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abandoned his work, for it is already a wellsettled doctrine that the filing by an employee of
a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for
reinstatement is proof enough of his desire to
return to work, thus negating the employer's
charge of abandonment. Verily, it would be
illogical for respondent Singson to have left his
job and thereafter file the complaint against his
employer. As we held in Villar v. National Labor
Relations Commission[8] x x x x It is clear from the records that sometime
in August 1994, immediately after petitioners
supposedly refused to work having lost earlier in
the certification election, several complaints for
illegal dismissal against HI-TECH were filed by
petitioners. These are sufficient proofs that they
were never guilty of leaving their jobs. The
concept of abandonment of work is inconsistent
with the immediate filing of complaints for illegal
dismissal. An employee who took steps to protest
his layoff could not by any logic be said to have
abandoned his work.
Abandonment is a matter of intention and
cannot lightly be presumed from certain
equivocal acts. For abandonment to exist, it is
essential (a) that the employee must have failed
to report for work or must have been absent
without valid or justifiable reason; and, (b) that
there must have been a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship manifested
by some overt acts - the second element is the
more determinative factor. Mere absence of the
employee is not sufficient. The burden of proof is
on the employer to show a clear and deliberate
intent on the part of the employee to discontinue
employment without any intention of returning.
Petitioners dismally failed to discharge their
burden. Their
evidence,
consisting
entirely
of cash vouchers of respondent SINGSON and his
co-salesman Raul Hista, for the months of May,
June and July 1996,[9] is grossly anemic - if not
totally irrelevant - to establish that respondent
Singson indeed deliberately and unjustifiably
abandoned
his
job. At
best,
these cash
vouchers merely show respondent's lackluster
performance during those months, and that he
paled in comparison with his co-salesman Raul
Hista in terms of sales output. As astutely
observed by the Court of Appeals x x x x Neither can we see any evidentiary
relevance of the vouchers of Raul Hista in
comparison with that of private respondent. They
do not in any way vouch petitioners claim of
abandonment nor do they refute the fact that
private respondent was illegally dismissed
because of petitioners failure to observe the
substantive as well as the procedural
requirements of the law. If at all, they merely
show the unsatisfactory performance of private
respondent which does not in any way authorizes
the abrupt dismissal of private respondent sans
observance of due process.
At any rate, petitioners undoubtedly could
have presented better evidence to buttress their
claim of abandonment. After all, being the
employers, they are in possession of documents
relevant to this case. For instance, they could
have at least presented in evidence copies of
II.
Employment
[Lagramas]
National
Labor
Relations
Commission
promulgated on June 20, 1996 in NLRC NCR CA
No. 010526-96. Petitioners also pray for the
reinstatement of the decision[4] of the Labor
Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-06717-94.
The
Bureau
of
Working
Conditions[32] classifies workers paid by results
into two groups, namely; (1) those whose time
and performance is supervised by the employer,
and (2) those whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer. The first involves
an element of control and supervision over the
manner the work is to be performed, while the
second does not. If a piece worker is supervised,
there is an employer-employee relationship, as in
this case. However, such an employee is not
entitled to service incentive leave pay since, as
pointed
out
in Makati
Haberdashery
v.
NLRC[33] and Mark Roche International v. NLRC,
[34]
he is paid a fixed amount for work done,
regardless of the time he spent in accomplishing
such work.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the
petition is DENIED for lack of showing that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error. The decision of the Court of Appeals,
reversing the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission and reinstating the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the backwages and other
benefits
awarded
to
private
respondent
Leovigildo Lagrama should be computed from the
time of his dismissal up to the time of the finality
of this decision, without any deduction and
qualification. However, the service incentive
leave pay awarded to him is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
misconduct.
xxx
B. Voluntary Termination
When an employee voluntary terminates his
employment with at least 36 months of credited
service without any misconduct on his part, 18
percent of the total amount credited to his
account, plus an additional of one percent for
each month (up to a maximum of 164 months of
credited service in excess of 36, will be
distributed to him provided (1) the employee has
completed his last Contract of Enlistment and (2)
employee advises the company in writing, within
30 days, from his last disembarkation date, of his
intention to terminate his employment. (To advise
the Company in writing means that the original
letter must be sent to the Companys agent in the
Philippines, a copy sent to the Company in New
York).
xxx
C. Other Terminations
When the employment of an
employee is terminated by the
Company for a reason other than
one in A and B above, without any
misconduct on his part, a
percentage of the total amount
credited to his account will be
distributed to him in accordance
with the following.
Credited Service Percentage
36 months 50%
48 75%
60 100%
When the employment of an
employee is terminated due to his
poor-performance, misconduct,
unavailability, etc., or if employee is
not offered re-engagement for
similar reasons, no distribution of
any portion of employees account
will ever be made to him (or his
eligible survivor[s]).
It must be recalled that on June 21, 1989,
Millares wrote a letter to his employer informing
his intention to avail of the optional retirement
plan under the CEIP considering that he has
rendered more than twenty (20) years of
continuous service. Lagda, likewise, manifested
the same intention in a letter dated June 26,
1989. Private respondent, however, denied their
requests for benefits under the CEIP since: (1) the
contract of enlistment (COE) did not provide for
retirement before 60 years of age; and that (2)
petitioners failed to submit a written notice of
their intention to terminate their employment
within
thirty
(30)
days
from
the
last
disembarkation date pursuant to the provision on
Voluntary Termination of the CEIP. Petitioners
were eventually dropped from the roster of crew
III.
Illegal Recruitment
AZCUNA, J.:
Appellants Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino
assail the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 15, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and eight counts of
estafa.
On March 16, 1993, the following information
was filed against Jose Alolino and appellants,
Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino:
The undersigned accuses ALONA BULI-E,
JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO and JOSE ALOLINO
for VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38 (b), PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED BY P.D. 1920
FURTHER AMENDED BY P.D. 2018, committed in
large scale, which is an act of economic
sabotage, and by a syndicate, committed as
follows:
That during the period from March 1991 to July
1992, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused representing themselves
to have the capacity to contract, enlist and hire
and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment / job placement to the following
persons:
1. Constancio Macli-ing
2. Jesssica Estay
3. Sidolia Fias-eo
4. John Mangili
5. Nieva Lampoyas
6. Sabado Agapito
7. Joseph Oratil and
8. Joel Oratil
in Taiwan without first obtaining or securing
license or authority from the proper government
agency
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On
the
same
day,
eight
separate
informations for estafa were also filed against
Jose Alolino and appellants Alona Buli-e (Buli-e for
brevity) and Josefina Alolino (Josefina, for
brevity). Except as to the dates, amounts
involved[2] and the names of complainants, the
following information in Criminal Case No. 11123R typified the seven other informations for the
crime of estafa:
That on or about the 12th day of July, 1992, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
II. The court a quo erred in finding that accusedappellant violated Section 6, par. (m) of R.A. 8042
when it did not reimburse the alleged amounts
received from private complainants;
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
COURT
COURT:
A. None, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In what capacity were you able to
know this Dominga Fortuna?
seminar
of
A. No, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
A. 1998, sir.
was
your
particular
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many were you who were
present when you actually tendered
the P5,400.00?
A. We were six (6), sir.
Q. Do you know the names of the others?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please tell us the names of
those other persons who were
present when you actually tender
the P5,400.00 to the accused?
A. Rebecca de Leon, Annie Nuque, Nenita
Andasan, Angelyn Magpayo, Lina
Ganot and Edgardo Salvador, sir.
Q. At that point in time after you had
given the amount of P5,400.00 to
the accused, was there an official
receipt that was issued or given to
you by the accused?
A. None, sir.
what
this
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee,
recruit and promise employment as contract
worker in Canada, to the herein complainant
ARACELI D. ABENOJA, without said accused
having first secured the necessary license or
authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Criminal Case No. 15571-R (Estafa)[6]
That on or about the 11th day of June, 1997 in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating &
mutually aiding one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
ARACELI D. ABENOJA by way of false pretenses,
which are executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud, as follows; to
wit: the accused knowing fully well that
he/she/they is/are not authorized job recruiters
for persons intending to secure work abroad
convinced said Araceli D. Abenoja and pretended
that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her
abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of
P35,000.00, when in truth and in fact they could
not; the said Araceli D. Abenoja deceived and
convinced by the false pretenses employed by
the accused parted away the total sum of
P35,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Araceli D.
Abenoja in the aforementioned amount of THIRTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00), Philippine
currency.
Only accused-appellant Remedios Malapit
was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial
court. Her co-accused, Nenita Maria Olivia
Gallardo, remained at large.
Upon
arraignment,
accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to all charges. The five (5)
cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Marie Purificacion Abenoja and Marilyn
Mariano met accused-appellant at her beauty
parlor in Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City. Marie met accused-appellant sometime in
January 1997 through her friend, Florence
Bacoco. A month later, Marilyn was introduced to
accused-appellant by Grace Lanozo, a fellow
nurse at the PMA Hospital.
Marie claims that accused-appellant enticed
her to apply for work as a caregiver in
Canada. Accused-appellant showed her a piece of
paper containing a job order saying that Canada
was in need of ten (10) caregivers and some
messengers. Accused-appellant also promised
her that she will be receiving a salary of
CN$2,700.00 (Canadian Dollars) and will be able
to leave for Canada in a months time.Heeding
accused-appellants guaranty, Marie eventually
applied for the overseas job opportunity.
On
June
6,
1997,
accused-appellant
introduced Marie to co-accused Nenita Maria
Olivia-Gallardo in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. On
the same day, Marie submitted herself to a
physical examination and personally handed to
Gallardo a partial payment of P18,000.00, for
which the latter issued a receipt. [7] Marie made
Code
15327-R
and
The Case
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo
appeal the March 6, 2000 Joint Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch
138), finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court rules
1. In Criminal Case No. 99-1112[,] accused
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo are
pronounced guilty of violating Section 6, of
Republic Act No. 8042, the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and they are both
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment.Pursuant to
the last paragraph of Section 7, Republic Act No.
8042, considering that both accused are nonlicensers or non-holders of authority, they are
both sentenced to pay fines of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) each. Both accused are ordered
to indemnify both complainants jointly and
severally of the amount of P118,000.00, the net
amount
after
deducting
the
recovery
of P40,000.00. They are likewise ordered to pay
both complainants jointly and severally the
amounts of P24,000.00 as reimbursement for
traveling expenses;P4,000.00 as rental for
boarding house, and P100,000.00 as unrealized
income;
2. In Criminal Case No. 99-1113[,] accused
Vicenta Medina Lapis and Angel Mateo are guilty
of violating Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code and they are both sentenced to suffer
The Facts
of
the
facts
The Issues
In their Brief, appellants
following assignment of errors:
interpose
the
I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violations of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995)
committed by a syndicate and Article 315
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellant Vicenta Medina Lapis guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and
estafa.
III
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
IV
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa defined and penalized under
Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended.[14]
First Issue:
money
from
know
the
else
that
A AIDA DE LEON.
A Yes.
A Yes, maam.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After
receiving
said
amount
of P5,000.00 what happened?
A After that meeting at Pasay City we
parted ways but [he] did not issue us
any receipt so on April 15, [he] again
called us up and told me that he
needs
NBI
clearance
so
we
processed our NBI clearance.
Q You told us that ANGEL MATEO called
you, where were you at that time?
A Baguio City.
Q Were you able to come here in Manila?
A Yes maam, we met in Quiapo.
Q Were you able to meet ANGEL MATEO
in QUIAPO?
A [He] did not arrive in Quiapo.
Q So what did you do?
xxxxxxxxx
the
Second Issue:
and
Angel
Mateo,
provides
the
Considering
that
complainants
were
defrauded in excess of the P22,000 limit fixed by
law,
the
maximum
penalty
of prision
mayor should be imposed in its minimum period,
or six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years,
plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000 in
excess of the P22,000 limit. The total amount
defrauded from the complainants was P158,600 -or P136,600
in
excess
of P22,000,
which
translates to an additional prison sentence of
thirteen (13) years based on the aforementioned
computation. Accordingly, the maximum penalty
to be imposed should be nineteen (19) years and
one (1) day to twenty-one (21) years, thus raising
the penalty to reclusion temporal. However, the
penal provisions for the crime of estafa provide
that the total penalty to be imposed should not in
any case exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment.
Witness:
Third Issue:
Liability as Co-conspirator
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court
should not have convicted Vicenta Medina Lapis
because the prosecution evidence did not
sufficiently prove her participation in the
Yes, maam.
Q: Could you remember what Vicenta
Medina [Lapis] said to you?
A: She promised that we will be sent
to Japan sooner as OCW, maam.
Q: Could you recall how she said it?
A: She
said
makakapunta
maam.
Sigurado
kayo ng
kay,
Japan,
Decision
is
the
IV.
Management Prerogatives
[3]
V.
Liability of Employer
denied
for
of
VI.
1
2
3
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
xxx
xxx
Witness
What I know is that he is a concessionaire.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Atty. Suarez
But do you also know that Sergio F. Naguiat is the
President of Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
Yes. sir.
Atty. Suarez
How about Mr. Antolin Naguiat what is his role in
the taxi services, the operation of the Clark Field
Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
He is the vice president."li[28]
And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat
Enterprises was his employer, he could not deny
that he received his salary from the office of CFTI
inside the base.lii[29]
"(b)
How can the foregoing (Articles
265 and 273 of the Labor Code)
provisions be implemented when the
employer is a corporation? The answer is
found in Article 212(c) of the Labor Code
which provides:
'(c)
'Employer' includes any person acting in
the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly.
The term shall not include any labor organization
or any of its officers or agents except when acting
as employer.'
xxx
xxx
4.
When a director, trustee or officer is
made, by specific provision of law, personally
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
to set aside the decision 1 of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission dated October 11,
1978, which affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated November 22, 1977 issued in NLRC
Case No. RB-1-38-78, entitled Tita Abejon, et al.,
versus La Union Stevedores, Inc. and Shipside,
Incorporated, declaring La Union Stevedores, Inc.
and Shipside, Incorporated jointly and severally
liable to pay herein private respondents their
separation pay and the equivalent of their
respective two-month salary as penalty for noncompliance with the clearance requirement of the
Labor Code, and the said respondent
Commission's en banc resolution 2 of February 9,
1979 denying herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, as well as the Order 3 of the said
Labor Arbiter dated April 6, 1979, directing the
immediate execution of the aforestated decision
and/or resolution.
Briefly, the records show the following undisputed
facts: Petitioner Shipside, Incorporated,
hereinafter referred to as SHIPSIDE, is a domestic
corporation engaged in the handling in bulk of all
kinds of materials, products and supplies, and
operates harbor and wharfage facilities capable
of servicing ocean vessels of deep draft at Barrio
Poro, San Fernando, La Union.
4.
Liability/Responsibility - It is expressly
agreed that the personnel assigned to the client
are not employees of the CLIENT, and as such
PRIME shall at all times stand solely liable and/or
responsible for the enforcement of and
compliance with all existing laws, rules and
regulations, such as, but not limited to the Labor
Code, Social Security Act, Employers (sic)
Compensation Commission Act as amended,
Medical Care; provided finally, that PRIME hereby
agrees and binds itself to save and hold CLIENT
free and harmless from any civil and criminal
liability with respect thereof and/or which may
arise therefrom.
SO ORDERED.
5.
Direct Hiring/Absorption - Since the
personnel assigned to the CLIENT are PRIME
employees, said employees cannot be absorbed
or hired directly by the CLIENT without PRIMEs
prior written consent. In which case, CLIENT shall
be charged by PRIME a placement fee equivalent
to ten percent (10%) of the commencing annual
gross compensation of the employee concerned if
said employees have worked with CLIENT for less
than five (5) months. If said employees have
worked with CLIENT as temporary employee for
more than five (5) months, CLIENT shall not be
charged any fee.
6. Injury/Damage - PRIME shall not be responsible
for any loss or damage caused by the assigned
personnel to the CLIENTs properties as well as
properties of the customers of the CLIENT unless
the loss or damage is caused by the fact that the
assigned personnel lacks the capacity to work by
reason of any mental or physical defect or he was
manifestly unfit or unqualified to perform the
tasks for which he has been assigned by PRIME to
the client.
In the event of injury to assigned PRIME
personnel under this contract, due to accidents
which are work-related, the CLIENT shall
reimburse PRIME for medical expenses incurred
which under existing laws are required to be
defrayed by the employers. In the case of
assigned PRIME personnel under regular status,
medical expenses due to accidents or illnesses,
whether or not work related, shall be defrayed by
PRIME under its Hospitalization Insurance
Scheme.
7. Confidentiality - PRIME shall guarantee the
confidentiality of CLIENTs nature of job where
PRIME personnel are involved.
8. Mode/Term of Payment - For and in
consideration of the abovementioned services,
the CLIENT shall pay PRIME the corresponding
hourly billing rate listed in Annex A which is an
integral part of this contract. Annex A consists of
letter agreement dated May 20, 1986 duly
conformed by PRIME and CLIENT as to the
specific hourly rates per job category and status,
as well as the composition of the billing rates,
basis for computation and the provision of
reserves for additional benefits granted to
assigned regular PRIME employees whenever
those are applicable and/or payable. Such rates
xxx
xxx
xxx
2
3
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x.
(emphasis supplied)
The NLRC Rules of Procedure 8[8] likewise require
the appeal and the appeal bond to be filed within
the ten (10)-day reglementary period:
Section 1. Periods of Appeal. Decisions, awards,
or orders of the Labor Arbiter and the POEA
Administrator shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both
parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
of such decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter or of the Administrator, and in case of a
decision or of the Regional Director or his duly
authorized Hearing Officer within five (5) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards or
orders. If the 10th or 5th day, as the case may be,
falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the last
day to perfect the appeal shall be the next
working day.
xxx
xxx
xxx
4
5
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
10
11
12
The NLRC, however, concluded that since RhonePoulenc made use of the services of the janitors
during the three-month transition period, then
said act of utilizing their services constitutes
absorption of the janitors into the petitioner's
workforce which gives them the right to be
retained. This ratiocination is not correct. The
public respondent failed to consider the fact that
during the three-month transition period prior to
Union Carbide's turnover of the facilities, the
service contract between Union Carbide and CSI
was still in force. Whatever benefit the petitioner
derived from the continuous availment by Union
Carbide of the services of CSI's janitors was
merely incidental. The NLRC also overlooked the
fact that it was still Union Carbide who paid CSI
for the services of these janitors. Also, even prior
to the expiration of the transition period, the
petitioner, in anticipation of the pullout of Union
Carbide and its hired service agencies, started
screening its own service contractors. Under
these circumstances, the petitioner may not be
deemed to have absorbed the respondent janitors
as its own employees.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated
March 13, 1991 and September 11, 1991 are SET
ASIDE. The decision of the labor arbiter dated
November 8, 1989 is hereby REINSTATED.
The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on December 2, 1991 is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 97008-09 July 23, 1993
VIRGINIA G. NERI and JOSE CABELIN,
petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Respondents are sued by two employees of
Building Care Corporation, which provides
janitorial and other specific services to various
firms, to compel Far Bast Bank and Trust
Company to recognize them as its regular
employees and be paid the same wages which its
employees receive.
Building Care Corporation (BCC, for brevity), in
the proceedings below, established that it had
substantial capitalization of P1 Million or a
stockholders equity of P1.5 Million. Thus the
Labor Arbiter ruled that BCC was only job
contracting and that consequently its employees
were not employees of Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC, for brevity). on appeal, this
factual finding was affirmed by respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity). Nevertheless, petitioners insist before us
that BCC is engaged in "labor-only" contracting
hence, they conclude, they are employees of
respondent FEBTC.
Petitioners Virginia G. Neri and Jose Cabelin
applied for positions with, and were hired by,
respondent BCC, a corporation engaged in
providing technical, maintenance, engineering,
housekeeping, security and other specific
services to its clientele. They were assigned to
work in the Cagayan de Oro City Branch of
respondent FEBTC on 1 May 1979 and 1 August
1980, respectively, Neri an radio/telex operator
and Cabelin as janitor, before being promoted to
messenger on 1 April 1989.
On 28 June 1989, petitioners instituted
complaints against FEBTC and BCC before
Regional Arbitration Branch No. 10 of the
Department of Labor and Employment to compel
the bank to accept them as regular employees
and for it to pay the differential between the
wages being paid them by BCC and those
received by FEBTC employees with similar length
of service.
On 16 November 1989, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 1
Respondent BCC was considered an independent
contractor because it proved it had substantial
capital. Thus, petitioners were held to be regular
employees of BCC, not FEBTC. The dismissal was
appealed to NLRC which on 28 September 1990
affirmed the decision on appeal. 2 On 22 October
1990, NLRC denied reconsideration of its
affirmance, 3 prompting petitioners to seek
redress from this Court.
i
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