimizing p = .211 actually
2
15
29.0
-14.0
6.7
worsens things in the middle range of the graph and
97
3
67.6
12.8
29.4
gives a xI = 135.3, which remainsan exceedinglypoor
4
131
114.1
16.9
2.5
147
5
148.3
-1.3
0.0
fit. (The appropriatenessof the chi-squaredstatistic is
6
143
154.5
-11.5
0.9
discussedin Sec. 3.2.) If one comparesPeirce's graphical
7
99
132.4
-33.4
8.4
test of fit with the chi-squared statistic, it is obvious
8
88
95.2
-7.2
0.5
55
9
58.2
-3.2
0.2
that the visual impact of the graphical display is to
34
10
30.5
3.5
0.4
weightall deviations fromthe expected values equally,
11
17
13.9
3.1
0.7
while chi-squared weights such deviations relative to
12
15
5.5
9.5
16.4
13
the magnitudeof each expected value. For this reason,
discrepanciesbetweenthe observedand expectedvalues
20
2.7
17.3
112.1
in the tails, even if they had been plotted, might not
30J
have appeared to be more serious than those in the
861
861
0.0
170.7
middle of the distribution,while it is preciselythe contribution of the tails to chi-squared that makes the
plained that
lattersignificant.
Clearly the most frustrating
aspect of this data set is
It was orderedby me in orderto obtain as severe a test
as possiblefromobservationforthe criticismof my mathe- its lack of detail with regard to the 20 good matches.
maticaldeductions.
Were even one of them to show 30 agreements,or even
the persuasiveness of the mathematical evidence
29,
a
Peirce
table,
To facilitate comparison,
provided
would
evaporate. Indeed, as shown in the earliertable,
exwith
the
recapitulatinghis son's counts, together
can
we
calculate from the data given that the total
under
binomial
model
pected numberof counts
the
numberof agreementsin these 20 cases was 288, or an
/30\
/1 i4 30-j
average of 14.4 for those signatureswith 13 or more
El Yj} = 861 ( 3)(1)()
agreements.Thus, althoughone or two very highvalues
remainsa numericalpossibility,it seems likelythat few
(See Table 2. The table given by Peirce omits the 15
if any values wereas highas 20.
cases with two or fewercoincidences,and the 20 with
Unfortunately for the record, Professor Peirce's
morethan 12.)3 Peirce commented:
demeanorand reputationas a mathematicianmust have
This is a species of comparisonfamiliarto mathematicians been sufficientlyintimidating to deter any serious
and such a coincidenceas above would be regardedas quite
demonstration
that the true mathematicalrebuttal.He was made to confessa lack of
and a sufficient
extraordinary,
but he was
any generalexpertisein judginghandwriting,
law ofthe case was embodiedin theformula.

2. BenjaminPeirce's Table (and

chi-squaredcomputations)

A graphical display of the comparisonwas also provided, which is reconstructedin Figure C accordingto FREQUE14CY
the descriptiongiven in the trial record (the actual 200
display was omittedfromthe trial record).

of Coincidences
C. Distribution
---

OBSERVED FREQUENCY
EXPECTED FREQUENCY

3. CRITIQUEOF PEIRCE'SMODEL
ofFit
3.1 Goodness
How convincingis Peirce's model and his evidence
for it? No formaltheory of goodness-of-fit
testing existed at the time,and Peirce can scarcelybe faultedfor
failingto provide one. Still, the quality of fit can reasonably be questioned. Peirce's graph shows only the
middle range,and even here thereappears to be a consistenttrendin the deviations.What the graph does not
show is the substantialabsence of reallypoor matches-

150100-

I~~~

~NME

OF

a The table in the trialrecordgives41 cases as "undistributed,"

but it is clear fromPeirce'stestimony
immediately
following
that
35 was meant. ("My son had also 35 undistributed
cases . ..."

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GREMNT

Meierand Zabell: BenjaminPeirceand the HowlandWill

501

not cross-examinedat all on the numericaland mathe- dependence,on the other hand, remains in full force.)
matical parts of his testimony,let alone made to list the Thattest,however,as notedbefore,yieldsonlya strongly
20 highvalues (see Appendix3).
suggestive significanceprobability,but nothing at all
as compellingas Peirce's calculation.
For all that one can raise questions about Peirce's
3.2 Model Assumptions
model and analysis, it remainsto considerthe extentto
The frequentparalysisof the law beforea demonstra- which the evidence available really contradictsit. Altion of mathematicshas long been noted. An extreme thoughthe conventionalchi-squaredtest clearlyrejects
view, expressedby Laurence Tribe in his 1971 Harvard the binomial model, it is not at all clear that the chiLaw Reviewarticle"Trial by Mathematics" (Tribe 1971) squared statistic should have even approximatelythe
is that laymen are too readily impressedand misled by familiar distribution.Under Peirce's model the probsuch presentationsand that they should thereforebe ability that a random pair of true signatures should
excluded-at least in jury trials. Whatever one thinks match in k stokes is indeed binomial, as claimed, and
of this position as a generality,Peirce's model, as well thus the expectedfractionof pairs with k agreementsis
as his data analysis, deserves closer examinationthan it also binomial. However, the (42) = 861 pairs are generated fromonly 42 signaturesand are not at all the same
receivedduringthe trial.
One might,for example, question the assumption- as 861 independenttrialsfroma binomialpopulation. It
that the relativefrequencies
required for the binomial model-that the probability is to be expected,therefore,
ofa matchshouldbe the same at each ofthe 30 positions. will show variabilitygreaterthan multinomialand that
One can easily imagine that certain strokes-perhaps the chi-squared statistic will also exhibit greater varithose early in the signature-would have a higher ability. To assess more rigorouslythe possible lack of
probabilityof matchingthan do others.The assumption fit of Peirce's model we turn to considerationof the
of equal probabilitycould readily have been checked rather large excess of pairs with over 12 matches (20
in the course of C.S. Peirce's work,but it seems never observed, only 2.7 expected). The Markov inequality
to have been questioned. (Of course, the effectof such (e.g., see Billingsley1979, p. 65), of which the familiar
inequalitywould be to reducethe variance in the number Chebyshev inequality is a direct corollary,states that
of matches, and thus to make the probability of 30 forany nonnegativerandomvariable Z, one has
matcheseven smallerthan that quoted.)
Pr{Z > t} < t-'E{Z} .
Far more serious is the implicitassumption of independence. One would expect that agreement in, say, Taking Z = the numberof pairs out of the 861 showing
positions1 and 3, would make far morelikelyan agree- 13 or more agreements,and t = 20, we findPrIZ > t}
mentin position2. The effectof such dependencewould < 2.7/20 = .14-not in itselfsufficient
reason to reject
be to increasethe variance and thus increase the prob- the Peirce model.A morerefinedanalysis,however,gives
ability of 30 matches over that quoted, quite possibly fairlyconvincingevidence that the Peirce model does
by orders of magnitude. To the extent that the data not fitthe data (see Appendix4).
bears on this point,it does indeed suggestthe possibility
andtheProduct
Rule
of dependenceby exhibitingwhat appear to be far too 3.3 Independence
many cases with over 12 matches to agree with the
Peirce's unargued and possibly unwarrantedassumpbinomialmodel.
tion of independence should occasion no surprise. It
A finalcritiqueof Peirce's discussionis the absence of was often
taken,for granted by thoughtfuland astute
any commenton correlationbetween signatures made scientistsof that era and later ones-not entirelyexclose in time. It is at least plausible that signatureslate ceptingthe scientificcommunityof today. For
example,
in life would differsubstantiallyfromthose made at a Simon Newcomb wrote in The Universal
Cyclopedia
youngerage, and also plausiblethat signaturesmade at a (1900, s.v. "Probability,Theory of"):
single sitting would be more similar than those made
The mathematicalrule for determining
probabilityin such
days or weeks apart. (Similar problems arise in the
a case [when the concurrence
of a large numberof circum,
statistical analysis of authorship,where both style and
stancesis necessaryto the productionof an event] is that
vocabulary may depend on the writer'ssubject matter
the probabilityof the concurrence
of all the eventsis equal
to the continuedproductoftheprobabilities
ofall theseparate
and mayvaryoverhis lifetime;see Mostellerand Wallace
events. As one example,suppose that a law requiringthe
1964, pp. 18-22, 195-199, 265-266.) Since many of the
concurrence
of the two housesof Congressand the President
42 signaturesused in the study were on leases and other
wereas likelyas not to be rejectedby any one of them,and
formedhis own opinion
that each one of the threeauthorities
dated documents,this question could also have been
of the othertwo. Then the probabilityof its
independently
examined,but thereis no evidencethat it was considered.
passingall threewouldbe a X a X 2 - SIn part these challengesto the fairnessof Peirce's test
can be met by the nonparametricproceduresuggested The product rule is misstatedhere, independencebeing
earlier.The questionsof uniformprobabilityof matching only introducedsubsequentlyin the context of an exin each of the 30 positions,and independencebetween ample. And while Newcomb has the mathematicsright
(The problem of time in his example,the application,althoughit can be given
them, would then be irrelevrant,.

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502

Journal
of the American
StatisticalAssociation,
1980
September

is exceedinglyapt to be given
the correctinterpretation,
an incorrectone. For let us agree that each branch of
governmentarrivesat its own opinion independentlyof
the other two on each law, where "independently"is
given the common meaningof decidingin ignoranceof
the deliberationsor decisionof the others.It does not at
all followfromthat that the decisionswillbe statistically
independent.Thus, if a law on capital punishmentis
under consideration,all might be influencedby public
opinion,a varietyof lobbies,or the recentreportof some
heinous crime. The failureof each to directlyinfluence
one another does not protect them from being simultaneouslyinfluencedby externalevents.
The confusionof this ordinarymeaningof "independence" with "statistical independence" remains a common errortoday and, although Newcomb himselfmay
have been clear about the matter,his examplehereseems
especiallyunfortunate.
For whileNewcomb mayjust have been careless,skimmingovera pointobviousto himself,
thestatisticallayman
who read him could easily go astray. This was certainly
the case fora noted experton forgery,AlbertS. Osborn
(1929, pp. 225-234), whose text QuestionedDocuments
cites "ProfessorNewcomb's rule" withapprobation,but
whose illustrationsof it show no awareness of the need
forindependence.In one instance,Osborn supposed an
individualsoughtwho was 5 feet114 inchestall, withblue
eyes and brown hair, had lost his left thumb and the
lower part of his rightear, and had a distinctivemole,
tattoo, and scar. Osborn assumed for the sake of argument that the firstof these traits had a probabilityof
0, thesecond 3, thethird4, and all therest1/200,and concluded that the probabilityof theirjoint occurrencewas
1 in 38,400,000,000,000.There is, of course,no reason to
suppose a priorithat height,eye color, and hair color
are independenttraits,althoughin this instancepossible
mutual dependence might not be too serious. Surely,
however,the occurrencesofa tattoo,a scar,and a missing
thumb and ear would be highly dependent. (A more
recent and notoriousinstance is the celebrated Collins
case.4)

This intuitive but incorrect interpretationis not

entirelyoffthe mark, however,in a case-such as the
present one-in which the probabilityof the evidence,
given the alternative (i.e., close agreementin the signatures, given a deliberate forgery),is taken to be very
near one. For in that case the likelihoodratio
Pr (evidenceInull hypothesis)

significanceprobability

Pr (evidenceIalternative)

and the posterior odds for the null hypothesis thus

reduce to
(significanceprobability)X priorodds

Hence, in this case, ifthe priorodds are not extreme,the

posteriorodds will indeed be of the same orderof magnitude as the significanceprobability.
Another problem affectingthe apparent strengthof
the evidence, however, comes from a very different
direction.In framingthe problem Peirce quite reasonably divided the possibilitiesinto two categories-either
Sylvia Ann Howland wroteboth signatures,or she didn't.
In the latter case we are left to presume that Hetty
Robinson had a hand in the matter.However, thereare
in fact many alternatives, which, although not very
plausible, still have prior probabilitieswell in excess of
5-3?. For example,Sylvia Ann Howland mighthave been
in the habit of tracingher own signature.Or perhapsthe
Executor, devoted to the destructionof Hetty's claim
(and her reputation), might have stolen the original
"second page" and replaced it with a forgery.Or we
could imagine that C.S. Peirce, in his enthusiasm for
the mathematicalmethod,mighthave been overgenerous
in countingagreementswhen comparingsignatures#1
and #10, and more particular when comparing other
signatures. Indeed, almost any outrageous possibility
that one could conceive of, provided only that it be
physicallypossible,would have a priorprobabilitymany
orders of magnitude greater than 5-3?. Without going
into the calculations, it should be clear that the odds
against Hetty's guilt cannot be assessed as anything
less than the priorodds in favor of these "outrageous"
possibilities.(The authors' intuitiveassessmentputs the
3.4 "Outrageous"
Events
odds in favor of some "outrageous" explanation in the
There are some general criticismsthat can be leveled presentcase as at least 10-4 or 10-s, and thus-even if
at the use of an extremelysmall significanceprobability we accept Peirce's model in its entirety-the strength
of the evidence against Hetty is bounded in this way.)
to exclude one hypothesisin favorof another.
The
problem of "outrageous" alternatives and their
Significanceprobabilitiesare frequentlymisconstrued
to be statementsof posteriorprobabilitywhen only two effect on limiting extreme posterior probabilities is
alternativesare under consideration(here, "Sylvia Ann discussedby Mostellerand Wallace (1964, pp. 90-91).
Howland wrote both signatures independently"yvs.
Despite the criticismmade here of Peirce's model and
"Hetty Robinson forgedthe second signature"); that is,
data
analysis, it stands as an example, in many ways
a significanceprobabilityof e against the null hypothesis
of the early use of formalstatistical methods
excellent,
comes to be regarded (erroneously) as effectivelya
in
a
scientific
and social setting. Not only did Peirce
posteriorprobabilityof 1 - e in favorof the alternative.
formulatethe problemin a plausible probabilisticframework, and calculate a proper significanceprobability
468 Cal. 2d 319,438 P.2D 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). Fairley
and Mosteller(1977, pp. 355-379) give the decisionof the Cali- forthat model,but he provideda test ofthe modelitself.
forniaSupremeCourtand a criticalevaluation.
That the test was solely graphical is in no way to his

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Meierand Zabell: BenjaminPeirceand the HowlandWill

discredit,since no more incisive testingprocedureshad
been developed, nor would be for many years to come.
Consideredagainst the backgroundof his era, Peirce's
analysis must be judged unusually clear and complete,
even though-from a modern viewpoint-we may regard his conclusionabout the significanceof his findings
less compellingthan he did.

4. AFTERMATH
Peirce was only one among many witnessesfor both
sides, but fromour point of view the next most interesting witness was J.C. Crossman, an engraver.Crossman testifiedfor the plaintiff,essentially in rebuttal
to Peirce. Peirce had said that such agreementas found
betweensignature#1 and #10 could not occurexceptby
design,no matterhow regularthe habits of the writer.
Crossman,however,gave testimonyabout the regularity
of the signatures of several individuals, most notably
those of the sixth Presidentof the United States, John
Quincy Adams (who signed his name "J.Q. Adams").
In each of these cases, Crossman testified,pairs of
signatureshad been foundin whichthe matchingwas as
good as or better than the matchingof#1 and #10. Unfortunately,the testimonydoes not suggest the correspondingvalue of p (.2 for Sylvia Ann Howland),
which powerfully influences the final probabilityespeciallysince the numberof strokesto be matched in
this case is considerablyless than 30.
How convincingwas the Peirce testimonyat the time?
Or what of Crossman's, supplementingthe microscopic
examinationofProfessorsHolmes and Agassiz? The court
did not say directly,but its decision can be viewed as
suggestingthat the courtwas at least leftin doubt about
the validity of the contested signatures. In brief,the
legal situationwas as follows.
As a general matter,a will may be revoked by the
testatorat any time until his death, althoughhe can by
contractbind himselfnot to exercisehis powerof revocation. Thus one mustlook forthe groundson whichHetty
Robinson asked that the earlier will and not the later
one prevail. She mighthave soughtto discreditthe later
will on the ground of undue influence.(Indeed, in an
earlier proceeding,Hetty had done exactly that, but
then withdrewthe case.) Alternatively,if the termsof a
will do evidence a contractualobligation-as if A puts
B's childrenthroughcollege, and B agrees to leave A
his house in return-a situation may arise in which a
testatoris not freeunilaterallyto change the terms.It
was Hetty Robinson's claim, supported with the 1862
will and otherevidence,that she and her aunt had contractedto makemutualwills,specifically
excludingHetty's
fatherEdward Robinson, so that in no case could he
inheritthe Howland fortune.However, Massachusetts
law at the time treated a beneficiaryunder a will as
disqualifiedon account of self-interestfrom testifying
about the circumstancessurroundingthe will, unless

503
called to testifyby the opposite party or by the court.5
Without Hetty's testimony,the evidence was judged
insufficient
to support her claim that the 1862 will was
in fulfillment
of a contract. On this ground the court
foundforthe defendant,Thomas Mandell, and it can only
be conjectured whetherit might have ruled otherwise
had it consideredthe contested signaturesto be valid.

4.1 DidSheorDidn'tShe?
So ends the case-without a findingon the question
of most interestto the outsider.Clearly if the contested
signatureswereforgeries,
Hetty Robinsonwas responsible
for them. Did she trace her aunt's signatureor didn't
she? Here the amateur findshimselfon shiftingsands.
Peirce includes in his testimonysome furtherbits of
evidence that point toward forgery,such as the position
of the signatureon the page, and the level of each letter.
Osborn,a specialistin the fieldof questioneddocuments
and a student of this case in particular,had no doubt
whatever that the codicil signature was a forgeryby
tracing. However, he makes no comment on the J.Q.
Adams signaturesthat appear to defythe usual tests of
forgery.Examination of those of the 42 comparison
signaturesstillextantshowsa greatdeal ofregularity,
but
one does not findthe same sortof identityas between#1
and #10. But the originaland both the contestedsignatures were said to have been writtenon the same day,
and thus mightwellbe morealike than signatureswritten
many days apart. The tendency of all three of the
signaturesat issue to followone line fromS throughw,
and then slope offforthe last threelettersin a slightly
differentdirection,looks at firstcompelling-until we
noticethat preciselythis patternis characteristicof most
of the 42 comparisonsignatures.This is, perhaps,as far
as an amateur can go, and no unequivocal conclusion
seems possible.

5. EPILOGUE
Hetty Robinson Green-she had recentlymarriedlost this case, and other legal actions subsequently.
However, far frombeing weak in those skills necessary
to the managementof so large a sum-the ostensible
reason forputtingthe moneyin trustin the firstplaceHetty Green turned out to be a dynamic and effective
operator in finance.According to contemporarynewspaper accounts she devoted herselfto the multiplication
of her fortuneand became one of the most colorful
figuresWall Street had known for many years. Despite
her enormous wealth, she lived for many years in an
inexpensiveflat in Hoboken and took the ferryto work
in New York City each morning.All this was part of a
consciously projected image of penury, which even
extendedto her wearingold and worn clothing.Viewed
as eccentricby many, she had a complex personality
I The American Law Review (1870, Vol. 4, pp. 656-663), discussesthisaspectofthe case in considerable
detail.

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504

Journal
of the American
StatisticalAssociation,
September
1980

that few-if any-understood. When she died on July

Evidence at the trial was introducedsuggestingthat
3, 1916, the New York Timesran her front-pageobituary relationsbetween Hetty and her aunt wereby no means
the next day with the simple headline, "Hetty Green as cordial as Hetty made out, thus castingdoubt on the
dies,worth
$100,000,000."6
credibilityof Hetty's testimony.For furtherdetails of
the case, see the AmericanLaw Review (1870, Vol. 4,
APPENDIX1: THE HOWLANDGENEALOGY,
AND
pp. 625-664).

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTSCONNECTED
WITH THE WILL

Hetty's father,Edward Mott Robinson, acquired his

wealth by marryinginto the Howland family.

APPENDIX2: CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF
OLIVERWENDELLHOLMES,SR.

Q. What was that color whose different

degrees of intensityyou have spoken of?
j RUTH BUTTS
|TS
ISAAC
GIDEON
(d. HOWLAND
1833)
HOWLAND, SR.
A. Ink color.
Q. Is that the best answeryou can give to that question?
A.
Black ink color would be a better.
GIDEON HOWLANDJR.
MEHITABLE HOWLAND
(d. 1847)
Q. That answer applies to the threesignatures,does it?
A. To the threesignatures,yes.
Q. What componentmaterialsdid you discover,by the
ABBY S. HOWLAND
EDWARDMOTT ROBINSON
SYLVIA ANN HOWLAND
(d. June 1865)
(d. 1860)
(d. July 1865)
aid of the microscopein the ink?
A. I did not discoverany definableparticles.
Q. Any knowledgewhichyou acquired by your examinEDWARD H. GREEN
HETTY ROBINSON
ation of the materialsof whichthe ink was composed,
you may give us.
When Hetty's motherdied in 1860, a settlementresulted A. That it was a deposit froma fluid.
in only $8,000 of the estate passing directly to the Q. That all?
daughter,Hetty, the rest (over $100,000) going to the A. That's all. I have spoken of the color.
husband, Edward Robinson. This was said to have Q. The materialsof whichthe paper was composed,and
resultedin ill feelingstoward Robinson both on the part
of theirabsorbentpowers,please state.
the difference
of his daughter,Hetty,and her aunt, Sylvia Ann. Hetty A. Fibers. I did not experimenton their absorbent
alleged that as a resultshe and her aunt agreed to make
powers.
and to exchange mutual wills, excludingHetty's father Q. State the examinationwhichyou made of the writing
fromany inheritance,should he survive either or both
in the body of those instruments,under the microof them. Because of the contractual nature of this
scope.
agreement, subsequent wills by either of the parties A. My attentionwas not particularlydirectedto that.
would not necessarilytake precedence.
Q. Then if I understandyou rightly,you did not exTo this end, accordingto Hetty, Sylvia Ann Howland
amine under the microscope,the writingof the body
had dictated a two-page will to her. Miss Howland had
of the instrument.
also dictated an additional one-page insert-to be A. I made various examinationsof the writingof the
broughtforwardonly if necessary-explaining that she
body of these instruments,but not with special
fearedpressurefromher caretakersto make a later will
referenceto evidence.
and imploringthe judge to recognizethis will only and Q. When did you firstsee these papers?
no later one. This "second page" and a copy of it to be A. I firstsaw these papers yesterday.
kept by Hetty-both signed by Sylvia Ann-were attached to the firstpage, but not shownto witnesseswhen
APPENDIX3: CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF
the will was executedand signedby Miss Howland later
BENJAMIN
PEIRCE
in the day.
ProfessorPeirce was an assured and effectivewitness

6NotableAmericanWomen(1971) gives a brief,excellent,and for his side, at times perhaps too assured. It is instrucobjectiveaccountof HettyGreen'slifewithfurther
bibliography; tive to contrastthe firstpart of his testimonywith the
a somewhatmoresensationalist
accountappearsin JohnT. Flynn's
inappropriately
titledMen of Wealth(1941). Much betterthanits finalportionof his cross-examination.
title would suggestis Boyden Sparkes and Samuel T. Moore's
book-length
biographyHettyGreen:A WomanWhoLovedMoney Q. Your life has been spent, has it not, for the most
(1931), reprinted
in 1948 as HettyGreen:The Witchof Wall Street.
part in mathematical studies, and in teaching the
This case, along withotherinstancesof the use of probabilityin
has it not?
same,
legal cases, is describedby Elmer Mode, Journalof theAmerican
StatisticalAssociation(1963). Unfortunately,
his presentationis A. It has.
compressedand erroneousin importantparticulars.The later Q. You are not an instructorin writingand do not
vicissitudesand ultimatedissolutionof the Howlandfortuneafter
professany peculiarskill in handwriting?
Hetty's death are describedin ArthurH. Lewis's The Day They

Shook thePlum Tree (1963).

A. I am not, and do not.

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Meierand Zabell: BenjaminPeirceand the HowlandWill

Q. You are not and never have been, have you, an
engraveror lithographer?
A. I am not and never have been.
Q. You have not practisedthe art of tracing,have you?
A. A very little, to find out what it consisted in, and
what could be accomplished in tracing by an inexperiencedhand.
Q. When did you so experiment?
A. The last timewithinabout ten days; a long timeago I
had done somethingof the kind, so that I had an
idea of it.
Q. Have you ever been called as a witnessto testifyin
regardto the genuinenessof handwriting?
A. Only wheretherewas no doubt.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. In the ordinary course of business to testifyto a
signaturethat was not known to persons who had
to use it in the way of business.
Q. But not in the case of questioned or suspected
handwriting?
A. No.

APPENDIX4: ANALYSISOF PEIRCE'SMODEL

Under Peirce's model, with p = .2, the probability
of finding13 or more agreements out of 30 trials is
Q = B(13; 30, .2) = .0031. The observed tail frequency
provides an estimate Q = 20/861 = .0232 and, calculating a binomial contrast based on n = (42) = 861
pairs,we findthat
0 - Q
{Q(1 - Q)\
(
nQ))
___

__

.0232 - .0031

___

___

__

___

_-

l (.0031) (.9969))I
861

10.61

505
(or equivalently,
12 = cov(E (o (X) X2) IX1)E(9I(X1,X3)IX1))
(See, e.g., Lehmann 1975, p. 368). Note that
E(&(xi,

k(Xi, X,)
Then

{0

> .0201} < var(Q)

PI 1j-Ql

(.0201)2

(.0031) (.9969)
(861) (.0201)2
=

l<i<j?n

(Xi,Xi)

is a U statisticwith variance under Peirce's model (ie.,

Q = B(13; 30, .2)) equal to
- - --Q)- + 2(n- -2)
var(Q) = Q(1

where
?ri2 =

.0089

and Peirce's model is rejected at the one percentsignificance level. For example, we mightsuppose that each
one of the 30 downstrokesin Sylvia Ann Howland's
signaturecan be in one of five equally possible states.
Then

E (1 (X1, X2) IX1)

-B

(13; 30, .2)

is constant,independentof X1. However,a morerealistic

model mightsuppose that each downstrokecan be in one
of a variable number of states, say S/"0 (1 < i < 30,
1 < j < ni), with possibly unequal probabilities pj(i).
In this case,

Q(X1) -E((X1,

X2)iX1)

is a nonconstant random variable, with E(Q(X1))=

B(30; 13, .2), so that o12 > 0, and var(Q) = 0(n'1) (instead of 0(n-2)). Whether20 signatureswith 13 or more
downstroke agreements is excessive under Peirce's
model thus depends on the value of a12. Specifically,
since U statistics are asymptoticallynormal, we can
calculate that

if the ith and jth signaturesagree in

13 or more downstrokes
if not.
=(

JX1= x0)

is the probability,given that one signatureis in configurationx1,that anothersignaturematchesit in 13 or

moredownstrokes.
If a12 = 0, then Chebyshev'sinequalitygives

whichis highly significant.However, as noted before,

the situationis not binomial,since the 861 pairs are not
independent.To assess the discrepancymore precisely,
we note that, properlyviewed, Q is a U statistic.For let
X be a random variable denoting the "configuration"
of a randomly chosen signature,so that X1, ..., Xn
1_ - Ql < 1I96
(n = 42) are independent and identically distributed
copiesof X, and let
(var())(59
I1

X2)

2,

var[E(ik(X1,X2)1X1)J

1.0232 - .00311

X 10
X

< 1.96

+ 8O12)-

861/

> .033 .

Thus, unless the standard deviation of E(4(X1, X2) IX1)

is at least ten timesas largeas its expectedvalue (.0031),
Peirce's model is rejectedat the fivepercentsignificance
level.

[Received
March1979.RevisedOctober
1979.]
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Fairley,WilliamB., and Mosteller,Frederick(1977), Statistics
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PublishingCo.
Flynn, John T. (1941), Men of Wealth,New York: Simon &
Schuster.

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1980

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