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Grace Poe Vs COMELEC
Grace Poe Vs COMELEC
Summary
On COMELECs Jurisdiction
2. The Courts conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence
recognizing the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine a candidates eligibility in the
course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it. The ponencia disregarded the
cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012 COMELEC Rules was
published) where it recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction to determine eligibility as
part of determining false material representation in a candidates CoC.
The Court even affirmed the COMELECs capability to liberally construe its own
rules of procedure in response to Ongsiako-Reyes allegation that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had not
been testified on, offered and admitted in evidence.
In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
holding that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate for councilor) did not file a valid CoC
and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica. Kimberlys CoC is
considered valid unless the contents therein (including her eligibility) is impugned
through a Section 78 proceeding.
3. Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the COMELECs
jurisdiction in determining the eligibility of a candidate in the course of ruling on a
Section 78 proceeding.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy
and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for
quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1)
ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated
within 10 days after the proclamation of the election results.
logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poes citizenship
and residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling;
any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum.
The effect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELECs limited
jurisdiction in Section 78 would only be expressions of the COMELECs opinion and
would have no effect in the determination of the merits of the Section 78 case
before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or
even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the present case, Poe can simply be a
candidate for the presidency, with her eligibilities open to post-election questions, if
still necessary at that point.
It was never the intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that
foundlings are natural born citizens.
Aruego said that the Rafols amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a
provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory
legislation.
2. The ponencias ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship
based on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution; it also misreads
what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers
under the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage,
must yield to the higher categorization accorded to foundlings who .do not enjoy
similar roots.
On Burden of Proof
1. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present
petitions) from the perspective of procedure carried the burden under its Section
78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material
representations.
2. Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine
citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners are correct in their
position that they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC
considered and relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.
3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe
to prove that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a naturalborn Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by
legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is a
natural-born citizen.
4. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to
determine who its citizens are.
5. The list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and
exhaustive.
In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person
who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is
really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after proof that the claimant has not
proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage.
7. The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to
Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen.