NAVARRO vs IAC

FACTS:
> The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His
registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan
River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down
towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east
and on the west.
> The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land.
Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
> Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of
foreshore land having an area of approximately 17 hectares.
> Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a
fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering 25 hectares of foreshore land.
Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the
property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of
Fisheries, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of 7 hectares of the
property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
> Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, and
claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
> During the pendency of the land registration case, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for
ejectment against Emiliano Navarro.
> The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to RTC.
> Court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being
a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.
> The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court. CA reversed the
findings of the court a quo and granted the petition for registration of the subject property.

The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the
riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically
registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, is
misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila
Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of
the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on their
land.
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own
tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own land
lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now
the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be
attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should
have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners'
own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.
Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited
on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila
Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of
body of water the Manila Bay is.

The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank not on a river bank, Manila
Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is,
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain .

ISSUE:

Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on accretion
is to be applied in multifarious situations.

Whether or not the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense
that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as
foreshore land?

Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which, by the mandate of Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.

RULING:
We find no merit in the petition. The disputed property was brought forth by both the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore
land by the action of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the
palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites : (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river;
and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the
soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank ; the owner of such estate is
called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners,
the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature of the
disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all
legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein
disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the
national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any
private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent
authority." Only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the
power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer
necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries
or for coast guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates
adjacent thereto.

AGUSTIN vs IAC
FACTS:

> The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on
the east in the province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony, Geodetic
Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by
the Tuguegarao Cadastre. An OCT wasissued for land east of the Cagayan River
owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin.
> As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt
on the western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
> All lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these
occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents.
> Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre
on its eastern bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's lot
depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the
western bank.
> After a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed,
and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the
spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the
eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the
river.
> While the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots
located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by
the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own
and drove away the private respondents from the premises.
> Private respondents filed a complaint to recover the land.
> Trial court rendered the decision for them to vacate the land.
> Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that the land in question had
become part of private respondents' estate as a result of accretion?
RULING:
NO. The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the
lots of the private respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions
even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of
course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court.

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of a river. All these requisites of accretion are present in this
case.
The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan
River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was
gradual and imperceptible.
These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial
deposits were made. The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on
streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the
waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of
easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners
thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost
upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968
or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said
accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the
New Civil Code apply to this situation.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent
segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and
transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided
that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches,
leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land
retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current.
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result
of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private
respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." The private
respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred
by avulsion to the other side of the river.