Whaley v Watson, 2000 SC 125.

Petitioners sought an interim interdict against a member of the

Scottish Parliament against his introducing a private members Bill
to abolish hunting of mammals.

Argued that by doing so he would be in breach of art 6 of The

Scotland Act 1998 (Transitory and Transitional A Provisions)
(Members' Interests) Order 1999 (SI 1999 No. 1350

'Where, at any time after the date on which he was returned as a member, a
member receives or expects to receive any remuneration, he shall not (a) do
anything in his capacity as a member in any proceedings of the Parliament which
relates directly to the affairs or interests of, or which seeks to confer benefit
upon, the person from whom the member B received or expects to receive
remuneration or to the affairs and interests of a client or an associate of that
person; or (b) encourage any other member to do anything mentioned in
paragraph (a).'
o

Scottish campaign against hunting with dogs provided assistance in

drafting bill benefits in kind

Considers that the petitioners seek to achieve, by a roundabout

method, the obstruction of the legitimate presentation of a Bill to
the Parliament which must be allowed to regulate its own affairs
and determine whether or not in its opinion the member is
competent to present it. That has already been decided and that, in
my opinion, is a matter for Parliament and the Standards
Committee. The matter seems to me to be compounded by the fact
that if persons such as the petitioners had a legitimate concern, and
maybe they have, that the lobbying rules had been breached, it
seems to me that their remedy is by way of complaint, petition or
even public address. This court, in my opinion, is not in the position
of interfering with legitimate decisions of the Parliament as to its
own affairs and certainly not to re-hear a decision that the
Standards Committee has already taken.

It seems to me to be a recipe for disaster to allow members of the

public who are aggrieved by the potential consequences of a
particular piece of legislation to have the right to enter into the
procedure of the Scottish Parliament and require this court to
declare that it has misdirected itself. There has been a vast
development in the last 20 years of the concept of judicial review
but it has always been very carefully orchestrated against the
background of Lord Diplock's celebrated dicta which are now too
well known to even be recorded. The Scottish Parliament is entitled
to make its own determination, in my opinion, upon its own rules
and this court should not even look at it on grounds of irrationality.
It may be in due course that if there is a fundamental irrationality in
its approach to the legislation it passes, such could be
challengeable for a number of reasons based on its legislative
competence upon the view that an organisation that is acting

beyond its powers is acting irrationally and therefore not within its
competence. In the case of the Parliament that is legislative
competence. I offer no further view on that subject. What I am
entirely satisfied about is that it is quite inappropriate for pressure
groups, or individuals, however their interests may be affected, to
have the right to tell, by way of legal action, a committee of this
Parliament that its own view of its own rules is inappropriate or even
wrong. That, in my opinion, is far beyond what the legislation
contemplated the extent of intervention