STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

GUIDELINES IN THE CONSTRUCTION

AND
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive
to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The
transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi)

Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG)

Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI

Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG

Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI

Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon

ESG

Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00
p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply
ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.

CHUCHI

Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG

Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa

Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your
own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI

Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG

Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

ESG

Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam
ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI

Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG

Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI

Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG

Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI

Eh, di sana

ESG

Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka
dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI

Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG

Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito.
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG

Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI

Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG

Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi
ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI

Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG

Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI

Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG

Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.

Magsumbong ka. 3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized
by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May
3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged
do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a
the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. 4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of
June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic
Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise
the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200
penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently,
her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or
would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons. Thus:

xxx

xxx

xxx

Senator Taada:

That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to
be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties
and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example
civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but
perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose
there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview
of this bill or outside?

Senator Taada:

That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to
be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Taada:
That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken
without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Taada:
I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of
one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know
that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Taada:
Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors
where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the
people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Taada:
That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed
that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person
without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being
recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno:Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a
party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is
public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada:
Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not between a speaker and a public.

xxx

xxx

xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx

xxx

xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private

communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share
or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or
signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely
to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the
phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation"
and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill
quoted below
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard.
But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not
all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are
often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among
others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication
between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was
neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a
different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us
with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by GlobeMackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by
petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private
respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts
worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of
the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal
auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled
Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of
Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The
report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his
own personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its
property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin
against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence
showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It
also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner
but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her
thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3)
days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave
benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November
8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these
findings. 2

After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to
reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and
other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution
dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of
private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for
moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in
ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any
employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e
discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared
with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer
and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property
pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process
when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored
petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to
the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for
illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has
not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is
not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her
during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employments, the employer shall

not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the
Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone
further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized
groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on
Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the
priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics as
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and
Human Rights. 9

The opening paragraphs on Labor states

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law. 10 (Emphasis
supplied)

Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State
is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the
present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection,"
at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of
the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the
same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of
Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social

justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national
development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and
the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job
except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the
1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And
this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a
case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the
other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal
has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant
with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act
No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible
ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to
grant to labor "full protection."13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal,
cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job,
for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc.
from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the
period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."

Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been
forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under
the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in
view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer
be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company
would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent
purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or
inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism"
or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22

In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation
pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the
Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory
construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the
words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court
from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have
used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground

or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as
when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and
the employee.

In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he
enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere
of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity
of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the
employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an
organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in
commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose
primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to
the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32

Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey

reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by
merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already
become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that
may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to
strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to
the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that
may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of
company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any company that has
business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness
to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR),
she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create
a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems
and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of
trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we
have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who
not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and
Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy
would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably
true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee,
neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because
the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous
transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of
Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's
questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned
from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's
findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner
dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his
side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain
whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and,
thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private
respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2)
years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)
Narvasa C.J., concurs
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)
Narvasa C.J., concurs

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required
appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing
that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules
to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of
licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4,
Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash
bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It
shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding
company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance
Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation

and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with
the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to
recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of
the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety
bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety
and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under
POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds
shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine
National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer
for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that
the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the
POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with
proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond
as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party
of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall
not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award,
an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of
P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to
perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety
bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is
required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended
to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee
the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to
monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can
go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the

provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the
POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were,
to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim
of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be
enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after
satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to
the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the
POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but
against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other
obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner
observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to
more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected
by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The
overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are
intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to
whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has
posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such
redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is
that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed
in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the
same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the
POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the
mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further
protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of
labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

# Footnotes
1 Order issued by NLRC Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta, Second Division,
dated October 30, 1992.
2 "That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed." Simonds v. Walker, 100
Mass. 113; National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass. 373, 11 Am. Rep. 367.
Charitable bequests are also governed by this maxim. Kieg v. Richardson, C.C.A.
N.C., B6 F. 2d 849, 858.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by
district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative
district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of
District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A", Petition),
RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313
(Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of
par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the
position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paraaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro
Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into
districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by
district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view
that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the
May 11, 1992 elections.
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws.
However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists
that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque fall under this category so that they should
continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running for
reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paraaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. 1 He does not also allege any

legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any
cause of action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified
voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by
respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be
one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmea v. Commission on
Elections. 2
Now on the meat of the dispute.
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is
"An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing

Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof
which provides:
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan. The elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide
them into two (2) districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu,
City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall
continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act
No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of the
municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by barangay for
purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large
in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections
in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in

question.
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly in relation to par. (c),
Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring
whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque and the other municipalities of Metro Manila
enumerated therein, which are all single-district municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the
1995 regular elections.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines submitted by the
Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and
stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod
and Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment, Paraaque together with the other twelve (12) municipalities
in the Metro Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for each district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to
mean that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities in
the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992).
Petitioner says that he received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant petition
asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the
Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with
existing laws. He would include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the municipality
of Paraaque.

Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313, Resolution
No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district apportionment of the
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular elections.
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on synchronized
elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion generated by the
seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical
implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were
susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the
Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we pursue
his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out
the single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the
second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the members of their respective
sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can,
divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the
legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which
induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in
that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved

and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and they should be given such construction as will advance
the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 6 A construction should be rejected
that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which
the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the
enactment. 7
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in
part:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for the
necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the
number of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by
district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses
constituting the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to be voted
for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the Congress of
the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan
seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by the
President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the recommendation
of the Commission on Elections aforestated;
WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly Section 3 thereof,
the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors
and Election Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation, public hearings, and consensustaking with the different sectors in the community, the Project of District Apportionment of single
legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district apportionment are
as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be
based on the 1990 census of population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no

barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall be fragmented or apportioned into different
districts.
This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3
of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian
seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral
process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and
under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the singledistrict cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise single-districts, will have to continue electing at
large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular
elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to apportion the single-district
cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.

As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election under
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a),
they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already
been apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for
cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue to
be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall
likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of
the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting
1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is
the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit, the
instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was
approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation
from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed
qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of
the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The
benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an
application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2)
month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the
Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989
pleaded thus:

xxx xxx xxx

With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA
6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely
requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or
casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be
entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not
entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law
provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain
portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover,
personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic)

leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why we should not be
entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of
Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an
applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the
date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual
employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation
from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature,
this Commission shall sustain its original decision.
xxx xxx xxx 3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari,
insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular
Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or
regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683,
provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the
following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to
perform specific activities or services with a definite expected
output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated
National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be
separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity under
R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as
amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or viceversa.

d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the

enactment of this law and have received the corresponding benefits
of that retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by
mandatory separation from the service under existing civil service
laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and
employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the
availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if
acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted and
approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of
them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits
provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If
casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more
reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel
Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the
government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the
law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the
benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed
Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project,
funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position
became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular
plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived,
temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period.
The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial
assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only
for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but
reorganization 5 to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent
with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the
government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for
a short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its
personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact,
there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 6

5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and local government units.

Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called
upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an
employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can
be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of
1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated
on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of
employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the
public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows:
1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which
appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and
Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public
interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service
eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an
appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these
include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and
scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank
as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are
appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department
of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain
a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service;
and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9

The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished
within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional,
unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v.
P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a
laborer holdingemergency status with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R
& R Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide
with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976,
she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980,
she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems)
DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management &
Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee. While with this
project, her designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981;
starting 9 July 1982, the status became permanent until the completion of the project on
31 December 1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's comment lists her
status as co-terminus with the Project.

The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered coterminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the
completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil
Service Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services
for retiring officers and employees of the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all
previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to
a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a)
thereof states that services rendered oncontractual, emergency or casual status are
non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some
contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or
appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual,
emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor
shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following
conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official
records and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies
concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22,
1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are
continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, coterminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and
temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment
as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's
status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991)
characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee

(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is
characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to
his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:

a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is coexistent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the
same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is
co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is coexistent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or
termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be
deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period
of 3 years" the appointment is for a specific period and upon
expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed
co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the
security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the
security of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We
see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the
former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically excluded from
the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued
that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific
enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and
benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet
adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool,
hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and
permanent employees.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen
(15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record
cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection
clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are

substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection
clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a
class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim
of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the
doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is
thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law
develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill
in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate
legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser,
expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to
Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are
extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary
separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one
received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend
the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683
indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early
retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular,
temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of
the date of separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this Act does
not include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform
specific activities or services with definite expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the
PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence,
vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the
inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon

termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of
employment is considered expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual
personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous
service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project
employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes
employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the
benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the
bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual)
without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or
streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions
remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations
promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5
March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of
eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need not be continuous,
in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal,
contractualor co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil
Service Commission. 21 A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683
of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all
social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants" 22 After
all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and
income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a
reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after
expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on
her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must
be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for
early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 14129

July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of plaintiffappellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of
that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding a probable cause that the crime charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the
trial started upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss
holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was
filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in
People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held
that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the
reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a
justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the
Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no
classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in
any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve
public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited section was
taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil
service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace,"
the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its
operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First
instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other
words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice
of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the
peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this
jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who,
by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422).
According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated
questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all officers appointed to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even
jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above
conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907,
and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments,
however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown
later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18 of the
Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendments were made through the
passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587
has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No.
357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved.
Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666,
657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again,
during the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history
of our election law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:

No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible
during the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or
Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in
any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty
of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for
a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January
9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or
employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly
election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or
employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a
term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to
deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on
August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March 10,
1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First Instance,
justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil
service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate or violated in
any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by
exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more
than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in
all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a
period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law
provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary
of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in any election nor take
part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.

This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was
effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the
peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded
in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace"
would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion
that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not
intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as
already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records which
might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as
indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from these records
proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background of Rep. Act No.
180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section 54
inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any
province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace
since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any province"
necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that they are
municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt
that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in the prohibition?
The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers
and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee.
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace
must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has
already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were
merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices
of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee cites
authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular application
to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly

construed against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and the
jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant asserts
that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to give "fair
warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world
will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and
again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will
frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs.
Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the
policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider
the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford,
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to
deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense which best
harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3
Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes,
frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the legislative
plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915)
25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the statute
is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now
within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the
justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the
Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First Instance" and
justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used
"judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just
one class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special
courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so construe
the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities would weaken
rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in
the Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be prohibited from

electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First
Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs.
103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and
exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office
the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do
not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to
create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative or
executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No.
237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of
the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the
petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the
provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on
January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are already
expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is
that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not
prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed amendment to
Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words,
House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it
was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered to
contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the
individual members of the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376),
a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace are not
covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy
so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in partisan
politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No.
1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which
expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of "expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered
by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known
as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an
intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . .
."

The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the
purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the
exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio
unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular
persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not
so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so
including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked.
(Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside
and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON,
CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of
877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the
owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the
north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang
Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three hundred
eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to
him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that
land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa,
Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in
Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to
defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to
certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.

Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The
lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in
the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary
hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought
eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds
of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title
derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the
land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by
the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint
and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ
of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The
parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late
hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration
proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the
same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision
of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of
the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action and it might have encouraged
them to ventilate their action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles
derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July
25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the
following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil.
183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447;Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil.
612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil.
110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503,
and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA
1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents
and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova
cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the
courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again,
consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis
sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss
Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.