Dorothy L Hiller pistoar oF AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN [aE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM 1951-1954 Historical Division Office of Information Services air ateriel Commend Historicel Study no 313 Yright-Patterson Air Force Bese January 1957 Originally TOP SECRET downgraded to SSCHET, July 1964 pxoluded from General Declessifi ions, June 1978 cation Schedule DECLASSIFISD with delet:HISTORY OF AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE BIOLOGIUAL WARE AKE FROGRAM oew ~ 270g PEISTORICAL STODY RO. 303ae an HISTORY OF Aig FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM 2952-5954 ea - = MInelassiiied} | en DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (on CHARGED 10. (DOD 5200.1-R, para 4-501a) ‘ool Ast na fine iF AFSDOHS) L7TUIG, Tamaya ramen a/Z OY ~ ‘This document is classified SAR Seeeet because the major portion of the information contained herein was drawn from source documents bearing that classification, This history contains information oa policy, plans, and pro- grams relating to the USAF Biological Warfare Program, ood technical data on specific agents and means of deliver~ ing them. It has not been possible to identify specific 7S paragraphs because moet of the source documents were not so marked. Extracts will not be made without prior approval of the originator (MGKH}. a SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TO FORSIGN NATIONALS. The information contained in this document will net be dieclosed to foreign nationale or their representatives. Prepared under provisions of AF Requiation No. 210-3 as a part of the USAF Historical Program. This document contains information sifecting the national defense of the United Stater within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C.. Sections 793 and 794, Its tranemission or the revelation of its contents in any mamer te an unauthorized person ie prohibited bylaws remot nk 7 64 Fee -! EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL ca - Le \ ws 0 | DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE we e | (DOD 5200.1-R, para 4-5Ole3951-1954 (unclassified) ay DOROTHY L. MILLER: AaB Historian Monograph Prepared BY Historical Division Offies of Information Services ‘hig Materiel Command | Wright-Patterson Air Force Base January 1957 Approved byt a gf Jather & C baum (Youll Ww WILBUR E. CLEMMER, Med ‘PAUL M. DAVIS, Ph.D. chief, Historical Division Supervising Historian _Blae ULIAN B. CROSS. Colontly USAF Chief, Information Servicesand Procurement 26+ + ¢ and Operational Conc onal Plans see eee ee eee AEORIENTATION OF THE Bi FARES Personnel end Training se + + tion Caly" Policy sees eee Managment... ee eee Headguasters ent of Program 6. +s. Project | “hafidential) . 2. Operati cold cece ewes 2 Evalva~ am Wy 2 3G 3 4s wo wae Sagk wae BuseCHAPTER Vil: CHAPTER VIL REUHITIONS 9 iterate Defeliants « oe ‘auti-Animat Bislogical Warfare party Sop0ud0g0 200" EFENSE see eee eeeeett Intelligence Protective SMa Detection and Id Conclusion ORGANIZATION AND MANAG Organization see ererrttt Management cveere sees tt Sinprovement of inter- end Intra~ ‘Service Management Relations - + THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE POTENTIAL seer eet Paychological Implications pxtrapolation aad Tazget Eifects - Agents os aeceeees es ttt Sclentifle Principles of Dissemiza- ton Aad secting Fa 184 105 189 195 199 210 245? am ee ee eee eececeecececee ee 227 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS. «+ sees s tees 253 GLOSSARY OF TERMS -.s.sseeceeeunees css oe ee edPREFACE wighe Hetozy of Ax Fores ws gamoleted by the AMF september 1952 it examines the DOR mraittee Regewt 4 USAF; ARDC: ‘AMG, and © oan records awaiiable 21 interviews Stevenson Get quarters. gupplemented BY ae However, the history snakes no claizn to peing complete 1 rime Umitations did nat pesmit examination a xestricted 0 Ais Force agencies point of views jeted area of yesearch, twat not phe progese pecause of its complexity: aia not permit wide generalization! gummed vp 12 simple black oF sehite wide difference! not siwaye canid Ht BE terme. Mozreovete ther were g of opinions wa reflected reasoned criticism of past errors. personal and P Some vie artisan in thelr implications Others were HOFE yiwod2 and had their origin in judgrnents that were somewhat preje udiced, It was inevitable, therefore, that anything more than a surface analysis led inte highly controversial areas. And by the same token it waa to be expected that some conclusions represent a compromise of views. oe : Hothwithetanding, om one voint there waa general accord; the evbstential fonde expeaded on biologita! warfare munitions had not brought commensurate returns. ‘There hed becn no dramatic fraition of the bright hopes entertained for the biolog~ ieal warfare program in 1951, Examined 2t close range, the initial planning seems to have met with a tremendous lack of succesesothere was a definite gap between planning ani per formance. But in a longer perspective it seeme clear that much was accomplished. In less than five yeare the program + went from a email beginning to an unduly expanded effert and thence ‘tc the stabilized position which it needed a0 badly. Meanwhile, the military services had developed a capability in: biological warfare, however Mmited: and they had sparked a consclouaness of the need for developing new weapon systems to fit the pattern of a future war, Even if they learned what not to do, thie was important.ad If the Air Force had its "druthez: it might bave acted differently. But in the last auulysis, all policies muat be considered in the light of the circumstances existing et the time. ‘The Stevenson Gommitice bed urged 2 strong biolog- ical warfare program. The Juint Chieis of Staff had placed this progvam in # top pricrity category- Ail eubacquent guidance indicated that considerable urgency existed to attain an operational readiness 2¢ soon as possible, This was an enormous responsiaility, particularly in view of the fact that the work was comparatively aew to the military services. Decisions often had to be mads before all the facts were in and before future trends could be judged. Therefore, any policies formulated in that trying period command a respectful hearing: and any opinion as to the motivee underlying those policies: can be enly poreonal opinions--nothing more: ‘There is, therefore, 2G need to defend the ‘piclogieal warfare program againdt the sterile defeatiom of disenchanted perfectioniste. Nor is there tay wish to ait in judgment on the program's leadership. Ldke most reports by outside groups, this study reflects the writer's limited knowledge> Tégeme and experience and is weakened farther by the writer's pers sonal philosophy. Rather, the attempt {s made here to dincuss, in a comprehensive and objective way, the action taken during the period being reviewed and to present some of the background and thinking that led ¢c the decisions,0 ame & INTRODUCTION Biological warfare is defined as the military utilization of bacteria, virunes, rickettsiae, fungi, toxins, and plant Srowth regulators to oroduce a lethal or incapacitating decase in man end animals ex te destroy oF injure crope. The terms alec includes defease aspects, For centecies the possible use of bloiogical agents is warfare had intrigued the imagination of military planners, However, it was not until the 1940's that the United States initlated the development of dieease producing organisms for Postible military application, ‘The need was plain, since intelligence sources had cited German end Japanese interest in thie type of research. After World War If this field of endeavor tock on added importance. By that time cvente had thoroughly guited the concent of the forty-eight otates As 2 anug fortress, with aceaus tor walle, The United States wes faced with potential enemies having numerically superior manpewez. Obvicusly iia alr force needed additional weapons in Its argenad, and the biological warfare weapon appeared to be a promising candidate, eeThe initial emphasis on » biological warfare program resulted from the major recommendations of the Stevenson ees gubmitted on 30 June 1959. With two exceptions, Secretary of Defence George C. Marshall approved thosc recommendations on 26 October anc directed their impls- mentation. In that same month General athan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, outlined the alr staff responsibilities for prepering the United States Alr Force to use biological agents, if required. On 21 February of the following year the Joint Chiefe of Staff placed the biological warfare pro- gram in strategic category I and charged the Air Force with developing a world-wide combat and defensive capability. And on 20 June 1951 the Vics Ghief of Staff made the Assistant Deputy Chief ef Steff, Operations, responsible for carcying out the Joint Ghiefs of Staff directive. That office directed tts Assistant for Atomic Energy to monitor 2 USAF biological warfare program and to establish within its orgenizationsl framework # biological warfare~-chemical * Mr. Earl P. Stevenson was the chairman of the ad hoc committee invited by the Secretary of Defense to review the BW-CW program. wa. ° @4 Eef21061 _ ~warfare division and also to w2t up the necessary supporting field agencies. All subsequent topeleve! guidance eald, in substance, to get on with the job of getting a capability at the earliest possible time/ The work proceeded on 2 high priority basis and wae stimulated further by the onset of the Koreau War ead the uneasy peace which os Between October 1950 and December 1951 the military servicer expanded their research and development program carried out procurement projects, planned production facii- ite, and te some extent engaged in construction of such facilities. A few munition prototypes were undergoing tests. Studies had been initiated preliminary to developing doctrine and plans. But there were recognized deficiencies in the program, ‘he services lacked reliable test data. The development of doctrine, operational plans, and logietic equipment and procedures hed failed te keep pace with munition development, Asa result, the USAF was not prepared in biclegical warfare, sor wae the planning adequate tc ineure that preparedness in the near future. Much remained to be done to eatlefy military requirements 2 to get the capability desired. Be 6A Eahes =eOn 15 January 1952 General Twining established a time phased program for attaining an early capability and set forth the respective responsibilities of the Air Force ee Although amended in July 1952 to establish more realistic 4 the so-called Twining directive was te become one of the most controversial elements of the entire biclogiesl warfare program. ‘otwithstanding, it remcined the major plece of guidance until its rescission in the latter part of 1953. Adsitional guidance included the USAF operating pro- gram for special weapons published in March 1952, which assigned a specific capability to Air Force units, This document represented the first indication of an actual Air Force capability in biological warfare. Another major piece of guidance was the "USAF Biological Warfare--Chemical Warfare Objectives Program" published in the latter part of 1953. This document consolidated Air Staff objectives. . By 1953 the Air Force, working on a crash basis with the Army Chemical Corps, had achieved a limited capability I ® General Twining did not change the assigninent of reapon- sibilities ag set forth in the October 1950 memorandum. ‘The project initiated by his directive was designated "Project Respondent" (Confidential). ts 64in the use of anti-persounel and anti-crop biological agents, | a had been standardized, . Only one anti-personnel m: ae i This was the M33, {Ned with Bruestia Suis (standardized | by the Chemical Corps as{____\The anti-crop capability | = was represented by the 14115 (forraerly the £73) filled with wheat and rye rest 3 In addition, the Air Force had daveloped on anti-crop spray system (the MG-1) for use in dissemi ing chemical growth inhibitors. These munitions were stockpiled and ready for operational use if directed by higher authority, ‘These achievements were commendable, but they fell far short of expectations, Asa result, ths Air Soree found | itself caddled with procuremeat programs fer munitions of Questionable military value. For example, the M33 riunition had critical defictencies, Area coverage wag cmall. to logistic and operational Mmitatioas were many and difficult | to remove. Although its operations] use generated only \ moderate personnel and specialised training requiremezts, the need fox equipment excceded the bounds of reason. Particularly cerious waz the fact that the Alr Force had Ecen unab!e to ceme up with leer: ve targets for biologicalmunitions. And little waa known of the psychological and economic effect the use of such weapons would have upon, an enemy people. ‘The ambitious efforts launched by the Twining directive had failed to produce satisfactory reeults. Research and development had failed ta support plaoning estimates, and the neaz future held out imal! hove for substantia: improve. ment. Obviously, the situatioa called dor a more critical look at the program end 2 vedefinition of poliey and objectives. In October 1953 the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff rescinded the Twining directive, and on 5 March 1954 the Secretary of Defense gave official status to a re-oriented biological warfare program which was te provide the much - needed change in direction. The Air Force committed itself to the policy ef delaying procurement of a biclogical munition until reasonably aure of ite effectivences. Em- phasis was to be on a long range research and development Ll pregram which would reault in superior weapons.-not merely incremental improvements to existing munitions, That is, instead of continuing to polish "gadgets" that showed Little promise, the services were to get munitions , Ee Le. 64? fils mem 9that would be worthy of the money and tims expended ia 6 their development. ‘The redirceted program placed the emphasis upon the development of o lethal, rather than an incapacitating, weapon. The wi dom of this decision did not go unchallenged. tn the nuclear weapon the Air Force already had a d: levastating icthal weapon, aad many favored expleiting the unique possibil- ities offered by the biological munition as an incapac! weapon, But there was general agreement thet orce could not afford to continue on a course that so far kad led to doubtful end items. Everyone considered the realigned pro- real gram a mor istic epproach to proving, or disproving, the military worth of a biological weapon system. By the end of 1954 the military services h2d completed the major part of the development and testing of the Z61 biological bomb filled with Bacillus anthrac!-.__.. \together with the required logistic susport. The superiority of this lethal anti-persoanel munition-agent combination over # ‘M33 was by no means a foregone conclusion. However, its development was highly significant to the over-all biological warfare program because the work aa pursue objectivity of purposs that was alry oa™ t the M33 project. Attention was being given to logistic and training considerations concurrently with development and a Crt—a: to reassign the biological wariare Program to its appropriate Place in military planning, Proponents of biological munitloue did not ask for special consideration; they asked oaly that the potential of such munitions not be judged by previous inferior reaulta, Many areas remained io be explored. Fox example, Blological warfare held tremendous Psychological implica. Hons, which so far had received only word play, They Considered it « fallacy to regard the biological weapon as of @ biciogical munition by Comparing it to the nuclear weapon was like Judging sheep and goats in the same ring at a fair, Bach had its own speciai capabilities and limitations. They felt that under certain cizcumstances, biological munitions might cuzpaee all other weapon types in effectivences, tn the Gaal analysis, however, only the Progress made in developing efficient munition-agent combinations, together With their supporting logis Systems, could determine the etature the blological warfare Program would attain in future Aix Force planning. To summarize, the original planning had failed to Produce truly effective munitions, Management had been e . 4: ‘ VORA eer2 critical area, Lut the mest form idzble barrier to the suecessiul military application of the biologies! warfare potential had proved to be the serious gope f= technical kmowledge. The reoriented program, based upon more conservative policies, was designed to semove that barrier, In seveloping the’. _umunition, the cervices oS had corrected meny of their carlier mistakes, And {2 was hoped that the evaluation of this munition by the Weapons Systems Evaii all biological uation Group would be favorable to the over- 7 ziare program.Ke CCN! a HL M33 BIOLOGICAL CLUSTER Bou The devotion cf an entize chapter to the M33 biological bomb in no Wattects to the importance this munition oceupled in war plans. The 33 was not effictent and everybody knew ic, But {t was the only standardised anti-personnel Biclogical Weapon, and it had served a useful purpose. Ina sense it had served as a valuable training vehicle. Deseriztion The 1433 consisted of 108 of the M114 four-pousd Biological bombs contained in the M26 slust: | The munition used the noze i bombs from clester, The componeat bomba in turn used an explosive charge to break the munitions Container and to epread the agent fill over the targetarea, - j The M114 could dissem inate concentrated Brucella ovis and Brucella imslitensi: Brucella suis (undulant fever) wae the most infectious Species of Brucella and had been standard); The agent wan didseminated through an acrocel and had to be taken individually into respiratory ¢vst, malaise, weakness, aches and usual aymptoms were peins, cnorexia, aad nig! sweats, sometimes accompanied by mental depression. Since these symptoms were char- acteristic of other diseases, undulant fever caused by a biological warfare attack would be difficult to diagnose. éGeguate therapy did not exist, and it was difficult to pre- 1 vent ization procedares, The M33 was primarily 2 strategic weapon for use at high aiti de. It was designed as an “area weapon’ at is, it did not pinpoint targets, This $00-pound munition fulfilled USAF requirements for a biological weapon to incapacitate enemy perecnnel in the event of v ©, However, it was eesentially an faterim n io: and waa to be replaced by the E133 in order to meet USAF requirements for the 759+ 22 pound new cerics cluster,OUR Defictencies | The M33 was standardized in 1951. Subsequently the smunition was stockpiled, operational plans were written, 4 logistic equipment was developed, versonne) were trained, and techniques were developed and incorporated {a proce» @ural documents, The Air Force had a continuing emergency capability with this munition, but it well kiew thal the 433 was ne match for nuclear weapons. Because of ite woight the M114 had to be carried {a small numbers and go the area Coverage was small, The agent was dlaseminated from the bomb by the explosion of a central burster, and enly a small Percentage of bacteria carried in the bomb was distributed fn the viable aerosol and in the particle aize (1-5 :olezons) which was best for infection via the lunge. ‘Thin meant that a lot of munitions were required to achieve effective coverage. I adiition, the 1433 was not compatible with the aerodynamic shaper and speeds of new type aircraft, Original USAF guldauce had specified tnternal carriage in bombardment type aircraft, Later it wae expanded to specify delivery > it by fighter-bomber type aircraft alse, but this capability " What would not exist unt!! external carriage was possible ould vot exist watt-AYrequirements for a biological anti-personnel munition, At that time the improved prototype bomb was designated the E48, ifodificatioas were made, and in 1951 the 243R2 model was stendardized as the MIl4 biological bomb. This bomb was the component bomb for the biological cluster which the Chemical Corps standardized as the M33. Stand- ardization action was taken at the request of Headquarters USAF. It was approved on 12 January 1951 by the Chem- 21 Corpa Technical Committee and subsequently approved by USAF headquarters.” The Air Force waived service tests 5 pricr to standardization. |e al The selection of Ths standardized in 1949 before many logistics problema had been worked out, Standardization action had broucat research on this ageat-Gill virtually to an end, leaving 6 unsolved many technical problems relating to logistics. a4 ‘The early stondardization of thy __,\munition-agent a combination had: ug consequences, It was not untilcompleting operational cuitability testing pric# to taking etandardizstion action. Perhaps the Air Force should have recognized the implications, but Air Force people were eascn- tlally operators, act acientisto, and so may have been justified In leaving it up to the more experienced judgment ef the Chem- 7 ical Corps to satisfy the criteria for standardization, On the other band, the Chemical Corps was under pressure. in recponse to the Stevenson Committec recommendations, the USAF wanted to stockpile biological munitions, end, upon the strong recommendation of the Chief Chen ab Officer, had ix Getober 1950 initiated procurement action for 5,601 clusters (later standardized ac the. os os Standardization did not mean that the Air Force was completely satisfied with this munition. Nor did it indicate necessarily that the developing ageacy acted arbitrarily, without concerning itself with whether or not the munition « 9 acceptable to the service for which it was developed. The USAF stated urgent sequircmente 1S for a biological werinye munitlen, and the ~ i & amf [Ey hoe simply the best available at the thme, Its as gometimes necessary te have 2 capability to respond to possible enemy action without waiting for the most desirable research objective. Gn 20 August 1952 the USAF started action to buy 13,900 a 9 additions! _\eiusters. Thie completed procurement acti al on thin anti-pezzenze! biological muni a ion. By that time, 23,900 clusters had been funded for by tsaue of military inter> departmental purchase requests to the Chemical Corps and were definite oblig ted funds so far ac the USAF was concerned, Testing In the summer of 1950, limited field tz3 a at the Dugway Proving Ground using the—acluster and MI14 bombs filled with Z rucella and simulants. They were air dropped and fired singly, ctatieally, and in groups. During calendar year 1951, a yelusters were cropped frorn B-29 type raft at Dugway. Two clusters wereted Brucella guis. It was estimated that 8 to 14 clusters would be required ~ te provide 13 to 25 per cent infectivity over 2 one-equare mile to area. These tects were satisfactory as far aa thoy went. They indicated that the biological weapon had to be reckoned with ac a potentially effective muai tion, However, it waa evident that large scale fleid tests would have to be zun bafore the Air Force could determine the cperationa thio agent-munition combination. At a conicreace on 13 March 1952, attended by representatives of the USAF and Army Che: cal Cozps, it was decided to conduct additional ——.iluster using clusters filled with live teating cf th agent in mass érops. Sinal operational suitability testing of tht was performed by the Aix Proving Ground and began on 2 June - 1952, The test was a joint effort of the USAF and Chem- seal Corps. All phoses were monitored and evaluated by 6 ARDC technical consultants, The logistic phase was consultants were participants in tho”, ?Ss! ae) testing operation was nicknamed {qr eccompli hed at Eglin Afr Force Base, Actucl bombing was performed at Dagwey Proving Ground. The objectives 3 - were (1) to determine the user suitability of TF agent- filed 1433 clusters when released from medium bombers; {2} to determine the necessary protective measures for handling and storing: and (2) to provice operational expe7+ tence from which the Air Force could develop tactics and techaiques end could evaluate the organizational and logis- Heal requirements and the poychological implications involved. The test consisted of five trials. Camp Detrick (the Chemicat Cazps researeh and pilot plant facility) ‘illed the bomblets!with____tthen sent them to the Edgewood Arseash ee for clustering. The arsenal furnished the Air Proving | Ground with 10 M433 clusters filled with Brucella suiz, ples one control cluster in aa unarmed coaditioa which was filled with representative samp ¢ of the production lots of agent. The Air Proving Ground Commend transported cach shipment by B-59 aircrait to Eglin Air Force Base, Sy at the proper altitude to maintain the viability the agent BM, At Eglin thi cunitions were unloaded and pleced fn Temperature recordings weTe esat least once every hour throughout she entire storage period. Samples of ths agent were withdrawn from the control cluster In order to get the viability count of the agent after arrival of the munitions at Eglin. A second sampling was taken just prior to each strike mission. | B-50 aireraft flew the munitions from Eglin te Dugway. After each mi: on the aircraft landed at Dugway (or st HiT Ax Force Base} and tumed over to the Chemical Corps the representative samples of the control cluster fox farther laboratory processing. To insure safety, technical escort was flown in C-124 aircraft, | Upon completion of cach bomb- ing mission, test personnel and air and weather crows were questioned and a tranzeript mide of thelx observations. tthe target area was located on level terrain 18 miles froma the nearest inhabited dwelling. The 11,000 guinea pigs used as test animala were placed in trenches and in the pre~ fabricated houses constructed especially for the purpose. the enimais were boxed, with only thelr heads exposed. Two hours after bombing they were taken to the animal storage area in the biological laboratory, After 6 30-day waiting period for incubation, autopsies and laboratory analysee were made. nc eR teaseraz : On 19 March 1953 the Air Proving Ground Command issued its final report on the user suitability tests run on the M33 munition, The repozt covered force requizements, munition peeeeaa and logistic support requirements. In brief, it concluded that the M33 cluster provided an additional item $x the USAF arsenal of weapons since it could infect hostile troops and civilians with a debilitzting illness, Howe ever, the report pointed out that the M33 would not be sultabte operationally until cextain logistic and operational limitations had been overcome. Also, personnel would have to have epecialized training in handling the munition. ° ‘This report made a worthwhile contribution to the M33 project. It made suggestions for improvement in derign and in field testing. But the test data were = limited to give much weight to the conclusions reached. Also, the 1952 tests, £0 did the teate run in 1951, showed 2 lack of cosr- —_— ® The report stated that the M33 bomb cluster with Brucella ~) guia compared with the atomic bomb would produce only “T7s to 1/2 as many casualties in an attack on a typical \ target city, bet would require 7 times ag many bombers. \ ft stated that the average logs of labor force during the \ first year after an attack would be 44 per cent for the | atomic bomb, but only 7 per cent for a biblogical munition, | eee ga ou823 08} cea. oe 4OP Sams : “t coordination in the planning phases, leading to delays. It was cvident:that more thought would have to be given to organization and management of future testing programs.” Production Quantity production of biological agents did not impose insuperable difficulties. ‘The essential raw materials were aveileble on the open market, and eaninment aud techaiques were elmilar to those used in production of antibiotics. ‘The main problem was in safeguarding the workers, Inter< tank contamination had to be reduced to the minimum, and any leakage or explosion had to be localized as much a2 possible. Biological agents were being produced at the pilot plant facility at Camp Detrick and at the Vigo plant, which was built during World War If at Terre Haute, Indiana, end later Leaged to Industry, However, the amount being turned out was not sufficient for needs in the event of war. Since agents died off rapidly they could not be stockpiled. Therefore, production facilities had to be available when weeded, and this was the responsibility of the Chemical “Corps. The Air Force merely submitted an eatimate of Ite requirements in terms of complete items.fom ‘The Chemical Corps! first production plant for vegeta- tive type bacterial agents (not spores and virus types} was econ eee ree se phere Authority to begin construction waa a memorandum dated 31 October 1950 from Sceretary of Defense Marshall to Secretary of the Army Pace, ut prior to that tle, process design studiee for the plant had been cersied on by the Blaw-Kaoe Gonstruction Company, a authorized by Chemical Corps contract issued 23 May 1950. This study contract was converted to a letter contract on 6 October 1950 by the Chief of Engineers, with the approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, The letter contract permitted the company to proceed with site investigation and with the study of architectural and structural features not included In the firat contract. On 18 December of that year the letter contract was converted to a formal contract and full scale engineering effort started at once. At fret the construction company cousidered under= ground as well as surface construction, but decided in, — ee * Redesignated Production Development Laboratories {n, March 1954. ose PR ee feesee favor of an above-ground plant to be located at Pine Bluer, As conet: Stlon progressed, the Stoze of Changed because of Fequizemerts for additionat equipmens, Personnel, maintenance, end Noor space, The fina} cost, The results of the hot Fun test com. Pleted in December indicated that the plant ould operate well beyond design Sspacity and that nafety Precactions 12 Were adequate, a Thereafter, quantities Aivere . i at the arsenal. The agent was held in tanke for from 14 to Placed in storage, Weeki Enough agent £11 was being matntatned to Pe x be increased excent to replace qentities that had dete rtoras,Qa a ox had been released for testing purpores upon the express authorization of Headquarters USAF. a As stated, the X-201 plant was built at a final coat of $84,000,000, The arsenal had several thousand employees. It was preparing biological agents which might never be used in war operations. Moreover, the plant was operating at cnly about 16 per cent of its capacity, It was inevitable, therefore, that its corietruction could not ¢2cape ee But te must be noted that the decision to create the big estab- lishment _ ‘ade in the interests of strengthening the nation's preparedness. Operational plans called for main- taining an adequate quantity of fill on hand at all times. Bince clustered munitions would have to be filled and loaded on short notice, the Chemical Corpe had no aliernative but ” to maintain the plant on a ready standby basis. Strategic and Operational Concept In £981 the Air Materiel Command asked for data on tactical and strategic planning, since euch plana would ne * Eventually USAF headquarters authorized the AMC to “release items without auch authorization, but AMC war to notify headquarters in the event of requests fox unu- aval quantities.2 influence the design of logistical supporting organizations and procedures. Guidance subsequently furnished by the Joint Chiefe of Staff was based on the ascumpticn that the natlonal policy governing the operational use of chemical agents would be applicable also to the operational use of Biological agents.. This policy specified that such agents _ gould be used operationally only to retaliate against an. aggreseor. Stocks were to be maintained ix the Zone of the Interior and could be released only by direction of Headquarters USAF, following authority iseusd by the President of the United ae Biological munitions were to be used simultaneously with other type bombing operations, and attacke were to be directed primarily against strategic os he concept thet the blological weapon was primarily a strategic weapon was generally accepted because most biological agents were slow to act and their use was im practical in close contact fighting or in sitnations of rapidly changing positions. Ales, their nse in tactical es * This restriction set the biological weapon in 2 separate categery from the so-called conventional weapons.operations, particularly if a quick acting tethal type agent were used. In any case, an atack in a tactica) situation would have to be thmed well in advance of assault type operations so that the agents would be moat effect ite Just prior ¢o or during the assault and ec that the using forces i could protect their own troops, “ ‘To plan for the logistic support of a bidlogical weayon, the AMG had to have an approved operational concept. But the Air Force ran into a snag on this point, The M33, for example, had been standardized before a firm logistic concept had been formulated. Ag-e result, the AMC could not recommend any one system of logistic support. The best it could do was to present several possible variations of a basic eyetem from which the USAF could detezmine the one moat compatible with its current planning. The leck of a firm operational concept also handicapped the ARDG ix providing the necessary eupport equipment. - ‘As stated previously, original USAF guidance called for 2 central control type of operation, Empty bombs were ~ to be stored in the Zone of the Interior. fillrd when needed, am aoe.Pee and airlifted into the combat area, ‘That guidance bad deter~ mined the ultimate design of the M33 cluster and had influenced the Chemical Corps ix ite standazdization action, Dut this guidance bad been based on the hypothesis that ouly a few munitions would be required per target, and by 1951 that concept was ne longer valid. i was then apparent that alr~ fe requirements would be excessive, Since §7,000 Ma3e would be needed fo cover 30 target arezs consisting of 30 square miles each, 1,221 C-54 aircraft equivalents would be required. It was evident that some means of assembling components in strategic areas was necessary. Therefore, the Air Force proposed that agenta be developed that could be packed in separate disposable containers, sent overseas, and stored. Empty bombs could be assembled overscae es required, This would _stmplify and reduce transportation needs, allow for constant resupply of viable agents, and reduce the chance of the Alr Force being caught without biclegical munitionr at the oncet of war, This concept had been presented by the ARDC in i981. Four years later the command was etill awaiting a final USAF headquarters determination, ‘Aga reeuit, the ARDC had been placed in the difficult <2 ¢ Bek oer on' ; THe, : | position of having to outguese the operational and logictic | a8 people in developing equipment for | ‘The oversees assembly of biological munitions was | i nota simple matter, First of all, agents would have to be + = }for = | ezwise, the Chemical Corpe would prabab! example; Prefer to ship as ncede: Also, the consent of foreign Severnments to stockpile munitions overseas would have | ment, i itze:i | By this time, completion Zilen-agent combination (the Deeitlas enthracis) that would permit over Opezational Plans Operational Sas The Tsining directive made the Air Force responsible for developing operations! plaad and their sepporting log tes for the biological warfare munition. Headquarter® : USAF delegated this responsibility te the Air Materiel Cora- mand, That co and then prepored an operational plan tgnated AMC | for the use of the M33, to be effective } July 1953. Dea- revision cach suceceding year. Operational Plan 13-53 related to the movement of wey 1433 clusters filled with B a suit Ito an over- seas theater, The plon eciled for su face movemzot concurrest with rement. It was to work this way.i a If the President of the United States authorized the combat use of biological weapons (and he would do #0 only in retaliation) USAF headquarters would notify AMC to initiate action. The AMC then would notify the Chemical Gorpe to deliver complete rounds to the aerial port des- ignated. The Chemical Corps would fill the munition on a crash basic at {ts production plant, lead 12 temperature control trailers with 30 M353 clustere each, and move them over the highway to the. aerial port. Each shipment would be accompanied by Chemical Corps technicians, qualified to perform decontamination in the event of leakage of agent from the containers, At the aerial port the trailers would be loaded on G-124 aircraft furnished by the Military Air Transport Service, complete with crews, Military escort would go aboard. At the overseas destination (USAFE areas only} the cargo would be turned over to the air depot wing designated by the Strategic Air Command to receive it. ‘The depot wing would then deliver the munitions te the combat unit and be responsible up to the time of sctual loading on strike aircraft, If additional strike missions were planned, the trailers would be reloaded on the aircraft end flown back i cul, <3 G4 2252 1A6ka to the Zone of the Interior- Otherwise, the airplanes would be released for other use and the traller# would be returned by narinex within 49 houre after Being emptied, When the sitjat alsiife requirement had been mets the filing plant in the Zons of the Interior was to atart shioment 57 surface carries in ordcr to sustain the overseas ESET requires woents of 2, 600 munitions = month. ‘cherefore, (ransport ships, ne well ae aircrntt, would have f0 be equipped to accommodate temperature control trailers which would protect the viability of the agent fill. the Chemical Corps was responsible for storing ané asuing biological sunitions and agents within the continental limits of the United States, Ths Air Force assumed that responsibility at the porte and overseas Logistic support was to be integrated into the normal ammunition support i system, not divorced as was the cas® with the atomic bomb. overseas air depots were to requisition, recelttr store, CLrrC———— == prescribed by yy of its own weapon! weapons and the necessa7¥ specialized equipment were pandled in normal supply chaanels: and technical traiaing pan pandied in established training courte? in each servicesthe area air commander. Reaupply of technical handling equipment was to be 02 & requisitioning basis. The AMC \ was to arrange for procurement (by the Chemical Gorps) : of the munitions and for receigt, Storrs maintenance, and iasue of biblogical munitions, plus the necessary ancillary equipment (such a6 the refrigerator van and mobile surveillance eel and the required defense equipment for all USAF units at directed by Headquarters USAF. ta summary, munitions could be released only by authority from the President. No prestocking meant alr movement ona demand basia. Also, special tyes of aiz= erait were needed. Specially trained personnel and sp¢~ Galiaed equipment had to be provided. Provisions had to be made for handling munitions in case of accident. The lable & Support equipment wae committed before it ws nequaily. Delivery of the refrigerated vane did not begin tntil August, and the mobile surveillance Jahoratery was till undergoing fabrication. Howeves: the operational plan could have been used if necess88) ‘Normally “avail< ability" means that the equipment hae deen standardized: catalogued, stocknumbered, and given fo & prime air saateriel area, ‘Thie support equipment ¥a* not available in that sense. 33-plan involved the use of other major command bases and ports. It required special allocations of airlift, and it called for Chemical Corps personel to act as escort and as etandby emergency decontamination teamse ‘The revised plan for the year 1954 was essentially the same. ‘The Tactical Aiz Command was to provide the necessary base eupport, designate the loading area, arrange for security measures, and provide its people with protective couipment, Alexandria Air Force Base was designated the derial port of embarkation: Brookley Air Force Base, the alternate oe Under the cizcumstances, AMG een planning was ratisfactory. However, tht planners were not happye Since stocks were kept in the Zone of the Interior, the AMG had te prepare plans that could be put into effect at any time, and in any theater, 08 directed by USAF heade quarters, (By that time the requirement for an operational capability had been extended te include TAG and FEAF.) ‘Au a result some AMC people felt that In trying to prepare for almost every eventuality they were preparing poorly for any one. Actually, at the end of 1954 the European Ra =>? < Sas”) continent and North America were the only areas where the Alr Foree could logistically eusport the M33 munition, ‘The use of plans In other areas, such as the Far Eaat. would be restricted by the limited amount of equipment available. Moreover, the AMG ceople monitoring the program had not been permitted personal contact with overseae commanders, and they felt they were merely aitting at AMG headquarters trying to “outguesa" the commanders {n operational theaters, This sense of frustration was Aggravated by their opinion that the biological warfare program had not received the necessary support within the AMG special weapons offic, In their opinion, cven at top Air Force levels the essential guidance had not always been forthcoming, In that connection, however. it must be recognized that USAF headquarters did not always have all the answers, Biological warfare was 4 new field. Platning documents could not anticipate all the questions that might arise. . Not until some precedent had been extablished could USAY headquarters come up with certain information necessary for AMC planners to have, a ‘ Dl. » Some dissatistaction also was expressed with the amount m~ of cooperation AMG had received from operational commanders, Wri etd el they needed refines ment:. The AMC needed a statement of une concept, but had Feceived only 2 genera) statement with resnect to hovw the Strategic Air Command, for example, proposed to use the Biological munition, This was not surprising. That com- ¢ mand bad looked at the M33 and did not like it, One aizplans and one atemle bomb could do x tremendous job, but the stlectlve use of the M33 took a lot of alreraft and a Jot of bombs. General LeMay had to haul the weapon that would give the Biggest return per payload. He could not afford fe reduce bis atomic capability by carrying an inferior Biological wezpon, a ( Nevertheless, the Strategic Alr Command could nat srbitrarily reject biologicst munitions. Natloaal policy a = eorecbluy cae Sommands had to plan for thelr possible vse. However, the policy did not require them to use such munitions unlees they would prova advantageous. ‘That is, thelr tise would bs determined by the nature of the selected target, the effects desired, and the rffectivencas > 42a weapon types available. In mo case could commanders use them unless specifically authorized to do os Logistic Support With respect to Jogistice planning, one major error stands out above ali others. This was the failure to reallas that logistics planning should coincide with the development and testing of 2 biological munitica, Until May 1953 only five per cont of the effort expended on the biological war- fave program had been devoted to logistics. The AMC did not collaborate in testing the M33, Little of the data collected was collected specifically for application to handling, storage, and surveillance procedures. Logis- tice information was fragmentary, leading te tentative conclusions, Aga result, = capability wae declared with the M33 before it could he supported logistically. What in the beginning had seemed to be of minor Importasce-= the development of an adequate support syatom--turned eut to be of major importance; for unless a munition can be supported, it can be of mall interest to the prospective user. Eventually this basic principle waa te receive due recognition, But in the case of the M33, the Air Force ae. sweiTicehad bought a munition that required excessive logistics equipment and for which logistle procedures and techniquet 23 CO were inadequate. Transport Egaipment [At one time the USAF was studying five possible sys~ tems for support of the M33. The two tasic systems proposed the use of temperature controlled trailera to transport either fitted M33 clusters or the M114 componsat bombs from the Chemical Corps plant at Pine Bluff to the ports of embarka~ tion. A szecial purpose vehicle of this nature Was necded pecause transportation from the production site to the target was a most crucial test for a biological munition: ‘As time gocs of, the viability of the ageat decreases and the munition becomes 2 pidlogical dud; Therefore, agent life had to be protected against temperature extremes, and handling and storage bad to be meticulously controlled. The use of a refrigerated trailer, oT Vat soemed to be the best solution to this problem. Early in 1953, Headquarters USAF authorized procure> ment of a refrigerated van and allocated approximately $640, 006 to the project. Although a standard commercial article, the van required certain changes to meet military ae@ 2 ee specifications. The Wright Air Development Center assisted in {ts development, and by August 1953 delivery was being ‘ a made of the 67 refrigerated vans on procurement. Yor storage purposes these trailers offe: ed many ade vantages over the permanent type igiess. they could be moved easily from one theater te another, and they efim- inated rehandling in storage and vequired less equipment. (On the other hand, they required more security guards, were more vulnerable to enemy sir attacks, and incurred higher operating costs becouse of the number cf units needed. Moreover, the limited number on procurement obviously could not meet total requirements, They would have to be kept shuttling back and forth between the Zone “ of the Interlor and overseas, Even if the AMC wanted to use thers for storage (which was not Ikely} there wore not encugh fer thls purpose, Still another major restriction to the use of these trailer bodies as shipping containers was their weight, They weighed 5,800 peunds, ond only €-124 aircraft cocld carry them. : As & result, favorable consideration was given to the concept of having the depots preheat egents prior te delivering clusters to the Strategic Air Command. Themethod was technically feasible, and it would eliminate the need for the trailer mounted refrigerators. Prebeating the agent would make it possible for any type aizcraft, with the possible exception of B-36"s, to My the munition to its 25 destination. zveillance rent Lo make sure that only effective clusters were used In actual operations the agent fill had to ba aesessed for viability count and freedom from contamination. Therefore, the surveillance (or maintenance) of a biclogical munities, was ons of the most vital elements ia the logistics system. Notwithstanding, until 1953 only slight attention had been given to this phase of logistics been handfeagzed by the lack of suitable sampling devices and sampling techalques, Since spectal!: hazards were Involved in assessing biological agent fille, ouch of the equipment and many of the techniques wacd for nrveillance of chemical and high explosive munitions were uot agplh<- cable directly to biological warfaze items. In addition, agencies were unwilling (pathaps were unabl 2) to agree: in advance oa what constituted adequate criteria for assessment.Two additional decign were proces 3 poses. They were modified to incorzorate safety features and guitable equipment for azceseing biologics! agents. Only two trailers were bought for this purpose because at that cnly two overseae area were contemplated for possibte biological warfare operations, The laboratories were to be given to the overseas theater depot ammunition gquadron when directed by USAF headquarters, The entire operation (developing and testing of 2 mobile taboratory trailer for surveillance of the M33 munition filled en ‘in overseas areas} Waa identifidd by the nickname eo “TA it wos © Heodquazters USAF-dizected — | project, requiring a special one-time installation, Tt was under the supervision end control of the Wright Air Develop- ment Centex, which desigacd the lsyout, installed the equip ment, ond tested it, The center got the munition from Pine Bluff arsenal, exponed it in a test chamber tn an jooleted pert of Wright-Patterson Aix Force Bace, and made testa % Nomencizture ble, Type MAusing qeality control niques cad analyses. The results Were to provide weitien Inborctory procedures £07 aasescin’ nitions asd en evaluation of the adequacy of the =a “TJ used two sampling methods. — one invelved the removal of bomblets fgom a comple cluster for examination. The ether tqvolved the use of 3 small metal container would give the same beat trancic? characteristics ef the cluster. The second system W28 simel npractical. thy the sampling done at Eglin in 3 test cxerciss. Although the ciusters were modified to facilitate bomblet removal, 1 took 1 1/2 manhours to remove One pomblet from a cluster after the ti-downa were removed. However, Headquarters USAT waa epposed to the large scale ex resentative sample container for the 333. The M23 wae an interiz , and it seemed inadvisable to increase theemount of equipment te’ support tt. Alr Fores headquarters n was to increase the accet-- Sbility of the bor! and to take the test campie directly from the bomblet removed from a ustor, Its replacement by a dummy bomblety it was thought, would not eeriously lower the effectivences of the cluster. i The’ operation was completed in October 1954. Although the laborstories proved satisfactory, 20 more were to be manufactured because * more efficient neseooment method waa being developed By the Chemical This waa the éye reduction test met os . However, Taboratozic a would not go begging. ‘The Surgeon General could make use of them is studying tho epidemicity of biological agents, and the WADS could une them ia support of its ficld teats. These laboratorize were later modified to support the surveillance phase of 26 the £$1/N munition development. In October 1954 the Di ectorate of Supply and Services at USAF headquarters directed the AMC commander to tnue to cevelopan Integrated logistic system for the 3433 within the Limits of the sv st equipment aval ble.got flat) USAF lens range objec- dives, an sécanate Jogictic system pad to be Teadys . Bg that time the sotlowing clemeats constituted the m=}oF postion of the logistic support system for the M33 munition. AMG Cperational pla 13-545 dated 5 May 1954 (32 amended) had beea distributed 27 he Army said it could support the plea. The F soduction plazt could f= eat ,2,000 M33 clusters a, month if sequited: geraware for 23,900 clusters #36 oF hand. Technical cree? pad been distributed OF were being revised. Thee included one which gutlined defense one gecoctamination procesuse? aad include calculating the amouat of prebeating requi: misolon, Asothet specified individual thon equipment. c, for anaaying was peing prepared. Since nome tecbaical oFSS=* bad been sgritten origin ly £7 gupport of ground tFOOPEY . to be revised to HOHE ghems applicable to = air bast opcF2> ton and also te incorporate findings of qainerability studies: Refrigerated VOR erailers, Golliess *tipa% and such Weze available in storages Loading end ho tenance instruction?were being distributed. Bombing tables were available on requisition from the Shelby Air Foree Depot. On? June 1954 the AMC had instructed the prime and zonal depots on how to compute requirements for defense equipment. ‘The AMG was not too well satisfied with its technical instructions. If ite crash procedures nad to be put into effect, the command would be in for trouble. But testing information was too meager and too unreliable to permit writing realistic technical instructions. Under the circum 28 stances, the command was doing a fine job. Test Exercises ‘To test operational plans and to evaluate support equip~ ment and training techniques, « test exercise was conducted in November 1953, This exercise bad heen in ihe talking stage since December 1952, but the publication of AMG a n @ Headquarters USAF established the basis of issue, quale itative requirements, priorities, format and content, and determined the initial publication of bombing tables, ARDG produced the tablee and entered them into the Air Force publication distribution system. AMC waa responsible for estabiiching quantitative requirements and for distributios, storage, and maintenance of stock levels. ARDC handled vesearch and development aspects. Interim, provisional, partial, and experimental table received epecial handling as determined by USAF headquarters. vi akOperaticunl Pst 30-53 on 10 April 1953 was the first off- cial action, Certsin factors, however, forced & poetpone= ment. The Strategic AIF Command could not participates she Military Air Teaasport service could not furnish aireraity and ALIG Cperetional Flan 13-53 (which Operational Plan 39-53 sac te paratlel] wes not pet effective. When thet pian became efiectives the plan for the test exercise ¥28 revised and sent to USAT headquarters for approvel: Mead- quarters approved the plan in principle, and at a conference rr ail were in complete egrec- ment on details. The formulation of a final draft of the exercise followed, and om 30 Cetober 1953, USAF bead- ers authorized the exercise. the WADE conducted Cet a two-day course of Instruction 02 qoading proceedures: ° he exereies was conducted oF 47-13 November 1953. ">"tase, representing an overseas tactical Air Force, The M33 clusters were filled with 2 simulant gent Marcescens) at the Pine Bluff Arsenal, loaded into two temperature controlled vane (30 cleste7s POF yen) and moved over the highway un teal Gorps technical eecort te Barksdole Air Force Base {Louisiana}, the ecrial port, There the loaded refrigesated vane were removed from the semitrailer chassis, mounted on Joading dollies, leaded into C-124 airezaft, oad flown to Eglin Air Force Proving Ground Com and personnel, and sample my fions were reloaded on C-124 airplanes, flown back to * parkedale Air Fores Basa, and ret 2d by surface move ment te Pine Blof A: farther assessment of the agent fll. The cange st the zerisl ports the Chemical Co=s reassumed responsibil vy for the return trip to the arsenal. of the test exercise demonstrated conclu- e port cystem anti-personnel biclogtest fons to anoverseas operational base, if dizected, As In any normal operation, deficiencies existed. Tho teletype communica= ton system was too slow. Loading procedures wert not einietent. ta some cases briefings were {nadequate and the proper precaations Wore not taken; had the agent Been a pathogen instead of simudant, casualties might have heen experienced. Also, the reject wate was high. It a —r—_. that specifications (prepared by WADG} were too restrictive, leading to > high reject rate which resulted in excessive consumption of stockpiled components. (Later, WADC was te make some recommenda- tions with respect to relaxing specifications.) Of najor seriousness~samsling procedures Were unrealistic and Jaboratory facilities were inadequate. In facts the onty fustification for referring to ‘the sporking aca at 8 “lab- oratory" was the presence of glassware, bench spactr and iaboratory persennel. Under these trying civcumstance s+ the workers performed ‘remarkably well. But the exercise pointed to the urgent need for = suitable surveiilance abe oratory end improved techniques. And the exercise showed clearly that the necessary logistic support was excessive a when considering the Lmited number of munitions carried:One recommendatica coming ovt of this test exercise bk a cecond practice exercise choulé plated the agent from the production site to 2 gerward operating 417 Force base using carfnce movement as well These were severel stumbling blocks with the programming of me for exch a miseion, The USAF had no suthozity t direct + of live agent beyond the continents rg mover g. The movement of the agent thro United Stat say ————— éecksion hod b: and made on who was to be respen: Alspocal action, Also, it seemed inadvisable to have the Command conduct the exereise, sinc? theu perform the test and te wee t agent instead of 2 hot agent. The AMC revized the pln accordingly. have been conducted in October I 4, bat te was suspended in September. Responsibilities for decontamination had not yet been determined. No one could predict accurately the sesults of a possible eccident. Tf the exercise became jmown te the general public and to potential enemies, the peychological and political impact might have adversely aifected the over-all biological warfare progres More+ over, the imulant agent bad alveady boon tested quecessitily, oad ia the opinion of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, the AMC had act far juotification for using live agent. By that time the Pine Bluff arcensi had completed sbout 50 per cent of ita part in the project: This work did not go down the drain, since the ewerience gained could be applied to other work. However en unfortuncte aspect was that the monitoring peopl= at AMC headquarters dork ns to the thinking that motivated the cancellation. They wondered if the action indicated a lack a nd’s abilitynr Actually, USAT headquarters was satisfied with the logisti fianming: ie door wae left open for 2 second try at some fature gate vader more propitious circumstance’: No one quar relied with the necessity for establishing the military worth of a biological munition. And eve7yone agreed that auch maneuvers were a good way to do ae In summation, the M33 had been standardized and the or operational usc. Subsequently, Aix Force had accepted it ig had undergone operational suitability fests with faiz degree of success. A plant existed for production of the x of cluster agent fll and for filling the required aumtNeverthelees, the manition was extremely dleappointing to the military user, The agent itself had inherent Hmita- done. Alreraft design had outrun munition design: the ‘M33 wae not satisfactory for external carriage by high performs ance sircraft, ‘The munition required an excessive amoust of logistic support. Realistic operational planning wae impossible because oof ineufficient testing dats. Munition expenditure rates could not be calculated except for 8 arrow range of target conditions, and intelligence people had been unable to determine potential target areas. Almont nothing was known of the effects an attack would have upon a nation's economy. Psychological aspects had not been exploited. Moreever, coordination between the developing, logistics, and using agencies lett much fo be desired, It wae evident that the available test data did not Justlfy the emphasis that bad been given ta procuring biological warfare munitions, Asa result, acute disillus sionment wae experienced by many former enthusiast: and the prestige of the entire biological warfare program auifered a damaging blow. Everyone familiar with the facta knew that the program was not accomplishing a& much ax it should, They wanted to know why. What was wrong? And how could it be corrects 1? 4e4 tee - 52 regOS) efor) oes “Asqonpas ay TOUGH CBSERMGD FVSN TF poy BONES gt0bz) oz eo eoopeat AD PoE AE xoy yavcndynba Buyesedsic, suzoqaty’ gt00Z) loot) oz Ou oo- soon 9 SPUIUIT, AAD PUY AE PLES TT PIPMD FO aI 29% ose 219 suopTenyg Ag 6ox5- TV ¢ alS7td git) lf) . ad te £9 quowdynby yz0ddng soraeySoT AA 2 3 (zz) aiS6) HOS ‘oorz | Es9z SUPT Me YorUOR Lo TRY osz s2t o0z suey, drxdg BO PUY Ae she oset zzLs worngiz38ic suopTonyy ¥ OuOTNUNYY MT ST ay i$ eee NE we aseras 86 ST Ra | OH HST WOACy (siwog yousquog) spung qrourdoyonsgy VSUV SINENGOTIATA TVOINHOSL NI SLOSLOUdOs, MI. REORIENTATION OF THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. PROGRAM Funds Ya accounting fer deficiencies in any milltary program the tendency is first to examine funds for their adequacy. Although no one realiy knows just how much is enough, there was general agreement that fande had been adequate fox the amount of emphasis that had been placed on the biclogicat warfare program, Sometimes Air Force funds were late 4n coming and the Chemical Corps temporarily had ta put up its own money for projects having Air Force implica~ tions. But on the whole, the Air Force had given the ae Chemical Corps more money than it could apeud, 42 of i Jume 1954, mmobligated funds at Camp Detrick amounted ee * Budgeting for itema and support equipment was based upon specific operational requiremente develoned hy the Directorate, Plans; Directorate, Operations; and Directorate, Supply and Services. ARDG and WADG bought research and development items and paid for testing. AMG originated military interdepartmental purchase requests for Chemical Corpe mimitions, buying items for stockpile and some test items. That command bad been charged with submitting the fiscal year 1954 budget estimate for biological munitions, but at that time lacked the necessary planning factors an¢ USAT quarters did the work. ~ 54- 64to $2,003,743 of flscal year 1954 money and $1, 304, 348 4 of fiscal 1955 money, In ths case of the M33 the major criticlsm wae that the Air Fores had gone into procure~ ment some thrce years before the munition had gone through ueer avitability testing, Incffect, the service had gambled, and it was lucky to get as much aa it did for the money, : ersonnel and Training A major problem in 1951 was the lack of technically qualified officers for aiz staff positions. To provide a nucleus of qualified officers, the Air Force established the so-called {00-mnan program, The files of raore than 1,000 officers were screened, and 100 officers were selected to receive one year of on-the-job training at Chemical Corps installations, Twenty-six medical officers were scheduled for this training. Subsequently these officers were to be reassigned throughout the Air Force, £e requisitioned. These people were "the cream of the crop"; many had mastere or doctorate degrees in the biochemistry field. Originally the training program was to continue for three yeara; however, it was diecontinuad after the second—=_ * year, The results were somewhat disappointing, The pro- gram was certainly better than nothing, but its limited scope | was a serious deficiency. Had there been an organized effort to insure more extensive training, the results would have been better. As it was, officers learned but 2 small segment of the over-all biological warfare Held, Some knowledge was gained of other projects through attendance at reminars hetd once 2 week at the Alr Force Held nffice at Camp Detrick; but In general, this program did not produce officers really qualified in biological warfare. Trainces were uncertain as to what assignments they could expect; morale was low. To many, the 100-man program seemed ill conceived-- without a clearly defined od Additional training included crash programs, either at Ghemics! Corps installations or at USAF headquarters. ‘The Air University offered some training in its special _ course. Algo, for 2 short time the Air Force perticipated in 2 very high-level Indoctrination project. A Joint Army-Navy-Alr Force Orientation Team was or; ganized by the Chemical Corps to brief senior commandexs of flag and general officer rank and key staff personne} on « 56~the capabilities and Limitations and oa the operational con~ cepts of biclogical warfare and chemical warfare weapons systems. This traveling teain began its work in September 1952, but the Air Force soon withdrew its memberehip on the grounds that not enough information was available to snake the briefings worthwhile, For example, tho film ghat eas produced on the strategic use of Dlological weapons showed t potential capability based os the 1952 techaical estimates that were proved by subseqsent tests to be far too optimistic. The Air Force recognized the need for an {ndoctrination program. “at the same time it wes unwilling to participate in additional briefings without data of more 3 valve and reliability. So summarise, the on-the-job training provided by | the 100-man program bad proved inadeanates alao the Air Force could not justify membership on the tri-service orientation team. However: training was being advanced | in other ways. The Biological Wwarfares-Chemical Warfare : | Division at Headquarters USAF provided an excellent eource for training officers to sesume MIF staff posts. | Retaliation Onty" Policy There waa no stated national policy with respect to plotogical warfare. However. plological warfare was S76 a Meeria m Associated so closely with chemical warfare that ths palicy for both was assumed to be the same, Under this implied policy, the biological weapan could be used only if authorized by the President of the United States, and even then only on a retaliatory basis. This pelicy did not mean "setaliation slwaye." Such weapons were to be used only if determined to be expedient militazily, It wae questionable, therefore, that they would be used ever, to retaliate in kind if other weapons would do the job better. It was an argument of long standing whether or not this policy had deterred progress. Some charged it with complicating operational planning and with discouraging Competent personnel from entering the program, The Army, for example, stated aa late as October 1954 that & major obstacle to progress was the reluctance of the unilitary te invest time and resources in a weapons ayetem that might never be uscd. But cthers did not agree entirely with this viewpoint. ‘Thoy recognized the aense of insecurity which existed, but they attributed it chiefly to the fact that since World War If the biological warfare program had been elther & “feast or famine" enterpriee. Morcover, “Ley were 38 - aft. eeei served a useful perpo: convinced that the policy b: ‘The biological weapon Lad not been proved 3 com: : the requirement to have a weapon, ond were i have , the entire program 2 retaii 7 3P been dropped. the Ais Force had to have a progrem, but did not 5 geazentee reaults. boca3 sevision at some future date, Subsequently, the policy was to de-emphasize talk about the offensive use of bace teriological agents and even te withhold a positive official eadorsement of the retaliatory concept. it seemed advisable to preserve a certain flexibility on this vital smattere Otte ciale recognized the danger of being trapped into a sigid policy coramitment. : In £982 the Bidlogicai Warfare--Chemical Warfare Division at USAF headguarters asked that the national policy on toxic chemical warfare be revised, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (urged by General Vandenberg) approved a detailed study on biological warfaze, which concluded that 2 clear ctatcrent of national policy was exsential and that the biological warfare program chould be exempt from the interim retaliatory policy. However, no change in pol- fey was roar im the fall of 1954 the Army requeated the Joint Chiefs to remove the setaliatory reatyiction. [t recognized the danger of pursuing such a course, for such action would ctions te the use of such remove the legal and moral 7 weapons by the Soviets. Algo, it might be extremely dis- advantageous ‘0 the United States, for it would declare thenation's intextion to uve the biological weapon when actually did not have the capability to justify the riek, Neverthe« less, the Chemical Corps pointed out that removing this restriction would restore to the United States the Initiative in the use of biological weapona--a prerogative which it had : ¢ surrendered under the existing national policy. ‘The Aix Forre and Navy did not concur {¢ the Army, vecommeudation, Although the Air Foree had on two oceasions favored the change, it then felt that circumstances dictated a reversal in its former position, By that time, officials had developed a better appreciation of the difficulties involved. Ae a result of the differences of opinion, the Bronte e fesm referred the matter to the Joint Strategic Survey fe & The Bronze Team wae composed of one member each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Members of the Bronze Team of the Joint Strategic Plans Group prepared reports and studies for the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertaining to Joint and combined education and training: military assistance snd training for nea-NATO allies; and chemical, biolog~ teal and radiclogical warfare and the review of annexes thereon In joint war plans. Members presented oral briefings te individuals at the highest level in the Depart- ment of Defense, including the Chairman of the Joint. Chiefs of Staff, The Air Force member was Colonel Roy A, Davidson, who served as Chief of Materiel and Services until transferred te the Joint Ghiefs of Staff on 1 July 1953.Committee for consideration. This committee corroborated Alr Force-Navy fudings and recommended ne change. The matter then went to the &: Secretary of Defense and was to go before the National Seeurity Couneil for review and decision; thus the matter wae still pending, The assumption was that the policy would remaiz the same. Thet is. in the event of ‘war, biological munitioas might be used only to retaliate Disapproval of the proposed change tn Policy conatituted the official Atr Force Position. It did not necessarily reflect the personal opinions held by come Alr Force People. Sige nificantly, Secretary of Defense Wilson vecognized the Hmplications of this policy in hs directive of § March 1954, In that document he warned that the “retaliatory only" pol fey was not fo dctex the military services in theiz efforve ub to achleve a truly effective capability im Motogical warfare, Management Tt was no secret that the Air Force WAa dlatatsefed with the results of Chemical Go te research in biological Warfare, The Sceretary of the Air Force. < cneerned at~ ape the slow progress being made, wondered if management problems were responsible. And on 15 January $953 Secretary Thomas Finletter asked General J. H. Doolittle to head a civilian committce to examine the potential of the biological warfare program, with particular reference to erganization and management aspects. Essentially the objective was to see Lf the program met Air Force require~ ments, and if not, what could be done aboutit. The proposal met with considerable opposition from the Research and Development Board and the Army. General Doolittle was asked to delay actica, pending the completion of studies which the Board and the Army were to make. The proposed Doolittle Gommittee did not ee Another proposal to improve management had contem- plated withdrawing the program from the services and placing fs under an ageacy similar to the organizational structure of the Atomic Energy Commission, The argument was that such action would minimize dominance by a single eervice, a * The study prepared by the Research and Developnient Boaré wat known ag the Whitman Report. or the Cairns Report Mr, Whitman was chairman of the Board, and D~ 7+ sonducted the study,eliminate interservice competition, and consolidate objec- tives and policy, However, the Secretary of Defense removed his original recommendation and it did not appear in the final Joint Chiefe of Staff paper. No one quarretled with the out~ come, Establishing a joint agency at top level did net promise to simplify or improve matters. Moreover, all, three services could be expected to resist giving over-all y management direction to 2 joint ageacy. Fundamentally, many management problems had their origin in the fact that so many agencies were involved in the program, This indicated the necessity for exercising considerable restraint in the natural desire of each group to advance its own interests, The so-called unification of the services in 1947 had not always produced a single- ness of purpose, and the biological warfare program was no exception. Service considerations seemed to have Influenced some decisions and evaluations, still, the friction between the developing and the using agencies undcubtedly was caused in large part by the lack of appreéation of the cther's problems, For example, the Ar Force complained that the Chemical Corps did not live up to ita commitments--that the results did nct bear ; Ga < bee 0 mm | tem out the Corps! predictions and that the developing agency was continually unable to meet deadlines. The records support this position. But alzo te he considered wes the possibility that staff groups had placed unreasonable demands upon the Chemical Corpe. The changing of mil itary requirements imposed an additional burden on the developing agency. Moreover, biological warfare war nvelatively new art and it was difficult tc make accurate predictions. It was to be expected that some of ths data developed would be too nebulous or too technical to be immediately applicable to Air Force problems. Had more people familiar with the required sciences been nasigned to staff positions, the impatience feit with the inability of the technical people te come wp with the right ‘ ~ answers might have been mitigated to 2 large extent. “ Actually, no person connected with the biological warfare program passed through its toils without scars, Nox Could enyone disclaim at least a small part of the responsibility for results, As one officer expressed ity uNobody comes out of the biological warfare program smelling like a rose," since all action was thoroughlyA 6 Coordinated and guidance by the Joint Chiefe of Stat rep- oe resented the thinking ofall the services. Therefore, the position must be accepted that in the beginning ali the military services got off on the wrong track. Tt was not until they gained a better appreciation of their mutual | Problems that inter-service relationshins improved, a echnical Knowledge Ie wee evident thas better direction and a inore sym. pathetic working relationship hetween the military rervices would go ® loug way toward Improving the statua of the work, ee — insufficient technical knowledge, not management, was the chief atumb- Ung block to getting aatisfactory end items, x . The development of biological weapons presented salque technical complexities in the sciences. The develop- ing agency was handicapzed by a critical shortage of engineers ee * The Twining directive wae coordinated by 92 persons. Not all were agreed, but the paper did get signed. Unfo: ft was not coordinated with G-4, Army. tas selieving Chemical Corps of ofteial r= sponsibisity. “* USAF thinking was alwaye iy so Team paper, which was Staff, The Bronze Tear a each from the threrfaraill 3 with airborne ordnance equipment. The Air Force was handleapped by its meager technical knowledge and Limited experience, All were more or less “playing by ear," To complicate matters further, a munition-agent combinstion might be convincing to the research scientist but inadequate to the military user, Convercely, if might meet military requirements, ‘put still not exploit fully the potentialities of the agent Sill. cue entire task was magnified by the ramifications of any decision. The consideration of one factor might lead to one position, but that position wes often invalidated by the considera- tlon of still another factor. ‘The services hed made progress in developing, test- ing, and evaluating biological munitions, but (here = apparent gaps when the program was coneidered from the operational viewpoint, Particularly critical was the prob< jem of translating experimental data to prediction of human infection and the subsequent target effect. Extrapolation had been a major weakness in the over-all program. ‘Although animals bad been used extensively in studies of infectivity, the resultant data did not necessarily pro- vide meaningful information on the virulence of 2 biclogical Os \2 ——agent to man, That Is, the Sir Force could be fately accurate in predicting what 4 biological warfare attack would do to a city’full of monkeys, but what an attack would do to 2 city full of human beings emained the “gixty-four dollar question.” What had plegued the biclogical warfare program from the beginning was the lack of guidance on what effects the Air Force wanted to produce with a biological munition, Aaa result, the Alr Force and the Chemical Corps had been at a sort of impasse on this point. The Alr Force asked the Chemical Corzs what it could produce; the Chem= jeal Corps in turn asked the Air Force what it wanted a roanition to do, And since too Little was kiewn of weapons effects, the Alr Force bad not been able to determine suitable targets. The Directorate of Intelligence was responsitie for making target studies, but had found the going rather rough, For one thing, intelligence people had been unable to agree on weapons effects data. It was evident that somewhere along the line, a compromise would is have to by made eo that they could get on with the work.The Deputy Caief of Stati evelopment had said ropeatcdly that plonsiag ¥35 peing based on over-optimisme both with reepact to the date of availablity of biological munitions and theit ee That over-optimism had produced the Twining Qiective, which established a crash program to attain an operational readiness. 37 getting definite time-phaced goals for achieving this caP ability, the dizective may bave produced more tangible sepults than would bave bees qealized otherwise. On the ether hand, many people wore convinced that the directive had dove the biological wa: damage. Igsued on 15 Jenaary 1952 the Twining dizective 29 ths first official statement of the esteblichment of a USAF ploto: te nis project to get on carly capability waa design — [ee _ ag of SAG medium pombers By 31 December 1952 ons * wag to be capable of using specific gati-perserncl, oxti-medium bombers, and additional biological agente were specified. By 31 December 1954 al Strategic Air Com= mand units were to ba ready for condacting biological warfare operations, ‘This directed capability later was extended to include all TAG and FEAF anita, In addition, all installations were te be able te defend against overt or covert attacks. The directive noted that revisions ould be required ue the program progressed, It dié net change the xsaignment of vesponsibilitiss outlined in the 20 October 1950 SS. ‘The Twining directive wes based largely on technical eetimates submitted by the Research end Development Board, which were based on Chemical Corpa predictions of what it epuld produce, Actually, the Air Force could not use ths completion dates specified because it did not know if the items would be acceptable. The estimates were based on extrapolations from laboratory data--n ot from field tests-= and therafore were not reliable. As « result, the Acting Vice Chief ef Staff issued an amendment on 3 July 1952+ eosspecifying agents by types instead of by name, This accorded some latitude to research people In accelerating the program, but it wae a long way from establishing realistic goalx for the a ‘A report issued by RAND in July 1952 trod on some Important toca, It guestioz~d the philosophy behind the Twining directive. RAND wes of the opisson that the directive would produce a fictitious capability--that & crash program would disrupt the normal steps of research ————“‘E therefore would result in inferfor munitions. In other words, RAND did not believe that the directive established a sensible biological warfare program. Eventually there was to be general egreement that tha Twining directive was ill timed. It bad been conceived in en emotional atmosphere that did not engender & calm a © ‘The agent Pasurella pestis originally spectGed wes not available, This amendment specified that by | January £955 all SAG heavy and medium borcbst wings, oll TAC medium, light, and fighter bomber wings, and all USAF aad FEAF light and fighter bomber wings were to be able fo use all suitable biological agents in offensive operations: ‘AL Att Force echelons were te be sble te defend against covert or overt attack.am appraisal of the potential of biological warfare. It had tried to put biological munitions into the operating com- mande before their development 2° far enough along to nasure reasonable success. Moreover: at wae felt by mony that the directive as arbitrary in its general tone ‘and that the Biological Wartare--Ghemical Warfare Divi< sion at USAF headquastere had been overly zealous ite girecting its troplementation. The ARDC made clear from the first that it could not falfill the requirements to the letter. As time went one those working with the program came to feel that the directive had been rammed 23 down their throats--and this was not palatable. B visi on, USAF Headquarters At the direction of the Vice Chief of Staif, @ specie! division had been set up in Air Fores headquarters to the Office of Atomic Energy at organize a biological warfare program, monitor it and expedite special projects. she primary mission of this division 2% to encouragé SE it was to ceases to function for any staff agency when this goal wae reached. To staff this office, most of the officers having knowledge of the program were withdrawn from the Air Staff and thetn the blolegical weeyons it developed qualified peop Even its mistekes could not be waritien off ag a loas, since those mistakes helped the program to find its proper place fn tary planning sooner than if the division bad not existed. But the aevly sctivated division got off to > bad otart, If was set up as a monitoring ond ‘coordinating agency; it was not in business to issue directives and to teke actions independently of staff agencies, Notwith- standing, the division chief at t men exceeded his aatherity. Moreover, the policies which he established produced gome rather violent seacticns. Many policies were bazed too much 02 F too little oa scienti efacts. In their opinion, it should pave been smical Gorps was promising more than it ¢o Actually it waa not until 1953 5ym ( that the Als Force kad better control on what techacal estimates represented. | It may have been true that prior evaluation of the biological warfare potential had been flavored by predom- {nantly partisan influences, The Chem{eal Cozps had stated that {t had produced a biological warfare munition, "and the Aiz Force had eagerly sought to dizect a capability C based upon that assumption. Hindsight inevitably cuggests that the Air Force placed too much confidence in Chemical Corps technical estimates and that strong personalities tried to drive the program through. But here, as in any development, there were extenuating circumstances: The preesure of world unrest called for positive action; the services coulé not indulge in watchful waiting for come~ : ¢ thing to turn up. And even those who later were to criticize en * Farller technical catimates had forecast end item progress in terme of “dates of availability," The 1953 Technical : Estimates defined the tezm as receipt of a iully engincered prototype through development and procurement. The dater of availability normaily cccurred one to two years aiter completion of the final engineering teats, But the 1954 technical estimates forecast end item progress in terms of “completion of development” (comp!=ttou of final tests by the development laboratories), This chonge was sac+ to delineate development statu.. items which hac bees ¢ tested and which met the spec: and could be produced im anc.the aggressive policies of the program's leadezahip would not kave been entirely satisfied with policies that were largely negative. : . Moreover, the over-optimism was not Mmited to any one individual or group af individuais, Bacteriological warfare had a strong emotional appeal. It wad new, Tt seemed to offer fabulous voseibllities. The Chemical Corps may have been too aggressive in selling the product of ite labora; but in so doing, it had willing buyers. In any event, subsequent developments were to show that service interests and personal conviction could not provide a stable basis on which to commit any part of the “Rational effort, The Air Force learned the hard way that enthusizem could not replace the need for cold calculation: « Realignment of Progr: ‘The capability achleved in the auti-crop field had been more encouraging than the results of the M33 anti~ personnel eae However, by carly 1953 it was painfully clear that the entire biological warfare program needed an overhauling. eee © Ghapter V outlines the capability achieved in the anti-crop biological warfare fleld. wheIna letter to Secretary of the Alx Force Thomas oT Finletter oa 9 January 1952, succeeded Colonel “Yas head of the BV-CW Division i 2) suggested that the biological war~ at USAF headquas fare progrem was out of phase, He doubted th of continuing work ona crash basis. The omission, or short cutting, of the established sequence of action (development, testing: acceptance, then procurement) had led to confusion and bad delayed, not accelerated, reel progress. 6 In April 1953, General Bunker wrote to Licutenast Gonezal T. D. te that the Air Force curement moncy would buy more target effect per dollar if inve where. In an cra of economy he considered the plological warfere program an unwarranted lussury. He recommended that oll procurement then pending be canceled except for \ cervice test quantities, and that future procurement should tbe contingsat upea the actucl demonstration of the effective= neos of biclegicel munitions. General Bunker was awars of _ @ Major Generai Energy: ra G, Benker, Assistant for Atomic adcuarters USAF.the severe impact such action qwould have upon the Chem~ feel Coxps. He also conceded that sestricting quentity procurement contvined some clement of risk. Still, be felt that the USAF no longer could proceed on 8 pareilel gront {n all areas~nite funds would have ta be dizected toward those weapons that promised the beat a on 25 May 1953 2 completely reoriented biological warfare program wes presested t@ the Air Force Council, ond by the end of thi seal year it bad been approved by ia Octeser 19 jane Vice taif veseinded the Twining cizective endSAF strates'< prosdogzam, The military services realized that they had reached the peint of diminishing returns on the development of existing end items.” In more detail, veseazch and develogment was fo be concentrated oa a few high priority end items. Only research tht wes epplicable tc improved munitions was tobe supported, Emphasis was to be placed on the development of a lethal anti-personnel biclogical muni- ton for release from high speed alzeraft and upon ths development of munitions for delivery of anti-crop pathogens from high speed aircraft and by balloons. Ay 1 July 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to have the resultz of 2 critical reappraisal of the over-all program and were to recommend to the Secretary of Defense the levei of effort to be placed on getting en offensive mil- itary capability. Meanwhile, the services were to maintain the existing Limited capability in the operational use of biological agents, Further procurement, however, was to ba held up; and no additional facilities, other than pilot plants, weze to be built, The USAF wae te continua to develop ductrine, tactics, and techniques aa new mani Training DE. tions and defense equipment became available.was to keep rece with devel Defease aspects were to coatinus £9 receive 2 high priority. | Ibis snteresting to note that the. realigned research and development program wae essentially the same as the proposed program cet forth in ARDC and WADC letters fetween 20 August 1952 end 28 Decesiber 4953, One excepe Hon was that the highest priority wee being placed on the ———rrrr——si‘i™=|=_— instead of cn & lethal agent which could be disseminated from on aeresoh generator or in dry form, os specified in the letter from ARDC to the Chief Chemical Officer om 8 October 1982. the redirected program resulted in the reprogram= rrr fiseal year 1953 tudget for bological end chemical warfare crn. a It gave no gueradtee of success, Tt was ® candid admission that previous policles bad failed fo produce satisfactory results, And it recognized the principle that the search @ [tems canceled from the program included 13, 200 of the E108 7h0-pound biological cluster 1§26, 136, 000); 6, 000 of the 500-pound biological anti~cx0p cluster, the £86 ($9, 000, 000); aud 5. 250 of the biological anti-personnel werosol generator cluster, the £99 (523, 875,000). Where possible, these funda were te be used to buy defense equipment. ~ 80 = non aefor efficient biclogical manitions must necessarily be slow pad painstaking. The services to te could afford to settle for half caswers to difficalt technica) problems.snunitions since 1950+ one age effective ggainst wheat crops, had been standardized 35. il The Air Force could disseminate thts agent bY Samed atrerait oF BY pellocns. In accitlon+ the Air Force had & aqveloped 3 eP78Y @ — _ spread chemical agents te inhibit plent growth. Alse receiving conciderstior waa the pos- athe Secretary of Defense tg March 1954 eirected the military service? 0 maintain an antl-CFS? capability, Sut ty 1958 the Ais Fores wae re-cxemining the anti-cxep PFO" gram and bad to geal vith meny conflicting opinions: Two etadies (ont mace PY the Directorate of jateltigence andvy other by the Arm; rch Office) were about i 2 180 degrecs cpart in theiz conclusions. eee On the o! agent-munitlon combinations believing that 3 tono agent would be ficient for 2 specific a B 6 5 g 3 B a i 5 - later found 2 2 requizements to be closer to 40 tons. Delivery of 150 functioning munitions would require the launching of 2,400 weapons, Because of possible unfav- erable wea her condi soa would require as, to launch 2,409 during a eingie tributing £000 weapoasémong $ launching cites. Moreover, to affect the cnemyla ing potential, attacks world Lave to be lauached Rear the beginaing vf hostilities to ailow the agent tlme to os and would have to be repeated at inte-vals. This posed the qucstion: Would the war be over before the effect could be of any real military significance? And even {f It were porcible, would it be deeizable to dectroy the food 2 of any nation? To do so might be politleally wawise, The psychclogical implications we: tremendous, “At the end of 1954 the problera remained to easesa me fond the probable effect cf a blological attac snd to reckon the resultant impact on that country's war raking petenticl, It was obvious that the ea y's air force and industrial capacity would bs the unary targets, Bince it would take onz year to destroy crops bat only three to six months to destroy cities, lowever, anti-crog unke fiona would provide the USAF vith the capability to negotiate fox cessation of hestilities--provided, of course, that the war lasted ‘at long. In any eveat, any docisica on the military worth of anti-crop operations could be corroborated cad continued ¢ Easis on23 2 : beeasicns, It was epidemic in nature, it was readily disseminated by the wind, and germination was immediate, The summer, or red, stage was the only stage in the Life eycle of stem rust that had any military significance. ‘The apores of stem rust of wheat that were consigned for military uec were growa and harvested under care~ fully controfied conditions. Since the agent lest its viability during storage, mew eupgifes had te be produced during the {oll and winter months of each year. Three production sites were operated in the semmer; H¥o in the winter. The rate of deter! ation was high (zbout 50 per cent), forcing improvements in processing and packaging ae Devices for disseminating this pathogenic agent consisted of those using « carrier (euch as feathers) ond those not exnploying a carrier. The latter had several advantages over the former. Less apace was required in the delivery mechanism; there was no loge of agent (in the former, some of the agent remained attached to the feathers}; also the latter permitted large target coverage per unit weight af pure agent. In the beginning, however, the emphasis had been on dissemea \erie= ton. —_ AMC Operational Plan 12-53 eh Ractatlons) Plan 12-53 Thirty-two hundred of the M16 clusters were mod= iHed to the E73R4 cluster and the AMC began to plan for thelr uce, if directed, AMC Operational lan 12-53 favolved the movement of the £7324 blologica! elu, The effective date for operations was for the period | March through 30 May of each calendar year. As Previously noted, the short Life of the agent required the manufacture of fresh supplies each year. The plan waa to work this way. Upon Presidential release and direction from USAF headquarters, the AMC would send oxt @ prepared TY as involved in the plan, MATS was to The Chemicala Corps was to load aircraft wit, =aigied components a and furnish teckal The cargo would be loaded, escort taken eboard, end aircraft fown to overseas bases. From then on theate? policies and plane would be followed. In the revised plan for calendar year 1954, TegPen” i qibilities were about the same qwo courier officers were to be provided by t Area Commander. Ogden Aiz Mater since eppropricte Might profiles had been worked out, 2° qdditionsl protection W728 necessary for protecting the pgent-fill en route to forwera bases from the Zene of the Jaterior. Both plans were paced on preetocking hardware ovexsces. Jano case were agents to be stored outside the United Stetes- fn October 1954 the CH 21 Corpa had on haad fo refrigerated storage, oF under procurement, the required quantities of whest and rye rast to mest Aix Force require- —_— rr for about 4, 300 M1ES ploiegical boss. A quantity of the haréware wea Pree , these positioned ef to overseas pases. If requ 3 a 8 a, pockaged, delivered te the 2s baseyor dinad a2geee DY mand had the capabity of conducting plological anti- Certain value in the Civil War, tut did not believe it sane Se ce as a strategic weapon oystem+ > Ba fader: sewer antAnother factor delaying the program was the failure of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Ovesations, te approve an operational and logistical concept for « balloen delivery system. The proposed concept was ag follows: Agent and all components of the agent containez were te be stored within the Zone of the Interior; hardware was te be stored st the launching sites; and upon short notice: agent end agent components were to be assembled into & ceroplete operational unit for air shipment to the launch- ing sites, where etorage was not expected to exceed 90 days, The preparation of the E77 for an operational flight would require only the insertion of the assembled containers into the waiting hardware, plus a few simple adjustments. This concept had been agreed to orally by AMG and WADC in November 1953, but the Aix Staff was reluctant te commit personnel and te activate unfts until teat results showed the use of balloons te deliver biological ee munitions to be practical. * Operational euitability testing was te consist primarily of handliag and functioning of munitions under conditions directed by reaults of development testing. It was not to Include hot testa. ae wus. 64 EF ae Pima oOTaid not believe that the met AMG require” for mizing the agent in the Zone of the Interiot and trens- posting Ht to #e jeunebing sites ice amie concert not anix it with the carrier at that point. Tht concept (calling for oversene mind of the agent and cartier) #28 fee® technically: However: called. formiles psx minute of Might time. An intelligence study 4 Le jeminate 2, 500 goik 2-50 couid di: structiveneos while spraying at proposal met{ ~ - iio.v However, the Air Force continued to be interested in this type of cp2ration. The following year the Air Force —————j stated a requirement for killing crop — = EXT a4 to get this capability bought 100 spray systema for B-29 and B-50 bombay installation and 3, 625 tons . {7,250,000 pounds) of ee eee = — chemical agent. Everything was shipped to the Air Force instellation at Spokane, Washington, where it xemained _ for any future emezgency use. The cevelopment end pro- urement of the spray tank was 2 era. sh project cad was It was a USAF headquarters-directed project, Paztic~ {pants included AMC, WADG, ARDC, and APG. Procur ment was initiated in October 1952, Scheduled. for completion by 1 April 1953, the project was completed five days abead of time. The results were satisfactory. Tests rea in February end March 1953 indicated that spr: ng vp to an altitude of 2,500 fect was feasible, Ths Air Force had an immediate lity for cprayiag chemical aati-crep agents from mSv the Air Forse to a. However, it ckould be noted no suitable pathogens ¢: ded this project delayed work ia accor 22 that the 1-A prio: y was not to the anti-personnel 2zea. The existing enti-crop chemical capab ‘exe going out of be extended, B-27 end B-50 aizezatt w fatare potential carriers ond sy3- active inventory, 2nd tems had besic limitations oof In one respect Peojeth ot unique. Nor- a oS while the Al Force bought handled aily the Army dough aircraft, But ia this case the entire project ¥ g dizectly with civillan coacerns. There- might by the USAT cealin of legality, oF et least of etaicay fore, some question ixement specified internal carriage of 7 @ The original requ’ . | the epray system by B-47 tyre / thia requi: twas removed, a3 June 1953 the sya- / term was stendardiced ag the Saray System, Airborne, | Type MC-1. ay tanke capable of q carricd by fighter-bombers vere also uader development by WAG. aveloped by the Navy bud proved too scpensive for Air Force SS The spray tonk d lomplicated, too heavy, 2nd 00 © a |be said to have existed, However, the project was a source of sati: faction te the Air Force, The Air Force had on occasion chafed under the slowness of the Chem- Seal Corpe tc take procurement actiou; and {n this instance it had proved itself capable of producing @ satisfactory end item on short notice when the urgency of the sequivement demanded a Defoliants Yn May 1983 the Air Force became intercated in the possibility of using the opray tank for disseminating chem- se ical agente that could defoliate plants. This was not a new idea, In the fall of 1943 the Chief of Staff had directed ee © Not all were agreed on thie. Some said that the purchase wae in direct conilict with Munitions Board instructions. Others saw no objection to Air Force procurement of commercial agents. Some were of the opinion that the Chemical Corps was not informed of the project, Cthers noted that cocrdination with the Chemical Corps wag rnade informally, and that the secrecy of the project stemmed primarily from the fact that to disclose the project would have comgromised security and made the price of the chemicals go up on the commercial market, #* A weapon. system for defoliation of plants could be used ta clear front line areas for observation: deny the enemy the use of vegetation for concealment purposes; establish visual navigations! aids over vast forested areas; increase susceptibility of vegetation to burning; and control the vegetation on bombing and gunnery rancen and paratroor drop areas,v eee of Sperationend staste (e1g Wale were cazzied out in 1944, 48a resale of experteace Gained during the Assault on Wo Jima and Okinawa 1 1345, the Aziny nag Set up a * Project: _~ ee with kidcen pilboxes, Sen emplacements, and eelensive Yo develop Weapons ang factics to dear Positions. In i5a4 Camp Deistek wag *earching for more Cr but no requirement existed; fad Glace these wa a Shortage of manp Detrick terminated the work. In gen, mriatained Inteze sp Teng enough to tasure @ eaticfactory ie the Air Force os, 8 Tequirement.for 3 dsfcliation agent and dissemi, device, cad Anne Be ge sitetegia ee miltary characte T1Stice specified uniticn ax, Gullabla (ov une by *rateyic and tactical als Weapon. 24 AVON He atjset al treund operations, Hsratlouu prompted the WADS to rece Cede cans venting low petarity, » , YF venutrement 3 low p Wee Wd tv hag ete veguitefurther study, No agent known at that time even remotely met the requirements as interpreted by that development center, To deliver the existing defollants would require from 25, 600 to 64,006 pounds per square mile, and delivery would have to be repeated in successive flights, thus destroying the element cf surprise, Delivery at Jow altitudes made the aircraft vulnerable to enemy fire, and new spraying techniques would have to be developed for delivery by high speed alreraft, In January 1955 proposed milltary characteristics for defoliants prepared by the WADC were at USAF headquarters, However, little could be done in this area of development until the services hed a auitable agent. = Antt-Animal Biological Warfare Program The possible use of biological agents against live stock bad occupied a relatively unimportant place in the over-all biological warfave program. The Air Force had endorsed tescarch in this area but had never stated x munition requirement becauee progress had not justified extensive nancial expenditures, Many blological agents were effective againgt both crops and enimais., Agents peculiar to animala were thosecausing hoof-and-mouth disease, sinderpesi . fowl plague, Noweastle disease, and hog cholexe, Of gresteet militar; ej heof-aad- iteting dlscaze affecting clovenhoofed enir and having averied mortolity rate); end rinderpect (which affected cattle and water beffalo chi: Ay and wag ucsally fatal). The United States was partieuiar! le to these diccases. Considerzble wo: d been done-on heg cholera, Tests using the Z73 feather bomb to diseeminate agents ad been conducted under cox Also, wo: educations] and commercial organizatis: However, work by t military 22 guimal agents woz largely terminated by @ ef Defense d ibility t| | 1 : hae, v a factors having an important bearing on the matter, . And some Air Force officers remained convinced that any cut back in this research constituted a serious mistake, How could any real capability be developed in defense techniouce unless more wae known of the potential afforded by cifensive operations? ‘ . Jn review, the 14115 and the chemical spray ayatem provided the Air Force with an ixamediate capability to attack food crops, The E77 was nearing completion, a: better munition types were under development. The Air Force was still interested In agente to defoliate plants, but had terzainated work on anti-animal research, Although it was maintaining ite anti-crop capability, the advisability of clspanding effort in this area wag heing questioned, The feasibility of planning for all anti-food operations was recciving close serutiny at high policy levels.