GERMAN PLANS FOR THE INVASION OF ENGLANDGERMAN PLANS for the INVASION OF ENGLAND 4.940 (Operation "SEALION")(i) GHRWAN PLANS FOR Tr OPERATION "Si#ALTON" The following account of the German Nav; part in the planning and preparation for the invasion ©: England has been produced by the German historian ssmann. his first work of research on a cr: al phage of the war is based on the extensive German documents in the custody of the Admiralty, of which only those throwing light on contemporary German naval policy have been used. DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE Note: any further information on this subject, that my be necessary for official historical purposes, can \ obtained on application to. Naval Intelligence Division (Section 24)! Admiralty, $.W.4. Ns1.D.2u/G.H.8. /1 February 1947. (Distribution Overieaf }w40Q00G00 (44) DISTRIBUTION First Lord First See Lord V.C.N.S. A.C.N8. Controller, Foreign Office Forcigen Office G.O.B. (coma. Birley) D.M.I. War Office (6) Vex Office, Historionl Section, 4.0.4.5, (1), Air Ministry (6). A.O.G. inc, Bomber Co ‘mond, air Historion] Bronch Capt. Devar) (Air Ministry) (2) Cay. Norfolk) Seerets RE. Staff College, Greenwich (2). Beexc ta ee eee Inpurisl Defence College (2) Scerctary, Joint Services Stefr, College (2). in in in D.N.I. and T. ottawa (2) ain D.S.I, Melbourne (2 in D.W.I. Yellington (2 avy Departme, 0)(444) CONTENTS Chapter Page ae The Origin of the Plan ..cvesseerevecveed it. Operational Preparations... ecseeer e+ 20lO A. Naval Stafy's Appreciation of the 19th July igho. 10 B. Discussion between the Chiefs of the Armed Forces and the Fihrer on 21st duly, 1940......14 C. The Military Requirements of the High Command of the amy and the Attitude of the Naval rerio cceni cen aenus alrite stele D. Crossing on a Nerrow or Broad Bront? seseseeeee Deneve eee eae BE. appreciction of Enemy Situation...,.31 F. Divevsionary Measurcs plamed by the Naval Staffe.eeee cess eee eee bd III. . The Carrying Out of the Neve! Preparations seep e eee He IV, 447 Operations in Relation to the Plenning of "SEALION"....+e+se000051 V. "The Days of Decision.....ceesveeeeeee ye 162 VI. Summery and Conclusions... eae +70 Note: This Cheptor epitomizes the story, ond should suffice for the rerder requiring only the broad outline, It hag references to the more deteiled peragraphs of the earlier Chapters, sera RT EREINS!...-oea INDEX to Paragraph Numbers.. +831) 2) 3) 4) 5} 6). 7) 3) (ay) SOURCES USED The War Diaries of the Nevel starr A} - November 1939 Alo’ ~ June 1940 4d - July 1940 412 = August 1940 ai3 ~ September 1940 epavn The War Diery of the Navel Staff Part (¢) VIT 1940 The verbel reports by 0. in S, of the Navy to Hitler. “geclion" files of the Navel tat’, (Newel War Dicry, Part BV). files for "Sealion" I,5 Informetion about the Enemy. " " 7 7 " I,1l operetionel intents of the Naval Groups, of Admiral Commanding. Subma : and of vb waved Gortnent in the Wass: : a vay as I,12 Progress of Prepatra i i a i if I,13 Memorandua py ¢, in of army, Attitude of Novel Staff eto. Fales I,1 Diyeotivee by the Supreme Co.mond of the Armed Forees. Personel notetions by the suthor from various reliable sources,FHQ OEM Ob.a.N. Sic L/SkL Ob.a.H. OKH Ob.a.L. Chet /oxd 0/8k1, Fihrerhauptquartier = Hitler's Headquarters Oberkomando der wehrmacht = Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Oborkomando der = Naval High Command criegenarine Gberbefchlshaver der = C, in C. of the Navy Eviogsmerine (Grand Admivel Racder) Seekrivgsloitung = Navel war Staff Erato = Operations- = Operations Division of abtciluag der tho Navel War Staff Seokriogsloitung (Head: Reer Agwiral Fricke) Oberbefcnlshaver des = C, in C. of the Heeres. (Piola Marshal von Brauchitsoh) Oberkommndo des Meeres Aymy High Command Aberbefchlshaber der C. in ©, of the Luttwette Luftweffo (Reichemarshell Gbring) Chef Gos Oberkomnandos = Chief of the supreme dor % Command of the armed (Picla Ma: Keitel) Forees. Chef dos Stcbos der Chicf of Staff of Navel Seckzicgslcitung Wer Staff (Adi vel Schniewind) Kriegstacebuch = oe Diary Operntionstce = D-Dey for Operation "Scelowen™ "Scnlion" Befehlshrter der U-Boots= Flag officer Commending (aami zal Dénitz) “Boats. Scebsfcnlshaber Ves Navel Comaonder West (Plottenchef) (C. in GC. Flest) (Vice Adsirel Litt jons) Wes ac of office-holdcrs in 1940,WZ ORIGIN OF 1) The initiation of a plen for a lending in Engicnd exme from the C, in G. of the Navy, As soon as ho knew in the Autumn of 1939 of the Pihrer's intention to leunch an offensive in the est, he ordorcd the Nevel Stef? to invostigete the possibilities of mm invasion of England. He stertod with tho supposition thet in tho ovent of a sucecssful outcome of the offensive, the Bolginn ond French Chennel const would become occupied by the Germans, and the Navy would possibly be confronted at short notice with tho task of lending the Gormen Army on the English South Gorst, Within the Noval stoff a specicl staff was formod to concentrate on working out details of militery, nevel end technics] shipping probloas, This properctorp planning occupicd tho Gormen Navel Staff, ¢nd nobody ¢lsc hed knowlcdgo 7f it cxeopt the personnel spociclly detailed f:r tho purpose. Wo Germen organisation had concerned itsclf previously with cny dcliberctions or properetory thoughts on the possibility of em invesion of Englend. In the preliminery considerctions by the Nevel Stef¥ it wes osteblished thet . mejor londing of troops in England involved nume yous militery and nevel conditions, of which the most importmnt was the complete destruction of the cnomy's air power as well cs the ennihiletion or xomovel of any cnemy forecs which could threcten the creaof nporecth of the lending forecr. 2) 4s 0 vesult of these preliminary reflections of the Neval Staff tho CG, in O. of the Navy first spoke to 1940, on the possivility of on the Fihrer on 25th M invasion of England. The Fuhrer ct first, however, took no further action on this proposal as he “fully apprecicted the exceptional difficulties of such en underteking". (Note: Words cnd sentences in inverted commas are textucl extracts from war disrics end other documents). Honee no >re2¢ ctory work resulted, ct thie stagé, in the Supreme Comaend of the Armed Forces. On the 20th June the C, in 0. of the Nevy cgcin reported to tho Plhrer on this question, cand he emphasised thet absolute cis superiority was nn essonticl prerequisite for ea xying out the operation, It is iaportent to offirm thet Grand Admirel Reeder did not .ke these two reports to Hitler with the intention of soposing the invasion or propegnting the iden, His wish was moinly to discugs the wnole guestion in good time, go as to avoid the consequences which might result from 2 hasty Geoision by Hitler, which might lend to the Navy being confronted by an insoluble problem cs regards matorinl proparntions. On the 20th June no discussion had yet taken plree in the Puhror's Hocdquertora as to whether tho invasion should ve propered. Neither had the Gonernl steff of the-3- Army occupied itself ct this time with the quostion of © landing in England, as it-"considered the enrrying out iapogsible” ond wes therefore ndverse to the speration, 3) However, in the lest days of Juno - after the terminction of the campaign in France, and rather Inte in the socson - the suggestion of the C, in C, of the Nevy wes teken up by the Supreme Command, who, on the and July, issued the first directive for the operation. It contrincd the following:- the Fithrer hns decided thet under cortain conditions - most important of which is the achievement of six superiority - » landing in Bnglend mey trke plece. The dite is still undecided, Preparations are to bo commenccd as soon os possible. At prosont, it isc quostion of thoorctie=l preparations for the possible event. 4) ‘The supreme Cozi d required dete for planning as follows :- Army: Estimato of strength of the British Army for the next few months. b) Appreciation of the operstionel use of artillery fron tho meinlead se edditioncl protcotion for aosombly of shipping space and of transport: (in co-operation with the Nevy)> tea ©) Appreciation of the p:ssibility -f lending strong forees (25 to 40 divisions) and A. Units, . b) Approcietion as to the moat suiteble sec ares, a the resources that would be required to tyensport troops and sunplics, and the ose rt forcos nocded.ae Was to take place on ¢ brorad front in order to Pacilitate the pengtration by the Army. ec) Neture cné extent of the available shipping spece, ond time required for getting it ready, approciction ss to whether and when decisive riz superiority enn be echieved. b) Possibility of supporting the crossing by mecns of cir-borne landings. On the 9th July the Navel Stcff requested the army ond the Luftweffo to s ‘Ae theiy operational intentions, which would form 2 basis for Navel pregerctions. The Ne cl Staff omphasiscd thet "the undertnking must be vegerded essentially cs one of transportation". Phe Nevel Stoff considered the area "in the English Channel petween 1930" Bast _and 1°30" West as the most ssing." 5) For the artillery sovor of the oneration from the Continent the Supreme Comacnd required the establishment 2f powerful battcrica in the cerca Colais- Cape Griz Nez - Boulogne, to provide protective fire for the tyensports and for the flanks of the landing front, This demand caused the Head of the ievel Oxdnence Department to warn thet it would not be possible antericlly to support the lending with the few hoavr suns thet would be aveileble for such Io ¢ renge requircnents, But the Fuhrer ordered the rapid construction cf gun amplacements on the Channel Coast; covering fixe was to be used capeciclly on the flanks,-5- 4) On the llth July, the Cc. in O.-of tho Navy expressed his view to the Fuhrer that he regarded the landing only ee on Ultimate resort in order to mcke Bnglend recdy to sue for ponco, He wes convinced thet even Without o lending England could be subdued by berzing her sec. supplics, by U-bent attecks and cir attecks on her convoys, end by mn intensive cir war ageinst hex centres of industry, Ho onumerated the grext aifficulties md risks involved in the proparction end execution of the lending operation, ond "ernnot © himself cdvoecte the lending", The Fuher olso rogarded the operntion only as © “last resort," before whieh cir suprcaney must first be attained, 7) on the 15th duly, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forees inforaed the Navel Staff thot the Fuhrer would require the operetion to be so prepnred that it sould be launched ony time from the 15th August. Thue the situntion which the C. in G. of the Navy in his evnversotions with Hitler in Mey ond Juno hed striven to avoid had become a reality; newcly thet the operetion might be ordered nt such short notice that it would be impsssitle in the tine dlablo ta onrry out antic the nocessary anteriol properctiona for the mt tesk. 8) Should the question bo raised why the German Armed Porces dia not attempt the invasion in the early summer of 1940, immediately after the capture of Dunkirk, when the South Ca vet of England was still open and unprotectcd ageinst German citcck, the onswer lies in the circumstanccsof the Nevrl gituction at that time. It is not possible jaerely to "swim sver" t> England, The wholo of the shipping speeo, stommers, barges; tugs, trawlers end moter bocts necessary for the crsssing, including even sacll fishing boats, which hed t+ susplement the inadequate number of wotor vessels, hed to be requisitioned immedintely ft Goron ports end en inlend weter weys; they had to be cauipyed for their snooial tack, cnd then moved to the Pronco-Belgion const end assembled ot the omborkatim ports. These ports, whose facilities had been partly ds ged, had to be propared for the Jsading; tho ser areas to he used for the ernssing hed | to be ewoxt for mines ond minefields had to be lela fer | protection of the aree 2f the crossing. Finelly the | whole vast scchinery, including the esvering forces, | had to bo trained snd co-ordinated to the sanlest detedl. 9) at this stege tho Nat Steff comacnted follcws on the Fuhrer's requiremonts: The extent of the properctions, the nlready apporent difficulties, and the exceptional repereussion «n German industry end on the whole traffic system were 59 extensive in their effect, that the Nevel Steff must avoid oll precipitct action, and must equelly reacin free to form its wn decision, its om cpimion os to the eventunl feasibility of the operation, The exceptional nature of the »perntion required the concentration of all tho resvurees of the Navy on this task. dnd yot, in the view of the c. inc.of the Navy the course of the wer so for hed shown that “operations and landings which had previously seesed Lapcssible were now feasible, thinks to the superior leadership and to ‘the exeeytionsl rorcl end offensive power of the ixmed Ferces". 10) _ The Direetive by the Supreme Comaend dated 16th July, which followed the telephone inf’ raation of the 15th, contained the decision of the Filhrer to prepare and evenuteliy carry out the lending in Bnglond in the fora of a surprise crossing on a broad front "approximctely from Reasaste to . point west of the Isle of Wight". The Dircetive required the >voparctions to be completed vy the middle of August. The Directive specified the following casenticl conditions ns neccssary dofore starting the operation: defert of the English Air Foree, crcnting mine-frece routes, strong protection of the flanks *f the crossing aren by monne of minefields, doninetion of the Coastal ares. by stgans of constal artillery, pinning down of the British tat .1 Forees ond prelininery wenkoning of these. i) the undertaking was given the code nome "SBALION". ho navel Steff regerded the stipulation that the cr:ssing should take place on c breed front between Renegrte end the Islé of Wight es an alterction to the previous plan, involving surious consequences . The question "brond or nryrow frent" was later to lead ta-~-8- fundamentel differences of yinion cnd tiresome discussions between the Navel Steff and the High Comunnd of the army, and vould eventually have to be solved by teens. of a enpronise Beenuse of their grest signifiernce these differences will be referred to Utter (Sco Chapter IT D). 12) In @ discussion between the Comacniers Commen end the attitude of the Nava: git The Navel gteff, after studying tne Puhrer's Directive of the 16th July, mde the following entry, ed 20th July: “The Generel Staff of the army hes given its intentions for carrying out the oeration, es foll-ws: rbout 100,000 men with approprinte equipment, ineluding hervy fear, must be tyonsported in the Piret a the cycs Dunkirk-Cherbourg to the area between Ramsgate and Lyme Bey, Further waves aust follow in quickcst succession, so thet the forantion of a lseel bridgeherd any bc awed in ty wrtest tine br a wer of 101 enent on the Island. vhis de, nds the most repid turn round of trensports fter disemberketion of the fivet ecnclon," The regvirenents of the Aray High Commend resulted in the following Transport Orgenisation, datéd 25th guy: Any Reguir: agnts for the First 4bout 90,000 mon with aprroprinte wer equipment, 650 tenks, 4,500 Horses; for this purpose the following cre necessar. For jrec Ostend-Zoul ogn about 550 barges, 185 tugs, 370 motorboats. re - Cherbourg 4bout 45 ships, 90 baxges, 30 te 38, 180 notorboata. In addition, the Luftwaffe, to seet the demands* epout 52 5 - 1a SUSf the Generel Steff, requires the-transportation of . batteries in the first wave. According to present crlevlations of the Navel Steff, this additional require-cnt can only be met to the extent of 30 ver cent, beceuse of the Leck of shi; end harbour facilitics. the trensportetion of the first wave, including 30 vor cent of the i.i. batteries, alone involves 100 per cent utilization of the available ports of embarkation. In the accond wave the army High Commend requires the trensportation of 160,000 men with equipment. The shipping spsee for this purpose nacunts to 2,000,000 tons. This is not availble, neither could it be ecconmodeted in the ares of enbarkation. A simultencous transportetion of the second wave is therefore not possible; indeed, it is necessary to spread this wave over 4 or 5 echelons xt intervels of 2 days,. The shipping spece for :the second wove, (including snother one third of the wane batteries) has to accomaodate 2 total of cbout 170,000 sen, 57,500 horses, 34,200 vehicles - end for this purpose the following are necded: 760 trensport bs: 187 tugs 574 motorboats 100 transports of kL0,000 G.R.T. s The ebove will be reinforced by the 45 trancparts of the first wave as scon os their first trensportation task bse been completed. The totel requirement of shipping space for operetién "SEALION is celeuleted by the Navel Staff on-1g- the basis of the preceding dats, with - 10 per cent nergin, asim 1,722 borges 471 tuga 1,161 notorborts 155 trensports The Uewel Steff co mented thet the whole of the trensportetion of cll the wrves must be exrried out with this totel shioping, ‘We shall see letcr to whet extent the cvailebility of shivping space cctuclly corresponded to the chove estimnto, 25) On the 29th July the New:l Steff sumacrised the army Generel f's roquirescnts as follows:- a) The army requires thé transportation of 15 landing divisions (about 260,000 men). In view of their anticipeted tasks, the Army High Comnand. vegards this o6 the miniaum number, fron which no departure ann be permitted, even if there are difficulties in transportction. This is « considercble reduction compared with the original reguirenent of the Finror (on 21st July) of 4o divisions, (See paragreph 20), b) These 13 divisions must attack the English const on the widest front (froa Romsgate to Lyme Bay); which meens that they must leave the French coast as far as possible simultaneously, and on the widest front. ce} The landing divisions must be ready for operations in England within the shortest time, that is, within 2 to 3 days, A period of 10 dayseG a for the trenszortction as provided by the tinetable ror the second wave, is inaccepteble to the Army. da) @he landing divisions must include sufficient heavy artillery, (for own use and for setting up along the English coast) and A.A. batteries | (for A.A. protection and for anti-tank defence). e) The Army General Staff requires the landing to take place at dawn, 26) On the 30th July the Naval Staff, reviewing the cuvrent state of naval preparations and the probable future rate of progress, concluded that operation "SEALION* could not be carried out before the 15th September; by which time, cecording to the Fuhror's view (seo paragraph 20}, the main operation should already have been completed because of the bad weather to be expected in the latter nalf of the month, 27) The attitude of the Naval Staif towards all these military requirements and to the problems of weather, tides, transyort and enemy action found expression in a comprehensive Memorandua which can be summarised as follows:- 1) For nevigotions1 reasons the optinu: period for the landing is two hours before High Water. For military reasons ~ as required by the army High Comaand the landing must take place at dawn. Thus the crossing of the Channel ana the approach to the coast must occur mainly during darkness, and with the aass of transport-a- craft, which exe difficult to move and nenocuvre, o certsin eaount of light (half-moon) is desirable. he fulfilment of these three requirements limits the period to a few days in any month, Moreover, a landing on the enemy coast is only possible with a strength of sen up to 2. 2) The first suitable period, after completion of cll preparations, falls at the ond of ao omber, that is, at a tine when long spells of fine weather can no longer be expected. 3) yen if the transportation of the first weve should succeed through particularly favourcble weether, the tis tcble transfer of the further waves ecnnot be guaranteed, owing to the large intervels in the schedules for the further shipping. 4) Full omsiderstion ust be given to the onemy's Fleet te his other means of defence at sca. In view of the weakness of our own neval forces, the enemy's ponetretion into the aren of trensports cannot be effectively prevented, because of the size of the crossing area, and in site of the flenking minefields and our ow sir superiority. 5) With the aveileble shipping space the mininwa intcrvel between the firet and second weves will'be 48 hours, The transportetion of the second weve will finish 8 = 10 days later, at the enrlicst.6) For reasons given above the Operations Divi of the Naval Staff felt that it must recomnend the postponement of the operation until next year, but proposed continuation of the preparations in case the mrestrictea air war, together with the naval measures, should cause 2 enemy to negotinte with the Fuhrer on the latter's own terms. If this should not materialise, the guestion of invasion would again arise in May 1941. 28) The Navel Staff Memorandum received the full concurrence of thé Commonder-in-Chief of the Navy, and on the basis of the foregoing deliberetions he rejected @ landing on a broad front, as offering no prospect of success, He considered that in certain circumstances NgRALION" could be cayvied out, but only if the transport operation were confined to « ncrrow front in the narrowest part of the Channel. 29) On the 31st July tho Comander-in-Chief of the Navy spoke to the Fuhrer in the sense of the above ménorandum end reported to him that the earliest date for comenconent wes the 15th September, The following were present ct this meetings Chic? of staf? of the Supreme Comand of the Armed Forces, Comonder~im-Chief of the arny, Colonel-Genercl Hnlder (Chief of Staff of” the Army), and Generel Jodl (Chief of the Operrtioncl Steff of the Armed Forces), The Fuhrer fully realised the difficulties~ 23 = enunernted by the Commaunder~in-Chief of the Navy, and agreed that 15th Septesber should be anticipated as the earliest colimencing dete, A definite decision would be reached cfter the Luftwaffe hed made en intensified eight-dey atteck on Southern England, If the Luttwarfe fniled to achieve considerable destruction of the opposing sir forces, herbours end navel forces, then it would be o exse of postponing the cperntion until middle of May, 1941. ©. 30) D. Crogsing on a narrow or c As expleined in Chapter I, paragraph 4, front? the anewer of the Neval Staff to the Supreme Commend'e question chant the most suitcble aren for e sefe, but prond crossing was as folloWst- the aren in the English Ghonnel between 1°30" Bast, and 1°30' West. This corresponds on the English coast to points between North Foreland and the western end of the Isle of Wight. This onswer largely met the desire of the Supreme Commend to land on a broad front, But obviously the Nevel gteff did not intend this definition to mecn that the landing fleet should cceupy the wnole width of the ar but only that within these limits the lending should occur at es place still to be determined, When by the Directive of the Supreme Command, dated 16th duly, the Army General Steff required a londing on 2 broad frent from Ramsgate to Lyme Bay, the Navel Staff wes confronted with on entirely new situation, which ineidentclly extended the originel= he aren by 60 miles to thy west, '"Wherces 20 far the crossing wae exnected only in the anrrow part between Btoples-Hastings ond Celais~peal,. the western transport youte had now been extended to the line Cherbourg-Lyme Bay. This involved the use of larger end faster ships for trensportation. At thia time there was no navel comment on the possibility of transportation on such a wide front, This comment occurred only on the 30th suly, after the army Generel Staff hea sent its precise requirements to the Novy, in which Ransgate to Lyme Bay were given, (See Pern, 32). The Commender-in-Chief of the Navy, agreeing with his steff, rejected the lending on & broad front, and on the foliowing dey reported to the Fuhrer thet the only possibility was the narrow front in the norrowest pert of the Ghennel. Only there could the Navy safeguard the oxossing ageinst enemy ection. Evidently the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy left this discussion, et’which the Navy's difficulties had been fully epprecicted by the Fuhrer, with the conviction that the Intter would decide ‘accordingly. For on the following day the Novel Staff ordered that ell ourrent preparations should be switched to the nrea on both sides of the Strcits of Dover, since the crossing aren was now to be between Staples-Beachy Head and Dunkirk- Deal. 31) A memorendum from the Neval Steff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army stated clearly thet the= 25 - transportation of troops gould only be guaranteed in the area of the Straits of Dover, and thet in thia narrow area a constant stream of shipping was considered possible. It is cortain that the Conmander-in-Chief of the Navy, in view of his talk with the Fuhrer, nad expected the latter to order the crossing on the narrow front. But this did not materialise, Indeed, already on the lst August, on the day after the discussion, the Flhrer decided - evidently under the influence of the denend from the Commander-in-chier of the army - that preparations for a broad front were to be continued, A discussion between the Commanders— in-Chief of the Army end Navy on 5th August resulted in no agreement, The Army had newly introduced a requirement for the landing of 1 to 1 Divisions by air in Lyme Bay for the purpose of occupying a harbour for use by further transports. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy thought that the Army Commander-in-Chief was unconvineed of the difficulties in carrying out © landing onc brond front, In further discussions between the two Staffs an effort would be made to eliminate these serious divergencies, 32) On the 7th August - late indeed - the first verbal discussion took place between the Ohief of the Army General Staff, Colonel-General Helder, and the niet of the Naval Stafi’, Admiral Schniewind, There was a strong clash of opinions between the two. The _ Chief of the army Staff said that limitation of thei areo of tkeneportetion to the Straits af Dover was uriacceptable, According to the General Staff it was essential to land in the West with powerful army forees, at least four Divisions in the Brighton area, - in order to be able to attack on the flanks. from. there, The nature of the terrain there would seem to. offer prosgecta of ¢ rexid advence in cn ecsterly direction, Om the other hand, the hinterland in the area Dover - Folkestone was extreuely msuitable for a frontal atteck; here too, relieving cttcoks on the flenk woulda pe required, Hence the Generel Steff attached the greatest importance also to simultaneous Landings in the arer Denl-Ramsgete. The General Staff alse required that at least 10 divisions be lended within four d in. the General cron between Ramsgate and Brighton. Only in the abdve ciyounstrnces could the first target be achieved, which would lend to the success of the final operntioncl objective, viz., the line from the mouth of the Thanes to Southampton, During the discussion Golonel~General Helder dvastierlly strted: "I utterly reject the Navy's proposel; from the point of view of the Army T regara their proposal as complete duicide. I might just as well put the troops thet heve been londed stright through the anuseye machines" Therewgon the Neval Steff pronounced that for similar recsons it must reject landing on 2 broad front; that it must regard the brond front not only as suicidal, but as a scerifice of the troons on their way to lend. * “The limitetion to Brighton Boy could beregerded cs a rapprochement by the General Steff to the point of view of the Neval staff, but the latter thought Brighton ae difficult es Lyme Bay in regard to weather, enemy interference, and unloading of stores. Hence the Neval Steff rejected this proposal clso, while the Army Staff regarded the narrow landing as an irresponsible measure, both tecticelly end operationclly. The Generel Steff maintained its demand for a dawn lending, clthough the Naval Staff agein strongly emphasised the difficulties ond military disadventages of trenssortation by night. The Aray staf counted on the possibility of tactiesi surprise, which the Navy regarded as out of the question. 33) ‘The Novel Steff reised « further objection to the brond front Innding, in thet there would be a dig difference ia the tines of high woter (3 to 5% hours) between the western Innding aren end Dover, Hither the unfevourcble tide aust be accented, or simultaneous landings «ust be renounced, A further ergument by the Naval Steff against the western Innding was thet “Naval Forces, and also the large contingents of the Army, would be exposed to heevy losses which might jeoperdise not only the western lending, but also the success of the whole enterprise." This donger was considered cll the grecter since the ettenuntion of trensports towards the west would greatly weaken the main area of trensportation, which might result in failure at this decisive point. ean Ataeda 3k) In a Generel. Staff memcrandum to the Supreme Command dated 10th August, it wes agein maintained for operntionsl reasens, thet simultcneous Inadinge at and to the weat of Brighton were necessary, For similar veasons abandonment of the landing in Lyme Bey was viewed with the greatest reluctance, 35) i£ferences of opinion existed also between the Army and the Air Force. The Commander-in-Chiet of the’ Air Force wished to use paratroopa and airborne troons only after the esteblishment of the bridgehead, while the army General Staff wanted the employment of paratroops during the gaining of the bridgehead, 36) when addressing the Flihrer on the 13th August, the Conmander-in-Cnie? of the Nevy asked for an early decision in the question of the width of front. In discussions at the Fuhrer's Headquarters on the following day the Chief of the Operations Division of the Navy made proposals to General Jodl, and these, 29 will appear later, clenred the way for the compromise which led to the Buhrer's final decision, They were:- 1) Basic restriction of the operation to a narrow front, but initiation of preparatory weasures for a wide front, 2) Renuncintion of the Army's demand for lending major forces at Brighton, since subsequent reinfor rents of troopa and supplies would not be possible in this sector, 37) Generel Jodl cgreed &e'priyaiple, and ovidently~ 29 - using these »ropossls 8 a basis the Supreme Command on 16th Auguat issued ¢ Directive on the following lines: Mein crossing to be on narrow font, sigulteneous landing of four to five thousend troops at Brighton by motor-bocts and the same number of cirborne troops at - Decl-Remegete. In addition on D-1 day the German Air Force wes to meke o strong attack on London, which would cause the populntion to flee the city snd block the rocds. Accordingly, the Nevel Steff on the 20th August, ordered the Nevrl Command West to acke prepnretions for the transportation of troops to the Brighton aren, dut only in so for cs would cllow for & single crossing of a strong contingent of troops for diversionary purposes. The Naval starf defined “aq strong contingent" as a powerful assault mit without heavy arms or Heavy equipsent, which wns to be ferried to the Brighton cren by the motor borts ond motor seiling vessels lying at Le Howre; while the reinforcements, heavy equipment end supplies for this contingent were to be transported on the left wing of the mein crossing aren. (Benthy Herd) and sfter lending, were to be sent on by road. Only if the situntion developed perticulerly favourably in relation to the enemy were these supplies to follow the motor boet flotilles by direct pec route, ‘In the mein crossing aren the Navel Steff hoped, if wenther were. good, to lendvoth echelons of six divisions ecch within six deys py continuous traffic in the coastel sector Beachy Hoad- Dover. 38) On the 21st August the Supreme Command concurred with the above intentions of the Naval Steff for the transportation from Le Havre. F A discussion with the Head of the Operations Division of the Generel Staff showed however that no agreement existed as yet in vegard to the movement of transports between Le Havre and Brighton, The General Staff rejected the interpretation of the Naval Staff, but rogerding the Brighton Landing not .6 a mere raid, wanted to have a whole army transported there, including heavy equipment, which had already been collected in the ayea of Le Havre; instead of the 25 steamers to be provided there, the army General Staff wented 70 steamers which were to be routed either direct, oy through the min transport area via the Dover Straits, and thence along the English coast to Brighton, : 39) The Naval Staff rejected this demand, but after further investigation tried to reconcile the General Staff by suggesting to, them and to the Supreme Command on the 23rd Auguat that 50 steamers should be loaded and despatched from Le Kevre; half of these would follow imediately behind the motor-bonts - if there were no enemy opposition - while the remainder would be sont by the main crossing route ‘and then on to Brighton. put the Commander-in-Chief of the army rejectedthis wromise ‘leo end proposed to xcport neeordingly te Fuhrer, By this time the Supreme Command had associatod itself with the view of the Navel Staff, who therefore enticipated the Fuhrer's approvel of their latust proposal. yo) Actually the Fuhrer, in the Supreme Command Directive dated 27th August, decided thet “the army operations mast ellow for the facts regerding aveileble ship.ing aprac ond security of the crossing end disenbsrk: tion." Accordingly, should the enemy situction be Zevour:ble, 25 transports in a aingle Joumoy, in conzeny with motor bonts, vere to proceed direct to the lonGing crc: at Brighton, while the re: ining 25 steamers were to sroceed via Boulogne-Beachy Head aftcr the cnemy coast had been occupied, and were to endeavour to make contact with the wits already landed at Brighton, This compromise solution which did not fully meet the operrtionrl necds of the Army, and probably lessened the prospects of the lending’ forces, wes unavoidable, havinr vogard to the tronsport situation. The Naval Staff believed that a decision in favour of the army's yequireuents would have involved risk of fnilure for the whole enterprise. 11) E. Intelligence of the Enemy "Following on the Pilhrer'’s decision of 27th August, which clearly defined the crossing-nren in the Channel, a decision could be recched aa to which individual sectors of the const were to be used for the=32- lending. Pactors governing their selections wera, firstly, the geographical features of the coast and the hinterlond, end secondly, the available intelligence on the enemy's local defence easures and operational intentions. The coast on both sides of Deal was rejected by the Naval Starr as unsuitable for landings, because for navigational reasons the approaching lending fleet would have to hug the coast throach the Downs; and this appeared to be feasible only if enemy opposition from the coast was no longer to be expected. after the Flnrer's decision of 27th august a landing in this area was ruled out, although it would have materially improved the militery conditions for landing. Froa South Foreland to Folkestone the coast consists of steeply descending chalk cliffs, which would present difficulties for a lending. Not until west of Folkestone does the high ground recede and the foreshore beeones low-lying w> to well beyond Dungeness. Between Folestone and Dungeness the coast forms a wide bay sheltered ageinst westerly winds, vith e flat beach, shelving gently. The approach to the bay from the irench coast is hindered by the banks in the line of epproseh, viz., the Varne and the Ridge, which cen be crossed at high water; but’ continuous shiy;ing would heve to prec round thea, The coastal sector 14 miles long, from west of Folkestone to Dungeness, was selected by the Naval Staff as landing area 5, and was allocated to the landing~The Fleet that was to scil from Rotherdam, Ostend and Dunkirk, 4 landing area A, presumably the area Deal-aoisgute, was no longer mentioned at thig jun cure; since the ylen to @ there was dtopued at en carly The coast between Dungeness and Cliff's ind is als low and here forms Rye Bay, where depths increase very slowly. West of Cliff's Bnd as far s8 Hastings there is no possibility of landing, as the cocut is atec) cad rocks and reefs are found off shofe, with anny roeks clso on the flct beech, the jength of coast between Dungeness ond Cliff's una, 1 alles long, was allocated, as landing area 0, to the transports which were assembled at Calais, The coast line between Bexhill and Beachy Hecd, ebout 11 «iles long, 1s alco low, with a flat beceh; but off shore there are - number of reefs end rock llows, which restrict the area suitable for landing, to cbout 7 miles. This was designated Landi. f free D, ind sllocated to the transports that Would scil from Boulogne, In the sector between Beachy Head and brighton, the chain of hills of the South Downs comes right up to the const. From the beach access to the heights of the chalk cliffs is >oasible only at a S (Birling Gap and Crowlink), snd even here itis difficult. west of brighton the hills of the South Downs gradusily recede ond the eoast line= 3h ~., consists of Low Land with » wide bese, which drics extensively.’ In spite of the favourable conditions for approceh, the Navel Staff considered a major landing vetween Beachy Head end Brighton impossible, because of the steep foreshore, the roeky beach and the obstacles thet lie off shore in severe) places. on the other hand the coastal sector from Brighton — to Selsey Bill appears suited for « lending in epite of some sandbenks off shore, since the lend ia low lying, and at Byighton end Worthing the beach is sendy, while west of Worthing io a brond bank, end there is © good shingle beech from Pagham to Selsey Bill. This stretch of coset, 2l ailes long, formed landing aren B, to be used by the forees frou Le Havre. 42) It wee the task of the High Comannd of the army to pronounce on the conditions of terrain of the hinter- lend end the consequent possibilitioa of overetions. On this subject the memo: nder-in= andum submitted by the Com Chief of the Army to the Supreme Comuand on the loth August contrined cxhaustive informution, md indicated what counter action by the British defences the General Staff nnticipsted on the basis of the intelligence that was available. The following is a quotation: “(n) A lending on the English coast only within the limits of Folkestone to Zastbourne is not acceptuble, In this sector we must already reckon with a fully prepsred cogstal defence, consisting of sbout four Divisions, cpart from the personnel of the coastel fortifiertions. In the neighbouringaot postal sscton, Kengete-tolkestone, there are presumed to be two further Divisions, between Eastbourne and Portsmouth two ore, If these ere not themselves attacked, they can at least, with theiy. reseyveg, cone to the ssSistanve of the Polkestone-Eastvourne sector. Behind these forces the British Command is sure to have availeble between London and Salisbury at leaat five operational Divisions, of which one is Anmoured;-in case of necessity there will be available one further division at Chatham, and one in Londen, Thus the landing troops, which, becéuce of the incaleuleble nature of the crossing and of the Isnding, will lack cohesion, vill fece nuseria:1 superiority which evn only be ated by the sinultanesus landings on’ aa wide. fy t es possible, Compensatory action by operational use cf the Luftwaffe is restricted because of ite task over the sea; there is clso the well-~knom difficulty of sccnming the lendscage from the cin, which limits effective. sstion in support. The torrein in this relatively narrow sector is exceptionally unfavoureble for oll arms, particularly for overating high speed units, The aclient ake between Dungeness ond the Militery Canal as well cs the cosetal sector between Bexhill and Eestbournc are marahicnd, veined by numerous wetervays ~ 1idecl for the- 36 - eneny'a defence, but impossible for operation vy our tanks. Commanding heights surround the whole landing front in « semi-circle and provide the English with natural defence position. Only if particularly advantageous circumstances develop - ond this is not anticipated - cen a repid advence from the ‘ narrow and unfavourcble pridzeheads be expected, with a view to the erpture of Dover ond the eliminetion of the corstal defences at Denl. The duration of the crossing is much too long. Even if the first echelons of § divisions are successfully thrown ashore for the formation of narrow bridge-heeds, the result of the initial battles ogninst considersbly superior forces seems questionable, when it takes 6 doya to lend the second echelon of these divisions together with the essential army troops. Bven if, in face of interference through wether ond British Ne forces, it is optimistically supposed that this task will be fulfilled, © further six divisions, particulerly infantry forcea and A.A, batteries, would heave to be awnited before operations could develop from the narrow bridgeheads ageinst’ the Thoanes-Southempton line (first operetional objeativ Thus the cdvance could hardly commence until 14 devs after the landing. This interval however gives the oncmy the opportunity ~ in onse he doesnot prefer offensive operctions during the first period of our numericcl inferiority - to build up sufficient defence forces on ¢ general line between Chatham'end Brighton, ond to organise the’ defence in such a wey cs to preclude the possibility of e quick break through by our forees. And so the conditions for repid success in Bnglend would disapyear. Hence the londing in this sector alone presents itself as a frontal attack against e« defence line, without good prospects of aurnrise, with insufficient foreea, on too nefrow 2 front, end which would receive only dyiblets of reinforcements. (b) The Army High Commend must therefore also require thet, starting from Le Havre, a aimulteneous lending be carried out at and west of Brighton. Only by the extension of the lending area will it be possible to surprise the British forces, who would presumably be “less likely to expect a landing in this locality; end thua, by locel success to confuse him, thereby matericlly improving the prospects cf genercl success. If, a8 must be expected from recent intelligence, the British defence is conducted on an offensive basis, then the enemy forces will e dispersed.in enre of & strictly dofonsive ¢ tiers, the fervition af rn 4 one hts oD dcfenec front on the line Chat! ve rendered impossible from the start, and pressure will be brourht on the English, which coulda lead to the rapid abandonment by them of the whole arec south ond south-east of London; in that event the prospects of 2 lending soon afterwards at Decl would be improved, The terrain ct Brighton is particularly suitable for operations by fast moving units, only if on this broad front sufficiently strong | forces, adequately and quickly sup2lied, are thrown in sinultrneously, does the »rospect erise of quickly gaining the first operetionel objective (mouth of Thazes to Southampton) and so creating the conditions for further repid and successful operations,” 43) At this time the Army High Command asseased the total strength of the units aveilable in Englend for operations, including coastal defence troops, but excludinr, anti-aircraft units, os 320,000 men; the strength of the reserve army as 100,000 men; men under training as 900,000 recruits, and the tote] number of men celled to the colours cs 1,640,000. According to unconfirmed reports received up to the 15th August by the German General Staff, the number of divisions at home in England emounted to 39, of which about 20 were regerded as completely- 39 - overstional, but. whose artillery wes believed to be ct only helf the normal strength. 4s regerds the defence arrangements in the coastel aren, the Generel Stcff learned by the 5th September that the vegion Tonbridge - Beachy Heed was characterized by.a largo ond excellently eamoufleged labyrinth of fortificntions, Hastings was described as a strongly estebliched centre of defence, Further reports from England mentioned the Isle of Wight as the most fortified Pert of the English South coest, as German lending attempts were pertioujerly expected there, Purther, the General staff learned - not, however, until the 9th October - that the coastal sector of Brighton - Dover wos defended es follows: (4) The first Line on the coast, (41) 300 yards from the corstline: machine gun nests, Gat) 1,000 yards inland: nenvy long range guns et intervals of about 800 mrds , (4v) 3,000 yards intand: a line of light artillery and machine gun nests. (v) 2% miles intend: a Line which: includes crmoured cars and tanks, sald to emount to 230 tanks and 380 armoured reconnaissance vehicles, Totel strength of troops in this line gbout 75,000 men bearing numbers 83, 85, 86, 95, 97, 98, 104, 106 and 107, Behind these lines, as a reserve, there are about 50,000 men in 2 zone about’ IPs nilos deep, who nro distributed on the : same principle as the first lines of defence, The data received by the Generel staff for its Sppreeietion of the enemy's position came mainly from= ho - the Becret Service Department of the Supreme Commend, and oleo from crptured matericl. 44) Phe War Dicry of the Navel Staff contrins the following remavka cn intelligence of the enomy: (4) (3) On the 17th July *the whole foreign Press, in pavticular the Engliah Press, comments that a major German attack is expected. Thousends of barges ond vessels are said to bo stending by on the Chennel ond Atlantic ‘sonst. The attack is expected in the Dover area, though the defences heye gre strongest. Strong air attacks lasting severnl days will precede the landing." On the 19th July "English defence measures (fxom con Americcn report): coastal defence by the aray, Defence is based on mobility and concentration of all available fire- power. No fixed defence line with built-in defences, The tesk of the Fleet and the R.A.P. would be to render impossible the lending of nrmoured units or surprise lmnding by troops. The R.A.F. is so orgenised that strong units ern be quickly concentrated at any danger spot, end also to attack the new German bases in Northern France and Holland snd to search for indicetions of German activity, such as theee rancably of chaps ond bs (414) On the 15th August "talk of a German invasion continues to appeer in the English Press, The possibility ie mentioned of « lrnding on the North-Ecst coast of Englend, probably originating from Norway. The styonger Germen air attacks are regerded as preparations for the invasion, ond the activity of German minesweeping vessels in the Chennel ag advence indications of a landiny, The concentration of ships in the Baltic and in the Norwegian fjords is mentioned." whe Navel Staff's appreciation of the enemy's position at the date for which the invasion was planned will be siven later (see paragraph 66 below). 45) #F,. Tho Diversionary Measures bee Perera ned by the As mentioned above, the English Press quoted as a@ possibility the landing on the North-East coast from the direction of Norway, Actually the German Naval Stef? hed prepared n fnirly extensive operstion, with the object of a feint landing on the North-East const, This was the so-celled operation “Herbstreise” (Autum Journey). This operation aimed nt cresting « diversion on land end xt sea from the renl landing which was to take place two days later on the English South coast. For this purpose the Naval Staff wes anxious thet intelligence ns to the foint operation should reach Bngland. If the oceasion arose during the operation,= 42 - the eneny was to have his attention called to it by conspicuous /f traffic. The Publicity given in England in the middle of August to this plan of the German landing on the North-Bast coast corresponded to the wishes of the Naval staff and can perhaps be traced to intelligence issued by the latter. For this feint operation transports from Norwegian traffic - including the liners "BUROPA", “BREMEN, "CNEISENAU", "POTSDAM" and a few trawlers - were to be formed on D minus 2 day into four convoys; they were to proceed from the area Bergen-Christiansand - South, and from the German Bight under escort of the cruisers "SMDEN", "NURNBERG", “KOLN", "BRENSE" with accompanying light escort forces, and were to advance towards the English coast between Aberdeen and Newcastle. In the event of contact with the enemy he was to be attacked if in inferior strength, but was to be avoided if superior, In the latter case the convoys were to be immediately diverted and scattered, and the ships were to procasd to the necreat harbours. When darkness set in, sbout 2130, the advance was to be broken off and the return journey commenced, By this time the individual fommations would have got about half-way to the Scottish coast, By dawn the large liners were to have disappeared in the direction of the tegat, while the loss conspicuous romaining steamers were to try to mingle with the Norwegian coastel traffic, In enge the situation warranted it, provision was made for a repetition= 43 - of the feint on D minus 1 day. The operation wes to be under the Comanander-in-Chief of the Neval Group North, Admirel Cerls. At the same time as “Herbstreise", the Navel Staff planned - also for diversionary purposes ~ an operation by the heavy cruiser “Kipper" in the area of Icelend-Faroes, In eddition, at the ‘time of SEALION, the pocket battleship "Scheer" was to make © sortie into athe atlentic for commerce raiding, from which the German Navel Steff ‘clso expected a diversion of British Naval Forces.THE GARRYING OUT OF THE MiVAL PRI 46) In the sphere of naval preparations, the requisitioning, equipment and assembly of the shipping required for the transportation constituted 2 most extensive tesk, which ocounied n grect decd of tines The Naval Staff on 25th July caleulated the total shipping space (sce Paragraph 24) as 155 traneport vonsels {about 700,000.G.R.T,), 1722 barges, 47 tugs and 21161 motor boats. At the same date the Naval staff's scheme for ships to be made aveilable was as follows: About 140 transports, of which 100 to be taken from German shipping, 40 from Holland, Belgiua and France; this amounted to 440,000 G.R.T. of German shipping, and 200,000 from the other countries, About 2,000 barges from the Rhine and from Holland, About 500 tugs from Ger: “and France, Holland, Belgiun The number of motor boats that’ could ve veguisitioned was at this time not yet determined, The withdrawal of this shipping from its previous employment involved serious inroads into the German economy, The number of available merchant ships in Germany, suitable for transportation of troops was limited, and had been sensibly reduced py heavy losses in the Norwegian operation, and through wines. Of the 1,200,000 G.2.1, which wre available to Gorman industry at the beginning of July, 800,000 G.2.T, wore employed in coal and ore traffic and 400,000 G.R.T, on coastal traffic, The reduction : * Mote: gee Appendix on page 828 grganization of German flaval Porges.of this tonnace by 440,000 G.R-T, would, according to the Transport Section of the Naval High Command, heve a serious effect on German shipping, especielly if withdrawn over a long period; moreover, further ships would have to be laid up in order to "ake crews available for the stecmers lying in Holland, France and Belgium, The position was no easier in the case of German inland shipping. The transport situation on the German inland waterways had already been severely strained, Figures provided by the Reich Ministry of Transport showed that German inland shipping would pe yveduced by 30 per cent to mest the requirements of the invasion, an@ that the effect on the 8 ply of coal, ore and food would be considersble. he requirement of tugs could only be met if nearly all tugs over 250 hop, were withdyam from the German harbours @ nd if all trawlera atill being used for deep sea and coastal fishing were requisitioned. ‘This would practically atop the supply of fish. The requirement in motor boats could only be met if use were made additionally of the motor boats from inland lakes, most of which were unseaworthy. 47) All these serious disadvantages had to be ace pted if SEALION were to be prepared, and they were accepted, The requisitioning of shipping space proceeded generally according to plan, On the other hand the movements of transports at sea and on the inland waterways, which were essential to bring the vessels to the yarda for alterations, and to the operational harbours, lagged- 6 behind schedule. This delay was caused by the weather, abnormally bad for the time of the yeor, and by the effects of enemy sir activity, which reacted not only on the moveaents but also on the concomitant mine- sweeping operations. flso, the ten-day blocking of the Doxtmund—Ems Cantl, coused by bombs in the middle of August, resulted in ¢ considercble hold-up in the assembly of motor borts coming from the Rhineland, As @ result of these delays the Naval staff on 30th August was foreea to report (seo paragraph 57) thet D.Day must be postponed fom the 15th Seytenber to the 2lst September. 48) On the 4th September the shipping séction of the Ravel Steff wes able to report that 168 transports (704,548 G.R.7.), 1910 barges, 419 tugs, including trawlers, and 1600 motor bocts had been requisitioned. By the 6th September all the steameys would be available for use. Most of the remeining vessels hed alrendy been assembled at the embarketion ports or were on the way there, The transport section expected thet the whole of the trensport flect would be rondy for use by the 19th september, On the 11th September the Nevel staff remarked that owing to the unfavourable weather end the effect of the eyomy's nix threct an@ mining operations, various Interruptions hed oceurred in the rasenbly of the tronsport fleet and liht navel forces, which however had not affected the tine-t: perotions for the operation, 49) On the state of minesweeving operations, the Navel Staff on \th Septeaber estgblished that searching md sweeping operations hed been seriously delayed duringeure August by the unfavourable weother. The maintenance of sorties in the Dover Straits, particularly in the British mined area west of the Dover-Colnis line, had only been possible in the south-eastern part, Mines or other obstructions had not been located, The Naval Steff hoped by the 19th September to clear up the mine situation west of Dover-Calcis, particwlarly in the British mined aree which had been presumed to exist. But it was doubtful whether it would be possible by searching operations to obtain a picture of the mine situction close to the English coast. Later, not util the 9th October, the Naval Steff learned that mines had been laid Ig miles ‘off the coast betyoen Dover end = - Brighton, which wore believed to de connected by cables to positions on lend, 50) Por the tacticel minefields planed by the Naval Steff to protect the flanks of the ercesing area, @ totel of 6,800 mines, including 800 dummy mines, end the necessary anti-sweeping equipment had been got” ready by the 4th September, The transfer of this gear to the operational harbours was in process, ond would be definitely completed by the 19th September. It was intended to carry out the mine-laying operntions in the period D - 8 to D ~ 2; the intended position of the minefields con be seer in the sketch overleat Tho average distance between mings in the individual minefields varied between 100 and 180 feat. The Anglo-French minefields in the Channel betweenDover ond Colais end in the area off Dunkirk were incorporrted into the German mine system, as constituting on effective protection. (In the sketoh these are. indicated by broken lines). 51) On the 6th Septenber, Admiral Commending U-boets proposed the following distribution of borts for the protection of the crossing:- 1) In the Channel: mein northern concentration: &) 5 medium boats in the ares Scillies- Lizard Head, b) 5 medium boats between Start Point and tho Chennel Islands. ¢) 5 small boats between Isle of Wight and Barfleur, 2) In the North Sca, south of line Cromer-Perschelli a) 3 small vonts between Cross Sand and Outer Gabbard, b) 3 smell b danger 6 nts east of the English en. 3) Off Longstone: 2 small poets on the English coastal route. 4) off the Pentland Firth: 4 smell boats west end east of the exits, The Navel staff eed to these proposels. 52) It was laid down thet +! cuthority for issuing orders during the crossing would be vested sol y in the Commanders of the Navel groups, who would also dscide on the use of weapons in the event of enemy interference, Basicnliy, protection against enemy forces wes the task of the escort forces allotted to the transport fleets, Vessels carrying only the weapons appertaining to Army* LONDON b Sitnaouke LE HAVRE 7 MEQRELAND Oe — BOULOGNE~49 = troops were te be Allowed to use these wenpona only in extrone necessity For carrying out the first lending, advance compenics with a total strength of 8,520 men were forsed, and these were to be embarked in warships of the escort forces, artificial fog was to be used only by naval forces ox by airevaft, The order for its use would bo given by the appropriate naval commmder, reement with the Army commander embarked in the Senior Officer's ship, Similey rules applied for the order to open fire, which wns only to be given in case of eneny interference, Otherwieo the aim was to achieve surprise. For the purely navel tasks connected with discmbarkation of the troops, such as control of transport treffic, establishment of navigetional aids ote,, ly navel landing wits, each consisting of 2 officers end 4O mon, were formed and Alloerted to individual groups of transports, ay The setting up of coastal artillery along the channel coast, ae orderea by the Fuhrer, wes completed by the middle of September, and the following were then ready for use: 2) Siegfried battery, south of Gris Nez with four 36 cm.guns. ~) Friedrich August battery, north of Boulogne with three 30.5 centimetre gune. o) Grosser Kurflrst battery, at Gris Nea with four 28 centimetre guns,ee a) Prinz Heinrich battery, between Colcis and Blene Nez, with two 28 centimetre guns. e) Oldenburg battery, cast of Calais, with two 2h centimetre gins, f) M.1, M.2, M.3, Mel batteries in the sector Gris Noz-Calais, with a total of fourteen 17 centimetre guns. : In addition, ecccording to a notetion,in the war diary of the Navel staff, there were thirty-five heavy end medium batteries of the Army, a8 woll as seven batteries of captured guns. The siting of these batteries, which commenced on the 22nd July, was completed or the 31st August.Sues ATR FER TIONS Right from the start the Nevel staff, end the aender-in-Chief of the Wavy personally, took every opportunity of stressing thet the aost important prerequisite for - successful Linding wes the schiovencnt of sir swrencey. The Fuhver, in his firet SuaLION directive of the end July, oxpreased himself aimilarly (sec nexagraph 3). Bven in the early period of material weakness of our naval pYegarations, in view of forces, it @oxcnded on the success of the Luftwaffe, whether the fitting out of the embarkation ports, the equipaent and assexbly of transports, and the very extensive mine locating and minesweeping operations could teke place without sericua interference by enemy air and navel forees. «ix supremacy - at least a definite sir superiority ~ would have to be a "feit necompli" before these preparations commenced, Aix mupremncy wes of sbaolity ly fecisive inpartence for the crossing, for the landing ond for sefesuarding supplies during the operction, The Navel Staff also appreciated olen Ly thet six supremacy alone could not provide permanent security areinst vastly ouperior enemy neval forces in the crossing area, and the same cppliod to the protective minefields which were to be laid, On the 31st July the Puhrer had informed the Commander~in-Ghief of the Navy (sce pexagraph 29) that=~ 52 - iff after cight days of intensive air war the Luftwaffe had not achicved considerable destruction of the enemy's cir force, herbours ond navel forces, the operation would have to be postponed until May 1941. On this occasion the Fuhrer also told ti Comucnder-in-Chict of the Navy cbcut the targets the Luftveffe had been given in connection with the & operation, 55) On the following day Directive No. 17 gaye the Conmander-in-Chief of the Germen »ir Force freedom tee vence the intensified war egainet England as from the Sth august, But the operctional objectives of the cir war differcd fron those which the ihrer, on the Slot July, hed indicated verbally to the Commender-in- Chief of the Navy; for the Luftwaffe were told to use all availeble forces to @ troy the R.a.F, end the aircraft industry sa soon as possible, and after achi-ving temporary or loeel six suvcriority, to coneuntrete on stta net herboure and perticwlsrly cxninst food swjyplies caé stores. ‘the instructions said that the aiy yer cgeinst enemy worships and ny should teke second place, in so far as fevoureble opportunities fox ottcek did not present themecl vcs. as affecting SEALTON, the Novel Steff regretted the lower priovity of the enemy navel tnrgets compared with the other objectives of the Luftwaffe ana proposed to eppeal to°éhe Supreme Command. on the 6th August the Navel staff felt obligeda atte to report to the Supreme Conmnand that minesweeping and preparations for German minelaying in the Channel area were not yet feasible because of the constant threat from the air, and that consequently the commencing date for SHALION was ondengerea. : On the 10th august the Naval Staff noted in its war diary: “Preparations for SEALION, particularly mine clearance, are being affected by the inactivity of the Luftwaffe, which is at present prevented from operating vy the bad Weather, and that for reasons not Known to the Naval Staff, the Luftwaffe had missed opportwities afforded by the recent very favourable weather, As the pihrer doos not Wieh to docide bout SHALION until «+ least eight to ten days after the commencement of the Luftwaffe's major air attacks, there is already some danger of the date being affected," 56) At the beginning of august the Luftwaffe had at ite disposal 2669 operational aircraft, which included 1015 bombers, 346 dive bombers, 233 fighters and 375 heavy fichters, The Comuander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe decided that the major attacks of Air Pleets 2 and 3 were to begin on the 13th August, As a preliminary measure, single dive bomber units attacked Portland and veymouth on 11th August as well as convoys on the east and south coasts of England, This was followed on the night of the 12th August by attacks on Bristol, Cardiff and Middlesbrough, and on the night of the 13th by operations against Portsmouth, Ramsgate, Hida@lesbrough, Rewcastle and Shields, German losses on these two deys amounted= 5h 4 to 53 aiveraft, the Lritish losses were given as 176. The major attacks commenced on the 13th August under unfavoureble omens; the first few days gave little pramise of success. Contrary to the feir weather period to be expected at thia time of year, there was cone depression after enother, weather conditions remained stormy end rainy during the next fortnight, restricting the Luftwaffe operations to single attacks by weaker units. Fighter protection in particular was difficult, and the vomber attacks frequently took place without escort. The enemy's fighter defence, which was leas affected by the bad weather during locel operations over his om country, proved to be powerful and tough, and German losses were high. In en attack leunched by the Luftwaffe on the 1Uth August without fighter escort German losses were 147 circraft, us compared with the observed enemy losses of only 49 aircraft, Not until the 24th august dig the weather pormit day and night operations by powerful squadrons, In the eastern area the enemy's Tighter protection was observed to be strong, while in the west it was weaker, On the following days the attacks Were continued with good results; the mein targets were aerodromes, industvial and harbour installations, (Bristol, | Biymingham, Liverpool, Newenstle, Hull, Plymouth). There appecred to be no. connection between these attacks and the SEALION plans, On the cther hand the enemy's lively cir cotivity - mine-loying, bomber attacks - and the varinble and mostly unfavourable weather, all contribute:= 55 - to delays ond losses in the presex-tions for SHALION. 57) The cffect of the enemy's air war and thé woinst enemy navel inadequate Gera forees caused the Naval Staff on the 30th August to report to the Supreme Command thet the terminal dete for SEALION properations (15th september) could not be kept. “The elimination by the Luftwaffe of activity by enemy sea and air forces in the Channel and along the embarkation coast had not yet sctorialised; and there wes no erly prospect of inmrovenent while the Luftwaffe pursued its present operational objectives." The ecrliest day for the rcadiness of the transport fleet - assuming @ favourable development of the Geren cir offensive and a consequent change of Luftwaffe objectives to suit SEALION - was now reported as the 20th September, but again this date could not be regarded as chsolutely certain, as it depended on the Luftwaffe's effectiveness in eliminating enemy sea ond cir forces. Thereupon the Supreme Commend deeided on the 21st September as the cerliest D.Doy end (as proposed by the Navel staff) intimeted that a prelisinary order for errrying out the ozerction would be issued ten days pefore the date, i.e. on D-i0, This postponement was not serious, aince the favourable conjunction of moon, tide and daylight had »ointed to dates between the 19th and 27th September as veing suitable, with the 2uth September as the best day.ot 58) On the lst. September extensive preparations for SZaLION began, with the movement of shipping from the German North Sea ports to embarkation ports. During this operation it became evident that undisputed air sweriority in the area of the movement of transports, which the Naval staff had stipulated in order to keep to the time-table, had no means been achieved, The enemy's light naval forces were soving practically undisturbed in this area, and were threatening German sea communications. 59) The Luftweffe's view of the situation at the end of August waa not unfavoursble, in spite of the effect of bad weather on their operations. The Luftwaffe regarded the result of their attacks on the English ground organisation and aircraft industry as considerable and were convinced that the R.a.J'. had already been severely damaged, The enemy’s losses since the 6th August were estimeted as 1,115 aircraft as opposed to German losses of 467 aircraft. Given good weather, the Luftweffe hoped to increase their successes considerably in September, and expected docisive results, In the meantime there hed becn several British bomber attacks on Berlin end this hastened the plan for yeprisal attacks on London, At the beginning of September fine weather set in, and it was used for day and night attacks, principally on the aerodrome installations round London. The R.A.F. fighter defence was wecker than in the previous week, On“57. - of the 6th September the first of the stronger eft took place over London, followed attacks, by 66 aire cn the 7th September by the first major attack with about 300 aircraft. Violont .act tons with enemy fighter forces led to major aix battles over London, which revealed the yenewed styength of the British fighter defence. This forced us to give equal priority to both the bomber attacks ma the systematic engarement of the enemy's fighter defence. Within the Luftwaffe the atmosphere was still elated end confident, tmough over-estination of the results achieved, and this exaggerated idea was fed by intelligence received from neutral countries. British attacks increesed on the Channel ports, whore the invasion preparations were observed. ‘The Gorman sir defence. was not strong enough to prevent rcconnaissance. Considereble © losses were sustained by the Germans, In Ostend three motor torpedo boats were put out of action by bombs, and ‘ on the 13th September an-air attack resulted in the sinking of eighty barges. In eadition, the naval measures, mine-sweeping operations and the assembly of the transport fleets at the embarkction ports were repentedly interrupted py the R.A.P. In spite of continuous casualties in shipping space, the Nevy was rble to report after every loss that it could be nade good by drawing on the reserves which have been held in veadiness, end thet the invasion py erctions were not affected, 60) Mecnwhile time was pressing for a decision, In order to keep to D.Day (21st September), the preliminaryorder would heve to be issued on the lith Septeuber. ! The following is & summary of the Navel . Staff's opprocintion dcted 10th September: Unsettled weether, quite abnorsnl for the time of yenx, wos considerably cffeoting the sovenent of tynnsports ond the mine clearence operctions for SEALION. “There is no sign of the defeat of the enemy's bir force over Southern England and in the Chamnel area; cnd this is vitel to a further eppreciation of the situation. The prelimincry attacks by the Luftweffe have indeed achieved a noticeable werkening of the s fighter defence, so that considerable enen Gorman fighter superiority can be assumed over the English syen. However, Gs shown by the experience of the last few days, the bombers cnd mine-laying squedrons of the R.A.F. axe still fully operational, and it must be admitted thet the operations of these British squadrons hove undoubtedly been successful, though serious inter- ference with or prevention of Ge: men trensport movements has not resulted so far." In spite of i terruptions and deloys the Navel Steff thought it could still guarentee the completion of re. -tions ss planned, with the earliest D.Day as 2ist September, But should further difficulties ond interruptions secur through weather or through enemy aetion, this dcte would be endangered. ‘We have not yet attained the operational conditions which the Naval Steff stipuleted to the Supreme Command cs being essonticl for the enterprise, namely undisputed cir supremcoy- 59 - in the Channel cree end the ¢climination of the enemy's air aetivity in the assembly aren of the Germen navel forces, ancillary creft and shipping." 61) ° It seems appropricte at this stage to sry a few words on the sttitude adopted by the Commender-in- Chiof of the Luftweffe towards the SZALION operation. From the beginning ReicheWarechell Goering never took much interest in SEaLION, He hoped that the air war alone, as conducted by him, would make England ready for peace, and he »robably never believed that it woulda come to an invasion operation. In fact, the Luftwaffe aid not predominantly devote ita operations to the cause of the plamed invasion, but gave priority to the “absolute air war. Thus the Luftwaffe went its own way, out of step with the invasion plans. 62) The attitude of the Naval staff towards the objectives pursued by the Luftwaffe ia shown by two successive entries in the war diary, which, being characteristic, commend attention, The entry on the 10th September reads: "It would be in conformity with the time-table preparations for operation SEALION if the Luftwaffe now concentyated less on London and more on Portsmouth and Dover, as Well as on the naval forces in end near the operational axea, in order to eliminate the potential throats of the enemy.. But the Navel stafr does not consider this a suitablé moment to approach the Luftwaffe or the Fuhrer with such demands, since the= 60 - Blhrer thinks the major.etteck on London may be decisive, end because a.systematie and. prolonged bombardment of London may result in; the enemy edopting an attitude which will ronder SgabION superfluous. Hence the Naval Staff will not proceed with the demend," This entry shows that even tho Nevel Steff did not vemain wminfluonced vy the current oxeggerated hopes in high quarters regnrding the effect of the intensified air war agcinst England. But when two days letor. « alarming report was vecoived from the Novel Group West of successful attacks by the R.A.F., the Navel Staff chonged its view, The report stated + interruptions ccused by the enemy's air force, long range artillery, and light navel forees had for the first time essumed major significenco. anchorages ct Ostend, Dunkirk, Crleis ond Boulogne cowla not be used as night anchorages for trensports. Duc to these restrictions further deleys wove anticipated, Losses or demngu to trensport vessels were not inconsidereble, though for the present they could be made good from roserves, This report prompted the Nayal steff vo enter the following in the war diary: "This report from the Neval Group West agein shows that up to the present German cir operctions have in no way contributed to the relief of the situation as regards navel measures and preparetions for SEALION, The oir wer is being conducted “es an absolute cir war", without regard to the presenteras requirements of the Navel ‘jar, and outside the framework of operation SEaLION, Ih its present form the air war cannot assiat preparations for SRALION, which are predominantly. in the hands of the Navy, In particular, one cannot diacern any effort on the part of the Luftwaffe to engage the wits of the British Fleet, which are now able to operate almost unmolested in the Channel, and this will prove extremely dangerous to the transportation, ‘ghus the main safeguard against British Naval forces would have to be the minefields, which, as repeatedly explained to the Supreme Command, cannot -be regarded as reliable protection for shipping. ‘The fact remains thet up to now the intensified eir war has not contributed towards the landing operation hence for operational and military xeagone the execution of the landing cannot yet be considered."oo 62 CHAPTER Vv ~ ‘THE DAYS OF DECISION 63) There is no evidence in the records, neither can it be assumed, that the foregoing review led to a fresh request to the Supreme Command for a change in the operational objectives of the Luftwaffe, For, on the following day (11th September) information was received from the Supreme Command that the Fuhrer had postponed the preliminary order for SHALION for three days, 1.¢. to the lyth Septembor, According to the Naval Staff's notation the postponement “was due to absence of the requisite conditions for carrying out the operation (defeat of the enemy's air force, elimination of enemy beses-near the operational area, weather conditions), Thus the earliest D.Dey beorme the 24th September, 64) On the 13th September the Fihrer, in a very hopeful. cpprociation of tho effocts of the Gorman ain offonsive, stated thnt under tho circumstances he had no thought of running the risk of SBALION, He was in agreement with the Commender-in-Chief of the army that the operation oould only be sponsored if the British defence hed first been strongly subdued by the Luftwaffe. In the meantime the Commander+in-Chief of the Army, Field- Marshal v. Brauchitsch, had reached the conclusion, having regard to the compromise solution of the width of front ordered by the Fuhrer, thet the operation would promise- 63 - nuceesn only if the enemy had clready been severely ‘ithout any doubt the situation as it presented itself in the middle of Septembér made the risk seem very great, involving actual possibility of failure. 65) ‘There was no in the appreciation of the Navel Staff regarding the preliminary decision wich waa duc on the 14th september, The Comander-in-Chief of the Navy's personal comments on the situation on the 1yth September were as follows: a) The present air situation does not provide conditiona for carrying out the operation, as the risk is still too great. >) If the SWALION operation fails, this will mean great gain in prestige for the British; the powerful effect of our attacks will thus be annulled, c) Aix attacks on ungland, particularly on London, must continue without interruption, If the weather is favourable on intensificaticn of the attacka is to be aimed at, without regard to SEALION, The attacks may have a decisive outcome, a) SRALION, however, must not yet be cancelled, as the anxiety of the British must be kept up; if cancellation became known to outside world, this would be great relief to the British, ne On the same day there wis a meeting between the Fuhrer, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Heads of the other two Services, Tne Fuhrer considered it wrong to cancel SEALION so soon, The attacks by the Luftwaffe had already nad considercble effect, though not as great as could be expected in goodwether. But the effect not been sufficient to produce the oir situstion necosscry for SEALION. Should the burden of the landing be added to continued air attacks, the totel effect would be very considercble, for it wes not one attack that wes decisive, but the overall result. If SEALION were now abandoned, there would be relief amons the British people, and the Luftwoffe's successes would be more easily borne by thom. The Comnander-in-Chief of the Navy repeated his steadYast opinion thet SEALION was the "ultima retio", whose risk was very grect. He recommended the intensification of six sttacks, perticularly on London, 28 these might win the war, He suggested awaiting the Odtober dates for SHALION. A disenaaion tool; place on a question raised by the Luftwaffe whether the attacks on London, which up to now had py oder been concentreted on importent war plants, should in future be extended to other parts of the city With the object. of incronsing the morel offect. The Puhtor tumed this down es he wished to keep systometic attroks on residential, quarters as 4 last resort and os ¥oorigal for British torror attacks. 66) ‘after the discussion the Fuhror decided on postponement of the oreliminary date to the 17th september (D.Day 27th September). In the Directive which was then issued by the Sudrome Command it was cgein stated that alr attacks on.= 65 - cet London were to be continued over a wider ta: avea with conseatretion om tergets of importence to the var effort or vital to the city, including vailway stations, "Terror attacks against purely xesidontial areas are reserved for use as an ultinate means of pressure, and are therefore not to be employed at Dresent." 67) On the night of 15th September British Bomber attacks on the coast from Boulogne to Antwerp caused considerable casualties to shipping in Antwerp. The main target of German air attacks continued to be London, and in addition, Southampton and Portland. Strong fighter and anti-aircraft defence resulted in high German losses. ff noted: On the following doy th. 0 el St "The enesy's continuous fighter defence off the coast, his concentration of bombers on the SEALION embarkation ports, and his coastal reconnaissance activity indicate thet he is now expecting an immediate lending. In the English south cocst areca many more petrol vessels were identified than on the previous day, On the night of 16th September strong enemy air attacks on the whole coastal area between Le Havre and Antworp caused further shipping casualties." The general impression was that the enemy's air force was by no means beaten, but on the contrary was showing increasing activity, Moreover, the continued bad weethor had further delayed the preparation- 66 - Gena the-mincewecning oscrations. The werther prospects offered no hove of s lony period of enti-cyclone. 68) Under these circunstences the Fuhrer decided on the 17th Seztember to postpone SU«LIOi indefinitely. The situation veyarding the enemy an tne opeyational area was summed up by the Navel staff on the 16th Septonber a8 follows: i) ‘The preparations for a landing on the Chennel gost 2re extensively known to the enemy, who is incrensingly taking counter neasures, Symptoms are, for example, operétional use of his aircraft for attecks end reconnaiasence over the German operational harbours, frequent appearance. of destroyers off the south coast of England, in the Straits of Dover, and on the Trnncoo-Belgian coast, stationing of his petyol vessels off the north coast of France, Churchill's last speech, ote, ii) The mein units of the Home Fleet are being held in readiness to repel the lending, though the majovity of the units are still in western bases, aii) Alyeady a large number of destroyers (over 30) hes been located by cir reconnaissance in the southern and south- eastern harbours.or Asble infor~-tion indiectes thet dy) AL the cnomy'e navel forces cre solely oceuried With this theatre of operations, As desired by the Fuhrer, the decision of the 17th September was not to mean a final renouncenent, He still kest open the nossibility of a landing in October, but approved the request of the Navel staff to disperse the shipping to orevent further losses, and to stop further assembly of the transport fleet, put this was to be done inconspicuously, so that the slowing up of the prevarations should not ve reeoyniaavle to the enemy, The High Conmands of the Navy and Azmy then asked that the interval between the preliminary and executive orders should ve increased to fifteen days, but the Fuhrer wae not yet able to make a decision on this point. 69) The need for extending the transport area hed shown itself to be urgent. of the total number of vessels that had been prepared for the operation the following had been, oither lost or damaged through enemy action by the 2lst September:- Of the 168 transports(700,000 G.R.T) - 21 lost or damageu (= 12.5%). Of the 1697 barges - 214 lost or damaged (= 12662) of the 359 tugs, ~ 5 lost or damaged (2 Llp. Thenks to the caret'ul plaming of the Naval Star’, these Losses could actually he replaced from yeserves, but eny further losses could not haveteen dealt with in this 70) Although the Fihrer emphasised on the 17th September that the “indefinite postponement" ordered by him did not signify a fine) renouncement, yet the enlarging of the area for assembly of transports started the ball rolling towaras cancellation. At the ond of Septomber the Comender-in-Chief of the Navy suggested to the Fihrer, in view of the advanced tine of year, thet the 15th October should be the latest dete for deciding on sither complete abandonment, ov postponoment tatil the Spring of 1941. Following this proposal, the .rmy High Comana pointed out that if the ten-day warning period were adhered to, it would not be possible to carry out the dispersal of the shipping sufficiently to reanco the air threat. The Diihrey then decided, on the 12th October, that until the Spring of 1941 preparations for a landing were to be maintoined solely as a means of bringing political and military preseurc on gngland, In the event of a fyesh decision to land in the spring or early summer of 1941, the requisite degree of readiness would be ordered in good tine, “The military Foundations for a later landing are to be improved in the interval. Measures for dispeysing the assembly points are to de ‘so arranged that: a) Pho impression is maintained in England that we are preparing & landing over a wide are! b) At the seme time Germon industry is relieved of the strain."on the 9th Jenusry 1941 the Flhrer decided thet proparntions for SEALION were to bo stopped in every sphere except the development of special equipment and the decoxtionaf the enemy,- 70 QHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS (Figures in breckets refer to parcgreph numbers in the preceding chapters) As cen be seen in Chapter I, the possibility of invading England was first considered by the Germans in the late autum of 1939, The problem was at thet time studied only within the German Navel Starf (1), and was not put to the Fthrer by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy until 3lst May 1940 (2), at a time when the imponding collapse of French resistance foreshadowed a German occupation of the Franco-Belgian channel const. At this first discussion and also at a second discussion on the 20th June, the Plhrer rejected the idea, He regarded the execution as impossible. The Commander~in-Chisf of the army held the same opinion, It is important to establish also that the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, when talking to the lhrer, neither suggested nor sponsored the invasion, since he too considered the visks involved to be very large, His main purpose was to raise the whole question with the Pilhrer in gooa time, so that the Mavy should not be confronted by insoluble tasks, should the Supreme Command precipitately isaue a sudden order to start extensive preparations. At a later oceasion - on the llth July - the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy told the Fihrer that he regarded the invasion only as a last resort, in order to make England ready toa's sue for yerec. He confidently hoped that ingl yesistence could be eliminated by interrunting her supolies from overacas end by en intensifiod air ive, but without having to invade (6). In the last days of June a surprising change of view occurred in the Puhrer's headquarters. Ina Supreme Command Directive dated 2nd July, the threo Services were instructed to initiate preparations for an invasion of England, the achievement of air supromacy being stipulated as on indispensable condition for the operation, It was addod that for the time being it was & caso of theoretical nreparation for a nossivle eventuality (3). The preliminary order of the 2nd July was soon followed by a second Supreme Commend Directive dated 16th duly, steting that the Pihrer had decided on "preparations end eventucl execution" of the landing, which was to ta é place over a wide arca, "npproximately betwoon Remsgete and west of the Isle of wight.” Because of the advanced time of year, it was stipulated that tho proparrtions must be completed by the middle of August (10), In 4 discussion on the 17th July between the Commander-in-Chicf of the Navy and the Commander- in-Chief of the Army, the Intter considered that, as October would be characterised by fog, the latest possible date for the operation would -have to be the middle of September, and that he would require one-B« month to complete it. The army High Command, controry to its previous attitude, now appecred to regard the undertaking os relotively easy, end thence the Commender~ in-Chief of the Navy felt it necessary to drew the attention of the Cownnder-in-Chief of the army to the greet risks that wero associated with the undertaking and to the possibility of losing the whole of the operational exmies involved (12 and 22). On the 19th July the Navel Stef? produced @ detailed sppreciation, which conteined the conclusion that the execution of the invasion “presented varied and exceptional difficulties, whose assessment required detailed study of the trensport problem (13 = 19). Tho cttitude of the Fuhrer st this time towards the planned operntion was oxprossed at a discussion on the 21st July with the Hecds of the three Sorvices (20), He emphasised thet the main difficulties lcy in the field of supplies, 40 divisions would be needed, In view of the wosther conditions the operation would have to be completed by the 15th September. If the preparations coula not be completed by the beginning of September, other plans would nnve to ba considered, Already on the next day (22nd July) the Nevel Staff reported to the Fihrer thet the preparations could not possibly be completed by the middle of August (23). In the merntime the detciled requirements of the Army had become aveilable. They specified « minimum of 13 divisions as essential for the crossing; these deta-3- sllowed the trensport problem to be worked out (24), end the mili y requ nts of the Ary High Command to be appreciated (25 end.22), As a result the Naval Steff roulized on 30th July that, becruse of the variety and extent of the necessary naval prepcrations the operation could not possibly begin before the 15th September; thet is, at ¢ dete whon, according to the Plhror's view, it should already have bcen completed (26). Inc memorendum of the samo date the Navel stetr concluded that it would not be adviscble to carry out the operation in the current 4 ar, but that prene: stions should continue in cnse the “unrestricted air wer in conjunction with the Navel measuros had not yet resulted in oking the enemy ready to negoticte." (27), It was in this sense that’ the Commandor-in-Chiet of the Navy reported to the Pihrer on the 3lst July, end specifically rejected the domond of the Any High Commend for s crossing on a wide front. He considerod tint the crossing could only be successful if the operation were limited to "a nYnow sector in the rer of the Dover Strnits.” The Fihrer fully appreciated the difficultics onumerated by the Commander-in~Chief of the Navy, cné approved the 15th geptomber ns the cerlicst D.dey, He reserved & decision cs to whether to launch the operation, he would first have to ownit the vosults of the projected intensified cir wor, (28-29) The question of the width of the invasion front, first reised at this noeting with the Fihrer, ployed-T- & decisive part in subsequent oporationnl orencretions, nnd involved the Newrl Staff ond the Genoral staff in gerious differences of opinion. The General Staff regarded a landing on a broad front (Ramsgate - Lyme Bay) as an essential condition for operational success on British territory; the Naval Staff could only guarantee the safe crossing of the Chamel if it were confined to @ narrow avea in the Straits ( Beachy Head - Deel). A discussion between the two Chiefs of Steff on the 7th September produced no agreement. It is true that on this oceasion the Chief of the Generel Stef?, waiving his grave scruples, gave up the Lyme Bey project, but demanded at lenet the landing of powerful army forces in the Brighton area, The Navel Stoff thought that this proposal also would have to be refused. (32). Although each side recognised the view of the other ae justified, both considered eny deviation from their vesjective well- founded points of view ns inadmisecble. Indeed, in further negotiations, ot which the Noval Staf?, ecting ona medintion proposal from the Supreme Comnand, declared its readiness to go some way towerds mecting the army High Command's request for a landing at Brighton, no agreement could be reeched, as the Amy High Command persisted in its wish to Irnd "a whole Amy at Brighton (34-39). This discrepancy had therefore to be finally cleared up by & decision of the Filhrer on the 27th August, which directed that the Army overntions must fit in with the facts in relation to the aveilablesey te shipping apace ond security of the crossing and of the disembarkation" (40), The Funrer's decision, which cleared up the 'wiath of front! controversy, made it possible to proceed with the selection of lending pleces, This was govomed by the cherccteristics of the conet and the operational possibilities presented to the army Command in tho Constel sector, once the lending hed taken place, Four lending ecctora were estrblished; "3" - wost of Folkestone to Dungeness: "C" ~ Dungoness to Cliff End "DY = Bexhill to Bonchy Heed: "EY - Brighton to Solscy Bill (41), In & mesovandum of the 10th August to the Suprene Comuand, the General Staff gave its approcietion of the enemy position, based on the conditions of torrain nnd on intelligence received from Englend, From the military point of view the most frvourcble conditions wore consiGvred to exist on the left wing at Brighton, whore the terrain clso fovoured the omployment of high specd units, It was hoped thet flancing attacks could be lounched from this region. ‘The Generel Bt f indi anted its first operntionel objective cs the ottninment of the line gowthempton - Mouth of the Thames (42). In order to disperse the enemy's defence forces, the [evel Staff plamnod n foint operation in the northern part of the North Sen, to be ecrricd out as conspicuously as possible, to simulete a lending in Scotlnnd; ond clso, by means of operations by the cruiser “Hippor" and the pocket battleship "Scheor* in the Iecland-Paroos region ond in the North ationtic,- 76 = to draw off the enemy's navel forces to this area (45)s Of the essential material preparations the greatest, ond the most exacting in time, was the xequisitioning, adaptation and sssembly of the shining s2ece needed for the Channel crossing. By mid-July the Nevel staff celculated the total yequirenent as 155 tronsport steamers (700,000 G.R.7.), 1722 varges, 471 sec-going tugs cnd 1161 motor boats (46). It ia confirmed that despite the particularly unfavourable weather in mid-summer 1940, and in spite of inter- ruptions ond losses throurh enomy nection, the Navel Staff succeeded in assembling the ontiro fleet of tronsports, fully redy for use, by the middle of September (47, 48). Performance of the necessary mine-sweeping operctions in the Channel oer. was moat unfevournbly sffeeted by the worthcy conditions end clso by chany cetivity, Under these circumstances the Navel Staff doubted wacthor it would pe possible to obtein a precise picture of tho ming situction in the immediate vicinity of the enemy const (49). The loertion of the tacticr] mincficlas in the crossing ores, for protection of the flenks, was decided, and the nocessery mining intcriel wna sot ready in mood tine (50). as © furthor protection a lenge number of U-borts wore ellocated positions, from which thoy were to procecd ageinat cnomy navel foroes (51).-77- Advance units and navel landing parties were formed for the first landing; the question.as to who was to rive the orders, always difficult in combined operctions, wee settled by vesting the cowend in the Naval Comuander for thé period of the crossing up to the momont of landing the troops (52). The construction of heavy cocstal batteries on the French Channel cozst prococdod rapidly, and was completed by the middle of September (53). From the begining the leading cuthoritios of the Supreme Coamend were unonimous that the principal eondition for a successful crossing was the prior achievenent of cir supremey in tho crea concerned, At his very first te k with tho Plbrer ~ cn the 25th Moy - the Comendcr-in-Chief of the Navy hod given this as an indispensable condition (54). Thus it might have been expected that the Luftwaffe, when starting its intensified air war in the middle of August, would operate fully end completely in the service of SEALION; that is, would direct its attacks exclusively or at least principally against those targets whose eliminetion would help >renare for the main overation. This, however, was by no means the case (55-59), From the very start the Comnander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe displayed no marked interest in the enterprise; he pursued other aims. He confidently hoped that an energetic aix offensive alono would cause the enany to sue for pence (61). “At this time the effect of the air attecks was generally ovcr-estimated in Germany,ond the Nevel 3 eff, including the Coammender-in~chict of tho Nevy, cllowed thomaslves to be influcnecd for erated hoves, The tho time being by those oxr, interruptiona end losses lrecay caused by the cnomy’s nix activity during the preparatory period lcd the Novel Steff rightly to capprecicte that the Luftwaffc's objectives were not fitting in with SBALION, end to acke remonstrances to the Buprome Cound; yet there was cssentinlly « Irck of drive in potitioning the Piirar to change the situstion (62), Tho Luftwaffo wes now discovering thet the onomy's resistrnec to theix own cetivity wes stronger and tougher, end ws ecusing grecter Gormen losses then snticipeted. Neverthcless ‘the morele in the Luftweffe remaincd confident (59). And yot, wien in mid-Se tember the time had come for ¢& decision whether to proceed with SEALION, the roquisite degroe of cir suprearcy hea not been atteined, nor - if the frets were faced - wore sir wor theremy sure indicctions thet the “cbsolutc" would achieve its objects within menaurable tiae (60). D.pey, which had originclly been Zixed for the 15th Septomber, was in the menntimc xostzoicd to 21st September at the request of the Navel Stct?, os the enemy's counter-cetavity snd the unfevoursble wocther had coused some delays in carrying out the proparctiona (57). With the 2lst September es D.Day, the preliminary ordor for the operstion hnd to be issued on the 11th september, since ton daya were necded for thé fine] preparctory mongures, such as the laying of tactical minefields ondtion of U-bosts On the 11th geptcmper tho Piinrer decided to postpone the prelininary order for thres dave, to the 14th Segtember, “heving regard to the fcot thet tho esscnbicl conditions for ‘earrying out the ovcration do not vet oxist", especially “the defent of the cnomy's air foree" (63). at the discussion on the 14th Soptember betwoon the Fuhyer and the Chiefs of the three 3 urvicos, the Commondor-in-Chicf of the Navy ¥ocommonded inerocscd cir attrcks, pertioularly on London, os "these attrcks could do decisive for the cuteome of the wer", He suggested weiting until the October detes for SEALION. (65). after tho discussion the Fuhrer ordered the postponement of the prelininery order until the 17th september (61), By this dete the situction had not changed, end he then decided to xostpone BUALION "indefinitoly". (68). Thus in effect a negative decision was reached This was followed on the 12th October by the Fnrer's Directive to maintein preparations until the Spring “purely as a means of political and military pressure on the English", an@ then ~ on the 9th January 194k, + bythe order to diseontinue preparations for SEALION (70),bite CONCLUSIONS In the course of a conversation at table at the Plhror's Headguertera in 1943 the latter stated, that he much regretted “having allowed hinself to be talked out of SUALION by the Navy in the autumn of 1940", This stccento phrese was by no asens warranted vy the facta, and yet ib contained c mesure of .truth, As the Navel Steff, in ite preliminary operctionel work and in the coarse of the preparations, probed deeper into the vreblei, so “rogressively confidence and fcith in avecoss recedcd. In ll spheres of war-lendoranip the Cowanndor-in-Chief yrossrvea independence of judgment in relation to his Staff, and he certcinly did not in every ense follow the opinion ef his collnborctors; but ho agreed with the cvireelctions end the intentions of the We cl Steff in oll attters relrting to the ploaning and exegution of SBALION, It orn elso be seen from the nrohives thet during the preperation of thie operrtion he keot the Pilarer informed of detnils conceming tho views and requirements of the Newel Steff, cs set down in. monorands snd proposcis to the Supreme Commend. Indeed, this wee entirely necesscry; as tho Fihvor, heaving regerd to his own beckground, wes unfrmilicr with the peculicrities of this amphibious undertoking; and it wes cll the more necessnty, since Grand-admirel Reeder, in his capecity cs Comacndor-in-Chief of the Nevy, bore the general responsibility for sucesss, Inc conversction thet the author hed in 1944 with the Grond-Admirel, the latter assumed ovédit in particular-~ 6 - ightened the Pihrer - who originally regarded the crossing of the channel as a mere “wexterided river crossing" - as to the true character of the operation, In view of the great risks, it goos without saying that, when discuseing the question with the Fuhrer, the Counendersin-Ohief of the Navy most strongly emphasized tho difficultios that would have to be overcome, From this the Fuhrer will have concluded that tho Naval Staff was basically antagonistic to the undertaking, altnough the Grand Admiral did adopt 2 positive attidue, gs long as cortain conditions’ could be fulfilled, This expleina the Pihrey's subsequent but unjustified improssion that it was the Navy who had talked him out of SEALION. Those who tend to draw the conclusion thet the operetion was abendoned beceuse of the German Aiv Force's failure to achieve effective air suprencoy come nearer to historical truth, but even this does not fully meet the exse. Tho. reel ccuse Iny deeper. Among the prerequisites for the operation, one remained unspoken, though it could te read between the lines in ell the discussions, rnd thet wes: Command of the Sea, for lack éf which Nepolcon's invasion plens came to nothing in 1605; neither could this condition b¢ a to the existing re ive erected in 1940, raving re; strongths, It was belicved that the lack of sea power could bé replaced by six power, ox, put in